Seeing the honest look of all these people, I confessed the scare I had had during the night. The workmen, having the case explained, laughed at the top of their lungs, and the woman explained further:

"So that was the way of it. You thought they were robbers, did you? Now just wait. This is the way it happened, and first let me say that —" and so forth, and so on.

She wearied me with her rustic slang, broken by peals of laughter.

Outside was the joyous morning, the blessed daylight, which I thought never again to behold. But was that the landscape which seemed to me so savage the night before? A veil of mist softened the azure distance; I heard the birds singing in the sky; fowls were cackling at my feet. The bluffs were redolent with perfumes, and on the beach the immensity of the sea unrolled itself. From that forest which I thought a desert I saw blue smoke mounting; all was sunlight, gaiety, joy of life, and from time to time the crow of a chanticleer pealed through the air like the trumpets of victory.

"Well — here 's to your health!"

Everybody drank; it was I who stood treat now, with a delicious white wine. "To you — to you — to you!" The good woman related my adventure for the second time, this time to the old man. It was a long story, for he was a little deaf. Then there was more laughter; it was a joy to hear them. "Farewell, good folks — till we meet again!"

One of the workmen helped to buckle my knapsack on my back, very proud to assist an artist; for he knew that sort, as he explained it all to the peasants.

Then I was off again through the grass, which was still moist with dew, light of heart, gay, even jolly. I waved good-by to the whole party, and as I was about to disappear round the bend of the footpath, I heard in the tense morning air that old woman straining her voice in explanations to the deaf man. He had heard at last, and understood. Wafted toward me by the breeze, his railing voice reached my ears:

"Eh? What d'you say? Rob whom? Rob an artist? Where 'd be the use? A pack of beggars without a cent!"

André Castaigne.

McCLELLAN AND HIS "MISSION."

A STUDY BY MAJOR-GENERAL FRY.

GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, son of the distinguished physician and surgeon George McClellan and of Elizabeth Brinton McClellan, was born in Philadelphia, Pa., December 3, 1826. His home education and training were careful and thorough, and in the year 1842 he entered the military academy at West Point. He graduated in 1846, No. 2 in a class of 59, was appointed second lieutenant of engineers, and joined the army under General Scott in Mexico. From the close of the Mexican war in 1848 to 1852 he served with credit as an officer of engineers, and in 1852–54 conducted with marked ability and energy government explorations and surveys in the far West. Promoted to a captaincy of cavalry in 1855, he was in that year sent abroad as one of a government commission to study foreign military systems. In January, 1857, he resigned, and became chief engineer, then vice-president, of the Illinois Central Railroad Company, and later president of the eastern division of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company, with his residence in Cincinnati. He was appointed major-general by the governor of Ohio, April 23, 1861. Before he had rendered any military services of note, indeed before the military operations of the rebellion had begun in reality, he was appointed major-general in the army of the United States (May 14, 1861), and assigned to the command of the Department of the Ohio. He invaded western Virginia in June with some twenty-seven regiments of raw volunteers, and was successful at Rich Mountain and Beverly. On July 22, after the battle of Bull Run, he was called to Washington, arriving there July 26, and was assigned to the command of the Division of the Potomac. On November 1, 1861, General Scott was placed on the retired list, and McClellan succeeded him as General-in-chief. Between July 26, 1861, and November 7, 1862, the Army of the Potomac was organized, the Peninsular campaign and the Antietam campaign were made by McClellan, and on the latter date he was relieved from duty, and his military career ended. In 1864 he was the Democratic party's candidate for the Presidency against Lincoln. After resigning from the army in November, 1864, he was employed mainly as an engineer, but was elected governor of his adopted State, New Jersey. After the election of President Cleveland he was offered, and declined, the office of minister to Russia. He died at Orange, New Jersey, October 29, 1885.

Nothing since the assassination of Lincoln more deeply affected the popular heart than McClellan's death. The President of the United States expressed the feelings of thousands in his telegram to Mrs. McClellan saying: "I am shocked by the news of your husband's death; and while I know how futile are all human efforts to console, I must assure you of my deep sympathy in your great grief, and express to you my own sense of affliction at the loss of so good a friend," and he correctly characterized McClellan as "a distinguished soldier and citizen, whose military ability and civil virtues have shed luster upon the history of his country." McClellan's mourners were sincere. His pall was borne and his body was followed by those who loved him; and as the solemn procession passed along the aisle for the last services, his bier was sprinkled by the tears of veterans.

As a cadet at the military academy, McClellan was intelligent, attentive, prompt, obedient, studious, and respectful. His manner was cordial, frank, and cheerful. He was a great favorite, and, though very young, exerted from the beginning a marked influence among his associates. His career in the Mexican war was characterized by energy, intelligence, and intrepidity. Gallant in bearing, and fascinating in manner, he attracted the favorable notice not only of Colonel R. E. Lee, then chief engineer of the army in Mexico, but of General Scott, the commander of that army. From the close of the Mexican war until the outbreak of the rebellion, in military and in civil life, McClellan was noted for the traits that command admiration, respect, and affection. His integrity, his sincerity, his piety, his purity of character, his loftiness of purpose, his fidelity to obligations personal and official, his affectionate consideration for others, were known to all men with whom he was thrown in contact, and the resultant of all these qualities constituted his so-called personal magnetism, which was a potent, if not an irresistible, force. He possessed the confidence of the General Government, of his native and adopted States, and of the people to whom he was known. His campaign in western Virginia (June and July, 1861), promptly opened with the raw levies at hand, vigorously prosecuted, and attended with triumph, elicited not only universal applause, but a vote of thanks from Congress for his "series of brilliant and decisive victories." It was therefore in compliance with sound judgment as well as with popular feeling that he was called to Washington to retrieve the disaster of the battle of Bull Run.

His career as a leader covered a period of about fourteen months only, beginning in July, 1861, and ending in November, 1862. In all things not connected with that period he exhibited after November, 1862, the same purity of character, the same integrity, the same fidelity, the same ability, that had characterized his life prior to 1861. No part of his career before he was called to Washington in July, or after he left the Army of the Potomac the following November, gave rise to a doubt of his ability, his learning, his integrity, his devoutness, his fidelity, obedience, and subordination. But endowed with the confidence of the people, and clothed with great responsibility and all the power the Government could bestow, he no sooner entered upon the duties of his high calling than a change came over him. To General Scott, his early friend and lawful superior, his conduct was insubordinate and disrespectful. To the President of the United States he showed neither the consideration due to the chief magistrate of the nation, nor the obedience due to the constitutional commander-in-chief. For his brothers-in-arms, who were doing heroically their respective parts, he expressed no appreciation;[1] while for the so-called politicians he showed utter contempt. Such were the relations he assumed toward those engaged in the cause of the Union. His relations toward the common enemy also underwent a change. The boldness, the resolution, the confidence, the promptness that had budded in Mexico, and bloomed in western Virginia, were blighted by delay, hesitation, doubt, timidity. The belief that he had been called to "save the country" had seized upon him, and though by no means a bigot, the strong religious element in his character served to fasten the conviction and blind him to the obligations and influences which governed him at other times.[2] Under the power of this hallucination he was insensible of his own weaknesses and errors, and of the merits and claims of others, and, as he expressed it in a letter to his wife, he carried "this thing on *en grand*." By his own estimate of his mission, he could not be insubordinate, disrespectful, or disobedient. He was all in all, and his own status ruled out all questions between him and others.[3] The day after he arrived in Washington, July 27, he wrote to his wife, "By some strange ope-

[1] Except that in speaking of his staff in a letter, August 13, he says, "Quite a fine-looking set they are." In his "Own Story," written long after the war, he says: "Fortunately I had some excellent officers at my disposal, and at once made use of them," and commends a few of his generals.

[2] "I will not fight a battle on Sunday if I can help it," he wrote to his wife, May 23.

[3] "I had only my own unwavering sense of right to sustain me." "Everything was to be done. An army was to be created *ab initio*, out of nothing."—"McClellan's Own Story."

ration of magic I seem to have become the power of the land." Three days later he wrote:

I have been working this morning at a bill allowing me to appoint as many aides as I please from civil life and from the army. . . . I went to the Senate to get it through,[1] and was quite overwhelmed by the congratulations I received, and the respect with which I was treated. . . . It seems to strike everybody that I am very young. They give me my way in everything, full swing and unbounded confidence. All tell me that I am held responsible for the fate of the nation, and that all its resources shall be placed at my disposal. It is an immense task that I have on my hands, but I believe that I can accomplish it. . . . When I was in the Senate Chamber to-day, and found those old men flocking around me; when I afterward stood in the Library looking over the capital of our great nation, and saw the crowd gathering around to stare at me, I began to feel how great the task committed to me. Oh, how sincerely I pray to God that I may be endowed with the wisdom and courage necessary to accomplish the work. Who would have thought when we were married that I should so soon be called upon to *save my country?*

On August 9 he wrote:

The people call upon me to *save the country.* I must *save it.* I receive letter after letter, have conversation after conversation, calling on me to *save the nation,* alluding to the presidency, dictatorship, etc. As I hope one day to be united with you forever in heaven, I have no such aspiration. I would cheerfully take the dictatorship and agree to lay down my life when the *country is saved.* I am not spoiled by my unexpected new position. I feel sure that God will give me the strength and wisdom to *preserve this great nation;* but I tell you, who share all my thoughts, that I have no selfish feeling in this matter. I feel *that God has placed a great work in my hands.* I have not sought it. I know how weak I am, but I know that I mean to do right, and I believe that God will help me, and give me the wisdom I do not possess. Pray for me that I may be able to accomplish my task, the greatest, perhaps, any poor weak mortal ever had to do.

On October 31 he wrote his wife:

I appreciate all the difficulties in my path; the impatience of the people, the venality and bad faith of the politicians, the gross neglect that has occurred in obtaining arms, clothing, etc., and above all I feel in my inmost soul how small is my ability in comparison with the gigantic dimensions of the task, and that even if I had the greatest intellect that was ever given to man, the result remains in the hands of God. I do not feel that I am an instrument worthy of the great task, but I *do* feel that I did not seek it. It was thrust upon me. I *was called to it;* my previous life seems to have been *unwittingly directed to this great end; and I know that God* can accomplish the greatest results with the weakest instruments — *therein lies my hope.*

[1] It was passed as he wanted it.

The occasion called only for an able, energetic, aggressive military commander. But, according to McClellan's belief, "God" had placed in his hands the "great work" of "saving the nation"; his "previous life" had "been unwittingly directed to this great end." The mission was divine, and metamorphosed him. The change of character from subordinate general to savior of the nation was fatal to McClellan. It necessarily involved the assumption of danger bearing due proportion in magnitude and imminence to his conception of the task God had put in his hands, and that task, he said, was perhaps the greatest "any poor weak mortal ever had to do." This led him to wild exaggeration of the enemy's force and enterprise, and thence to an anxious and cautious, though active, defensive. Hence we find him saying, August 9:

General Scott is the great obstacle. He will not comprehend the danger. I have to fight my way against him.

August 15:

General Scott is the most dangerous antagonist I have. Our ideas are so widely different that it is impossible for us to work together much longer.

August 16:

I am here in a terrible place; the enemy have from three to four times my force; the President, the old General, cannot or will not see the true state of affairs. . . . I have, I believe, made the best possible disposition of the few men under my command; will quietly await events, and, if the enemy attacks, will try to make my movements as rapid and desperate as may be. If my men will only fight I think I can thrash him, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers. As it is, *I trust to God to give success to our arms.* . . . only wish to *save my country,* and find the incapables around me will not permit it. They sit on the verge of the precipice, and cannot realize what they see. . . . Providence is aiding me by heavy rains which are swelling the Potomac, which may be impassable for a week; if so, *we are saved.*

August 18 (also to his wife):

The true reason why I did not bring you here was that I did not deem it safe.

Again, on August 20, he wrote:

I have now about 80 field guns (there were but 49 at Bull Run), and by Saturday will have 112. There were only some 400 cavalry at Bull Run; I now have about 1200, and by the close of the week will have some 3000. . . . In a week I ought to be perfectly safe.

August 25:

Friend Beauregard has allowed the chance to escape him. I have now some 65,000 effective

men; will have 75,000 by end of week. Last week he certainly had double our force. I feel sure that the dangerous moment has passed.

As late as September 8 McClellan made a formal report to the Secretary of War, in which he said:

It is well understood that, although the ultimate design of the enemy is to possess himself of the city of Washington, his first efforts will probably be directed toward Baltimore with the intention of cutting our line of communication and supplies. . . . To accomplish this he will no doubt show a certain portion of his force in front of our positions on the other side of the Potomac, in order to engage our attention there and induce us to leave a large portion of our force for the defense of those positions. He will probably also make demonstrations in the vicinity of Aquia Creek, Mathias Point, and Occoquan, in order still further to induce us still further to disseminate our forces. His main and real movement will doubtless be to cross the Potomac between Washington and Point of Rocks, probably not far from Seneca Falls, and most likely at more points than one. His hope will be so to engage our attention by the diversions already named, as to enable him to move with a large force direct and unopposed on Baltimore. I see no reason to doubt the possibility of his attempting this with a column of at least 100,000 effective troops. If he has only 130,000 under arms, he can make all the diversions I have mentioned with his raw and badly armed troops, leaving 100,000 effective men for his real movement.

This is enough to illustrate the dangers, as McClellan saw them, from which he was called upon to save the nation.

By October Washington was fairly well fortified, and a great army, organized, armed, equipped, and tolerably well drilled, rested behind the line of intrenchments. The country was saved (for the first time) in spite of those who would not, or could not, see the danger. McClellan was supreme. As early as August 2, though a junior officer serving in the presence of his General-in-chief, he says he "handed to the President a carefully considered plan for conducting the war on a large scale"; at the same time he found the President, Cabinet, General Scott, and all deferring to him; and in September he inclosed to his wife "a card just received from 'A. Lincoln,'" and said, "It shows too much deference to be shown outside."[1] Standing between a junior officer who assumed to be the savior of his country, and a President and people who first caused and then encouraged the assumption, General Scott was of course soon crowded out. McClellan did not intrigue against his superior officer. He had lost the consciousness that he had a superior. Regardless of General Scott and everybody else, he went ahead conscientiously, as required by the higher law of his sacred mission.

Notwithstanding Lincoln's great cares and exacting duties, he even then saw dimly what the trouble was; but from lack of experience in high office, and ignorance of military affairs, neither his perception of it nor his relation to it was plain enough to make him say positively to McClellan, as he said at a later date to Hooker, "You go ahead and gain victories, and I will take care of the dictatorship." Hence McClellan's functions as savior of the nation were not canceled, though they were somewhat changed by the course of events.

The prayer of the public, "Lord, deliver me from mine enemies!" was changed into, "Lord, deliver mine enemies into my hands!" The Union was chafing under the disaster of Ball's Bluff, the blockade of the Potomac by the enemies' batteries on its banks, the danger of foreign intervention, the enormous expenditures for a war in which no battles were being fought, the sight of the rebel flag south of the Potomac, and a deep sense of wrongs too long endured. The weather during the months of October, November, and December was remarkably favorable for military operations in Virginia. The offensive was demanded from all quarters, and in all ways; but McClellan would not move. He was fully aware of the deep and widespread feeling, and no doubt knew that his own *prestige* was endangered by ignoring it. Yet he was too conscientious in the fulfilment of his high mission to be influenced by the wishes of the Government, by popular clamor, or by selfish or personal considerations. He felt as he wrote his wife in August: "God has placed a great work in *my* hands. I have no selfish feeling in this matter." He knew, however, that though the country was "saved" for the time its enemies in arms must be overcome, and he maintained, in the report of September 8 to the Secretary of War, that "the Army of the Potomac should number not less than 300,000 men, in order to insure complete success, and an early termination of the war"; and urged that all the available troops in Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, and at least 10,000 of the Illinois troops, and all those of the Eastern and Northern States be at once ordered to report to me for duty." So he went on increasing his strength, but would not move. The Northern people continued their rush to arms. The General Government had only to accept and muster into its service men who were raised, organized into batteries, companies, and regiments by the States. The troops

[1] Concerning the appointment of Stanton as Secretary of War, McClellan says in his "Own Story," "The next day the President came to my house to apologize for not 'consulting me on the subject.'"

for the Army of the Potomac as a rule reached Washington uniformed, armed, and partly equipped. The ample and efficient general staff of the army was at hand to supply all needed arms, ammunition, clothing, and transportation as rapidly as it was possible to procure them; and there was no limit to the Government's expenditures for that purpose. Yet in his hallucination McClellan said and repeated that he was thwarted by "incapables," and that *he* had to "*create* an army out of *nothing*." On the contrary, he was right when he stated in his letter of July 30, "They give me my way in everything, full swing and unbounded confidence." All the resources of the country were at his disposal, and he was remarkably efficient in organization. His army grew, and so did the desire of the Government and the public for it to advance. July 27, before he thought he was the savior of the country, McClellan wrote his wife that he would "crush the rebels in one campaign." On October 6, he said to her,

> I shall take my own time to make an army that will be sure of success. . . . I do not expect to fight a battle near Washington; probably none will be fought till I advance and that *I will not do till I am fully ready*. My plans depend on circumstances. So soon as I feel that my army is well-organized, and well-disciplined, and strong enough, I will advance, and force the rebels to a battle in a field of my own selection. A long time must yet elapse before I can do this, and *I expect all the newspapers to abuse me for delay, but I will not mind that.*

This was fidelity to his mission.

> How I wish [he wrote to his wife November 17] that God had permitted me to live quietly and unknown with you. But his will be done! I will do my best, try to preserve an honest mind, do my duty as best I may, and will ever continue to pray that he will give me that wisdom, courage, and strength, that are so necessary to me now.

Here was the religious soul, the man with a mission from God that raised him above newspapers, politicians, and even above the President, who, he says in the letter just quoted, "is honest, and means well." Late in November he wrote:

> I cannot guess at my movements, for they are not within my control. I cannot move without more means. . . . I still trust that God will support me and bear me out. *He could not have placed me here for nothing*. . . . I am doing [he says, late in November] all I can to get ready to move before winter sets in, but it now begins to look as if we were condemned to a winter of inactivity,

because the army was not large enough, and well enough organized, equipped, drilled, and disciplined.

Its want of readiness, he says, was no fault of his, but was due to his being "thwarted and deceived by these incapables at every turn."

While the extensive preparations were going on to make the Army of the Potomac three hundred thousand strong, McClellan discovered a new danger growing out of the general urgency for an advance, from which he felt that he must "save the country." It was a "treasonable conspiracy" within the Union. The "Radical leaders," in the cabinet and out of it, he says, finding that they could not use him, and seeing that

> if I achieved marked success, my influence would necessarily be very great throughout the country, . . . determined to ruin me in any event and by any means: first, by endeavoring to force me into premature movements, knowing that a failure would probably end my military career; afterward by withholding the means necessary to achieve success. . . They determined that I should not succeed, and carried out their determination only too well, and at fearful sacrifice of blood, time, and treasure. . . . I do not base my assertions as to the motives of the Radical leaders upon mere surmises but upon facts. . . [In the opinion of these conspirators] the great end and aim of the war was to abolish slavery. To end the war before the nation was ready for that would be a failure. The war must be prolonged and conducted so as to achieve that. . . The people of the North were not yet ready to accept that view, and it would not answer to permit me to succeed until the people had been worked up to the proper pitch on that question.

The war would not be finished until that result was reached, and therefore it was not their policy to strengthen General McClellan so as to insure success.

> . . . Had I been successful in my first campaign [he says], the rebellion would perhaps have been terminated without the immediate abolition of slavery.

In his opinion, if not one of the conspirators, President Lincoln was their tool. McClellan says:

> The Radicals never again lost their influence with the President, and henceforth directed all their efforts to prevent my achieving success. After this time [January 12, 13, 1862] Secretary Chase worked with them, and became my enemy.

An order issued by the President in March restricting his authority to the Army of the Potomac was

> one of the steps taken to tie my hands in order to secure the failure of the approaching campaign. . . The Administration, and especially the Secretary of War were inimical to me, and did not desire my success.

An order to discontinue recruiting, issued on the score of economy,[1] April 3, 1862, is offered as evidence of "a desire for the failure of the campaign."

THESE quotations are from what McClellan wrote in his "Own Story," long after the war. He did not at the time fully realize "the length to which these men were prepared to go in carrying out their schemes," but he saw the "conspiracy," and felt that it was part of his mission to "save the country" from it. With a conspiracy embracing the President and Cabinet to have his army defeated, and an opposing army in his front exceeding his own in numbers, two-, three- or fourfold, according to his estimate, and bent like his own Government upon his destruction, McClellan's task had certainly become, as he expressed it, "the greatest any poor weak mortal ever had to do." With the Union and the Confederacy in bitter hostility to each other, McClellan, with an army raised by the one to put down the other, felt that he was called upon to use that army in such a way as to defeat the purposes of both. No wonder he did not advance! He had no political aims — at that time at least — and no sinister purpose. But, laboring under an overruling hallucination, he not only failed as a leader, but made a record that is inconsistent with his real character. The reasons which he gives for his refusal to advance are that

it was not till late in November, 1861, that the Army of the Potomac was in any condition to move, nor even then were they capable of assaulting entrenched positions. By that time the roads had ceased to be practicable for the movement of armies. . . . Any success gained at that time in front of Washington could not have been followed up, and a victory would have given us the barren possession of the field of battle with a longer and more difficult line of supply during the rest of the winter.

The general assertions made in July that he would "crush the rebels in one campaign" and in October that the "crushing defeat of the rebel army at Manassas" was the great object, and that the advance of that army should not be postponed beyond November 25, were not verified. But another cause of delay was that after McClellan became General-in-chief, November 1, his

plan comprehended in its scope the operation of all the armies of the Union, the Army of the Potomac as well. It was my intention, for reasons easy to be seen, that its various parts should be carried out simultaneously, or nearly so, and in coöperation along the whole line. If this plan was wise,[2] and events have failed to prove that it was not, then it is unnecessary to defend any delay which would have enabled the Army of the Potomac to perform its share in the execution of the whole work.

This "plan" required that

the Western armies should commence their advance so much earlier than that of the Army of the Potomac as to engage all the Confederate Western forces on their own ground, and thus prevent them from reinforcing their army in front of Richmond.

That was done effectually. The "Western armies" were active, and kept the opposing forces so fully occupied that there was no transfer of their troops from West to East.

To say nothing of minor affairs, Garfield, of Buell's army, by a difficult campaign, ending in the battle of Middle Creek, January 10, drove Humphrey Marshall out of eastern Ken-

[1] At that time there was a military force of 637,126 men in the service, and it was the general impression that this force was sufficient to put down all armed resistance to the Government.

[2] Events have not proved the wisdom of the plan in all particulars. In November Halleck was sent to command in Missouri, and Buell in Kentucky, and McClellan says that when Buell arrived in Kentucky "he found a complete state of disorganization; not only so, but that nothing was being done to mend the matter and no steps being taken to prepare the troops for the field." Nevertheless, in his letter of instructions, dated November 7, to Buell, he said, "Throw the mass of your forces by rapid marches by Cumberland Gap, or Walker's Gap, on Knoxville, in order to occupy the railroad at that point, and thus enable the loyal citizens of Eastern Tennessee to rise, while you at the same time cut off the enemy's communication between Eastern Virginia and the Mississippi." This service was further directed in a letter from McClellan to Buell on the 12th of November, and McClellan states that he "constantly urged Buell to send a column to that region." To "throw the mass of his forces on Knoxville," Buell, with wagon transportation of which he had but little, would have had to march in mid-winter, with troops "disorganized" and "not prepared for the field," a distance greater than from Washington to Richmond, cross a formidable range of mountains in which the enemy held the gaps, and use wagon roads worse than those in Virginia which McClellan pronounced at that season impracticable "for the movement of armies." But supposing that "the mass" of Buell's forces had been pushed through to Knoxville, it could not have been supported or supplied, and with the great railroad, a vital artery, running through Knoxville and connecting eastern Virginia with the southwest, the enemy could — and with no military operations going on in Virginia certainly would — have concentrated by rail an overwhelming force at Knoxville, and a surrender or a Moscow retreat would have been the result. To establish and maintain a force in east Tennessee was even at that early date well known to be one of the most important of the Union's military measures. But it could not be done at that time, and was accomplished some two years later, only by the direct operations of one army and the coöperation of another army, both better prepared and equipped than Buell's at that time. This part of McClellan's plan, being impracticable, was unwise. Hence the wisdom of the plan cannot pass as a defense of the delay of the Army of the Potomac.

tucky; and Thomas, also of Buell's army, in midwinter advanced upon Zollicoffer, defeated him at the battle of Mill Springs, January 19, 20, killing the commander and dispersing and driving his forces across the Cumberland River. Grant, of Halleck's army, fought the battle of Belmont November 7, captured Fort Henry February 6, and Fort Donelson February 16, and his forces were pushed by Halleck up the Tennessee River to Pittsburg Landing. Before the end of February the mass of Buell's army was in middle Tennessee with a detached column, working its way to Cumberland Gap,— which it captured June 18,— and Buell had advanced his headquarters from Louisville to Nashville.

McClellan's plan was that the movement of the Western armies and that of the Army of the Potomac should be made "simultaneously, or nearly so, and in coöperation." The Western armies, poorly armed, equipped, and drilled, as compared with the Army of the Potomac, were active and successful, fully occupying the forces opposed to them, and, in addition to this reason for moving, the President *ordered*, January 27, that an advance of all the armies should be made on February 22; and on January 31 issued a special order that the Army of the Potomac should move forward on or before February 22, and seize and occupy a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas Junction. But to the requirements of his own plan for simultaneous movements, and to the President's general and special orders, McClellan felt that he was required by the great mission intrusted to him by God to turn a deaf ear. The "coöperation along the whole line," required by his plan, failed upon his part of the line, and the Army of the Potomac did not then "perform its share in the execution of the whole work." It did not coöperate with the Western and sea-coast forces, did not advance as ordered by the President, did not even brush away the Potomac batteries which blockaded Washington. Yet in the impatience which its inaction aroused McClellan saw only proofs of the "conspiracy" to "force" him "into premature movements," and "failure." It was not until the enemy evacuated Centerville and Manassas, March 9, and got out of reach by moving behind the Rappahannock, that the Army of the Potomac was moved at all. Then it went only as far as Fairfax Court-House; "partly," McClellan says, "with the hope that I might be able to take advantage of some accident and bring Johnston to battle under favorable circumstances." But the "accident" did not happen, and McClellan merely rode over the field that the enemy, not one half his strength, had occupied, undisturbed, for the preceding eight months. When Johnston abandoned Manassas, the "Urbana" route to Richmond, which the President had approved March 8, lost its promise, and was abandoned also. The struggle between the President and McClellan concerning the line to be taken by the Army of the Potomac in the new condition of affairs, was renewed, the former still advocating the direct overland route, with Washington as a base, and the latter contending for a transfer of the army to the lower Chesapeake, and the use of Old Point Comfort as a base, McClellan having said, in his report of February 3:

> I would prefer the move from Fortress Monroe as above, as a certain, though less brilliant, movement than that from Urbana, to an attack upon Manassas.

This was the "lower Chesapeake," or Peninsular route.[1] In advocating its adoption, McClellan said in his report of February 3:

> The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the year. The country now alluded to is much more favorable for offensive operations than that in front of Washington (which is *very* unfavorable), much more level, more cleared land, the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and the spring some two or three weeks earlier.

As it turned out, McClellan was misinformed concerning the region he advocated; and his movement to it divided his own forces and concentrated the forces of the enemy, and, after all, he was forced against intrenchments as formidable as those which he dreaded at Manassas. But the President yielded to his generals. McClellan's plan, agreed upon conditionally, at Fairfax Court-House, March 13, by a council of war composed of corps commanders, required

> operations to be carried on . . . from Old Point Comfort between the York and James rivers— *Provided*, 1st, that the enemy's vessel *Merrimac* can be neutralized; 2d, that the means of transportation sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac; and 3d, that a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries on the York River; 4th, that the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace.

These are the four conditions upon which the council of war approved McClellan's proposition to transfer the Army of the Potomac

[1] In his "Own Story," McClellan says, p. 194: "The Administration had neither the courage nor the military insight to understand the effect of the plan I desired to carry out."

to the Peninsula. Having laid down these conditions, the council said:

If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment.

On March 13, the day that the council of war reported, the President, though not giving the plan his approval, authorized its execution by a letter, as follows, from the Secretary of War to McClellan:

The President, having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution:

1. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication.

2. Leave Washington entirely secure.

3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe or anywhere between here and there; or at all events move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route.

It must be noted the fourth condition of the council of war was not that the force to be left to cover Washington should be sufficient to make the capital secure, or prevent its capture; but it was to "be such as to give an *entire feeling of security for its safety from menace.*" Manifestly this condition was impossible of fulfilment, and nothing but blind reliance upon a higher than human power could have led McClellan to transfer the army to the Peninsula with the consequences of that condition staring him in the face; especially as the President had added his positive order to "leave Washington entirely secure."

After enunciating the four conditions upon which the transfer of the Army of the Potomac might be made, the council said: "If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment." That is to say, the council of war recommended to McClellan two plans of campaign, the first or Peninsula plan to be adopted only in case four distinctly stated conditions could be fulfilled. If not, then the second, or overland, plan of moving directly "against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment" was recommended. If the state of things upon which the council based its recommendation of the first plan did not exist, then its recommendation was unquestionably for the second plan. By McClellan's approval of the council's report, he was committed to the observance of the conditions embodied in it, and the question is, Did he know they could be fulfilled? The answer must be, Certainly not. It is only necessary to read the conditions in the light of the facts of the time, to decide that. It follows that by the recommendation of the council of war, and his own approval of that recommendation, McClellan was bound to move directly "against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment." That was the plain logic of the case. But he says in his "Own Story," that "as early as December, 1861, I had determined not to follow the line of operations leading by land from Washington to Richmond, but to conduct a sufficient force by water," etc. It will be remembered also that on January 31 the President ordered that by February 22 the Army of the Potomac should advance by the overland route. To this McClellan objected, and on February 3 the President wrote him saying: "You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac—yours to be down the Chesapeake . . . mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas." McClellan submitted a strong argument in favor of his plan, and said, in opposition to the President's plan, "In the unprecedented and impassable condition of the roads, it will be evident that no precise period can be fixed upon for the movement on this line." In consequence of McClellan's urgency in support of his own plan, and his assertion of inability to fix any "precise period" for movement under the President's plan, the latter, when the report of the council of war was laid before him with McClellan's approval, authorized, though he did not approve, the movement to the lower Chesapeake. That the President's inability to endure further delay was a moving cause of his sanction, is shown by the last words of his letter heretofore quoted, authorizing the transfer. "At all events," he says, "move *such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route.*"

As McClellan moved his army to the Peninsula without the fulfilment of the conditions stipulated by his council of war, and against the judgment of the President, it is plain that he was still acting according to the dictates of his mission from God, to save the country in his own way.

But no sooner had he in person, and the larger part of his army, gone to the Peninsula, than a feeling that Washington was insecure took possession of the authorities,—that is to say, the failure of the fourth condition expressed itself,—and the President directed two of his military advisers, General E. A. Hitchcock and Adjutant-General L. Thomas, to examine and give a distinct opinion, whether General Mc-

Clellan had complied or not with the order of the President in relation to the entire security of Washington. The opinion, dated April 2, was that the order of the President "has not been fully complied with"; and on April 4 the President directed that McDowell's First Corps, consisting of Franklin's, McCall's, and King's divisions, then in front of Washington, should be detained for the defense of the capital. In response to McClellan's complaints of the withdrawal of Blenker's division and McDowell's corps, the President wrote him April 9:

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you, . . . as I thought, acquiesced in it — certainly not without reluctance. After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction;[1] and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. . . . My explicit order that Washington should . . . be left entirely secure had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

Notwithstanding the President's explanation, McClellan regarded the detention of McDowell's corps as "*the most infamous thing that history has recorded.*" Franklin's division, however, was, at McClellan's urgent request, sent to him after only a week's detention, and McCall's division was, for like reason, sent to him while he was on the Chickahominy. But notwithstanding the fact that the best two thirds of McDowell's corps joined McClellan, he alleged that he had been deprived of *that corps*, and that is the main specification in support of the charge that a "conspiracy of traitors who are willing to sacrifice the country and its army for personal spite and personal aims" was at work to secure his defeat "by withholding the means necessary to success."

His feeling against the supposed conspirators and traitors was of course intensely bitter, and he attributed his failure to their machinations. In his "Own Story," he specifies the particular act of the executive which caused the failure of the Peninsular campaign. It was this: On May 18, the Secretary of War addressed a letter to McClellan in answer to a call for McDowell's force to be sent by water, in which he said:

The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely; and it is believed that even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock[2] by the way of the Potomac and York rivers than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route.

He is ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the capital from any possible attack, so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to coöperate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond.

McClellan says:

This order rendered it impossible for me to use the James River as a line of operations, and forced me to establish our depots on the Pamunkey and to approach Richmond from the north. *Herein lay the failure of the campaign.* . . . As it was impossible to get at Richmond, and the enemy's army covering it, without crossing the Chickahominy, I was obliged to divide the Army of the Potomac into two parts, separated by that stream.

The facts of record are at variance with the foregoing quotation. The *Merrimac* was not destroyed till May 11, and prior to that date the Confederates held Norfolk and the James River. McClellan of his own free will had established his depots on the Pamunkey before the President's order of May 18 was received — before it was even made. He had taken locomotives and cars in his transports for the purpose of using the railroad from White House to Richmond as his line of operations. Though free and vigorous in his protests against such action on the President's part as he did not like, McClellan at the time did not allege that the letter of May 18 forced him to the Pamunkey as a base,[3] or that he had any objection to that base. It was the base he had intended to use in his favorite plan of advancing by Urbana.

[1] It is a fair presumption that an order from the President to McClellan to leave Washington entirely secure empowered McClellan to judge what would constitute entire security. But an "entire feeling of security from *menace*"— indeed an entire feeling of security from capture — could not prevail in Washington after the Army of the Potomac had been transferred to the Peninsula, and though McClellan was in or near Washington some two weeks after his movement, with its conditions, had been sanctioned, he had, so far as appears, no understanding or even discussion with the Executive as to the force which would make Washington secure from "menace" or capture. He left at Manassas and Washington — or ordered there — all that he deemed necessary to garrison those places, and also posted a force under Banks in the Shenandoah Valley.

[2] The forces gathered under McDowell on the Washington overland line after McClellan went to the Peninsula were named the Army of the Rappahannock.

[3] In McClellan's testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war, the following appears: "*Question:* Could not the advance on Richmond from Williamsburg have been made with better prospects of

McClellan in person arrived at the White House May 16, and wrote his wife: "Have just arrived over horrid roads. No further movement possible till they improve." The next day, May 17, he wrote her: "I expect to have our advance parties near [enough to] Bottom's Bridge to-day"; he added that all the bridges were burned, but that the river was fordable, so the difficulty was "not insuperable by any means," showing that he did not know that the Chickahominy was going to be a serious obstacle. On the 18th he wrote: "We will go to Tunstall's or perhaps a little beyond it, and will now soon close up on the Chickahominy, and find out what Secesh is doing. I *think he will fight us there, or between that and Richmond.*"

It is not only true that McClellan established his depots on the Pamunkey of his own accord, but it is further true that it was his intention before leaving Washington to establish them there. In a report to the Secretary of War, dated March 19, he said:

> I have the honor to submit the following notes on the proposed operations of the active portion of the Army of the Potomac. The proposed plan of campaign is to assume Fort Monroe as the first base of operations, *taking the line of Yorktown and West Point upon Richmond as the line of operations*, Richmond being the objective point. It is assumed that the fall of Richmond involves that of Norfolk, and the whole of Virginia; *also that we shall fight a decisive battle between West Point and Richmond. . . . It is also clear that West Point* should as soon as *possible be reached and used as our main depot.*

Here the objective, the base, and the line of operations (upon which he expected a *decisive battle "between West Point and Richmond"*) are laid down with mathematical accuracy by McClellan himself before starting from Washington; and he indicated no purpose, and expressed no wish, to change the base or line until the enemy turned or was turning his right flank late in June. Nothing but hallucination growing out of his higher-law mission could have induced McClellan, in face of these facts, to write after the war that he was "forced" by the Secretary's letter of May 18 to "establish our depots on the Pamunkey, and to approach Richmond from the north"; and to add, speaking of the army after it had been driven to the James by the enemy, "it was at last upon its true line of operations,[1] which I had been unable to adopt at an earlier day in consequence of the Secretary of War's peremptory order of May 18, requiring the right wing to be extended to the north of Richmond."

The "decisive battle between West Point and Richmond," predicted by McClellan, was fought, beginning June 26, by the enemy in full force attacking the right flank of the Army of the Potomac after it had lain six weeks astride of the Chickahominy. McClellan was forced to the James River, which had come into possession of our gunboats, after the fall of Norfolk and destruction of the *Merrimac*, May 11. Even before the attack his mind seems to have been fastened, not upon taking Richmond, but upon "saving" the Army of the Potomac and the country. At 6:15 P. M., on June 25, he telegraphed Stanton:

> I have just returned from the field, and find your despatch in regard to Jackson. Several contrabands, just in, give information confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beauregard arrived with strong reinforcements in Richmond yesterday. I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is estimated at two hundred thousand. . . . This army will do all in the power of men *to hold their position and repulse any attack.* I regret my great inferiority of numbers. . . . If the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs.

On the 28th he sent a long telegram to the Secretary of War reporting the disaster, and closed it by saying, no doubt with the assumed conspiracy of "traitors" and his mission to "save" the country still uppermost in his mind,

> The Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now the game is lost. *If I*

success by the James River than by the route pursued, and what were the reasons for taking the route adopted?

"*Answer:* I do not think that the navy at that time was in a condition to make the line of the James River perfectly secure for our supplies. The line of the Pamunkey offered greater advantages in that respect. The place was in a better position to effect a junction with any troops that might move from Washington on the Fredericksburg line. I remember that the idea of moving on the James River was seriously discussed at that time. But the conclusion was arrived at that under the circumstances then existing the route actually followed was the best. I think the *Merrimac* was destroyed while we were at Williamsburg."

[1] After McClellan reached the James he said in a communication to the President, July 4, "Our communications by the James River are not secure. There are points where the enemy can establish themselves with cannon or musketry and command the river, and where it is not certain that our gunboats can drive them out. In case of this, or in case our front is broken, I will still make every effort to preserve at least the *personnel* of the army," and added, July 7, "I have been anxious about my communications. Had long consultation about it with Flag-Officer Goldsborough last night."

This is the line to which he says he changed base as the "true line of operations."

save this army now, I tell you plainly I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.

This was the language of a man laboring under a deep-seated hallucination. On June 26, the day the battle opened, he telegraphed to his wife:

You may be sure that your husband will not disgrace you, and I am confident that God will smile upon my efforts and give our arms success.

On June 11 he wrote her:

I *must* be careful, for it would be utter destruction to this army were I to be disabled.

Even after the Seven Days' fight was over, he was still in pursuance of the sacred mission imposed upon him alone of saving the army and the country.

On July 17 he said:

I did have a terrible time during that week, for I stood alone without any one to help me.

On July 8 he says:

I have written a strong, frank letter to the President. . . . If he acts upon it *the country will be saved*—

and at midnight he added,

I am alone with you and the Almighty, whose good and powerful hand *has saved me and my army.*

And as late as August 23 he wrote her:

I take it for granted that my orders will be as disagreeable as it is possible to make them unless Pope is beaten, in *which case they will want me to save Washington again.*

But the most striking proof of McClellan's hallucination is afforded by his so-called "Harrison's Bar letter" of July 7. He begins by saying to the President, who was then at his camp,

You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in our front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions, or reducing us *by blocking our river communications.*[1] *I cannot but regard our condition as critical*—

and then tells the President that

the time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy covering the whole ground of our national trouble.

Thereupon he proceeded to lay down a definite course for the Government to pursue in the broad field of its "civil and military policy." It is easy to understand, as McClellan says in his "Own Story" of the President's treatment of the letter, that after "he read it in my presence," he did not allude "further to it during his visit, or at any time after that."

This letter under the circumstances is one of the most extraordinary productions on record.[2] When McClellan wrote it he was not General-in-chief. His only functions were those of the commander of the Army of the Potomac, and that army, worsted in a seven days' fight, had been driven to the cover of the gunboats on James River, and, as McClellan himself reported, was in danger of being cut off from supplies, and overwhelmed by an attack in front. In this condition of affairs he addressed a carefully prepared letter to the President, laying down a civil and military policy for the United States, covering among other things the question of slavery, and urging the extremity of his own military situation as an argument for the adoption of his views upon political as well as military policies. In a letter to his wife of August 30, McClellan said, "You know that I have a way of attending to most other things than my own affairs." No better proof of that could be offered than his "Harrison's Bar letter," written under the hallucination that he was the chosen savior of the country. Engaged in actual war, with the cause he was fighting for at stake upon the use of his sword, he proceeded to "save the country" with his pen.

From what the President saw and heard at Harrison's Bar, and with McClellan's letter in his pocket, it must have been with a heavy heart that he returned to Washington on July 9. According to McClellan, the Army of the Potomac, the mainstay of the Union, far away upon the Peninsula, was besieged, with its line of communication by James River insecure, its front in danger of being overwhelmed, and the rebel army victorious, and 200,000 strong, between McClellan and Washington, in the finest season for military operations.

On the 11th the President ordered that General Halleck "be assigned to command the whole land-forces of the United States as general-in-chief, and that he repair to this capital." Halleck reached Washington July 23, and was confronted by the great military problem then pressing for solution. Pope's "Army

[1] Yet after the war he says in his "Own Story" that at last the army, being on the James, was upon "its true line of operations."

[2] The editor of McClellan's "Own Story" denies that "the letter was written in consultation with friends at the North as a political document"; and says, p. 489, "No one of McClellan's most intimate personal friends at the North knew even of the existence of this letter, until rumors about it came from members of Mr. Lincoln's cabinet."

This goes to show that the letter was evolved by McClellan's own sense of his mission.

of Virginia," some 40,000 strong, made up of McDowell's, Frémont's, and Banks's forces, was in front of Washington, and McClellan's Army of the Potomac, about 90,000 effective, was beleaguered in the Peninsula, and the rebel army, estimated by McClellan at 200,000 men, was between them. The Union forces were to be united, and Washington was to be protected. McClellan maintained that he should be heavily reinforced, but whether he could after his repulse take Richmond against the enormous force he thought opposed to him was a matter of grave doubt, and if he could, might it not result in an exchange of capitals — the enemy giving up Richmond, and taking Washington? Before deciding the momentous question that met him at the threshold of his new office, Halleck, the day after his arrival in Washington, started to the Peninsula to confer with McClellan. He reached Harrison's Bar July 25, had a full conference with McClellan, and on his return to Washington made a report — July 27 — to the Secretary of War, the correctness of which McClellan never disputed.

In that report Halleck says:

> I stated to the general that the object of my visit was to ascertain from him his views and wishes in regard to future operations. He said that he proposed to cross the James River at that point, attack Petersburg, and cut off the enemy's communications by that route south, making no further demonstration for the present against Richmond. I stated to him very frankly my views in regard to the danger and impracticability of the plan, to most of which he finally agreed.
>
> I then told him that it seemed to me a military necessity to concentrate his forces, with those of General Pope, on some point where they could at the same time cover Washington, and operate against Richmond, unless he felt strong enough to attack the latter place with a strong probability of success, with the reinforcements which could be given to him. He expressed the opinion that with 30,000 reinforcements he could attack Richmond with a "good chance of success." I replied that I was authorized by the President to promise only 20,000, and that if he could not take Richmond with that number, we must devise some plan for withdrawing his troops from their present position to some point where they could unite with those of General Pope without exposing Washington. He thought there would be no serious difficulty in withdrawing his forces for that purpose, but the movement he said would have a demoralizing influence on his own troops, and suggested the propriety of their holding their present position till sufficient reinforcements could be collected. I told him that I had no authority to consider that proposition, and that he must decide between advising the withdrawal of his forces to some point, to be agreed upon, to meet General Pope, or to advance on Richmond with the reinforcements which the President had offered; that I was not sufficiently advised in regard to the position of our forces, and those of the enemy, to say how many additional troops could be given to him with safety, but that the President had decided that question by fixing his reinforcements at 20,000, and I could promise no addition to that number.
>
> I inferred from his remarks that under these circumstances he would prefer to withdraw and unite with General Pope; but I advised him to consult his officers, and give me a final answer in the morning. He did so, and the next morning informed me that he would attack Richmond with the reinforcements promised. He would not say that he thought the probabilities of success were in his favor, but that there was "a chance," and he was "willing to try it." In regard to the force of the enemy, he expressed the opinion that it was not less than 200,000, and I found that in this estimate most of his officers agreed. His own effective force was, officers and men, about 90,000, which, with, 20,000 reinforcements, would make 110,000. I had no time or opportunity to investigate the facts upon which these estimates were based, and therefore can give no opinion as to their correctness. His officers, as I understood, were about equally divided in opinion in regard to the policy of withdrawing or risking an attack on Richmond.

It is plain from this that McClellan's plan was not to resume his advance upon Richmond, but to put his army across James River to cut the enemy's communications with the South. He would not say that he thought the probabilities of success "were in his favor," in case of another advance against that city, but merely that there was a "chance." That he meant nothing more than this is supported by the statement in a letter to his wife, August 8, "My only hope is that I can induce the enemy to attack me." The Government was not willing to take the "chance," and the result was his withdrawal from the Peninsula. This, of course, was a severe blow to him. Prior to this he does not appear even to have thought evil of Halleck. July 25, before Halleck arrived, McClellan wrote to his wife, "I think Halleck will support me." August 1, after Halleck's return to Washington, he wrote, "I have a very friendly letter from Halleck this morning"; but his relations with the Government had not improved. August 2 he said in a letter to his wife,

> When you contrast the policy I urge in my letter to the President with that of Congress and of Mr. Pope, you can readily agree with me that there can be but little natural confidence between the Government and myself. We are the antipodes of each other.

By August 4 he received Halleck's order to withdraw the Army of the Potomac, and then, though not characterized as a "conspirator" or traitor, Halleck was put down as one of that "herd," and was denounced as a suspicious

character and as hopelessly stupid. August 4 McClellan wrote his wife, "Halleck has begun to show the cloven foot"; August 8, "I strongly suspect him"; August 10:

> Halleck is turning out just like the rest of the herd. . . . The absurdity of Halleck's course in ordering the army away from here is that it cannot possibly reach Washington in time to do any good, but will necessarily be too late. I am sorry to say that I am forced to the conclusion that H. is very dull and very incompetent. Alas! poor country!

and finally, in his "Own Story," written twenty years after the war, he says:

> Of all men whom I have encountered in high position, Halleck was the most hopelessly stupid. It was more difficult to get an idea through his head than can be conceived by any one who never made the attempt. I do not think he ever had a correct military idea from beginning to end.

His superiors were all "incapables," or "conspirators," and it belonged to him alone to save the country. After the withdrawal from the Peninsula was begun, in pursuance of the orders of August 4, McClellan says:

> It was continued with the utmost rapidity until all the troops and material were *en route* both by land and water on the morning of the 16th; [and he adds] late in the afternoon of that day, when the last man had disappeared from the deserted camps, I followed with my personal staff in the track of the grand Army of the Potomac, bidding farewell to the scenes still covered with the marks of its presence, and to *be forever memorable in history as the vicinity of its most brilliant exploits.*

This touching picture was drawn in his official report of August 4, 1863, and repeated in his "Own Story." No one can dispute the individual heroism and fortitude of the men composing the Army of the Potomac in that campaign, but this great general, one of the purest and most intelligent of men, must have been laboring under a delusion when he pronounced the failure of the Army of the Potomac in the Peninsula to be more "brilliant" than the subsequent exploits of that army in capturing Richmond and all the opposing forces.

Pope's defeat carried consternation from Bull Run to Washington for the second time, and McClellan was again called to power, notwithstanding the bad relations between him and the Government. His Peninsula campaign had failed, his army had been brought back to Washington against his will, and Halleck had superseded him as Commander-in-chief. Adversity partly dispelled his hallucination, and he entered with vigor and ability upon the performance of his new duties as commander of the defenses of Washington. The capital, however, was not in danger. Its intrenchments were formidable,[1] as McClellan knew before he left the city in the spring; the battles that had been fought had not been without heavy losses to the enemy, and though Pope's army was defeated, it was far from destroyed. Only a little more than one corps of the Army of the Potomac had been seriously engaged under Pope. They had suffered severely, but had lost neither spirit nor organization. The other corps of the Army of the Potomac were intact and in good order, having had no engagements since the Seven Days' fight on the Peninsula nearly two months before.

McClellan wrote his wife, September 2:

> Pope is ordered to fall back upon Washington, and as he reënters everything is to come under my command again. A terrible and thankless task. Yet I will do my best with God's blessing to perform it. God knows that I need His help. Pray that God will help me in the great task now imposed upon me. . . . I only consent to take it for my country's sake and with the humble hope *God has called me to it.*

Here again was an earnest and honest conviction of a sacred mission.

McClellan with great promptness and industry gathered up his forces, and with good generalship marched forth to give battle to Lee, who was moving into Maryland. He won the battles of South Mountain September 14, and Antietam September 17, but the functions of the subordinate general were again supplanted by those of the savior of the country. September 5 he wrote his wife:

> The case is desperate, but with God's help I will try unselfishly to do my best, and, if He wills it, accomplish the *salvation of the nation.* . . . How weary I am of this struggle against adversity! But one thing sustains me—that is my trust in God. . . . Truly God is trying me in the fire.

It is noteworthy that in a despatch to his wife, dated September 7, McClellan said:

> The feeling of the Government toward me I am sure is kind and trusting. I hope with God's blessing to justify the great confidence they now repose in me, and will bury the past in oblivion.

September 20, after Antietam, he wrote:

> I feel some little pride in having with a beaten and demoralized army defeated Lee so utterly and *saved the North so completely.* . . . Since I left Washington, Stanton has again asserted that I, not Pope, lost the battle of Manassas, No. 2.

[1] In his "Own Story," p. 196, he calls them "numerous well-built and well-armed fortifications."

I am tired of fighting against such disadvantages, and feel that it is now time for the country to come to my help and remove these difficulties from my path. . . . I feel that I have done all that can be asked in twice saving the country. If I continue in its service, I have at least the right to demand a guarantee that I shall not be interfered with. I know I cannot have that assurance so long as Stanton continues in the position of Secretary of War, and Halleck as general-in-chief.

The subordinate general who admitted on the 7th the "kind feeling" and "great confidence of the Government," and buried "the past in oblivion," after two weeks of success was again the savior of the country, demanding the dismissal of his two military superiors, the Secretary of War and the General-in-chief!

September 22 he wrote his wife:

I am confident that the poison still rankles in the veins of my enemies at Washington, and that so long as they live it will remain there.

It will be remembered that in a telegram to Stanton of June 28, during the Seven Days' fight, he said:

If I save this army now, I tell you plainly I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.

This probably is some of the "poison" to which he refers, because in a letter of July 20 he said in relation to the bitter charge just made:

Of course they will never forgive me for that. I knew it when I wrote it.

It was no doubt true that McClellan had bitter enemies in Washington. His own conduct rendered that inevitable, and, as shown by the quotation just made, he knew that he had said what they could "never forgive." It was a life and death struggle between him and them. But the trial really took place before the tribunal of public opinion. McClellan was defeated there, not by the action of his enemies in Washington, but by his own inaction in the field. Having defeated Lee and driven him across the Potomac, the Government and the public demanded an active pursuit, and, in refusing that, McClellan lost his case. Antietam was fought on the 17th of September. On the 18th the rebel army recrossed the Potomac into Virginia. McClellan would not pursue for various reasons — want of transportation, of clothing and equipage, etc., and because

the entire army had been greatly exhausted by unavoidable overwork, fatiguing marches, hunger, a want of sleep and rest, [he] did not feel authorized to cross the river with the main army, over a very deep and difficult ford, in pursuit of the retreating enemy, known to be in strong force on the south bank, and thereby place that stream, which was liable at any time to rise above a fording stage, between my army and its base of supply.

The Government and the public, believing that the advantage gained ought to be followed up, and that the rebel army, far from Richmond, must be quite as greatly reduced in numbers and supplies, and as much worn out by marching and fighting, as the Army of the Potomac, insisted upon an active continuation of the campaign. McClellan insisted upon rest and further preparation. On September 22 he telegraphed Halleck:

As soon as the exigencies of the service will admit of it, this army should be reorganized. It is absolutely necessary, to secure its efficiency, that the old skeleton regiments should be filled up at once . . .

And on September 27 he said in a long report:

This army is not now in condition to undertake another campaign, nor to bring on another battle unless great advantages are offered. . . . The new regiments need instruction. . . . My present purpose is to hold the army about as it is now, rendering Harper's Ferry secure and watching the river closely, intending to attack the enemy should he attempt to cross to this side. . . . When the river rises so that the enemy cannot cross in force, I purpose concentrating the army somewhere near Harper's Ferry and then acting according to circumstances.

He was waiting for the river to rise so that the enemy could not get at him, when the Government was thankful that it remained low, expecting him to get at the enemy. He said further:

I rather apprehend a renewal of the attempt in Maryland, should the river remain low for a great length of time and should they receive considerable addition to their force. . . . In the last battles the enemy was undoubtedly greatly superior to us in numbers, and it was only by very hard fighting that we gained the advantage we did.

On September 29 he wrote his wife:

I think Secesh has gone to Winchester. . . . If he has gone there I will be able to arrange my troops more with a view to comfort, and if it will only rain a little so as to raise the river, will feel quite justified in asking for a short leave.

All this was in the season for offensive operations, and when the Government wanted activity. It gave McClellan's enemies in Wash-

ington and elsewhere the very advantage they desired. It was not then in their power to destroy him, but it was in his power to destroy himself, by losing again the confidence of the Government and the public, and reviving the discontent at his inactivity that had so nearly proved fatal to him during the preceding autumn and winter. By October 6 the President's patience was exhausted, and Halleck telegraphed McClellan on that day:

> The President directs that you cross the Potomac, and give battle to the enemy or drive him south.

But McClellan did not move. On October 25 the President in his own name telegraphed McClellan:

> I have just read your despatch about sore-tongued and fatigued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything.

Possibly the rebuke in this despatch was unmerited, but the President's telegram shows the feeling that McClellan's delay had aroused. McClellan was aware of the impatience prevailing throughout the country as well as in Washington, and wrote his wife October 25, "I see there is much impatience throughout the country for a move"; but fidelity to the great task intrusted to him by God of *saving the country*, in his own way, was uppermost in his mind.

The many questions and disputes, the nature and spirit of which may be inferred from the President's telegram about fatigued horses, that arose between McClellan and the Washington authorities at that time revived the doubts, which his advance to Antietam had nearly removed, concerning his fitness for aggressive operations, and increased the strength and bitterness of his enemies. On October 28 Halleck reported to the Secretary of War: "In my opinion there has been no such want of supplies in the army under General McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the orders to advance against the enemy." At last McClellan "fixed upon the 1st of November as the earliest date at which the forward movement could be commenced"—*thirty-three days after the battle of Antietam!* By November 2 he was on the march in grand style, with fair promise of an active and successful campaign. Ripened by experience, he was at his best. But his advance had for the second time been too long delayed for his own good. On November 7 he received an order relieving him from command of the Army of the Potomac, and his military career closed forever.

McClellan believed to the day of his death that the enemy outnumbered him, and that the Government was controlled by a conspiracy to prevent him from succeeding, lest he should destroy the military power of the Confederacy and end the war before slavery was abolished. To save the country from danger within and without, he had to make sure of saving the Army of the Potomac, and that required him not to attack the army opposed to him, except under specially favorable circumstances. Instead of forcing the fighting, he was led to the policy of over-caution, and of waiting to take advantage of the audacity or blunders of the enemy. On the other hand, the task which had been assumed by the Northern people and the Government was to suppress by force of arms, and in the shortest possible time, a flagrant rebellion. Their policy was essentially and necessarily offensive war of the most aggressive kind. When McClellan said July 27, 1861, he would "crush the rebels in one campaign," he was exactly in harmony with the Government and the public. They gave him what they thought ample means, and there never was a day during his command that the Government and the Northern people did not desire him to defeat the "rebels." It was for that purpose they put themselves into his military custody. Many of his supporters were alienated by his failure to fight as they expected, but no Union man, in the Government service or out of it, sought or desired the failure of his campaigns or battles. For a year before he was relieved from duty his military operations were not conducted in accordance with the policy of the Government, and that year, notwithstanding some successes, was one of disaster and disappointment to the North. These, in general terms, are the considerations that gave weight to the demands of Stanton and other opponents of McClellan that he be relieved from command regardless of his professional ability, his early promise, his services in organizing the Army of the Potomac, and the advantages he had gained or might be about to gain in encounters with the enemy. Lincoln's opinion of McClellan's fitness for the occasion was, in the end, probably about the same as Stanton's; but it is not likely that he would have acted upon it, if Stanton and others had not urged him. His kindness of heart was in the way, and he was constitutionally reluctant to make changes, especially at such a time; or, as he expressed it, he did not like to "swap horses while crossing a stream."

Though an earnest religionist, McClellan was not a fanatic. The mission with which he thought he was charged was a function of his military command, and ended with it. Like a patriot and a good soldier, he accepted deposition gracefully, and his relief from duty did not cause a ripple of disorder in the noble Army

of the Potomac, with which he was popular to the last.

In his book, "The Peninsula," General Webb says: "This then to be the first deduction from the narrative of the events of 1861 and 1862: General McClellan did not give to the will of the President, and the demands of the people, that weight in the formation of his plans of campaign to which they were entitled."

Probably the author did not express his meaning accurately in the foregoing quotation. Strictly construed, the criticism is not correct. The formation of his plans of campaign is one of the things in which the general cannot rest upon "the people," nor even upon the President, though of course the latter must always be implicitly obeyed. The formation of plans of campaign is a professional matter of the highest importance. It belongs to the soldier, not to the civilian, and the general is bound to proceed in that duty of his office according to his own judgment and conscience. The plan of campaign is one of the things which by its nature must be kept from "the people," as long as possible, lest it become known to the enemy. McClellan's failure to give weight to the will of the President and the demands of the people in *this particular* was not his mistake. The trouble was that, from an honest conviction of his own high mission, he put himself above both President and people in all matters relating to the war. In short, he acted conscientiously as the chosen savior of his country, instead of a subordinate soldier of the Republic.

James B. Fry.

SOPHIE GERMAIN.

AN UNKNOWN MATHEMATICIAN.

IF a thin circular sheet of metal be fastened firmly at the center by a clamp, and if a violin bow be drawn across its edge, a musical note will be produced. The plate is thrown into vibration by the bow; the vibration does not all come up at once and all go down at once, but it divides itself into some even number of sectors, say six or eight, and as one sector goes up the sector on each side of it goes down. The line between two adjacent sectors goes neither up nor down, but remains at rest. If sand be scattered evenly over the plate before the musical note is produced, it will be shaken off the parts which are most in motion, and it will collect in the lines of rest, or "nodal lines," as they are called. Different musical notes cause the plate to be differently divided up, and the state of vibration of the plate is made plain to the eye by the lines of sand marked out on it. This experiment, a very striking one, which is still performed in all physical laboratories, was exhibited at Paris, soon after its discovery by Chladni, in 1808. It created a great sensation, and a commission was appointed to repeat it with various modifications, and to make a report upon it. The Institute of France, at the suggestion of Napoleon, offered its grand prize for a mathematical discussion of the phenomenon. There were not wanting great mathematicians in Paris at that time — Lagrange, Laplace, Legendre, Poisson, Fourier, but none of them were inclined to undertake this question; Lagrange, in fact, had said that it could not be solved by any of the then known mathematical methods. The offer was twice renewed by the Institute, and in 1816 the prize was conferred upon a woman, Mlle. Sophie Germain. It is very remarkable that so great a distinction as to have received the prize of the Institute of France for a profound mathematical discussion should not have preserved the name of Sophie Germain from oblivion, but it has not done so. There are probably not a score of persons in this country who have ever heard of her, and in her own country she is not usually mentioned among its famous women. As proof that women may be pure mathematicians, Mrs. Somerville has had, outside of Italy and Russia, to stand alone. This is unfortunate, for the detractors of her sex have maintained that her work, though exceedingly profound, was not remarkable for originality. That charge cannot be brought against Sophie Germain. She showed great boldness in attacking a physical question which was at that time entirely outside the range of mathematical treatment, and the more complicated cases of which have not yet submitted themselves to analysis. The equation of elastic laminæ, which is still called Germain's equation, formed the starting-point of a new branch of the theory of elasticity. In her later years Sophie Germain turned her attention to questions of philosophy, and high German authority has recently discovered that her philosophical writings contain the germ of the Positive Philosophy of Comte. It is a curious thing that a woman so deserving of recognition has not received it in a fuller degree; it must be looked upon as one of those accidents by which the distribution of praise for merit is too often badly regulated. A mathematician, so remote is his subject from the ordinary concerns of men, has to be a very great mathematician indeed to be so much as heard of by the general public. Sophie Germain, besides deserving remembrance on account of her contributions to science, had a charming personality, and the few details that have been preserved concerning her life will not be found to be without in-