

## MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

### A Song in Camp.

THE article on the "Songs of the War," by Mr. Brander Matthews, in THE CENTURY MAGAZINE for August, brought back to my memory vividly an experience at Murfreesboro', just after the battle of Stone's River. There was a good deal of gloomy feeling there. The losses in the army had been terrible; and, besides, there were among the troops a large number of Kentucky and Tennessee regiments, to whom the Emancipation Proclamation was not palatable. A number of officers had resigned, or tendered resignations, on account of it. One day a whole batch of resignations came in, all written in the same handwriting and coming from one regiment, including nearly all the officers in it, assigning as a reason their unwillingness to serve longer in consequence of the change in the purpose and conduct of the war. The instigator of these letters was found, and dismissed with every mark of ignominy — his shoulder straps were cut off, and he was drummed out of camp. This heroic remedy caused the officers whom he had misled to withdraw their resignations; but the thing rankled. A few days afterward a glee club came down from Chicago, bringing with them the new song,

"We'll rally round the flag, boys,"

and it ran through the camp like wildfire. The effect was little short of miraculous. It put as much spirit and cheer into the army as a victory. Day and night one could hear it by every camp fire and in every tent. I never shall forget how the men rolled out the line,

"And although he may be poor, he shall never be a slave."

I do not know whether Mr. Root knows what good work his song did for us there — but I hope so.

*Henry Stone.*

### The Confederate Strength in the Atlanta Campaign.

THE paper by General Joseph E. Johnston on the Atlanta campaign, in the August number of THE CENTURY MAGAZINE, asserts that on the 30th of April, 1864, the strength of the Confederate army was "37,652 infantry, 2812 artillery with 112 guns and 2392 cavalry," — in all 42,856. The return of the army on file in the War Department signed by General Johnston and attested by his adjutant-general, for April 30th, 1864, shows its "present for duty" almost 53,000:

Infantry.....	41,279
Cavalry.....	8,436
Artillery, 144 pieces.....	3,277
	52,992

The difference between these figures and those given by General Johnston from the same return is, that

\* For Cantey's strength, see General D. H. Maury's return April 22d, 1864.

† For Loring's strength, see General S. D. Lee's return May 10th, 1864.

in the magazine he gives the footings of the column of "effective total." This, in all Confederate returns, includes only sergeants, corporals, and private soldiers for duty. That the cavalry had an effective total of but 2392 with 8436 officers and men for duty is accounted for by the fact that a large number of horses were grazing in the rear because of the scarcity of forage at Dalton. They were brought to the front and the men became effective when Sherman's army began to advance. General Johnston's statement that his artillery comprised but 112 pieces is a manifest error, for the return plainly says 35 companies, 144 pieces.

The battle of Resaca was fought on the 13th, 14th, and 15th of May. Prior to that time, the Confederate army was reënforced by General Mercer's brigade of four Georgia regiments, which had been on garrison duty on the Atlantic coast. A footnote to the return of April 30th records that one of these regiments, the 63d Georgia, joined the army "since the report was made out," and that its effective total was 814. All of these regiments had full ranks; 2800 is a low estimate of their line-of-battle strength. Cantey's division,\* 2 brigades of infantry and 2 batteries, 5300 for duty, came from Mobile about the 7th of May and was stationed at Resaca. Loring's division, 3 infantry brigades and 2 batteries, from General S. D. Lee's command, with 5145 for duty and a detachment of 550 from French's division, reached Resaca May 10th, 11th, and 12th. Meantime a regiment of the Georgia State line, estimated as six hundred strong, had been added to Hood's corps.

General Johnston had at Resaca at least 67,000 men for battle and 168 pieces of artillery. General Sherman had at most 104,000: † the odds against General Johnston when "the armies were actually in contact" were as 100 to 64, instead of "10 to 4," as stated in his article.

On the night of May 16th the Confederate army evacuated Resaca. On the following day, at Adairsville, it was reënforced by General W. H. Jackson's cavalry command, 4477 for duty, which was increased to 5120 by June 10th. On the 19th of May at Cassville the division of General French joined the army with 4174 effectives, exclusive of the detachment which was at Resaca. Another Georgia State line regiment, estimated as 600, was added to Hood's corps, and Quarles's brigade, 2200 strong, came on the 26th of May at New Hope Church. A comparison of the return of April 30th with that of June 10th shows an increase to the fighting strength of the army of 3399 from the return of men "absent with leave" in the corps of Hood, Hardee, Wheeler, and in the artillery. The return of May 20th is missing, but that of June 10th shows an increase since May 20th of 649 "returned from desertion" and 799 "joined by enlistment."

\* For French's detachment, see General French's report of "effectives when joined."

† For Sherman's army at Resaca, add 5200 for cavalry joined between May 1st and 12th to his strength May 1st of 98,797.

General Johnston has to account between April 30th and June 10th for men available for battle at least:

Present for duty at Dalton	April 30th	52,992
Mercer's brigade	May 2d	2,800
Cantey's division	" 7th	5,300
Loring's " "	May 10th, 11th, and 12th	5,145
French's detachment	May 12th	550
French's division	" 19th	4,174
Jackson's cavalry	" 17th	4,477
Jackson's cavalry increase before June 10th		643
Quarles's brigade	May 26th	2,200
Two regiments Georgia State line		1,200
Furloughed men returned		3,399
Recruits		799
Returned deserters		649
		84,328

All these figures are official except for Mercer's brigade and the two regiments of the Georgia State line.\*

The return of General Johnston's army June 10th is the first on file in the War Department which includes all these reinforcements. It shows "present for duty":

	Officers.	Men.
Infantry	5049	47,554
Cavalry	1232	12,372
Artillery, 187 pieces	257	4,414
	6538	64,340
Or in round numbers		71,000

The difference of over 13,000 is accounted for by losses in battle, desertion, and increase in absent sick. The incomplete return of Medical Director Foard shows killed and wounded May 7th to 20th, inclusive, 3384. The return of June 10th shows 1551 killed and died since May 20th, indicating fully 6000 wounded. The same return shows 569 deserters. The 1542 prisoners captured from Hood and Hardee, shown by increase of absent without leave in their corps, account for the remainder without examining the returns of Polk's corps and the cavalry.

General Johnston's army reached its maximum strength on the New Hope Church line, where he must have had 75,000 for battle when the armies faced each other May 27th. General Sherman's army † there numbered, of all arms, for duty, 93,600 men, and several brigades of this force were employed in guarding trains and watching roads in all directions, for Sherman's army had no rear. Odds of less than 5 to 4 against him is "the great inequality of force" which General Johnston complains compelled him "to employ dismounted cavalry" in holding this line.

In a footnote to his article General Johnston says:

"I have two reports of the strength of the army besides that of April 30th, already given: 1. Of July 1st, 39,746 infantry, 3855 artillery, and 10,484 cavalry; total, 54,085. 2. Of July 10th, 36,901 infantry, 3755 artillery, and 10,270 cavalry; total, 50,926."

The return of July 1st shows "present for duty" all arms, officers and men, 64,578, instead of 54,085. (As in case of the return of April 30th, General Johnston gives only the "effective total.") The loss since June 10th is accounted for by 1114 dead, 711 deserters, 1042 increase in absent without leave (prisoners), and 3693 in increase of absent sick and wounded.

None of the returns of this army, either under Johnston or Hood, make any account of the Georgia militia, a division of which under General G. W. Smith

\* For strength of Jackson's cavalry division, see General S. D. Lee's return May 10th, and the return of General Johnston's army June 10th, 1864.

† For strength of General French's division, see his return of "effectives when joined."

joined the army about June 20th near Kenesaw, making its available force on that line nearly 70,000 men.

The return of July 10th gives the present for duty 60,032, instead of 50,926, the loss since July 1st being 1377 deserters, 526 dead, two regiments sent to Savannah, and prisoners and wounded. This with the Georgia militia (increased to about nine thousand when the army reached Atlanta) represents the force turned over to General Hood July 18th, viz.:

Infantry	42,571
Cavalry	13,318
Artillery, 187 pieces	4,143
Militia (probably)	5,000

65,032

General Johnston asserts that the only affair worth mentioning, on his left at Resaca, was near the night of May 14th, when "40 or 50 skirmishers in front of our extreme left were driven from the slight elevation they occupied, but no attempt was made to retake it." In his official report, made in October, 1864, he says that at 9 o'clock at night of May 14th he "learned that Lieutenant-General Polk's troops had lost a position commanding our bridges." Comment upon the generalship that would leave a position commanding the line of retreat of an army in charge of 40 or 50 skirmishers within gun-shot of a powerful enemy is unnecessary, for it was not done. The position was held by a line of men. It was carried on the evening of May 14th by a gallant charge of two brigades of the Fifteenth Corps of the Union army. Reinforced by another brigade, they held it against the repeated and desperate efforts of Polk's men to retake it. The battle lasted far into the night. General John A. Logan, in his official report of it, says that when at 10 o'clock at night "the last body of the enemy retired broken and disheartened from the field, . . . it was evident to the meanest comprehension among the rebels that the men who double-quickened across to their hills that afternoon had come to stay." General Logan also says that by the capture of this position "the railroad bridge and the town were held entirely at our mercy."

The Fifteenth Corps lost 628 killed and wounded at Resaca. The troops in its front, Loring's and Cantey's divisions and Vaughan's brigade, according to their incomplete official reports lost 698. Much the greater part of this loss must have been on the evening of May 14th, for there was no other line-of-battle engagement on this part of the field.

General Johnston characterizes the battle of May 28th at Dallas as "a very small affair," in which the Confederates lost about 300 men and the Union troops "must have lost more than ten times as many." This was an assault made upon troops of the Fifteenth Corps by two brigades of Bate's Confederate division and Armstrong's brigade of Jackson's cavalry dismounted, supported by Smith's brigade of Bate's division and Ferguson's and Ross's brigades of Jackson's cavalry. Lewis's Kentucky brigade attacked the front of Osterhaus's division without success. Bullock's Florida brigade charged along the Marietta road and was driven back, with heavy loss, by the fire of the 53d Ohio regiment. Armstrong assailed the position held by Walcutt's brigade across the Villa Rica road and met a bloody re-

For strength of Quarles's brigade, see Johnston's narrative, p. 575.

† For Sherman's strength on the New Hope line, see his return May 31st and deduct Blair's Seventeenth Corps, which did not join the army until June 8th.

pulse. General Bate officially reported the loss in his division as 450. General Walcutt in his official report says that "244 dead and wounded rebels were found in my front," and many were doubtless removed. The Confederate loss in this "very small affair" was, therefore, over 700. The loss of the Fifteenth Corps was 379, or about one-half the Confederate loss, instead of "more than ten times as many."

General Johnston assumes that General Sherman used his entire army in the assault on Kenesaw Mountain, when, in fact, he employed less than 15,000 men. The remainder of the army was not engaged, except in the continuous battle of the skirmish lines. The assaulting column of the Army of the Cumberland, directed against Hardee's corps, was composed of 5 brigades about 9000 strong. The formation was such that each brigade presented a front of but two companies. The leading regiments lost very heavily; those in the rear suffered few casualties. General Thomas reported the entire loss as 1580. The attack of the Army of the Tennessee was made upon the Confederate intrenchments held by French's division and a part of Walker's, by three brigades of the Fifteenth Corps, numbering 5500 men. Their formation was in two lines; their total loss 603, three-fourths of this falling on the regiments in the first line.

General Johnston expresses the belief that Northern soldiers could not be repulsed with casualties so small as reported at Kenesaw. In this he, unwittingly perhaps, compliments Sherman's army at the expense of his own. On the 22d of June, five days before the battle of Kenesaw, he tells us that the divisions of Stevenson and Hindman were repulsed, in an assault on the Union line, with a loss of one thousand men. These divisions, June 10th, numbered over 11,000 for duty. Their loss, therefore, was but 9 per cent., while that of the troops of the Army of the Cumberland engaged at Kenesaw was 17 per cent.; of the Army of the Tennessee, 11 per cent. In both cases the loss sustained was sufficient to demonstrate the futility of further effort. In neither case was it a fair test of the staying qualities of the troops who on many fields had shown their willingness to shed any amount of blood necessary when there was reasonable hope of success.

E. C. Davies,

Late Major 53d Ohio Regiment.

CINCINNATI, September 8th, 1887.

#### A Rejoinder to General Robertson by Colonel Mosby.

IN THE CENTURY for August, General Beverly H. Robertson defends himself against the charge of having disobeyed orders in the Gettysburg campaign, and imputes to me the absurdity of trying to prove that Stuart knew nothing about it, and also with defending him against "an imaginary attack." With equal propriety it might be said that General Robertson has defended himself against "an imaginary attack." I never intimated that Stuart was ignorant of his default. Stuart fought at Gettysburg and knew that Robertson did not. The latter affects to be unaware of the fact that two of General Lee's staff have published accounts of Gettysburg, in which they attribute the loss of the battle to the want of cavalry to make the preliminary reconnaissances; and that in the memoir of his chief by Stuart's adjutant, the blame of it is put upon himself

(General Robertson). The accusation against which I defended Stuart was, that by going into Pennsylvania around Hooker's rear with a portion of the cavalry he had taken away the eyes of the army, so that General Lee, like a blind man, had stumbled into the fight. I think I have shown that the fault was not in Stuart's plan, but in the execution of the part assigned to a subordinate. If Booth plays "Othello" with a bad support, the performance as a whole will be a failure, no matter what may be the merit of the chief actor. The complaint against Robertson is, that having been placed with a large force of cavalry in observation, with orders to follow on the *right* of the army *next to the enemy*, he gave General Lee no information of their movements, but followed on the *left*, and never reached the battle-field. He says that he was ordered "to cross the Potomac where Lee crossed," and follow on the *right* of the army. No such instructions were given him, as they would have involved a physical impossibility, as Lee crossed with Longstreet on the *left* at Williamsport. So did General Robertson. His instructions were: "*After the enemy has moved beyond your reach*, leave sufficient pickets in the mountains, and withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah, and place a strong and reliable picket to watch the enemy at Harper's Ferry, cross the Potomac and follow the army, keeping on its *right* and rear." In his letter to Stuart of June 23d, General Lee had directed that, if the cavalry passed through the Shenandoah Valley, it must cross on our *right* at Shepherdstown (where A. P. Hill crossed) and move towards Frederick City. Stuart's instructions to Robertson indicated the same general direction for him to go, and, if they had been obeyed, would have put the cavalry in its proper position, between our infantry and the enemy. The Northern army moved into Pennsylvania east of the Blue Ridge or South Mountain, while Robertson's command moved on a parallel line, about twenty miles to the *west* of it. This is the only example in war of the cavalry of an invading army marching in rear of the infantry. He says that, as he was ordered to avoid pikes, he was compelled to go by Martinsburg. But that could not have been the reason for selecting this route, as he actually traveled along pikes nearly all the way; whereas, if he had gone by Shepherdstown, he might have avoided them altogether. The *suggestion* to keep off turnpikes, to save his horses' shoes, did not require him to change the direction prescribed for him on the *right* of the army. He says he hurried on from Virginia to join the army, and by *forced* marches reached Chambersburg on the evening of July 2d, and Cashtown on the next morning — which was the last day of the battle. If he had kept on to Gettysburg, he might have reached there in time to witness the last scene of the great tragedy. He had marched from Berryville to Chambersburg in *three* days — which is exactly the time that it took Longstreet's infantry to march the same distance. But then Longstreet did not pretend to be in a hurry. If keeping behind the *left* wing is the same thing as being on the *right* flank of the army, then there can be no doubt that General Robertson obeyed orders. At Cashtown, he says that he heard that Pleasonton was moving to capture our trains, so he turned off and went to meet him. Pleasonton was then fighting Stuart at Gettysburg. General Robertson made no report of his operations in this campaign, but General Jones, who was

under him, says that at Cashtown an order came from General Lee requiring a cavalry force to be sent to Fairfield, and that in the *absence of General Robertson* he determined to move in that direction at once, and that near there he encountered and routed the 6th United States Regulars. There was *only one* regiment of Federal cavalry there, which thus neutralized two Confederate brigades with two batteries of artillery. If all of our cavalry had been at the front, Meade could not have spared even this one regiment to send after Lee's trains; it would have been all he could do to take care of his own. In the skirmish at Fairfield on July 3d was the first time Robertson's command had seen the enemy since it disappeared from his front at Middleburg, Va., early on the morning of June 26th. Keeping eight days out of sight of the enemy was not exactly the way to carry out Stuart's order *to watch and harass him*. It was his leadership *preceding* the battle that I criticised. In modern war the most important service of cavalry is rendered before a battle begins. General Robertson says that it was at Martinsburg, and not at Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge, "*as Colonel Mosby insinuates,*" that he received orders from General Lee to join the army. In December, 1877, a letter of his was published in the Philadelphia "Times," in which he justified his delay in Virginia, on the ground that his instructions required him "*to await further orders,*" and stated that on June 29th, *at Ashby's Gap*, he received orders from General Lee to join the army, and started forthwith. He fortified this statement by certificates of two members of his staff. The instructions which I recently found among the Confederate archives direct him to hold the mountain gaps "as long as the enemy remains in your [his] front in force." He staid there *three* days after they had gone into Pennsylvania, and now makes no explanation of the delay, but raises an immaterial issue about the skirmish at Fairfield, which simply proves that on the day of battle he was in the rear with the wagon trains. General Robertson says that he gave satisfaction to General Lee. Now, that General Lee was dissatisfied with some one is shown by his report in which he complains that "the movement of the army *preceding* the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry." I have elsewhere shown that this censure can only apply to the commander of the cavalry who was left with him to observe the enemy. As soon as the army returned to Virginia, General Robertson, at his own request, was relieved of command. No argument in favor of acquittal can be drawn from the leniency that was shown in this case. There was but little of the stern Agamemnon in the character of General Lee.

Jno. S. Mosby.

SAN FRANCISCO, August 24th, 1887.

#### An Anecdote of the Petersburg Crater.

I WAS in Virginia in 1864, and the paragraph in General Grant's Vicksburg paper describing the mine explosion and the frightened negro who was lifted "bout t'ree mile" brings to my mind the mining of the Confederate works before Petersburg in the summer of 1864. Among the prisoners captured was one whose face was greatly begrimed, and as he marched by he was saluted by a blue-coat with the remark, "Say, John-

ny! guess you got blown up." "Well," replied Johnny with an oath, "I should just say so; but somehow I got the start of the other fellows, for when I was coming down I met the regiment going up, and they all called me a blasted straggler!"

Henry R. Howland.

BUFFALO, September 7th, 1885.

#### Ransom's Division at Fredericksburg.

IN the August, 1886, number of THE CENTURY General James Longstreet published what he "saw of the battle of Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th, 1862."

The omissions in that article were so glaring and did such injustice, that I wrote to him and requested him to correct what would produce false impressions. His answer was unsatisfactory, but promised that, "I [Longstreet] expect in the near future to make accounts of all battles and put them in shape, in a form not limited by words, but with full details, when there will be opportunity to elaborate upon all points of interest."

General Lee, in his report of the battle of Fredericksburg, December 13th, 1862, writes as follows:

... "Longstreet's corps constituted our left, with Anderson's division resting upon the river, and those of McLaws, Pickett, and Hood extending to the right in the order named. Ransom's division supported the batteries on Marye's and Willis's hills, at the foot of which Cobb's brigade of McLaws's division and the 24th North Carolina of Ransom's brigade were stationed, protected by a stone wall. *The immediate care of this point was committed to General Ransom.*"

The italics in this paper are all mine. The positions are stated by General Lee exactly as the troops were posted. Lee's report continues, farther on:

... "About 11 A. M., having massed his [the enemy's] troops under cover of the houses of Fredericksburg, he moved forward in strong columns, to seize Marye's and Willis's hills. General Ransom advanced Cooke's brigade to the top of the hill, and placed his own, with the exception of the 24th North Carolina, a short distance in rear."... "In the *third assault*" [his report continues] "the brave and lamented Brigadier-General Thomas R. Cobb fell at the head of his gallant troops, and almost at the same moment Brigadier-General Cooke was borne from the field severely wounded. Fearing that Cobb's brigade might exhaust its ammunition, General Longstreet had directed General Kershaw to take two regiments to its support. Arriving after the fall of Cobb, he assumed command, his troops taking position on the crest and at the foot of the hill, *to which point General Ransom also advanced three other regiments.*"

General Kershaw took command of Cobb's brigade, which I had had supplied with ammunition from my wagons, and I repeated the supply during the day.

General Longstreet in his official report says:

... "General Ransom on Marye's Hill was charged *with the immediate care of the point attacked*, with orders to send forward additional reinforcements, if it should become necessary, and to use Featherston's brigade of Anderson's division, if he should require it." And continuing, "I directed Major-General Pickett to send me two of his brigades: *one, Kemper's, was sent to General Ransom to be placed in some secure position to be ready in case it should be wanted.*" And again, "I would also mention, as particularly distinguished in the engagement of the 13th, Brigadier-Generals Ransom, Kershaw, and Cooke (severely wounded)."

General McLaws was not upon the part of the field in the vicinity of Marye's and Willis's hills during the

battle, but his aide, Captain King, was killed on the front slope of the hill near Marye's house.

My own permanent command was a small division of two brigades of infantry,—my own, containing the 24th, 25th, 35th, and 49th; and Cooke's, the 15th, 27th, 46th, and 48th regiments,—all from North Carolina; and attached to my brigade was Branch's battery, and to Cooke's brigade the battery of Cooper.

At the time the fog began to lift from the field, I was with Generals Lee and Longstreet, on what has since been known as Lee's Hill. Starting to join my command as the Federals began to emerge from the town, General Longstreet said to me, "Remember, general, I place that salient in your keeping. Do what is needed; and call on Anderson if you want help."

I brought up Cooke before the first assault to the crest of the hills, and before that assault ended, Cooke took the 27th and 46th and part of the 15th North Carolina into the sunken road in front. The 48th North Carolina fought on top of the hill all day.

At the third assault I brought up the 25th North Carolina just in time to deliver a few deadly volleys, and then it "took position shoulder to shoulder with Cobb's and Cooke's men in the road."

During this third attack General Cobb was mortally hit, and almost at the same instant, and within two paces of him, General Cooke was severely wounded and borne from the field, Colonel E. D. Hall, 46th North Carolina, assuming command of Cooke's brigade.

At this juncture I sent my adjutant-general, Captain Thomas Rowland, to the sunken road to learn the condition of affairs. "His report was most gratifying, representing the troops in fine spirits and an abundance of ammunition. I had ordered Cobb's brigade supplied from my wagons."

After this third attack I was bringing up the 35th and 49th North Carolina of my brigade, when General Kershaw, by a new road leading from the mill below, came up on horseback with his staff at the head of *one* regiment, which he took in just at Marye's house. He was followed by a second regiment, which halted behind a brick-walled graveyard upon Willis's Hill.

About sundown Brigadier-General Kemper was brought up, and relieved the 24th North Carolina with two of his regiments and held the others in closer supporting distance. On the 20th of December, 1862, he sent me a list of his casualties, with this note:

"HEADQUARTERS KEMPER'S BRIGADE,  
December 20th, 1862.

"GENERAL: I inclose herewith the statement of the losses of my brigade on the 13th and 14th insts. while acting as part of your command. While a report of my losses has been called for by my permanent division commander, and rendered to him, it has occurred to me that a similar one rendered to yourself would be proper and acceptable. Permit me to add, general, that our brief service with you was deeply gratifying to myself and to my entire command. I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

"J. L. KEMPER, BRIGADIER-GENERAL.  
"BRIG.-GEN. RANSOM, COMMANDING DIVISION."

As stated in my letter to General Longstreet dated August 14th, 1866, when I brought to his attention his extraordinary omissions, it gave me unfeigned pleasure to mention properly in my official report the meritorious conduct of those who were a part of my permanent command and those others who that day fell under my direction by reason of my "*immediate care of the point attacked.*" My official report exhibits no self-seeking nor partial discriminations.

Upon a letter from me (of the 17th of December, 1862) to General R. H. Chilton, assistant adjutant-general Army of Northern Virginia, wherein I protest against the ignoring of my command in some telegraphic dispatches to the War Department at Richmond relative to the battle of the 13th, General Longstreet indorses these words: "*General Ransom's division was engaged throughout the battle and was quite as distinguished as any troops upon the field*"; and the same day, the 19th of December, I received from both him and General Chilton notes expressing the regret felt by General Lee at the injustice of which I complained. Those original letters are now among the "Official Records" in Washington.

I may be pardoned for remembering with pride that among the Confederate troops engaged on the *whole* battle-field of Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th, 1862, none were more honorably distinguished than the sons of North Carolina, and those of them who with brother soldiers from other States held the lines at Marye's Hill against almost ten times their number of as brave and determined foes as ever did battle can well trust their fame to history when written from truthful official records.\*

R. Ransom.

\* When credit is not given for quotations, they are from my official report of the battle.—R. R.



THE BAGGAGE GUARD.

## MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

### Union War Songs and Confederate Officers.

THE reading of Mr. Brander Matthews's "Songs of the War," in the August number of *THE CENTURY*, vividly recalls to mind an incident of my own experience which seems to me so apt an illustration of the effect of army songs upon men that I venture to send it to you, as I remember it, after twenty-two years.

A day or two after Lee's surrender in April, 1865, I left our ship at "Dutch Gap," in the James River, for a run up to Richmond, where I was joined by the ship's surgeon, the paymaster, and one of the junior officers. After "doing" Richmond pretty thoroughly we went in the evening to my rooms for dinner. Dinner being over and the events of the day recounted, the doctor, who was a fine player, opened the piano, saying: "Boys, we've got our old quartette here; let's have a sing." As the house opposite was occupied by paroled Confederate officers, no patriotic songs were sung. Soon the lady of the house handed me this note: "Compliments of General — and Staff. Will the gentlemen kindly allow us to come over and hear them sing?" Of course we consented, and they came. As the general entered the room, I recognized instantly the face and figure of one who stood second only to Lee or Jackson, in the whole Confederacy. After introductions and the usual interchange of civilities, we sang for them glees and college songs, until at last the general said: "Excuse me, gentlemen, you sing delightfully, but what *we* want to hear is your army songs." Then we gave them the army songs with unction, the "Battle Hymn of the Republic," "John Brown's Body," "We're Coming, Father Abraham," "Tramp, Tramp, Tramp, the Boys are Marching," through the whole catalogue, to the "Star-spangled Banner,"—to which many a foot beat time as if it had never stepped to any but the "music of the Union,"—and closed our concert with "Rally Round the Flag, Boys." When the applause had subsided, a tall, fine-looking fellow in a major's uniform exclaimed, "Gentlemen, if we'd had your songs we'd have licked you out of your boots! Who could n't have marched or fought with such songs? While we had nothing, absolutely nothing, except a bastard 'Marseillaise,' the 'Bonny Blue Flag,' and 'Dixie,' which were nothing but jigs. 'Maryland, my Maryland' was a splendid song, but the true, old 'Lauriger Horatius' was about as inspiring as the 'Dead March in Saul,' while every one of these Yankee songs is full of marching and fighting spirit." Then turning to the general he said: "I shall never forget the first time I heard 'Rally Round the Flag.' 'T was a nasty night during the 'Seven Days' Fight,' and if I remember rightly it was raining. I was on picket, when, just before 'taps,' some fellow on the other side struck up that song and others joined in the chorus until it seemed to me the whole Yankee army was singing. Tom B——, who was with me, sung out, 'Good heavens, Cap, what are those fellows made of, anyway? Here we've licked

'em six days running and now, on the eve of the seventh, they're singing "Rally Round the Flag." I am not naturally superstitious, but I tell you that song sounded to me like the 'knell of doom,' and my heart went down into my boots; and though I've tried to do my duty, it has been an up-hill fight with me ever since that night."

The little company of Union singers and Confederate auditors, after a pleasant and interesting interchange of stories of army experiences, then separated, and as the general shook hands at parting, he said to me: "Well, the time *may* come when we can *all* sing the 'Star-spangled Banner' again." I have not seen him since.

*Richard Wentworth Browne.*

### General Edwards's Brigade at Spotsylvania.

IN the interesting article in the June *CENTURY*, entitled "Hand-to-Hand Fighting at Spotsylvania," the author, while generally accurate and graphic, unaccountably omits any reference to that brigade of the Sixth Corps which was first engaged there, which was holding the key to the position when his own (Upton's) brigade came upon the field, and which, without egotism, can claim to have fought longer and more effectively than any other brigade of the Sixth Corps engaged. This honorable claim is made for the Fourth Brigade, Second Division, commanded by Colonel Oliver Edwards, which on that day had present for duty three small regiments, the 10th and 37th Massachusetts and the 2d Rhode Island. This claim is based upon the following facts:

When the two divisions of the Sixth Corps, which had been massed the previous evening, were summoned to the support of General Hancock, whose Second Corps had penetrated the Confederate lines, General Wright, who had just assumed command of the Sixth Corps, directed that the first brigade under arms and ready to move should lead the way. Edwards's brigade was first in line and led the march of the corps. It moved to the vicinity of the Landrum House, passing the Confederate generals and some of the prisoners who had been captured by Hancock, and, reaching the edge of woods facing the scene of action, came into line of battle facing by the rear rank, and advanced toward the captured works with the 10th Massachusetts on the right, the 2d Rhode Island in the center, and the 37th Massachusetts on the left.

The situation at this time was simply this,—the force of the Second Corps' attack had of itself broken up the organization of that command; the mass of men had been withdrawn to the outer face of the Confederate works and re-formed as well as possible under the circumstances. By the time this was accomplished the Confederates were prepared to undertake the recapture of the works they had lost. Then it was that Edwards's brigade moved forward and occupied the outer face of the intrenchments, relieving some troops already there

and connecting with the Excelsior Brigade. As the command came into position, it covered the nose or apex of the angle with the Rhode Island regiment, the 10th Massachusetts extending along the right face.

The brigade was scarcely in position when the Confederates advanced to the attack, the ground being extremely favorable for their purpose. On their side of the works it was wooded, and, in addition, scarcely forty yards to the rear of the fortifications was a hollow or a ravine which formed a natural siege approach. In that ravine, almost within pistol-shot of the Union lines, they were enabled to form columns of assault entirely screened from view, and the resulting attack had the appearance of lines of battle suddenly springing from the bosom of the earth. Three times in rapid succession their columns formed and rushed upon the angle held by Edwards and his nine hundred men, and as often did the deliberate fire of the Fourth Brigade repel the attack with terrible slaughter. To the right of Edwards's position, however, the defense was not so successful; the Union troops were driven back from the intrenchments, a force of Confederates crossing the works and taking position in a piece of woods, which gave them an enfilading fire on Edwards's right, so severe and well directed that it threw his 10th Regiment into confusion. It was at this time that Upton's brigade came upon the field and, in the words of that officer himself, encountered so severe a fire that he was unable to occupy the intrenchments, but resting his left upon them, near Edwards's right, his brigade lay down and opened fire.

Thus three assaults had been repulsed by Edwards's brigade before any other troops of the Sixth Corps came upon the field. As soon as the development of the Union line to the right relieved the flank fire somewhat, the 10th Regiment was returned to its place in the works, and throughout the remainder of that memorable day the brigade held its position with a fire so deadly and well directed that no hostile lines of battle could live to cross the few yards between the works and the ravine spoken of. Once, indeed, by the use of a white flag the Confederates came near accomplishing by stratagem what they had failed to do by force of arms. This emblem of peace being displayed in front of the Fourth Brigade, an officer ranking Edwards, but himself ranked by General Eustis, who was present, unjustifiably ordered the Fourth Brigade to cease firing. Instantly the purpose of the movement was shown by the dash of the Confederate line of battle for the coveted works. Fortunately, however, Edwards and his command were on the alert, and repulsed the attack, but not until the hostile colors were for a moment planted on the works,—the only instance during the day in which anything like a line of battle was enabled to advance so far at that point.

Near night the brigade was relieved, but the 37th Regiment was almost immediately ordered back to hold the works which had been unceremoniously vacated by a regiment of the Second Corps out of ammunition. The guns of the 37th also were empty, but the brave fellows pushed their bayonets under the head log, and thus held the works until a fresh supply of ammunition could be procured, when the firing was resumed and continued until 3 o'clock on the morning of the 13th.

This regiment was thus in action continually for more

than twenty hours, during which time it fired over four hundred rounds per man. At one time its guns became so foul that they could no longer be used, many of them bursting in the hands of the men. As it was impossible to relieve the line, a regiment from the Second Corps exchanged guns with the 37th, enabling the latter to continue their fire without interruption. It was in front of the right wing of this regiment and almost directly in the rear of the apex that the oak-tree, twenty-one inches in diameter, was cut down by bullets and fell within the Confederate lines.\* I believe every regiment that fought anywhere in that part of the field claims to have shot down this particular tree; but in truth no single organization is entitled to all the credit. Certainly the Fourth Brigade, and especially its 37th Regiment, may claim the lion's share. Not only was this command engaged longer than any other, but all day the fire of the entire brigade was delivered under the head log, deliberately and well directed, and from the position of the troops a large portion of their fire concentrated at this point. Another fact, which would seem to settle the matter, was that the tree fell during the night, near midnight in fact, and hours after the firing had practically ceased on all parts of the line save at this vital point.

*James L. Bowen.*

SPRINGFIELD, MASS.

#### The Lost War Maps of the Confederates

IN several published articles, and in several books by Confederate generals and civilians, there have been severe criticisms (some just and some unjust) in regard to the want of suitable maps for the guidance of our commanders. General D. H. Hill in *THE CENTURY*, and General Dick Taylor and Mr. Jefferson Davis in their books, have made special mention of this want, and General Long in his recent "Memoirs of Robert E. Lee" comes to the defense of that distinguished general from this implied blame, and remarks that "the want of maps should be placed where it properly belongs,—with the war-directing authority at Richmond," and he further states that "the blunders complained of were more the result of inattention to orders and want of proper energy on the part of a few subordinate commanders than any lack of knowledge of the country." These remarks of General Long are substantially true. The writer has the best of reasons from personal knowledge and observation, and from an interview with General Lee a little after daybreak on Sunday morning, June 29th, 1862, for confirming the truth of the latter remarks as to "inattention to orders and want of proper energy," in this particular campaign up to that date. The escape of McClellan's army from White Oak Swamp was undoubtedly due to these short-comings, and I am persuaded that General Long and others have proved conclusively that the same cause prevented the concentration of Lee's army at the proper time before Gettysburg and occasioned its defeat there. It is one of the many failings of humanity to shift blame from one shoulder to another, as it is also to claim the merit of success where it is not due. Any simpleton can now untie a Gordian knot, knowing how Alexander did it.

\* Several trees were cut down.—See foot-note, page 306, of *THE CENTURY* magazine for June, 1887.—EDITOR.

It is true that there were no maps of any account in existence at the time when General Lee assumed the command, that were of use to the Army of Northern Virginia, June 1st, 1862. Incomplete tracings or fragments of the old "Nine-Sheet" map of Virginia were probably all that our commanders had for guidance. General Long has, therefore, seemingly made an error in asserting in his note at the close of chapter ten of his book that the map accompanying that chapter was "used by General Lee during this campaign," as will be seen by reference to the indorsements on the map itself. The "Seven Days' Fight" occurred in June-July, 1862. This map was approved by me April 3d, and was "sent from the Engineer Bureau with letter of April 4th, 1863." It may, as alleged in the note, have been *filed* subsequent to these dates, but it was not in existence at the time stated by General Long, as will be seen further on.

Up to this period the blame, if any is due, must lie with the "war-directing power at Richmond." It is probable that weightier matters filled the minds of the higher authorities at this time, and that too much reliance was placed by commanders in the field in the efficiency of local guides and the insane and ridiculous notion that was affected that one Southern man could lick three Yankees under any and all circumstances; and besides, our armies as yet had not had sufficient battlings and unnecessary losses of men, to develop the indispensable necessity of a more intimate knowledge of topographical details of regions over which troops must be manœuvred. The march up the peninsula from Yorktown, the battle of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, Jackson's collision with Hill's line of march from Mechanicsville to Gaines's Mill, and the whole seven days' campaign brought out this fact in strong colors, bloody colors, at Beaver Dam Creek.

One of the first things that engaged General Lee's attention on taking command of the army was the organization of some plan for procuring accurate maps for his own use and that of his commanders. A few days after this event, on the 3d or 4th of June, the writer was sought by Major Walter H. Stevens, Chief Engineer of the army at that time, and Major Jasper S. Whiting, his associate, and was informed that they had been sent from headquarters by General Lee to find a suitable person to take charge of a topographical organization which he was desirous of having formed as soon as possible, and proceed to the field, as he found no maps of consequence on taking command of the army; and as maps were indispensable, no means must be spared to procure them. I was asked if I would undertake the duty and on what terms. They were informed that I had an application for the appointment to a captaincy in the Engineer Corps, favorably indorsed by the President, which for several months had been conveniently pigeon-holed in the Engineer Bureau, and that if they would procure that appointment I would accept it and proceed immediately to work. It was done by order of General Lee on recommendation of those officers, and my commission was dated and received on June 6th. Two or three surveying parties furnished with the necessary instruments were immediately organized and started from Richmond as a center, to radiate thence to the picket-lines of the army, from Meadow Bridge around to James River, each party taking an allotted sector of that circumscribed

space. This work had not sufficiently far advanced to be of any use in June, for no part of the region beyond our lines was accessible to survey until June 30th, when orders were given to follow in the wake of our army and extend the surveys as fast and as far as possible. The field work was mapped as fast as practicable, but as the army soon changed its location, more immediate attention was given to other localities. Therefore, this map in question was dated 1862-3: it was not available as complete until the spring of 1863. Other parties, soon after these first ones were started, were sent into Hanover and Spotsylvania counties, and as fast as possible other parties, amounting in all to about thirteen, were formed and sent into other counties of northern and north-eastern portions of Virginia, until in the course of time detailed surveys were made and at the close of the contest nearly all the work was mapped, from the western part of Fauquier and Rappahannock counties to Wilmington, North Carolina; from the strategic lines on the eastward to the Piedmont region of Virginia; and down the valley of Virginia as far as the Potomac River in Jefferson and Berkeley counties; and into south-western Virginia as far as Smyth county; and nearly all the counties south of James River east of Lynchburg unoccupied by the Federal forces. The surveys in North Carolina embraced a considerable belt on each side of the Weldon and Wilmington R. R. The exact limits of these extensive surveys can not now be recalled, for these maps have all been lost.

The general plan of operations was adopted of placing full parties in each county, and maps of each county thus successively surveyed in detail were constructed on a comparatively large scale, giving full credit to heads of field corps in the titles; and also general maps, one north and one south of James River, were prepared on a smaller scale, preserving all the details. So great was the demand for maps occasioned by frequent changes in the situation of the armies, that it became impossible by the usual method of tracings to supply them. I conceived the plan of doing this work by photography, though expert photographers pronounced it impracticable, in fact impossible. To me it was an original idea, though I believe not a new one, but not in practical use. Traced copies were prepared on common tracing-paper in very black India ink, and from these sharp negatives by sun-printing were obtained, and from these negatives copies were multiplied by exposure to the sun in frames made for the purpose. The several sections, properly toned, were pasted together in their order, and formed the general map, or such portions of it as were desired; it being the policy, as a matter of prudence against capture, to furnish no one but the commanding general and corps commanders with the entire map of a given region.

From this statement it will be seen that to General Lee is due the credit of promptly originating methodical means for procuring accurate maps to supply the want that has been, by implication mainly, so unfavorably commented on. Many maps that grace various memoirs, and personal recollections, and descriptions of campaigns and battle-fields in Virginia have their basis in the maps made as above described, though accredited to others. "I could a tale unfold" in regard to some of these stolen maps, but *cui bono? Nil proprium ducas quod mutari potest.*



General Woodruff, United States Engineer, orally, and Generals Lee and Gilmer and several other persons have from time to time, by letter, inquired of me the fate of these maps. It may be of public interest to give all the information I have concerning them, for it does not seem to be known how extensive, how complete, and how valuable these surveys were. It was gratifying to my pride to learn that the United States Engineer Bureau was desirous of obtaining our maps, and to hear one of the distinguished officers attached thereto remark that our maps were better than their own. His expressed reasons in nowise reflected on his own service, but accounted for it from the fact that no regular system could be maintained in consequence of the frequent change of commanders of the Army of the Potomac. On Sunday, April 2d, the night of the evacuation of Richmond, about 10 o'clock P. M., I placed in charge of an engineer officer and a draughtsman, upon an *archive* train bound for Raleigh, North Carolina, a box or two containing all the original maps and other archives of my office, except the field notebooks, which were burned by order of my superior. This officer in charge never has reported to me the fate of this property, nor his own fate. It is supposed it was burned with the train, or pillaged, for fragments of some of the maps were reported to have been seen along that route in North Carolina. Nineteen years after the shipment of this property I received a package of worthless securities, personal property, from a son of General Gilmer in Savannah. He could give no information as to how this package came into his father's possession. I presume General Gilmer did not have them in 1867-8, when I saw him in Savannah, for he did not mention them. This package was in one of those boxes, my camp-desk. Who sent those papers to General Gilmer? and did the sender retain the maps and correspondence? There were many autograph letters from various generals acknowledging with thanks the receipt of maps, with commendations as to their completeness and accuracy. I should like to recover these letters. The *negatives* of the general maps, to divide the chances of capture, I gave to my private secretary. Some time after, he informed me that he had carried them with him in his flight as far as Macon, Georgia, and on his return, for greater security, had placed them in a lady's trunk, a fellow-passenger's. Hearing *en route* that all baggage of returning fugitives was to be examined at Augusta, Georgia (which proved to be a false rumor), he incontinently burned them *to save them*. This is the extent of my information concerning the fate of these valuable maps. On learning this sad fate

of all the evidences of our three years' labor, and that my modicum of glory was thus dissipated in thin air, my feelings were akin to those of Audubon when he learned that the rats had destroyed his labor of years in the wilderness of woods; or, more congenially, perhaps, to those of General Magruder on being informed in advance of written orders that he was to make preparations for evacuating his lines before Yorktown at an early hour. Raising himself on one elbow, when he was roused from his slumbers to hear the verbal order to that purport from General Johnston, he remarked with mingled astonishment and disgust, in that peculiar manner of speech which all who knew him will recognize: "Stevens (Stevens) *this tranthit gloria pe-nin-thu-le.*"

Albert H. Campbell.

CHARLESTON, W. VA., May 17th, 1887.

General Robert B. Potter and the Assault  
at the Petersburg Crater.

IN THE CENTURY magazine for September (page 764), in an account of the Explosion of the Mine at Petersburg, it is stated that

"each of the three commanders of the white divisions presented reasons why his division should *not* lead the assault. General Burnside determined that they should 'pull straws,' and Ledlie was the (to him) unlucky victim. He, however, took it good-naturedly."

There are the best reasons for saying that this statement is incorrect, and among them is a letter written by General Robert B. Potter to one who especially enjoyed his confidence, in which he says:

"My division expected and was anxious to have the advance, because they knew the ground, had an interest in the work, were in the best condition, and known to be the best division in the corps."

That he did not have this task committed to him was well known by his friends to have been the one great disappointment of General Potter's army life, and there are those who have often heard him say that, so far from there having been reluctance on the part of any of the division commanders of the Ninth Corps to take the leading place in the charge, they were all desirous of that honor. The question was decided by General Burnside in order that in the choice there should not seem to be any favoritism, and, especially, to avoid that appearance of partiality for a very dear personal friend which would not improbably have been said to have influenced him had he chosen General Potter.

Henry C. Potter.

NEW YORK, Nov. 5th, 1887.



A CAVALRY ORDERLY. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

## MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

### The Opening of the Atlanta Campaign.

IN the August CENTURY General Joseph E. Johnston — *clarum et venerabile nomen* — writes :

Cantey with his division arrived at Resaca that evening (7th) and was charged with the defense of the place. During the day our cavalry was driven from the ground west of Rocky-face through the gap. Grigsby's brigade was placed near Dug Gap, — the remainder in front of our right. About 4 o'clock P. M. of the 8th, Geary's division of Hooker's corps attacked two regiments of Reynolds's Arkansas brigade guarding Dug Gap. They were soon joined by Grigsby's brigade on foot. The increased sound of musketry indicated so sharp a conflict that Lieutenant-General Hardee was requested to send Granbury's Texan brigade to the help of our people, and to take command there himself. These accessions soon decided the contest, and the enemy was driven down the hill. . . .

Information had been received of the arrival of the Army of the Tennessee in Snake Creek Gap, on the 8th. At night on the 9th General Cantey reported that he had been engaged with those troops until dark. Lieutenant-General Hood was dispatched to Resaca with three divisions immediately.

It so happened that the brigade of Kentucky cavalry was present at Dug Gap and Snake Creek Gap, and that the regiment I commanded — the 9th Kentucky Cavalry — was in front at both places; and it may not be improper to put on record an account of those affairs, and thereby correct the unintentional mistakes in the meager statements given above.

The winter having ended and all possible preparations having been made, the operations known as the Dalton-Atlanta campaign opened on May 5, 1864, by the advance of General Thomas on Tunnel Hill, and on May 7 the withdrawal of our forces within Mill Creek Gap marked the beginning of the long retreat. Including the corps of General Polk, then under orders to join him, General Johnston had under his command, available for strategic purposes, between 65,000 and 70,000 men of all arms. It was a superb army of veterans, with implicit confidence in its general, and capable of great achievements. Deficient to a certain extent in supplies, it had enough for any possible movement its commander could order. Being a Confederate army, it necessarily was inferior to the army before it in numbers, equipment, and supplies. This was generally the case. It was necessarily so. With five millions to over twenty millions; with no market, no ships, no factories, no credit; against a people commanding the sea, rich in all resources, and with all the world to buy from, — it was the fate of the Southern armies to confront larger, better equipped, and admirably supplied armies. Unless we could by activity, audacity, aggressiveness, and skill overcome these advantages it was a mere matter of time as to the certain result. It was therefore the first requisite of a Confederate general that he should be willing to meet his antagonist on these unequal terms, and on such terms make fight. He must of necessity take great risks and assume grave responsibilities. While these differences between the two armies that confronted each other in the mountains of North Georgia existed, they were no greater than always existed, and for which every Con-

federate general must be presumed to have prepared. I repeat, it was a superb army. While it had met defeat, and knew what retreat meant, it had fought battles which were, and are, among the bloodiest in all the annals of war; and it felt that under Johnston it could parallel Chickamauga and renew the glories of Shiloh.

It lay behind an impassable ridge, through which, on its left flank, were only two accessible gaps, — Dug Gap, less than four miles south-west from Dalton, on the main road from Dalton to Lafayette, and perhaps six miles from Mill Creek Gap, and Snake Creek Gap, some eighteen miles south from Mill Creek Gap. With these gaps fortified, the left flank and rear of that army were absolutely safe; for while the Rocky-face and Chattooga ridges protected our flank, through these gaps we had access to attack the flank of the enemy if he attempted to make a march so far to the left and rear as to threaten our communication south of the Oostenaula or Coosa. These gaps were capable of easy and impregnable fortification. Dug Gap was a mere road cut out of the mountain-side, and really needed no breastworks, for the natural palisades and contour of the mountain rendered easy its defense by resolute men. Snake Creek Gap was a gorge apparently cut through the mountains by the creek which ran through it. It was a narrow defile between Milk Mountain and Horn Mountain, which are merely a prolongation of the Chattooga Mountains, and capable of impregnable defense.

These gaps were well known to both armies. Through them ran public roads, and soldiers of both armies had marched through both. Late in February Dug Gap had been seized by an Indiana regiment and held until Cleburne retook it. As early as February General Thomas, knowing that at that time Snake Creek Gap was unguarded, proposed a campaign, the plan being to attract General Johnston's attention by a demonstration on Buzzard Roost, and to throw the main body of the army through Snake Creek Gap, and cut his communications between Dalton and the Oostenaula.

Neither of these gaps was fortified, and on May 5, when the campaign opened, Dug Gap was guarded by a small command of Arkansas troops under Colonel Williamson, numbering perhaps 250, and Snake Creek Gap was left wholly unprotected. At Resaca, where the railroad crosses the Oostenaula, Cantey's brigade was held on the evening of the 7th of May, on its route from Rome to Dalton.

General Sherman had in hand for attack nearly 100,000 men and 254 guns, divided into three armies, — the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by General Thomas, numbering 60,773; the Army of the Tennessee, General McPherson, 24,465; the Army of the Ohio, General Schofield, 13,559. It was a superb army, admirably equipped, abundantly supplied, excellently led. It was veteran, and had known victory. It had pushed its antagonist out of Kentucky with the surrender of Donelson; had captured Tennessee; captured

Vicksburg; repossessed the Mississippi River; driven its foe over Missionary Ridge in flight. It knew how to fight, and was willing to fight.

On May 7 our cavalry was driven through Mill Creek Gap. On that night, after we had gone into camp, Colonel Grigsby, who commanded the Kentucky cavalry brigade, was ordered to send a regiment to the front of Dug Gap, to guard the approaches to it. In obedience to that order the 9th Kentucky Cavalry passed over Rocky-face Ridge, and near to midnight bivouacked on Mill Creek, about a mile from, and in front of, Dug Gap. Heavy picket lines were thrown out on all the roads leading down the valley. There were several of these roads, and scouts were sent out to ascertain the movements of the enemy. By daylight it was discovered that very large bodies of troops were moving down the valley on all the roads leading to the south. General McPherson had marched from Chattanooga to Rossville, thence west of Chickamauga Mountain to Shipp's Gap and to Villanow, where the road forks,—one branch leading down the east foot of Taylor's Ridge, the other leading across towards Rocky-face; this road again forks, one leading through Dug Gap, the other down the valley to Snake Creek Gap. Until McPherson reached Villanow it was only a conjecture as to his course, and until the head of his column turned towards Snake Creek Gap his destination was uncertain. His march was concealed by Hooker's corps of the Army of the Cumberland, which corps, forming Thomas's right, marching from Ringgold via Nickajack Gap and Trickum, hid the flank movement of McPherson. The plan was for Hooker to seize Dug Gap and push forward sufficiently to protect the flank of McPherson, and strike the flank of Johnston if he turned on McPherson; while McPherson, marching through Snake Creek Gap to Resaca, should not only destroy but hold the only railroad tributary to Johnston. The possession of Dug Gap by Hooker not only rendered Dalton untenable, but made a retreat from Dalton by the line of the railroad extremely hazardous, and it completely protected McPherson from attack on his left flank. With Hooker descending from Rocky-face on our left flank and rear, McPherson holding Resaca, Thomas, with the corps of Howard and Palmer, pushing to Dalton, and Schofield to his left, our army would have been in perilous posture.

The march of Hooker and McPherson was discovered early on the morning of May 8 by the scouts of the 9th Kentucky Cavalry, and timely information given that at least an attack on Dug Gap was certain, and that the columns on the march were very heavy, and their movements guarded by forces too large to be either resisted or developed by the detachments sent out by the 9th Kentucky. On this information the remainder of Grigsby's brigade was ordered to Dug Gap, and reached there none too soon. All possible delay to the march of Hooker's corps was made, but about 2 P. M. Geary's division of that corps drove the 9th Kentucky across the creek and slowly up the mountain-side, until the regiment fell back in its proper position in the gap, where it found the brigade drawn in mere skirmish line along the edge of the mountain-side. As one-fourth of cavalry soldiers hold the horses, I presume that we had about 800 of our brigade in the fight and 250 Arkansas troops; and this handful of men held that gap until nightfall, repelling every

assault. After nightfall Granbury's Texas brigade relieved us, but the assault was over. Hooker had failed in his part of the mission. That flank of our army was safe.

The importance of holding that gap was so manifest that Generals Hardee and Cleburne, with their staffs, galloped to the scene to encourage us by their presence and to aid Colonel Grigsby by their suggestions; and though the fight was made under their eye, that command needed no encouragement, and its officers and men knew that they were holding one of the doors to Dalton.

I hold in my hand the official report of General Geary, by whom that attack was made, and on the whole it is a fair and soldierly report. But he is mistaken in his belief that we had two lines of intrenchments, or that we were ever driven from our first position. Our loss was very small—in killed and wounded not a score. He reports that he made that attack with two brigades of infantry and two batteries, being an aggregate of perhaps 4500 men, or about four to one, besides the batteries. Assault after assault was made from 3 o'clock until after dark, and each assault repulsed with loss. At first, in a mere spirit of exuberant fun, some of the men rolled stones down the mountain-side; but when the effect was noticed they were directed to use these means as part of our defense; great stones were rolled down on the supporting lines on the mountain-sides or at its foot; and as these boulders would go leaping, crashing, breaking off limbs, crushing down saplings, we fancied we could see the effect of the unexpected missiles. It also proved a valuable resource to us, for our ammunition would have given out, and was about exhausted when the attack ceased.

General Geary reports an aggregate loss of 357 officers and men, of whom some 50 were the adventurous advance, who actually reached the crest, only to be made prisoners. After dark our brigade, being relieved by the Texas brigade of Granbury, was ordered to the foot of the mountain to feed and to obtain ammunition.

While this attack had been going on, McPherson had steadily marched towards Snake Creek Gap, to protect which gap no steps had been taken. Undoubtedly if a cavalry force had been started to Snake Creek Gap at the same moment Grigsby was ordered to Dug Gap, it would have reached there before McPherson, and held it during the night of the 8th, during which time infantry support could have reached there. I do not wish to be understood as offering any criticism on these facts; I am merely stating the facts as I believe them. Why these gaps were left unguarded, why a prompt effort was not made to hold Snake Creek Gap, I neither pretend to know nor venture to guess; nor do I offer any criticism. That they were not guarded, and that this gave Sherman the easy means of causing the evacuation of Dalton and the retreat to Resaca, are undoubtedly true. That we could have held Dalton or made an attack on Sherman if these gaps had been held is a problem over which military men may differ. Whatever may have been the reason or cause, the fact is that the provision made to hold Snake Creek Gap was an order to Grigsby during the night of the 8th to move his brigade to its mouth. The 9th Kentucky had been on duty continuously for over twenty-four hours; the whole brigade for over twelve hours, and

under fire all the afternoon. But with cheerful alacrity the command began its march as soon as it could feed, after being relieved by Granbury,—possibly about 10 o'clock. The night was dark, the road rough and unfamiliar, and it was difficult to find guides. But just at dawn we came in sight of the eastern mouth of the gap, and, contrary to our information, found it in possession of the enemy. Colonel Grigsby had been informed that a company of Georgia troops were on picket on the road to the gap, and at or near its eastern outlet. We had not seen that company, and Colonel Grigsby naturally concluded that the troops we saw a few hundred yards before us were those. The usual confusion of an all-night march and the halt of the head of the column had jammed the different organizations somewhat together in a narrow lane. The advanced vidette reported the troops to be Federals. Colonel Grigsby, still supposing them to be Georgians, ordered a small scout to the front. In these few minutes the enemy, having discovered us and being concealed by the character of the ground and the forest, had formed line of battle, while our column had become more confused by many of the men dismounting to rest. Between us and the foot of the mountain was a fallow cotton-field, on the near edge of which was a row of deserted cabins. The road ran along this field a few hundred yards with a gradual descent until it passed through a fringe of willows and underbrush, beyond which there were other open fields, and then on both sides of these open fields were also thick woods.

Suddenly a long skirmish-line broke from the woods, ran to the fringe of willows, and directly through towards the row of cabins, keeping up a brisk fire as they ran. Behind the skirmish-line was developed a line of infantry. For a moment the fire staggered the head of the column, and the order to fall back and form could not be executed. The 9th Kentucky was in front, and very quickly its front companies were dismounted and a dash made for the cabins. Fortunately our men reached them first and drove the Federal skirmishers back. This gave breathing time, of which immediate and brilliant advantage was taken by Major J. Q. Chenowith, who led a portion of the 1st Kentucky, on horseback, on a détour to the right through the woods until he reached the fringe of willows, when at full run he charged the skirmish-line on the left, and the dismounted men of the 9th Kentucky charged on foot through the open field. The audacity of this sudden and unexpected dash caused the skirmish-line to run at break-neck speed, and the line of infantry to halt and to await reinforcements. This gave ample time to form the brigade for its day's work of retreating fight.

The immediate result of this was a delay to the Federal column of several hours, increased caution on the part of McPherson in his march during the day, and prompt information of his movement to our army headquarters.

The force under McPherson was so large that our small brigade of cavalry could not force it to develop its line. All that was possible was to cause the march to be as slow as that of a skirmish-line. This was done. It was late in the afternoon when McPherson drove us into the works before Resaca, which were defended only by Cantey's brigade and ours.

It was a gloomy prospect. We knew that McPherson had a force of from 15,000 to 20,000, and that there was no possibility of our receiving any reinforcements that afternoon and night. One serious attack by McPherson and Resaca must have been captured.

Fortunately McPherson knew that Hooker had failed in his attempt to seize Dug Gap, and consequently the road from Dalton was free to any Confederate column moving on him. The intrenchments at Resaca were formidable, and when McPherson felt the lines, the response was resolute and spirited. As Hardee came as reinforcements at Dug Gap, so here Hood joined us. He and part of his staff came to share our fate. Calmly we waited for the inevitable assault. We did not doubt that it would be made. McPherson was young, ambitious, and able. In our ranks he was accounted the equal, perhaps the superior, of Sherman. Here was an opportunity that Sherman might well say "does not occur twice in a single life"; and not for a moment did we doubt that such a soldier, with such an army, would seize such an opportunity.

I recall the scene, as a group stood on a knoll and watched the skirmishers advance. As the puffs of smoke arose in the distance, as the sharpshooters paid compliments to this group, General Hood rode up, and after a few moments' gaze turned the head of his horse and rode a few feet, and by motion called Colonel Grigsby to him; in another moment Grigsby called me, and General Hood said in a cheery yet grave tone, "We must hold until night."

Just at dusk the enemy began to fall back, and to our surprise the retrograde movement ended near to where we had commenced our fight in the morning.

*Wm. C. P. Breckinridge.*

LEXINGTON, KY., August 27, 1887.

#### Kershaw's Brigade at Fredericksburg.

GENERAL RANSOM'S letter, in THE CENTURY for December, 1887, in regard to his services at Fredericksburg, contains an error in relation to the operations of my brigade. In the morning of that day, my troops were stationed at the foot of Lee's Hill. After the assaults on General Cobb's position had commenced, I was directed to send two of my regiments to reinforce Cobb, and did so. Before they had reached him, tidings arrived of the fall of General Cobb, and I was immediately ordered to take the rest of my brigade to the position held by his forces, and assume command of the troops of McLaws's division there. I preceded my troops, and as soon as possible arrived at the Stevens House at the foot of Marye's Hill. As my brigade arrived they were placed—two regiments, 3d and 7th South Carolina, at Marye's house, on the hill, and the rest of them in the sunken road, with the left resting about the Stevens House. The last regiment that arrived was the 15th South Carolina (Colonel De Saussure's). He sheltered his command behind the cemetery on the hill until his proper position was made known, when he moved deliberately and in perfect order down the road to the Stevens House, and proceeded to the right of my line. Instead of having two regiments engaged at that point, as General Ransom supposes, I had five regiments and a battalion (my entire brigade), each of which suffered more or less severely. During these operations I received no

orders or directions from any officer but my division commander, General McLaws. I requested not to be relieved that night, and remained in that position until the evacuation of Fredericksburg by the Union forces. These facts were officially reported at the time, and were then too well known to be the subject of mistake.

*J. B. Kershaw.*

CAMDEN, S. C., Dec. 6, 1887.

#### The Last Victim of the War.

TO THE traveler on the old Walnut Hills road, Cincinnati, at noon, May 11, 1865, an unwonted spectacle presented itself. To the south of the road along the ravine near by stood, in solemn silence, a regiment of soldiers facing the road, the companies at each wing at right angles, forming a hollow square. Within this, near the left, stood a squad of soldiers, arms at the shoulder, bearing upon the breast of a youth kneeling erect beside his coffin and facing them at eight paces, with hands unbound and tremorless at his side, and eyes bandaged with a white handkerchief. At the word of command the guns were fired and the youth fell dead.

Thus perished Thomas Martin, the last victim of the great civil war. The war was over, Lee had surrendered, Richmond had been taken, Johnston had yielded, Davis had been captured. Federal and Confederate, the blue and the gray, were fraternizing everywhere save in that lonely ravine, within the corporate limits of Cincinnati, where was being transacted the most revolting deed of war — the deliberate killing by overwhelming power of an unresisting human being.

Few of the citizens of Cincinnati were aware of the tragedy at the time; and how few now, as they read this narrative, will recall it. We are living in a time of reminiscences, and the history of this poor Confederate soldier may have its lesson.

Nearly a year before this execution, its victim, a native of Kentucky, had been captured in that State and brought to Cincinnati as a prisoner; there he had been brought before a court-martial upon the charge of being a guerrilla, and had been convicted and sentenced to be shot. He was a mere boy, quite illiterate, unable to read or write: he claimed that he was a regular Confederate soldier, and evidently the distinction between such a soldier and a guerrilla was beyond his knowledge.

At the time this sentence was rendered, no one expected it would be carried into execution. No member of the court, and certainly the military commandant of the city, General August Willich, did not. The sentence had been rendered for its deterrent effect upon the guerrillas in Kentucky. So little did General Willich think the sentence would be executed that he gave the boy his liberty, the freedom of the city, using him as a sort of orderly; and in his intercourse with him he became attached to him. Time passed; and the day when General Hooker would leave the department, of which he had had command since General Sherman's action retired him from the front, was approaching.

In an evil moment for the victim, General Hooker, in the first days of May, 1865, asked an aide to read over the papers on file in the department, so that he might dispose of them. In so doing, the papers relating to this boy were found. The general had forgotten the case. He inquired whether sentence had been executed. Learning that it had not, he sent for General

Willich, his subordinate, and asked for the facts. General Willich stated them as above given. Next day, he received an order from General Hooker directing him to shoot the boy on the 5th of May, then only a few days off. General Willich was dumfounded. To shoot the boy who had been his attendant for nearly a year, and whom he had respected for his faithful conduct, was too much for the stern old soldier of many years and many wars. With tears in his eyes he rushed to Judge Stallo, now our minister at Rome, and besought his interference. Judge Stallo, in turn, came to me and solicited my aid.

Meanwhile General Hooker had left the city to attend the funeral of Mr. Lincoln at Springfield. Therefore I could not reach him. At my request, Mr. Gaither, then Superintendent of Adams Express Company, sent a telegram to Major Eckert to be laid before Mr. Stanton, requesting his intervention. But no order came, and preparations were made for the execution.

The boy was dressed for death. The priest, Father Garesché, brother to General Rosecrans's chief of staff, — who fell at Stone's River, — attended him. The mournful procession took its way to the ravine, yet General Willich moved slowly, hoping the order for suspension would be received. He left a mounted orderly to wait until the last moment for a telegram from Stanton. Anxiously, imploringly, he looked back for his messenger. At length, to his great joy, in the distance he saw him coming at full speed, holding in his outstretched hand a paper. It was this telegram:

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 5, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER: Suspend the execution of Thomas Martin, to be executed in Cincinnati this day, until further orders.

By order of the President.

E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

Great was the rejoicing. The soldiers who were to shoot the boy now congratulated him on his escape, and all returned to the city. Alas, how short-lived was this joy!

It had been my purpose to advise General Hooker, on his return, of what I had done; but my first knowledge of this was from an aide of his, who delivered a note from the general requesting my presence at his headquarters.

The moment I saw Hooker, I discovered that he was under great excitement, which he was striving to suppress, and in this effort he fairly succeeded. He did not look me full in the face, but sat sideways, looking obliquely, ever and anon casting upon me furtive glances. In slow and measured tones, he said:

"Judge Dickson, I was very angry at you on my return and had ordered your arrest; but reconsidered it, and am now more composed."

"Why, you surprise me, General! What is the matter?"

"Why, sir, on my return to the city I found my administration of this department had been interfered with; that Martin, whom I had ordered shot, had not been shot; that Mr. Stanton had suspended my order. I immediately telegraphed him, demanding why he interfered. He replied that it was in response to the Gaither telegram — your work. I demanded of him to send me a copy of this telegram, which he did. Oh, yes, sir! I have got it. I know all you did."

"Well, General, was it not all right?"

"No, sir; it was not right. No, sir. Why, sir, when I was in command of the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln would not let me kill a man. Lee killed men every day, and Lee's army was under discipline; and now, sir, Lincoln is dead, and I will kill this man. Yes, sir, I will. The order is given to shoot him to-morrow, and he will be shot; and don't you interfere."

"Did Stanton order you to shoot him?" I inquired.

"No, sir. He left the matter in my hands, and I demanded that he be shot—and shot he will be."

"Well, General," I again interposed, "this boy was only a guerrilla. The war is over. He belonged to Colonel Jesse's command. The papers of this morning tell us that the Government has given Jesse the same terms given Lee; that he is now in Louisville, where he has been feasted and fraternized with by Union officers. Will it not be shocking to shoot here one of his deluded followers?"

"It makes no difference," replied the general. "Louisville is not in my department. I am not responsible for what is done there. I will do my duty in my own. I will kill him. Yes, sir, I will; and that to-morrow."

The image of the speaker rises before me with startling distinctness. The manner as well as the words indicated that his mind was oppressed with the thought that Lincoln's humanity had thwarted his career. In some way it seemed to him a relief to sacrifice this boy. Hence his eagerness that the opportunity should not escape him.

As I gazed upon the man the uppermost thought in my mind was, not the brutality of his act, nor yet pity for the fated youth,—though these thoughts were not absent,—but simple amazement that such a man, only a few months before, in a supreme crisis, should have held in the hollow of his hand, as it were, the fate of this mighty nation.

But why revive these harrowing incidents of the war? As well ask, Why tell the story of the war at all? If it is to be told, let us have the whole. Let the young not be misled; the dread reality has something else than the pomp and circumstance, however glorious. Besides, there will be other wars and other generals. Let these remember that an abuse of power will sooner or later rise up in judgment against them.

*W. M. Dickson.*

#### Hooker on the Chancellorsville Campaign.

[THE subjoined letter has been kindly furnished to us for publication by Lieutenant Worth G. Ross, son of the late Colonel Samuel Ross, to whom it is addressed. It is believed that it has not before been printed.—EDITOR.]

LOOKOUT VALLEY, TENN., Feb. 28, 1864.

MY DEAR COLONEL: For some reason your letter was a long time in reaching me. When the Eleventh Corps gave way on Saturday, Berry's division and Hays's brigade were dispatched to seize and hold the ground occupied by the left of that corps. Berry double-quickened his men to the point, but was too late. The enemy were already in possession. When this was reported to me I directed my engineers to establish a new line, which was pointed out to them on the map, and at the same time stated to them that we would

probably have to move on it as soon as the enemy opened on us in the morning, as his batteries would sweep the plain in front of the Chancellorsville House, and, besides, enfilade the line held by the Second and Twelfth Corps nearly its entire length. Soon after these instructions were given to the engineers, peremptory orders were sent to General Sedgwick to advance over the plank road from Fredericksburg and attack the enemy in front of the Second and Twelfth Corps at daylight. My single object in holding on to the position as long as I did was to hear Sedgwick's guns, which I momentarily expected, of course. General Warren had been sent to guide him. The orders reached him between 10 and 11 o'clock, [he] had but eight miles to march, a bright moonlight night, with only a small force to oppose. Probably had he marched as directed, not a gun would have been fired. With Lee in my front and Jackson on my flank I was unwilling to attempt to force my way through Lee, especially as the roads through the forests would only enable me to present my columns with narrow fronts, which the enemy could cut down as fast as they were exposed. I knew that I could do this, and I gave the enemy credit for being able to do as much as I could, but no more. Had Sedgwick come up on Lee's rear, the latter would have found himself between two armies, and would doubtless have followed Jackson's flank movement, which I desired, as that would throw the enemy off the short road to Richmond and our troops on it. I do not know that you ever heard that I had one and a half millions of rations afloat in the Potomac to throw up the Pamunkey River in view of this contingency.

I recrossed the Rappahannock, expecting to return at or near Franklin's Crossing, where I had elbow room, and at least an even chance for being victorious, and so stated to the President at the time. No general battle was fought at Chancellorsville, for I was unwilling to give battle with such great odds against me. I rejoice that what was not gained was not lost.

We lost no honors at Chancellorsville. With all of our misfortunes the enemies' loss exceeded our own by one-third. Of this I have abundant evidence in the official returns of the enemies' casualties, as they have from time to time been published. If I did not cross the river again it will appear that it was for reasons over which I had no control. The rains had nothing to do with our returning from Chancellorsville, for it had been determined on in my mind long before the rain commenced falling. I do not like to be quoted as authority on this subject until after the official report is published, and for the flattering terms in which you speak of me—*not ever*. I hope that you and yours are well. My kindest regards to Mrs. Ross and my best wishes for yourself.

Your friend,  
JOSEPH HOOKER.

COLONEL SAMUEL ROSS,  
*Commanding Brigade, Twelfth Corps.*

#### Erratum.

A TYPOGRAPHICAL error in General Sherman's "Grand Strategy of the Civil War," in the February number, gave General Thomas's loss at Nashville as 305 instead of 3057 (revised compilation).

## Strength of the Confederate Army at Chickamauga.

ON this moot subject an examination of the original returns in the War Department, which I have personally made, shows the following result:

General Bragg's return, 31st of August, 1863, shows under the heading "present for duty," officers and men, 48,998.

This return does not include the divisions of General Breckinridge or General Preston, the brigades of Generals Gregg and McNair, or the reinforcement brought by General Longstreet. The strength of each is accurately given in Confederate official returns. The

total Confederate force available for battle at Chickamauga was as follows:

General Bragg's army, 31st of August, 1863, for duty.....	48,998
Longstreet's command (Hood's and McLaws's divisions), by return of Army of Northern Virginia, 31st of August, 1863, for duty.....	11,716
Breckinridge's division, by his official report in "Confederate Reports of Battles," for duty.....	3,769
Preston's division, by his official report in "Confederate Reports of Battles," for duty.....	4,509
Brigades of Gregg and McNair, by General Bushrod Johnson's official report (So. Hist. Soc. Papers, Vol. XIII.), for duty.....	2,559
Total.....	71,551

CINCINNATI, O.

E. C. Dawes.

## TOPICS OF THE TIME.

## Shall Fortunes be Limited by Law?

THE leveling instincts of a democracy are apt to answer the question with an emphatic Yes. The equalization of men in their standing before the law, in their political privileges, in their opportunities in the administrative service of the country, in their educational advantages, and in the position of their sects before the State is apt to find in the eyes of many only its next step in the equalization of wealth, or at least in the prevention of the development of extremes. On the other hand, he who pins his faith to the political power of the State, who believes that the State has the right to regulate property because it makes property possible, has only to be convinced that great fortunes are dangerous to the State to echo the democratic answer with another and as hearty an affirmative. The proposal finds even a more favorable soil in our own country for the reason that our whole political system has been consciously set from the beginning against the development of permanent great fortunes, and that with a success in which we have taken considerable pride. Our legislation has aimed at removing every artificial obstacle to the dispersion of great fortunes: primogeniture has been forbidden; entails have been limited; equal division of the property of intestates has become the legal rule; and the result has been, until comparatively recent years, that "from shirt-sleeves to shirt-sleeves were three generations."

The old rule, however, no longer holds good. Representative fortunes have come to be enormously larger—larger, indeed, than were really conceivable fifty years ago; and this one fact has quite altered most of the conditions of the case. Almost any division of the "large fortune" of a half-century ago gave as a result several small fortunes, usually so small as to have in them no power of recuperation and self-increase. But a reasonably equitable division of a fortune of two hundred millions gives at least one fortune whose annual income is so much beyond anything that the heir is at all likely to spend, that its own natural increase will carry the principal up again to its original limit within an ordinary life-time, without any special ability in the owner beyond that of care-taking. The general principle that all the children ought to have a share will no longer suffice to break up and disperse all the fortunes of the republic; the very magnitude of

the estates has already given us some of the phases of a system of primogeniture, from which it had been persistently assumed that we had escaped at the Revolution. An entire escape from all its phases can now be found only in a failure of direct heirs or in the succession of an incorrigible spendthrift. And it is a fact too, to be carefully kept in mind, that the succession of incorrigible spendthrifts is no longer so common as it once was. The larger the estate, the more apt is the heir to be a plain, hard-working young man, who shows more signs of uneasiness at assuming the responsibility of managing the property than of elation over his opportunities of squandering it. Every indication goes to show that our very large fortunes, instead of being dispersed, are to hold their own and even to grow from generation to generation until they reach that natural limit placed by the ability of one person to manage an estate.

It is very natural, then, that those who feel that law and social conditions together have failed in the work which they were considered competent to do should every year have a stronger desire to put new legal limitations on the growth of American fortunes. The dangers of enormous accumulations of wealth in the hands of single persons in a republic, the contrast between the daily income of the "plutocrat" and the amount which the long struggle of a workingman's whole life will bring, the passions aroused by the vulgar display affected by so many of the smaller "large fortunes," are all forces bearing in the same direction. The proposals of prohibitory succession duties on inheritances above a limited amount, of prohibitions of gifts above the same amount, unless to public or charitable uses, or of an income tax rising in percentage with the amount of the income to a prohibitory tax on all incomes above a legal limit, are various forms of a single purpose—that the very rich shall become no richer, and that they shall not be permitted to transmit their present wealth undiminished to an indefinite line of successors.

It is well, however, to weigh carefully the fact that, in the mass of cases, wealth means the sum of some service done to the public, which would not have been done but for the reward found in the legal permission to accumulate and transmit wealth. He who has retired with a snug fortune has been engaged in a life-long struggle to provide dry-goods for the public a