

after two o'clock, Governor Harris of Tennessee, who, after the death of General Johnston, had joined the staff of Beauregard in action, taking me aside, asked if I did not regard the day as going against us irremediably, and whether there was not danger in tarrying so long in the field as to be unable to withdraw in good order. I answered that I thought it would soon be our proper course to retreat. Having an opportunity a moment later to speak to General Beauregard in private, I brought the subject before him in almost these words:

"General, do you not think our troops are very much in the condition of a lump of sugar thoroughly soaked with water, but yet preserving its original shape, though ready to dissolve? Would it not be judicious to get away with what we have?"

"I intend to withdraw in a few moments," was his reply.

Calling upon his aids-de-camp present, he dispatched them with orders to the several

corps commanders to begin the rearward movement. He also directed me to collect as many of the broken organizations as I could,—both of infantry and artillery,—post them in the best position I might find, and hold it until the whole army had passed rearward of it. Such a position I quickly found on an elevated ridge in full view of the chapel and the ground to the right and left of it, and also somewhat more elevated, rising abruptly toward the enemy and receding gently toward Corinth. There I collected and posted some two thousand infantry, making them lie down and rest. I also placed in battery some twelve or fifteen guns, so as to sweep the approach from the direction of the enemy. There also I remained until after four o'clock, or until all the Confederate forces had retired, General Breckenridge's troops being the last, and without seeing a single Federal soldier. I then retired, carrying from the field the caissons loaded down with muskets and rifles picked from the field.

Thomas Jordan.

## MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

### The Offer of Union Command to General A. S. Johnston.

[THE following statement was written in response to an inquiry by us as to the details of the offer of high command referred to in the two foregoing papers.—Ed.]

The circumstances which gave rise to the expressed desire of the administration in 1861 to retain General Albert Sidney Johnston in the Federal army were as follows:

Early in April, 1861, while on duty in the adjutant-general's office in Washington, I learned that Colonel Sumner had been dispatched *incog.* to California, with secret orders to assume command of the department of the Pacific, and that this unusual course had been prompted by the fear that the forts and arsenals and garrisons on that coast would be placed in the hands of the secessionists by General Johnston, the then commander, who was reported to be arranging to do so.

I had just received a letter from General Johnston expressing his pleasure at the large and handsome parade of State troops in San Francisco, on February 22d, and at the undoubted loyalty to the Union cause of the whole Pacific coast, and also his earnest hope that the patriotic spirit manifested in California existed as strongly in all other States, and would as surely be maintained by them as it would be in the Pacific States in case of attempted secession.

Fearing the effect of the superseding orders upon a high-toned and sensitive officer, one whom I esteemed as a brother, and earnestly desired to be secured to our cause, I induced Major McDowell to show the letter to Secretary Cameron, and to urge every effort to keep General Johnston from leaving the service. His

superior qualifications, his influence among prominent citizens at the South, and especially among his relatives in his native State, Kentucky,—which it was exceedingly desirable to keep in the Union,—were strong inducements to these efforts. My desire was met as cordially and earnestly as it existed, and I was authorized to send, as I did through my friend "Ben Holliday," in New York, for transmission by telegraph to St. Louis, and thence by his "pony express" to San Francisco, the following message: "I take the greatest pleasure in assuring you, for the Secretary of War, that he has the utmost confidence in you, and will give you the most important command and trust on your arrival here. Sidney is appointed to the Military Academy." This message reached General Johnston after the arrival of Colonel Sumner.

In response to the above, and by the same channel of communication, I received this message: "I thank you and my friends for efforts in my behalf. I have resigned and resolved to follow the fortunes of my State." His letter of resignation was soon received, and put an end to all hope, especially as Texas—which had then seceded—was his adopted State.

I felt in 1861, as I now know, that the assertion that General Johnston intended to turn over to the secessionists the defenses of California, or any part of the regular army, was false and absurd. Under no circumstances, even if intended, could such a plan have succeeded, especially with the regular army. But no such breach of trust was intended, nor would any graduate of West Point in the army have committed or permitted it. It had no better foundation than the statement of Senator Conness of California, who three years later urged and secured the assignment of Gen-

eral McDowell to command on the Pacific coast, on the ground that after the war for the Union should have ended there would be in California a more powerful rebellion than that then existing among the Southern States.

*Fitz John Porter.*

NEW YORK, December 8, 1884.

#### General Robert Patterson and the Battle of Bull Run.

APPENDED to General Beauregard's paper in the November CENTURY, on "The Battle of Bull Run," is the following foot-note:

"It was Patterson upon whom the Government at Washington depended to neutralize Johnston as an element in McDowell's contest with Beauregard. But, whether from the faultiness of Scott's instructions or of Patterson's understanding of them, or from his failure or inability to execute them,—all of which is matter of controversy,—Patterson neither held Johnston nor reënforced McDowell.—ED."

General Patterson's duty was to assist in carrying out the plans of the general-in-chief when they were made known to him. There is no official record that General Scott gave any order to General Patterson to reënforce General McDowell.

Some nineteen years ago General Patterson, having sought justice in vain through every official channel, published his "Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah in 1861," in which he thus summarizes his defense:

"(1) That I have already courted an investigation of any charge that could be brought against me; (2) that my whole course was entirely approved by the officers attached to my command, whom I was instructed to consult; (3) that I complied with every order issued to me; (4) that I kept Johnston from joining Beauregard, not only on the day I was directed to do so, but for five days afterward; (5) that I was never informed that the battle had not been fought, at the time indicated, though within reach of a telegraph, but on the contrary, the only dispatch received convinced me that the battle had been fought; (6) that for the delay in fighting it I was in no wise responsible; (7) that the general-in-chief, when I told him I was not strong enough, in my opinion, to attack Johnston, could have ordered me to do so, if he differed

from me, as I told him all the circumstances, and asked, 'Shall I attack?' (8) that I informed him that Johnston had gone to General Beauregard, and he himself, in his comments on my testimony (see page 241, vol. II., 'Conduct of the War'), admits that he knew it before delivering battle on the 21st of July."

After a long and useful life, wherein he never hesitated to obey his country's call, General Patterson has passed away. His son now speaks for him.

*Robert E. Patterson.*

UNITED SERVICE CLUB, PHILADELPHIA, NOV. 10, 1884.

[While we gladly give place to the above communication, it is proper to say that the object of the foot-note was to make clear to the reader the importance of certain events in the campaign of Bull Run, and not to assign responsibility for those events; and it was to guard against such an inference that we expressly stated this responsibility to be matter of controversy.—ED.]

#### Uniform of the Highlanders at Bull Run.

IN a foot-note to the "Recollections of a Private" in the November CENTURY, it is said that the Seventy-ninth New York wore the Highland dress at the battle of Bull Run. If by that is meant the "kilts," it is an error. It is true that all the officers and many of the men did wear that uniform when we left the city in June, 1861, and on dress-parade occasions in Washington. But when we went into Virginia, it was laid aside, together with the plaid trowsers worn by all the men on ordinary occasions, and we donned the ordinary blue. Captain ——— was the only one who insisted on wearing the kilts on the march to Bull Run, claiming that as the Highlanders wore that dress in India, it would be quite as comfortable in Virginia; but while chasing a pig, the day before we reached Centreville, the kilts were the cause of his drawing upon himself the ridicule of the whole regiment. When we started for the battle-field on that Sunday morning he, also, appeared in ordinary blue uniform.

*William Todd,*

Company B, Seventy-ninth New York (Highlanders).

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## TOPICS OF THE TIME.

### Some Practicable Retorms.

THE experience of the recent Presidential campaign illuminates the path of political reform with respect to two or three matters of great importance, concerning which there should be no difference of opinion.

The first is the separation, in a few of the States, of the State and Congressional elections from the Presidential election. Twenty years ago the State elections were held separately in many of the States; but the number of these separate elections has been gradually reduced, until the only Northern States now holding

elections before November are Vermont, Maine, and Ohio. Pennsylvania was once the "Keystone State" of the political arch, but its citizens grew weary of that distinction, and transferred their State contest to November. Indiana was a "pivotal" State four years ago, but the experience of that campaign sufficed for Indiana, and the October election was abolished. In West Virginia the same change was made at the last election. The remaining States may well follow the good example. The fewer these preliminary elections become, the greater will be the injury suffered by the States that retain them. The people of these States

of the household. She declared that "the colored people didn' want to be niggers for the Yanks!"

Our corps arrived at White House Landing, May 22, 1862, and here we found a large portion of our army, which was encamped on the wide, level plain between the wood-skirted road and the Pamunkey River, occupying tents of all descriptions. Another camp was located at Cumberland Landing, a few miles below White House. The first night of our arrival was a stormy and tempestuous one, and it was evident that an attack from the enemy was expected, as we received orders to lay upon our arms. The

Pamunkey is navigable to this point, having sufficient depth, but is very narrow,—in fact, so narrow that some of the larger steamers could not turn, for their stem and stern would reach either bank, except at selected places. The broad plain was crowded with tents, baggage-wagons, pontoon trains, and artillery,—all the accompaniments of a vast army. Here some of the regiments who came out from home in a Zouave uniform changed their bright clothes for the regular army blue, and, as marching orders came with the sunrise, moved off the field, leaving windrows of old clothes on the plain.

*Warren Lee Goss.*



## MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

### General R. S. Ewell at Bull Run.

WITH UNPUBLISHED LETTERS OF GENERALS FITZHUGH LEE, EWELL, AND BEAUREGARD.

In General Beauregard's article on Bull Run, on page 101 of the November CENTURY, is this severe criticism of one of his subordinates:

"The commander of the front line on my right, who failed to move because he received no immediate order, was instructed in the plan of attack, and should have gone forward the moment General Jones, upon whose right he was to form, exhibited his own order, which mentioned one as having been already sent to that commander. I exonerated him after the battle, as he was technically not in the wrong; but one could not help recalling Desaix, who even moved in a direction opposite to his technical orders when facts plainly showed him the service he ought to perform, whence the glorious result of Marengo, or help believing that if Jackson had been there, the movement would not have balked."

The officer referred to is the late Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell, and the censure is based on the following statement on page 95:

"Meanwhile, in rear of Mitchell's Ford, I had been waiting with General Johnston for the sound of conflict to open in the quarter of Centreville upon the Federal left flank and rear (making allowance, however for the delays possible to commands unused to battle), when I was chagrined to hear from General D. R. Jones that, while he had been long ready for the movement upon Centreville, General Ewell had

not come up to form on his right, though he had sent him between seven and eight o'clock a copy of his own order, which recited that Ewell had been already ordered to begin the movement. I dispatched an immediate order to Ewell to advance; but within a quarter of an hour, just as I received a dispatch from him informing me that he had received no order to advance in the morning, the firing on the left began to increase so intensely as to indicate a severe attack, whereupon General Johnston said that he would go personally to that quarter."

These two short extracts contain at least three errors, so serious that they should not be allowed to pass uncorrected among the materials from which history will one day be constructed:

1. That Ewell failed to do what a good soldier of the type of Desaix or Stonewall Jackson would have done—namely, to move forward immediately on hearing from D. R. Jones.
2. That Beauregard was made aware of this supposed backwardness of Ewell by a message from D. R. Jones.
3. That on receiving this message he at once ordered Ewell to advance.

The subjoined correspondence, now first in print, took place four days after the battle. It shows that Ewell did exactly what Beauregard says he ought to have done—namely, move forward promptly; that his own staff-officer, sent to report this forward movement, carried also to headquarters the first intelligence of the failure of orders to reach him; that no

such message was received from D. R. Jones as is here ascribed to him; and that the order sent back by Beauregard to Ewell was not one to advance, but to retire from an advance already begun.

These mistakes, I am sure, are unintentional; but it is not easy to understand them, as General Beauregard has twice given a tolerably accurate though meager account of the matter—once in his official report, and once in his biography published by Colonel Roman in 1884. Neither of these accounts can be reconciled with that in *THE CENTURY*.

Upon reading General Beauregard's article, I wrote to General Fitzhugh Lee, who was Ewell's assistant adjutant-general at Manassas, asking his recollection of what took place. I have liberty to make the following extracts from his reply. After stating what troops composed the brigade, he goes on:

"These troops were all in position at daylight on the 21st July, ready for *any* duty, and held the extreme right of General Beauregard's line of battle along Bull Run, at Union Mills. As hour after hour passed, General Ewell grew impatient at not receiving any orders (beyond those to be ready to advance, which came at sunrise), and sent me between nine and ten A. M. to see General D. R. Jones, who commanded the brigade next on his left at McLean's ford, to ascertain if that officer had any news or had received any orders from army headquarters. I found General Jones making preparations to cross Bull Run, and was told by him that, in the order he had received to do so, it was stated that General Ewell had been sent similar instructions.

"Upon my report of these facts, General Ewell at once issued the orders for his command to cross the run and move out on the road to Centreville."

General Lee then describes the recall across Bull Run and the second advance of the brigade to make a demonstration toward Centreville, and adds that the skirmishers of Rodes's Fifth Alabama Regiment, which was in advance, had actually become engaged, when we were again recalled and ordered to "move by the most direct route at once and as rapidly as possible, for the Lewis house"—the field of battle on the left. Ewell moved rapidly, sending General Lee and another officer ahead to report and secure orders. On his arrival near the field they brought instructions to halt, when he immediately rode forward with them to General Beauregard, "and General Ewell begged General Beauregard to be allowed to go in pursuit of the enemy, but his request was refused." General Lee adds: "That this splendid brigade shared only the labor, and not the glory, of that memorable July day was not the fault of its commander; and when General Beauregard says that he cannot help believing that if Jackson had been on his right flank at Manassas the 'movement would not have balked,' he does great injustice to the memory of a noble old hero and as gallant a soldier as the war produced."

As to the real causes of the miscarriage of General Beauregard's plan of attack there need be little doubt. They are plainly stated by his immediate superior in command, General Joseph E. Johnston, in his official report, as being the "early movements of the enemy on that morning and the non-arrival of the expected troops" from Harper's Ferry. He adds: "General Beauregard afterward proposed a modification of the

abandoned plan, to attack with our right, while the left stood on the defensive. This, too, became impracticable, and a battle ensued, different in place and circumstances from any previous plan on our side."

There are some puzzling circumstances connected with the supposed miscarriage of the order for our advance. The delay in sending it is unexplained. General Beauregard says it was sent "at about eight A. M.," but D. R. Jones had received his corresponding order at ten minutes past seven, and firing had begun at half-past five.

The messenger was strangely chosen. It was the most important order of the day, for the movements of the army were to hinge on those of our brigade. There was no scarcity of competent staff-officers; yet it was intrusted to "a guide," presumably an enlisted man, perhaps even a citizen, whose very name was unknown.

His instructions were peculiar. Time was all-important. He was ordered not to go direct to Ewell, but first to make a *détour* to Holmes, who lay in reserve nearly two miles in our rear.

His disappearance is mysterious. He was never heard of after receiving the order; yet his route lay wholly within our lines, over well-beaten roads and far out of reach of the enemy.

Lastly, General Beauregard, in his official report, gives as his reason for countermarching the movement begun by Ewell at ten o'clock, that in his judgment it would require quite three hours for the troops to get into position for attack. Had the messenger dispatched at eight been prompt, Ewell might have had his orders by nine. But at nine we find Beauregard in rear of Mitchell's Ford, waiting for an attack which, by his own figures, he should not have expected before twelve.

It is not for me to reconcile these contradictions.

*Campbell Brown,*

Formerly Aide-de-camp and Assistant Adjutant-General on General Ewell's staff.

SPRING HILL, TENN., December 29, 1884.

[CORRESPONDENCE.]

UNION MILLS, July 25, 1861.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD.

SIR: In a conversation with Major James, Louisiana Sixth Regiment, he has left the impression on my mind that you think some of your orders on the 21st were either not carried out or not received by me.

My first order on that day was to hold myself in readiness to attack—this at sunrise. About ten, General Jones sent a copy of an order received by him in which it was stated that I had been ordered to cross and attack, and on receipt of this I moved on until receiving the following:

On account of the difficulties of the ground in our front, it is thought advisable to fall back to our former position.  
(Addressed) General Ewell. TO & I-2 A. M.  
(Signed) G. T. B.

If any other order was sent to me, I should like to have a copy of it, as well as the name of the courier who brought it.

Every movement I made was at once reported to you at the time, and this across Bull Run, as well as the advance in the afternoon, I thought were explained in my report sent in to-day.

If an order were sent earlier than the copy through General Jones, the courier should be held responsible,

as neither General Holmes nor myself received it. I send the original of the order to fall back in the morning. The second advance in the afternoon and recall to Stone Bridge were in consequence of verbal orders.

My chief object in writing to you is to ask you to leave nothing doubtful in your report, both as regards my crossing in the morning and recall — and not to let it be inferred by any possibility that I blundered on that day. I moved forward as soon as notified by General Jones that I was ordered and he had been.

If there was an order sent me to advance before the one I received through General Jones, it is more than likely it would have been given to the same express.

Respectfully,

R. S. EWELL, B. G.

MANASSAS, VA., July 26, 1861.

GENERAL: Your letter of the 25th inst. is received. I do not attach the slightest blame to you for the failure of the movement on Centreville, but to the guide who did not deliver the order to move forward, sent at about eight A. M. to General Holmes and then to you — corresponding in every respect to the one sent to Generals Jones, Bonham, and Longstreet — only their movements were subordinate to yours. Unfortunately no copy, in the hurry of the moment, was kept of said orders; and so many guides, about a dozen or more, were sent off in different directions, that it is next to impossible to find out who was the bearer of the orders referred to. Our guides and couriers were the worst set I ever employed, whether from ignorance or over-anxiety to do well and quickly I cannot say; but many regiments lost their way repeatedly on their way toward the field of battle, and of course I can attach no more blame to their commanding officers than I could to you for not executing an order which I am convinced you did not get.

I am fully aware that you did all that could have been expected of you or your command. I merely expressed my regret that my original plan could not be carried into effect, as it would have been a most complete victory with only half the trouble and fighting.

The true cause of countermanding your forward movement after you had crossed was that it was *then* too late, as the enemy was about to annihilate our left flank, and had to be met and checked *there*, for otherwise he would have taken us in flank and rear and all would have been lost.

Yours truly,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

General R. S. EWELL, Union Mills, Va.

P. S. Please read the above to Major James.

N. B. The order sent you at about eight A. M., to commence the movement on Centreville, was addressed to General Holmes and yourself, as he was to support you, but being nearer Camp Pickens, the headquarters, than Union Mills, where you were, it was to be communicated to him first, and then to you; but he has informed me that it never reached him. With regard to the order sent you in the afternoon to recross the Bull Run (to march toward the Stone Bridge), it was sent you by General J. E. Johnston, as I am informed by him, for the purpose of supporting our left, if necessary.

G. T. B.

Do not publish until we know what the enemy is going to do — or reports are out — which I think will make it all right.

B.

#### Names of Western Gun-boats.

MR. A. H. MARKLAND, who had charge of the mail service of the Union armies, and whom General Grant has credited with the origination of that service, but who disclaims the honor in favor of General Grant himself, writes us that General Wallace is in error in speaking of the steamboat which was the headquarters of General Grant during the advance upon Fort Donelson as the *Tigress*. It was not till the Vicksburg campaign that this boat was so used, the *New Uncle Sam* being the vessel referred to at Donelson. By order of General Grant, Mr. Markland took the latter boat from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson, with letters for the army. As the Union soldiers marched into the fort on one side, messengers started to meet them from the other with letters from home.

Mr. Markland also challenges Admiral Walke's correctness in calling the boat commanded by the latter at Belmont the *Taylor*. He says: "The boat was never known as the *Taylor* while she was in the service. Some of the officers wrote of her as the *Taylor*, which was probably a slip of the pen. I was personally acquainted with the officers who commanded her after Captain Walke, and without exception they called her the *Tyler* when speaking of her. Every official report of Captain Walke while in command of her speaks of her as the *Tyler*. The official reports of Admiral Porter speak of her as the *Tyler*. In all the correspondence of General Grant, as well as in his official reports, when he refers to her, he refers to the *Tyler*."

To this Admiral Walke makes rejoinder by referring to the reports of the Secretary of the Navy of 1862, where, he says, "It will be found Flag-Officers Foote and Davis and all the commanders of the boat called her the *Taylor* (so named in honor of the memory of General Zachary Taylor) instead of *A. O. Tyler*, the name she had when she was purchased by our Government; and in all my correspondence she retained the name of President Taylor (a national name for a national vessel) while I had command of her and until about a year after, when her name was changed again to *Tyler*. (See Report of Sec'y of Navy, July 11, 1863.)"

EDITOR.

#### Erratum.

MAJOR D. W. REED, late of the Twelfth Iowa, on behalf of several members of that regiment, calls attention to a clerical error in General Wallace's article on the capture of Fort Donelson, by which the Fourteenth Iowa is credited to both Cook's and Lauman's brigades of General C. F. Smith's division. In the first instance it should be the Twelfth, which was engaged in General Smith's assault. General Wallace probably took the organization of the brigades from the official table of casualties, where the same error occurs.

ED.