

carefully and leave an even surface that is flat to the unembossed leather. While the paste is still wet, turn the leather right side upwards, and with the two modelling-points go over the raised leaves, etc. Mark out all outlines clearly, raise one side of a leaf, press downwards the other work at the various veins, gently model little depression and stroke into shape parts that should catch the eye or form shadows. When working at the squirrel be very particular about the lines round the eye, the prominence of the cheek bone, nose, and eyebrow, also the height of the upper part of the tail and the modelling-lines for the lower. It is more effective to raise one or two places fairly high, and keep the rest of the space lowered than to have an entirely even and raised surface. As the paste underneath hardens quickly, the work of modelling must be done quickly and at once, a leaf or stem once wetted and filled in at the back must be finished off without delay. The chief veins of leaves look well opened out and enlarged, and side veins indicated by lines branching from them. When engaged on modelling the centres of such flowers as are shown in Fig. 2, great care is needed, as they contain three different heights; thus the outer petals are raised from the background and their centres raised above their edges, then the inner cap is raised

very high on the side where the light is shown and is depressed deeply at the spot where the one pistil is shown, in fact the markings of the whole of this flower are done most carefully.

Having raised up and modelled the chief parts of the design and marked out with the modelling tools such parts as are required to be in low relief, the background is next finished. Wet the leather and take one of the punches, hold it perfectly upright, quite even, and close to the surface, then give it a light firm tap with the hammer. Look at the mark made on the leather; if the punch has not been held straight, one part of the impression will be much deeper than the other; if it is held correctly, the impression will be perfect and not too deep. Continue to fill up the space with the design on the punch, but let every mark be at even though close distances from each other, and none overlapping. The straight lines enclosing the design are made with the aid of a ruler, the small rounds that edge the same in Fig. 2 with one of the round punches.


In Fig. 3, a design for the upper band of a dado, there is a more even and conventional system of embossing used than in flower subjects. The parts raised are the head and hair of Medusa and the centre branches of leaves and berries. The modelling of these

parts is but little raised, and the lines that are afterwards made over it are few in number but deeply marked. The background is punched in with a large punch.

In Fig. 4 an example is given of the finer description of leather work that should only be attempted when a perfect mastery of the tools has been acquired. The centre represents a coat of arms, and can be used either to ornament book-covers, cigar-cases, or card-cases. The modelling is very fine, and the parts in high relief—the crest and coat of arms; the helmet and the drapery are in relief, but are subordinate to the rest of the work. The background is well depressed, and the markings on the leather made with a small punch.

In Fig. 5 some designs are shown for use upon the underside of books and blotting-cases. They are chiefly taken from old illuminated manuscripts, where they form borderings. All lines and workings without much relief as to backgrounds and without the help of embossing require great care in drawing and cutting, therefore this part of the undertaking is about the most difficult. The lines and the design are cut and not raised up with rye meal and white sawdust, but punches are used to depress the rounds and crosses.

B. C. SAWARD.



## POLITICS FOR GIRLS.

By FREDERICK RYLAND, M.A.

### PART I.

*Women and Politics.*—Some words of apology seem to be necessary before I begin these papers, since a conventional opinion exists that women ought to know nothing about politics. I call it a conventional opinion because I do not believe that it is seriously held by the vast majority of those who affirm their agreement with it.

As a matter-of-fact, women always have taken an interest in politics, and have been most powerful factors in political life. Passing over illustrious female monarchs, like Elizabeth of England and Catharine of Russia, it is only necessary to remind the historical student of the great parts played in the History of England by the great Whig ladies in the last century, and by the dames of the Primrose League in this. And in our own day, women have already been admitted to a share in all matters of municipal and local interest. They help to elect members of the Vestry, which look after the affairs of the parish, and members of the County Council, as well as the Guardians of the poor and the members of the School-board. They may even become members themselves, if they convince the electors that they are fit and proper persons to discharge the duties laid by parliament on these several bodies. Though not in the

limited sense "political," yet in the wider sense of the word these duties are political duties. They have to do with the government of the State, though only in a somewhat restricted sphere. And in fulfilling them, questions constantly arise which run up into politics in the strictest sense of the term. There is no clear line of division. The woman who is called on to form an opinion about the administration of the laws which relate to the destitute and the insane can hardly help having to consider points with which Parliament has frequently to deal. She cannot help considering whether greater restrictions should not be put on the sale of intoxicating liquors, whether some better provision should not be made for the relief of the aged and honest poor, whether a fairer method of local taxation would not enable the burdens to be more easily borne. The State then may be said to almost oblige a woman to consider political questions.

And a greater duty seems likely to be laid upon women before long. It seems probable that before the girls who read this page grow into full womanhood, the Parliamentary franchise—that is, the right and duty of voting for Members of Parliament—will be given to women in the United Kingdom as it has already been given in some of the Colonies.

Many of the most influential members of both our great parties—the Conservatives and the Liberals—are in favour of the change; and in all probability it will be carried into effect within ten or twelve years.

If, then, women already do take part in politics, and are likely, before long, to be called on to take a more important part, is it not worth while for girls to give some little attention to the subject?

At present it is hardly too much to say of women in general—of course, there are many and notable exceptions—what Burke said of ministers of religion in his day, "They know nothing of politics but the passions they excite." They are frequently ignorant of the most ordinary and important facts as to the constitution of the country. They know little or nothing of the working of the machinery of Government, what the machinery is intended to achieve, or how far it succeeds in achieving it. They have never given a moment's thought to the great political ideals for which men strive so earnestly and so persistently.

To think over these matters and to acquire something like accurate knowledge on all these points seems to me a clear duty of every citizen of the state. However limited our sphere of direct action we influence numbers of others; and to some extent we must regard

ourselves as responsible for mistakes and blunders which arise from the neglect of this duty.

*Parties in Politics.*—It is necessary to get out of your mind the vulgar idea that a person who takes a deep and sincere interest in political matters is always a passionate partisan. He may enrol himself in one of the great historic parties, but he is not for all that likely to be a heated and unreasoning fanatic. The truth is, that all real thought about these matters makes a man first of all moderate in expression, and secondly tolerant in opinion. It is the ignorant and the inconsiderate who become fanatics. Enthusiasm for a creed and a party is quite compatible with a candid recognition that the opposite creed holds much that is valuable, and that the opposite parts could not be spared from the national council.

In nearly all countries there exist two parties of people interested in politics, one of which lays especial stress on the importance of preserving existing institutions and securing order and permanence in the conditions under which men do their daily work, while the other party lays especial stress on the importance of adapting existing institutions to the changing needs of modern life. There is no party in modern civilised states which resists every change; there is no party which wants to change everything at once. In England to-day the most old-fashioned Tory sees much that he would willingly change; though he may be more doubtful than an enthusiastic Radical as to the efficacy of any given change that they were both willing to accept. And the most revolutionary Radical must to some extent be a Conservative. If he wants to disestablish the churches in Wales and Scotland and England, to get rid of the House of Peers, to give Ireland an independent government, to relieve the poor of all taxation, to do away with the army and the navy, to secularise all education, to abolish the Crown—he recognises that some of these changes must take precedence of others. He must, if he is a practical man, refuse to meddle with some of the institutions—become in fact a Conservative with regard to them—while he is attacking the others. No man who is fit to be outside the walls of a lunatic asylum proposes to make a clean sweep of all the old institutions in one session of Parliament.

It is then largely a question of degree. Most Conservatives will admit that some of the institutions we most value may be of very little importance a century or two hence. But they hold that of recent years enough has been done in the way of changing the form of the political machine to render any further change unadvisable at present. From 1832 to 1895 a number of most important changes in the constitution of the House of Commons, and its relation to the country, have taken place; nearly the whole machinery of the Central Government has been overhauled and altered; and the whole of the machinery of local government has been changed almost from top to bottom. Up to the present the full results of these changes have not become manifest. They ask, why not leave big constitutional changes alone for a while? At the same time Conservatives usually express themselves anxious for minor changes in the direction of what is called Social Reform. Having spent over fifty years in improving and enlarging the machinery, let us, they say, put it to the use for which alone it exists, to secure the well-being of the people. Let us wait and see that the laws we have already made for the advantage of trade and agriculture, for the education of the young, the relief of the poor, the promotion of thrift and industry and cleanliness, the maintenance of order against criminals and against foreign aggression, are properly administered. And at the same time let us devote the next best

part of our attention to changing the law where it is seen to be defective, as we are aware that it frequently is. And let us give time to the changes we make to produce their full effect, not expecting too much from them; but not hastily and as it were angrily make further changes until we have seen exactly what results have been produced.

The Liberal is usually more hopeful than the Conservative about the prospects of any given change he wishes to see brought about. One of the worst drawbacks of Conservative temper is its want of faith. Young men are naturally more prone to take sides with the party of progress; middle-aged and elderly men with the party which is less anxious for change. And the latter are almost as much inclined to underrate the need of change, as the former are to underrate the difficulties of making the change.

Even when we come down to a specific question such as that of Home Rule for Ireland, we find all sorts of shades of political belief. Some Unionists, although they repudiate Home Rule, would go as far in giving Ireland control of its local administration as many of the opposite party who call themselves Home Rulers. Many men who accept Home Rule mean by it no more than what their opponents would be willing to concede, if only they thought that would be the end of the question and no further need for concession would arise.

*No Hard-and-Fast Line.*—In fact, the first lesson you have to learn in politics is that parties are not divided by a hard-and-fast line. A party does not consist of a group of men all thinking exactly the same about the chief subjects of debate. It consists of men who, by tradition, by association, by the accidents of birth, education and trade, neighbourhood, marriage and so forth, as well as by reasoning, are enrolled under one banner. But the ideals of these men may differ widely. Their opinion of the means to reach those ideals may differ widely. The things which some of the party care most about (*e.g.* Local Veto) others care next to nothing about, but just assent to as probably "not so bad, if you only work them reasonably." For the moment the great group of men—say a million—are crowded together round one banner, or round one "old umbrella." But the crowd is always changing a little. Some members drop off and join the rival crowd, to be replaced by others. And there are in it smaller groups which hang a little apart, and in their sympathies belong to the rival crowd and perhaps wish to go over to the opposite party in a body.

We are accustomed to talk of a political party as an army marching all in one direction. The figure of speech is sometimes correct; but like most such figures, to a large extent misleading. A political party is often more like a badly organised pilgrimage feeling its way through a wilderness which has never yet been mapped out, a crowd uncertain where they want to go and how to get there. Small parties start off on exploring expeditions in this direction or in that. They are moving, some of them, towards points wide apart. After a time a decision is taken, and the leaders tell the crowd that they must follow those pioneers who are most numerous and who have met with the fewest obstacles. Then for a time the march is continued in one direction. When the point wished for is reached, or is found to be unreachably, a fresh period of uncertainty follows and a fresh decision is taken.

Never believe that any single political creed contains the whole of political wisdom. Never believe that any single party contains the whole of political honesty and skill. What the two parties hold in common is, as a rule, the most important and valuable part of their belief. What they quarrel about is often mere questions of detail.

Yet at any given time one party rather than the other may seem to be the wiser and the more honest. What the Blues propose to do may seem to me more advantageous and less dangerous than what the Yellows propose. It will be my duty then to join that party, to strive to make it move in the direction I hold right; and at last, if I find it become hopelessly incapable or reckless, to vote for the other party.

People who act like this hold the balance at general elections. The fanatic and the bigoted and the lazy who will not take the trouble to think for themselves, but swallow their party-creed, and shout the party cries without reflection, have fortunately not the final voice.

In England the moderate men though they are an undoubted source of annoyance to party-agents and managers, are not held in dishonour. In the United States an ugly name, of which I admire the singular hideousness, but of whose etymology I am ignorant, has been given to them. They are called Mugwumps. Happily for America, the Mugwumps are becoming, nay, have become, a great power in the country.

It is perhaps worth while to remind my readers that at the present time the two great parties prefer to call themselves Unionists and Liberals. The Unionists are divided into Liberal-Unionists, who left the other Liberals in 1885 when the majority of the party adopted Home Rule for Ireland as the first great political object to be striven for, and Conservatives who are the historical descendants of the party which has had Pitt, Peel and Peacock as its chief leaders. The Liberal-Unionists give us an example of power which moderate men may exercise when they break the bonds of party-allegiance in what they think a just cause.

*The Scope of these Papers.*—In these slight papers there will be no possibility of doing more than look at a few of the chief points of interest in the region we call political. It will be unadvisable to descend to particular questions, such as those which at a given time divide the nation sharply. To come to any just decision, or even to any fairly reasonable opinion, on such a point as Home Rule for Ireland, or the Disestablishment of the Welsh Church (two of the chief questions on which the last general election turned), would require: (1) A thorough knowledge of the general machinery of government; how government is actually carried on. (2) A knowledge of the chief aims of government, the kind of results which statesmen want to bring about, and hope to bring about, by applying the machinery of government in a certain way. (3) A precise acquaintance with the special facts which bear upon the subject under debate. Under this third head, we must consider such questions as these. What is the actual condition of Ireland to-day? Do the people of Ireland all want Home Rule? If not, what part of them do? Will they be satisfied with less? What exactly is the feeling of the Roman Catholic and Celtic population towards the Protestant and non-Celtic? What do the present leaders of the Celtic party really want? Will granting what they want involve or make likely a demand for more? Will it endanger in any way the well-being of Irishmen, or of particular classes of Irishmen? Will it in any way injure Scotchmen and Englishmen? What will be its effect on the welfare of the Empire as a whole?

To discuss such questions as these is of course entirely outside the aim of these few papers. What I do propose to do is, however, to consider in some degree questions of the other two kinds. In other words I propose to consider "How we are governed."

(To be continued.)

## POLITICS FOR GIRLS.

By FREDERICK RYLAND, M.A.

## PART II.

## HOW WE ARE GOVERNED.



**THE EXECUTIVE.** Some people will tell you that the most important part of the machinery of government is the House of Commons. And to a large extent this is true.

The House of Commons is, under ordinary circumstances, the representative of the nation during the interval between one general election and another. But the great national representative, or agent, is too wise to

be constantly interfering with the details of government. The actual government is carried on by a large number of paid servants of the State, who do their work without much noise or discussion; silently, effectively, and well.

The magistrate and the policeman, the postman and the tax-collector, the customs-house officer, the soldier and the sailor, the judge, the clerk in the public offices whether of the lowest rank or the highest, is really helping to govern the country. These thousands and tens of thousands of officials are doing the actual administrative work, which is absolutely necessary that you and I may do our daily work and take our nightly sleep in peace and quietness.

Let us remember that some gratitude is owing to them for their untiring and conscientious discharge of the duties laid upon them. After all, they are only human; and yet they do their work with almost mechanical accuracy, and with more than mechanical energy. With how few scandals and how few bad mistakes do the great public offices get through their perennial task of providing forty millions of us—nay, four hundred millions, if we take the whole Empire into account—with peace and order and a score of other good things, only less precious!

The chief public offices are—

(1) The Home Office, which has charge of the police, prisons, the health of the public, the inspection of factories, mines, etc.

(2) The Colonial Office, which exercises some regulating power over the colonies, and serves as the proper channel between the colonial governments and the Imperial or central government.

(3) The India Office, which assists in the government of India, and serves as an intermediary below that dependency and the Imperial government.

(4) The Foreign Office, which looks after the relations between our own government and foreign states.

(5) The War Office, which shares with the Horse Guards the administration of the Army.

(6) The Admiralty Board, which controls the Navy.

(7) The Treasury, which looks after the pay-

ment of taxes, and thus provides the money necessary.

(8) The Post Office.

(9) The Local Government Board, which supervises the County Council and other local administrative authorities.

(10) The Board of Trade.

(11) The Office of the Secretary of Scotland.

(12) The Irish Secretary's Office.

(13) The Board of Agriculture.

(14) The Committee of Council on Education.

There are others, but these are the chief.

The heads of these departments are members either of the House of Lords or House of Commons. They change with the government, so that the party which is in the majority of the House of Commons has the ultimate direction of every important department of the executive (or administrative) machinery. This secures free intercommunication between Parliament and all parts of the executive. Of this I shall have more to say directly.

*Parliament.*—The business of Parliament is of five principal kinds.

(1) It is the legislative machine by which all changes in the law of the land are made. Sometimes changes are immediately effected by an Order in Council, that is an order made by the Queen on the advice of her Privy Council instead of on the advice of her Great Council, as Parliament was formerly called. But such changes are, in nearly every case, made in virtue of an authority conferred by Act of Parliament.

(2) It gives authority to raise taxes.

(3) It supervises the administration and forms what used to be called the "Grand Inquest" of the nation, the great and final court of inquiry into real or supposed abuses.

In most of the chief offices, such as the Foreign Office and the India Office, there are two parliamentary heads. To be a little more precise, in such offices there is a Secretary of State, a parliamentary under-secretary, and a permanent under-secretary. The Secretary of State sits, let us say, in the House of Lords, then the parliamentary under-secretary sits in the House of Commons. Both of these change with the government. The permanent under-secretary does not. He preserves the traditions of the office, and coaches up his titular superiors in the business of the office. The two parliamentary heads may know very little about the special needs of the office over which they preside, but they are usually men of business ability, and good speakers.

The first advantage of this curious arrangement is this. It ensures the thorough responsibility of all government departments to Parliament. Any member may ask a question and the secretary or parliamentary under-secretary is expected to answer it. The questions asked during an evening occupy a long time, and sometimes amount to two or three hundred. They cover all sorts of subjects, of all degrees of importance. An enthusiast about prison reform inquires whether on a certain date a certain prisoner was not obliged to do something which it was not strictly legal to require him to do. An enthusiast about temperance wants to know how many convictions for drunkenness took place in a certain district last month. A Post Office reformer has a grievance about the size of post-cards, and asks whether the Postmaster-General's attention has been called to it. A military expert asks about the cartridges issued to a certain regiment. A naval man

wants to know if foreign beef is supplied to a naval hospital. And so on, and so on.

Another advantage is, that while it ensures that legitimate curiosity should be satisfied, and errors and injustices should be brought to light, it also prevents undue interference with the work of the executive. A Unionist government is now in power. Just because a Unionist is at the head of a given office, the Unionist majority will not want to interfere with that office. They will trust their man. And the Liberal members may ask questions, but they cannot effectively hinder the work of the office, because on any attempt at a vote of censure they will be outnumbered; unless indeed the error of the department is so scandalous that independent and honest Unionists will vote with the Liberals.

Thus the parliamentary headship of the executive acts in two distinct, and to some extent, opposed ways.

(a) It secures thorough parliamentary control.

(b) It prevents parliament from constantly interfering in the details of administration, which would destroy the discipline of the departments and introduce disorder into the government.

(4) It practically selects the men who govern the country. To dismiss Ministers is the special privilege of the House of Commons. An adverse vote of the House of Commons is practically equivalent to the dismissal of the ministry. No ministry continues in office after such an adverse vote, except to carry on the business of the country until their successors are appointed. They immediately send in their resignations to the Queen, or dissolve Parliament in hope of securing a more reliable majority in the new Parliament.

The House of Commons not only dismisses ministers, it to all intents and purposes selects them. The Liberal members select their leader, and he, after consultation with others, selects his chief subordinates. In the same way the Conservatives select theirs. When the Liberals are in the majority—that is when there are more Liberals than Conservatives in the House of Commons—the Queen sends for the Liberal leader (elected be it remembered by those of his party who are members of the House of Commons), and he "forms a government," that is, places his chief followers at the head of the different offices which we have just enumerated. These ministers are by constitutional etiquette bound to stick together, and censure on one of them is ordinarily regarded as a censure on the whole.

Practically then the House of Commons may be regarded as selecting the body of men who, at the time, are at the head of the government. Theoretically, no doubt, the Crown selects the ministers. And in doubtful cases some choice is still left to the Crown. But on all ordinary occasions of a change of government the Queen sends for that statesman who is most acceptable to the majority of the popular House.


(5) Finally, Parliament has certain functions of a judicial character, but these are not very important. The "House of Lords" which sits in trial for appeals is not actually and really the House of Peers but a small committee of law-lords, ex-lord-chancellors and others; Peers who have not been lawyers never sit on it. The House of Commons can commit offenders to prison, and assumes jurisdiction in all cases where its privileges are assailed. The House of Lords acts as a court of justice in cases of impeachment.

(To be continued.)

## POLITICS FOR GIRLS.

By FREDERICK RYLAND, M.A.

## PART III.

THE MONARCHY AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS—  
POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE.

**I**N these chatty papers it is of course not intended to attempt any systematic account of the machinery by which the government of the country is carried on, or the process by which new laws are made. My object is rather to bring to the notice of my readers certain particular considerations which a girl of intelli-

gence, having access to ordinary sources of political information, such as newspapers, the conversation of fathers and brothers, school histories of England, and even elementary books about the constitution, is rather likely to overlook.

In my first paper, for instance, I did not lay stress on the legislative functions of Parliament, that is the work it performs in the way of making first laws, because this is tolerably familiar to most of us. But I drew attention to the way in which Parliament, acting on behalf of the nation, watches and controls the executive government, and even in a sense selects the persons who shall actually and effectively wield the power of the State. Nor have I dwelt on the manner in which the House of Commons is elected, the qualification of voters, the arrangement of constituencies, and other details of that kind. These will be found adequately described in many useful books on the constitution, two of which I will venture to recommend to you. One of them is the short and simply-expressed little shilling primer written by Miss Anna Buckland, called *Our National Institutions*, the other is a fuller and more important book—but still far from difficult and abstruse—by the well-known historical writer, Mr. Oscar Browning. It is called *The Citizen, his Rights and Responsibilities*. This well-arranged and well-written book is a marvel of cheapness, as it costs only eighteenpence. Armed with even the smaller of these volumes, a girl could in a few hours know a great deal more about the structure and work of the government of her country than most grown-up men who exercise the franchise or right to vote. In fact it has always seemed to me a scandal, that men grossly ignorant of the very elements of political knowledge, should have a vote at all; and it is to be hoped that some day we in England shall follow the example of America, and insist that our boys and girls shall, all of them, be taught the outlines of the constitution of their country; a kind of information, it would appear, at least as important as the geography of Central Asia, or the history of England in the eleventh century.

*The Monarchy.*—A doubt may have arisen

in the minds of some of my readers. If Parliament really exercises this control over the Government, what power has the Queen?

Most English folk are aware that the Sovereign of this great empire is said to reign, but not to govern. The Crown acts only on the advice of its ministers, that is of the cabinet; and the cabinet is responsible to Parliament, and may at any moment during the session be turned out of office by a vote of the House of Commons. What then does the Crown do? And what is the use of having a king or queen?

Geography-books describe the government of England as a "limited monarchy," and place it in the same class with that of Germany; while they oppose it to those of the United States and of France, which are described as "republics." As a matter of fact our own constitution, in many respects, much more closely resembles that of France than it does that of Germany. In France there is a President, who once elected remains outside of party politics, and rules only through, and by means of, his cabinet. Like the Queen, he must confide the real executive power to the leaders of that party which has the majority in the representative chamber, whether he personally approve of their policy or not. He does not go out of office with the varying fortunes of party warfare. He is elected for a fixed term of years; and he performs certain very dignified, though at first sight not very important functions, as the representative of the whole nation. He is the titular head of the state, and is surrounded with much honour. He keeps a kind of court (though it is not called a court) at the Palace of the Elysée. In fact he is almost an elective king, without power to transmit his office to anybody else.

In what is believed to be a more democratic country than England, *viz.*, the United States of America, the President has in many respects more power than our own Queen. He is much more independent of the representative chamber, and can keep a cabinet in office which is unacceptable to the majority in that chamber. In fact he has some of the powers of a German emperor united with those of an English prime minister.

These examples will show that a Republic cannot, or at any rate does not, manage to get on without having a titular head of the state as well as a head of the cabinet. In what is called a Republic this head is not hereditary, though we must remember that in some kingdoms too the crown has not been hereditary, e.g., in the former kingdom of Poland. He is not called a king and does not wear a crown, as a king or queen does on a few occasions during the reign. He is elected for a term of years, and not for life. But in most other respects he occupies almost exactly the same position as a sovereign.

The truth is people are not all philosophers, and they want a titular head to the state who can represent the unity, the power and the dignity of the country, incarnate so to speak in a single person whom they can raise their hats to and cheer in the streets. What would the vast majority of our countrymen and women think on being shown a group of bald-headed statesmen going into a board room, and being told that they are "the government"—a group of country squires, rich merchants, and successful lawyers, in ordinary costume without special grace of bearing or dignity of association, hot from the squabbles of debate and the intrigues of office? They want somebody with the prestige of immemorial family honour,

bound up with the great achievements of the country in the past. They want somebody whose family has come to be looked on as belonging to everybody, whose babies are watched by the millions of English maids and English mothers as they grow up into lads and lassies, men and women, taking part in the social life of the country; whose portraits are in every stationer's shop. The head of a family whose roots are in the dim past of our glorious history and whose tendrils are in the hearts of living men and women, above all the women, is a better head of the state, than a statesman, however patriotic, taken out of the thick of political conflict.

*Other Advantages of Monarchy.*—With this advantage go others. Dynastic relations with the heads of foreign states still count for a great deal, though for less than they once did. One can imagine a royal uncle brought up in the centre of the political institutions of a free country giving informal and kindly advice over a cigar to an imperial nephew nurtured only in the fear of revolution and ignorance of liberty, where formal representations by professional diplomatists would not be tolerated. It is matter of common notoriety that in the case of Germany, the close family tie between the present Emperor and the English royal family has done a great deal to improve the relations between the governments of the two countries.

The heir to an hereditary crown is more likely to be well fitted for the ceremonial duties of the head of the state than a self-made man not born in the purple. He is so far above others in social and political rank that he can afford to be gracious and easy without any fear of loss of dignity. If a man of any ability he is almost certain to have a wide practical knowledge of all sorts and conditions of men. He has been brought up in the centre of affairs from his childhood; he knows by personal acquaintance kings and emperors, great ministers and generals, and bishops; affairs of state have been a subject of everyday experience.

This leads us to another point. What a permanent under-secretary is to the transitory parliamentary head, such (in reverence be it spoken) is the constitutional sovereign to his prime minister. The Queen carries on the traditions of the supreme office; she remembers the ways of Melbourne, of Peel, and of Palmerston and Beaconsfield. Advice which a new and a young prime minister can hardly care to take from a subordinate he can take from the Queen.

A worried prime-minister can sometimes shelter himself from importunity by hinting, like David Copperfield's Mr. Spenlow, at the inexorable necessity of consulting the wishes of a royal or imperial Mr. Jorkins.

The Queen is the head of Society, with a big S, as well as of government. The very fact that she is both makes it impossible for the "best people," the best educated, the richest, the noblest by birth and rank, to scoff at politics. In great Republics this too often happens. The representatives of wealth and culture and hereditary breeding hang aloof from politics; and leave the arena of civic duty to professional politicians and ignorant demagogues. In the United States which we usually regard as the type of a democratic government, if you speak of a man as a "politician" it is regarded almost as an insult; it is very nearly as bad as calling him a thief. In England the proudest and richest and most gifted regard it as an honour to serve the state in parliament. The duke's son meets

the Radical workman in Parliament; he has to listen to him, he sits on the same committee with him, and he learns not perhaps to agree with him but to understand him, to respect him and possibly to sympathise with him. The Radical workman realises that his fellow M.P., the Marquis of Breadaloes, is not a bloated aristocrat, but a capable man of business with startlingly democratic views on one or two subjects and quite genial manners.

By separating the real and the ceremonial headship of the State, and leaving one to the Prime Minister and the other to the Sovereign, we diminish jealousy, because the prize of supreme power is made less dazzling; we secure continuity of authority during constitutional crises; and we give more time and greater freedom to statesmen. Lord Rosebery and Lord Salisbury can go to Parliament from Downing Street in a shilling hansom, talking to a private secretary. If the Prime Minister were also the titular and ceremonial head he might have to go in a State carriage with half-a-dozen officials in other carriages. And if there were no ceremonial head the vast majority of the English, Scotch, and Irishmen who have never got beyond Standard IV., and the whole of the three hundred millions of Hindustan would not believe that there was any head of the State at all. The ceremonial aspect of royalty indeed counts for most. It shows the people a concrete reality; a visible, cheerable, gracious person to obey and, if necessary, die for instead of a mere abstraction.

Tommy Atkins will fight with more courage and more cheerfulness for a Little Widow, who has sent kindly messages to the hospital, whose son has perhaps commended him in action, and whose daughter has perhaps pinned a medal on his breast, than for those abstractions which make the hearts of well-educated men and of philosophers and historians burn within them—Patriotism and Civic Virtue.

*The Expense of Monarchy.*—It is sometimes urged that the cost of monarchy is excessive and that it throws an enormous burden on the tax-payers. The cost of monarchy is no doubt considerable, but it is open to question whether the cost of monarchy is not less than the cost of a presidential election every few years. In the United States the direct cost of electing the President is as far as I can ascertain about £1,000,000 sterling; and we must add to this the tremendous cost of the three months of paralysis to trade which the election causes, as well as the indirect expenses in the way of election literature, railway fares, and so on, which do not find their way into the formal accounts. An English general election costs directly and avowedly about £1,000,000 sterling, indirectly and unavowedly at least as much again; and there is no reason to think that a presidential campaign could be conducted for less money. It is true the election of the President might be left in the hands of the members of the two houses, but this (a) would never satisfy thorough-going democrats, and (b) would give too much power to Parliament. Suppose a President were elected every four years at a cost of £2,000,000 this would give something like £500,000 a year as the cost of the President, in addition to his official salary.

Now the cost of the English Crown is nominally nearly three-quarters of a million sterling. To be more exact there are:—The "Civil List" of £385,000 a year; Prince of Wales and his family, £86,000; Duchy of Lancaster, £48,000; Duchy of Cornwall, £57,000, and certain dowries, pensions, etc., amounting to less than £190,000 more. Altogether it comes to about £700,000 a year. But there are important items to be set off. In the first place the Crown has surrendered to the nation the income of the "Crown lands," that is the

income arising from the private estates of the English royal family. These amount to £420,000. The Duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall in the same way are attached to the royal family just as the estates of the Duke of Bedford or the Duke of Westminster are attached to the family of Russell or Grosvenor. Altogether the sums to be set off amounted in 1894 to £525,000. This income does not come out of the pockets of the tax-payers. No doubt it could be confiscated by Parliament if a revolution took place, just as the Duke of Bedford's or the Duke of Westminster's income might be confiscated. But this confiscation would be flagrantly criminal, and might lead to the most serious foreign complications. These deductions leave about £175,000 a year as the cost of monarchy. Even from a pounds, shillings and pence point of view, this is not a costly outlay for a stable government, accepted without a murmur except by an insignificant group of fanatics, the tiny section of theoretical Republicans.

*The House of Lords.*—What is the use of a second chamber whose decisions may overrule those of the first and representative chamber? What is the advantage in a democratic state of an arrangement by which an irresponsible body may set aside the decisions of the body which exists only that it may represent the wishes of the majority of the people?

In the first place it is often important that reform, however necessary and inevitable, should not occur too suddenly. A long period of discussion is required in order to familiarise men's minds with the changes about to be made, especially when these are large and far-reaching, to enable citizens to thoroughly understand the drift of the new proposals, to become aware of the changes that the new law effects, to become familiar with the traps it lays in the path of the ignorant and careless. Otherwise the new law tends to become a dead-letter, or merely provides practice for lawyers. It takes a long time to accommodate the habits of the people to a new law. Carelessly-drawn Acts of Parliament are even now often passed in a hurry to meet some merely fancied need, or a need already adequately provided for by a forgotten and disused statute. Every such Act is a source of expense and danger to the community.

Thus even if our representative system were absolutely perfect in theory and practice, if it fully and instantly reflected the opinion of the majority of the people of the three kingdoms, there would still be some advantage in having a second chamber to criticise and revise, and sometimes to reject new legislation.

As a matter of fact the majority of the representative house does not by any means necessarily reflect the opinion of the majority of persons qualified to vote. The representative system is far from perfect. Large numbers of persons qualified to vote are never put on the voting lists at all. Of those who get on, many are so apathetic that they will not take the trouble to go to the poll. Many voters have votes in several different constituencies. More important still, the vote of an elector in a small constituency like Newry, with 1800 voters, counts for eight or nine times as much as the vote of an elector in a great constituency like Middlesborough, with its 15,000 voters; each returns only one member to Parliament. Thus one vote is far from having the same value in every constituency. Then again questions of importance are not submitted separately to the electorate, but the main issues (which themselves are often highly complex) are made more difficult by being crossed by a number of minor issues, such as Local Veto, Anti-Vaccination, Anti-Vivisection, Bimetallism, etc., as well as by a host of merely local and personal considerations.

Besides all this, a House of Commons fairly and deliberately elected on a comparatively simple issue five or six, or even three years ago, may often be very much out of harmony with the electorate of to-day. New questions may have cropped up: for instance, a government placed in office to deal with a domestic reform, may find itself confronted with a great crisis in foreign affairs. Or the government may have forfeited all respect by showing gross incapacity.

A majority in the elected house may be a fictitious or composite majority, formed of a number of separate groups, each pursuing its own ends, and caring nothing at all for the ends pursued by the other groups. In such circumstances a government which depends on such a composite majority may come to be in the position of a merchant, who "sells legislative measures to groups, for the votes which are necessary to keep that government in power."

In any of these cases the second chamber may be able to bring about an appeal to the country. It can prevent the misrepresentative majority from having its own way, and from changing the whole structure of government. In a country like England, without a written and fixed constitution, a scratch majority of half-a-dozen members got together by the astuteness of party managers, could, except for the veto of the House of Lords, alter every fundamental law without any further inquiry into its credentials being made.

In the spring of 1895, the government of Lord Rosebery no doubt honestly believed that it represented a majority of the voters of the country. It complained bitterly that one or two of its most important measures, passed in the Commons by a majority of about thirty or forty votes, were thrown out or altered by the House of Lords. Not unnaturally supporters of the government urged that it had been so recently elected (1892), that it must be considered as accurately reflecting the state of public opinion. As long as possible it refused to dissolve Parliament and consult the country. When it was forced to do so, it found itself in a minority of 150. In other words, the majority which supported Lord Rosebery did not represent the opinions of the people as accurately as the non-elective House of Lords did.

The great Liberal thinker, John Stuart Mill, laid great stress on "the evil effect produced upon the mind of any holder of power, whether an individual or an assembly, by the consciousness of having only themselves to consult. A majority in a single assembly, when it has assumed a permanent character, when composed of the same persons habitually acting together, and always assured of victory in their own house, easily becomes despotic and overweening, if released from the necessity of considering whether its acts will be concurred in by another constitutional authority."

Some sort of veto then is required which shall be able to force a government which has a majority of doubtful authority, to appeal to the country. The present arrangement does practically secure this. The House of Lords may make a stand whenever it likes. But it can only resist a House of Commons effectively up to the point when it has been decisively ascertained that the House of Commons has the country behind it. If the House of Lords makes a mistake and resists unnecessarily and unwarrantably, the only result will be to send back a larger majority than ever pledged to the change which the Lords have resisted. And the Lords will have suffered a decided loss of prestige in consequence. Every collision in which the House of Lords loses the battle with the Commons, weakens the power of the Upper House, which therefore avoids unnecessary conflicts.

The business of a really satisfactory upper

house includes that of revision of the bills brought up from the lower house. This also is performed, though with less thoroughness than might be wished, by the House of Lords.

*The Constitution of the House of Lords.*—A great deal of fault can easily be found with the construction of the House of Lords. The hereditary principle, though it has something, has not perhaps very much to be said in its favour. Some change is bound to come. But the great advantage of the present House is, that it is an actual existing working wheel in the machinery, a wheel which does its work with fair efficiency, and which on the whole has, and merits, the respect of the majority of thinking men.

A better theoretical constitution for the second chamber can easily be devised; but however well devised, no one can be certain that the new house would work better than the present house. It might be too weak or too strong. It might give way too readily; or resist until danger-point was reached and revolution was imminent.

The great advantage of the present house is its independence. It is on the whole above the possibility of bribery, direct or indirect.

Other things equal, it is easier to bribe a man with £100 a year than a millionaire. It is easier to put undue party pressure on a rising barrister or a trades-union official, with a seat in the Commons than on a peer with a rent-roll of scores of thousands. Mr. Smith may be a better man than the Duke of Belgravia, but at any rate he is more accessible, and he is cheaper. A little personal flattery, a little social distinction, a small berth for a poor brother or friend, a second-rate post in a second-rate public office for a son, may be given very easily. And these things mean so much to a poor man. The party screw can be turned on with overpowering force. The peers have no constituencies, and the "Caucus" has no terrors for them.

The hereditary element is weaker in the House of Lords than is generally believed. In 1892 there were about five hundred and sixty members of the house. About one hundred of these had been commoners themselves, raised to the peerage on account of wealth, learning, ability, or actual services to the country. Out of the four hundred and sixty-three who succeeded their fathers in the

peerage, between seventy and eighty were peers whose peerages date within the last sixty years, representing the reward of recent success, or recent merit.

Of the peers who succeeded by hereditary title, a large number came from families which have been for generations concerned in public business, men whose fathers and grandfathers have had a large share in moulding the destinies of the country. The elder sons in such families are frequently, if not usually, brought up with a view to a diplomatic or official life. Political knowledge and political tact tend to become hereditary with them, as well as the title.

I have much more to say, but this must suffice. I should like to have pointed out that the English aristocracy has never been a caste, that it has never been cut off by insuperable barriers from the commoners, as the old French and German nobility used to be. I should have liked to say something of some hopeful plan of reform of the upper house; everybody is agreed that some change in its constitution is desirable. But this paper has already run to an excessive length, and I must draw it to a definite close.



## THROUGH THINGS TEMPORAL.

By ELLEN THORNEYCROFT FOWLER.

### CHAPTER II.

So Lady Millicent Carewe was taken across the sea for the express purpose of forgetting Edmund Thornton. She did not forget him—she was not made of forgetting material; but the edge of her pain wore off in time, and as she would as soon have thought of fighting against the laws of Nature as against the social traditions of her class, she was spared the wear and tear of continual chafing, a thing no mortal can stand for long without a breakdown of some sort. Perhaps her cheek grew a little paler, a little more delicate in its oval outline, while her brown eyes acquired a pensive look which had never been seen in them aforesaid; but she soon regained her wonted health and strength, never robust at the best of times, and if her stately manner was even more quiet and reserved than it used to be, it only added to her charm.

"I hope you are not angry with me, my darling," said Lady Roehampton one day.

"Angry, mother? oh, no! how could I be angry with you?"

"I am sure that your father and I influenced you for your own happiness. Of course, Milly dear, we should never forbid you absolutely to do anything on which you had set your heart, but if you set your heart on an undesirable object, it is our duty to point out to you your mistake, though the ultimate decision must always rest with you," continued the Countess, whose conscience was apt to be troublesome when she perceived the lengthening oval of her daughter's cheek, and the sad look in the brown eyes.

"Of course, of course, dear mother; and you know I hate deciding things for myself, I

like someone else to make up my mind for me."

"Yes, yes, dear; quite right and proper of you. And, by the way," added her ladyship in that studiously careless tone which always betrays preparation, "have you heard that Miss Thornton is engaged to marry little Dr. Collins? Milford" (Milford was the housekeeper at Carewe Court) "told me in her letter yesterday."

"No, I had not heard; and I am surprised—very much surprised. Dr. Collins is very nice and clever, and all that, but don't you think he is a little—a little—common, mother?"

"Of course he is, darling. He is a dear little man, and I am quite devoted to him, but he never pretends to be a gentleman. His father kept a chemist's shop in the village when first I married and came to Carewe, and then the son became a doctor. All that is quite charming in its way, you know, and I wouldn't say a word against it for the world; in fact I always feel the greatest respect for what are called 'self-made people'; but still, my love, it would be quite impossible, wouldn't it? for you to be sister-in-law to little Dr. Collins."

Millicent's eyes dilated with horror: "Oh, mother, what an idea! I should as soon think of being sister-in-law to Milford. But of course, if—if—things had turned out differently, Edmund would never have let his sister marry such a person as Dr. Collins."

"But, my sweetest, how could he have prevented her, even if he had wished to do so? which I doubt, as there was nothing snobbish about Mr. Thornton, and that would have been a very snobbish thing to do. If

the brother had the right to please himself, the sister had the right to please herself also. Therefore, darling, though I can't deny that Mr. Thornton is a charming person in his way, you see it is really best not to be mixed up at all with people of that sort."

And the girl, who under all her amiability was an aristocrat to her finger-tips, saw the force of her mother's reasoning, and in her heart of hearts agreed with it.

But though Lady Millicent Carewe could so far obey the traditions of her class as to shut out of her life Edmund Thornton and his love, she could not go so far as to put anyone else in his place. Lovers loved and lovers rode away again, but Lady Millicent was cold and indifferent alike to all. Her father and mother loved her too well to insist upon anything that was distasteful to her, and were, moreover, only too thankful to keep their adored daughter at home, to be the light of their eyes and the joy of their old age; so beautiful Millicent Carewe seemed destined to be an old maid. But she did not appear unhappy, or even dissatisfied. Hers was one of those calm, unemotional natures that take life easily; and Time seemed willing to "write no wrinkle" on that sweet white brow of hers.

The years rolled on, and the Earl of Roehampton was gathered to his fathers; after the lapse of another decade his countess followed him; and then Lady Millicent reigned alone at Carewe Court as co-heiress of William, sixth and last Earl of Roehampton. By that time she was close upon forty years old, and was a very grand lady indeed. She was the ruling spirit of the neighbourhood, and was treated as a kind of royal personage. If Lady Millicent said a thing, that thing became as

know one another better than those at home know us."

*Milliner in a children's millinery warehouse.*—"In the afternoon, an errand girl comes round to us and we each give her a farthing for milk, and she takes in the milk for us all. We put our tea in our own teapots, and put them in the kitchen. At a quarter to four, a bell rings and we have tea. We have only to bring it from the kitchen."

*Milliner.*—"The daily work of a milliner is very interesting; it has its trials like other trades. I say trades, yet it is more than that, it is an art, and only those who have taste for it can ever succeed."

*Assistant in a draper's shop.*—"I always notice as it gets late the people are much easier to serve than in the early part of the day. About seven o'clock we get rushing busy. About half-past ten I go home, having worked since nine. I receive six shillings a week."

*Dressmaker.*—"There is no royal road to dressmaking; it means perseverance and application and not a small amount of patience."

*Mantle-maker.*—"Since I have been 'second hand' I have lived entirely in the house and have found it much more comfortable than lodgings. We work from eight to seven-thirty."

*Dressmaker.*—"I should like to speak a word or two to the average workroom girl, according to those I have met; they are of a very kind and genuine disposition, always

willing to help one another whether in home or workroom troubles. It was only last week that I was speaking to one of our girls, and she told me that every Thursday she and a girl friend go visiting some very poor people, and at the time we were talking over the poor, this young girl was working on a pair of woollen shoes, as a certain old lady had not got a pair to her feet. This was in our tea hour, half an hour allowed. This is only one instance of many."

*Girl in village shop and post office two miles from a town.*—"Seven o'clock in the morning I receive the sealed letter bag from the postman, open it, sort the letters and send the post-boy round the village with them. Now customers begin to come in for little things that they want for breakfast, for the poorer people seem to live from meal to meal, only buying a small quantity of food as they want it. After breakfast I help to cut up pigs, send the joints out in time to cook them for dinner. Eleven o'clock the postman returns for first despatch of letters. I make all the bills and do the booking and ordering of goods. One o'clock my dinner, which is very interrupted by customers; one wants a chop for his dinner, another a knot of thread to finish some straw bonnets for the warehouse. Four o'clock, postman is here again with more letters. People who are expecting them call for them. Our tea-time is as much interrupted as the dinner-hour."

"Six o'clock, and the postman is here again for the last despatch of letters, I have to seal them in the letter-bag and he takes them to the town office. Now we begin making sausages, I only season them and string them ready for sale. Customers now flock in and their wants are numerous; one wants groceries, another meat or some medicines or pills, or a ready-made shirt, or calico, or brushes, or paraffin oil; all this comes within my work and I help in it all. Aunt and I do all the work; she pays me as she would a stranger."

*A young married woman.*—"I have on my hands the entire work of my house including the washing and baking. Beside the housework proper I make a good many of my own dresses and find time for visiting, keeping up my small store of accomplishments and reading. In summer there is the garden to attend to. My experience is that by doing my own work and so saving the expense of labour we can live very comfortably on one pound a week, this including dress and all personal expenses. I have carefully kept account to be sure of this. We have the comfortable consciousness of living much within our income. In the evenings while I work, my husband often reads aloud; at nine o'clock we have a very light supper, and after this we have music as a rule. I would not like to exchange my home-life for any profession in the world."

## POLITICS FOR GIRLS.

By FREDERICK RYLAND, M.A.

### PART IV.

#### FEMALE SUFFRAGE.



**N** this paper I want to talk mainly of certain problems connected with the question of Socialism; but before doing so we will try and find room for a few paragraphs about a question which has a special interest for women:

Ought women to have a vote for members of the House of Commons?

The object of giving any class of persons the franchise, or the right to vote, is to secure that the interests of that class shall not be overlooked. If the class is already indirectly represented, or has no special interests, there is no need to give it the right. It is, perhaps, an open question whether the class of women as such has any special interests not adequately provided for; but the general drift of thoughtful opinion seems to be in the direction of admitting that it has. Men and women certainly do not entirely understand each other's point of view, and there are many questions, some great and some small, in which women as a rule take a line of their own. This is especially the case with regard to social questions, which are likely to engross much more attention than they have hitherto done.

Then there is the argument for justice. Why should a person otherwise qualified be refused a vote simply on the ground of sex? Mr. A. at No. 1 has a vote; Mrs. B. at No. 2, with equal education, and an equal stake in the country, is refused a vote, merely because she is a woman. This seems on the face of it to be an outrage on fairness. But, as a matter of fact, things are usually worse, since Mrs. B.'s gardener or coachman will probably have a vote, while she is without one.

These two are the chief arguments in favour of admitting women to the franchise, and their weight is very great. On the other hand, there are several important points to be considered. In the first place, it is not at all clear that the great majority of women who would obtain the franchise would care to use it. There seems to be no general and wide demand for it; and it is quite within the bounds of possibility that English women might do as German women have done in one of our South African colonies, ask the legislature to take back the gift which they did not want. At any rate, probably not ten per cent. of the female voters would on a purely political question go to the poll. It would require some very stimulating appeal, some harrowing attack on the sentimental side, to induce them to vote in large numbers; but when they did vote, the rush would in many constituencies entirely overwhelm the male voters. Now, it cannot be for the advantage of the State that a large body of voters, who habitually take little interest in political matters and do not get the political training which comes from incessant discussion, should be able to rush in and form a momentary and irresponsible majority. Such a majority on a single point, formed of voters with an inferior degree of political knowledge, and with an inferior degree of moral and physical force to back it, would hardly compel the submission of their opponents. Suppose, for instance, the vast majority of men were in favour of a war with Russia, and the women vetoed it, or *vice versa*; in either case it would be felt that as the men supply by far the greater part of the blood and the treasure which would be spent on a war, and are out of all comparison in a better position to judge of the effect of such a war on the honour, welfare, and commerce of the country, with them must rest the final decision.

The truth is, that the intelligence even of highly intelligent women is not political. Only a few will take interest in politics steadily and

continuously. If only women interested in politics vote, it is hardly too much to say that women as a whole will be very little better represented than they are now. And we must remember that the factory-girl class will be by far the most important class of women voters. The married woman who has no separate house property will have no vote; the rich educated women, who chiefly desire the franchise now, would be in a hopeless minority. Political power in many large cities would be chiefly in the hands of young, ill-educated, giddy, and often ill-conducted girls, living in lodgings.

Another objection is sometimes taken that difference of political opinion between man and wife would lead to quarrels. Although I am apt to agree with the remark of the old antiquary, Aubrey, who, speaking of Milton and his first wife, says that "two opinions sleep not well upon the same bolster," yet I think that this is not likely to lead to much unhappiness. A more serious matter for women is the fact that as rights of citizenship can hardly be conferred without corresponding duties, the franchise would probably be accompanied by the obligation to sit on juries, the liability to be called as special constables, and the duty to assist the police when called on in order to perform various unpleasant functions.

In all probability these objections will be overruled; and if, instead of conferring the franchise wholesale, we confer it gradually, restricting it at first to women of some wealth and education, most of the difficulties will disappear. One thing is certain, that if women want the franchise they will have to ask for it, and that in a much more extended fashion than they have at present shown any inclination to do. Probably there are many more men who wish women to have a vote than there are women who wish to gain it.

*Individualism and laissez-faire.*—In my first paper I said that the modern Conservative is not necessarily opposed to changes in social

arrangements. Many Liberals also regard such changes as more important than "tinkering the Constitution." In what direction is change likely to take place?

During the middle part of this century—roughly speaking from about 1830 to about 1870—the most able and the most aggressive political party was the Radical. Men like Bright and Cobden and J. S. Mill were working out the ideas of Adam Smith and Bentham, and inducing their countrymen to accept them. The ideal of these representatives of middle-class Liberalism was freedom. Their policy was the policy of *laissez-faire* in the eighteenth century. This phrase (which had been invented by Turgot and the other French economists called Physiocrats) expressed the general principle that government should allow people to do as they liked, to interfere as little as possible between man and man, to refrain from regulating commerce, industry, and property, as much as possible. Everything, or nearly everything, was to be left to free contract between citizens. The State was to aim at confining itself to seeing contracts were carried out, and to suppressing disorder within and without. The employer and the workman must be left to settle at what wages and under what conditions work was to be carried on. The buyer and the seller must be left to determine the price and the conditions of sale. Government must not be paternal. The favourite gibe of the *laissez-faire* Liberals

was to call any interference with free contract "grandmotherly legislation." Their ideal was to let the weakest go to the wall quietly and speedily. The strong and successful were to have it all their own way.

This individualistic theory, which made much of the rights of the individual (at any rate, the successful individual), and regarded with suspicion all claims made on him by the State, greatly influenced English politics for nearly half a century. It is stated in the most moderate and most convincing way in the works of John Stuart Mill, such as the "Representative Government" and the admirable essay "On Liberty." But it was not allowed to entirely override other considerations. Thanks to the writings of Carlyle, Ruskin, and Maurice, and to the practical exertions of such philanthropists as the great Earl of Shaftesbury, a different and opposing current of thought made itself felt. Freedom of contract, it was pointed out, is only a sham where one of the contracting parties is rich and can afford to wait, while the other is poor and starving; where one is well-informed and intelligent, the other ignorant and unused to think for himself. So instead of glorifying free competition, the "higgling of the market," and so forth, the opposing party set itself to mitigate the [hardships] they inflicted on the weaker party. Thus the Factory Acts, passed between 1833 and our own time, have gradually restricted the rights of employers, and by limiting the labour of

young children and of women, by insisting on proper methods of payment, on proper sanitary conditions in factories, on guarding workmen from dangers incidental to the processes of manufacture, have done much to protect those who were unable to protect themselves. A government inspector everywhere comes between the employer and his workmen, and little is left to free contract. This is only one example out of many. The adulteration of food, short weights and measures, ignorance and incompetence on the part of doctors, teachers, and workmen, have been to some extent guarded against by direct interference of Parliament, in defiance of the principle of *laissez-faire*.

Nowadays the danger is that we shall come to rely too much on State assistance. Whenever we are in difficulties, whenever an industry languishes, or a hardship is felt, there is a cry for a new Act of Parliament and fresh inspectors. A few people die of starvation during an exceptionally hard winter, somebody gets poisoned, a bad accident occurs on a railway, and the daily press is sure to be full of suggestions that the State should interfere. We seem in danger of forgetting the truth which the poet proclaimed long ago:—

"How small, of all that human hearts endure,  
That part which laws or kings can cause or cure!"

(To be continued.)



## A CHILD OF GENIUS.

By LILY WATSON, Author of "The Hill of Angels," "In the Days of Mozart," etc.

### CHAPTER V.

It was not until the visitors had fairly vanished from sight that Katharine found her tongue. She had seen them off the premises; the three plush-headed Duvigny youths



and the two little girls were drawn up in the front courtyard to see the procession depart. Katharine felt that her cousin took in every detail; the yard paved with cobble-stones, the strewn autumn leaves, the hen-coop full of forlorn poultry, the children, foreign and funny in their play overalls. Curious adjuncts all these to a front door, according to English ideas! "She despises us I am certain!" thought Katharine, as she flew back to her mother, eager to discuss the incident in all its bearings. She was surprised to find her in tears and alone.

"Why, what is the matter, mamma? Aren't you glad to see my uncle and

and the two little girls were drawn up in the front courtyard to see the procession depart. Katharine felt that her cousin took in every detail; the yard paved with cobble-stones, the strewn autumn leaves, the hen-coop full of forlorn poultry, the children, foreign and funny in their play overalls. Curious adjuncts all these to a front door, according to English ideas! "She despises us I am certain!" thought Katharine, as she flew back to her mother, eager to discuss the incident in all its bearings. She was surprised to find her in tears and alone.

What does that signify?" cried Katharine. "Weren't they nice to you? Don't let us go to their dinner!" exclaimed the ardent champion. "Let us send down an excuse. Why should we be trodden under the feet of any upstart relations?"

Madame Duvigny shook her head. "Oh, dear," she sobbed, "things always happen wrong; if I had only known! Marie was so untidy when she let them in; and you, Katie, what a figure you are! And of course the children were not fit to be seen. Oh dear, oh dear!"

At the crises of life, comparatively insignificant details have a way of forcing themselves to the front, especially in the estimation of women. Madame Duvigny was all-engrossed in her distress at not having presented a better front to these new-found relations. "They might have let me know," she wailed. "And oh, Katharine, if you would but be more tidy! Look at your hair and your dress and your shoes! I am sure I work as hard as I can to keep things nice—oh dear me!"

Madame Duvigny was finding it, even with the help of her widow's jointure.

"I want a new frock," said Katharine, abashed by this outburst, and only half understanding it. "Mamma might manage better," she was always saying to herself, in her headstrong critical youth, but it never occurred to her that she might do a good deal to contribute to that result.

"It is care and neatness that you want," lamented Madame Duvigny.

"Don't let us think of such dismal things now," urged Katharine, sitting down on a low stool and laying her ruddy elf-locks on her mother's lap. "Cheer up, mamma, and tell me all about this new uncle. I knew I had an Uncle Richard in Australia, but I thought he had forgotten all about us, or was never coming home, or was dead or something."

"I did not correspond with him after your father's death. I hardly saw his wife before they went abroad, fourteen years ago, and as he—naturally perhaps—did not like my second marriage, there has been no intercourse between us. But he has, I suppose, made his fortune; he was an "Honourable" out there, for he was a member of the Colonial Government. Now he has come back and is going to live near



of the little infant-mistress. And yet there was a something of her own face in the picture; little enough perhaps; just a faint resemblance in the poise of the head, or in the way the crisp curls set about the brow.

She looked at it earnestly. And as

she put it back in its place, she heaved a sigh which seemed to rise from the very depths of her being.

Yet the Nigle people always said that Miss Soutar was such a lively little body—and why shouldn't she be? asked complaining matrons, since she was

fairly paid for work she said she liked, and had plenty of friends, and no cares and responsibilities in the world, since her only relative was a younger brother, doing very well abroad.

(To be continued.)

## POLITICS FOR GIRLS.

By FREDERICK RYLAND, M.A.

### PART IV. (Continued.)

#### SOCIALISM.



HE movement which I have briefly described is often called socialistic. It emphasizes the right of society over the individual, and regards with more favour the combined and compulsory action of many through the machinery of govern-

ment, than the free union of individuals without government assistance.

But the term "socialism" is highly ambiguous. It is sometimes used to denote any kind of scheme which aims at equalising men and giving to all the same advantages. In this sense the Education Acts and the Poor Laws are socialistic. At other times it is applied to any scheme which aims at securing the greatest happiness for the greatest number by direct governmental interference, whether equality be aimed at or not. In this sense the term "paternal government" is socialistic, although it may only aim at securing greater liberty for each by government interference. The Factory Acts, mentioned in a previous number, are called "socialistic," because they are an interference on the part of society in order to secure certain important advantages for the wage-earners which experience has shown cannot be secured without such statutes. The copyright laws and patent laws, which help to secure to authors and inventors the reward of their skill and industry, are examples of "socialism" in this loose use of the term.

But the most accurate use of the term is much more restricted. In this sense it means a scheme of social reconstruction under which all the means of production, viz., land, factories, machinery, tools, raw material, etc., would be held in common by society, and controlled by government officers. No man would have any private means of producing commodities for sale. All the land and what is necessary to cultivate it would be in the hands of the State. Every mine, factory, workshop, and warehouse would belong to the nation. Since the word Socialism is now so loosely used, it is perhaps better to keep the term "Collectivism" for this proposal, which tries, as Professor Sidgwick says, to "substitute common for private ownership, and governmental for private management, of the instruments of production in all important departments of industry, so that the payment of interest on industrial capital may cease, and 'labour receive its full reward.'"

The advantages which the scheme offers are obvious. It tends to equalise wealth, and thus to do away with the extremes of excessive riches and excessive poverty, both of them dangerous and to some extent debasing. It tends to avoid the waste which is produced by

the competition of private and individual producers. If successful it would substitute "industrial peace, mutual service, and a general diffusion of public spirit for the present conflict of classes and selfish struggles of individuals." So enamoured are the more fervid spirits among the Socialists by this vision, that they denounce the present state of things as brutal, barbarous, and immoral, for them "Property is theft."

On the other hand nearly all careful thinkers who are sufficiently well acquainted with history and political economy hold that the scheme is hopelessly impracticable. There are, first of all, the initial difficulties, the more or less forcible appropriation by society of the wealth now held by individuals, and the sullen revolt into which it would drive the most energetic and successful men.

Then there is the fact that it will be almost impossible to satisfactorily allot the functions and duties of individuals, and their scale of pay. If all are to be servants of the State, who is to decide who shall be "captains and leaders of industry," and who mere rank and file? Who is to decide whether a lad of fifteen is to be a doctor, an artist, a labourer, a mechanic, or a clerk? It cannot be left to the choice of the boy or his parents, and it will probably have to be decided by competitive examination—a most unsatisfactory test, since the best men often develop late; or by the *ipse dixit* of some government official—an insupportable tyranny, since the lot of each of us will be fixed without appeal at the disposal of some irresponsible and commonplace functionary, who may condemn a Tennyson to wheel bricks in a barrow, and make a man only fit to play a barrel-organ chief musician; or lastly by popular vote—which will give all the best situations to those with the most plausible tongues, and the most superficial abilities.

In all probability a few years' trial of Socialism in England would send abroad into exile nearly all men of energy and ability, who would put their talents at the disposal of states in which the institution of private property permitted them a free scope for their special powers, and an adequate reward for their industry.

In the next place Collectivism would in all probability greatly diminish the production of wealth. Wealth increases rapidly because men of ability are at liberty to devise new contrivances for production, to economise labour and materials, and to work as hard and as long as they choose. The chief motive which leads them to do this is the desire to produce wealth for themselves, and still more for their families. Socialism will do away with this motive. In the Collectivist state saving becomes an impossibility or a crime. No man will be able to invest money at interest. Instead of the Watts and Stephensons who raise themselves by means which double and treble the national income in a few years, we shall have only government officials paid an annual stipend. The tendency of all govern-

ment officials is to do as little as possible, and to do it always in the same way. The more energetic they are, the more inconvenience they cause to those beneath them and those above them. A government by officials, a *bureaucracy*, is the most stupid and the most stereotyped of governments. What China is to-day, England may be to-morrow, if she adopts Collectivism and puts the control of her industry in the hands of men whose one great aim is not to cause trouble, to let sleeping dogs lie, and to draw their salaries in peace and quietness.

In a book which everybody ought to read—a marvel of cheapness and excellence in printing, paper, and binding as well as an admirable example of clear and interesting exposition of economic truth—I mean Mr. Mallock's *Labour and the Popular Welfare*, you will see it shown that at the close of last century Great Britain, with a population of 10,000,000 had an income of £140,000,000, or £14 a head; whereas to-day, with a population of 37,000,000, the total income is £1,300,000,000, or £35 a head. This enormous increase of wealth he shows is due to the ability of investors, merchants, and other men who obtain command of capital. The author shows that the "labouring classes of this country, in proportion to their number, receive to-day £47,000,000 a year more than the entire income of the country at the beginning of the reign of Queen Victoria. . . . The same number of labourers and their families as then formed the whole labouring population of the country now possess among them every penny of the amount that then formed the income of the entire nation. They have gained every penny that they possibly could have gained if every rich man of that period, if duke, and cotton lord, and railway king, followed by all the host of minor plutocrats, had been forced to cast all they had into the treasury of Labour, and give their very last farthing to swell the labourer's wages. The labourers have gained all this; but that is not all. They have gained an annual sum of £47,000,000 more. And they have done all this not only without revolution, but without any attack on the fundamental principles of property. On the contrary, the circumstances which have enabled Labour to gain most from the proceeds of Ability, have been the circumstances which have enabled Ability to produce most itself."

This rapid growth of wealth, then, has come about in consequence of the present individualistic state of society, when each man fights primarily for himself and his family. It could not have come about with a society ruled by mere officials who tend to become lazy tyrants without initiation and without energy.

If this difficulty were overcome, many other objections would remain. Even a successful system of Collectivism would make men less prudent, less self-reliant, less capable than they are now. In the struggle which goes on between nations, not only intermittently on

the battlefield, but continuously in the markets of the world, that nation which produces men of the greatest average ability and force of character must on the whole succeed best. Socialism, even if it established comfort and ease at home for a few years, would inevitably lead to the disappearance of the nation which adopted it. Under it life would become more and more monotonous. The adventurers and the restless, the men of resource and originality, would desert us to enlist under alien flags. Even apart from the question of remuneration—and Socialism would take care that additional effort and ability did not mean additional pay—the terrible sameness of life in which everybody was middle-class, in which society had no ups-and-downs, in which there was no poverty and no wealth, no great failures and no brilliant successes—the dull, flat insipidity of such a life would drive away from us the men who, under the present régime, give us the greater part of our wealth, and those things which are better than wealth—beauty, truth, and freedom.

*The Task before us.*—What we have to do nowadays is to try and reconcile the two conflicting ideas, Individualism and Socialism. We want, as far as possible, to mitigate the evils caused by unequal distribution of wealth,

without, at the same time, weakening the incentives to private effort. We want to see that, as far as possible, no man is hopelessly miserable—that even the poorest shall not starve in silent despair, that even the lowest shall have a chance of education and of the pleasures which come from literature and science and art, that the most feeble and old shall have kindly help in their weakness. But we want to take care that in shielding failure and feebleness from suffering, we do not sap the foundations of national welfare by making men mere dependants on the Government, who open their mouths and shut their eyes and see what their mighty Grandmother sends them.


In order to carry out this ideal we shall have to make many experiments, the majority of which will probably end in more or less of failure. We must not pin our faith to any one formula. It is not a sufficient objection to say that one scheme is opposed to freedom, or that another infringes the rights of property, or that a third is socialistic. All government involves an inroad on freedom; all taxation infringes the rights of a man to his property; nearly all social legislation is more or less socialistic. What we have to do is to keep ourselves free from prejudice and party feeling, and to judge each scheme on its merits. We must not object to Old Age Pensions because they are the pet scheme of a statesman whom we do not admire; or to some scheme of temperance reform because it is advocated by a High Church bishop; or to some other scheme because it comes from the barracks of the Salvation Army.

We must not forget that society is an organic whole, with a life history like other organisms. This social life is not made; like Topsy, it has *grown*. Any plan of reform which forgets this is doomed to failure. A living creature

maintains itself by ceaseless small adaptations to its circumstances, and so does a nation. It cannot make a clean sweep and divest itself of its own past. Its possibilities are limited by its history. One of the wisest political thinkers, Edmund Burke, told the French Revolutionists, "You began ill because you began by despising everything that belonged to you"; but he also said that "a State without some means of change is without the means of its conservation."

The interests we have to reconcile are not diametrically opposed. It is not, as somebody stupidly and brutally said, "a struggle between the Haves and the Have-nots." What a labourer gains is not necessarily lost by the employer; what the employer gains is not necessarily lost by the workman. What the taxpayer surrenders for the use of the poor may be returned to him tenfold in increased peace, order, health, and education. The rates which keep up hospitals, sanitary arrangements, lunatic asylums, and so forth, are not spent simply for the benefit of the ailing and the poor. They also form a great insurance fund, which secures the well-to-do and comfortable from death and disease and discomfort.

In bringing these discursive articles to a close, let me once more recommend to those girls who have taken interest in them a little book for further reading. Besides Miss Anna Buckland's shilling primer, *Our National Institutions*, and Mr. Oscar Browning's fuller volume called *The Citizen*, already mentioned, I should like to name Mr. Thomas Raleigh's *Elementary Politics*, an admirable "attempt to define the terms which are commonly used in political argument." This little volume will serve as a capital stimulant to thought. If I induce you to read it you will not regret the time you have spent over my rough and desultory papers.



WHITE LILY PISTIL. SECTION OF PISTIL.

## STUDIES OF PLANT LIFE.

By MRS. ELIZA BRIGHTWEN, Author of "Wild Nature Won by Kindness," etc.

### PART VIII.

#### FERTILISATION.

HAVING now considered some of the many wonderful arrangements by which the pollen of plants is dispersed, we will endeavour by tracing the course of the pollen-grains after they reach the stigma, to learn what is meant by the term "fertilisation of the ovules." These are the minute specks contained in the ovary which are to become seeds, and by means of which the plant will eventually reproduce itself.


To the naked eye, the yellow pollen we see on the anthers of flowers appears as small grains; but, when magnified, these grains are seen to be singularly beautiful, each little sphere having on its surface a chequered network and delicately sculptured patterns.

The forms, too, are as varied as the ornamentation.

Some plants have triangular grains, some oval shaped and others are many-sided.

I have given a few examples and would specially call attention to the pollen-grains of the *Pinus* tribe (fir-trees) to which I alluded in the last chapter. These are remarkably buoyant, owing to the two little bladders with which they are furnished.

Now we are going to watch this yellow dust performing its appointed office in the central organ of a flower. In order



#### POLLEN-GRAINS.

- 1 *Morina*. 2 *Cobea*. 3 *Convolvulus*. 4 *Dianthus*.
- 5 *Pinus*. 6 *Aibucca*. 7 *Buphthalmum*.

to do so we will take a white garden lily, and remove the petals, sepals and stamens, leaving only the pistil which (as shown in the drawing) consists of three parts, the club-like stigma, a very long style, and its base the ovary, which contains three cavities. In these last we see a number of small, colourless spore-like bodies termed ovules (from *ovum* an egg), each consisting of an outer coat, and a mass of cells in the centre called the *nucellus*.

An opening exists at one end of each ovule called the micropyle (meaning a little gate or entrance), and this opening leads down into the middle of the nucellus, where lies what we may call the life principle, but what is known in botany as the embryo-sac.