

ions — the two center assaulting divisions — took 31 pieces of artillery, several thousand small arms, and 3800 prisoners. In that one hour of assault they lost 2337 men in killed and wounded,—over twenty per cent. of their whole force! On the northern end of the ridge, General Sherman lost in his two days'

fighting 1697 in killed and wounded. Of these, 1268 were in his own three divisions. During the night the last of Bragg's army was withdrawn from Missionary Ridge, and Chattanooga from that time remained in undisputed possession of the Union forces.

J. S. Fullerton.

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

"Lee's Invasion of Pennsylvania"—A Reply to General Longstreet.

GENERAL LONGSTREET'S article on Gettysburg in the February CENTURY is notable for its mistakes as well as for its attitude toward General Lee and others.

First. The statement that General Lee passed over more deserving officers from other States in order to give the command of his corps to Virginians is an unworthy attack upon a man who was as singularly free from such prejudices as he was from self-seeking, either during the war or after it. Lee said in a letter to President Davis, October 2d, 1862:

"In reference to commanders of corps with the rank of lieutenant-general, of which you request my opinion, I can confidently recommend Generals Longstreet and Jackson, in this army. My opinion of the merits of General Jackson has been greatly enhanced during this expedition. He is true, honest, and brave; has a single eye to the good of the service, and spares no exertion to accomplish his object. Next to these two officers I consider General A. P. Hill the best commander with me. He fights his troops well and takes good care of them. At present I do not think that more than two commanders of corps are necessary for this army."

This was Lee's judgment after a campaign in which both the Hills and McLaws had served, and long before there was any question of making either of them a lieutenant-general. It would be about as just to accuse Lee of undue partiality to Georgia in making Longstreet his senior lieutenant, as it is to accuse him of partiality to Virginia in selecting A. P. Hill rather than D. H. Hill or McLaws for the command of his third corps.

Second. In regard to the battle of Gettysburg: the first day's fight was brought on unexpectedly to Lee. In the absence of Stuart he was not aware of the proximity of the Federal army. The first day's operations were very successful. Two of the seven infantry corps of the Federal army were virtually demolished, having been defeated and driven in disorder completely from the field, leaving many killed and wounded and several thousand prisoners to the victors.

Third. It was at the close of this day's work that General Lee, in view of its results, and of the indications it gave of the position of the Federal army, decided to follow up the fight. General Longstreet advised a movement across Meade's front to threaten his left and rear. Such a movement would have been difficult in the absence of Stuart; it could not have been executed in the then position of the army with sufficient promptness to surprise Meade; and if successful it simply would have forced the Federal army back to some position nearer Baltimore and Washington where the issue of battle was still to be tried. General Longstreet begs the question when he assumes that Meade would then have been obliged to attack at a disadvantage. General Lee decided that this plan did not promise as good results as to follow up the partial victory already gained. More than one-fourth of the Fed-

eral army was beaten. (Of the First and Eleventh Corps that had numbered 20,931 on June 30th, not 5700 were in line on July 2d.) That army was not concentrated, and hours must elapse before its full strength could be marshalled for battle. The absent portions would reach the field jaded by forced marches to meet the depressing news of the defeat of their comrades. Doubt and uncertainty would prevail, increased perhaps by the fact that the present Federal commander was so new in his place. Lee's troops were much better up, only Pickett's division and Law's brigade being out of reach. Not to press the Union army was to lose the greater part of the advantage of the first day's victory. The Federals would soon recover from their depression if not pressed, and his own troops would be disappointed. Lee believed if he could attack early on the second day he would have but part of the Federal army to deal with, and that if he could repeat his success of the first day the gain would be great. He therefore determined upon attack. On the night of the 1st (not on the forenoon of the 2d, as General Longstreet has it) he decided, after a conference with Ewell and his division commanders, to make the attack early next day from his right with Longstreet's two divisions that were within reach, this attack to be supported by Hill and Ewell. (See Ewell's and Early's reports; Early's paper in "South. Hist. Papers," Vol. IV., p. 241; and Long's "Memoirs of Lee.")

Fourth. General Longstreet would have us infer that he was not ordered by General Lee to attack early on the second day; but that his memory is at fault on this point has been abundantly shown by Generals Fitz Lee, Pendleton, Early, Wilcox, and many others. No testimony on this point is more direct and conclusive than that of General A. L. Long, then military secretary to General Lee. He says in his recently published "Memoirs of R. E. Lee" (page 277), that on the evening of the 1st, when General Lee had decided not to renew the attack on Cemetery Hill that day, he said (in Long's presence) to Longstreet and Hill, "Gentlemen, we will attack the enemy in the morning as early as practicable." Long continues: "In the conversation that succeeded he [Lee] directed them to make the necessary preparations and be ready for prompt action the next day." Long shows plainly that General Lee's design was to attack the troops in front before the whole Federal army could get up, and he describes graphically the impatience Lee showed next morning, as early as 9 A. M., at Longstreet's delay. General Longstreet is wrong, too, in giving the impression that his divisions were 15 or 20 miles away on the night of the 1st, for in his official report he says that "McLaws' division. . . reached Marsh Creek, 4 miles from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and Hood's division [except Low's

brigade] got within nearly the same distance of the town about 12 o'clock at night." Hood says he was with his staff "in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak" on the 2d and his troops were close behind. Kershaw (of McLaws' division) says in his official report that on the 1st of July they "marched to a point on the Gettysburg road some two miles from that place, going into camp at 12 P. M."

General Longstreet, to explain his delay, besides the above reasons scrapes together a number of others,—such as the presence of some Federal scouts and pickets west of the Emmettsburg road, the movement of Sickles's rear-guard along that road, the presence of one of General Lee's engineers (who had been sent to give information, not to command his corps). No time need be wasted on these. The fact is that General Longstreet, though knowing fully the condition of things on the night of the 1st, knowing that Lee had decided to attack that part of the Federal army in his front, knowing that every hour strengthened Meade and diminished the chances of Confederate success, and knowing that his corps was to open the battle and deliver the main assault, consumed the time from daylight to nearly 4 P. M., on July 2d, in moving his troops about four miles, over no serious obstacle, and in getting them into battle. Meantime on the Federal side Hancock's corps, which had camped three miles from Gettysburg, reached the field by 6 or 7 A. M.; Sickles's two brigades that had been left at Emmettsburg came up by 9 A. M.; the rear of the Fifth Corps by midday, and the Sixth Corps, after a march of 32 miles in 30 hours, by 2 P. M. Had Longstreet attacked not later than 9 or 10 A. M., as Lee certainly expected, Sickles's and Hancock's corps would have been defeated before part of the Fifth and the Sixth Corps arrived. Little Round Top (which, as it was, the Fifth Corps barely managed to seize in time) would have fallen into Confederate possession; and even if nothing more had been done this would have given the field to the Confederates, since the Federal line all the way to Cemetery Hill was untenable with Round Top in hostile hands.

Fifth. That Longstreet's attack when made was poorly seconded by the other corps may be true, and thus another chance of winning a complete victory on July 2d was lost, but this does not change the fact that the first and great opportunity of that day for the Confederates was lost by Longstreet's delay.

Sixth. Victory on the third day was for the Confederates a far more difficult problem than on the second, but it was still within their reach. But one need not be surprised at the failure of Pickett's attack after reading in this article of the hesitation, the want of confidence and hearty coöperation, with which General Longstreet directed it. Lee never intended that Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble should fight unsupported by the remainder of the army. He expected "that with proper concert of action . . . we should ultimately succeed." (Lee's report.) Longstreet was directed to use his whole corps, and when he felt embarrassed by the Federal forces on or near the Round Tops he was given a division and a half from A. P. Hill's corps with power to call for more. General Long says: "The original intention of General Lee was that Pickett's attack should be supported by the divisions of McLaws and Hood, and General Longstreet was so ordered." ("Memoirs of Lee," page 294. See also statements of

Colonels Venable and Taylor, "Four Years with General Lee," page 108.) Lee's efforts for a concerted attack were ineffectual. Pickett was overwhelmed not by troops in front but by those on his flanks, especially by those on his right flank, where Wilcox was sent forward too late to be of use, and where he was too weak to have effected much at best. Yet Longstreet did not use any part of Hood's and McLaws' divisions to support Pickett, or to make a division in his favor, or to occupy the troops on his flank which finally defeated him. These divisions were practically idle except that one of Hood's brigades was occupied in driving off the Federal cavalry which made a dash on that flank. Longstreet, in a word, sent forward one-third of his corps to the attack, but the remainder of his troops did not coöperate. And yet he reproaches Lee for the result!

McDONOUGH, MD., February 16, 1887.

W. Allan.

Stuart's Ride around the Union Army in the Gettysburg Campaign.

It is generally agreed by Southern writers that the battle of Gettysburg was the result of an accidental collision of armies. General Lee in effect says in his report of the campaign that his failure was due to his ignorance of the movements of the enemy; and the absence of a portion of the cavalry under Stuart, or rather its separation from the army, is assigned as the primary cause of its failure by General Long, the biographer of General Lee, and by General Longstreet in the February CENTURY, 1887. Both ignore the fact that Stuart left with General Lee, under command of General Beverly H. Robertson, a larger body of cavalry than he took with him. General Long charges that Stuart's expedition around Hooker was made either from "a misapprehension of orders or love of the éclat of a bold raid" (which, of course, implies disobedience); and General Longstreet, while admitting that Stuart may have acted by authority of Lee, says that it was undertaken against his own orders, which were to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown, west of the Blue Ridge.

That General Lee was greatly embarrassed by want of intelligence of the movements of the enemy was not due to the lack of cavalry; and Stuart is not responsible for the inefficient manner in which he was served.

When it was determined that Stuart should take three brigades of cavalry to join Ewell on the Susquehanna and leave his other two to perform outpost duty for the army in Virginia, General Lee was in the Shenandoah Valley with the corps of Hill and Longstreet. The latter was holding the gaps and Stuart was guarding the approaches to them east of the Ridge. Hence Stuart came under Longstreet's orders. Hooker's headquarters were in Fairfax, with his army spread out like a fan—his left being at Thoroughfare Gap and his right on the Potomac at Leesburg. On returning from a scout, I reported to Stuart the scattered condition of Hooker's corps, and he determined, with the approval of General Lee, to pass around, or rather through, them, as the shortest route to Ewell. There was an opportunity besides to inflict much damage and to cut off communication between Washington and the North.

I have lately discovered documents in the archives of the War Department that set at rest the question of Stuart's alleged disobedience of orders, and show that General Longstreet then approved a plan which he now

condemns as "a wild ride around the Federal army." He directed Stuart to pass around the rear of the enemy in preference to crossing west of the Ridge, in order to prevent disclosing our designs.*

Under date of June 22d, 7:30 P. M., he writes to General Lee: "I have forwarded your letter to General Stuart, with the suggestion that he pass by the enemy's rear if he thinks he may get through."

Up to the morning of June 25th it was perfectly practicable for Stuart to have done so. In accordance with Lee's and Longstreet's instructions, Stuart withdrew from the front on the evening of the 24th to pass around Hooker, leaving Robertson about Middleburg with three thousand cavalry and two batteries of artillery to observe the enemy. Stuart's success depended upon preserving the *status quo* of the Federal army until he could get through it. Hooker was on the defensive waiting for his adversary to move. It did not seem to occur to General Longstreet that the march of the infantry down the Shenandoah Valley would disclose all to the enemy that the cavalry would have done. It was no fault of Stuart's that he was foiled by events which he could not control. When on the morning of the 25th he reached Hooker's rear, he found his whole army moving to the Potomac and all the roads occupied by his troops. This compelled a wide détour, and instead of crossing the river in advance of the enemy, as he expected, he was two days behind him. Thus all communication was broken with General Lee and Ewell. The march of Hill's and Longstreet's corps on the day before had been in full view of the signal stations on Maryland Heights and was telegraphed to Hooker, who made a corresponding movement.

On the morning of June 26th the enemy disappeared from Robertson's front and crossed the Potomac. In that event his instructions from Stuart were, "to watch the enemy and harass his rear — to cross the Potomac and follow the army, keeping on its right and rear," and "to report anything of importance to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, with whose position you will communicate by relays through Charlestown."

* "HEADQUARTERS, MILLWOOD, June 22, 1863, 7 P. M. MAJ-GEN'L J. E. B. STUART, Comdg. Cavalry. GENERAL: General Lee has inclosed to me this letter for you to be forwarded to you provided you can be spared from my front, and provided I think that you can move across the Potomac without disclosing our plans. He speaks of you leaving *via* Hopewell Gap and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by that route, I think that you will be less likely to indicate what our plans are than if you should cross by passing to our rear. I forward the letter of instructions with these suggestions. Please advise me of the condition of affairs before you leave and order General Hampton — whom I suppose you will leave here in command — to report to me at Millwood either by letter or in person, as may be most agreeable to him. Most respectfully, J. LONGSTREET, Lieutenant-General. — N. B. I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present moment will in a measure disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed route in rear of the enemy. J. LONGSTREET, Lieutenant-General."

"HEADQUARTERS, 22d June, 1863. MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, Commanding Cavalry. GENERAL: I have just received your note of 7:45 this morning to General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were to arrest our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us and get across the Potomac before we are aware. If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank and keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of General Ewell's army will probably move toward the Susquehanna by the Emmettsburg route, another by Chambersburg. Accounts from him last night state that there was no enemy west of Fredericktown. A cavalry force (about one hundred)

Robertson retired to the mountain gaps and remained until the afternoon of the 29th, when he was recalled to the army by a courier from General Lee. At night on the 27th General Lee heard, through a scout at Chambersburg, of Hooker's advance. As no information of it had come from the cavalry he had left in Hooker's front in Virginia, he thought that Hooker was still there. He immediately issued an order for the concentration at Gettysburg, and sent for Robertson's command, that had been left, he says, to hold the mountain passes "as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac." It had staid there three days after they had gone. As Stuart had been ordered to Ewell on the Susquehanna, it could not have been expected that he should also watch Hooker on the Potomac. Stuart's instructions to divide the cavalry and take three brigades with him to Ewell, on the Susquehanna, were peremptory; he was only given discretion as to the point of crossing the Potomac. It was therefore immaterial, so far as giving information to General Lee was concerned, whether he crossed east or west of the ridge. In either event they would have been separated and out of communication with each other. General Lee must then have relied on Robertson or nobody to watch Hooker.

Instead of keeping on the right of the army and in close contact with the enemy, as Stuart had ordered, Robertson's command marched on the left by Martinsburg and did not reach the battle-field. When General Lee crossed the Potomac, he left General Robertson between him and the enemy. By July 3d he had so manoeuvred that Lee was between him and the enemy. Stuart had ridden around General Hooker while Robertson was riding around General Lee. If, in accordance with Stuart's instructions, Robertson had promptly followed on the right of the army when the enemy left, it would have been ready and concentrated for attack; a defensive battle would have been fought, and Gettysburg might have been to Southern hearts something more than a

"Glorious field of grief."

WASHINGTON, Feb. 9, 1887.

John S. Mosby.

guarded the Monocacy Bridge, which was barricaded. You will, of course, take charge of Jenkins's brigade and give him necessary instructions. All supplies taken in Maryland must be by authorized staff-officers for their respective departments, by no one else. They will be paid for or receipts for the same given to the owners. I will send you a general order on this subject, which I wish you to see is strictly complied with. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, K. E. LEE, General."

On the following day General Lee wrote as follows: "HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, June 23d, 1863, 5 P. M. MAJOR-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, Commanding Cavalry. GENERAL: Your notes of 9 and 10:30 A. M. to-day have just been received. . . . If General Hooker's army remains inactive you can leave two brigades to watch him and withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain to-morrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day and move over to Fredericktown. You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, etc. Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind to watch the flank and rear of the army and (in event of the enemy leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and bringing everything clean along the valley, closing upon the rear of the army. As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving toward Warrenton, the commander of the brigades to be left in the mountains must do what he can to counteract them; but I think the sooner you cross into Maryland, after to-morrow, the better. The movements of Ewell's corps are as stated in my former letter. Hill's first division will reach the Potomac to-day, and Longstreet will follow to-morrow. Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements. I am very respectfully and truly yours, R. E. LEE, General."

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

A Missing Confederate Cipher Dispatch.

ON the 6th of April, 1887, a statue of General A. S. Johnston, who fell at Shiloh twenty-five years before, was unveiled in the Metarie Cemetery at New Orleans. Among those present at that interesting ceremony was the Confederate ex-President, Mr. Jefferson Davis. Being called upon, he spoke in his usual controversial vein, including these words: "On the field of Shiloh he [Johnston] made but one mistake. He had planned that battle and had sent me a telegram,—which was lost,—which described it just as it was fought—the only battle in the world's history that was fought as the general expected."

In effect this is but a re-avertment of a story first broached in his "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," and repeated orally in one or more public addresses. In his book (Vol. II., p. 57) Mr. Davis gives the full text of a telegram from General Johnston to himself dated April 3d, 1862, which he describes as explaining the proposed Confederate "order of movement" upon Pittsburg Landing, and the concluding paragraph of which is in these words: "Hope engagement before Buell can form junction." This was immediately followed, on the same page, with a telegram which he says he sent on the 5th of April, to wit, "General A. S. Johnston: Your dispatch of yesterday received. I hope you will be able to close with enemy before his two columns meet."

This is presented, however, by Mr. Davis not as the answer to the telegram of the 3d of April, but to "one in cipher" of the 4th of April, which he declares is lost, thus strangely overlooking the fact that the closing words of his own dispatch are too clearly the echo of those of Johnston's telegram of April 3d not to be his answer thereto, as is made indisputable by the history of that telegram.

As after the 29th of March, 1862, General Johnston really exercised no active command over the army at Corinth, he either had not found it necessary to provide himself with the means of cipher communication with the Richmond authorities or had mislaid them. Be this as it may, after the conference with Beauregard and the corps commanders at the quarters of the former, on the morning of April 3d, when Beauregard explained his plan of battle, which General Johnston approved, the latter, wishing to inform Mr. Davis of the forward movement, wrote the dispatch of that date. To secure the transmission of it with essential secrecy he sent it to Beauregard for translation into a dictionary cipher (based upon Webster's school dictionary, three columns to the page) which that general had for such communications with his government. That translation I give as it exists in General Beauregard's official telegram book in its regular order of date as follows:

"CORINTH, April 3d, 1862, 3 P. M.
"TO THE PRESIDENT, RICHMOND, VA.

"General Buell 132. R. 5—166 L 26—250. M 20—250 Rg—239 M 32—111 M 28—Columbia 43 M 6—Clifton 252 M 6.—218 M. 26. Mitchell 32. R. 22—124. R. 32.—276 R 27—248 M, 1—250 R. 9—59 R. 17—108—M. 20—109. R. 16—175 R 6 ed—109 R. 18—252. M 6—174 L. 28—31 M. 10—69. L. 12—Pittsburg—84 M. 4—111. M. 28—Bethel—156 M. 4—37 M. 20—111. M 28

Corinth—210 M. 16 111 M. 28—Burnsville—63 R. 25—252 R. 11—169. L 12—Monterey—174. R. 14—Pittsburg. Beauregard, 221 R. 10—132 R. 5—56, M. 14—Polk 150. M. 7—Hardee, 48. M: 3—Bragg 213 M. 6—276. M. 22. Breckinridge 210 M. 16—126 M. 4—92. R. 18—32. M. 28—Buell 44. M. 13—109 M. 6—146. L. 20—

(Signed)

"A. S. JOHNSTON,
"General C. S. A."

After translation the original was returned to General Johnston, among whose papers it was found and published by Mr. William Preston Johnston, in the biography of his father, as well as by Mr. Davis, but on the part of the son, altogether unwittingly of the fact that it was the translation of the very cipher dispatch whose loss Mr. Davis had deplored, for the reason, as he imagined, that it was not only the plan of battle as Johnston had devised, but as he had fought it. On the other hand, the son adduces it as "clearly" showing that *it was the plan of battle as his father had originally devised*, but not as he had fought it; "doubtless," as he naively suggests, "in deference to General Beauregard's opinion in the matter, and for reasons which seemed sufficient at the time." In that biography this dispatch appears without the evidence of the hour of its transmission, and is thus and otherwise made to do duty inconsistent with the fact of that hour, to wit, 3 P. M. Here is the text of it as printed both by Mr. Davis and by Mr. W. P. Johnston:

"CORINTH, April 3d, 1862.

"General Buell in motion 30,000 strong, rapidly from Columbia by Clifton to Savannah. Mitchell behind him with 10,000. Confederate forces—40,000—ordered forward to offer battle near Pittsburg. Division from Bethel, main body from Corinth, reserve from Burnsville, converging to-morrow near Monterey on Pittsburg. Beauregard second in command, Polk the left, Bragg the center, Hardee the right wing, Breckinridge the reserve. Hope engagement before Buell can form junction.

"TO THE PRESIDENT, RICHMOND."

Mr. Davis admits that he has vainly sought to resurrect the alleged missing cipher dispatch of the 4th of April. In other words, the original of no such paper was among the very full files of official papers left by General Johnston; though it is a fact that they were so full as to be worth ten thousand dollars after the war to the United States government. But Johnston's papers did contain the telegram of the 3d of April—really the only cipher dispatch that was transmitted. The alleged tenor of the telegram of April 4th makes it improbable, I may add, that any dispatch revealing the plan of battle was sent.

The text of the cipher telegram of the 3d of April disposes of two myths: the one born of the bad memory of Mr. Davis as to its scope and tenor; the other, begotten in the brain of the son by an ill-grounded criticism on the part of the Comte de Paris, to the effect that the attack should not have been made, as it was, in three deployed lines parallel with the line of the enemy, but with the three corps moving in columns of attack perpendicularly to the Federal line, each corps having its own reserve. Turning his back square upon the fact that he had just been laboriously seeking to show that his father, not Beauregard, had planned the manner of the battle as well as of the march, Colonel

Johnston here claimed that his father had originally ordered the attack just as the Comte de Paris fancied it should have been ordered, but "doubtless" had been persuaded out of it by Beauregard — thus, *inops consilii*, contradicting the very claim he had just put forth that his father had designed the tactics of the battle, which therefore was unachieved because of his death.

Should there be a shred of doubt left in regard to the true history of General Beauregard's controlling influence and part in bringing about the Shiloh campaign, that, it seems to me, must disappear before the following telegraphic dispatch, which was sent while General Johnston was marching toward Corinth for the concentration urged by Beauregard:

"DECATUR, March 15th, 1862.

"TO GENERAL G. T. BEAUREGARD:

"Have you had the south bank of the Hatchee examined near Bolivar? I recommend it your attention. It has, besides other advantages, that of being farther from enemy's base.

"A. S. JOHNSTON."

That is to say, as near to the date of the battle of Shiloh as three weeks, General Johnston had regarded it as most advantageous that the Confederate concentration should take place not so near to the enemy's base as Corinth, but fully fifty miles away to the north-westward, behind the Hatchee River, and covering Memphis, according to his Bowling Green memorandum of February 7th, 1862, ready in case of defeat to retire into that town and there await a siege and capture. These are not the views, I submit, of a general who within a week thereafter would repair to Corinth with the plan of an offensive campaign fully rounded in his mind ready for execution within a fortnight, but of one bent solely upon the defensive; views precisely consonant with his proffer of the command to Beauregard, and to withdraw his headquarters from the immediate vicinage of Confederate forces.

Thomas Jordan.

Union Sentiment among Confederate Veterans.

THE ovation to Mr. Henry W. Grady on his return to Atlanta proved how truly he expressed the feelings of his people in his New England Society speech. This feeling is not confined to the new generation who were too young to take part in the war, but it is also the well-nigh universal sentiment of the veterans who fought for the "Lost Cause." For my part, it is now several years since I became convinced that it is an inestimable blessing, not only to the whole country, but especially to us of the South, that the war ended in the removal of the incubus of slavery and the consolidation of the entire nation under one flag and one

government. We can hardly doubt that if the Union had been broken up into three or four confederacies (as it would have been after its prestige was once destroyed), they would have felt toward each other as France, Germany, Austria, and Russia feel at this day. The result would have been vain attempts to maintain a durable balance of power, continual wars, conscription, standing armies, fortifications and custom-houses on every frontier, and burdens far more grievous than those under which all Europe is now groaning. The Southern Confederacy (or confederacies), being inferior in population and resources, would have felt these burdens far more than the others. None of these new nationalities would have been strong enough to command the respect of the great European powers, which would have made America the field of their intrigues and conquests, as was attempted in Mexico under Maximilian. Instead of that, we have the grandest country and the most magnificent destinies ever vouchsafed to any people. We could not realize this while the bitterness of defeat was still fresh in our hearts, but a quarter of a century has produced a vast change in the Southern mind. An old adage says: Wise men change their opinions sometimes — fools never; and the great popular heart is almost always wise.

One thing especially should make us proud — it always gave me pleasure to boast of it when in Europe — and it is this: After passing through the most gigantic struggle that any country ever underwent, not a drop of blood was shed after the heat of conflict had ceased. Not even banishment was inflicted upon any of the vanquished, the result being that instead of creating an Ireland in the South we are now one people, united as one man for the defense and the honor of our whole country.

These opinions, formed even before I left America to follow a military career abroad, were confirmed and intensified by seeing the condition of the European masses, taxed without mercy and made "food for powder" to maintain or modify the "balance of power." Yet if they were only my individual ideas, I would hardly feel justified in proclaiming them; but I will state that in the last few years I have expressed these views to *hundreds* of my former brother-soldiers, and that of all those, *only one* failed to give them the most hearty approval — and he had been a very prominent political leader, but not much of a soldier. I have therefore good grounds for asserting that the Southern veterans who fought the war are a unit in their desire for peace and harmony and the maintenance of the restored Union, now and forever.

R. E. Colston,

Formerly Brigadier-General, C. S. A.

WASHINGTON, February 17th, 1887.



MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

The Question of Command on Cemetery Ridge.

IN the March CENTURY Mrs. Warren publishes a letter of General Warren, written soon after the battle of Gettysburg, showing that General Meade's orders to him on the afternoon of July 2d were to look, not specifically to Round Top, as I have stated, but — a much wider mission — to the left of the army. I regret that I did not see that letter before writing my brief account, in which I dwelt less on General Warren's services than I would otherwise have done, because they were so universally recognized. The duty confided to him was a very responsible one, and, as the result shows, could not have been intrusted to better hands. The quickness with which he comprehended the threatened dangers in all their magnitude, when a simple incident revealed them to *him* as it would have done to few others, the apt measures he adopted to avert them, and, above all, the promptitude — his leading characteristic — with which he *acted*, saved both the Round Tops to us, disconcerted the enemy's plans, and proved General Warren to be what he was, one of the ablest and most meritorious of our generals.

In the same CENTURY General F. A. Walker of General Hancock's staff comments on my expressed belief that, had my instructions for the cannonade of July 3d been carried out by Captain Hazard, commander of the artillery of the Second Corps, the Confederate assault would not have reached our lines; and considers this "a very severe impeachment" of General Hancock's conduct of his artillery. I fully appreciate and honor the motive of General Walker's courteous criticism, and his very kind references to myself, but he writes under misapprehensions which are widespread and misleading, and which, as they place me in a false position, I beg leave to explain. He says:

"In the first place, two antagonistic theories of authority are advanced. General Hancock claimed that he commanded *the line of battle* along Cemetery Ridge. General Hunt in substance alleges that General Hancock commanded the *infantry* of that line, and that he himself commanded the artillery.

"Winfield S. Hancock did not read his commission as constituting him a major-general of infantry, nor did he believe that a line of battle was to be ordered by military specialists. He knew that by both law and reason the defense of Cemetery Ridge was intrusted to him, subject to the actual, authentic orders of the commander of the Army of the Potomac, but not subject to the discretion of one of General Meade's staff-officers. . . .

"So much for the question of authority. On the question of policy there is only to be said that a difference of opinion appears . . . as to what was most expedient in a given emergency."

General Hancock's claim that he commanded all the troops of every description posted on his part of Cemetery Ridge is perfectly valid. It cannot be disputed, and I never questioned it. But all commands must be exercised subject to the established principles for the government of armies. Under these, commanders of special arms issue their own orders direct to their subordinates serving with army corps, who must submit them to the corps commanders with whom they

serve. The latter, being supreme on their own lines, can modify or countermand these orders, but by doing so they make themselves responsible for the result. Thus all conflicts or theories as to authority are avoided. Our "Regulations" (Scott's), adopted in 1821, reads:

"The superior officer of the corps of engineers, or of the artillery, serving with one of the army corps . . . will receive the orders of the commandant thereof, to whom the said superior officer of engineers or of artillery will communicate any orders he may receive from his own particular commandant-in-chief, attached to general headquarters."

Separate paragraphs provided rules for the military "staff" and administration, — the latter including the supply departments. "Staff-officers" are forbidden to give orders except in the names of their generals. From this rule administrative officers are specially exempted, their chiefs directing their respective departments in their own names, but subject to the control of their generals, with whom they serve.

All these regulations are essential to the management of a large army, but are only partly applicable to a two-company post, the school in which most of our officers both of the war-office and of the regiments were trained. So in the "Regulations" of 1861-3, they were all condensed into one short paragraph:

"Staff officers, and commanders of artillery, engineers, and ordnance, report to their immediate commanders the state of the supplies and whatever concerns the service under their direction, and receive their orders; and communicate to them the orders they receive from their superiors in their own corps."

Closely examined, this is correct; but it is obscure and misleading. It lumps together officers of the staff and of administration as "staff-officers," and so connects them with those of the special arms as seemingly to confirm the erroneous idea that engineer officers are staff-officers and of course that artillery officers must be the same. It is an odd notion, which could not find a lodgment in any other army than our own, that an artillery commandant-in-chief, a "corps commander" himself to all intents and purposes, and provided with a staff of his own, is "one of the staff-officers" who runs about a battle-field carrying "the actual and authentic orders" of the general-in-chief to other corps commanders. A "staff-officer" is an officer below the rank of brigadier, attached to the person or headquarters of a general as his aide or assistant.

To illustrate the general principle as to the service of the special arms, I quote from the "Instructions of Frederick the Great" to his artillery. He was himself, by the way, an "artillery specialist" of the highest order, yet I have never heard it suggested that this unfitted him for "ordering a line of battle." He was also a disciplinarian of the sternest school, yet he "almost preached insubordination" in order to reduce to a minimum the mischief that meddling with the artillery by any general, even the general-in-chief, might occasion. He says:

"It sometimes happens that the general in command, or some other general, is himself forgetful, and orders the fire to be opened too soon, without considering what injurious consequences may result from it. In such case the artillery officer must certainly obey, but he should fire as slowly as possible, and point the pieces with the utmost accuracy, in order that his shots may not be thrown away."

As to the other question, that of policy, each general must decide it for himself, and General Hancock presumably acted according to his best judgment in the emergency suddenly presented to him when the cannonade opened. I do not know his reasons for countermanding my orders, and therefore cannot discuss them, even were I disposed to do so. As to the hypothetical case presented by General Walker, the possible effect of the enemy's cannonade on the *morale* of the troops, and his question, "Who was the better judge, General Hunt or General Hancock?" I may be permitted to reply, that a corps commander ought to be, so far as his own corps is concerned. It is, however, one of the necessary duties of an artillery commander to study the qualities of the other arms, for these must be considered in organizing and distributing the artillery, and are, as we see in this very case, important elements in determining its service. I had studied the Army of the Potomac, believed in its high qualities, and when, for special reasons, I instructed our batteries to withhold their fire for a given period, I knew the severity of the trial to which I was subjecting all the troops. I knew, also, that while the batteries would be the direct object of the enemy's fire, their men must stand idle at the guns and bear its full fury, while the infantry, lying on the reverse slope of the ridge and out of the enemy's sight, would be partly sheltered from it. Yet I felt no misgiving as to the fortitude of my cannoners, and no doubt as to that of the infantry. I think I was justified by the event, for the troops on General Hancock's line where my instructions were not followed, and those on General Newton's line (on Hancock's immediate left), where they *were* followed, were in equal "heart and courage" for the "fearful ordeal of Longstreet's charge." The object of my orders, however, was to spare them this ordeal altogether by breaking up the charge before it reached our lines. Had my orders been fully carried out, I think their whole line would have been — as half of it was — driven back before reaching our position, and this would have given us our only chance for a successful counter-attack. As it was, the splendid valor of Pickett's division alone enabled the Confederates, although defeated, to preserve their *morale* intact.

Henry J. Hunt.

A Just Man and a Great Historical Work.

In the recent death of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert N. Scott of the Third Artillery, well known in connection with his work of compiling the War Records, the nation has met with a loss which is in many respects irreparable. It is not too much to say that no one now living possesses the intimate knowledge which Colonel Scott had gathered of the numerous disputed and still partly obscured points of our war history. The loss would be less if he had left written notes of his conclusions and of the records which sustained

them. Fortunately, however, the extended work upon which he was engaged — much greater, of its kind, than any Government has heretofore undertaken — is more advanced than many who have watched it since its inception suppose it to be.

Robert Nicholson Scott was born at Winchester, Tennessee, January 21st, 1838. His father was a widely known Scotch Presbyterian clergyman, and a man of untiring energy and great ability. In 1857, while with his father in San Francisco, young Scott was appointed second lieutenant in the Fourth Infantry. He was then nineteen years of age. Older officers under whom he served say that he was a marked man with them from the first. While full of life and sociability, there was a gravity, a large-mindedness, and a mature judgment manifested in the discharge of all duties committed to him that attracted the attention of his superiors. In November, 1861, he joined the Army of the Potomac with the rank of captain. He was engaged in the siege of Yorktown, was wounded at Gaines's Mill, and was brevetted Major for gallant conduct in that engagement. From June, 1863 to September, 1864 he was senior aide-de-camp to Major-General Halleck. He was lieutenant-colonel of volunteers on General Halleck's staff, and on duty with that officer at the headquarters of the army and the Military Division of the James until July, 1865. He went with General Halleck to the Pacific coast as adjutant-general of the Military Division of the Pacific, and served there with that officer until 1869, when he accompanied him to the Military Division of the South, where he served with him until 1872. It was during this long service with General Halleck, throughout which he held the most confidential relations with that officer, that he gained a knowledge which no other man of his rank, and few of any rank, acquired of the secret history of the war. A great part of Halleck's most confidential correspondence with Lincoln, Stanton, and the chief officers of the army is in the handwriting of Colonel Scott. On the 1st of January, 1878, he was ordered to Washington to take charge of the work of compiling the War Records. He was the author of a digest of military laws which is now the accepted authority to the time of its date. In addition to his duties in compiling the records, he was twice called on to assist in revising army regulations. He was assigned as the military secretary of the joint commission of the two Houses of Congress for the reorganization of the army under the Burnside bill, and at the time of his death was a member of a board to untangle, re-arrange, and revise the present compilation of army regulations. This wide range of duties performed under, or in association with, officers of great prominence, made him more generally known among those of high rank than almost any other officer of equal age and position. To this distinction can be added, as a crowning glory, that he gained and held the unqualified respect and cordial esteem of all.

To rich and varied stores of the most confidential knowledge concerning the moving reasons and forces which operated about the great headquarters, and of the real personal and official relations of those in command, Colonel Scott added severe, continuous, and methodical study. To guide him and give effect to his work he was possessed of thorough impartiality, unswerving

fidelity to the trust imposed in him, and a courage which forbade even hesitation upon the question of doing exact justice without fear of the powerful, or favor to friends. He was devoted to his work. For over nine years he scarcely left it. His days of recreation were very few, and were taken at long intervals. He not only gave his office hours to his task, but his nights at home as well. With the eagerness of an explorer, he pursued every clew which threw new light on the records. He spared no pains of research which promised to make any chapter of military history more complete. It is absolutely certain that he has never withheld a paper of any kind found in the records which, if added, would change the history by so much as a hair's breadth. It was such qualifications, and such use of them, that now give value to the great work which he has left.

The progress of this work is of national interest. The general examination of the immense mass of records, both Union and Confederate, in possession of the Government has been completed, and the material which properly belongs to the plan of the work has been selected, copied, and chronologically arranged. Of this selected material, that part relating to operations up to January 1, 1865, has been divided into chapters and volumes according to the plan of Colonel Scott, and this plan has received the formal approval of the Secretary of War. As adopted, it really fixes the arrangement of the material already gathered, covering the operations of the closing six months of the war.

The mass of records which have been examined filled scores of rooms in the War Department, and several large buildings besides. The records embrace the files of the War Department proper, and of the adjutant-general's office, engineer's office, ordnance office, and of the offices of the provost-marshal general, quartermaster-general, and commissary-general. The files of the adjutant-general's office, in addition to the records there made during the war, embrace all the records of the several departments, districts, military posts, etc., as well as those of all the armies, corps, divisions, brigades, and regiments. Besides all these, there are the corresponding records of the Confederate Government. The examination of this immense collection has been most thorough. Besides his own force, a large number of clerks in the office of the adjutant-general have been employed in the preliminary sifting and arranging. The work began in the summer of 1874, under Secretary Belknap, an appropriation of fifteen thousand dollars having been made to enable the Secretary of War "to have copied for the public printer all reports, letters, telegrams, and general orders not heretofore copied or printed, and properly arranged in chronological order." Both Secretary Belknap and Adjutant-General Townsend took great interest in the matter, as have all of their successors. The second year the appropriation was increased to fifty thousand dollars. The work was pushed with vigor, the best men in the War Department being assigned to it. A great collection of telegrams sent and received, and battle reports, both Union and Confederate, were selected and printed in volumes ready for the compiler. When Colonel Scott took charge, in January, 1878, much valuable preliminary work had been done, and the true magnitude of the undertaking began to appear. He at once organized a most efficient force, and began again at the very beginning. All col-

lected material was compared with originals, and the many omissions inseparable from preliminary examinations of such immense masses of records were supplied. He entered into correspondence with all officers yet alive whose records seemed incomplete, for the purpose of obtaining originals which might have been retained. No paper written since the war has been allowed a place; but all original papers have been accepted, and, where the owners desired, copied and returned. Through the efficient services of General Marcus J. Wright, the agent of the War Department for the collection of Confederate records, Colonel Scott received a great mass of material, and through his own efforts much more was gathered, until, considering the circumstances attending the dissolution of the Confederacy, the collection of Confederate records, including field-maps, is surprisingly complete.

Upon this immense collection of official material Colonel Scott had worked without intermission for nearly ten years. As a result, its examination is complete, and the material to be printed will make about fifty volumes. As several of these contain two or three parts, the total number of separate volumes will be about eighty. A large collection of maps has been made, covering the operations of both sides for the entire period of the war. These will appear in atlas form. Twenty-five separate volumes have been printed and issued of the operations from 1861 to January 20th, 1863. Fifteen other separate volumes, up to and including (nominal) Volume XXV., are stereotyped and ready for the index. The volumes for the rest of 1863 are, with one exception, ready for the printer. Of the operations for 1864, which run over to January 15th, 1865, and are embraced in Volumes XXXII. to XLIV., three are ready for the printer, four more are ready for final revision, and the plan and scope of the remaining six, including the subjects for each chapter, have been adopted. To close the work of compilation there remains only the arrangement of the material already collected for the period from January, 1865, to the disbandment of the armies.

It is fortunate that two men remain who have been active workers with Colonel Scott from the first, and who are thoroughly acquainted with his methods and plans. These are his chief clerk, Mr. J. S. Moodey, who has had special charge of the valuable indexes, and Mr. J. W. Kirkley, of the adjutant-general's office. There is also great reason for congratulation that the work has advanced so far toward completion. As it stands, it will endure as a fitting monument to an able, faithful, and impartial soldier.

P. S.—Since the above lines were written, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry M. Lazelle of the 23d Infantry has been ordered to assume the duties of compiler. Colonel Lazelle was born in Massachusetts, and was graduated from the Military Academy in 1855. During the war he was assistant commissary-general of prisoners until October, 1863, when he became colonel of the 16th New York Cavalry. Since the war he has been on staff duty on the frontier and in Indian campaigns, and from 1879 to 1882 commandant of cadets at West Point; and he was detailed to witness the movements of the British troops in India. His recent detail was that of inspector-general of the Department of the Columbia. He has been an excellent officer in a varied line of duties.

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

General Donaldson's Fortunate Mistake.

PRIOR to the battle of Nashville, Major-General James L. Donaldson (who won honors in the Mexican war, and who died in the spring of 1886) was quartermaster under General Thomas. He once told me the following incident.

Having occasion to purchase mules for the army, he ordered a person in whom he had confidence to visit the contiguous Northern States, inadvertently saying to him, "Buy as many as you can"—not supposing he would be able to secure more than a few thousand at the most. Some weeks afterward, just before the attack upon Hood's army, General Donaldson, on meeting his agent, inquired how many mules he had been able to secure. To the amazement of the general, he was informed that *twenty thousand* or more had been obtained. Upon which the astonished general exclaimed, "I am a ruined man! I shall be court-martialed and driven from the army for not limiting you in the purchase. You have procured many times more than I had any idea or intention of purchasing; but the fault is mine, not yours. I ought to have been particular in my orders." In an extremely disheartened state he went to his home, believing that such a thoughtless act on his part could not be overlooked by the commanding general.

He had scarcely reached his house before a messenger came from General Thomas with an order for General Donaldson to come immediately to headquarters. This seemed to be the sealing of his fate, and in a state of trepidation bordering on frenzy he appeared before General Thomas, whom he found in a mood, apparently, of great depression. Soon after Donaldson had entered his presence General Thomas said, "Donaldson, how many mules have you?" With some perturbation he replied, "Upwards of twenty-five thousand." "Twenty-five thousand, did you say?" repeated the general. "Is it possible that you have this number? Donaldson, accept my most heartfelt thanks; *you have saved this army!* I can now have transportation, and can fight Hood, and will do so at once."

R. H. Eddy.

General Grant on the Terms at Vicksburg.

THE following letter, dated New York, November 30, 1884, not hitherto printed, was addressed to General Marcus J. Wright, Agent of the War Department for the collection of Confederate Records, by whose permission it is here printed from the original manuscript:

DEAR GENERAL: Herewith I send you General Pemberton's account of the surrender of Vicksburg. As the written matter is "Copy," and supposing you have what it has been copied from, I do not return it, though I will if you inform me that you want it.

A gentleman from Philadelphia sent me the same matter I return herewith, last summer. I probably left the paper at Long Branch, but do not know certainly. All there is of importance in the matter of the

surrender of Vicksburg is contained in the correspondence between General Pemberton and myself. The fact is, General Pemberton, being a Northern man commanding a Southern army, was not at the same liberty to surrender an army that a man of Southern birth would be. In adversity or defeat he became an object of suspicion, and felt it. Bowen was a Southern man all over, and knew the garrison of Vicksburg had to surrender or be captured, and knew it was best to stop further effusion of blood by surrendering. He did all he could to bring about that result.

Pemberton is mistaken in several points. It was Bowen that proposed that he and A. J. Smith should talk over the matter of the surrender and submit their views. Neither Pemberton nor I objected; but we were not willing to commit ourselves to accepting such terms as they might propose. In a short time those officers returned. Bowen acted as spokesman. What he said was substantially this: the Confederate Army was to be permitted to march out with the honors of war, carrying with them their arms, colors, and field batteries. The National troops were then to march in and occupy the city, and retain the siege guns, small arms not in the hands of the men, all public property remaining. Of course I rejected the terms at once. I did agree, however, before we separated, to write Pemberton what terms I would give. The correspondence is public and speaks for itself. I held no council of war. Hostilities having ceased, officers and men soon became acquainted with the reason why. Curiosity led officers of rank—most all the general officers—to visit my headquarters with the hope of getting some news. I talked with them very freely about the meeting between General Pemberton and myself, our correspondence, etc. But in no sense was it a council of war. I was very glad to give the garrison of Vicksburg the terms I did. There was a cartel in existence at that time which required either party to exchange or parole all prisoners either at Vicksburg or at a point on the James river within ten days after captures or as soon thereafter as practicable. This would have used all the transportation we had for a month. *The men had behaved so well that I did not want to humiliate them. I believed that consideration for their feelings would make them less dangerous foes during the continuance of hostilities, and better citizens after the war was over.*

I am very much obliged to you, General, for your courtesy in sending me these papers. Very truly yours,

U. S. Grant.

The Cause of a Silent Battle.

IN the interesting articles upon the Civil War which have appeared in *THE CENTURY*, reference has been made (page 764, March, and page 150, May, 1885) to the supposed effect of the wind in preventing, as in the case of the heavy cannonading between the *Merrimac* and *Congress*, the transference of sound-waves a distance of not over three and one-half miles over water; and

at another time, during the bombardments of the Confederate works at Port Royal, a distance of not more than two miles. "The day was pleasant," says the observer, "and the wind did not appear unusually strong." Yet "people living in St. Augustine, Florida, told me afterward that the Port Royal cannonade was heard at that place, 150 miles from the fight."

It occurs to me that the effect of the wind is greatly exaggerated in these instances. How an ordinary breeze could "carry all sounds of the conflict away from people standing within plain sight of it" and yet carry the same sound 150 miles in the opposite direction, is rather too strongly opposed to scientific fact to remain on record undisputed.

In all of these cases, is it not probable that the varying density of the air had much more to do with this strange acoustic opacity than the wind?

These statements call to mind the prevalent belief that fog, snow, hail, and rain, indeed any conditions of the atmosphere that render it optically opaque, render it also acoustically opaque; which up to the time of Mr. Tyndall's experiments in the English Channel, off Dover, had scarcely been questioned. His tests made in 1873-74 proved conclusively, as is now well known, that on clear days the air may be composed of differently heated masses, saturated in different degrees with aqueous vapors, which produce exactly the deadening effects described above.

I submit as a case in point a similar effect, and its explanation as furnished by Mr. R. G. H. Kean to Professor Tyndall, and considered by the latter of sufficient value to find a place in his published works:

"On the afternoon of June 28, 1862, I rode, in company with General G. W. Randolph, then Secretary of War of the Confederate States, to Price's house, about nine miles from Richmond, the evening before General Lee had begun his attack on McClellan's army, by crossing the Chickahominy about four miles above Price's, and driving in McClellan's right wing.

"The battle of Gaines's Mill was fought the afternoon to which I refer. The valley of the Chickahominy is about one and a half miles wide from hill-top to hill-top. Price's is on one hill-top, that nearest to Richmond; Gaines's farm, just opposite, is on the other, reaching back in a plateau to Cold Harbor.

"Looking across the valley I saw a good deal of the battle, Lee's right resting in the valley, the Federal left wing the same. My line of vision was nearly in the line of the lines of battle. I saw the advance of the Confederates, their repulse two or three times, and in the gray of the evening the final retreat of the Federal forces. I distinctly saw the musket-fire of both lines, the smoke, individual discharges, the flash of the guns. I saw batteries of artillery on both sides come into action and fire rapidly. Several field-batteries on each side were plainly in sight. Many more were hid by the timber which bounded the range of vision.

"Yet looking for nearly two hours, from about five to seven P. M. on a midsummer afternoon, at a battle in which at least fifty thousand men were actually engaged, and doubtless at least one hundred pieces of field-artillery, through an atmosphere optically as limpid as possible, not a single sound of the battle was audible to General Randolph and myself. I remarked it to him at the time as astonishing.

"Between me and the battle was the deep, broad valley of the Chickahominy, partly a swamp shaded from the declining sun by the hills and forest in the west (my side). Part of the valley on each side of the swamp was cleared: some in cultivation, some not. Here were conditions capable of providing several belts of air, varying in the amount of watery vapor (and probably in temperature), arranged like laminæ at right angles to the acoustic waves as they came from the battle-field to me."

John B. De Motte.

DE PAUW UNIVERSITY, INDIANA.

A Reply to Colonel Mosby by General Robertson.

IN THE May number of THE CENTURY Colonel John S. Mosby has seen proper to make mention of my command in the cavalry of the Army of Northern Vir-

ginia during the Gettysburg campaign; and as a means of defending General J. E. B. Stuart from an imaginary attack has misrepresented a portion of General Stuart's cavalry. Colonel Mosby knows very little of Stuart's character if he supposes that so true a soldier would have silently passed over such disobedience of orders as Colonel Mosby imputes to me. The fact that Colonel Mosby has "lately discovered documents in the archives" at Washington, which are to "set at rest" something that has not been set in motion, will not excuse him for attempting in 1887 to prove by argument that Stuart in 1863 did not know whether I had obeyed his orders in the Gettysburg campaign.

The orders left with me by General Stuart, dated June 24th, were exactly obeyed by me, to his entire satisfaction as well as to that of General R. E. Lee. These orders embraced the duty of holding Ashby's and Snicker's gaps, to prevent Hooker from interrupting the march of Lee's army; and "in case of a move by the enemy on Warrenton," to counteract it if possible. I was also ordered when I withdrew from the gaps to "withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah," to cross the Potomac where Lee crossed, and to "follow the army, keeping on its right and rear."

The only road by which the orders (which particularly specified the avoidance of "turnpikes" on account of the difficulty and delay of shoeing horses) could be complied with, carried my command to Martinsburg; at which place, and not in the gaps of the mountains, as Colonel Mosby insinuates, a courier from General Lee met me. My command was hurried from there to Chambersburg and thence by forced march, on the night of July 2d, to Cashtown, where it arrived at about 10 A. M. on July 3d. Ascertaining at Cashtown that General Pleasonton was moving from Emmetsburg directly on the baggage and ammunition trains of General Lee's army, which were exposed to his attack without defense of any kind, I pressed forward with my command and intercepted the advance of General Pleasonton, under the command of Major Samuel H. Starr. A severe and gallant fight was made at Fairfield, in which Major Starr of the 6th United States Regular Cavalry was wounded and captured with a large portion of his staff, while his regiment was severely damaged. Adjutant John Allan and three others of the 6th Virginia Cavalry were killed, 19 were wounded, and 5 were reported missing.

That fight at Fairfield, on the last day of the fighting at Gettysburg, refutes the imputation intended by Colonel Mosby to be conveyed in his remark that my command "did not reach the battle-field."

From that fight at Fairfield I was ordered by General R. E. Lee to cover his wagon trains, and in obeying the same, my command was engaged in repeated skirmishes, particularly at Funkstown and Hagerstown, after which it returned to Virginia,—the last command that recrossed the Potomac.

If there existed the least ground for Colonel Mosby's statements, there would be found among the reports of general officers some reference to the imputed dereliction of duty on my part. As no such reference is made, and no imputation of disobedience of orders intimated, it may be assumed that neither Stuart nor Lee had any reason to complain of my command.

B. H. Robertson.