

its only rival in dignity of site. Durham, intrinsically, is grand, majestic, and imposing; but Lincoln is all this and very beautiful as well. No other cathedral has so strong yet graceful a skyline, and no other so fine a group of spireless towers. Individually each tower may be surpassed elsewhere, but all three together they are matchless. Not even the knowledge that they once bore spires which now are gone hurts their air of perfect fitness to the church they finish and the site they crown. And as to sites, while Durham is made more picturesque by the trees about it and the castle walls beside it, Lincoln's loftier perch and closer union with the town give it the nobler look. But comparisons are futile. Durham stands superbly in front of its city; Lincoln stands superbly above its city; each is unparalleled in its way, and it is hopeless to determine which way is really finer.

Of course with such a cathedral one need

not pick one's point of view; the difficulty would be to find a place above the horizon whence the church of Lincoln could not be well seen. But to my mind there is one point of view from which it is almost better worth seeing than from very near or from very far. This is from the Vicar's Court—a beautiful walled garden sloping down the hill to the southward of the choir. Seen from here in summer, a mass of trees conceals the greater part of the long body; but the tall transept-fronts show clearly, and the roof-lines, and above them the great tower at just the right distance for appreciating its majesty of form and its loveliness of decoration.

Almost all the old ecclesiastical dwellings have disappeared except for frequent fragments built into newer walls. But we scarcely regard their absence, Lincoln the church and Lincoln the secular town have so much else to show us in so many shapes and styles.

*M. G. van Rensselaer.*

## MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

### General Lee's Views on Enlisting the Negroes.

[THE subjoined letters, which contain their own explanation, are sent to us through the Hon. W. L. Wilson, M. C., by the Hon. Andrew Hunter, of Charleston, West Virginia, who assures us that they have not before appeared in print.—EDITOR.]

RICHMOND, January 7, 1865.

TO GENERAL R. E. LEE.

DEAR GENERAL: I regret that in the succession of stirring events since the commencement of the present war I have had so little opportunity to renew our former, to me at least, exceedingly agreeable acquaintance, and particularly that I have so rarely, if ever, met with a suitable occasion to interchange views with you upon the important public questions which have been and are still pressing on us with such intense interest.

It would have demanded, indeed, in view of the scarcely less than awful weight of care and responsibility Providence and your country have thrown upon you, and which you will pardon me for saying has been grandly met, no ordinarily favorable opportunity to have induced me to intrude upon your overburdened time and attention for such a purpose; and in approaching you now, in this form, upon a subject which I deem of vital importance, I offer no other apology than the momentous character of the issue fixed upon the hearts and minds of every Southern patriot.

I refer to the great question now stirring the public mind as to the expediency and propriety of bringing to bear against our relentless enemy the element of military strength supposed to be found in our negro population; in other words, and more precisely, the wisdom and sound policy, under existing circumstances, of converting such portions of this popula-

tion as may be required into soldiers, to aid in maintaining our great struggle for independence and national existence.

The subject is one which recent events have forced upon our attention with intense interest, and in my judgment we ought not longer to defer its solution; and although the President in his late annual message has brought it to the attention of Congress, it is manifestly a subject in which the several States of the Confederacy must and ought to act the most prominent part, both in giving the question its proper solution and in carrying out any plans that he may devise on the subject. As a member of the Virginia Senate, having to act upon the subject, I have given it much earnest and anxious reflection, and I do not hesitate to say here, in advance of the full discussion which it will doubtless undergo, that the general objections to the proposition itself, as well as the practical difficulties in the way of carrying it out, have been greatly lessened as I have more thoroughly examined them. But it is not to be disguised that public sentiment is greatly divided on the subject; and besides many real objections, a mountain of prejudice growing out of our ancient modes of regarding the institution of Southern slavery will have to be met and overcome, before we can attain to anything like that degree of unanimity so extremely desirable in this and all else connected with our great struggle. In our former contest for liberty and independence, he who was then at the head of our armies, and who became the Father of his Country, did not hesitate to give his advice on all great subjects involving the success of that contest and the safety and welfare of his country, and in so doing perhaps rendered more essential service than he did in the field; nor do I perceive why, upon such a subject and in such a crisis as the present, we should not have the benefit



of your sound judgment and matured wisdom. Pardon me therefore for asking, to be used not only for my own guidance, but publicly as the occasion may require: Do you think that by a wisely devised plan and judicious selection negro soldiers can be made effective and reliable in maintaining this war in behalf of the Southern States? Do you think that the calling into service of such numbers of this population as the emergency may demand would affect injuriously, to any material extent, the institution of Southern slavery? Would not the introduction of this element of strength into our military operations justify in some degree a more liberal scale of exemptions or details, and by thus relieving from active service in the field a portion of the intelligent and directing labor of the country (as seems to be needed) have a beneficial bearing upon the question of subsistence and other supplies?

Would not, in your judgment, the introduction of such a policy increase, in other regards, our power of defense against the relentless warfare the enemy is now waging against us?

These are but some of the leading inquiries which suggest themselves. But I beg, General, if from a sense of duty and the promptings of your elevated patriotism, overriding unwise and ill-timed delicacy, you consent to reply to these inquiries, for the purpose before frankly indicated, that you will give me your views, as fully as your engagements will allow, upon every other question that may occur to you as likely to conduce to a wise decision of this grave and, as deemed by many, vitally important subject. With highest esteem,

Your obedient servant,

*Andrew Hunter.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTH VIRGINIA,  
11th January, 1865.

HON. ANDREW HUNTER, RICHMOND, VA.

DEAR SIR: I have received your letter of the 7th inst., and, without confining myself to the order of your interrogatories, will endeavor to answer them by a statement of my views on the subject. I shall be most happy if I can contribute to the solution of a question in which I feel an interest commensurate with my desire for the welfare and happiness of our people. Considering the relation of master and slave, controlled by humane laws and influenced by Christianity and an enlightened public sentiment, as the best that can exist between the white and black races while intermingled as at present in this country, I would deprecate any sudden disturbance of that relation, unless it be necessary to avert a greater calamity to both. I should therefore prefer to rely upon our white population to preserve the ratio between our forces and those of the enemy which experience has shown to be safe. But in view of the preparations of our enemies it is our duty to provide for continued war, and not for a battle or campaign, and I fear that we cannot accomplish this without overtaxing the capacity of our white population. Should the war continue, under existing circumstances, the enemy may in course of time penetrate our country and get access to a large part of our negro population. It is his avowed policy to convert the able-bodied men into soldiers, and to emancipate all.

The success of the Federal arms in the South was followed by a proclamation of President Lincoln for two hundred and eighty thousand men, the effect of

which will be to stimulate the Northern States to procure as substitutes for their own people the negroes thus brought within their reach. Many have already been obtained in Virginia, and should the fortune of war expose more of her territory, the enemy would gain a large accession to his strength.

His progress will thus add to his numbers and at the same time destroy slavery in a manner most pernicious to the welfare of our people. Their negroes will be used to hold them in subjection, leaving the remaining force of the enemy free to extend his conquest. Whatever may be the effect of our employing negro troops, it cannot be as mischievous as this. If it end in subverting slavery, it will be accomplished by ourselves, and we can devise the means of alleviating the evil consequences to both races. I think, therefore, we must decide whether slavery shall be extinguished by our enemies and the slaves be used against us, or use them ourselves at the risk of the effects which may be produced upon our social institutions. I believe that with proper regulations they can be made efficient soldiers. They possess the physical qualifications in an eminent degree. Long habits of obedience and subordination, coupled with the moral influence which in our country the white man possesses over the black, furnish an excellent foundation for that discipline which is the best guarantee of military efficiency. Our chief aim should be to secure their fidelity.

There have been formidable armies composed of men having no interest in the cause for which they fought beyond their pay or hope of plunder. But it is certain that the surest foundation upon which the fidelity of an army can rest, especially in a service which imposes peculiar hardships and privations, is the personal interest of the soldier in the issue of the contest. Such an interest we can give our negroes by giving immediate freedom to all who enlist, and freedom at the end of the war to the families of those who discharge their duties faithfully (whether they survive or not), together with the privilege of residing at the South. To this might be added a bounty for faithful service.

We should not expect slaves to fight for prospective freedom when they can secure it by going to the enemy, in whose service they will incur no greater risk than in ours. The reasons that induce me to recommend the employment of negro troops at all render the effects of the measures I have suggested upon slavery immaterial, and in my opinion the best means of securing the efficiency and fidelity of this auxiliary force would be to accompany the measure with a well-digested plan of gradual and general emancipation. As that will be the result of the continuance of the war, and will certainly occur if the enemy succeed, it seems to me advisable to adopt it at once, and thereby secure all the benefits that will accrue to our cause.

The employment of negro troops under regulations similar in principle to those above indicated would, in my opinion, greatly increase our military strength, and enable us to relieve our white population to some extent. I think we could dispense with our reserve forces except in cases of necessity.

It would disappoint the hopes which our enemies base upon our exhaustion, deprive them in a great measure of the aid they now derive from black troops, and thus throw the burden of the war upon their own



people. In addition to the great political advantages that would result to our cause from the adoption of a system of emancipation, it would exercise a salutary influence upon our whole negro population, by rendering more secure the fidelity of those who become soldiers and diminishing the inducements to the rest to abscond.

I can only say, in conclusion, that whatever measures are to be adopted should be adopted at once. Every day's delay increases the difficulty. Much time will be required to organize and discipline the men, and action may be deferred until it is too late.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. Lee, General.

Some Errors in General Sherman's "Grand Strategy."

IN the February CENTURY is a paper from General Sherman on "The Grand Strategy of the War of the Rebellion." Near the outset of this paper the distinguished author makes a statement as to "the two great antagonist forces" of which the following is the gist:

*First.* That the belligerent populations, leaving out Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, were in round numbers nineteen and nine millions respectively.

*Second.* That while the entire Federal army averaged (from January, '62—May, '65) from 500,000 to 800,000 "present," the Confederate army averaged about 569,000 men—this last number being determined by taking one-sixteenth of the nine millions which is assumed as the total population of the Confederacy.

*Third.* That the three States of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri furnished to each belligerent a "fair quota," and may be left out of the count.

*First.* To get a population of nine millions in the Confederate States, General Sherman has included the entire slave population of these States in 1860. By the Census of that year, the 11 Confederate States had in round numbers 5,450,000 whites and 3,650,000 blacks. Now the slave population of these States not only furnished no soldiers to the South,—it supplied much the larger part of the 178,975 colored troops which were enrolled during the war on the side of the North. Nay more—the records of the War Department show that besides some 22,000 white Union troops obtained from scattered points throughout the South, the State of Virginia (West Virginia) furnished 31,872, and that of Tennessee 31,092 men to the Federal army. Hence, in setting down the belligerent populations, not only is it misleading to include the slaves on the Confederate side, but large sections of West Virginia and East Tennessee should be transferred from the Southern to the Northern side. Considering population with reference to the men contributed to the two armies, is it not evident that (omitting Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland) the two belligerents drew from populations which were in the neighborhood of twenty millions and five millions, instead of nineteen millions and nine millions? It is not intended here to ignore the fact that the slave population of the South was in many ways a source of strength to that section, and that its presence enabled the South to send to the field a larger percentage of white men than could otherwise have

been spared. But it is absurd to estimate, as General Sherman does, that the slaves approached, in the value of their contributions to the struggle, an equal number of white people.

*Second.* The total number of men furnished to the Federal armies was 2,778,304 (or about 2,300,000 when reduced to a three-year standard); and of these, as General Sherman states, there was an average after January 1, '62 of from 500,000 to 800,000 present in the field. No report of the total number of Confederates enrolled exists, but General Sherman would have us believe that the Confederate Government was able to keep an average of 569,000 men actually in the field. Its limited resources in the way of armament and supplies would have made this impossible—but look at it simply as a question of population. It appears from Phisterer's figures that the average strength of the Federal armies present in the field was about one-fourth of the total number of troops furnished. If the Confederates showed the same proportion between enrolled men and those "present," there must have been over 2,000,000 Confederate troops enrolled during the war out of a total white population of about five millions!

This result might have given the author pause. But while the Confederate records are defective, there was no necessity for such wild statements as General Sherman makes. Many returns of the Confederate armies exist, and from these an approximate estimate of the total Confederate strength can be obtained. There never was a time, for instance, when the Army of Northern Virginia numbered 100,000 men present. It rarely even approached it; and yet this army generally exceeded in strength the main western Confederate army. It is doubtful whether there was at any date, throughout the Confederacy, more than half the men "present" that General Sherman assumes as the average strength of the Southern armies, and it is very certain that their real average strength was less than half of the numbers he gives. The total number of Confederates enrolled during the war was probably between 600,000 and 700,000 men. The former estimate was given by a Northern writer upon a careful examination of the records twenty years ago, and the best estimates at the War Records office to-day do not vary greatly from that number.

*Third.* It is certain that Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland furnished far more troops to the Northern than to the Southern side, which, considering the fact that these States were occupied almost entirely by Union troops, is not surprising. Phisterer credits

Maryland with	46,638	Union troops.
Missouri "	109,111	" "
Kentucky "	75,760	" "

If General Sherman means by "fair quota" that these States contributed forces to the two armies in the same proportion as that existing between the total Northern and Southern armies, he may be near the truth. But if he means, as seems probable, that they contributed equal or nearly equal numbers to the two sides, he is as wide of the mark as he is in the points above noted.

W. Allan.

MCDONOUGH, MARYLAND, April 14, 1888.