

with entire confidence, to meet their worthy antagonists in other battles. It was, however, decided by the authorities at Washington, against my earnest remonstrances, to abandon the position on the James, and the campaign. The Army of the Potomac was accordingly withdrawn, and it was not until two years

later that it again found itself under its last commander at substantially the same point on the bank of the James. It was as evident in 1862 as in 1865 that there was the true defense of Washington, and that it was on the banks of the James that the fate of the Union was to be decided.

George B. McClellan.

NOTE: The foregoing outline of the Peninsular Campaign will be supplemented in succeeding numbers by papers dealing more directly with the engagements, including contributions from Generals Fitz-John Porter, D. H. Hill, Franklin, and Longstreet. The "Recollections of a Private" will also cover the ground of the Seven Days' Battles.—ED.

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

Effect of the Wind upon the Sound of Battle.

THE incident connected with the fight between the iron-clads in Hampton Roads related by Gen. R. E. Colston, where the power of the wind was sufficient to carry all sounds of the conflict away from people standing within plain sight of it, recalls several similar instances that came within my own experience while serving with the army operating along the sea-coast of the Southern States during the war. At the bombardment of the Confederate works at Port Royal, South Carolina, in November, 1861, the transport my regiment was on lay near enough in shore to give us a fine view of the whole battle; but only in some temporary lull of the wind could we hear the faintest sound of the firing. The day was a pleasant one, and the wind did not appear to be unusually strong; but I noticed then and afterward that a breeze on the coast down that way was very different from the erratic gusts and flaws I had been used to in the New England States, the whole atmosphere seeming to move in a body, giving sound no chance to travel against it, but carrying it immense distances to the leeward. People living at St. Augustine, Florida, told me afterward that the Port Royal cannonade was heard at that place, 150 miles from where the fight took place.

A portion of the siege batteries at Morris Island, South Carolina, were not more than two miles from our camp; but at times the firing from them and the enemy's replies could only be heard very faintly even at that short distance, while at others, when the wind blew from the opposite direction, the sounds were as sharp and distinct as if the battle were taking place within a few rods of us.

S. H. Prescott.

CONCORD, N. H.

The Gun-boat "Taylor" or "Tyler."

WE are permitted to print the following note bearing on a recent criticism of Rear-Admiral Walke's designation of the gun-boat under his command on the Mississippi river as the *Taylor*:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, February 11, 1885.

SIR: In reply to your letter of the 30th ultimo, and referring to previous correspondence, you are informed that at the time Commander John Rodgers purchased the gun-boats *A. O. Tyler* and others, he was acting under the orders of the War Department. In a com-

munication to this Department, dated June 8, 1861, he states as follows:

"I have, after consideration with General McClellan, and after inspection by Mr. Pook, the naval constructor, bought three steamboats for naval service in these waters. They were called the *A. O. Tyler*, the *Lexington*, and the *Conestoga*. The name of the first of these I will, with your permission, change to *Taylor*, a name of better augury than *Tyler*."

No action was taken by this Department concerning the changing of the name of the *A. O. Tyler*.

The Mississippi flotilla was not turned over to the Navy Department until the 1st of October, 1862. Prior to that date the officers and enlisted men, except the regular officers of the navy detailed for duty therein, were paid by Quartermaster Wise, under authority of the War Department.

I am unable to inform you what name the accounting officers of the Treasury recognized in settling the accounts of the vessel referred to. Very respectfully,

W. E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.

Colonel A. H. MARKLAND, Washington, D. C.

Col. Markland has ascertained that on the records of the Quartermaster-General's Department the name of the vessel is sometimes written *Taylor*, but more generally *Tylor* or *Tyler*. He claims that as no authorization of the change of name by Admiral Rodgers has been found the boat should go down to history as the *Tyler*.—EDITOR.

Errata.

THE captain who, with his men, volunteered to go on the *Carondelet's* perilous passage of Island Number Ten (as described by Admiral Walke on p. 442 of the January number), was not Hollenstein but Hottenstein.— In the papers on "Shiloh" in the February number, the name of General John C. Breckinridge (*sic* in his autograph) was misprinted Breckenridge, which, however, is not without the apparent sanction of Dr. Thomas's "Dictionary of Biography" (Lippincott). The Breckenridge branch of this eminent Kentucky family (including the Reverend Doctor Robert J. Breckenridge, uncle of the General) were, we believe, staunch supporters of the Union.— A manifest error occurs on page 739 of the March number, in Colonel Wood's article on "The First Fight of Iron-clads," where Norfolk is said to be "within two miles" of Fortress Monroe. The distance, as shown by the map in the same number, is twelve to fifteen miles.—EDITOR.

battle-field. I was enabled, after great labor and care, to meet these friends and comrades in command of men, than whom there could be none more intelligent, better disciplined, braver, more confiding in each other, and more determined on success. They embraced soldiers from Maine, Michigan, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New York, and all New England—together with all the regular army, then at the East, from all parts of the country. Their commanders were not excelled by those in any other corps in ability, experience, or reliability; they had the highest confidence in each other, in the army, and in their own men, and were fully competent to oppose their able adversaries.

I have said we did not fear Lee alone at Beaver Dam Creek. Nor, though anxious, did we fear the combined attack of Lee and Jack-

son at Gaines's Mill. Defeat to us was necessarily great damage to them. Our flanks were secure and could not be turned; though fewer in numbers, the advantages of our position, combined with the firm discipline of our own brave men, overcame the odds. Our adversaries were forced to meet us face to face. All day they struggled desperately for success, and near night, after fearful destruction, broke our line at one point, just at a time when a most unforeseen mismanagement on our part aided to crown their labors with possession of the field. Still, our confidence was not broken; and, as we shall see in a succeeding paper, under like circumstances victory crowned our arms with success against the same opponents, strongly reënforced, at Malvern Hill.

Fitz John Porter.

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

Sawing out a Channel above Island Number Ten.

THE Engineer Regiment of the West was an organization composed of twelve full companies of carefully selected workmen, chiefly mechanics, and officered by men capable of directing such skilled labor. Most of the officers and about six hundred of the men were engaged in the operations about New Madrid and


tions of that regiment I am not aware that any of its officers ever made a report beyond a verbal notification to the general in command that the work required of it was done. This narrative is therefore made entirely from memory, aided by reference to letters written to my family and not intended for publication.

It is perhaps proper to state here that the term "canal," as used in all the letters and reports relating to the opening of this waterway, conveys an entirely wrong idea. No digging was done except by way of slightly widening a large break in the levee, and those officers who speak of the men as "working waist-deep in the water" knew nothing at all of the matter.

The enemy held Island Number Ten and the left bank opposite, and the same bank from New Madrid down to Tiptonville, a ridge of high land between the back swamp and the river.* In rear of their positions was Reelfoot Lake and the overflow, extending from above them to a point below Tiptonville. Escape by land was impossible, the right bank below New Madrid and that town being occupied by General Pope. The gun-boats under Foote held the river above, and our heavy batteries commanded the only place of debarkation below. Having accomplished this much, the problem for General Pope to solve was to cross his army to make an attack, for which purpose he judged that two gun-boats, to be used as ferry-boats, would be sufficient. The general stood with me on the parapets of Fort Thompson (just captured) and pointed out his whole plan; and he was so confident that his letter to Foote would bring the boats that he directed me to go back to the fleet at Island Number Eight by dug-out across the overflow, and come down with them past the batteries, and a set of private signals was arranged between us then and there for use upon their appearing in sight.

I reached the flag-ship in the afternoon about dark, and that evening Foote called together all his com-

* The reader is presumed to be acquainted with the fuller map of the operations here referred to, printed on page 441 of the *JANUARY CENTURY*, with Admiral Walker's paper on the Western Flotilla. The above map shows the course of the channel as corrected by Col. Bissell.—Ed.



MAP OF THE MISSISSIPPI AT ISLAND NO. 10.
Showing (corrected) line of the channel cut by the Engineer Regiment.

Island Number Ten; to them should be given the credit of the success of the engineering operations of that campaign. In order to do this and to correct some erroneous impressions, I yield to the request of the editor of THE CENTURY MAGAZINE to give a brief account of the opening of the so-called "canal" above Island Number Ten, a work which was executed under my personal and general direction. In all the opera-

manders in council. One or two wanted to run the blockade, but the commodore flatly refused. He explained that his boats, since they were armored solely about the bows, were invincible fighting up-stream, but fighting down-stream were of little account; and that if one of them should be boarded and captured, she could be turned against us, and could whip the whole fleet and place Cairo, Louisville, and St. Louis at her mercy! One of the captains said that if he were allowed to go, he would stand in the magazine and blow the vessel out of water if the enemy got on board. Another, I think, was quite as emphatic, but Foote was firm.

I then, in a pleasant way, made a peremptory demand upon him for a gun-boat. As pleasantly, but still firmly, he refused; whereupon I started up, rather excited, and with considerable emphasis said: "General Pope shall have his boats, if I have to take them across the country."

The next day, with two of the tugs of the fleet, I explored the shore carefully on each side: first on the eastern shore, to see if the enemy were securely shut in, which I found to be the case; and then on the western, to see if St. James's Bayou, which emptied into the river seven miles above Island Number Eight, in any way communicated with St. John's Bayou, which debouched at New Madrid. Here I found no possible way across.

Early the next morning while standing on the levee, chagrined at my failure to obtain a gun-boat, and mindful of the strong language I had used before the officers of the fleet, and while waiting for the guide to get the dug-out ready to take me back to camp, I spied, directly opposite me across the submerged fields, an opening in the timber; and the thought flashed upon me that there was the place to take the transports through. This proved to be an old wagon-road extending half a mile into the woods; beyond and around was a dense forest of heavy timber. The guide said it was two miles to the nearest bayou. I asked him to make a map upon my memorandum-book, which he did, showing a straight cut to the first bayou and the general route of the bayous to New Madrid. This route we carefully explored, and I reached General Pope's headquarters about dark. When my report of the interview had reached Foote's refusal, the general gave vent to his disappointment and indignation. Some officer present making some suggestion about a "canal," I immediately pulled out my memorandum-book, and showing the sketch said the whole thing was provided for, and that I would have boats through in fourteen days.*

General Pope then gave me an order on the authorities at Cairo for steamboats and anything the regiment might need. That evening Captain Tweddale, Lieutenant Randolph, and I sat up till a late hour arranging all the details, including barges to be fitted with heavy artillery to be used as gun-boats, and the next morning they started with one hundred men

for Cairo, to meet me at Island Number Eight with all the materials they could get the first day. Other officers and men started by the same route daily, until the 600 men of my force had returned, and my stock of supplies was complete. I returned in the dug-out through the selected channel, and in due time found at the proposed starting-point four stern-wheel steamboats, drawing thirty to thirty-six inches of water, and six large coal-barges, besides one columbiad, three large siege-guns with carriages and ammunition, saws, lines, and all kinds of tools and tackle in great quantities, and fully two million feet of timber and lumber.

The way through the submerged corn-field and the half-mile of road was easy enough, but when we reached the timber the labor of sawing out a channel commenced. The one steamer which had a powerful steam capstan was put in the lead, and the others having hand capstans were fastened single file in the rear, and then the six barges in like order, so that the progress of the first controlled all the others. Captain Tweddale took charge of the cutting in front, while Lieutenant Randolph was fitting up the improvised gun-boats astern. About three hundred men were assigned to each, and they worked in relays without the slightest intermission from daybreak until dark.


First of all, men standing on platforms on small rafts cut off the trees about eight feet above the water. As soon as a tree was down, another set of men, provided with boats and lines, adjusted about it a line which ran through a snatch-block and back to the steam capstan, and hauled it out of the way; thus a partial cut was made forward, the lines always working more than two hundred feet ahead of the capstan, so as to leave plenty of room for the saws. It took about four sets of lines to keep pace with twelve saws.

When the space about the stumps allowed sufficient room, a raft about forty feet long was lashed to a stump, and the saw set at work in a frame attached by a pivot and working in an arc as shown in the sketch—two men working the saw at opposite ends by a rope, and a fifth on the farther side of the tree guiding its teeth into the tree. Where the stumps were too close, or irregular, three yawl-boats were used instead of the raft. No trouble was experienced with the stumps a foot or less in diameter. With the larger ones it was different; the elms spread out so much at the bottom that the saw almost always would run crooked and pinch. If it commenced running up, we notched the top and set the frame farther in; if down, we put in powerful tackle, and pulled the top of the stump over.

Here was where the ingenuity of the officers and men was exercised: as the saws were working four and a half feet beneath the surface, and the water was quite turbid, the question was how to ascertain what was interfering with the saw, and then to apply the remedy. But I found Captain Tweddale equal to the most obstinate stump. I think two and a half hours was the longest time ever expended upon any one, while about that number of minutes would dispose of some small ones when the saw was ready. In all it took eight days to cut the two miles.

When we reached the bayous the hard and wet work began. The river had begun to fall, and the water was running very rapidly. We had to get rid of great drift heaps from the lower side with our machinery all on

* The Records of the War Department, which I have just seen for the first time, contain a letter from General Pope to me, which I never before heard of (dated the day I was on my way back from the gun-boat with the plan fully matured), asking if I could not dig a canal, a "mere ditch of a foot wide which the water of the river would soon wash out," from a point one mile above Island Number Ten to a point one mile below. That land was at this time ten feet under water.—J. W. B.



the upper side. Small pieces of drift would be disposed of by the yawl-boats, or a single line and snatch-block would take them right out; but sometimes a great swamp oak, three feet through, and as heavy as *lignum vitæ*, lying right across our channel a foot or so under water, would try our tackle. We had then to raise them up to the surface, and hold them there till they could be chopped in pieces. In one case it took eight lines from the four capstans to get one up.

In one of the bayous for about two miles the current was so swift that all the men who were out on logs, or in exposed places, had safety lines tied around them; and as the timber was slippery, some were indebted to these lines for their lives. During the whole work not a man was killed, injured, or taken sick.

While all this was being done in front of the boats, Lieutenant Randolph was at work with his detachment in the rear in improvising gun-boats to supply the lack of Foote's. The barges used were coal-barges, about eighty feet long and twenty wide, scow-shaped, with both ends alike. The sides were six inches thick, and of solid timber. The original plan was to use three of the steamboats with a barge on each side—the other steamer to be kept as a reserve. One columbiad and three thirty-two-pounders were mounted on platforms, and arrangements were made to use a considerable number of field-guns to be taken on board at New Madrid. Six hundred men of the Engineer Regiment, using one of the steamers with her two barges, were to land at break of day at the mouth of the slough about a mile below and opposite Fort Thompson, and with their intrenching tools dig a line of rifle-pits as soon as possible. About the same number of picked men were to be with them to help fight or dig, as occasion might require. The other two sections of the flotilla were to be filled with men, and landed just below, as best could be done when the resistance was developed. The reserve steamer with her men, not being incumbered with barges, could move rapidly and take advantage of any opening to land the force, which could by a flank movement aid any of the other parties; or if either of the other boats became disabled, it could help them along.

When about half-way through the channel, I left the flotilla and reported progress to General Pope.

Upon a reëxamination of the ground from Fort Thompson, he concluded that it would be best to make the leading boat a fighting boat that could not be disabled. So he telegraphed to Cairo and St. Louis for a great number of coal-oil barrels. These arrived through the channel about the time the boats reached the lower end of St. John's Bayou. In the mean time the steamer to be used was so bulkheaded with lumber that her engines and boilers were secure from damage from field-artillery, and the forward part of the hull, which projected beyond the barges, was bulkheaded off and filled with dry rails, to keep her from being disabled. There were no heavy guns and few field-guns opposed to us at this point. Upon the arrival of the barrels they were laid in two tiers all over the bottoms of two barges; the interstices were filled with dry rails, the whole well secured in place by a heavy floor. No shot could reach the hull of the steamer through these, and no number of holes could sink the barge with all this buoyant matter. On the steamer and barges protection was prepared for a large number of sharpshooters. Such a craft as that would have covered the debarkation of the Engineer Regiment, and protected them till they could dig rifle-pits and take care of themselves, and then it could have been used to cover the landing of the rest of the army.

The boats and barge gun-boats were kept concealed in the bayou, just back from New Madrid, for a day or two, till the soldiers could be prepared for the passage and attack. Meanwhile Foote concluded to risk the passage of the island with the *Carondelet* and afterward with the *Pittsburgh*, and the whole plan was changed; the gun-boats could move so much more rapidly that they were to silence the Confederate field-guns, while the transports, loaded with troops, could land wherever an opening could be found. The whole scheme was accomplished so successfully that I think not a man was killed or wounded, and the entire Confederate force surrendered. The barges were not used at all; nor did any of the Engineer Regiment cross: they were kept on the right bank, ready to be called in case of any disaster, which, fortunately, did not occur.

Several of the captured officers told me that after the gun-boats had run their batteries, nearly their

whole force was withdrawn from about Island Number Ten and kept concealed in the woods back of the practicable landing-places, and they were well prepared to pick off all the men that could possibly be landed from the gun-boats; the woods were so close to the bank that they probably could have done so; but when they saw the four transports, loaded with troops, steam out from the bayou, they knew that all hope was gone, and the word was given for each man to take care of himself. A few hundred did manage to

make their way through the swamps in the rear, but the most of them quietly yielded to the inevitable. So well had the movement been concealed that they had not the least idea of what was being done.

When the boats were about half-way through, Thomas A. Scott, the Assistant-Secretary of War, came on board from the gun-boat fleet. After a suitable inspection of the work, he returned and telegraphed to President Lincoln from Cairo that Island Number Ten would be taken within a certain time — and it was.

J. W. Bissell.

TOPICS OF THE TIME.

Abetting the Enemy.

ONE of the most stubborn and discouraging evils of current politics is revealed in the notorious fact that the rascals in either party may count with confidence upon the moral support of a good share of the reputable men in the other party. To this depth does partisanship daily descend. The average party man regards party success as so much more important than the public welfare, that he is quite willing the State should suffer at the hands of his opponents, if by this means a point can be made against them in the next campaign. There are "good men" in each party ready to promote corruption and chicanery in the other party,—men who, if any nefarious deed is proposed by the worst of their opponents, do not shrink from quietly aiding and abetting the iniquity. If the miscreants cannot be openly assisted without incurring responsibility for their own party, they will at least refrain from open opposition, hoping for the success of evil schemes and rejoicing at their consummation. Is it too much to say that the average partisan wishes the State to be injured by every act of his opponents, exults when they go wrong, and ill conceals his vexation when anything is done by them for the benefit of the country?

Such conduct we might expect from those mercenaries who make politics a trade, and it would not be strange if each party contained a large number of ignorant and inconsiderate persons who would be governed by these petty motives; but one is sometimes appalled at the extent to which intelligent citizens have fallen under the sway of such pernicious passions. The prospect of reform in politics grows dim when we contemplate the tacit alliance so widely established between the respectable men of each party and the malefactors of the other.

It too often occurs that wise and beneficent measures, proposed by one party, are treated with captious and sneering criticism, and even defeated, by the other for purely partisan reasons. In one of the State legislatures, a few weeks ago, a measure was introduced looking toward the restriction of intemperance by a certain method. The party in opposition held a caucus to determine its own action upon the question. Several of the legislators expressed themselves as favoring the method proposed; they believed it to be the best method of dealing with the evil; but they readily agreed to oppose the measure before them, for the avowed reason that they would not help the party

in power to do a good thing for the State. That party might gain some credit from the measure if it were adopted; and that party should gain no credit for patriotic action if they could help it. The measure, as they believed, would benefit the State, and the State was greatly suffering for some kind of legislation; but the State might continue to suffer; it should never be relieved by their opponents; no good should come to the State if they could help it, unless it came through their own party. This was exactly the purport of their reasoning. Inasmuch as the measure required a three-fifths vote, the minority were able to defeat it. The action of this caucus was reported in all the party organs, and the heroic conduct of these gentlemen who stood so firmly with their party, and who so nobly resisted the temptation to consider the welfare of the State, did not fail to receive its proper meed of praise. To none of these partisans did it appear that the men in question had acted otherwise than magnanimously; not a whisper of disapproval came from the ranks of their own party. Yet these men had violated the solemn obligation which they assumed in entering upon the duties of their office; they had deliberately done the State what they believed to be an injury in order that benefit might accrue to their political organization. The fact that such action should occur, and such considerations be openly urged at one of our great political centers, without exciting adverse comment, indicates in a somewhat striking manner the extent to which partisanship has degraded our politics.

Those partisans who rejoice over the blunders and sins of their opponents, and who deplore and obstruct their efforts to do well, have, of course, a reason for their conduct. They think that their own party practically monopolizes the virtue of the nation; that the other party is composed almost wholly of rogues; and that, therefore, patriotism is summed up in the support of their party. The good of the State is identified with the success of their party; if by abetting the evil-doing of their opponents they can maintain themselves in power, they will most effectually promote the public welfare. At the very best, then, these people are encouraging evil that good may come, and rejoicing in evil as a means of bringing good; this puts them into a class concerning whom we have high authority for saying that their "damnation is just."

But is not the notion too childish to be entertained by people of common sense, that either of the two great parties which so equally divide the voters of this

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

General Beauregard's Courier at Bull Run.

At the first battle of Manassas General Beauregard's order to General Ewell to advance on the right did not reach him promptly. An accident to the courier who bore the order was stated at the time to be the reason of the delay. He was thrown from his horse, his head striking a tree with such force as to render him unconscious. I saw him myself lying helpless just in rear of the line at Mitchell's Ford, badly used up and bleeding. When he was able to move on General Ewell must have been on his way to the left.

I was a private in the 7th S. C. V., but detached as orderly for General M. L. Bonham, whose brigade held Mitchell's Ford on that day.

Robert R. Hemphill.

ABBEVILLE, S. C.

The Death of Theodore Winthrop.

I NOTICE in "The Recollections of a Private," in your March number, a statement regarding the death of Major Theodore Winthrop, which is incorrect. The facts are these:

Major Winthrop headed a force at the battle of Bethel, intending to turn our left flank. His course lay through a heavily wooded swamp. On our left was a slight earth-work or rifle-pit, in which lay a small infantry force. About seventy-five yards in front of this was a rail fence; just beyond, the ground dipped suddenly about four feet, the woods running almost up to the fence. Our attention was called by cheering to the advance of Major Winthrop's troops. Looking up, we saw the Major and two privates on the fence. His sword was drawn, and he was calling on his troops to follow him. Our first volley killed these three; those following, being protected by the peculiar formation of the ground, were not injured, but upon the fall of their leader, they beat a precipitate retreat. I was among the first to reach these men. All were dead, having been instantly killed. Major Winthrop was shot in the breast, the others in the head. All were buried in the same grave. About ten days afterward, a flag of truce came up asking for Major Winthrop's body. Having assisted in burying him and being confident of my ability to recognize his body, I was sent with a party to disinter and turn it over to his friends. Among the numberless incidents that followed this skirmish, none are more indelibly impressed on my mind than the gallant bearing of this unfortunate young man, when I first saw him, calling his men to follow, and confident that he had accomplished his object, and the immediately succeeding rattle of our muskets and his fall.

RICHMOND, VA.

J. B. Moore.

"Fortress" Monroe.

IN THE CENTURY for March, 1885, Colonel John T. Wood and Mr. W. L. Goss speak of "Fortress Monroe." Except that these contributions to the history of the War are widely read and quoted, I should re-

frain from calling your attention to this error. The proper designation is "Fort Monroe," in honor of President Monroe, who was in office when its construction was commenced. The first appropriation bill in which it is specifically designated as "Fort Monroe" is dated March 3, 1821. By General Orders, No. 11, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, February 8, 1832, it was called, by order of the Secretary of War, "Fort Monroe." There is a tradition in the Engineer Department, U. S. A., that the plan of the fort was designed by General Simon Bernard, an ex-officer of the French Army under Napoleon, and appointed Assistant-Engineer, U. S. A., with the rank of Brigadier-General, November 16, 1816. The drawings were made by Captain W. T. Poussin, Topographical Engineer, acting aide to General Bernard.

John P. Nicholson.

PHILADELPHIA.

Positions of Union Troops at the Battle of Seven Pines.

THE map printed on page 118 of the May CENTURY, with General Joseph E. Johnston's description of the battle of Seven Pines (a map for which General Johnston is not responsible), was misleading in an important particular. The line described as the "position of the Union troops on the evening of May 31" should have been entitled "position of the Union troops on the morning of June 1." At the close of the first day's fighting, May 31, the Union forces at Fair Oaks Station were separated from the left, which suffered so severely at Seven Pines, and which retreated to a third line of entrenchments midway between Seven Pines and Savage's Station. During the night connection was made between the two wings, and in the morning the army presented front on the line indicated in the map as the second position.

EDITOR.

The "Mississippi" at the Passage of the Forts.

IN a letter to the Editor, Rear-Admiral Melancton Smith, who commanded the *Mississippi*, during the passage of the forts at New Orleans, quotes from page 949 of Admiral Porter's article in the April CENTURY: "Meantime Farragut was steering up the river with all his fleet except the *Mississippi*," etc., and adds: "The *Mississippi* proceeded with the fleet up the river and was present at the engagement with the Chalmette batteries. At 3 P. M. the same day, when at anchor off New Orleans, I was ordered to return to the quarantine station (just above Fort St. Philip) to look after the *Louisiana* and to cover the landing of the troops under General Butler. Admiral Porter, seeing the *Mississippi* the morning after the fleet passed up, doubtless supposed it had remained at anchor below."

EDITOR.



DUMMIES AND QUAKER GUNS LEFT IN THE WORKS AT HARRISON'S LANDING ON THE EVACUATION BY THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. (FROM SKETCH AT THE TIME BY A. R. WAUD.)

towards improving the health of the army. Boxes with goodies from home came by express in great numbers. One of my friends at one time received a whole cheese, and for a week was the envy of the company.

Hooker's brigade moved towards Malvern Hill on the second of August, and on the fourth attacked the enemy near Glendale. On the fifteenth all was bustle and confusion, getting ready for some movement—perhaps another advance on Richmond. But instead we took up our line of march down the Penin-

sula. The people on the way openly expressed hatred of us and sympathy with the rebellion. No guards were posted over the houses as heretofore, and we used the fences to cook our coffee, without reproach from our officers. At one house, near the landing, a notice was posted forbidding the burial of a Yankee on the estate. That house was very quickly and deliberately burned to the ground. Steamboats and wagons were crowded with our sick. After rapid marches we arrived at Hampton, and embarked again for Alexandria.

Warren Lee Goss.

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

General Imboden's "Incidents of the Battle of Manassas."

THE series of War Papers now being published in THE CENTURY are of such extraordinary value as history and material for history, that it is desirable to have them as accurate as possible, and to correct even small errors of fact as they are stated. Allow me to correct two in General Imboden's article in the May CENTURY. The general could not have tossed "little Julia," the daughter and only child of Stonewall Jackson, in his arms three days after the battle of Bull Run, for she was not born until more than a year after that time. She might have been seen in "long dresses" near Fredericksburg, just before

her father was killed at Chancellorsville, for she was there making her first visit to the army, and was then only about six months old.

Again, General Jackson did not put General D. H. Hill under arrest while crossing the Potomac into Maryland at Leesburg. It was General A. P. Hill who was put under arrest on the day before we crossed the Potomac, Sept. 4th, for disobedience of orders in not moving his division as early in the morning as he was directed to do, and thereby delaying the prompt movement of the corps. I had given the order to General Hill fixing the hour for marching, and carried the order from General Jackson putting him under arrest. General Branch was in command of A. P. Hill's divis-

ion when we crossed the Potomac northward. I may add that General Jackson was seriously bruised and hurt by the falling of a vicious horse which was presented to him the day he crossed into Maryland; and being compelled to ride in an ambulance for a day, he turned the command of his corps over to General D. H. Hill for that day's march. After the battle of Sharpsburg, and while the army was encamped at Bunker Hill, the difficulty between Generals Jackson and A. P. Hill was revived, and they preferred charges against each other. Then General Lee took the matter up, and after an interview with each of them, the charges, which he had disapproved and returned, were mutually withdrawn, and that was the end of it—to all appearances.

General Imboden is right in his intimation that Major Harman was the only man who could swear before General Jackson with impunity. Jackson seemed to regard Harman's superior qualification in that line—and he was the most stalwart and stirring swearer I ever heard—as a necessary part of his equipment as quartermaster. Harman was the only quartermaster in the Confederacy who could have kept up with "Jackson's Foot Cavalry," but he and Jackson accomplished results by means and manners entirely different.

Hy. Kyd Douglas.

HAGERSTOWN, MD., May 15, 1885.

[Soon after the appearance of his article in the *May CENTURY*, General Imboden, in a letter which came too late for the July number, wrote to correct the two misstatements described above. He says that after the battle of Bull Run the camp was visited by the families of many officers, and that he had always supposed the child he saw at Stonewall Jackson's quarters to have been the general's daughter, Julia. In his anecdote of the arrest of General Hill, he confounded General D. H. Hill with General A. P. Hill, it having been the latter who was placed under arrest during that campaign, as explained by Colonel Douglas.—EDITOR.]

The Second Day at Seven Pines.

GENERAL D. H. HILL has called our attention to an error in General Gustavus W. Smith's paper in the *May CENTURY*, on "The Second Day at Seven Pines." General Smith quotes as follows from the Union general Mindil's account of the fighting on the second day (June 1):

"After Richardson's and Hooker's divisions and Birney's brigade had driven the Confederates well back from the railroad in front of the position held by Richardson during the night, Sickles' brigade united with these forces, and a general advance was made. No serious opposition was encountered, and Casey's camp was reoccupied before two o'clock P. M., the ground being covered with the rebel dead and wounded as well as our own."

The reports of both sides (Vol. XI., Part I., "War Records") show conclusively that the Confederates remained in possession of Casey's camp during the second day, and retired of their own accord the following night, their rear-guard withdrawing at sunrise of June 2.

EDITOR.

Subterranean Shells at Yorktown.

GENERAL J. E. JOHNSTON, in his article "Manassas to Seven Pines," published in the *May CENTURY*, in referring to Jefferson Davis's statement about planting sub-terra shells in the vicinity of the citadel of Yorktown when the enemy evacuated that place says,— . . . "This event was not mentioned in General D. H. Hill's report, although General Rains belonged to his division, nor was it mentioned by our cavalry which followed Hill's division. Such an occurrence would have been known to the whole army, but it was not; so it must have been a dream of the writer."

My recollection of that circumstance is as follows: I was at that time assistant adjutant-general to General Fitz John Porter, who was director of the siege of Yorktown. On the morning of May 4th, 1862, our pickets sent in a prisoner, who said he was a Union man, had been impressed into the rebel service, and was one of a party detailed to bury some shells in the road and fields near the works. General Porter sent the man under guard to General McClellan, with a letter recommending that he and other prisoners be sent to take up the shells. A cavalry detachment passing along the road leading to Yorktown had some of its men and horses killed and wounded by these shells. Our telegraph operator was sent into Yorktown soon after our troops had got possession of the place. He trod upon one of the buried shells, which burst and terribly mangled both of his legs, from which he died soon after in great agony.

The next morning (May 5th) I rode over the road leading to Yorktown, and saw the place where the shells had exploded, and also saw several places where the location of the buried shells had been marked by small sticks inserted in the ground, with pieces of white cotton cloth tied to the sticks. In the casemates and covered ways about the fortifications I saw a number of large shells, placed so that they could easily be fired by persons unaware of their presence. It was the subject of general remark at the time, that the planting of these sub-terra shells was due to the ingenuity of General Rains. The substance of the above narrative is taken from my diary of May 4-5, 1862.

Fred T. Locke.

NEW YORK, May 16, 1885.

General Johnston's Chief of Artillery at Bull Run.

By inference, at least, General Imboden's paper in the *May CENTURY*, describing "Incidents of the Battle of Manassas," does injustice to the late General William N. Pendleton. General Imboden speaks of himself as the senior captain among the four captains of artillery of General Johnston's army. But, in fact, at the time of the march of the latter to reinforce Beauregard, Captain Pendleton, who was a West Pointer, had been promoted to be chief of artillery on General Johnston's staff with the rank of Colonel. General Imboden also says that up to the time he left the field with his exhausted battery, he did not see Colonel Pendleton with the latter's battery. But it is a fact that Colonel Pendleton was at times with his battery and active on the field as chief of artillery, as shown by the reports of

Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Jackson, who comment on his services. Members of his battery have recently stated that he led them into the action.

EDITOR.

The Rear-Guard after Malvern Hill.

IN the May CENTURY, page 149, referring to the retreat from Malvern Hill, July 2d, General McClellan gives Keyes's corps the credit of furnishing the entire rear-guard. You will find from the report of Colonel Averell, of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, the rear-guard was made his command and consisted of his regiment of Heintzelman's corps, first brigade of Regular Infantry, consisting of the Third, Fourth, Twelfth, and Fourteenth infantry, of Porter's corps, and the New York Chasseurs, of Keyes's corps. To confirm this statement, let me refer you to "Official Records of the Rebellion," Vol. XI., Part II., page 235. In the same volume, page 193, will be found Keyes's official report, but no mention of Averell. In fact, Averell was the rear-guard to Turkey bridge and a mile beyond that point, where he found General Wessells of Keyes's corps. The official reports of Fitz John Porter, Sykes, and Buchanan all speak of Averell as having covered this retreat. The undersigned was a first lieutenant in the Twelfth Infantry, served through the Peninsula Campaign, was in command of Company D, First Battalion, at Malvern Hill, and remembers distinctly that the first brigade Regular Infantry slept on the field on the night of July 1st in line of battle. We were surprised the next morning to find that the entire army had retreated during the night, leaving Averell with his small command as a rear-guard to cover the retreat, which was done in the masterly manner stated by General McClellan, but by Averell, and not by Keyes.

Henry E. Smith.

UNITED STATES CLUB, PHILADELPHIA, May 25, 1885.

Notes of the Congress-Merrimac Fight.

THE editorial note, on page 750 of the March number of THE CENTURY, giving the anecdote regarding Lieutenant Joseph B. Smith's death, and the sending of his sword to his father, by flag of truce, should be supplemented by another, which gives a glimpse of a curious phase of human nature.

After Lieutenant Smith was killed, at the foot of the after ladder, on the gun-deck of the *Congress*, the writer took from his body his watch and chain, and one shoulder-strap, the other having been torn off by the shell which killed him. These were, in due time, sent to his father. When we abandoned the burning

ship Smith's body was placed in a cot, and lowered out of the bill-port, the men supposing that it was one of the wounded. During the following summer Admiral Smith's house in Washington was entered by burglars, and, among other things, the much valued watch of his dead son was carried off by them. The newspapers, in reporting the robbery, dwelt upon the distress occasioned to the admiral by the loss of the memento. Soon after, to the surprise of the family, they received the watch by express, with a letter from the burglars, declaring that if they had known the history of the watch they had taken, nothing would have induced them to touch it.

With regard to another matter in this connection, I note that Colonel Wood repeats the statement so often made, that the *Congress* was set on fire by hot shot late in the day. This is true; but she had been on fire for a long time before the hot shot of which he speaks were fired. The first broadsides exchanged on that day were from the starboard side of the *Merrimac* and the port side of the *Congress*; for the ship had not yet swung to the young flood when the *Merrimac* passed up. The heavy guns of the latter did fearful work. One of the eight-inch guns of the *Congress*, amidships on the gun-deck, was dismounted by this broadside, and all the gun's crew killed or mortally wounded,—besides very many others. This broadside must have set the *Congress* on fire near the after magazine. It was in my room, the third one aft, on the port side, that the smoke of burning wood soon became apparent, and it was there that the carpenter's crew cut away the berth, and then the skin of the ship, to enable them to get the hose down; but that fire was never put out, and gained from the first.

On page 742, in the same article, Colonel Wood speaks of the *Congress* coming within range as the *Merrimac* swung; and that then "he got in three raking shells" with the after pivot-gun. I can tell him what two of those shells did. The first one dismounted and knocked the muzzle off the starboard chase-gun,—a thirty-two pounder,—and killed or wounded every man at it. The second ranged through the stern-frame lower down, passed through the ward-room pantry, on the starboard side, through the ward-room and steerage, and out upon the berth-deck, killing or mortally wounding, in its passage, every one of the "full-boxes"—that is, the cooks and ward-room boys, who were the powder passers from the after magazine.

The powder division of the *Congress* was under the command of Purser McKean Buchanan, the brother of Captain Buchanan, of the *Merrimac*.

Edward Shippen,

PHILADELPHIA, March 5, 1885.

Medical Director U. S. N.



"The canal across the peninsula opposite Island Number Ten, and for the idea of which I am indebted to General Schuyler Hamilton, was completed by Colonel Bissell's Engineer Regiment, and four steamers brought through on the night of the 6th."

General Pope again, in his official report to General Halleck (same volume, pages 85-87), dated "Head-quarters Army of the Mississippi, camp five miles from Corinth, Mississippi, May 2, 1862," writes:

"On the 16th of March I received your dispatch, directing me, if possible, to construct a road through the swamps to a point on the Missouri shore opposite Island No. 10, and transfer a portion of my force sufficient to erect batteries at that point to assist in the artillery practice on the enemy's batteries. I accordingly dispatched Col. J. W. Bissell, Engineer Regiment, to examine the country with this view, directing him at the same time, if he found it impracticable to build a road through the swamps and overflow of the river, to ascertain whether it were possible to dig a canal across the peninsula from some point above Island No. 10 to New Madrid, in order that steam transports might be brought to me, which would enable my command to cross the river. The idea of the canal was suggested to me by General Schuyler Hamilton in a conversation upon the necessity of crossing the river and assailing the enemy's batteries near Island No. 10 in the rear.

The New York "Herald," in its issue of April 13, 1862, published an article in reference to this channel, entitled "The Schuyler Hamilton Canal."

Schuyler Hamilton,
Late Major-General of Volunteers.

NEW YORK, June 16, 1885.

The Charge of Cooke's Cavalry at Gaines's Mill.

IN THE CENTURY for June there is an article on the battle of Gaines's Mill, signed by Fitz John Porter, in which appear singular errors of statement regarding the action of the "Cavalry Reserve," affecting also the conduct and reputation of its commander. They are chiefly found at pp. 322-3:

"We lost in all twenty-two cannon; some of these broke down while we were withdrawing, and some ran off the bridges at night while we were crossing to the south bank of the Chickahominy. The loss of the guns* was due to the fact that some of Cooke's cavalry which had been directed to be kept, under all circumstances, in the valley of the Chickahominy, had been sent to resist an attack of the enemy upon our left. The charge, executed in the face of a withering fire of infantry, and in the midst of our heavy cannonading, as well as that of the enemy, resulted, as should have been expected, in confusion. The bewildered and uncontrollable horses wheeled about, and dashing through the batteries, satisfied the gunners that they were charged by the enemy. To this alone I always attributed the failure on our part to longer hold the battle-field, and to bring off all our guns in an orderly retreat. Most unaccountably this cavalry was not used to cover our retreat or gather the stragglers, but was peremptorily ordered to cross to the south bank of the river." [Foot-note: "See 'War of the Rebellion—Official Records,' Vol. XI., Part II., pp. 43, 223, 273, 272.—F. J. P."]

To silence forever the injurious statements and insinuation of the last sentence, I give here evidence of two witnesses who were present, and whose high character is known to all. Major General W. Merritt, colonel Fifth Cavalry, superintendent United States Military Academy, writes me, April 8, 1885:

"The cavalry remained, with you in immediate command, on that portion of the field, until after midnight on the 27th of June, 1862. It provided litter-bearers and

lantern-bearers for our surgeons who went over the field of battle, succoring and attending the wounded. . . . The cavalry was the last force to leave the field and to cross the Chickahominy, and the bridge on which it crossed, between 12 midnight on the 27th and 2 A. M. on the 28th of June, was, I think, rendered impassable by your order."

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel J. P. Martin, assistant adjutant-general United States Army, wrote me from Fort Leavenworth, April 30, 1885:

"The artillery did not drive the enemy from his front; the enemy was not driven from his front, but the charge of your cavalry did stop the advance of the enemy, and this enabled Porter's troops to get off the field. I am by no means alone in the belief that the charge of the cavalry at Gaines's Mill, on June 27, 1862, saved Fitz John Porter's corps from destruction. . . . You did not direct your command at once to cross the river. There were no frightened men in your vicinity. All the frightened men were far to your right; you could not have reached the retiring crowd; and if you could have stopped them, you could have done more than Porter himself did do, and he was amidst them, for I saw him. Your command, at least a part of it, was the very last to cross the river. . . . Your reputation is made, and the afterthought of a defeated commander can never smirch it."

It should be observed that in the short extract from THE CENTURY, above, General Porter repeats the assertion that the cavalry caused the loss of the (22) guns,—emphasizes, makes plainer the meaning of the opening sentence: to the charge "alone I always attributed the failure on our part to longer hold the battle-field, and to bring off all our guns in an orderly retreat."

Captain Weeden, commanding battery C., Rhode Island Artillery, reports, page 282, "Rebellion Records," the loss of a section by stress of the enemy's attacks; the two other sections "held in support in rear of Griffin's brigade" opened fire; "the smoke had filled the whole field to the woods, and it was impossible to direct the fire. The batteries were limbering to the rear in good order" when, he says, the cavalry fugitives ran through them, but he only lost one more piece "mired in the woods." But General Griffin reports that the artillery "opened fire upon the enemy advancing upon our left; but it was too late; our infantry had already commenced to fall back, and nothing being left to give confidence to the artillerymen, it was impossible to make them stand to their work." And that was just when the cavalry did go in and give confidence to the three batteries on the left, and the saving work was done.

I have examined the "Official Records" and found reports of about twenty batteries engaged in the battle, and the above is the only mention of the cavalry fugitives to be found in them; their losses are attributed to other causes. Here I will give the account of the loss of whole batteries:

General Seymour reports, p. 402, of Captain Easton, "This gallant gentleman fell and his battery was lost with him."

Captain Mark Kerns was wounded, but "loaded and fired the last shots himself, and brought four of the guns off the field." Of another battery he reports, "No efforts could now repel the rush of a successful foe, under whose fire rider and horse went down and guns lay immovable on the field."

Captain I. H. Cooper, battery B., Pennsylvania Artillery, reports, p. 410:

* One is reminded of the mournful fate of the famous skaters,— "It so fell out they all fell in—the rest, they ran away." "We lost in all twenty-two cannon"; "the loss of the guns was due" "to Cooke's cavalry"; "the rest" "ran off the bridges," or "broke down."—P. St. G. C.

"The remaining infantry falling back, we were compelled to retire from our guns. The charge being too sudden and overpowering, it was impossible to remove them, many of the horses being killed by the enemy's fire."

Was General Porter prevented from bringing off all these guns by the cavalry charge?

General Porter says, p. 322:

"Just preceding this break" (in Morell's line) "I saw cavalry, which I recognized as ours, rushing in numbers through our lines on the left."

All the evidence goes to disprove this very deliberate statement, and that all the infantry on the left had broken and was fast disappearing before the first advance of the cavalry. Again he says:

"General Cooke was instructed to take position, with cavalry, under the hills in the valley of the Chickahominy—there with the aid of artillery to guard our left flank. He was especially enjoined to intercept, gather, and hold all stragglers, and under no circumstances to leave the valley for the purpose of coming upon the hill held by our infantry, or pass in front of our line on the left."

What strange folly of self-contradiction is betrayed between this order "to guard our left flank" and the violent condemnation in the first extract, which we have been considering, of the march "to resist an attack of the enemy on our left . . ." in a "charge executed in the face of a withering fire of infantry, and in the midst of our heavy cannonading as well as that of the enemy." Could a poet laureate say more?

"Cannon to right of them,
Cannon to left of them
Volley'd and thundered—

Then they rode back—"

Ay, there's the rub.

When I reported to General Porter before the battle, I remember that he proposed that I should take post in the narrow open meadow on the extreme left. I urged that that flank of the army was virtually covered by the Chickahominy; that, moreover, it was covered by three reserve batteries, and three twenty-pounder batteries on the opposite side of the river; while the position I had taken on the hill-slope was within view, and also within cavalry striking distance. If I had gone there, I should not have been able, when the time came, to *face*, and, with artillery aid, to stop the enemy in the flush of his success. To some such objections which I made General Porter evidently yielded, instead of "enjoining" me; for the cavalry remained quite near his first station, Adams's house; and I was there with him repeatedly. An order "under no circumstances to leave the valley for the purpose of coming on the hill" would have been to a general officer not only unprecedented, but insulting.

How strange, to military ears, would sound an order "to intercept, gather, and hold all stragglers," on the extreme front and flank!—and the warning not to "pass in front of our line on the left!" Such extravagance of action—marching with no earthly object, between two lines of fire—is seldom thus forestalled! Seriously, this passes the bounds of sanity. But it is emphasized by his map which represents my cavalry as actually making a flank march between the lines of battle,—Morell's and Longstreet's.

It seems necessary to add the statements of eye-witnesses, from different points of view,—men of well-known high character,—to corroborate my assertions and my corrections of the misrepresentations of the

part played by the cavalry and myself in the battle, as found in THE CENTURY article.

Next morning at Savage's Station the Prince de Joinville approached me with both hands extended, saying with *empressment*, "I saw you make your charge, yesterday"; and next day he wrote to the Duc d'Aumale [see "New York Times," August 13, 1862:]

. . . "Those fresh troops rush in good order upon our left, which falters, flies, and passing through the artillery draws on in disorder the troops of our center. The enemy advances rapidly. The fusillade and cannonade are so violent that the projectiles striking the ground raise a permanent cloud of dust. At that moment General Cooke charged at the head of his cavalry; but that movement does not succeed, and his horsemen on their return only increase the disorder. He makes every effort, aided by all who felt a little courage, to stop the panic, but in vain."

The Comte de Paris wrote to me, February 2, 1877:

. . . "I was with De Hart's battery on the crest of the hill when you advanced on our left. . . . The sacrifice of some of the bravest of the cavalry certainly saved a part of our artillery; as did, on a larger scale, the Austrian cavalry on the evening of Sadowa. . . . The main fact is, that with your cavalry you did all that cavalry could do to stop the rout."

General W. Merritt wrote me, February 2, 1877:

"I thought at the time, and subsequent experience has convinced me, that your cavalry and the audacity of its conduct at that time, together with the rapid firing of canister at short range by the battery mentioned, did much, if not everything, towards preventing the entire destruction of the Union army at Gaines's Mill. The circumstances were these:

"The enemy had emerged from a wood, where his ranks were more or less disorganized, into an open field. Instead of finding the way clear before him he was met by a determined charge of cavalry and a heavy artillery fire. In his mind a new line of fresh troops were before him. It was but natural, at that stage of our military experience, that he should hesitate and halt, to prepare for a new emergency. He did so; and that night the cavalry bivouacked as near the scene of these events as the enemy did."

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel J. P. Martin wrote to me, March 24, 1870:

"It is my opinion that but for the charge of the Fifth Cavalry on that day, the loss in the command of General Fitz John Porter would have been immensely greater than it was; indeed, I believe that the charge, more than any other thing, was instrumental in saving that part of the army on the north bank of the Chickahominy.

"You were the last general officer of General Porter's command on the field on the left, General Porter himself leaving before you did; you had, therefore, an excellent opportunity of seeing what was going on."

Colonel G. A. H. Blake, United States Army, wrote me, June 16, 1879:

"About sundown you advanced the brigade under a warm fire and I deployed the Fifth and First cavalry in two lines, and a little to the rear of (the interval of) reserve batteries of artillery, which had opened a rapid fire. The infantry of the left wing had then disappeared from the top of the hill. You then rode off to a battery further to the left, where Rush's lancers had been ordered. The Fifth Cavalry soon charged, and I saw no more of them. You had ordered me to support them; there was a warm fire, and the smoke and dust made everything obscure. I saw none of the Fifth after it was broken, pass through the battery, which was very near. It was soon forced to retire, and was followed by the First in its rear."

Finally, General William N. Grier, United States Army, wrote me, July 19, 1879:

"The reserve was stationed on the hill . . . in full view of the slopes of the hill, down to the timber through which the enemy debouched in large numbers. The

United States batteries were on the slope of the hill, a little to our right front. You ordered the Fifth to make a charge, directing me to make a second charge after the Fifth would rally. I never saw that regiment again on that day, after it was enveloped in a cloud of dust, making the charge — but soon after saw a battery or two emerge from the dust . . . withdrawing from the contest. I then wheeled my squadrons into column of fours, at a trot along the top of the hill, until getting in rear of the batteries — receiving the enemy's fire at a loss of an officer and many men and horses — and, as I then supposed, saving the batteries from further loss."

The orders actually given were to support the batteries to the last moment, and then charge, if necessary, to save them.

P. St. George Cooke.
Brigadier and Brevet Major-General.
United States Army, Retired.

DETROIT, June, 1885.

RECOLLECTIONS OF A PARTICIPANT IN THE CHARGE.

Remembering clearly the incidents connected with the cavalry charge, I wish to clear up a point in regard to that charge, so far as the regiment (the Fifth Regular Cavalry) with which I had the honor of being connected was concerned.

The battle did not begin till noon. We were stationed on the left of our position. As the hours of the day passed by, the battle became more and more furious. At about five o'clock in the afternoon we were moved up near to the crest of the hill on our left, and within some twenty rods of the five or six batteries planted on the crest of the hill.

It was something marvelous to watch those brave men handle their guns; never a man flinched or was dismayed, though a most withering fire of musketry and artillery was poured upon them.

Just before dark, when we could tell by the sound of the musketry fire, and by the constantly advancing yells of the charging foe, that he was getting near the guns in our front, General Philip St. George Cooke, commanding the cavalry, rode to our front. I was on the right of the front line of the first squadron, and I heard his order to Captain Whiting, commanding the five companies of our regiment that were present on the field. He said, "Captain, as soon as you see the advancing line of the enemy, rising the crest of the hill, charge at once, without any further orders, to enable the artillery to bring off their guns." General Cooke then rode back around the right of our squadron.

Captain Whiting turned to us and said, "Cavalry! Attention! Draw saber!" then added something to the effect, "Boys, we must charge in five minutes." Almost immediately the bayonets of the advancing foe were seen, just beyond our cannon, probably not fifty rods from us. Captain Whiting at once gave the order, "Trot! March!" and as soon as we were fully under way he shouted, "Charge!"

We dashed forward with a wild cheer, in solid column of squadron front; but our formation was almost instantly broken by the necessity of opening to right and left to pass our guns. So furiously were our brave gunners fighting that I noticed this incident: The gun directly in my front had just been loaded; every man had fallen before it could be fired. As I bore to the right to pass this gun, I saw the man at the breech, who was evidently shot through the body, drawing himself up by the spokes of the wheel, and reaching for the lanyard, and I said, "He will fire that gun," and so

kept to the right, and almost immediately felt the shock of the explosion. Then I closed in to re-form the line, but could find no one at my left, so completely had our line been shattered by the musketry fire in front and the artillery fire in our rear. I rushed on, and almost instantly my horse reared upright in front of a line of bayonets, held by a few men upon whom I had dashed. My horse came down in front of the line, and ran away partly to our rear, perfectly uncontrollable. I dropped my saber, which hung to my waist by the saber-knot, and so fiercely tugged at my horse's bit as to cause the blood to flow from her mouth, yet could not check her. The gun I had passed, now limbered up, was being hauled off at a gallop. I could direct my horse a little to right or left, and so directed her toward the gun. As she did not attempt to leap the gun, I gained control of her, and at once turned about and started back upon my charge. After riding a short distance I paused. The firing of artillery and infantry behind and of infantry in front was terrific. None but the dead and wounded were around me. It hardly seemed that I could drive Lee's battle-scarred veterans alone, and so I rode slowly off the field. My regiment had only about two hundred and fifty men in action. Our commissioned officer was the only one not wounded, except some who were captured. Only about one hundred returned from that bloody field for duty the next day. Some were captured, but a large number fell in that terrible charge, and sleep with the many heroes who on that day gave their lives for the Union. So far as those of the Fifth Regular Cavalry present in this charge were concerned, we certainly did our whole duty, just as we were ordered. We saved *some* guns, and tried to save all.

Rev. W. H. Hitchcock.

FAIRVIEW, ILL., June 13, 1885.

"General Beauregard's Courier at Bull Run."

THE effort of Mr. Robert R. Hemphill (in the July CENTURY) to clear up the obscurity surrounding the fate of General Beauregard's missing courier at the First Battle of Manassas, only deepens the mystery which attaches to that now interesting person.

Mr. Hemphill thinks that he saw this courier, disabled by a fall from his horse, "lying helpless in rear of the (Confederate) line at Mitchell's Ford, badly used up and bleeding."

How is this possible? General Beauregard says that the courier started about 8 A. M. from "Camp Pickens, the headquarters," to go first to Holmes, then to Ewell. To seek either Holmes or Ewell by way of Mitchell's Ford would be nearly like going from New York to Brazil by way of London.

At a later hour General Beauregard rode from his headquarters to a hill in rear of Mitchell's Ford, and thence, near noon, a staff officer, accompanied by a courier, set out to go to Ewell with an order to move to the support of our left. Meeting with some accident, he sent the courier ahead to deliver the order. It was perhaps this officer whom Mr. Hemphill saw.

Campbell Brown.

SPRING HILL, TENN., July 5, 1885.

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

A Contradicted "Famous Saying."

EDITOR OF THE CENTURY MAGAZINE.

Sir: About two weeks after the battle of Shiloh there appeared in some newspaper that was shown to me a report of a conversation assumed to have taken place between General Grant and myself soon after the battle, in which I was represented as rallying him upon the narrowness of his escape, and saying that he had not transports enough to carry off ten thousand men; to which he was reported as replying, in substance, that when it came to retreating transportation would not have been required for more than ten thousand.

The story had been colored for popular effect, but was traceable to a conversation in a vein of pleasantry that occurred at my camp among a party of officers, in which I had taken but little part.

Some time afterward it took on a modification which suited the alleged conversation to my meeting with General Grant on my arrival at Pittsburg Landing during the battle. This changed materially the character of the report, but I continued to treat it with the indifference which I thought it deserved, though the story has been freely circulated. I never knew until within a few months past, through the publication of the "War Records," that in its modified form it had the indorsement of an official authorship.

From that publication it appears that a year after the battle General Grant called upon three of his staff-officers to make reports concerning the movements of General Lew Wallace's division on the day of the battle, in answer to a complaint of the latter officer that injustice had been done him in General Grant's reports. Two of the officers, namely, General McPherson and Captain Rowley, in their replies confined themselves to that subject. The third, Colonel Rawlins, on the other hand, made it the occasion of a specific defense, or explanation, or commendation, or whatever it may be called, of General Grant's relation to the battle. Among other things that have since been more or less disputed, he said:

"General Nelson's division of the Army of the Ohio reached Savannah on the afternoon of the 5th of April, but General Buell himself did not arrive. . . . You [General Grant] then rode back to the house near the river that had been designated for headquarters, to learn what word if any had been received from General Nelson, whose division you expected soon to arrive at the landing on the opposite side of the river; and you there met Maj.-Gen. D. C. Buell, who had arrived at Savannah and taken a steamer and come up to see you, and learn how the battle was progressing in advance of his force. Among his first inquiries was: 'What preparations have you made for retreating?' To which you replied, 'I have not yet despaired of whipping them, general'; and went on to state to him your momentary expectation of the arrival of General Wallace, to whom orders had been timely and repeatedly sent, and that General Nelson's division might soon be expected by the wagon-road from Savannah," etc.

This statement, ridiculous and absurd in its principal feature, is incorrect in every particular.

It is well known that I arrived at Savannah on the 5th of April; General Grant did not, as might be inferred, find me at the landing at Pittsburg—I found

him there; we did not meet at "the house near the river," but on his headquarters steamer.

I mention these points only to show the tendency of the statement to error, and I aver that no such conversation as is described ever occurred, and that the contingency of a retreat was not brought forward by General Grant or by me.

My attention has within a few days been called to the fact that an article, in a recent number of THE CENTURY, has given fresh circulation to the story, and has combined the official and the original phraseology of it. I have regarded it as a trivial question, of little moment to either General Grant or myself; but perhaps the value attached to it by others makes it proper for me to give it an attention which I have not heretofore chosen to bestow upon it.

AIRDRIE, July 10, 1885.

D. C. Buell.

General Heintzelman in the Peninsula Campaign.

IN THE CENTURY for May General McClellan has an article, "The Peninsular Campaign," in which there are one or two misstatements in regard to the Third Corps, commanded by General Heintzelman. Fortunately my father's papers, which are in my possession, contain replies to both allegations,—one in the handwriting of General Heintzelman's adjutant-general, and the other the rough draft of a letter addressed to General L. Thomas, then Adjutant-General of the Army.

On page 147 General McClellan states:

"All the corps commanders on the south side were on the 26th directed to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare in support of Porter on the next day. All of them thought the enemy so strong in their respective fronts as to require all their force to hold their positions."

Upon the demand for troops General Heintzelman replied as follows:

HEADQUARTERS 3D CORPS, 4 P. M., June 26, 1862.
GENERAL MARCY, Chief of Staff: I think I can hold the intrenchments with four brigades for twenty-four hours; that would leave two (2) brigades available for service on the other side of the river, but the men are so tired and worn out that I fear they would not be in a condition to fight after making a march of any distance. . . .
S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Brigadier-General.

This is far from being a statement that all his forces were required to hold his own lines.

Then, on page 148, General McClellan says:

"Meanwhile, through a misunderstanding of his orders and being convinced that the troops of Sumner and Franklin at Savage's Station were ample for the purpose in view, Heintzelman withdrew his troops during the afternoon, crossed the swamp at Brackett's Ford, and reached the Charles City road with the rear of his column at 10 P. M."

When the same statement was first made in 1863 General Heintzelman wrote the following letter:

HEADQUARTERS DEFENCES OF WASHINGTON,
April 11, 1863.
GENERAL L. THOMAS, ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., WASHINGTON.
GENERAL: I find in the "New York Tribune" of the 8th of April a "Preliminary Report of the Operations

of the Army of the Potomac, since June 25, 1862," made by General G. B. McClellan. . . .

In a paragraph commencing "On the 28th Porter's corps was also moved across the White Oak Swamp," etc., is the following:

"They were ordered to hold this position until dark, then to fall back across the swamp and rejoin the rest of the army. This order was not fully carried out, nor was the exact position I designated occupied by the different divisions concerned."

I was furnished with a map marked in red with the positions we should occupy.

As I had the fortified lines thrown up some time before by the troops in my command I had no difficulty in knowing where to go, and I did occupy these lines. General Sumner's were more indefinite and he occupied a position in advance of the one designated. This left a space of half a mile unoccupied, between his right and Franklin's left. In the morning I was informed that some rebels were already at or near Dr. Trent's house, where General McClellan's headquarters had been; I sent and found this to be the case. General Franklin had also called at my headquarters and told me that the enemy were repairing the bridges of the Chickahominy and would soon cross in force. About 1 P. M. I saw some of our troops filing into the fields between Dr. Trent's house and Savage's Station, and a few moments later Generals Franklin and W. F. Smith came to me and reported the enemy approaching and urged me to ride to General Sumner and get him to fall back and close this gap. I rode briskly to the front, and on the Williamsburg road, where it passed between my two divisions, met General Sumner's troops falling back. He wished me to turn back with him to arrange for ulterior operations, but as my right flank was entirely uncovered by these movements, I declined until after I had seen my division commanders and given them orders how to fall back. On my return there was some difficulty in finding General Sumner, and when found he informed me he had made his arrangements. I returned to my command, and on the way found the ground filled with troops, more than could be used to any advantage, and if the enemy planted a few batteries of artillery on the opposite side of the railroad, they would have been cut in pieces.

An aide to General McClellan having reported to me the day before to point out to me a road across the White Oak Swamp, opening from the left flank of my position of the fortified lines, I did not hesitate to retreat by that road, and left at 3 P. M. General Smith, of Franklin's corps, having sent to the rear all his batteries earlier in the day, I, at his request, let him have two of mine (Osborn's and Bramhall's), and they did good service that afternoon in checking and defeating the rebel attack.

My remaining would have been no aid to General Sumner, as he already had more troops than he could defile through the narrow road in his rear, and the road I took covered his left flank.

Before dark the advance of my corps was across the swamp, and by 10 P. M. the rear was over, with but little molestation from the enemy. I immediately sought General McClellan, and reported to him what I had done, and this is the first intimation I have had that my conduct was not entirely satisfactory.

To hold my position till dark, by which time I was to receive orders, would have been impossible. After Generals Franklin and Sumner had fallen back, my right flank and rear were uncovered, and by a road which passed entirely in my rear; and beyond my right flank my only line of retreat would have been cut off, and I would have lost my entire corps. I did not know where General McClellan was, and it was therefore impossible to report to him for orders.

When General Birney reached Fisher's Ford, the enemy were there, but not in force; they soon arrived in force, and he had to take another road more to our left. Had we been a little later they would have been in possession, and our retreat by this road cut off.

S. P. HEINTZELMAN.

I trust that you will be able to find space for these letters.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mary L. Heintzelman.

National Memorials of the Civil War.

VIEWS OF GENERAL GRANT AND SENATOR SUMNER.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE CENTURY MAGAZINE.

SIR: In General Badeau's article on General Grant, published in your current (May, 1885) number, page 160, occurs the following passage:

"Soon after the close of the war I was present when a Committee of Congress, headed by Charles Sumner, waited on him [General Grant] to propose that a picture should be painted of the surrender of Lee, to be placed in the rotunda of the Capitol. But he told them he should never consent, so far as he was concerned, to any picture being placed in the Capitol to commemorate a victory in which our own countrymen were the losers."

Will you allow me to submit the reasons why I think General Badeau is mistaken in affirming that Charles Sumner headed the committee which called on General Grant for the purpose specified? I thought it was generally known that Mr. Sumner stood almost alone in our Congressional annals, among statesmen identified with the Union side in the Civil War, as advocating the policy of not allowing victories of fellow-citizens over each other to be perpetuated by national memorials, but as the statement referred to seems to have passed unchallenged by the press, I think it now incumbent on me to give the evidence as to Mr. Sumner's position on this question, drawn entirely from the proceedings of the United States Senate.

As early as May, 1862, the question arose upon a dispatch of General McClellan, where, after announcing the capture of Williamsburg, he inquired whether he was authorized to follow the example of other generals and direct the names of battles to be placed on the colors of regiments. This being communicated to the Senate, Mr. Sumner, May 8, 1862, moved the following resolution: *Resolved*, That in the efforts now making for the restoration of the Union and the establishment of peace throughout the country, *it is inexpedient that the names of victories obtained over our fellow-citizens should be placed on the regimental colors of the United States.*

February 27, 1865, more than a month before the surrender of Lee, the Senate having under consideration an appropriation for a picture in the National Capitol, Mr. Sumner moved as an amendment, "That in the National Capitol, dedicated to the National Union, *there shall be no picture of a victory in battle with our fellow-citizens.*"

On December 2, 1872, Mr. Sumner introduced in the Senate the following bill: *A Bill to regulate the Army Register and the Regimental Colors of the United States.*

WHEREAS, The National Unity and good-will among fellow-citizens can be assured only through oblivion of past differences, and it is contrary to the usage of civilized nations to perpetuate the memory of civil war. Therefore,

Be it enacted by the Senate, etc., that the names of battles with fellow-citizens shall not be continued in the Army Register or placed on the regimental colors of the United States.

This bill was the cause of a hasty and ill-considered resolution of censure passed by the Massachusetts Legislature, which did much to embitter the last years of Mr. Sumner's life. Happily the resolution was rescinded the winter before his death. But it was neverthe-

less true that he *suffered* for this, as he had suffered for his advocacy of the cause of the slave.

I know that it is exceedingly difficult to prove a negative, but if the recorded acts and opinions of a man exceedingly tenacious of his views when once adopted *can* prove anything, it seems to me that I have shown that Charles Sumner could not have proposed to General Grant to have a picture of the Surrender of Lee placed in the Rotunda of the Capitol. I am inclined to think that General Badeau may, in this instance, have confounded the action of Senator Wilson with that of Senator Sumner. Senator Wilson was at that time Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs and, as the Senate proceedings show, held opposite opinions from his colleague in regard to the policy of perpetuating the memorials of civil war. To find Mr. Sumner represented as acting in behalf of such a policy is as surprising to one familiar with his record as it would be to encounter a statement that Cobden had advocated the Corn Laws or Garrison the Slave Trade.

I will only add that on careful investigation it appears that neither Mr. Sumner's motions nor his bill was ever enacted into written law. The idea contained in them, however, has become part of the *unwritten law* of the Republic. No picture or other representation of a victory in battle with fellow-citizens has ever been placed in the National Capitol, and it is safe to say that none will be. The names of the battles of the Civil War were placed on the regimental colors, and in the Army Register, by an order of General McClellan in 1862. In 1878 the names of the battles were stricken from the Army Register by order of the Secretary of War, and when new sets of colors are furnished to the regiments of the regular army the names of the battles are no longer inscribed thereon.

Charles W. Eldridge.

General Grant's Premonition.

GENERAL GRANT'S reticence in talking about himself has always been one of his marked characteristics. The only occasion known to many well-informed persons when General Grant was ever heard to express an opinion of his own qualifications was at a dinner he gave at the White House in March, 1874. There were but few guests, among them Roscoe Conkling, Simon Cameron, and Senator J. W. Johnston of Virginia. The last-named gentleman sat next to General Grant at the table. The talk turned on the war, and

while the others were discussing it Senator Johnston turned to General Grant and said to him:

"Mr. President, will you permit me to ask you a question which has always been of great interest to me? Did you, at the beginning of the war, have any premonition that you were to be the man of the struggle?"

"I had not the least idea of it," replied General Grant. "I saw a lot of very ordinary fellows pitching in and getting commissions. I knew I could do as well and better than they could, so I applied for a commission and got it."

"Then," asked Senator Johnston, "when did you know that you were the man of destiny?"

General Grant looked straight ahead of him, with an expression on his inscrutable face that Senator Johnston had never seen there before.

"After the fall of Vicksburg," he said, after a pause. "When Vicksburg capitulated, I knew then that I was to be the man of the war; that I should command the armies of the United States and bring the war to a close."

"But," said Senator Johnston, "you had had great and notable successes before the days of Vicksburg. You had fought Shiloh and captured Fort Donelson."

"That is true," responded General Grant; "but while they gave me confidence in myself, I could not see what was before me until Vicksburg fell. Then I saw it as plainly as I now do. I knew I should be commander in chief and end the war."

At the same White House dinner Simon Cameron described the scene when General Joseph E. Johnston resigned his commission in the United States army. Mr. Cameron said he was sitting one morning in his room at the War Department, he being Secretary of War, when General Johnston entered, deeply agitated, and carrying in his hand a paper, which Secretary Cameron suspected was General Johnston's resignation. He handed it to the secretary without saying a word. The secretary glanced at it, saw what it was, and said:

"I regret to see this, General; I understand what it means. You are going South. This is not what you should do."

General Johnston replied under great emotion:

"I feel it my duty to resign, and I ask that my resignation be accepted at once."

"It shall be," said the secretary; "but you are mistaken as to your duty."

General Johnston bowed and said:

"I think it my duty," and, without another word, the two men bowed low to each other and General Johnston hurried from the room.

M. E. Seawell.

BIGOTRY.

EACH morn the fire-maids come to robe their queen,
Who rises feeble, tottering, faded, gray.
Her dress must be of silver blent with green;
At the least change her court would shriek dismay.

Each noon the wrinkled nobles, one by one,
Group round her throne and low obeisance give.
Then all, in melancholy unison,
Advise her by antique prerogative.