

LETTERS OF TWO BROTHERS.

PASSAGES FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF GENERAL AND SENATOR SHERMAN.

INTRODUCTION.



WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN was born in Lancaster, Ohio, February 8, 1820, the sixth child in a family of eleven. His father was a judge of the Supreme Court of Ohio, and a man of prominence, but died when Tecumseh was only nine years old. At the death of her husband Mrs. Sherman found herself unable to provide properly for all her children, and Tecumseh was taken into the family of his father's oldest friend, the Hon. Thomas Ewing. At sixteen he entered West Point, and four years later was graduated sixth in the class of 1840. His first military service was in Florida, but at the beginning of the Mexican war he was sent with troops to California, and so missed any opportunity for active service in the war. In 1850

he was promoted to a captaincy, and married Miss Ellen Boyle Ewing, the elder daughter of the Hon. Thomas Ewing, then Secretary of the Interior under President Taylor. In 1853 Captain Sherman resigned his commission and became a banker in California, representing a St. Louis banking-house. Owing to the financial troubles in California in 1857, it was decided to close that branch of the bank, and Sherman spent the next two years in Leavenworth, Kansas, as a partner in the law firm of his brother-in-law, Thomas Ewing, Jr. Legal work proved very distasteful to him, and in 1859 he accepted the position of superintendent of the State Military Academy of Louisiana. Here he remained until the breaking out of the War of Secession, sending his resignation to the governor upon the seiz-

ure of the State Arsenal, that being the first act of open defiance against the general Government on the part of Louisiana.

John Sherman was three years younger than his brother Tecumseh, and at fourteen had already begun to support himself as a rodman for the Muskingum River Improvement Company. He soon came to be engineer in charge, but was removed after a year's service in this capacity, because he was a Whig. At seventeen he began the study of law in the office of his eldest brother Charles, at Mansfield, and May 10, 1844, on coming of age, was admitted to the bar. In 1848, he was sent to the National Whig Convention at Philadelphia, and his political life dates from that time. His intense interest in the excitement over the attempt to repeal the Missouri Compromise, from 1851-54, led to his election to Congress, and from December, 1855, when he took his seat in the House of Representatives in Washington, his firm convictions and his earnestness in expressing them made him prominent. He was appointed by Congress on the Kansas Investigating Committee, a position of great personal danger, and in 1861 was elected senator from Ohio, only a few weeks before the first shot was fired on Sumter. He always took great interest in the financial questions of the day, thus preparing himself for the work he accomplished as Secretary of the Treasury under President Hayes.

After General Sherman's death the desire to know what use was to be made of his papers

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was expressed so promptly, and with such evident sincerity, that I was led to undertake their arrangement for publication. Early in the work I found a series of letters which at once awoke my deepest interest, and which proved to be a correspondence between General Sherman and his brother John, during more than fifty years.

These letters, exchanged by men of such eminence, and many of them written during the most stirring times of our country's history, seem to me a unique collection. They make a correspondence complete in itself, are of great historical value, and the expressions of opinion which they contain are very freely made, and give an excellent idea of the intellectual sympathy existing between the brothers. The letters, however, show but poorly their great affection for each other. Their temperaments and dispositions were so unlike, and their paths in life led in such different ways, that they naturally looked upon the great events of the day from widely different points of view. Still they never failed to feel and show for each other the greatest love and devotion as well as respect.

In publishing these letters, my chief desire has been to let them speak for themselves, and to put them in such form that they may easily be understood. I feel sure that they will command general interest, and be accorded that ready sympathy which was so freely and lovingly expressed at the time of General Sherman's death.

Rachel Ewing Sherman.

THE STORM AND STRESS PERIOD.

THE SOLDIER COUNSELS MODERATION.

IN August of 1859 when General Sherman was appointed superintendent of the State military school in Louisiana, great attention was being paid in the South to the military education of young men, and it is singular, in the knowledge of after events, that General Sherman should have gone to teach the art of war to the youth of the South. While there, or about that time, he received an offer from a banking firm to open a branch office in London, but after consulting his brother John, he decided not to leave this country and his school, in which he was soon greatly interested. It was not long, however, before his relations with the school became strained, owing to his Northern ideas. In September, 1859, he wrote to his brother John from Lancaster, Ohio, where he stopped on his way to Louisiana:

I will come up about the 20th or 25th, and if you have an appointment to speak about that time I should like to hear you, and will so arrange. As you are becoming a man of note

and are a Republican, and as I go south among gentlemen who have always owned slaves and probably always will and must, and whose feelings may pervert every public expression of yours, putting me in a false position to them as my patrons, friends, and associates, and you as my brother, I would like to see you take the highest ground consistent with your party creed.

Throughout all the bitterness in the House of Representatives before the war, General Sherman urged upon his brother John to maintain a moderate course; but even then the general thought him too severe on the South, and in October, 1859, wrote as follows:

Each State has a perfect right to have its own local policy, and a majority in Congress has an absolute right to govern the whole country; but the North, being so strong in every sense of the term, can well afford to be generous, even to making reasonable concessions to the weakness and prejudices of the South.

If Southern representatives will thrust slavery into every local question, they must expect the consequences and be outvoted; but the union of States, and the general union of sentiment throughout all our nation are so important to the honor and glory of the confederacy that I would like to see your position yet more moderate.

In December, John Sherman being the Republican candidate for Speaker of the House, the brother, who was greatly excited and anxious as to his election, writes from New Orleans, Sunday, December 12, 1859:

DEAR BROTHER: I have watched the despatches, which are up to December 10, and hoped your election would occur without the usual excitement, and believe such would have been the case had it not been for your signing for that Helper book. Of it I know nothing, but extracts made copiously in Southern papers show it to be not only abolition but assailing. Now I hoped you would be theoretical and not practical, for practical abolition is disunion, civil war, and anarchy universal on this continent, and I do not believe you want that. . . . I do hope the discussion in Congress will not be protracted, and that your election if possible will occur soon. Write me how you came to sign for that book. Now that you are in, I hope you will conduct yourself manfully. Bear with taunts as far as possible, biding your time to retaliate. An opportunity always occurs. Your affectionate brother, W. T. SHERMAN.

The following letters relating to the Helper book explain themselves:

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 24, 1859.

MY DEAR BROTHER: Your letter was duly received, and should have been promptly answered, but that I am overwhelmed with calls and engagements.

You ask why I signed the recommendation of the Helper book. It was a thoughtless, foolish, and unfortunate act. I relied upon the representation that it was a political tract to be published under the supervision of a committee of which Mr. Blair, a slaveholder, was a member. I was assured that there should be nothing offensive in it, and so, in the hurry of business in the House, I told Morgan, a member of last Congress, to use my name. I never read the book, knew nothing of it, and now cannot recall that I authorized the use of my name. Everybody knows that the ultra sentiments in the book are as obnoxious to me as they can be to any one, and in proper circumstances I would distinctly say so, but under the threat of Clark's resolution, I could not, with self-respect, say more than I have.

Whether elected or not, I will at a proper time disclaim all sympathy with agrarianism,

insurrection, and other abominations in the book. In great haste, your affectionate brother,
JOHN SHERMAN.

SEMINARY, ALEXANDRIA, LA., Jan. 16, 1860.

DEAR BROTHER: I received your letter explaining how you happened to sign for that Helper book. Of course, it was an unfortunate accident, which will be a good reason for your refusing hereafter your signature to unfinished books. After Clark's resolution, you were right, of course, to remain silent. I hope you will still succeed, as then you will have ample opportunity to show a fair independence.

The rampant Southern feeling is not so strong in Louisiana as in Mississippi and Carolina. Still, holding many slaves, they naturally feel the intense anxiety all must whose people and existence depend on the safety of their property and labor. I do hope that Congress may organize, and that all things may move along smoothly. It would be the height of folly to drive the South to desperation, and I hope, after the fact is admitted that the North has the majority and right to control national matters and interests, that they will so use their power as to reassure the South that there is no intention to disturb the actual existence of slavery.
Yours,
W. T. SHERMAN.

SPECULATIONS AS TO WAR.

THROUGH all of General Sherman's letters of this date, one can hear the thunder-crash before the storm. His longing for peace and for the avoidance of trouble is reassuring in a man of great military longings and ambitions. In February, 1860, he writes:

If Pennington succeeds, he will of course give you some conspicuous committee, probably quite as well for you in the long run as Speaker. I don't like the looks of the times. This political turmoil, the sending commissions from State to State, the organization of military schools and establishments, and universal belief in the South that disunion is not only possible but certain, are bad signs. If our country falls into anarchy, it will be Mexico, only worse. I was in hopes the crisis would have been deferred till the States of the Northwest became so populous as to hold both extremes in check. Disunion would be civil war, and you politicians would lose all chance. Military men would then step on the tapis, and you would have to retire. Though you think such a thing absurd, yet it is not so, and there would be vast numbers who would think the change for the better.

I have been well sustained here, and the Legislature proposes further to endow us well and place us in the strongest possible financial

position. If they do, and this danger of disunion blow over, I shall stay here; but in case of a breach I would go North. Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN.

Later, when things look more peaceful for the country, he writes:

The excitement attending the Speakership has died away here, and Louisiana will not make any disunion moves. Indeed, she is very prosperous, and the Mississippi is a strong link which she cannot sever. Besides, the price of negroes is higher than ever before, indicating a secure feeling. . . .

I have seen all your debates thus far, and no Southern or other gentleman will question their fairness and dignity, and I believe, unless you are unduly provoked, they will ever continue so. I see you are suffering some of the penalties of greatness, having an awful likeness paraded in — to decorate the walls of country inns. I have seen that of —, and as the name is below, I recognize it. Some here say they see a likeness to me, but I don't.

The following letters, relating to John Sherman's speech in New York, explain themselves:

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1860.

MY DEAR BROTHER: Yours of the 12th instant was received when I was very busy, and therefore I did not answer in time for you at Lancaster. . . .

Your estimate of the relative positions of Speaker and Ch[] of W[] and M[] Com[] is not accurate. The former is worth struggling for. It is high in dignity, influence, and when its duties are well performed it is an admirable place to gain reputation. I confess I had set my heart upon it and think I could have discharged its duties. . . . My present position is a thankless, laborious one. I am not adapted to it. It requires too much detailed labor and keeps me in continual conflict; it is the place of a schoolmaster with plenty of big boys to coax and manage. I will get along the best I can. . . . You need not fear my caution about extreme views. It is my purpose to express my political opinions in the City of New York in April, and to avoid hasty expressions, I will write it out in full for publication.

Affectionately yours, JOHN SHERMAN.

LOUISIANA STATE SEMINARY OF LEARNING
AND MILITARY ACADEMY,
ALEXANDRIA, LA., April 4, 1860.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I know that some men think this middle course absurd, but no people were ever governed by mere abstract principle. All governments are full of anoma-

lies,—English, French, and our own; but ours is the best because it admits of people having their local interests and prejudices, and yet live in one confederacy. I hope you will send your speech, and if national, I will have it circulated. . . .

I see you have reported nearly all the appropriation bills early in the session. This has been referred to in my presence repeatedly as evidence of your ability and attention to business; so, whether you feel suited to the berth or no, it will strengthen your chances in the country. . . . Your brother, W. T. SHERMAN.

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 13, 1860.

DEAR BROTHER: I send you a copy of my speech in New York. I delivered it with fair credit, and to a very large, kind audience. Upon looking it over, I perceive a good deal of bitterness, natural enough, but which you will not approve. It is well received here. Affectionately yours,
JOHN SHERMAN.

ALEXANDRIA, LA., May 8, 1860.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . Last night I got the copy of the speech and read it. . . . There is one point which you concede to the Southern States, perfect liberty to prefer slavery if they choose; still, you hit the system as though you had feeling against it. I know it is difficult to maintain perfect impartiality. In all new cases, it is well you should adhere to your conviction to exclude slavery because you prefer free labor. That is your perfect right, and I was glad to see that you disavowed any intention to molest slavery even in the District. Now, so certain and inevitable is it that the physical and political power of this nation must pass into the hands of the free States that I think you all can well afford to take things easy, bear the buffets of a sinking dynasty, and even smile at their impotent threats. You ought not to expect the Southern politicians to rest easy when they see and feel this crisis so long approaching, and so certain to come, absolutely at hand. . . . But this year's presidential election will be a dangerous one; may actually result in civil war, though I still cannot believe the South would actually secede in the event of the election of a Republican. . . . Your affectionate brother,
W. T. SHERMAN.

GENERAL SHERMAN FAVORS SEWARD.

AS the year goes on, General Sherman's anxiety increases, and his position becomes almost too strained for comfort. In his intense longing to preserve peace, he favors the nomination of Seward rather than of Lincoln, believing him to be less inimical to the South. In June of 1860 he writes:

I think, however, though Lincoln's opinions on slavery are as radical as those of Seward, yet Southern men, if they see a chance of his success, will say they will wait and see. The worst feature of things now is the familiarity with which the subject of a dissolution is talked about. But I cannot believe any one, even Yancey or Davis, would be rash enough to take the first step. If at Baltimore to-day the convention nominate Douglas with unanimity, I suppose if he get the vote of the united South he will be elected. But [if], as I apprehend will be the case, the seceders again secede to Richmond, and there make a Southern nomination, their nominee will weaken Douglas' vote so much that Lincoln may run in. The real race seems to be between Lincoln and Douglas. . . . Now that Mr. Ewing also is out for Lincoln,—and it is strange how closely these things are watched,—it is probable I will be even more "suspect" than last year. All the reasoning and truth in the world would not convince a Southern man that the Republicans are not abolitionists. It is not safe even to stop to discuss the question; they believe it, and there is the end of that controversy. . . . Of course, I know that reason has very little influence in this world; prejudice governs. You, and all who derive power from the people, do not look for pure, unalloyed truth, but to that kind of truth which jumps with the prejudices of the day. So Southern politicians do the same. If Lincoln be elected, I don't apprehend resistance; and if he be, as Mr. Ewing says, a reasonable, moderate man, things may move on, and the South become gradually reconciled. But you may rest assured that the tone of feeling is such that civil war and anarchy are very possible. . . .

JOHN SHERMAN'S VIEWS AFTER THE ELECTION
OF LINCOLN.

THE following letter, written by John Sherman to his brother shortly after the election of Lincoln, is full of the intensest feeling, and is a complete statement of the Republican sentiment of the time.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, November 26, 1860.

MY DEAR BROTHER: Since I received your last letter I have been so constantly engaged, first with the election and afterwards in arranging my business for the winter, that I could not write you.

The election resulted as I all along supposed. Indeed, the division of the Democratic party on precisely the same question that separates the Republican party from the Democratic party made its defeat certain. The success of the Republicans has, no doubt, saved the country from a discreditable scramble in the House. No doubt the disorders of the last winter, and

the fear of their renewal, induced many good citizens to vote for the Republican ticket. With a pretty good knowledge of the material of our House, I would far prefer that any one of the candidates be elected by the people rather than allow the contest to be determined in Congress. Well, Lincoln is elected. No doubt, a large portion of the citizens of Louisiana consider this a calamity. If they believe their own newspapers, or what is far worse, the lying organs of the Democratic party in the free States, they have just cause to think so. But you were long enough in Ohio and heard enough of the ideas of the Republican leaders to know that the Republican party is not likely to interfere directly or indirectly with slavery in the States, or with the laws relating to slavery; that, so far as the slavery question is concerned, the contest was for the possession of Kansas and perhaps New Mexico, and that the chief virtue of the Republican success was in its condemnation of the narrow sectionalism of Buchanan's administration, and the corruptions by which he attempted to sustain his policy. Who doubts but that, if he had been true to his promises in submitting the controversy in Kansas to its own people, and had closed it by admitting Kansas as a free State, that the Democratic party would have retained its power? It was his infernal policy in Kansas (I can hardly think of the mean and bad things he allowed there without swearing) that drove off Douglas, and led to the division of the Democratic party and the consequent election of Lincoln.

As a matter of course, I rejoice in the result, for in my judgment the administration of Lincoln will do much to dissipate the feeling in the South against the North by showing what are the real purposes of the Republican party. In the mean time, it is evident we have to meet in a serious form the movements of South Carolinian Disunionists. These men have for years desired disunion. They have plotted for it. They drove Buchanan into his Kansas policy. They got up this new dogma about slave protection. They broke up the Charleston Convention merely to advance secession. They are now hurrying forward excited men into acts of treason without giving time for passion to cool or reason to resume its sway. God knows what will be the result. If by a successful revolution they can go out of the Union, they establish a principle that will break up the government into fragments. Some local disaffection or temporary excitement will lead one State after another out of the Union. We will have the Mexican Republic over again, with a fiercer race of men to fight with each other. Secession is revolution. They seem bent upon attempting it. If so, shall the government resist? If so, then comes

civil war, a fearful subject for Americans to think of.

Since the election I have been looking over the field for the purpose of marking out a course to follow this winter, and I have, as well as I could, tested my political course in the past. There has been nothing done by the Republican party but merits the cordial approval of my judgment. There have been many things said and done by leading Republicans that I utterly detest. Many of the dogmas of the Democratic party I like, but their conduct in fact in administering the government, and especially in their treatment of the slavery question, I detest. I know we will have trouble this winter, but I intend to be true to the moderate conservative course I think I have heretofore undertaken. Whatever may be the consequences, I will insist in preserving the unity of the States, and all the States, without exception and without regard to consequences. If any Southern State has really suffered any injury, or is deprived of any right, I will help redress the injury and secure the right. They must not, merely because they are beaten in an election, or have failed in establishing slavery where it was prohibited by compromise, attempt to break up the government. If they will hold on a little while, they will find no injury can come to them unless, by their repeated misrepresentation of us, they stir up their slaves to insurrection. I still hope that no State will follow in the wake of South Carolina. If so, the weakness of her position will soon bring her back again or subject her to ridicule and insignificance.

It may be supposed by some that the excitement in the South has produced a corresponding excitement in the North. This is true in financial matters, especially in the cities. In political circles, it only strengthens the Republican feeling. Even Democrats of all shades say, The election is against us; we will submit and all must submit. Republicans say, The policy of the government has been controlled by the South for years, and we have submitted: now they must submit; and why not? What can the Republicans do half as bad as Pierce and Buchanan have done?

But enough of this. You luckily are out of politics, and don't sympathize much with my Republicanism anyway; but as we are on the eve of important events, I write about politics instead of family matters, of which there is nothing new. . . . Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

GENERAL SHERMAN'S UNREST IN LOUISIANA.

THIS is followed by a letter from General Sherman, in which one can see that already he fully realizes the inevitable outcome of the dissolution of the Union and the strength of the South.

Some months later he demanded 75,000 men to defend Kentucky, which required in the end more than twice that number to defend it, and he was in consequence called and believed to be insane. It was his knowledge, obtained through his singular position in the South, that enabled him to foresee more accurately than others the immense proportions of the coming war.

LOUISIANA STATE SEMINARY OF LEARNING
AND MILITARY ACADEMY,
ALEXANDRIA, December 1, 1860.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . The quiet which I thought the usual acquiescence of the people was merely the prelude to the storm of opinion that now seems irresistible. Politicians, by hearing the prejudices of the people and [in] running with the current, have succeeded in destroying the government. It cannot be stopped now, I fear. I was in Alexandria all day yesterday, and had a full and unreserved conversation with Dr. S. A. Smith, State senator, who is a man of education, property, influence, and qualified to judge. He was, during the canvass, a Breckinridge man, but, though a Southerner in opinion, is really opposed to a dissolution of our government. He has returned from New Orleans, where he says he was amazed to see evidences of public sentiment which could not be mistaken.

The Legislature meets December 10, at Baton Rouge. The calling a Convention forthwith is to be unanimous, the bill for arming the State ditto. The Convention will meet in January, and only two questions will be agitated: Immediate dissolution, a declaration of State independence, or a general convention of Southern States, with instructions to demand of the Northern States to repeal all laws hostile to slavery and pledges of future good behavior. . . . When the Convention meets in January, as they will assuredly do, and resolve to secede, or to elect members to a General Convention with instructions inconsistent with the nature of things, I must quit this place; for it is neither right for me to stay, nor would the Governor be justified in placing me in this position of trust; for the moment Louisiana assumes a position of hostility, then this becomes an arsenal and fort. . . . Let me hear the moment you think dissolution is inevitable. What Mississippi and Georgia do, this State will do likewise. Affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

In the next letter, of December 9, General Sherman, after reasserting his belief that "all attempts at reconciliation will fail," and repeating that Louisiana will undoubtedly follow South Carolina and Georgia, laments personally this, his fourth change in four years, and "each time from calamity,"—California, New York, Leavenworth, and now Louisiana, a state of affairs which,

it must be admitted, would have been discouraging to any man. On December 15, John Sherman urges his brother to leave Louisiana at once, while the General waits, hoping against hope for peace.

I am clearly of the opinion that you ought not to remain much longer at your present post. You will in all human probability be involved in complications from which you cannot escape with honor. Separated from your family and all your kin, and an object of suspicion, you will find your position unendurable. A fatal infatuation seems to have seized the Southern mind, during which any act of madness may be committed. . . . If the sectional dissensions only rested upon real or alleged grievances, they could be readily settled, but I fear they are deeper and stronger. You can now close your connection with the seminary with honor and credit to yourself, for all who know you speak well of your conduct; while by remaining you not only involve yourself, but bring trouble upon those gentlemen who recommended you.

It is a sad state of affairs, but it is nevertheless true, that if the conventions of the Southern States make anything more than a paper secession, hostile collisions will occur, and probably a separation between the free and slave States. You can judge whether it is at all probable that the possession of this capital, the commerce of the Mississippi, the control of the territories, and the natural rivalry of enraged sections, can be arranged without war. In that event, you cannot serve in Louisiana against your family and kin in Ohio. The bare possibility of such a contingency, it seems to me, renders your duty plain—to make a frank statement to all the gentlemen connected with you, and with good feeling close your engagement. If the storm shall blow over, your course will strengthen you with every man whose good opinion you desire; if not, you will escape humiliation.

When you return to Ohio, I will write you freely about your return to the army—not so difficult a task as you imagine. Affectionately your brother,
JOHN SHERMAN.

The following short extracts from letters at this time show the gradual approach of war. General Sherman writes from Louisiana:

Events here seem hastening to a conclusion. Doubtless you know more of the events in Louisiana than I do, as I am in an out-of-the-way place. But the special session of the Legislature was so unanimous in arming the State and calling a convention that little doubt remains that, on January 23, Louisiana will follow the other seceding States. Governor Moore takes the plain stand that the

State must not submit to a black Republican president. Men here have ceased to reason; they seem to concede that slavery is unsafe in a confederacy with Northern States, and that now is the time; no use of longer delay. All concessions, all attempts to remonstrate, seem at an end.

A rumor says that Major Anderson, my old captain (brother of Charles Anderson, now of Texas, formerly of Dayton and Cincinnati, Lars, William, and John, all of Ohio), has spiked the guns of Fort Moultrie, destroyed it, and taken refuge in Sumter. This is right. Sumter is in mid-channel, approachable only in boats, whereas Moultrie is old, weak, and easily approached under cover. If Major Anderson can hold out till relieved and supported by steam frigates, South Carolina will find herself unable to control her commerce, and will feel, for the first time in her existence, that she can't do as she pleases. . . . A telegraphic despatch, addressed to me at Alexandria, could be mailed at New Orleans, and reach me in three days from Washington.

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 6, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I see some signs of hope, but it is probably a deceptive light. The very moment you feel uncomfortable in your position in Louisiana, come away. Don't, for God's sake, subject yourself to any slur, reproach, or indignity. I have spoken to General Scott, and he heartily seconds your desire to return to duty in the army. I am not at all sure but that, if you were here, you could get a position that would suit you. I see many of your friends of the army daily.

As for my views of the present crisis, I could not state them more fully than I have in the inclosed printed letter. It has been very generally published and approved in the North, but may not have reached you, and therefore I send it to you. Affectionately your brother,

JOHN SHERMAN.

GENERAL SHERMAN RESIGNS FROM THE
LOUISIANA MILITARY ACADEMY.

GOVERNOR MOORE of Louisiana took possession of the arsenal at Baton Rouge, January 10, 1861. General Sherman comments upon this in a letter written to his brother, January 16, and regarding it as a declaration of war, sends in his resignation January 18,¹ a copy of which he incloses to John Sherman in a letter dated the same day.

ALEXANDRIA, January 16, 1861.

MY DEAR BROTHER: I am so much in the woods here that I can't keep up with the times at all. Indeed, you in Washington hear from

¹ See "Memoirs," Vol. I, p. 184.

New Orleans two or three days sooner than I do. I was taken back by the news that Governor Moore had ordered the forcible seizure of the Forts Jackson and St. Philip, at or near the mouth of the Mississippi; also of Forts Pike and Wood, at the outlets of Lakes Borgne and Pontchartrain. All these are small forts, and have rarely been occupied by troops. They are designed to cut off approach by sea to New Orleans, and were taken doubtless to prevent their being occupied by order of General Scott. But the taking the arsenal at Baton Rouge is a different matter. It is merely an assemblage of storehouses, barracks, and dwelling-houses designed for the healthy residence of a garrison, to be thrown into one or the other of the forts in case of war. The arsenal is one of minor importance, yet the stores were kept there for the moral effect, and the garrison was there at the instance of the people of Louisiana. To surround with military array, to demand surrender, and enforce the departure of the garrison, were acts of war. They amounted to a declaration of war and defiance, and were done by Governor Moore without the authority of the Legislature or Convention. Still, there is little doubt but that each of these bodies, to assemble next week, will ratify and approve these violent acts, and it is idle to discuss the subject now. The people are mad on this question. I had previously notified all that in the event of secession I should quit. As soon as a knowledge of these acts reached me, I went to the vice-president, Dr. Smith, in Alexandria, and told him that I regarded Louisiana as at war against the Federal Government, and that I must go. He begged me to wait until some one could be found to replace me. The supervisors feel the importance of system and discipline, and seem to think that my departure will endanger the success of this last effort to build up an educational establishment in Louisiana. . . . You may assert that in no event will I forego my allegiance to the United States as long as a single State is true to the old Constitution. Yours, W. T. SHERMAN.

LOUISIANA STATE SEMINARY OF LEARNING
AND MILITARY ACADEMY,
ALEXANDRIA, January 18, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER: Before receiving yours of the 7th¹ I had addressed a letter to Governor Moore at Baton Rouge, of which this is a copy:

"SIR: As I occupy a quasi military position under the laws of this State, I deem it proper to acquaint you that I accepted such position when Louisiana was a State in the Union, and when the motto of this seminary was inscribed in marble over the main door: 'By the liberal-

¹ Meaning the letter of the 6th.

ity of the General Government. The Union—*Esto perpetua.*' Recent events foreshadow a great change, and it becomes all men to choose. If Louisiana withdraw from the Federal Union, I prefer to maintain my allegiance to the old Constitution as long as a fragment of it survives, and my longer stay here would be wrong in every sense of the word. In that event I beg that you will send or appoint some authorized agent to take charge of the arms and munitions of war here belonging to the State, or advise me what disposition to make of them. And furthermore, as President of the Board of Supervisors, I beg you to take immediate steps to relieve me as superintendent the moment the State determines to secede; for on no earthly account will I do any act or think any thought hostile to or in defiance of the old Government of the United States. With respect, etc. W. T. SHERMAN."

I regard the seizure by Governor Moore of the United States Arsenal as the worst act yet committed in the present revolution. I do think every allowance should be made to Southern politicians for their nervous anxiety about their political power and the safety of slaves. I think that the Constitution should be liberally construed in their behalf, but I do regard this civil war as precipitated with undue rapidity. . . . It is inevitable. All the legislation now would fall powerless on the South. You should not alienate such States as Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri. My notion is that this war will ruin all politicians, and that military leaders will direct the events. Yours, W. T. S.

In the following letter of February 1, to John Sherman, the General quotes the handsome note from Governor Moore accepting his resignation.

I have felt the very thoughts you have spoken. It is war to surround Anderson with batteries, and it is shilly-shally for the South to cry "Hands off! No coercion!" It was war and insult to expel the garrison at Baton Rouge, and Uncle Sam had better cry *Cave!* or assert his power. Fort Sumter is not material, save for the principle; but Key West and the Tortugas should be held in force at once, by regulars if possible, if not, militia. Quick! They are occupied now, but not in force. Whilst maintaining the high, strong ground you do, I would not advise you to interpose an objection to securing concessions to the middle and moderate States,—Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri. Slavery there is local, and even if the world were open to them, its extension would involve no principle. If these States feel the extreme South wrong, a seeming concession would make them committed. The cotton States are gone, I suppose. Of course,

their commerce will be hampered. . . . But of myself. I sent you a copy of my letter to the Governor. Here is his answer :

“BATON ROUGE, January 27, 1861.

“DEAR SIR: It is with the deepest regret I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant. In the pressure of official business I can now only request you to transfer to Professor Smith the arms, munitions, and funds in your hands whenever you conclude to withdraw from the position you have filled with so much distinction. You cannot regret more than I do the necessity which deprives us of your services, and you will bear with you the respect, confidence, and admiration of all who have been associated with you. Very truly, your friend and servant, THOS. [O.] MOORE.”

This is very handsome, and I do regret this political imbroglia. I do think it was brought about by politicians. The people in the South are evidently unanimous in the opinion that slavery is endangered by the current of events, and it is useless to attempt to alter that opinion. As our government is founded on the will of the people, when that will is fixed, our government is powerless, and the only question is whether to let things slide into general anarchy, or the formation of two or more confederacies, which will be hostile sooner or later. Still, I know that some of the best men of Louisiana think this change may be effected peacefully. But even if the Southern States be allowed to part in peace the first question will be revenue.

Now, if the South have free trade, how can you collect revenues in the eastern cities? Freight from New Orleans to St. Louis, Chicago, Louisville, Cincinnati, and even Pittsburgh, would be about the same as by rail from New York, and importers at New Orleans, having no duties to pay, would undersell the East if they had to pay duties. Therefore, if the South make good their confederation and their plan, the Northern confederacy must do likewise or blockade. Then comes the question of foreign nations. So, look on it in any view, I see no result but war and consequent changes in the form of government.

A QUESTION OF MILITARY SERVICE.

IN March of 1861, General Sherman started north by the Mississippi River. On the way, and after reaching Ohio, he heard discussions as to the advisability of coercion. Whereas in the South there were absolute unanimity of opinion and universal preparation for war, in the North there were merely argument and apathy. After leaving his family at Lancaster, he went to Washington, still uncertain as to his next move. While there, he called on Mr. Lincoln, and stated his fears and convictions as to war and the

gravity of it. Mr. Lincoln treated all he said with slight scorn and absolute disregard, and remarked, “Oh, well, I guess we ’ll manage to keep house.”¹ This, with the general unconcern and disregard of the necessity of military interference, discouraged General Sherman, and, greatly dispirited, he returned to Ohio, and took his family to St. Louis, after ascertaining from friends that in all probability Missouri would stick to the Union. In writing at this time he says :

Lincoln has an awful task, and if he succeeds in avoiding strife and allaying fears, he will be entitled to the admiration of the world ; but a time has occurred in all governments, and has now occurred in this, when force must back the laws, and the longer the postponement the more severe must be the application.

On April 8 General Sherman wrote to his brother :

Saturday night late I received this despatch : “Will you accept the Chief Clerkship in the War Department? We will make you Assistant Secretary when Congress meets.—M. BLAIR.” This morning I answered by telegraph : “I cannot accept.”

In writing to explain his refusal, he does not state the real reason, which was undoubtedly that he preferred active service. John Sherman’s letter of April 12 approved of the determination, and states more fully his reasons for advising it. It is interesting to see, from the very first, John Sherman’s belief in his brother’s talents as a soldier, and conviction that he would rise to a high position in the army in the event of war. Through all of General Sherman’s letters of that time there are evidences of very sincere distrust of himself, and deprecation of John’s flattering belief,—unusual qualities in a man destined to greatness.

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER : I was unexpectedly called here soon after receiving your letter of the 8th, and at midnight write you. The military excitement here is intense. Since my arrival I have seen all the heads of departments except Blair, several officers, and many citizens. There is a fixed determination now to preserve the Union and enforce the laws at all hazards. Civil war is actually upon us, and, strange to say, it brings a feeling of relief ; the suspense is over. I have spent much of the day in talking about you. There is an earnest desire that you go into the War Department, but I said this was impossible. Chase is especially desirous that you accept, saying that you would be virtually Secretary of War, and could easily step into any military position that offers.

It is well for you seriously to consider your conclusion, although my opinion is that you ought not to accept. You ought to hold your-

¹ See “Memoirs,” Vol. I, p. 196.

self in reserve. If troops are called for, as they surely will be within a few days, organize a regiment or brigade, either in St. Louis or in Ohio, and you will then get into the army in such a way as to secure promotion. By all means take advantage of the present disturbances to get into the army, where you will at once put yourself into a high position for life. I know that promotion and every facility for advancement will be cordially extended by the authorities. You are a favorite in the army, and have great strength in political circles. I urge you to avail yourself of these favorable circumstances to secure your position for life; for, after all, your present employment is of uncertain tenure in these stirring times. . . .

Let me now record a prediction. Whatever you may think of the signs of the times, the Government will rise from this strife greater, stronger, and more prosperous than ever. It will display energy and military power. The men who have confidence in it, and do their full duty by it, may reap whatever there is of honor or profit in public life, while those who look on merely as spectators in the storm will fail to discharge the highest duty of a citizen, and suffer accordingly in public estimation. . . . I write this in great hurry, with numbers around me, and exciting and important intelligence constantly repeated, even at this hour; but I am none the less in earnest. I hope to hear that you are on the high road to the "General" within thirty days. Affectionately your brother,
JOHN SHERMAN.

GENERAL SHERMAN STANDS ALOOF.

FROM the time of General Sherman's conversation with Mr. Lincoln he distrusted the preparations of the administration, which savored greatly of militia and raw recruits. With this army General Sherman was unwilling to cast his lot, believing that he was worthy of a better command or of none. In April he writes to John:

But I say volunteers and militia never were and never will be fit for invasion, and when tried, it will be defeated, and dropt by Lincoln like a hot potato.

And in the same letter:

The time will come in this country when professional knowledge will be appreciated, when men that can be trusted will be wanted, and I will bide my time. I may miss the chance; and if so, all right; but I cannot and will not mix myself in this present call. . . . The first movements of our government will fail and the leaders will be cast aside. A second or third set will rise, and among them I may be, but at present I will not volunteer as a soldier or anything else. If Congress meet, or

if a National Convention be called, and the regular army be put on a footing with the wants of the country, if I am offered a place that suits me, I may accept. But in the present call I will not volunteer.

WASHINGTON, Sunday, April 14, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . The war has really commenced. You will have full details of the fall of Sumter. We are on the eve of a terrible war. Every man will have to choose his position. You fortunately have the military education, character, and prominence that will enable you to play a high part in the tragedy. You can't avoid taking such a part. Neutrality and indifference are impossible. If the government is to be maintained, it must be by military power, and that immediately. You can choose your own place. Some of your best friends here want you in the War Department; Taylor, Shires, and a number of others talk to me so. If you want that place, with a sure prospect of promotion, you can have it, but you are not compelled to take it; but it seems to me you will be compelled to take some position, and that speedily. Can't you come to Ohio and at once raise a regiment? It will immediately be in service. The administration intend to stand or fall by the Union, the entire Union, and the enforcement of the laws. I look for preliminary defeats, for the rebels have arms, organization, unity; but this advantage will not last long. The government will maintain itself, or our Northern people are the veriest poltroons that ever disgraced humanity. For me, I am for a war that will either establish or overthrow the government and will purify the atmosphere of political life. We need such a war, and we have it now. . . . Affectionately yours,
JOHN SHERMAN.

OFFICE ST. LOUIS RAILROAD CO.,

ST. LOUIS, April 22, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I know full well the force of what you say. At a moment like this the country expects every man to do his duty. But every man is not at liberty to do as he pleases. You know that Mr. Lincoln said to you and me that he did not think he wanted military men. I was then free, uncommitted. . . . I approve fully of Lincoln's determination to use all his ordinary and extraordinary powers to defend and maintain the authority with which he is clothed and the integrity of the nation, and had I not committed myself to another duty, I would most willingly have responded to his call. . . .

The question of the national integrity and slavery should be kept distinct, for otherwise it will gradually become a war of extermination,—a war without end. If, when Congress

meets, a clearly defined policy be arrived at, a clear end to be accomplished, and then the force adequate to that end be provided for, then I could and would act with some degree of confidence, not now.

I take it for granted that Washington is safe; that Pickens can beat off all assailants; that Key West and Tortugas are strong and able to spare troops for other purposes; that, above all, Fort Monroe is full of men, provisions, and warlike materials, and that the Chesapeake is strongly occupied. Then the first thing will be the avenues of travel. Baltimore must be made to allow the free transit of troops, provisions, and materials without question, and the route from Wheeling to the Relay House kept open. Here there must be some fighting, but a march from Brownsville or Frostburg would be a good drill, via Hagerstown, Frederick, and the Potomac.

From present information I apprehend that Virginia will destroy the road from Harper's Ferry west, and maybe the Marylanders will try the balance; but, without an hour's delay, that line should swarm with troops, who should take no half-way measures. . . . Affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN.

CONFIDENCE IN McCLELLAN.

THROUGH all the spring months, while he was nominally but president of a street-car company, General Sherman's imagination was engaged in defending the country, building forts, occupying positions of importance, and possessing railroads. His letters were full of military suggestions, some of which John Sherman showed the Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron, who, as it might appear, acted upon them.

OFFICE ST. LOUIS R. R. CO.,
ST. LOUIS, April 25, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . Virginia's secession influences some six millions of people. No use in arguing about it at all, but all the Virginians, or all who trace their lineage back, will feel like obeying her dictates and example. As a State, she has been proud, boastful, and we may say overbearing; but, on the other hand, by her governors and authority, she has done everything to draw her native-born back to their State.

I cannot yet but think that it was a fatal mistake in Mr. Lincoln not to tie to his administration by some kind of link the Border States. Now it is too late, and sooner or later Kentucky, Tennessee, and Arkansas will be in arms against us. It is barely possible that Missouri may yet be neutral.

It is pretty nearly determined to divert the half-million set aside for the July interest for arming the State. All the banks but one have consented, and the Governor and Legislature

are strongly secession. I understand to-day the orders at the custom-house are to refuse clearance to steamboats to seceding States. All the heavy trade with groceries and provisions is with the South, and this order at once takes all life from St. Louis. Merchants, heretofore for peace and even for backing the administration, will now fall off, relax in their exertions, and the result will possibly be secession, and then free States against slave,—the horrible array so long dreaded. I know Frank Blair desired this plain, square issue. It may be that sooner or later it is inevitable, but I cannot bring myself to think so. On the necessity of maintaining a government, and that government the old constitutional one, I have never wavered, but I do recoil from a war when the negro is the only question.

I am informed that McClellan is appointed to command the Ohio militia,—a most excellent appointment; a better officer could not be found. . . .
W. T. SHERMAN.

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1861.

MY DEAR BROTHER: Your recent letters have been received. One of them I read to Secretary Cameron, and he was much pleased with some of your ideas, especially with your proposition about Fort Smith and the island off Mobile. The latter is probably now in possession of the Government.

It is probable that no movements will be made into the cotton States before winter. A regular plan has been formed by General Scott, and is daily discussed and reconsidered by him and other officers. The movements now occurring are merely incidental, rather to occupy public attention and employ troops than to strike decisive blows. In the mean time it is becoming manifest that the secessionists mean to retreat from position to position until they concentrate sufficient force to strike a decisive blow. I have a fear, not generally shared in, that now a rapid concentration is taking place, and that within a few days we shall have a terrible battle near Washington. Indeed, I don't see how it can be avoided. General Butler at Norfolk, General McClellan at Grafton, General Patterson at Charleston, and General Scott here, all concentrating, will surely bring on a fight in which I fear the Virginians will concentrate the largest mass. I have been all along our lines on the other side, and confess that we are weaker than I wish. Every day, however, is adding to our forces, and strengthening our position. . . .

What think you of Frémont and Banks as Major-generals of volunteers, and Schenck as Brigadier? They are all able men, though I know you don't like volunteers. These appointments are generally satisfactory, even to

the regular officers, many of whom say that they had rather serve under able citizens than old-fogy officers. The old army is a manifest discredit. The desertion of so many officers (treachery, I had better say), the surrender on parole of so many officers in Texas where all the men were true to their allegiance, has so stained the whole regular force of officers that it will take good conduct on their part to retrieve their old position.

You are regarded with favor here. It will be your own fault if you do not gain a very high position in the army. . . . Affectionately yours,
JOHN SHERMAN.

On May 3, 1861, John Sherman wrote from Philadelphia:

The time is past for expedients. They must either whip us, or we shall whip them. A threat of secession is idle. Missouri can't secede, nor can Virginia secede. . . . Those Dutch troops in St. Louis will have enough backing. Thank God, the arms in the arsenal were not stolen. I am now acting as volunteer aide to Major-general Patterson. Porter, Belger, Beckwith, Patterson, Price, and others, are on his regular staff.

GENERAL SHERMAN OFFERS HIS SERVICES.

In John Sherman's letter-book is a copy, sent at the time, of a letter General Sherman wrote to Secretary Cameron in 1861, giving his reasons for not enlisting sooner. Upon receipt of this, it was decided at Washington to make him colonel of three battalions of regulars, or major-general of volunteers.

OFFICE ST. LOUIS R. R. CO.,
ST. LOUIS, May 8, 1861.

HON. S. CAMERON, Secretary of War.

DEAR SIR: I hold myself now, as always, prepared to serve my country in the capacity for which I was trained. I did not and will not volunteer for three months because I cannot throw my family on the cold support of charity, but for the three years' call made by the President, an officer could prepare his command, and do good service. I will not volunteer because, rightfully or wrongfully, I feel myself unwilling to take a mere private's place, and having for many years lived in California and Louisiana, the men are not well enough acquainted with me to elect me to my appropriate place. Should my services be needed, the Records of the War Department will enable you to designate the station in which I can render best service. Yours truly,
W. T. SHERMAN.

UNDER FIRE AS A SPECTATOR.

BEFORE leaving St. Louis, General Sherman was an unintentional witness of the first fighting

in the West, of which he gives the following account:

OFFICE ST. LOUIS RAILROAD CO.,
ST. LOUIS, May 11, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER: Very imprudently I was a witness of the firing on the people by the United States Militia at Camp Jackson yesterday. You will hear all manner of accounts, and as these will be brought to bear on the present Legislature to precipitate events, may be secession, I will tell you what I saw.

My office is up in Bremen, the extreme north of the city. The arsenal is at the extreme south. The State camp was in a pretty grove directly west of the city, bounded by Olive street and Laclede Avenue. I went to my house on Locust, between Eleventh and Twelfth, at 3 P. M., and saw the whole city in commotion, and heard that the United States troops were marching from the arsenal to capture the State camp.

I told Ellen,¹ then took Willy² to see the soldiers march back. I kept on walking, and about 5.30 P. M. found myself in the grove, with soldiers all round, standing at rest. I went into the camp till turned aside by sentinels, and found myself with a promiscuous crowd, men, women, and children, inside the grove, near Olive street. On that street the disarmed State troops, some eight hundred, were in ranks. Soon a heavy column of United States regulars followed by militia came down Olive street, with music, and halted abreast of me. I went up and spoke to some of the officers, and fell back to a knoll. . . . Soon the music again started, and as the regulars got abreast of the crowd, about sixty yards to my front and right, I observed them in confusion, using their bayonets to keep the crowd back, as I supposed. Still, they soon moved on, and as the militia reached the same point a similar confusion began. I heard a couple of shots, then half a dozen, and observed the militia were firing on the crowd at that point; but the fire kept creeping to the rear along the flank of the column, and, hearing balls cutting the leaves of trees over my head, I fell down on the grass and crept up to where Charley Ewing³ had my boy Willy. I also covered his person. Probably a hundred shots passed over the ground, but none near us. As soon as the fire slackened, I picked Willy up, and ran with him till behind the rising ground, and continued at my leisure out of harm's way, and went home.

I saw no one shot, but some dozen men were killed, among them a woman and little girl. There must have been some provocation at the

¹ His wife. ² His eldest son. ³ Brother-in-law.

point where the regulars charged bayonets and where the militia began their fire. The rest was irregular and unnecessary, for the crowd was back in the woods, a fence between them and the street. There was some cheering of the United States troops, and some halloos for Jeff Davis.

I hear all of Frost's command who would not take the oath of allegiance to the United States are prisoners at the arsenal. I suppose they will be held for the orders of the President. They were mostly composed of young men who doubtless were secessionists. Frost is a New-Yorker, was a graduate of West Point, served some years in the army. . . . He was encamped by order of the Governor; and this brings up the old question of State and United States authority. We cannot have two kings: one is enough; and of the two the United States must prevail. But in all the South, and even here, there are plenty who think the State is their king. As ever, yours affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

OFFICE ST. LOUIS R. R. CO.,
ST. LOUIS, May 20, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . The greatest difficulty in the problem now before the country is not to conquer, but so to conquer as to impress upon the real men of the South a respect for their conquerors. If Memphis be taken, and the army move on South, the vindictive feeling left behind would again close the river. And here in Missouri it would be easy enough to take Jefferson City, Lexington, and any other point, but the moment they are left to themselves the people would resume their hatred. It is for this reason that I deem regulars the only species of force that should be used for invasion. I take it for granted that Virginia will be attacked with great force this summer, and that the great problem of the war—the Mississippi—will be reserved for the next winter. . . .

In the war on which we are now entering paper soldiers won't do. McClellan is naturally a superior man, and has had the finest opportunities in Mexico and Europe. Even his seniors admit his qualifications. Yours affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

A COLONELCY PREFERRED TO A
BRIGADIERSHIP.

OFFICE ST. LOUIS R. R. CO.,
ST. LOUIS, May 22, 1861.

MY DEAR BROTHER: I received your despatch last evening stating I would be appointed colonel of one of the new 3-battalion regiments. This was, I suppose, an answer to my own despatch to the Adjutant-general asking if such would be the case. The fact is, so many persons had written to me and spoken

to me, all asserting they had seen or heard I was to have one of the new regiments, that I thought the letter to me had been misdirected or miscarried. . . . I shall promptly accept the colonelcy when received, and think I can organize and prepare a regiment as quick as anybody. I prefer this to a Brigadier in the militia, for I have no political ambition, and have very naturally more confidence in regulars than militia. Not that they are better, braver, or more patriotic, but because *I know* the people will submit with better grace to them than to militia of any particular locality. . . .

I think Missouri has subsided into a quiescent state. There will be no attempting to execute the obnoxious and unconstitutional militia law. A prompt move on Little Rock from here and Cairo and recapture of Fort Smith from Kansas would hold Arkansas in check—a movement which could be made simultaneous with that on Richmond. I hope no men or time will be wasted on Norfolk; it is to one side and unimportant. The capture of Richmond would be fatal to Virginia, and the occupation of Cumberland, Hagerstown, and Frederick by the Pennsylvanians, whilst troops threatened Winchester from Washington, would make the further occupation of Harper's Ferry useless. But, after all, the Mississippi is the great problem of the Civil War, and will require large forces and good troops. Affectionately your brother,

W. T. SHERMAN.

On May 14, General Sherman received a despatch from his brother Charles in Washington, telling him of his appointment as colonel of the 13th Regular Infantry, and that he was wanted in Washington at once.

The following letter was written while he was preparing to leave St. Louis for Washington, and the next one (June 8) from Pittsburg on his way East.

OFFICE ST. LOUIS R. R. CO.,
ST. LOUIS, May 24, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER: I have already written you so much that more would be a bore. Yours of the 21st is at hand, and I can act with promptness and sufficient vigor when the occasion arises. You all overrate my powers and ability, and may place me in a position above my merits, a worse step than below. Really I do not conceive myself qualified for Quartermaster-general or Major-general. To attain either station I would prefer a previous schooling with large masses of troops in the field—one which I lost in the Mexican War by going to California. The only possible reason that would induce me to accept high position would be to prevent its falling into incompetent hands. The magnitude of interest at issue now will admit of no experiments. . . .

I have still my saddle, sword, sash, and some

articles of uniform which will come into immediate play. But look out—I want the regular army and not the 3-year men. . . . Yours affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN.

A FORECAST OF GENERAL THOMAS'S ABILITY TO COMMAND.

PITTSBURG, Sunday, June 8, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . Should I on my arrival find the Secretary determined to go outside the army, and should he make advances to me, of course I shall accept. In like manner if he tenders me a brigade I will [do] my best, or if a colonely—ditto. I still feel that it is wrong to ask for anything, and prefer that they should make their own choice of this position for me. You are with General Patterson. There are two A. No. 1 men there—George H. Thomas, Colonel 2d Cavalry, and Captain Sykes, 3d Infantry. Mention my name to both, and say to them that I wish them all success they aspire to; and if in the varying chances of war I should ever be so placed, I would name such as them for high places. But Thomas is a Virginian from near Norfolk, and, say what we may, he must feel unpleasantly at leading an invading army. But if he says he will do it, I know he will do it well. He was never brilliant, but always cool, reliable, and steady, maybe a little slow. Sykes has in him some dashing qualities. . . . If possible I will try and see you in your new capacity of soldier before I make another distant break. If you please, you may telegraph to Mr. Chase simply that I have come to Washington on Taylor's call, but I cannot wait long, and if the Administration don't want my services, to say so at once emphatically. Yours affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN.

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER: At last the order is out, and I am Colonel 13th Infantry. I have been

(To be continued.)

asking for orders, and am this moment informed for the present, that inasmuch as Lieutenant-colonel Burbank may enlist my regiment, and as my personal services here are needed, I will forthwith consider myself on duty here attached to General Scott's staff as Inspector-general. I did not dream of this, but it really does well accord with my inclinations and peculiar nature. My duty will be to keep myself advised of the character and kind of men who are in military service here near Washington, and to report to General Scott in person. Porter can tell you what these duties will amount to. . . . I suppose you will soon be here, for from Colonel Burnside I hear [that] all of Patterson's army is on the Maryland side of the Potomac, and no possible movement will be attempted before Congress meets. . . . In haste, your brother,
W. T. SHERMAN.

General Sherman remained on duty with General Scott only ten days (June 20-30), and then was given command of one brigade of McDowell's army, which was to move from the defenses of Washington.

He assumed command June 30, and went to work at once to prepare his brigade for the general advance.

CAMP OPPOSITE GEORGETOWN,

July 16, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER: We start forth to-day, camp to-night at or near Vienna; to-morrow early we attack the enemy at or near Fairfax C. H., Germantown, and Centreville; thereabouts we will probably be till about Thursday, when movement of the whole force, some 35,000 men, on Manassas, turning the position by a wide circuit. You may expect to hear of us about Aquia Creek or Fredericksburg (secret absolute). . . .

If anything befall me, my pay is drawn to embrace June 30, and Ellen has full charge of all other interests. Good-by. Your brother,
W. T. SHERMAN.

THE NEW MEMBER OF THE CLUB.

I.



SOMETHING must have detained me that evening, since it was nearly midnight when I arrived at the club, and I hate to be so tardy as that, for some of our best members are married men now, who never stay out after one o'clock, or two at the very furthest. Besides, the supper is served at eleven,

and the first comers take all the pleasant little tables which line the walls of the grill-room, leaving for the belated arrivals only the large table which runs down the middle of the room.

As every one knows, ours is a club whose members mainly belong to the allied arts. Of course, now and then a millionaire manages to get elected by passing himself off as an art patron; but for the most part, the men one meets there are authors, actors, architects, and artists on canvas or in marble. So it is that the supper served at eleven every Saturday night,

LETTERS OF TWO BROTHERS.¹

PASSAGES FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF GENERAL AND SENATOR SHERMAN.

THE GLOOMY YEARS OF THE WAR.

NEEDS ON THE KENTUCKY LINE.



AFTER Bull Run, Sherman's brigade remained encamped at Fort Corcoran, near Washington. He was made a brigadier-general of volunteers, and in his next letters explains his transfer to the West. He was relieved of his command

by General Fitz-John Porter, and started for Cincinnati on one of the last days of August, to meet General Robert Anderson.

At this time John Sherman was in Ohio, and his letters from there to his brother require no explanation.

FORT CORCORAN, August 19, 1861.

MY DEAR BROTHER: . . . A few days since General Robert Anderson sent for me to meet him at Willard's. I found him with Senator Johnson, a Mr. Maynard, and several other members from Kentucky and Tennessee. They told me the President had resolved to send assistance to the Union men of Kentucky and Tennessee, that Anderson being a Kentuckian, to him was given the lead, and that he was allowed to select three brigadiers; that he had chosen me first and Burnside and Thomas next. The President agreed, but McClellan would not spare me till the danger in his front was lessened. It was then agreed to wait a week, when, if nothing happens here, I am to be ordered into Kentucky. As I understand, we are to go there in person, mingle with the people, satisfy ourselves of their purpose to oppose the Southern Confederacy, and then to assist in the organization there of a force adequate to the end in view, that when Kentucky is assured in her allegiance we then push into East Tennessee. I feel well satisfied that unless Kentucky and Tennessee remain in our Union it is a doubtful question whether the Federal Government can restore the old Union. . . .

There is no time to be lost, and I will not spare my individual efforts, though I still feel as one groping in the dark. Slowly but surely the public is realizing what I knew all the time

— the strong vindictive feeling of the whole South. Your brother, W. T. SHERMAN.

CINCINNATI, September 9, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER: I am still here. General A— went quietly over to Frankfort last Thursday, and I hear from him that things are progressing favorably. The time seems to have passed in this country when the voice of the People is considered the voice of God. Notwithstanding the large vote for the Union, and the controlling majority in the Legislature, there is still a doubt whether that State (Kentucky) will go for the Union. . . .

I think it of vast importance, and that Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois must sooner or later arm every inhabitant, and the sooner the better. I hardly apprehend that Beauregard can succeed in getting Washington, but should he, it will be worse to us than Manassas; but supposing he falls back, he will first try to overwhelm Rosecrans in Western Virginia and then look to Tennessee. We ought to have here a well-appointed army of a hundred thousand men.² I don't see where they are to come from, but this is the great center. I still think the Mississippi will be the grand field of operations. Memphis ought to be taken in October, even if we have to fortify and hold it a year. I think it of more importance than Richmond. It may be that the Southern leaders have made such tremendous calls upon their people and resources that if we remain on the defense they will exhaust themselves; but upon the first manifest symptoms of such a result, we should follow it up. Here we have no means of offense and but little of defense, and if you are full of zeal you could not do better than to raise your voice to call the young and middle-aged men of Ohio to arms. If they can't get muskets, then let them get such arms as can be gathered together, or if not that, then let them organize in companies in every township, and be ready to collect together and move on short notice. I am amazed to see here and every-

¹ It should be explained that the letters printed here are only a part of the correspondence of General and Senator Sherman, which is to appear later in book form.—EDITOR.

² On page 231 of his "Memoirs," General Sherman Vol. XLV.—56.

describes how on October 11, 1861, he made his famous suggestion (turned to his great injury) to Secretary Cameron, that 60,000 troops were needed on that line for defense, and 200,000 for offense. See also his letter herewith dated October 5.

where such apparent indifference when all know that rebels threaten the capital and are creeping around us in Missouri and Kansas. If they are united, and we disunited or indifferent, they will succeed. I knew this reaction was natural and to be expected, but it is none the less to be deplored. . . . Affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, September 12, 1861.

MY DEAR BROTHER: Enlistments in this part of the State now go on rapidly. . . . If, however, voluntary enlistments fail, then drafting must be resorted to. It is the fairest and best mode, for it makes all classes contribute alike.

I have been at a loss what to do with myself this fall. I dislike the idea of being idle in these stirring times. My relations with Governor Dennison are not such as will justify me in asking the organization of a regiment, and I will not undertake it without *carte blanche* as to officers. I notice from the papers that he has adopted somewhat such a plan of enlistment as I suggested to him. If he asks me to assist to execute it I will do so at once and actively, but I presume he will not do so. As to making speeches through the State, it is very irksome. And this is not all. Speeches from me, unless I enlist or were in the service myself, will not come with a good grace. My speeches would be regarded as political. There is no disposition this fall to gather in mass-meetings to hear speeches. It is probable that I shall take some part in the canvass for the Union ticket, but after the election I will go to Washington and seek some active employment until after Congress meets. . . . JOHN SHERMAN.

[LETTER DICTATED.]

MANSFIELD, OHIO, September 28, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER: I am at last engaged in recruiting. I have received an order from Governor Dennison to raise two regiments of infantry, one squadron of cavalry, and a battery of artillery, and I am now hard at work executing the order. I want a good colonel, an educated, brave, reliable officer. I must have him. The order of the Governor gives me the utmost latitude in the selection of the officers of this force, and I am determined it shall be well commanded if proper officers can be obtained. Can you name me one as major, and one as lieutenant-colonel? They will receive promotion upon the meeting of Congress, when I shall resign the nominal place of Colonel. In the multiplicity of your important duties I trust you can name such officers as I wish. I would like it all the better if one at least of them may be a Kentuckian, as this force is intended for Kentucky. Affectionately, your brother, J. S.

MULDRAUGH'S HILL, 40 miles from Louisville,
October 5, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I'm afraid you are too late to save Kentucky. The young, active element is all secession; the older stay-at-homes are for union and peace, but they will not take part. In the mean time the Southern Confederacy, looking forward to this very condition of things, has armies organized, equipped, etc., and has the railroads so disposed that by concentration they can overwhelm any part. . . . It will require near one hundred thousand men in Kentucky, and where they are to come from I don't know. . . .

If the Confederates take St. Louis and get Kentucky this winter, you will be far more embarrassed than if Washington had fallen into their possession, as whatever nation gets the control of the Ohio, Mississippi, and Missouri rivers will control the Continent. This they know, and for this they will labor. You of the North never fully appreciated the energy of the South. My health is good, but, as you perceive I am far from easy about the fate of Kentucky. Affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-general.

On the 8th of October, 1861, General Anderson, worn out by the cares of his position, resigned, and General Sherman naturally was forced into the command until he could be relieved. He continued in it until the middle of November, when General Don Carlos Buell was sent to relieve him, and Sherman was ordered to report to General H. W. Halleck, then in command in Missouri. In a letter to Adjutant-general Lorenzo Thomas, dated Louisville, October 22, General Sherman wrote:

You know my views, that this great center of our field was too weak, far too weak, and I have begged and implored till I dare not say more.

The two following letters show clearly how weak General Sherman considered his position, and how hard he tried to better it by acquiring more men and better arms.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY,
October 26, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER: I am just in receipt of your letter, and am glad the Secretary remembered my remark that to accomplish the only purposes for which Kentucky can be used there should be a force here of 200,000 men. My force is ridiculously small, and I hate to augment it by dribbles. Look at the facts; we know the South is all armed and prepared and must have Kentucky—for it they will struggle. They see us undervaluing their force. They have already invaded the State with five times

my forces, and are gradually preparing for an onset. I know their leaders and their designs, and feel that I am to be sacrificed. The Western part of the State is now in their possession. They have about 6000 men in the Valley of the Big Sandy, 6000 or 7000 at Cumberland Gap and Ford, and I doubt not at least 35,000 in front of me, with nothing between us but Green River, now fordable, and about 23 miles of intervening country. Indiana is devoid of arms, so is Ohio and the Northwest, and to my crying demand for arms they send me a few hundred of condemned European muskets, whilst the people ask for rifles. We have called on the Kentuckians to form regiments, and they are responding slowly to be sure, but when they come for arms I can only answer I have none, or such as they won't touch. I tell you, and warn you of the danger so far as my power goes, I cannot promise to prevent the enemy reaching the Ohio River at a hundred different points. Our camps are full of their spies, and the people here all prefer their Southern connections. . . . I am compelled to distribute them [the troops] on three weak lines, all dependent on railroads which may at any moment be interrupted; also on telegraphs which are daily cut. A reverse to any one of these might be fatal to all, yet I cannot do otherwise. The forces up Sandy must be driven or threatened from the direction of Paris. Those at Cumberland Gap from [Camp] Dick Robinson, and those over Green River from here; this is the most important point and the most in danger. The Southern army wants it with its mills, foundries, shops, and all the affairs of a city, besides the control of the river. . . .

Yours, W. T. SHERMAN.

It is interesting to remember how completely the future carried out General Sherman's prediction with regard to the Kentucky line. In 1863 Burnside was cornered there, as Sherman always believed his successor must be, and Sherman was sent to his relief. After being relieved of his command in Kentucky by General Buell, and reporting to Halleck in St. Louis, General Sherman went to his old home in Lancaster, Ohio, for a short leave, and on his return was sent to take command of the camp of instruction at Benton Barracks, near St. Louis, and to get the troops there into condition for immediate use. On January 9, 1862, he writes:

. . . By giving up command in Kentucky I acknowledged my inability to manage the case, and I do think Buell can manage better than I could, and if he succeeds he will deserve all honor, but I do think it is wrong to push him on that line, whilst the army at Washington remains comparatively inert. . . .

Now Halleck has in Missouri about 80,000 men on paper, and there are not in an organ-

ized shape more than 10,000 or 20,000 opposed to him, yet the country is full of Secessionists, and it takes all his command to watch them. This is an element which politicians have never given full credit to. These local Secessionists are really more dangerous than if assembled in one or more bodies, for then they could be traced out and found, whereas now they are scattered on farms and are very peaceable, but when a bridge is to be burned they are about. . . . Affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN.

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP OF INSTRUCTION,
BENTON BARRACKS (near St. Louis, Mo.),
Feb. 3, 1862.

DEAR BROTHER. . . . I am still here at the Barracks, doing my best to organize, equip, and prepare regiments for the coming spring. . . .

I believe an attempt will be made on the forts on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers in coöperation with Buell, who finds with his 120,000 men he still needs help. I rather think they will come up to my figures yet. Halleck is expected to send them from 30,000 to 50,000 men. Had this been done early and promptly, the Confederates could not have made Bowling Green and Columbus next to impregnable. Until these places are reduced it will not do to advance far into Tennessee, and I doubt if it will be done. East Tennessee cannot exercise much influence on the final result. West Tennessee is more important, as without the navigation of the Mississippi all commercial interests will lean to the Southern cause. If the Southern Confederacy can control the navigation of the Lower Mississippi, and European nations from the mouths of the Mississippi, what can Missouri and Kentucky do? These are, however, questions for the future. . . . Affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 15, 1862.

DEAR BROTHER. I was infinitely rejoiced to see in this morning's paper the announcement that you were to command at Cairo. I sincerely hope it is true. If so, you will have a noble opportunity to answer those who have belied you. Take my advice: be hopeful, cheerful, polite to everybody, even a newspaper reporter. They are, in the main, clever, intelligent men, a little too pressing in their vocation.

Above all things be hopeful and push ahead. Active, bold, prompt, vigorous action is now demanded. McClellan is dead in the estimation of even military men. . . .

Do not the cheers with which our gunboats were received in Tennessee and Alabama show you what I have always contended, that this rebellion is a political one, managed by "Southern gentlemen" and not grounded in the uni-

versal assent of the people? [Andrew] Johnson has now more adherents in Tennessee than Jeff Davis. Let our leading army officers who have been educated to defend the nation catch the spirit of our people, a generous, hopeful, self-sacrificing spirit. Let them go ahead, and you will find the Union restored and strengthened by its trials. . . . Affectionately yours,
JOHN SHERMAN.

While General Sherman was in command of the camp of instruction at Benton Barracks, the movement up the Tennessee began. Grant and Foote took Fort Henry. Before Fort Donelson was taken, Sherman was ordered to go at once to Paducah, Ky., to take command of that post and expedite the operations up the Tennessee and Cumberland. The day after his arrival [February 16] there came the news of the capture of Fort Donelson.

On February 23, General Sherman wrote from Paducah, Ky.:

Don't get to war with McClellan. You mistake him if you underrate him. He must begin to move soon, and I think he will. If he can threaten Richmond and cause Johnston to fall back from Manassas, he will relieve the capital, which is the reason why foreign governments talk of acknowledging the Southern Independence.

THE QUESTION OF SURPRISE AT SHILOH.

SENATE CHAMBER, WASHINGTON CITY,
April 20, 1862.

DEAR BROTHER: I heartily and with great pride in you congratulate you on your escape and for the high honor you won in the battle of the 7th [6th] and the 8th [7th]. Cecilia¹ and I have watched with the most anxious interest your course, and have read every word that was accessible to us in regard to the battle. I need not say that it has been with the highest satisfaction. The official reports of Generals Halleck and Grant leave nothing to desire except that the information as to your wound in the hand is indefinite. From your subsequent operations I infer it is not so serious as to disable you. It was a fearful battle, and I cannot yet conceive how a general rout was avoided. The first accounts gave an exaggerated account of the surprise, of whole regiments killed or captured in their tents, and of inexcusable carelessness in guarding against surprise. More recent accounts modify the extent of the surprise, but still there is an impression that sufficient care was not taken; that pickets were not far enough advanced or of sufficient force, and that General Grant should have been nearer his command. I sincerely hope he will be relieved from all blame.

¹ John Sherman's wife.

The general tone of public sentiment is very hopeful.

This arises partly from the changed tone of our foreign news, and perhaps from the comparative ease of money matters under our enormous expenditures.

The great drawback is on account of McClellan's position. Military men of the highest character, as well as nearly all civilians, think he is in a position from which he cannot retreat, and where he must fight under very great disadvantage. Still the general feeling is hopeful of the success of our arms and the preservation of the Union. I still adhere to my conviction that we shall demonstrate the strength, unity and prosperity of a Republican Government for fifty years to come. Notwithstanding your reluctance to mingle in the stirring events of the time it will be your fate to do so, and I have entire confidence that it will be with success and distinction. Affectionately yours,
JOHN SHERMAN.

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP SHILOH,
April 22, 1862.

DEAR BROTHER: My hand is still very sore, but I am able to write some. The newspapers came back to us with accounts of our battle of the 6th and 7th inst., as usual made by people who ran away and had to excuse their cowardice by charging bad management on the part of leaders. I see that we were surprised, that our men were bayoneted in their tents, that officers had not had breakfast, etc. This is all simply false. The attack did not begin until 7:45 A.M. All but the worthless cowards had had breakfast. Not a man was bayoneted in or near his tent. Indeed our brigade surgeon Hartshorn has not yet seen a single bayonet wound on a living or dead subject. The regiments that professed to have been surprised lost no officers at all, and of the two that first broke in my division, the 53d and 57th Ohio, the 53d lost no officers and only 7 men, the 57th 2 officers and 7 men. Some of my Ohio regiments that did fight well lost as many as 49 and 34, but not a bayonet, sword, or knife wound, all cannon and musket ball. Those of my brigade held our original position from 7:45 A.M., when the attack began, until 10:10 A.M., when the enemy had passed my left and got artillery to enfilade my line, when I ordered them to fall back. We held our second position until 4 P.M., and then fell back without opposition to the third and last position, more than a mile from the river.

As to surprise, we had constant skirmishes with the enemy's cavalry all the week before, and I had strong guards out in front of each brigade, which guards were driven in on the morning of the battle, but before the enemy

came within cannon-range of my position every regiment was under arms at the post I had previously assigned to them. The cavalry was saddled and artillery harnessed up, unlimbered, and commenced firing as soon as we could see anything to fire at. . . . The enemy did not carry either of my roads until he had driven Prentiss and got in on my left. . . .

Whether we should have been on this or that side of the Tennessee River is not my business. I did not apprehend an attack from Beauregard, because I thought then and think now he would have done better if he could have chosen ground as far back from our stores as possible. We are bound to attack him, and had we run out of cartridges or stores or got stampeded twenty miles back from the Tennessee the result would have been different from now. But we knew the enemy was in our front, but in what form we could not tell, and I was always ready for an attack. I am out of all patience that our people should prefer to believe the horrid stories of butchery, ridiculous in themselves, gotten up by cowards to cover their shame, than the plain natural reports of the officers who are responsible, and who saw what they describe. My report, with all the subordinate reports of brigadiers and colonels, with lists of killed and wounded and missing, went to General Grant on the 11th.

The enemy is still in our front; we can get a fight the hour and minute we want it. Halleck, Buell, Grant, all in authority are now here and responsibility cannot be shifted. The common soldiers and subordinates ran away, and now want to blame the commanders. . . . Your affectionate brother, W. T. SHERMAN.

CAMP 8 MILES FRONT OF CORINTH, May 7, 1862.
MY DEAR BROTHER. . . . The scoundrels who fled their ranks and left about half their number to do their work have succeeded in establishing the story of surprise, stuck with bayonets and swords in their tents, and all that stuff.

They were surprised, astonished, and disgusted at the utter want of respect for life on the part of the Confederates, whom they have been taught to regard as inferior to them, and were surprised to see them approach with banners fluttering, bayonets glistening, and lines dressed on the center. It was a beautiful and dreadful sight, and I was prepared and have freely overlooked the fact that many wilted and fled, but, gradually recovering, rejoined our ranks. But those who did not recover their astonishment had to cast about for a legitimate excuse, and the cheapest one was to accuse their officers; and, strange to say, this story is believed before ours who fought two whole days. . . .

Every battery (3) was harnessed up in position before called on to fire, and the cavalry—only

350 in my whole division—was in the saddle at daylight, and the attack did not begin until the sun was two hours high. . . .

Prentiss was not surprised, for I sent him word an hour before the enemy's infantry began to appear, and he was not made prisoner until after 3 P. M. . . .

I confess I did not think Beauregard would abandon his railroads to attack us on our base, when he knew that by waiting a short time we would be forced to advance, when he would most assuredly have been beaten.

I am now on the extreme right, and we are in contact with the enemy's pickets. Some fierce struggle must soon follow, but that the war is ended or even fairly begun I do not believe. Affectionately your brother, W. T. SHERMAN.

WASHINGTON CITY, May 10, 1862.

MY DEAR BROTHER: I received your recent letter, in which you mention your position on the morning of Sunday very opportunely.

It arrived on the morning I had to make a speech on Ohio volunteers. . . . You will see from Harlan's remarks there is much feeling against Grant, and I try to defend him, but with little success. . . .

As to your personal position you need not fear. Halleck's opinion about your action on Sunday is the opinion of the country. You are as likely to be abused on my account as on your own. I am so accustomed to the storms of factious opposition as to be perfectly serene under it. I hope you will become so. Affectionately,
JOHN SHERMAN.

CAMP BEFORE CORINTH, HEADQUARTERS
5TH DIVISION, May 12, 1862.

MY DEAR BROTHER. . . . I was gratified on Monday when I came in contact with my old Kentucky command. They gathered around me, and were evidently pleased to meet me again, officers and men. I think Mr. Lincoln is a pure-minded, honest, and good man. I have all faith in him. . . .

I think it is a great mistake to stop enlistments. There may be enough soldiers on paper, but not enough in fact. My aggregate, present and absent, is 10,452. Present for duty, 5298; absent sick, 2557; absent wounded, 855. The rest are on various detached duties, as teamsters or hospital attendants, embracing about 600 sick in camp. About this proportion will run through the whole army. I have not really one thorough soldier in my command. They are all green and raw. . . .

Last evening I had to post my own pickets and come under the fire of the enemy's pickets. Came near being hit. Of course being mounted and ahead, I and staff always get an undue share of attention.

I made my official report of the battle of the 6th and 7th [Shiloh] on the 11th of April, sent it to Grant, and he to Halleck. It has not been published, and it is none of my business. An officer ought not to publish anything. His report is to the Government, may contain confidential matter, and the War Department alone should have the discretion or not, according to the interests of Government. . . .

Grant had been expecting Buell a whole week before he arrived. We all knew the enemy was in our front, but we had to guess at his purpose. Now that it is known, all are prophets; but before we were supposed to be a vast aggressive force sent by an intelligent government to invade the South, and for us to have been nervous on the subject of attack would have indicated weakness. Beauregard then performed the very thing which Johnston should have done in Kentucky last October. My force was divided, he could have interposed his, attacked McCook at Mobile and Thomas at London, and would have defeated us with perfect ease. The Secessionists would then have had Kentucky and Mobile both. Why he did not is a mystery to me. And Buckner told me that Johnston's neglect on that occasion was so galling to him that he made him give a written order not to attempt to manoeuvre. . . . Affectionately yours, W. T. SHERMAN.

NOT IN PERFECT ACCORD POLITICALLY.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, August 24, 1862.

DEAR BROTHER: Your letter of August 13, with inclosures, was received. I have read carefully your general orders inclosed, and also your order on the employment of negroes. I see no objection to the latter, except the doubt and delay caused by postponing the pay of negroes until the courts determine their freedom. As the act securing their freedom is a military rule, you ought to presume their freedom until the contrary is shown, and pay them accordingly. . . .

You can form no conception of the change of public opinion here as to the negro question. Men of all parties who now appreciate the magnitude of the contest and who are determined to preserve the unity of the Government at all hazards, agree that we must seek the aid and make it the interest of the negroes to help us. Nothing but our party divisions and our natural prejudice of caste has kept us from using them as *allies* in the war, to be used for all purposes in which they can advance the cause of the country. Obedience and protection must go together. When rebels take up arms, not only refuse obedience, but resist by force, they have no right to ask protection in any way. And especially that protection should not extend

to a local right inconsistent with the general spirit of our laws, and the existence of which has been from the beginning the chief element of discord in the country. I am prepared, for one, to meet the broad issue of universal emancipation. . . .

By the way, the only criticism I notice of your management in Memphis is your leniency to the rebels. I inclose you an extract. I take it that most of these complaints are groundless, but you perceive from it the point upon which public opinion rests. The energy and bitterness which they have infused into the contest must be met with energy and determination. . . . Such is not only the lesson of history, the dictate of policy, but it is the general popular sentiment. I know you care very little for the latter. . . . It is sometimes passionate, hasty, and intemperate, but after a little fluctuation it settles very near the true line. You notice that Frémont, Butler, Mitchel, Turchin, and Cochrane are popular, while Buell, Thomas, McClellan, and others are not. It is not for military merit, for most persons concede the inferiority in many respects of the officers first named, but it is because these officers agree with and act upon the popular idea. . . .

Since my return I have spent most of my time in my library. I have always felt that my knowledge of American politics was rather the superficial view of the politician, and not accurate enough for the position assigned me. I therefore read and study more and speak less than usual. . . .

We all wait with intense anxiety the events impending in Virginia. We all fear results for a month to come. Now is the chance for the rebels. Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

On July 16, Halleck, who had just been ordered to the East to succeed McClellan, sent General Sherman a despatch telling him that Grant was to succeed to his [Halleck's] command, and ordering Sherman to Memphis. Sherman reached Memphis July 21, and immediately took command, giving his time to the discipline and drill of his two divisions, and to the administration of civil affairs.

MEMPHIS, Sept. 22, 1862.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . Troops are moving up through Arkansas from Missouri. It looks as though they want to swap countries with us. It is about time the North understood the truth that the entire South, man, woman, and child, is against us, armed and determined. It will call for a million men for several years to put them down. They are more confident than ever; none seem to doubt their independence, but some hope to conquer the Northwest. My opinion is, there never can be peace and we must fight it out. I guess you now see how,

from the very first, I argued that you all underestimated the task. None of you would admit for a moment that after a year's fighting the enemy would still threaten Washington, Cincinnati, and St. Louis. We ought to hold fast to the Mississippi as a great base of operations. I would regard the loss of St. Louis as more fatal to our future success than the capture of Harrisburg and Philadelphia. . . . You doubtless, like most Americans, attribute our want of success to bad generals. I do not. With us you insist the boys, the soldiers, govern. They must have this or that, or will cry down their leaders in the newspapers, so no general can achieve much. They fight or run as they please, and of course it is the general's fault. Until this is cured, you must not look for success. Affectionately yours,

W. T. SHERMAN.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, Sept. 23, 1862.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . As one of the bad signs I regret to notice so many quarrels between officers. . . . The feeling among the people is general that the regular officers are indisposed to treat with decent civility those who, like most of the great military men of history, are educated in the field rather than in the school. And it is feared that habits of education and association make them feel indifferent to the success of the war—fighting rather from a pride of duty than from an earnest conviction that the rebellion must be put down with energy. Since Halleck went to Washington every movement is left to him absolutely. No interference or even advice is tendered. He has chosen his own officers, and if he fails I see nothing left but for the people to resort to such desperate means as the French and English did in their revolutions.

I am rejoiced that you have been able to keep out of the adversities that have befallen us. Your course in Memphis is judicious. Your speech I can heartily indorse. I hope you can maintain yourself at Memphis until relieved, and I have no doubt you will fill an honorable place in the history of our times. By the way, I received within a day or two a letter from a gentleman of the highest political status, containing this passage: "Within the last few days I heard an officer say he heard your brother the General abuse you roundly at Corinth as one of the blank abolitionists who had brought on the war, and that he was ashamed to own you as a brother." I have no doubt the officer said this, but I knew you did not, and so contradicted it with decided emphasis. I only repeat it now to show you how persistently efforts are being made to separate the class of high regular officers to which you belong from civilians. Whenever that separation is effected

all important commands will gradually be transferred to such officers as Banks, Sigel, Morgan, Nelson, and to such regular officers as show a sympathy with the radical faction, as Hunter, Frémont, and Doubleday. I earnestly deprecate all such tendencies. I want the war conducted regularly according to the tenets of civilized warfare. I prefer regular officers, and scarcely ever criticize them, and never in public; but if the time shall come when emancipation of blacks and colonization of whites is necessary in order to preserve the unity of this country, then I would prefer a fanatic like John Brown to lead our armies and an Abolitionist like Chase, with brains and energy, to guide our counsels. Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

MEMPHIS, Oct. 1, 1862.

DEAR BROTHER. . . . I rather think you now agree with me that this is no common war, that it was not going to end in a few months or a few years. For after eighteen months' war the enemy is actually united, armed, and determined, with powerful forces, well handled, disciplined, and commanded, on the Potomac, the Ohio, and Missouri. You must now see that I was right in not seeking prominence at the outset. I knew and know yet that the Northern people have to unlearn all their experience of the past thirty years and be born again before they will see the truth. . . . Everybody thought I exaggerated the dangers, so I have no right to an opinion; but I rather think many now see the character of the war in which we are engaged. I don't see the end, or the beginning of the end, but suppose we must prevail or perish. I don't believe that two nations can exist within our old limits, and, therefore, that war is on us, and we must fight it out. . . .

When anybody tells you that I ever doubted your honesty and patriotism, tell him he says false. I may have said you were a politician, and that we differed widely in the origin of this war, but that being in it we fully agreed that it must be fought out. But you have more faith than I in the people. They are not infallible. People may err as much as men, as individuals, and whole communities may err. Can the people of the North be right and the South too? One of the peoples must be wrong. . . . Your brother,

W. T. SHERMAN.

AFTER THE ELECTIONS IN 1862.

THE following letter from John Sherman was written just after the autumn elections, which resulted so disastrously to the Republican party.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, Nov. 16, 1862.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . Two matters now excite attention among politicians: What is the

cause and what will be the effect of the recent elections; and what are we to do about our depreciated paper money? No doubt many causes conspired to defeat the Union party. The two I will name were the most influential, and yet the least will be said about them.

The first is that the Republican organization was voluntarily abandoned by the President and his leading followers, and a no-party Union was formed to run against an old, well-drilled party organization. This was simply ridiculous. It was as if you would disband your army organization because it was tyrannical, and substitute the temporary enthusiasm of masses to fight regular armies. Political as well as military organization is necessary to success. Ward meetings, committees, conventions, party cries are just as necessary in politics as drills, reviews, etc., are in war; so the Republicans have found out. If they have the wisdom to throw overboard the old debris that joined them in the Union movement, they will succeed. If not, they are doomed.

The other prominent reason for defeat is, the people were dissatisfied at the conduct and results of the war. The slow movements on the Potomac and, worse still, in Kentucky dissatisfied and discouraged people. It was a little singular that the Democrats, some of whom opposed the war, should reap the benefit of this feeling, but such is the fate of parties. Lincoln was a Republican. He put and kept in these slow generals, and we will be punished for it by having an organized opposition limiting appropriations. No doubt the wanton and unnecessary use of the power to arrest without trial, and the ill-timed proclamation, contributed to the general result. The other matter I allude to is demanding careful consideration. As it is my line of official duty, I have formed certain theories, which may be all wrong, but as they are the result of reflection I will act upon them. My remedy for paper money is by taxation to destroy the banks and confine the issue to Government paper. Let this [be the] only issue, as it is found to be difficult to negotiate the bonds of the Government. As a matter of course, there will a time come when this or any scheme of paper money will lead to bankruptcy, but that is the result of war, not of any particular plan of finance. I watch your course closely and take great interest and pride in your success. Affectionately your brother,

JOHN SHERMAN.

MEMPHIS, Nov. 24, 1862.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . The late elections don't disturb me a particle. The people have so long been accustomed to think they could accomplish anything by a vote, that they still think so; but now a vote is nothing more than

a change, and will produce no effect. The war might have been staved off a few years, or the issue might have been made up more clearly, or the first enthusiasm of the country might have been better taken advantage of, but these are now all passed, and faultfinding will do no good. We are involved in a war that will try the sincerity of all our professions of endurance, courage, and patriotism. Leaders will, of course, be killed off by the score. Thousands will perish by the bullet or sickness, but war must go on — it can't be stopped. The North must rule, or submit to degradation and insult forever more. The war must now be fought out. The President, Congress, no earthly power, can stop it without absolute submission. . . . Yours affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

REACHING OUT FOR VICKSBURG.

GENERAL SHERMAN sent to his brother copies of the orders he received from Grant before his [Sherman's] attack on Vicksburg, and also the following remarks, which have never been published, and which were written by him in response to the severe criticisms of the press after the failure of his attempt.

I put the division of M. L. Smith in motion the next day (9th), and in the three succeeding days we marched into Memphis, arriving there the 12th. Forthwith sent special aids to Helena, to which point Curtis's forces detached to Grenada had returned to Columbus, Ky.; communicated daily to General Grant progress made, and fixed the 18th to embark. I got some boats in Memphis, loaded them with ammunition, provisions, and forage in advance, calculating for 30,000 men for forty days. I reported promptly the fact that by combining the Memphis and Helena forces, and deducting the garrisons ordered, I could not make up more than 30,000 men. I reported the same fact to Halleck. I could not get the boats to embark at Memphis until the 20th and at Helena the 22d, but I had appointed Christmas day to reach the mouth of the Yazoo, and did it, detaching portions on my way down to break the very important railroad leading from Vicksburg to Texas; finished out 100 miles to Monroe, La., and running three trains a day. Arrived at the mouth of the Yazoo, I met all the navy officers who had been running up and down for months. All agreed we could not land at Haynes' Bluff on account of the batteries and torpedoes. The only practicable landing-place where we could emerge was at or near Johnson's plantation. All agreed on this, but no one knew of the road or roads leading back to Vicksburg, save that there had been roads, and the distance was seven miles.

I examined all the maps, questioned all the officers and negroes, and then announced, in orders, the time, place, and manner of landing, marching, and fighting. Grant had been advised of all my movements, and his orders were "as soon as possible," naming to me the 18th. I had no reason to doubt that he would soon be heard of. I once did hear from a negro that the Yankees had got to Yazoo City. Had that been true, we could have succeeded. Same of Banks coming up. My instructions never contemplated my taking Vicksburg alone. It was ridiculous, but I supposed every hour and minute I might hear Grant's guns to the north and Banks's south. Grant was, it appears, by rain and the acts of the enemy, compelled to fall back of where I had left him, and had no means of sending me word. I urged the attack because, from the masses of the enemy I saw, and the sounds of cars coming twenty and thirty times a day, I felt the enemy was receiving large reinforcements. I know the attack was made on the best point, and those who say otherwise don't know the ground. I do, having examined each spot in person by night and day. On the point of the real attack, the head of the Chickasaw Bayou, I had assembled all of Morgan's and Steele's divisions,—more than half my whole force,—and as many men as could be assembled on that ground. The other divisions at the same time also were actually engaged, though Morgan and Blair did not think so because they could not see and hear it, but I did. . . .

It is not so that the troops were injured by my management. They were reëmbarked as soon as such a thing could be done. We went by Milliken's Bend to Arkansas Post, where as usual I had to lead, and back again here, before Banks can be heard of or Grant's troops come up even by water. Grant is now here in command, well satisfied that I fulfilled his orders to the letter, regretting only that he was unable to coöperate until too late.

Yours,
SHERMAN.

MEMPHIS, Dec. 20, 1862.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . The great evil is absenteeism, which is real desertion, and should be punished with death. Of course I would have the wounded and sick well cared for, but the sick-list, real and feigned, is fearful. More than one half the paper army is not in the enemy's country, and whilst the actual regiments present for duty are in arrears of pay and favor, sick and discharged men are carefully paid and provided for. Unite with others and discriminate in favor of the officers and soldiers who are with their companies. The "absent and sick" should receive half pay, because of the advan-

tages they receive of fine hospitals and quiet residence at home. The "absent without leave" should be treated as deserters, and in no event receive a dollar's pay, clothing, or anything else. In course of time we may get an army. Finance is very important, but no use of discussing that now; we must fight it out, if it devastates the land and costs every cent of the North. . . .

I rise at 3 A. M. to finish up necessary business, and as usual write in haste. . . . I am very popular with the people here, and officers, and indeed with all my men. I don't seek popularity with the "sneaks and absentees" or the "dear people." . . . Affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN.

JOHN SHERMAN'S CONFIDENCE IN GENERAL BANKS.

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1863.

MY DEAR BROTHER: We are watching with the most eager interest the progress of your expedition. We all hope its success will brighten the gloom cast by operations here. If the Mississippi can only be opened and Texas and Arkansas detached, it will be a gleam of hope by which I can see the end of the war. Without an outlet to the South and West, and with such a blockade as we can easily keep up, the Southern Confederacy cannot exist. This will settle the cotton question, for Texas and Arkansas, with the free labor that can easily be thrown there, can grow enough cotton for the world—another ground of hope. Banks and yourself I regard as the best officers we have. . . . I have always believed in you, even when you were under a cloud. If you and Banks can act harmoniously and actively together, you are able to do more than any two men in this continent.

By the way, Banks is a reserved man, not from pride or over self-confidence, but from the defects of a limited education and from a sensitiveness this unconsciously gives him. The more you know him the better you will like him. He and I are warm friends. Became early attached in his famous contest for Speaker when I first entered Congress. Although new in political life, I stuck to him when his prospects were dark, and ever since there has been a sincere friendship between us, although we have not often met. This feeling I know will warm him toward you, and his abilities will excite your respect. I write this in anticipation of your meeting and having to coöperate. . . .

This Government has to be maintained, and I now look to you and Banks as the "men of promise." . . . I do not favor the Bankrupt Law, as you suppose, and I can't conceive how you got that idea, unless because I presented petitions. I am occasionally asked for letters

to you. I generally decline, except where refusal would wound a valued friend.

Affectionately yours, JOHN SHERMAN.

NAPOLEON, ARK.,
STEAMER "FOREST QUEEN,"
Jan. 17, 1863.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . On the supposition that Banks will have taken Port Hudson and reached Vicksburg, we start back for that place to-morrow. Of ourselves we cannot take Vicksburg. With Banks, and a fleet below us and a fleet above, we may make a desperate attempt, but Vicksburg is as strong as Gibraltar, and is of vital importance to the cause of the South. Of course they will fight desperately for it. We must do the same, for all are conscious that the real danger of this war—anarchy among our people—begins to dawn. The people of the North mistake widely if they suppose they can have peace now by opposing this war. . . .

I hope the politicians will not interfere with Halleck. You have driven off McClellan, and is Burnside any better? Buell is displaced. Is Rosecrans any faster? His victory at Murfreesboro is dearly bought. Let Halleck alone, and if things don't go to your liking, don't charge it to men but to the condition of things. Human power is limited, and you cannot appreciate the difficulty of molding into a homogeneous machine the discordant elements which go to make up our armies. A thousand dollars a day would not pay me for the trouble of managing a volunteer army. I never dreamed of so severe a test of my patriotism as being superseded by McClelland, and if I can keep down my tame [?] spirit and live, I will claim a virtue higher than Brutus'. I rarely see a newspaper, and am far behind the times; indeed, am not conscious that a Congress sits, though I know it must. Do think of the army, and try and give us the means to maintain discipline, prevent desertion, pillage and absenteeism. Under the present system of mere threats and no punishment, our armies melt away like snow before the sun. I doubt if Burnside, Rosecrans, Grant, and Curtis now have, all combined, 300,000 in their front ranks. This army, 30,000 a month ago, though reinforced by 2400 men, is now down to 24,000, though we have lost only 2500 in battle; sickness and detachments make a perfect stream to the rear. Blair has a brigade in my corps, and sees now the practices of war as contrasted with its theory, and could give some useful hints on these points. Affectionately, W. T. SHERMAN.

CAMP NEAR VICKSBURG,
Jan. 25, 1863.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . Unless you enact a law denying to all citizens between the ages of

eighteen and forty-five, who do not enlist and serve three years faithfully, the right of suffrage or to hold office after the war is over, you will have trouble. The army grows a good deal at the apathy of the nation, at home quiet, comfortable and happy, yet pushing them forward on all sorts of desperate expeditions. Newspapers can't now turn armies against their leaders. Every officer and soldier knows I pushed the attack on Vicksburg as far as they wanted to venture, and if others think differently, they naturally say, "Why not come down and try?" . . . Two years have passed, and the rebel flag still haunts our national capital—our armies enter the vast rebel territory, and the wave closes in behind, scarcely leaving a furrow mark behind. The utmost we can claim is that our enemy respects our power to do them physical harm more than they did at first, but as to loving us any more, it were idle even to claim it. Our armies are devastating the land, and it is sad to see the destruction that attends our progress—we cannot help it. Farms disappear, houses are burned and plundered, and every living animal killed and eaten. General officers make feeble efforts to stay the disorder, but it is idle. . . .

The South abounds in corn, cattle, and provisions, and their progress in manufacturing shoes and cloth for their soldiers is wonderful. They are as well supplied as we, and they have an abundance of the best cannon, arms, and ammunition. In long-range cannon they rather excel us, and their regiments are armed with the very best Enfield rifles and cartridges, put up at Glasgow, Liverpool, and their new Southern armories, and I still say they have now as large armies in the field as we. They give up cheerfully all they have. I still see no end, or even the beginning of the end. . . .

The early actors and heroes of the war will be swept away, and those who study its progress, its developments, and divine its course and destiny, will be most appreciated. We are in for the war, and must fight it out, cost what it may. As to making popularity out of it, it is simply ridiculous, and all who attempt it will be swept as chaff before the wind. . . . Your affectionate brother, W. T. SHERMAN.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
January 27, 1863.

DEAR BROTHER: The pressure of official duties here prevented me writing sooner, but I have kept a watchful eye on all your movements recently.

I have not the slightest hesitation in justifying every movement you have made. The newspapers are generally down on you, and will command the public attention to your prejudice, but intelligent persons do not fail to notice that not a specific allegation is made

against you. The authorities sustain your actions throughout. This is especially so as to the Secretary of War. I read your official report, and was very anxious to have it published. It would correct many errors, and would be a complete justification and explanation of many things not understood.

I asked General Halleck to allow me to publish it. He declined unless the Secretary of War consented, and said he would submit my application to the secretary. Afterward I saw the secretary, and he told me he had directed a copy of the report to be furnished for publication. I again called at Halleck's, and saw General Cullum, who objected to the publication of the report on various grounds.

After a full conversation with Cullum, I supposed I had satisfied him that it ought to be published, and he agreed to submit my reasons to Halleck, and ask a reconsideration. This morning I received a note from Halleck stating that as further operations would occur before Vicksburg, he did not deem it advisable to publish the report at present. Thus the matter ends. Cullum stated to me that there was no officer of the army who did not entirely justify your attack on Vicksburg under the circumstances as you supposed them to be. In the end you will be justified in public opinion.

Military matters look dark here in the Army of the Potomac. Burnside is relieved, and Hooker is in command. The entire army seems demoralized. Perhaps when it is ready to move it may be all right. A certain amount of dissatisfaction always will exist in an army. I was very glad to notice that you were popular with, and had the confidence of, your men. This is the case with but few officers. I deeply pity Porter.¹ . . .

If we recover from the folly of legislators, and the quarrels of our generals, it will be evidence of vitality remarkable in the history of any nation. I believe we will survive all these dangers, and I agree with you that no course is left for us but to fight it out. I cannot respect some of the constituted authorities, yet I will cordially support and aid them while they are authorized to administer the Government. Pray write me as often as you can. Affectionately yours,
JOHN SHERMAN.

THE PRESS AS AN ALLY OF THE ENEMY.

CAMP BEFORE VICKSBURG,
February 4, 1863.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I now know the secret of this last tirade against me personally. Of course newspaper correspondents regard me as the enemy of their class. I announced that all such accompanying the expedition were

¹ Fitz-John Porter.

and should be treated as spies. They are spies because their publications reach the enemy, give them direct and minute information of the composition of our forces, and while invariably they puff up their immediate patrons they pull down all others. Thus this man K——, dating his paper upon the steamer *Continental*, the headquarters of Generals Steele and Blair, gives to these general officers and their divisions undue praise, and libel and abuse to all others. This not only plays into the hands of our enemies by sowing dissensions among us, but it encourages discontent among the officers who find themselves abused by men seemingly under the influence of officers high in command. I caused K——'s communication to be read to him, paragraph by paragraph, and then showed him my instructions by my orders made at the time and the official reports of others, and how wide he was of the truth. And now I have asked his arrest and trial by General Grant on charges as a spy and informer. The 57th article of war, which is a law of Congress, is as follows: "Whoever shall be convicted of holding correspondence with, or giving intelligence to, the enemy, either directly or indirectly, shall suffer death," etc. I will endeavor to bring in all the facts by means of the evidence of officers who took part in all these events. My purpose is not to bring K—— to death or other severe punishment, but I do want to establish the principle that citizens shall not, against the orders of the competent military superior, attend a military expedition, report its proceedings, and comment on its officers. Affectionately your brother,
W. T. SHERMAN.

To a copy of General Orders No. 67, in regard to the giving of intelligence to the enemy, General Sherman added this comment:

. . . Now, to every army and almost every general a newspaper reporter goes along, filling up our transports, swelling our trains, reporting our progress, guessing at plans, picking up dropped expressions, inciting jealousy and discontent, and doing infinite mischief. We are commanded absolutely to proceed against them under the 57th article of war. Shall the laws of Congress be obeyed? Shall the orders of the War Department be respected? Or shall the press go on sweeping everything before it? . . .

The press has now killed McClellan, Buell, Fitz-John Porter, Sumner, Franklin, and Burnside. Add my name, and I am not ashamed of the association. If the press can govern the country, let them fight the battles.

CAMP BEFORE VICKSBURG,
February 12, 1863.

DEAR BROTHER: I have hitherto sent you original papers or copies to satisfy any one of

the falsehood of the attacks against me in the late Vicksburg matter. I had a newspaper reporter arrested and tried by a court-martial, but by the rulings of the court I infer they are of opinion that to make the accused come within the order of the War Department, the fact should be proven that the very substance of the objectionable matter went to the enemy. I have been unable to find the identical matter, but in every Southern paper I get I find abundance of evidence to show that Northern papers furnish the Southern leaders abundant and timely notice of every movement. I send you two to show this fact. In the Vicksburg "Whig," at the bottom of the last column of the first page, you will see that it states positively that a correspondent of one of the Northern journals wrote *in advance* of the Federal plans in the late move on Vicksburg. Had they received three days' notice of our coming to the Post of Arkansas, they could have so reinforced that it would have cost us a siege; but then we were beyond the power of the press, and succeeded. And so it must ever be. These newspaper correspondents hanging about the skirts of our army reveal all plans, and are worth a hundred thousand men to the enemy. . . .

Affectionately your brother,

W. T. SHERMAN.

CAMP BEFORE VICKSBURG,
February 18, 1863.

MY DEAR BROTHER: . . . We have reproached the South for arbitrary conduct in coercing their people — at last we find we must imitate their example. We have denounced their tyranny in filling their armies with conscripts, and now we must follow her example. We have denounced their tyranny in suppressing freedom of speech and the press, and here too in time we must follow her example. The longer it is deferred, the worse it becomes. Who gave notice of McDowell's movement on Manassas, and enabled Johnston so to reinforce Beauregard that our army was defeated? The press. Who gave notice of the movement on Vicksburg? The press. Who has prevented all secret combinations and movements against our enemy? The press. . . .

In the South this powerful machine was at once scotched and used by the rebel government, but at the North was allowed to go free. What are the results? After arousing the passions of the people till the two great sections hate each other with a hate hardly paralleled in history, it now begins to stir up sedition at home, and even to encourage mutiny in our armies. What has paralyzed the Army of the Potomac? Mutual jealousies kept alive by the press. What has enabled the enemy to combine so as to hold Tennessee after we have

twice crossed it with victorious armies? What defeats, and will continue to defeat, our best plans here and elsewhere? The press. I cannot pick up a paper but tells of our situation here, in the mud, sickness, and digging a canal in which we have little faith. But our officers attempt secretly to cut two other channels — one into Yazoo by an old pass, and one through Lake Providence into Tensas, Black, Red, etc., whereby we could turn not only Vicksburg, Port Hudson, but also Grand Gulf, Natchez, Ellis Cliff, Fort Adams, and all the strategic points on the main river, and the busy agents of the press follow up and proclaim to the world the whole thing, and instead of surprising our enemy, we find him felling trees and blocking passages that would without this have been in our possession, and all the real effects of surprise are lost. I say, with the press unfettered as now, we are defeated to the end of time. 'T is folly to say the people must have news. Every soldier can and does write to his family and friends, and all have ample opportunities for so doing, and this pretext forms no good reason why agents of the press should reveal prematurely all our plans and designs. We cannot prevent it. Clerks of steamboats, correspondents, in disguise or openly, attend each army and detachment, and presto! appear in Memphis and St. Louis minute accounts of our plans and designs. These reach Vicksburg by telegraph from Hernando and Holly Springs before we know of it. The only two really successful military strokes out here have succeeded because of the absence of newspapers, or by throwing them off the trail. Halleck had to make a simulated attack on Columbus to prevent the press giving notice of his intended move against Forts Henry and Donelson. We succeeded in reaching the Post of Arkansas before the correspondents could reach the papers. . . . Affectionately, SHERMAN.

During this time John Sherman writes to his brother urging him to be more moderate in his dealings with the newspaper men, and protesting against his threats of retiring, which have given him grave concern.

CAMP BEFORE VICKSBURG,
March 14, 1863.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . The Conscript Bill is all even I could ask — it is the first real step toward war. And if Mr. Lincoln will now use the power thus conferred, ignore popular clamor, and do as near right as he can, we may at last have an army somewhat approximating the vast undertaking which was begun in utter blind, wilful ignorance of the difficulties and dangers that we were forced to encounter. . . .

I have been much pleased with your course in Congress, and regret that anything I have

done or may do has given you trouble or concern. I could easily have been popular, as I believe I am with my own command, by courting the newspaper men, but it does go hard to know that our camps are full of spies revealing our most secret steps, conveying regularly to the enemy our every act, when a thousand dollars won't procure us a word of information from Vicksburg. I know the press has defeated us, and will continue to do it, and as an honest man I cannot flatter them. I know they will ruin me, but they will ruin the country too. . . .

Napoleon himself would have been defeated with a free press. But I will honestly try to be patient, though I know in this, as in other matters, time *must* bring about its true result, just as the summer ripens the fruits of the season. . . . Affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

CAMP BEFORE VICKSBURG, April 3, 1863.

MY DEAR BROTHER: I received your long letter from Mansfield, for which I am much obliged. You certainly have achieved an enviable name in the Senate, and I confess I am astonished at your industry and acquirements. I readily understand how, in a revolution of the magnitude that now involves us all, older men should devolve on you and the younger school of men the legislation and experiments necessary to meet a state of facts so different from the common run of events. The Finance Bill and Conscription Acts of the late Congress in my judgment may keep the management of the affairs of the nation in the hands of the Constitutional Government. Anything short of them, the war would have drifted out of the control of President and Congress. Now, if Mr. Lincoln will assume the same position that Davis did at the outset, he can unite the fighting North against the fighting South, and numerical force systematized will settle the war. I know the impatience of the people, but this is one of the lessons of war. People must learn that war is a question of physical force and courage. A million of men engaged in peaceful pursuits will be vanquished by a few thousand determined armed men. The justice of the cause has nothing to do with it. It is a question of force. Again, we are the assailants, and have to overcome not only an equal number of determined men, however wrongfully engaged, but the natural obstacles of a most difficult country. . . .

McPherson is a splendid officer. Grant is honest and does his best. I will do as ordered. I will suggest little, as others talk of my failing to take Vicksburg, and I want them to try a hand. . . . Affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

THE CONSCRIPT ACT.

CAMP BEFORE VICKSBURG, April 23, 1863.

DEAR BROTHER: I had noticed in the Conscript Act the clauses which empowered the President to consolidate the ten companies of a regiment into five when the aggregate was below one half the maximum standard, and to reduce the officers accordingly. Had I dreamed that this was going to be made universal, I would have written you and begged you, for the love of our ruined country, to implore Lincoln to spare us this last and fatal blow. Two years of costly war have enabled the North to realize the fact that by organized and disciplined armies alone can she hope to restore the old and found a new empire. We had succeeded in making the skeletons of armies, eliminating out of the crude materials that first came forth the worthless material, and had just begun to have some good young colonels, captains, sergeants, and corporals. And Congress had passed the Conscript Bill, which would have enabled the President to fill up these skeleton regiments full of privates who soon, from their fellows, and with experienced officers, would make an army capable of marching and being handled and directed. But to my amazement comes this order. . . . This is a far worse defeat than Manassas. Mr. Wade, in his report to condemn McClellan, gave a positive assurance to the army that henceforth, instead of fighting with diminishing ranks, we should feel assured that the gaps made by the bullet, by disease, desertion, etc., should be promptly filled, whereas only such parts of the conscript law as tend to weaken us are enforced, viz.: 5 per cent. for furlough, and 50 per cent. of officers and non-commissioned officers discharged to consolidate regiments. Even Blair is amazed at this. He protests the order cannot be executed, and we should appeal to Mr. Lincoln, whom he still insists has no desire to destroy the army. But the order is positive, and I don't see how we can hesitate. . . . Grant started to-day down to Carthage, and I have written to him, which may stave it off for a few days; but I tremble at the loss of so many young and good officers who have been hard at work for two years, and now that they begin to see how to take care of soldiers, must be turned out. . . .

If not too late, do, for mercy's sake, exhaust your influence to stop this consolidation of regiments. Fill all the regiments with conscripts, and if the army is then too large, disband the regiments that prefer to serve north of the Potomac and the Ohio. Keep the war south at all hazards. If this consolidation law is literally enforced, and no new draft is made, this campaign is over. And the outside world

will have a perfect right to say our Government is afraid of its own people. . . . Affectionately yours,
W. T. SHERMAN.

DISTRUST OF GRANT'S VICKSBURG PLANS.

CAMP BEFORE VICKSBURG.

April 26, 1863.

MY DEAR BROTHER: To-morrow I start with my corps to bring up the rear of the movement against Grand Gulf, and, maybe, Jackson, Miss. I feel in its success less confidence than any similar undertaking of the war, but it is my duty to cooperate with zeal, and I shall endeavor to do it. . . .

Grant came down by river, and his entire army—about 70,000—is now near here, but the whole country is under water, save little ribands of alluvial ground along the main Mississippi and all parallel bayous. My proposition was one month ago to fall back upon our original plan, modified by the fact that Yazoo River could be entered by its head and could be used as far down as Greenwood, which is the mouth of the Yalabusha. If our gunboats could have passed that point, a real substantial advantage would have been gained, for it would have enabled the army to pass the Yalabusha, whereas now it is a serious obstacle like the Rappahannock, and will have to be fought for. . . .

McClelland's corps marched from Milliken's Bend along a narrow road to Carthage. McPherson has followed, and I start to-morrow. Sixty thousand men will thus be on a single road, narrow, crooked, and liable to become a quagmire on the occurrence of a single rain. We hope to carry ten days' rations with us. Seven iron-clad gunboats and seven transports have run the Vicksburg batteries; with these we can reach Grand Gulf below the mouth of Black River, whence there is a road to Raymond sixty-five miles, and Jackson. The destruction of this road isolates Vicksburg. Now, if we can sustain the army, it may do, but I know the materials of food, forage, and ammunition cannot be conveyed on that single precarious road. Grant has been opening a canal from the Mississippi to Willow Bayou three miles; and Willow Bayou Roundaway and Bayou Vidal form a connected channel for forty-seven miles, terminating at Carthage, but it is crooked, narrow, and full of trees. Large working parties are employed in removing these, but at best it is only calculated that it can be used by scows drawn by small steam-tugs. It is not even contemplated that the smallest transports can navigate it. The canal itself is far from being done. I went through it yesterday in a small boat, and estimate it will take one month to give it eight feet water with the present stage, but the water in the river is now falling rapidly. We

count on another rise in June from the Missouri, but these rises are accidental and may or may not come. The great difficulty will be to support an army operating from Grand Gulf. . . .

Between the two choices open to him I far prefer Grenada. One is sure and natural, the other is difficult and hazardous in the extreme. There is no national or political reason why this army should be forced to undertake unnecessary hazard. It is far in advance of Hooker, Rosecrans, or Curtis. We have done far more than either of these armies, but have encountered more calumny and abuse than all. . . .

Banks is afraid even to attempt Port Hudson, and from all I can hear is more likely to be caged up in New Orleans than to assist us against Vicksburg. . . . Affectionately your brother,
W. T. SHERMAN.

POLITICAL GLOOM.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, May 7, 1863.

MY DEAR BROTHER: . . . I regret to notice from your letter that Grant's recent movements do not meet your approval. It was regarded as a bold and successful plan to turn the flank of the enemy, but if he is no weaker from the south side of Vicksburg than from above, I do not see what we have gained. We have a telegraphic account of your recent attack on Haynes' Bluff, but do not understand its purpose.

As for the consolidation of regiments, it is idle for me to interpose. Halleck regulates all these matters. He is king in all questions regulating the detail affecting the army. Stanton has far less power than Halleck, and indeed holds office by a frail tenure and with limited influence. It is no use for a civilian to talk to Halleck. He would regard your opinion, but certainly not mine, though we are good friends. . . . You certainly have been sagacious in your anticipation of military events. Charleston is not taken, the war is prolonged, and but little chance of its ending until we have a new deal.

If only the people will be patient so long, all will be well. The best of it is, they can't help themselves. The rebels won't let us have peace even if we wanted it. It may be better that the Democrats be allowed to take the helm, as they could not make peace, and then war would be more vigorous and united.

This war has always seemed to me simply a tragic necessity. I have watched its civic progress, and hope to see its termination. It may, like the French Revolution, travel in a large circle, destroying all that have taken part in it; still there is no way but to go ahead. We may slowly learn wisdom in its prosecution, for we certainly have not shown it thus far. . . . Affectionately your brother,
JOHN SHERMAN.

CREDIT FOR VICKSBURG.

WALNUT HILLS, VICKSBURG, May 29, 1863.

MY DEAR BROTHER: I received a few days since your most acceptable letter of May 7, which met me here. You will now have a fair understanding of the whole move thus far. The move by way of Grand Gulf to secure a foothold on the hills wherefrom to assail Vicksburg appeared to me too risky at the time, and General Grant is entitled to all the merit of its conception and execution. . . . [Not signed.]

MANSFIELD, OHIO, July 18, 1863.

MY DEAR BROTHER: I supposed when Vicksburg fell that you would have a period of rest, and perhaps might return to Ohio to find yourself popular and famous. But the fortune of war carries you into new dangers, and I hope new successes. We have been very anxious for news from your movements, but as yet we have only had uncertain reports, and can only live in the hope that you will whip Johnston and win new laurels. I have just returned from Cincinnati, where I was during the whole of Morgan's raid. How completely the tone of the press has changed in regard to you. Even the "Gazette," which has been malignant to the last degree, published quite a number of letters in which your share of the movements about Vicksburg was highly praised. I notice, however, that the editor has said nothing. All other papers, and indeed all officers and citizens with whom I conversed, gave you great credit. So that now in the Northern States, and especially here in Ohio, your popularity is second only to that of Grant. You need care but little for this, as you passed through a storm of obloquy which would have submerged many an officer. Popular opinion is so changeable that it is worthless. It is founded upon rumor, and is as explosive as gas. Meade has had a foretaste of this. His drawn battle at Gettysburg relieved the country from a great danger, and he was at once a hero, he was the coming man. He has allowed Lee to escape him, and all his popular honors are lost. McClellan has succeeded in establishing the position of a party leader, and now enjoys the bad honor of being cheered by a New York mob of thieves and scoundrels, while poor Hooker is dropped by all just when he thought he had Lee in his power.

While the war goes on there is a danger looming up that seems to me more ominous than any other. It is the Presidential election next summer. We will have a fierce canvass. If the election cannot be held in the Southern States, no one is likely to get a majority of the electoral college. This must be, to secure an election by the people. All the States must be counted, and under the Constitution the successful candidate must have a majority of all

the electoral votes. Can this be secured by any one man? If not, the election then goes into the House, and who can tell the result? The war has done a great deal to shake that implicit obedience to law which has been the great conservative element; but in the struggle for so vast a prize will it not be easy to clog the machinery for a legal election, and then civil war or anarchy is the certain result? These are only possible dangers, but it is well to look them in the face.

At present I do not stand very well with my political associates, because I have openly differed with them on important questions. But I am too well grounded in the principles of the Republican party to be shaken in my faith. Indeed, nearly all the errors into which the administration has fallen have arisen from the advice of an old school of politicians who never belonged to the Republican party. Affectionately your brother, JOHN SHERMAN.

JACKSON, MISS., July 19, 1863.

MY DEAR BROTHER: The fall of Vicksburg and consequent capitulation of Port Hudson, the opening the navigation of the Mississippi, and now the driving out of this great valley the only strong army that threatened us, complete as pretty a page in the history of war and of our country as ever you could ask my name to be identified with. The share I have personally borne in all these events is one in which you may take pride for me. You know I have avoided notoriety, and the press, my standard enemy, may strip me of all popular applause, but not a soldier of the Army of the Tennessee but knows the part I have borne in this great drama, and the day will come when that army will speak in a voice that cannot be drowned. . . .

In the events resulting thus the guiding minds and hands were Grant's, Sherman's, and McPherson's, all natives of Ohio. . . . Your brother,
W. T. SHERMAN.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, August 3, 1863.

MY DEAR BROTHER: Your letter dated July 19 at Jackson is received. What you say about the injustice of the press was undoubtedly true a month ago, but it is true no longer. Since the fall of Vicksburg each of the officers named by you has been very highly lauded, and that by all parties and papers. With you it has been especially laudatory. Even your old enemy, the Cincinnati "Gazette," has in several recent numbers spoken of you in very complimentary terms and without any apparent recollection that it has libelled you for months. With the officers of the army you stand very high. Indeed, it is now unnecessary for you to care for defenders. I will think of your proposition to visit Vicksburg, and will probably do so this fall. At present I am involved in the politi-

cal canvass now going on in Ohio, but will not be long. My position does not require me to take a very active part.

Affectionately yours, JOHN SHERMAN.

General Sherman did not visit Ohio until the following Christmas.

GENERAL SHERMAN ON LAW AND ORDER.

CAMP ON BIG BLACK, EIGHTEEN MILES FROM VICKSBURG, August 3, 1863.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . You and I may differ in our premises, but will agree in our conclusions. A government resting mediately on the caprice of a people is too unstable to last. The will of the people is the ultimate appeal, but the Constitution, Laws of Congress, and Regulations of the executive departments, subject to the decisions of the Supreme Court, are the laws which all must obey, without stopping to inquire why. All *must* obey. Government,—that is, the executive,—having no discretion but to execute the law, must be to that extent despotic. If this be our government, it is the “best on earth”—but if the people of localities can bias and twist the law or execution of it to suit their local prejudices, then our government is the worst on earth. If you look back only two years, you will see the application. There are about six millions of men in this country all thinking themselves sovereign and qualified to govern; some thirty-four governors of States who feel like petty kings; and about ten thousand editors who presume to dictate to generals, presidents, and cabinets. I treat all these as nothing, but when the case arises I simply ask—Where is the law? Supposing the pilot of a ship should steer his vessel according to the opinion of every fellow who watched the clouds above or the currents below, where would his ship land? No, the pilot has before him a little needle; he watches that, and he never errs. So if we make that our simple code, the law of the land must and shall be executed, no matter what the consequences; we cannot err. Hundreds and thousands may honestly differ as to what the law should be, but it is rarely the case, but all men of ordinary understanding can tell what the law is. We have for years been drifting toward an unadulterated democracy or demagogism, and its signs were manifest in mob laws and vigilance committees all over our country. And States and towns and mere squads of men took upon themselves to set aside the Constitution and Laws of Congress, and substitute therefor their own opinions. I saw it and tried to resist it in California, but always the General Government yielded to the pressure. I say that our Government, judged by its conduct as a whole,

paved the way for rebellion. The South, that lived on slavery, saw the United States yield to abolition pressure at the North, to proslavery pressure at the South, to the miners of California, the rowdies of Baltimore, and to the people everywhere. They paved the way to this rebellion. The people of the South were assured that so far from resisting an attempt to set up an independent government of homogeneous interests, the United States would give in and yield. They appealed to precedents and proved it, and I confess I had seen so much of it that I doubted whether our Government would not yield to the pressure and die a natural death. But I confess my agreeable surprise. Though full of corruption and base materials, our country is a majestic one, full of natural wealth and good people. They have risen not in full majesty, but enough to give all hopes of vitality. Our progress has been as rapid as any philosopher could ask. The resources of the land in money, in men, in provisions, in forage, and in intelligence, have surprised us all, and we have had as much success as could be hoped for. The Mississippi is now ours, not by commission but by right, by the right of manly power. No great interest in our land has risen superior to government, and I deem it fortunate that no man has risen to dictate terms to all. Better as it is. Lincoln is but the last of the old-school presidents, the index (mathematically) of one stage of our national existence. . . . Our Government should become a machine, self-regulating, independent of the man. . . .


As to the press of America, it is a shame and a reproach to a civilized people. . . . I begin to feel a high opinion of myself that I am their butt. I shall begin to suspect myself of being in a decline when a compliment appears in type. I know in what estimation I am held by *my* press, those who have been with me all the time, and they are capable to judge, from privates to major-generals. I saw a move to bring Grant and myself East. No, they don't. . . .

We will be in Mobile in October, and Georgia by Christmas, if required. . . .

I see much of the people here—men of heretofore high repute. The fall of Vicksburg has had a powerful effect. They are subjugated. I, even, am amazed at the effect; we are actually feeding the people. . . .

Grant and wife visited me in camp yesterday. I have the handsomest camp I ever saw, and should really be glad to have visitors come down. I don't think a shot will be fired at a boat till Jeff Davis can call his friends about him and agree upon the next campaign. I want recruits and conscripts, and will be all ready in October. As ever, your brother,

W. T. SHERMAN.



LETTERS OF TWO BROTHERS.

PASSAGES FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF GENERAL AND
SENATOR SHERMAN.

THE END OF THE WAR.

PROSPERITY OF THE NORTH IN WAR TIME.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, November 14, 1863.

MY DEAR BROTHER: . . . On Tuesday next I start for Gettysburg to take part in the pageant of a dedication of the battle-field as a national cemetery. From thence I will probably go to Washington—two weeks in advance of the session. The very first thing I mean to do is to press the enforcement of the draft. The long delay, and the various shifts and subterfuges by which the execution of the law has thus far been defeated, are disgraceful, and very injurious to the cause. . . . I notice in some of the Southern papers that a hope is entertained that the draft cannot be enforced. This is idle. The war was never more popular than at this moment. The new call will fall lightly. Ohio must send 35,000, or one to fifteen of her voters. The apportionment has been made even to townships and wards, and in very many places the quota will be made by voluntary enlistments, aided by large gratuitous bounties from citizens. There is no lack of men, or of a determination to send them. The wonderful prosperity of all classes, especially of laborers, has a tendency to secure acquiescence in all measures demanded to carry on the war. We are only another example of a people growing rich in a great war. And this is not shown simply by inflated prices, but by increased production, new manufacturing establishments, new railroads, houses, etc. . . . Indeed, every branch of business is active and hopeful. This

is not a mere temporary inflation caused by paper money, but is a steady progress, and almost entirely upon actual capital. The people are prospering, and show their readiness to push on the war. Taxes are paid cheerfully, and the voluntary donations for our soldiers and their families are counted by thousands. . . . I confide in your entire success. Affectionately,

JOHN SHERMAN.

GENERAL SHERMAN ON LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

GENERAL SHERMAN spent Christmas of 1863 with his family, then in Lancaster, Ohio, but missed seeing John, who had already gone to Washington.

LANCASTER, OHIO, Dec. 29, 1863.

MY DEAR BROTHER: . . . I hear you have gone on to New York, and therefore I must go off without seeing you.

I think the President's proclamation unwise. Knowing the temper of the South I know that it but protracts the war by seeming to court peace. To them it looks like weakness. I tell them that as they cool off, we warm to the work, that we are just getting ready for the war; and I know the effect is better than to coax them to come back into the Union. The organization of a civil government but complicates the game. All the Southern States will need a pure military government for years after resistance has ceased. You have noticed the debate in Richmond on the President's proclamation. That is a true exhibit of the feeling South. Don't

fall into the error that the masses think differently. Of course property-holding classes South deplore the devastation that marks the progress of their own and our armies, but the South is no longer consulted. The army of the Confederacy is the South, and they still hope to worry us out. The moment we relax they gain strength and confidence. We must hammer away, and show such resistance, such bottom, that even that slender hope will fail them. . . .

I still am opposed to all bounties. The draft pure and simple, enough to fill vacancies in the ranks, pay of men in the front increased to \$25, \$30, or even \$40 a month and that of men at depots and to the rear diminished to a bare maintenance if not less. Four hundred dollars bounty is an absurd commentary where two thirds draw bounty and remain absent from the ranks, and are discharged for disability without hearing a shot. Deal with the army as you would if you were hiring men for special work. Pay those who do the work high; those who are sick, unfortunate, or shirking, pay little or nothing. The same of officers from the major-general to lieutenant. The President must make vacancies for the rising officers, the "creations" of the war. I am willing to quit if a younger and better man can be found for my place. . . . Your affectionate brother,
W. T. SHERMAN.

LANCASTER, Dec. 30, 1863.

DEAR BROTHER: I have been importuned from many quarters for my likeness, autographs, and biography. I have managed to fend off all parties, and hope to do so till the end of the war. I don't want to rise or be notorious for the reason that a mere slip or accident may let me fall, and I don't care about falling so far as most of the temporary heroes of the war. The real men of the war will be determined by the closing scenes, and then the army will determine the questions. Newspaper puffs, and self-written biographies, will then be ridiculous caricatures. Already has time marked this progress, and indicated this conclusion.

If parties apply to you for materials in my behalf, give the most brief and general items, and leave the results to the close of the war or of my career. As well might a judge or senator seek for fame outside their spheres of action as an officer of the army. We must all be judged by our own peers, stand or fall by their verdict. I know I stand very high with the army, and feel no concern on that score. To-day I can do more with Admiral Porter or the generals than any general officer out West, except Grant, and with him I am as a second self. We are personal and official friends. Affectionately yours,
W. T. SHERMAN.

WHO WERE THE ABOLITIONISTS?

THE following letters were written in the winter and spring of 1864, while General Sherman commanded the troops along the Mississippi, and John Sherman was in the Senate at Washington. General Sherman's letters contain expressions of confidence in General Grant, who had just been ordered to command the armies of the United States.

ON BOARD *Juliet*, BOUND FOR VICKSBURG IN
A FOG, Friday, January 28, 1864.

DEAR BROTHER: I have organized a cavalry force to sweep down from Memphis toward Mobile, and have gathered together out of my garrisons a very pretty force of 20,000 men, which I shall command in person, and move from Vicksburg down east, in connection with the cavalry named, to reach Meridian, and break up the railroad connections there. This will have the effect to disconnect Mississippi from the eastern South States, and without this single remaining link they cannot keep any army of importance west of the Alabama River. Our armies are now at the lowest point, and so many are going home as reenlisted veterans that I will have a less force than should attempt it, but this is the time, and I shall attempt it. It seems my luck to have to make the initiative, and to come in at desperate times, but thus far, having done a full share of the real achievements of this war, I need not fear accidents. . . .

You, who attach more importance to popular fame, would be delighted to see in what estimation I am held by the people of Memphis, Tenn., and all along this mighty river. I could not well decline an offer of a public dinner in Memphis, but I dreaded it more than I did the assault on Vicksburg. I had to speak, and sent you the report that best suited me, viz: that in the "Argus." The report of the "Bulletin," which may reach the Northern press, is disjointed, and not so correct. Indeed I cannot speak from notes, or keep myself strictly to the point, but 't is said that the effect of my crude speeches is good. . . .

I know that for us to assume that slavery is killed, not by a predetermined act of ours, but as the natural, logical, and legal consequence of the acts of its self-constituted admirers, we gain strength, and the enemy loses it. I think it is the true doctrine for the time being. The South has made the interests of slavery the issue of the war. If they lose the war they lose slavery. Instead of our being abolitionists, it is thereby proven that they are the abolitionists. . . .

The Mississippi is a substantial conquest; we should next get the Red River, then the Alabama, and last push into Georgia. . . . Your affectionate brother,
W. T. SHERMAN.

U. S. SENATE, January 29, 1864.

MY DEAR BROTHER: . . . The general prosperity of the country is so marked that I am afraid of a reaction or a collapse. The currency is awfully inflated, and our ability to borrow and to pay interest has a limit. If the war continues two years longer we will be terribly embarrassed. Still we have the sure foundation of public credit, a great country, and a large and active population. Let me hear from you as often as possible. Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

GRANT AT THE HEAD OF THE ARMY.

ON March 24, 1864, General Sherman writes from his headquarters at Nashville, Tenn.:

I went to Cincinnati with Grant to see Ellen.¹ I stayed but two days, and am now here. I go to Decatur, Huntsville, and Chattanooga, to be gone a week and then return here. I will have plenty to do. I am bored for photographs, etc. I send you the only one I have, which you can have duplicated and let the operator sell to the curious. Give Grant all the support you can. If he can escape the toils of the schemers, he may do some good. He will fight, and the Army of the Potomac will have all the fighting they want. He will expect your friendship—we are close friends. His simplicity and modesty are natural and not affected. Whatever part is assigned me I will attempt, cost what it may in life and treasure. . . .

And again he writes:

Grant encourages his juniors, and takes pleasure in supporting them. . . . Newspaper men are afraid of me, and I hope before the war is much older we will be allowed to conscript every citizen of good physique found about our camp, on the ground that he has fled to escape the draft. Such an order would have an admirable effect.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 26, 1864.

MY DEAR BROTHER: Your movements have been so rapid of late that I scarcely knew where to address you. I have recently met with several officers who have been with you, among others General Grant and General Butterfield. General Grant is all the rage; he is subjected to the disgusting but dangerous process of being lionized. He is followed by crowds, and is cheered everywhere. While he must despise the fickle fools who run after him, he, like most others, may be spoiled by this excess of flattery. He may be so elated as to forget the uncertain tenure upon which he holds and stakes his really earned laurels. I conversed with him

¹ His wife.

but little, as I did not wish either to occupy his time or to be considered his flatterer. The opinion I form of him from his appearance is this; his will and common sense are the strongest features of his character. He is plain and modest, and so far bears himself well. All here give him hearty coöperation, but an officer who does not like Halleck tells me that Halleck will ruin Grant with the President in sixty days, or on failure to do so will resign. . . .

We all here are disposed to take a hopeful view of the "status in quo." The enormous government bounties have been effective, but they are terribly severe on our finances. We can't forever endure such expenditures. Warning and caution as to danger are unheeded. Our people are so hopeful and energetic that they will bear more than any other. . . .

You are now in a position where any act of yours will command public attention. You will be unduly lauded and sharply abused. I hope you have seen enough of the base motives that dictate praise and blame to disregard both, but preserve the best of your judgment in utter disregard of flattery or clamor.

When any of your friends come to Washington give them notes to me. I may be of service to them. At all events I like to see them. Affectionately yours, JOHN SHERMAN.

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 5, 1864.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . Grant is as good a leader as we can find; he has honesty, simplicity of character, singleness of purpose, and no hope or claim to usurp civil power. His character more than his genius will reconcile armies and attach the people. Let him alone. Don't disgust him by flattery or importunity. Let him alone. . . . If bothered, hampered, or embarrassed, he would drop you all in disgust, and let you slide into anarchy. . . . Let us manage the whites and niggers, and all the physical resources of the country, and apply them where most needed. Let us accomplish great results, leaving small ones to conform in due season. . . .

I will be here about two weeks, and then to the front. Let me hear from you. I care no more for the squabbles about the presidency, than I do for the causes of the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty, and Grant cares still less. . . . Your brother, W. T. SHERMAN.

THE FINANCIAL CAULDRON.

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 17, 1864.

MY DEAR BROTHER: . . . Our finances are bubbling up and down in that feverish state where a panic might easily come. Chase is a man of ability, but in recent measures he has

failed. I have been generally the laboring one in the Senate on these measures, though very often my judgment has been against them. I have felt like a subordinate officer, who, while he does not approve the plan of operations, yet deems it his duty fairly to execute his part of it rather than by fault-finding to impair it. The war is daily driving us to extraordinary measures, and our form of government is not *unit* enough to carry them out. We are embarrassed by State banks, State laws, and local issues and interests. The other day a determined effort was made in New York to run gold up to 200, but was promptly met by a free sale by the government of gold and exchange, and the movement failed. It was aided by this very bad news from Fort Pillow, not so bad from the loss of men, but from the question of retaliation raised by the massacre of negro troops. We all feel that we must either disband negro troops or protect them. It is fearful to think about the measures that may be necessary, but what else can we do? An investigation will be made by the Secretary of War and by Congress, and if the rebels are determined to massacre prisoners, then a new and terrible stage of this war will be commenced. . . . Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

ON THE WAY TO ATLANTA.

ON March 18, 1864, General Sherman relieved General Grant of the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi. During the spring and summer of that year he was busily engaged provisioning and moving his great army into Georgia, following General Joseph E. Johnston, according to orders from General Grant. On May 20 and June 9, he writes from the heart of Georgia.

KINGSTON, GA., May 20, 1864.

DEAR BROTHER: I have daily telegraphed to General Halleck our progress, and have no doubt you have kept pace with our movement. Johnston had chosen Dalton as his place of battle, but he had made all the roads to it so difficult that I resolved to turn it, so I passed my army through a pass 20 miles south of Dalton, and forced him to battle at Resaca. That, too, was very strong, but we beat him at all points, and as I had got a bridge across the Oostenaula below him, and was gradually getting to his rear, he again abandoned his position in the night, and I have been pushing my force after him as fast as possible, yet his knowledge of the country, and the advantage of a good railroad to his rear, enabled him to escape me, but I now have full possession of all the rich country of the Etowah. We occupy Rome, Kingston, and Cassville. I have repaired the railroads to these points, and now have ordered

the essential supplies forward to replenish our wagons, when I will make for Atlanta, 59 miles from here and about 50 from the advance. Johnston has halted across the Etowah at a place called Allatoona, where the railroad and common road pass through a spur of the mountain, making one of those formidable passes which give an army on the defensive so much advantage, but I propose to cross the Etowah here and to go for Marietta via Dallas. Look at your map, and you will see the move. We expect to cross the Etowah on the 23d, when we will move straight on, fighting when opposed. Of course our labor and difficulties increase as we progress, whereas our enemy gains strength by picking up his rear-guard and detachments. Put forth the whole strength of the nation now, and if we can't whip the South we must bow our necks in patient submission. A division of our territory by the old lines is impossible. Grant surely is fighting hard enough, and I think this army will make its mark. Your brother,

W. T. SHERMAN.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, ACWORTH, GA., June 9, 1864.

DEAR BROTHER: It is out of all reason to expect me to write much, and I know you do not expect it. Were I to attempt narration it would swell to unreasonable lengths, and even in my communications to the War Department I must confine myself almost to generalities. Suffice it to say that General Grant and I had a perfect understanding, and all things are now as near our calculations as possible, save and except that the Red River has clipped from the general plan our main feature, a simultaneous attack on Mobile from New Orleans. But the Red River expedition is out, and I have substituted a smaller force subject to my own orders, in lieu of the larger one contemplated made up by General Banks. . . . My long and single line of railroad to my rear, of limited capacity, is the delicate point of my game, as also the fact that all of Georgia except the clear bottoms is densely wooded, with few roads, and at any point an enterprising enemy can in a few hours with axes and spades make across our path formidable works, whilst his sharpshooters, spies, and scouts, in the guise of peaceable farmers, can hang around us and kill our wagonmen, messengers, and couriers. It is a big Indian war; still, thus far I have won four strong positions, advanced a hundred miles, and am in possession of a large wheat-growing region, and all the iron mines and works of Georgia. Johnston's army is still at my front, and he can fight or fall back as he pleases. The future is uncertain, but I will do all that is possible. As ever, your brother,

W. T. SHERMAN.

After the adjournment of the Senate in the spring of 1864, John Sherman returned to Ohio, where he spent the spring and summer.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, July 24, 1864.

MY DEAR BROTHER: I have not written to you for some time as I knew you were so well occupied, and hoped by this time you would have attained the goal of your present movements — Atlanta. We all feel that upon Grant and you, and the armies under your command, the fate of this country depends. If you are successful, it is ardently hoped that peace may soon follow with a restored Union. If you fail, the wisest can hope for nothing but a long train of disasters and the strife of factions. All our people cling to the hope of success, and seem perfectly willing to submit to taxation, bad administration, and every ill short of disunion. Whether it is the result of education, the constant warnings of the early Southern statesmen, or the reason of the thing, everybody here dreads the breaking up of the Union as the beginning of anarchy. The very thing they fight for in the South is, for them and for us, the worst calamity. What can be more terrible than the fate of Kentucky and Missouri? A man cannot go to bed at night, except in fear of the knife and torch. This lawlessness will extend all over the country if we do not have military success. All the clamor the copperheads can make about personal liberty don't affect the people, if they can only see security and success. Bad precedents in time of war will easily be corrected by peace. But the anarchy of unsuccessful war will reduce us to a pitiable state, in which we will easily fall victims to demagogism or tyranny. Every one feels that you have done your part nobly. Grant has not had such success. No doubt he has done as well as any one could with his resources and such adversaries. Still he has not taken Richmond, and, I fear, will not this campaign. . . .

I congratulate you on the ability and success of your campaign. I see many officers, and they all speak of it, not only as a success, but as a scientific success, evincing abilities of a high order. I found on a short visit to Cincinnati that you were very popular there. I saw Anderson, Swords, Dunn, and a host of others, all of whom entertained great kindness for you. . . . Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

PLAIN ENGLISH TO SCHUYLER COLFAX.

THE following letter of August 12, 1864, written from Atlanta, Georgia, to Hon. Schuyler Colfax, in answer to a request from him to allow the soldiers to return to their homes to vote, shows the intense feeling General Sherman had regarding the political use of the soldiers during the war.

This letter was sent through John Sherman, and is in his letter book.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, August 12, 1864.

SCHUYLER COLFAX, ESQ.,
SOUTH BEND, IND.

MY DEAR SIR: John Sherman has sent me your letter of August 2, in which you intimate a wish that certain nine regiments of Indiana troops should be ordered where they can be furloughed so as to vote in the fall elections.

Of course it is impossible. I have not now troops enough to do what the case admits of without extra hazard, and to send away a single man would be an act of injustice to the remainder. I think you need not be concerned about the soldiers' vote. They will vote; it may not be in the coming election, but you may rest assured the day will come when the soldiers will vote, and the only doubt is if they will permit the stay-at-homes to vote at all.

I hope you will be elected, but I do think the conscript-law is the only one that is wanted for the next few years, and if the President uses it freely he can checkmate the copperheads, who are not in favor of being governed by Jeff Davis, but are afraid to go to the war. Their motives are transparent. Jeff Davis despises them more than you do, and if he prevails in this war he will deal with copperheads with infinitely more severity than he will with men who fight for their country and for principle. I am, etc., W. T. SHERMAN,

MAJ.-GENL.

THE MARCH TO THE SEA.

ON December 18, John Sherman writes from the Senate in Washington after hearing news of the "March through Georgia."

I need hardly congratulate you on your magnificent campaign through Georgia. This has been and will be done so often that you will not need anything from me on the subject. We have watched with the deepest interest every step of your march that we could trace through the rebel papers. A very excellent map from the Coast Survey is posted in my room, marked with your stopping-places, and has daily been changed, as you progressed to the coast. No such anxiety has been evinced in any campaign by all classes as in yours. We now hear rumors of the capture of Savannah. I hope we will get official advices to-day. I live next door to Stanton, and he favors me with the despatches when they come. By the way, he is your fast friend, and was when you had fewer.

The election of Lincoln scarcely raised a ripple on the surface. It was anticipated. Even the Democratic Congressmen seem willing to acquiesce cheerfully, and silently submit to all measures deemed necessary. In Congress we have but little to do. New taxes and loans are the principal point of legislation. We will impose taxes enough. Hitherto New England influence has prevented suitable taxation, but now its necessity is imperative. I am assigned Fessenden's place in the Senate as Chairman of Finance, and have enough to do. Chase is Chief Justice. . . . I could send you letters from very distinguished persons, very complimentary to you, but you will have enough of that incense. Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

No letters appear to have been written by General Sherman during the march from Atlanta to Savannah. In the next one, written from Savannah on December 31, 1864, ten days after its capture, he says:

I hear the soldiers talk as I ride by—"There goes the old man. All's right." Not a waver, doubt, or hesitation when I order, and men march to certain death without a murmur if I call on them, because they know I value their lives as much as my own. I do not feel any older, and have no gray hairs yet. My health is good, and save a little rheumatism in my right arm during the last march I have not been indisposed a day, and even then I rode daily my march.

I do not fear want of appreciation, but on the contrary that an exaggerated faith will be generated in my ability, that no man can fulfil. . . . I cannot do anything looking to permanency till the war is ended. Thomas's success in Tennessee, which was part of *my plan*, will go far to assure the *safety* of the Ohio Valley. Love to all. Yours affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN.

The enthusiasm created in the North by the capture of Savannah, and the victory of General Thomas at Nashville, occasioned much talk of General Sherman's promotion, and even some political rumors concerning the use of his name in future elections. On January 22, 1865, he writes from Savannah touching upon these rumors.

I start to-day for the advance of my army at Pocatigo, but we have had such storms and rains that the whole country is under water, but we will be off as soon as possible. No one is more alive to the importance of time than I am.

I wrote you that I deem it unwise to make another lieutenant-general, or to create the rank of general. Let the law stand as now. I

will accept no commission that would tend to create a rivalry with Grant. I want him to hold what he has earned and got. I have all the rank I want. . . .

If you ever hear anybody use my name in connection with a political office, tell them you know me well enough to assure them that I would be offended by such association. I would rather be an engineer of a railroad than President of the United States, or in any political office. Of military titles I have now the maximum, and it makes no difference whether that be major-general or marshal. It means the same thing. I have commanded one hundred thousand men in battle, and on the march, successfully and without confusion, and that is enough for reputation. Next I want rest and peace, and they can only be had through war. You will hear of me, but not from me, for some time. Affectionately your brother,
W. T. SHERMAN.

The next letter from General Sherman is a short and hurried one of April 6, from Goldsboro, after he had completed the last and most difficult part of his march—425 miles from Savannah to Goldsboro—through marshy land, during much rainy weather, following Johnston's retreating army, and with five large navigable rivers, with their bridges burned, to cross. He says:

Railroads work well, our supplies are well up, and we shall march on Monday, April 10. The next two months will demonstrate whether we can manœuvre Lee out of Richmond and whip him in open battle.

In a note of April 11, John Sherman, writing from Ohio, incloses a letter from William W. Murphy, then United States Consul General at Frankfort. In this note John Sherman says:

The news from Grant is so glorious that the whole country is wild with joy.

HERO WORSHIPERS.

THE letters of the years following the war treat entirely of the difficulties of reconstruction. John Sherman, while firmly attached to the Republican party, endeavored through all these troubles to be moderate and conciliatory. But he believed it necessary to extend suffrage to the negroes, and was intensely opposed to President Johnson and his policies.

General Sherman, on the other hand, never acknowledged allegiance to any party, and resented all appearance of such allegiance. He opposed universal suffrage, and believed that extending it to the negroes was but adding to an existing evil.

After the grand review at Washington on May 24, 1865, General Sherman was ordered to

St. Louis to command the Military Division of the Mississippi, and writes from there on August 3, 1865:

Cox's letter on the subject of suffrage is a new bombshell in your camp. He has thought for himself, and come to a conclusion different from the new creed of the East, and will in my judgment be sat upon and badgered, but he is as near right as he can get. Negro equality will lead to endless strife, and to remove and separate the races will be a big job, so any way we approach the subject it is full of difficulty. But it is better to study the case and adapt measures to it, than to lay down the theory and force facts to meet it. . . .

I think I will make that trip, and that is all this year. I did think of coming to Detroit to see Ord, but am bothered by people in traveling so much that I prefer to be quiet till the people run after new gods. In a short time new issues will drop us out of memory. Affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN.

And again after a few days, he writes from Ohio, where he passed part of that summer:

LANCASTER, OHIO, August 9, 1865.

DEAR BROTHER: After I get fixed in St. Louis, I will cast about for some chance to be independent of our government, for I feel there is a desire to be rid of me. Stanton, in Grant's absence, has ordered one of my chief staff officers away from me (Beckwith), without as much as by your leave. Now this was never done, save by Jeff Davis, when he was secretary of war, for orders to the army officers always should go by command of the commander-in-chief, but Stanton orders about as though it was his lawful prerogative. I would resist publicly, but don't want to bring on another controversy. Of course if my staff officers are taken away without my being consulted, they will feel little dependence on me, and my influence will subside. But that is a small matter compared with turning the army into a machine auxiliary to politics. If the War Department is to give orders direct to the army below us, and not through us, you can see that we are dissolved from all control, responsibility, or interest. The true way is for the War Department to indicate to us what the Administration wants done, and then hold us responsible for the means used. But if the secretary handles the army behind us, how can we take an interest? My own opinion is, the Administration will either break itself down or drive us out. Grant is so anxious for harmony that he will not interfere until it is too late, when he will find somebody else commands instead of him. . . . Yours affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

ST. LOUIS, MO., September 21, 1865.

DEAR BROTHER: I got your letters by Mr. Kinneard, and spent a whole day with him and his party,¹ first in a steamboat going up and down the river, then in carriages, and finally at a banquet. The whole party seemed much pleased with the courtesies shown them, and to me were sufficiently complimentary. General Grant was here also, and they expressed themselves more than usually pleased at the opportunity to see us together. In Europe they are settling down to the conviction that Grant and I accomplished the military problem, and now they look to you to bring order, system, and prosperity out of the wreck. I am well satisfied at the course things are taking. No matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of people South we cannot accomplish it by force. Nor can we afford to maintain there an army large enough to hold them in subjugation. All we can or should attempt is to give them rope to develop,—in an honest way if possible,—preserving in reserve enough military power to check any excesses, if they attempt any. But I know they will not attempt any, and you may look for outbreaks in Ohio quicker than in Georgia or Mississippi. You hardly yet realize how completely this country has been devastated, and how completely humbled the man of the South is. Of course editors and talkers may express opinions we don't like, but they will take good care not to reduce those opinions to acts. Affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN.

ST. LOUIS, November 4, 1865.

DEAR BROTHER: I notice that foreigners are very anxious to see me, and all who come here come to call. I will be here all winter, and if you want anything I can do it. I hope you are sure of your reflection. I have many inquiries as to your prospects, and cannot answer them. I think you have more influence and reputation out of Ohio than any man of the State. You observe that Mr. Johnson is drifting toward my terms to Johnston. He cannot help it, for there is no other solution. Any plan will have objections, but that least of all. Affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN.

On November 29, 1865, General Sherman writes from St. Louis:

I am going to start for Arkansas on Friday, and be absent some three weeks. I take it, nothing important can occur at Washington until after Christmas, unless it be on the question

¹ A party of Englishmen with letters of introduction from John Sherman.

of the admission of the Southern members. I have never committed myself on that point, and though everybody supposes that my terms with Johnston looked to that result, you will remember that those terms specially provided that the laws of Congress were to control all questions. Now the new oath is and was a law of Congress, and the members-elect must take the new oath, and if they cannot it is their fault or misfortune, not ours. If they take the prescribed oath I think they should be admitted, simply because you cannot expect to hold a people always without representation, and it will give them additional weight if they be denied now, and afterward received. It is always better when concessions are to be made to make them at once, and not seem to be forced to do it after contest. You can now simply say, "Certainly, come in by subscribing to the conditions and oaths already prescribed by law, the same oaths we take." Affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

ST. LOUIS, December 22, 1865.

DEAR BROTHER: I am just back from Little Rock, have read the message and all the reports, which seem satisfactory. Grant's report is all I ask, but no one ever has and may not agree with me as to the very great importance of the march north from Savannah. The march to the sea seems to have captivated everybody, whereas it was child's play compared with the other. All well with me—I will write soon.

And on January 17, 1866, he writes again from St. Louis:

I get a great many commentaries on the past, and have no reason to object to the exalted examples with which my name is connected. According to some enthusiasts Hannibal, Alexander, and Napoleon fall below my standard. I always laugh at these, and prefer to stand by the record, being perfectly satisfied with Grant's resumé of the campaigns of 1864-5. Affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

OPPOSED TO NEGRO SUFFRAGE.

ST. LOUIS, Jan. 19, 1866.

DEAR BROTHER: The papers this morning announce your election by a strong vote, and settle that question. I am of course very glad, for it demonstrates not only your strength but that the people of Ohio approve your past. As to the future, of course in all things political you have far more knowledge than I, but I do believe that the extension of the election franchise is being pushed beyond the rule of right. All beings are entitled to the protection of the law, even "infants not born," but because of such natural right it is not to

be inferred they must vote. To vote implies an understanding almost equivalent to the ability to make laws. It is legislative, not natural, right. Instead of enlarging the privilege, we must gradually curtail it, in order to have stability and security. On all these questions you can afford to lay low, and avail yourself of the experience of those who seem blind to present passions begotten by the war. It was this popular clamor for supposed rights that carried the South into rebellion. No people were ever more unanimous than they, and though now they concede themselves vanquished, yet on this and kindred subjects they are as unanimous as ever. To place, or attempt to place, the negro on a par with the whites will produce new convulsions. The country is in no condition to go on with such contests. Better pacify or acknowledge conditions than attempt new ones dangerous to the peace of the whole country. It will take ten years for the South to regain full prosperity, with the negro free, and that should precede any new complication. Affectionately, W. T. SHERMAN.

ST. LOUIS, February 11, 1866.

DEAR BROTHER: I had a pleasant trip to Detroit, reaching there in a snowstorm on Wednesday morning. I got a couple of hours of quiet, and then for two days was kept on the jump, visited and dined. When I got away I think I must have touched the hands of 10,000 people. At the dinner we had the best people of the city, who were even more eulogistic than usual. I saw Mr. Cass, who sat in a chair and was seemingly much flattered by my visit. He simply said that he hoped the present peace would not be disturbed by experiments. . . . We cannot shove the South back as territories, and all steps to that end must fail for many reasons, if no other than that it compels the people already there to assume an hostile attitude. The well-disposed of the South must again be trusted—we cannot help it.

You are classed universally as one of the rising statesmen, above mere party rules. And whilst you should not separate from your party you can moderate the severity of their counsels. . . . Affectionately, W. T. SHERMAN.

THE BURNING OF COLUMBIA.

THE question as to the burning of Columbia, S. C., having been raised by Wade Hampton, General Sherman writes the two following letters on the subject, and incloses an old order, given at the time.

I have no doubt myself, and Howard, Logan, Woods, and all who were in Columbia that

night concur with me. The fire which burned up the city began about dark after I had been in six hours, and I know that great exertions were made to stop it, but there had been all day, and continued to late at night, a perfect tempest of wind, and I saw hundreds of balls of cotton on fire flying hundreds of yards. It is barely possible some malicious soldier started the fire, but I rather think this devilish spirit grew as the fire progressed. I know that the general judgment of the country is that no matter how it began it was all right; still I know that the cotton was the cause of the rapid spread of the fire, and this resulted from the fact that the bales had been ripped open with knives, so that long before the fire began the houses and trees were white with it, and it was plain a spark would spread like gunpowder. It was not specially my business, for Howard was in actual command of the troops in Columbia, but being present in person the world holds me responsible. I would like you to introduce the petition, and to say that I have no doubt as to the parties responsible for all the consequences.

It was not until the day after the conflagration that I destroyed the arsenal, and other public factories, which were in the suburbs, and had escaped the fire that burned the town. Affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

ST. LOUIS, Mo., April 2, 1866.

DEAR BROTHER: I know the railroad depot and three large bridges were burned *before* a soldier of ours had entered Columbia, and I know that six hours before the real conflagration began I saw half a dozen piles of cotton *on fire*, in the streets, one large pile near the market-house where the great conflagration began, which fire our soldiers were putting out as I rode by it. . . . Wade Hampton defended Columbia as long as he dared, and then ran away, leaving the city full of cotton blowing about like flakes of snow, so that trees, and frame-houses, and garden fences, were literally white. Of course a mayor could expect no terms—being helpless he took what he could get. I told him of course I had no intention to burn or destroy anything, except what my previous orders defined. I saw Wade Hampton's cotton order printed in a Columbia paper, but kept no copy, as it was notorious, for he openly declared that Yankee footsteps should not pollute his threshold, and he commanded everything like corn fodder to be burnt lest we should get it.

They boasted that we would find a Moscow and its consequences. . . . The treatment of our officers and prisoners at Columbia was enough to have warranted its utter annihilation, and after the fire began it required all our efforts to

prevent its extending to the suburbs, including the Old Hampton house,—now owned by Preston, brother-in-law of Wade Hampton,—which was saved by John Logan. Affectionately yours,

W. T. SHERMAN.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE
MISSISSIPPI.

IN THE FIELD, NEAR COLUMBIA, S. C.,
Feb. 16, 1865.

Special Field Orders, No. 26:

. . . General Howard will cross the Saluda and Broad rivers as near their mouths as possible, occupy Columbia, destroy the public buildings, railroad property, manufacturing and machine shops; but will spare libraries and asylums and private dwellings. He will then move to Winnsboro', destroying en route utterly that section of the railroad. . . .

By order of Major-general W. T. SHERMAN.
L. M. DAYTON, *Assistant Adjutant-general*.

This order was made the day before we entered Columbia, about the time the rebels were cannonading our camps on the west side of the Congaree, and burning their three splendid bridges (Saluda and Broad unite at Columbia and make the Congaree). During the 16th, Howard crossed the Saluda at the factory above Columbia, and that night crossed Stone's brigade to the east side of the Broad River, and under its cover laid the pontoon bridge, completing it about noon of the 17th. Stone's brigade went into Columbia about 11 A. M., the mayor having come out 3 miles and notified him that Beauregard and Hampton had evacuated. They evacuated because they knew that Slocum and Kilpatrick were moving straight for Winnsboro', 26 miles to their rear, and I wanted them to stay in Columbia another day. Their hasty evacuation was not to spare Columbia, but to save being caught in the forks of the Congaree and Catawba, which would have resulted had they given time for Slocum to reach Winnsboro'. Mayor Goodwin complained to me of the cotton-burning order of Wade Hampton—and especially that Hampton and Beauregard would not consent to his request that the liquor (which had run the blockade, and been transferred from the coast to Columbia for safety) was not [should be] removed or destroyed. This liquor, which our men got in bucketfuls, was an aggravation, and occasioned much of the disorder at night after the fires had got headway. We all know how the soldiers and junior officers hated South Carolina, and I can hardly say what excesses would have resulted had the general officers allowed them free scope. . . .

W. T. SHERMAN.

The latter part of March, 1866, John Sherman says in a long letter on family matters:

You may have noticed that I have been in Connecticut making two speeches. That at Bridgeport is reported in full in the "New-York Times" of yesterday. Our difficulties here are not over; Johnson is suspicious of every one, and I fear will drift into his old party relations. If so, he will carry with him but little peace and prestige, and will soon be in deserved disgrace. It is also evident that Grant has some political aspirations, and can, if he wishes it, easily attain the presidency.

And on April 23, he writes:

DEAR BROTHER: So little attention is paid to Wade Hampton's gasconade that I do not think it worth while to give it importance by an answer. Indeed, I do not find it printed in any Northern paper, and having sent you the only copy I have seen I find it impossible to get another. The materials of a reply are on hand, and are entirely satisfactory, but I will let it rest until the charge is taken up by some one else.

As for the civil rights bill, I felt it so clearly right that I was prepared for the very general acquiescence in its provisions both North and South. To have refused the negroes the simplest right granted to every other inhabitant, native or foreigner, would be outrageous; and to confess that our government is strong enough to compel their military services, and yet not strong enough to secure them the right to acquire and hold property, would involve a gross inconsistency. I hope this bill will be made the basis of a compromise. If fairly enforced in the South, the public mind will be satisfied for the negro to take his chances for political privileges. . . . Affectionately,

JOHN SHERMAN.

THE REVOLT AGAINST ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1866.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I meet a great many from the South whom I knew before the war, and I confess I am gratified with their sentiments and conduct. If they could now see their manifest interests to accept the recent adjustment or amendment to the Constitution as a reasonable and fair settlement, the South would soon be resurrected into greater wealth and power. I only fear their political alliance with the pestilent copperheads of the North, and thus perpetuate sectional enmity. I really fear that Johnson, who is an honest man, will from sheer stubbornness and bitter dislike to Stevens and a few others lend himself to this faction. The very moment the South will agree

to a firm basis of representation, I am for general amnesty, and a repeal of the test oaths. But the signs of the times indicate another tiring political contest. I see no way to avoid it. I will have to take part in it, but you can, and I hope will, stand aloof. Don't commit yourself to any political faction, and don't fail to remember that the republican or anti-slavery, and now anti-rebel, feeling is deeper and stronger than any other in the Northern States. We could surely contend with a manly fighting rebel like your friend, but never will with those who raised the white flag in the rear. . . . Affectionately,
JOHN SHERMAN.

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1866.

MY DEAR BROTHER: . . . I read your speech at Salem and like it. It is now wise for you to avoid all expressions of political opinion. Congress and the President are drifting from each other into open warfare. Congress is not weak in what it has done, but in *what it has failed to do*. It has adopted no unwise or extreme measures. The civil rights bill and constitutional amendments can be defended as reasonable, moderate, and in harmony with Johnson's old position and yours. As Congress has thus far failed to provide measures to allow legal senators and representatives to take their seats, it has failed in a plain duty. This is its weakness; but even in this it will have the sympathy of the most of the soldiers and people who are not too eager to secure rebel political power. As to the President, he is becoming Tylerized. He was elected by the Union party for his openly expressed radical sentiments, and now he seeks to rend to pieces this party. There is a sentiment among the people that this is dishonor. It looks so to me. What Johnson is is from and by the Union party. He now deserts it and betrays it. He may varnish it up, but after all he must admit that he disappoints the reasonable expectations of those who intrusted him with power.

He may by a coalition with copperheads and rebels succeed, but the simple fact that nine tenths of them who voted for him do not agree with him, and that he only controls the other tenth by power intrusted to him by the Union party, will damn him forever. Besides, he is insincere; he has deceived and misled his best friends. I know he led many to believe he would agree to the civil rights bill, and nearly all who conversed with him until within a few days believed he would acquiesce in the amendments, and even aid in securing their adoption. I almost fear he contemplates civil war. Under these circumstances, you, Grant, and Thomas ought to be clear of political complications. As for myself I intend to stick to finance, but, wherever I can, will moderate the actions of the

Union party, and favor conciliation and restoration.

Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

The political situation in Ohio made it necessary for John Sherman to return there soon after he had started on a trip to the West.

MANSFIELD, October 26, 1866.

DEAR BROTHER: Your letter of the 20th has been received. I thought and was glad to hear that you had a charming trip. I saw enough of the mountain region to give me a new estimate of its great value. In some respects I regret that I did not go with you, but, situated as I am, it was extremely fortunate that I returned as I did. My political position ought not to be misunderstood, but unfriendly critics took occasion of my absence in the canvass to attribute it to duplicity or cowardice. The President's course on the civil rights bill and constitutional amendment was so unwise that I could not for a moment allow any one to suppose that I meant with him to join a coalition of rebels and copperheads. Besides, Johnson was elected by a party upon professions before and after his election and inauguration so pointedly different from his recent course that it appeared to me a betrayal of those who trusted his profession, and therefore in the highest sense dishonorable. But worse than all, his turning out good men—sometimes wounded soldiers—merely because they adhered to their party connections, and putting in men who opposed

the war throughout, is simply an unmitigated outrage that will stain the name of any man connected with such conduct. This was the deliberate judgment of *nearly every man in the Union party*, and this feeling was intensified by the President's conduct in his recent tour, when he sunk the presidential office to the level of a grog-house.

I do trust you will not connect your name with this administration. You lose in every way by it. Grant ought not to ask it, for in the common judgment it places you in equivocal relations with him. You will have all the odium earned by disappointment in the reorganization of the army, and will have a more difficult, delicate, and responsible duty to discharge, in which you can gain no credit and may lose much. Besides, it connects you as a partizan with Johnson—just what he wants, but what you ought to dread. What can you think of the recent telegrams about your private letter? If you wrote a private letter, what business had they to make it public in the most offensive way by innuendo. Grant and you are above the ephemera of party politics, and for the sake of the country I hope will keep so. Let Johnson take Cowan, or some one of the score that left the Union party with him, but my convictions are so strong that you ought not to play administrator "de bonis non" of Stanton that I write this freely. If you conclude otherwise I can only say I will deeply regret it. Affectionately, JOHN SHERMAN.

CAPRICE.

I.

THE forest edge I wandered by,
While it was cool from night;
Out from the ferns a butterfly
Flashed fluttering into light,
Pulsing through the golden sky
In little thrills of flight.

II.

I followed—why, I could not tell;
Whither, I did not care:
The chimes of some far chapel-bell
Made tremulous an air
Fragrant with thyme and asphodel,
Too faint to lift a prayer.

V.

"So—go to mass, my child," said I,
"With book and rosary,
Forget the sea-fowl's angry cry;
But shouldst thou pray for me,
Tell thy dear God his butterfly
Has fluttered out to sea."

III.

I marked the butterfly to where
The sea beat on the sand;
Its beating stunned the summer air,
Its gray breath chilled the land.
A little girl was walking there,
A prayer-book in her hand.

IV.

"Where dost thou go, my little maid,
So near the waves so high?
And art thou never, then, afraid
To hear the sea-fowl's cry?"
"Kind sir, I go to mass," she said,
"And the dear God is nigh."

IV.

LETTERS OF TWO BROTHERS.

PASSAGES FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF GENERAL AND SENATOR SHERMAN.

RELATIONS OF GRANT AND SHERMAN AFTER THE WAR.

GENERAL SHERMAN'S MISSION TO MEXICO.



AFTER returning from his Western trip, General Sherman was summoned to Washington in October, 1866, by the President, who wished to make him Secretary of War.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 31, 1866.

DEAR BROTHER: I got your letter, and have this morning answered by telegraph, but wish to write more fully. When here last winter I did not call to say good-by to the President, and wrote him a good letter of apology, inclosing my good wishes for his success in his professed desire to accomplish in his term of office the restoration of civil government all over our land. When I got into Riley I received a despatch from the President asking leave to publish it. I answered that he could publish anything I ever wrote if it would do any good, if Mr. Stanbery would advise it, but desiring, if possible, to avoid any controversy. On this he did not publish—and I have not made any request in the premises. I don't believe he will publish it, and I don't care much, for it contains nothing more than I thought then—viz., in February last. When I got here there was a move to send Grant to Mexico with [Lewis D.] Campbell in an advisory capacity. Grant could not then be put to one side in that way, and on my arrival I found out that the President was aiming to get Grant out of the way and me in, not only as Secretary of War, but to command the army, on the supposition that I would be more friendly to him than Grant. Grant was willing I should be Secretary of War, but I was not. I would not be put in such a category, and after much pro and con we have settled down that I shall go with Campbell. The Secretary of the Navy is preparing a steamer for us, and it will be ready next week at New York, whence we will go forth to search for the government of Mexico, not a task at all to my liking, but I cheerfully consented because it removes at once a crisis. Both Grant and I desire to keep plainly and strictly to our duty in the army, and not to be construed as partizans. We must be prepared to serve every administration as it arises. We recognize Mr. Johnson as the lawful President, without committing

ourselves, in the remotest degree, to an approval or disapproval of his specific acts. We recognize the present Congress as the lawful Congress of the United States, and its laws binding on us and all alike, and we are most anxious to see somehow or other the Supreme Court brought in to pass on the legal and constitutional differences between the President and Congress.

We see nothing objectionable in the proposed amendments to the Constitution, only there ought to have been some further action on the part of Congress committing it to the admission of members when the amendments are adopted; also the minor exceptions to hold office, etc., should be relaxed as the people show an adherence to the national cause. . . . I feel sure the President is so in the habit of being controlled by popular majorities that he will yield. Save he may argue against Congress, and in favor of his own past expressed opinions, Congress should not attempt an impeachment or interference with the current acts of the executive, unless some overt act clearly within the definition of the Constitution be attempted, of which I see no signs whatever. Some very bad appointments have been made, but I find here that he was backed by long lists of names that were Union men in the war. Of course our army cannot be in force everywhere, to suppress riots in the South, Indians in that vast region, only a part of which we saw, where whites and Indians both require watching, and the thousand and one duties that devolve on us. This army can never be used in the political complications; nothing more than to hold arsenals, depots, etc., against riots, or to form a nucleus of an army of which Congress must provide the laws for government and the means of support. Neither the President nor Congress ought to ask us of the army to manifest any favor or disfavor to any political measures. We are naturally desirous for harmonious action—for peace and civility. We naturally resist the clamor of temporary popular changes, but as each administration comes in we must serve the executive and the War Department with seeming friendship.

I have called on Mr. Stanton, who received me with all cordiality, and placed at my dis-

posal ample means to execute my present task with ease and comfort.

I start from here to-night, and will reach St. Louis on Friday night, ready to start for New York as soon as the vessel is ready, and as soon as Campbell is ready, say all next week. I don't know that I can come by way of Mansfield, as you see I must move fast—staying every spare minute I can at home. Write me fully, and let us all pull together and get past this present difficulty; then all will be well. . . . Yours affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

On November 11, General Sherman sailed on the U. S. ship *Susquehanna* on his mission to Mexico.

U. S. S. *Susquehanna*, OFF SANDY HOOK,
Nov. 11, 1866.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I had to make this trip to escape a worse duty, and to save another person from a complication that should be avoided.

I am determined to keep out of political or even quasi-political office, and shall resign before being so placed, though I cannot afford to resign.

I hope that Congress will not let power pass into the hands of such men as Butler, Phillips, etc.—extreme men, as much so as Davis, Cobb, etc. We have escaped one horn of the dilemma, and ought, if possible, the other. But it is too late to argue anything; but I feel that if we cannot be calm and temperate in our country we have no right to go to Mexico to offer ourselves as their example and special friends. You can write me through the Navy Department, as I may run to New Orleans, where Sheridan could hold a letter for me; but I expect little the next two months. Affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 3, 1866.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I was heartily glad you got out of the War Department. The mission to Mexico is a very honorable one, and with your views on "annexation" is a very safe one for the country. We all hope that the French will go out, and that you will keep the United States out. We want as little to do with Mexico politically as possible, and as much trade with her as is profitable. She is terribly in need of a strong government, and if her mixed population would elect you or some other firm military ruler as emperor or king, it would be lucky for her, but a bad business for the "elected one." I have never seen the elements of a stable government in Mexico, but she has physical resources that might, under a firm ruler, make her the second power in America. Self-government is out of the question. The worst

enemies of Mexico are her own mixed, ignorant population. If Maximilian could have held on, he would have secured them physical prosperity; but sooner or later the pride of our people, aroused against European intervention, would have got us into a quarrel with him. It is therefore best that he leave. What you can do for or with Mexico we will see. Your military reputation, and aptitude with all classes, may help to bring order out of chaos. . . .

Your reception at Havana must have been grateful, and the whole Mexican trip will, no doubt, close agreeably for you a year of trials and ovations. If they don't make you emperor down there we will welcome you back as the "republicanizer" of the worst anarchy on the globe. If you establish Juarez, come away by all means in hot haste before the next pronunciamiento.

As for domestic matters, Congress meets to-morrow very much irritated at the President. As for Butler or impeachment, you need not fear we will follow the one or attempt the other. Johnson ought to acquiesce in the public judgment—agree to the amendment, and we will have peace. The personal feeling grows out of the wholesale removal of good Union men from office. Campbell is as responsible for this as any man in Ohio; while I was under a cloud for being friendly to Johnson, and absent from the State, they turned out all my special friends, and put in copperheads. . . . Affectionately,

JOHN SHERMAN.

BRASOS, SANTIAGO, Dec. 7, 1866.

DEAR BROTHER: We have nearly completed the circle without finding Juarez, who is about as far away as ever up in Chihuahua, for no other possible purpose than to be where the devil himself cannot get at him.

I have not the remotest idea of riding on mule-back a thousand miles in Mexico to find its chief magistrate, and although the French go away and Maximilian follow, I doubt if Juarez can be made to trust his life and safety to his own countrymen. We found Vera Cruz in possession of the French Maximilian, and we found Tucapiso in possession of local troops in the interest of Maximilian, but they had not the remotest idea where we should look for Juarez. We have just reached here, and shall to-morrow go up to Matamoros to meet General Escobedo, who can possibly fix some date when Juarez will come within reach of civilization.

The truth is that these Mexicans were and are still as unable as children to appreciate the value of time. They shrug their shoulders, and exclaim, "Juin sabe," (God knows), and "Poco tiempo" (In a short time), utterly regardless of combinations with others.

Mr. Campbell can deal with none but Juarez, and the republican government he represents, and that government partakes of the characteristics of Mexicans — viz., indecision and utter want of combination.

I believe the French want to leave, but would like to bring us into the scrape. Their scheme of giving Mexico a stable government has cost them 200,000,000 of gold, and the whole conception was in hostility to us, to be ready to reabsorb the old Louisiana purchase, where, as Napoleon calculated, our Union had failed. But our Union has not failed, and the French are willing to go; but they are scattered, and must collect before they can march for the sea-coast to embark. By reason of the everlasting contest between the rival factions of Mexico, the property-holders desire some sort of stable government, and these favor Maximilian. He may attempt to remain after the French go, but I think would soon be forced to go. Then Mexico must of necessity settle her own difficulties. Some think she can, some that she cannot, without our aid. This cannot be done without Congress, and on that point I am no advocate. All I can say is, that Mexico does not belong to our system. All its northern part is very barren and costly. Its southern part is very good, tropical country, but not suited to our people or pursuits. Its inhabitants are a mixture of Indians, negroes, and Spanish that can never be tortured into good citizens, and would have to be exterminated before the country could be made available to us. I am obeying orders, and not carrying out a project of my own, and it is well you should understand it, though I cannot impart it to others.

I don't know what policy the administration has adopted, but I should deplore anything that would make us assume Mexico in any shape — its territory, its government, or its people. Still, the French occupation, designed in hostility to us, should be made to terminate.

Affectionately, W. T. SHERMAN.

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1866.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . On the whole, I am not sorry that your mission failed, since the French are leaving; my sympathies are rather with Maximilian. The usual factions of Ortega and Juarez will divide the native population, while Maximilian can have the support of the clergy and property. They are a miserable set, and we ought to keep away from them. Here political strife is hushed, and the South have two months more in which to accept the constitutional amendment. What folly they exhibit! To me Johnson and the old *encrustated* politicians, who view everything in the light of thirty years ago, seem like blind guides. After March

4 they will rally to the amendment, and it will then be too late. . . . Very truly yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

GENERAL SHERMAN returned to St. Louis from Mexico by way of New Orleans.

ST. LOUIS, SUNDAY, December 30, 1866.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I came up from New Orleans right through the country that I had been the means of raiding so thoroughly, and did not know but that I should hear some things that would not be pleasant; but on the contrary, many people met me all along the road in the most friendly spirit. I spent a whole day at Jackson, Mississippi, where chimney-stacks and broken railroads marked the presence of Sherman's army. But all sorts of people pressed to see me, and evinced natural curiosity, nothing more. . . .

I have a despatch from Mr. Stanton saying that my action in the delicate mission to Mexico meets the approval of the President, the cabinet, and himself, so I got out of that scrape easily. I do not want to come to Washington, but to stay here quietly as long as possible. When Grant goes to Europe, then I will be forced to come. The longer that is deferred, the better for me. Affectionately, W. T. SHERMAN.

NEGRO SUFFRAGE AND RECONSTRUCTION.

GENERAL SHERMAN, having been summoned to Washington, writes from St. Louis on January 8, 1867.

DEAR BROTHER. . . . I need not say I don't want to come. There can be no satisfaction to me in being drawn into the vortex of confusion in which public affairs seem to be. I cannot do or say anything that will influence either the President or Congress. If the President be impeached, and the South reduced to territories, the country will of course relapse to a state of war or quasi-war, and what good it is to do passes my comprehension. Our debt is already as much as the country can stand, and with Indians and local troubles we will have full employment for all the regular army. I suppose the Southern States will then require a standing army of an hundred thousand men, and it would be prudent to provide them before the emergency is created.

ABOUT this time General Sherman writes:

. . . I got your letter a few days ago, and am glad you feel so confident of the political situation. I am not alarmed at the fact that universal suffrage, blacks, whites, Chinese, and Indians, is to be the basis, but the devil comes when we will be forced to contract the right

of suffrage. It is easy enough to roll downhill, but the trouble is in getting back again; but I am out, and shall keep out. . . .

. . . G. A. Custer, lieutenant-colonel, Seventh cavalry, is young, *very* brave, even to rashness—a good trait for a cavalry officer. He came to duty immediately on being appointed, and is ready and willing now to fight the Indians. He is in my command, and I am bound to befriend him. I think he merits confirmation for military service already rendered, and military qualities still needed (youth, health, energy, and extreme willingness to act and fight). . . .

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1867.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . You will have noticed that my name is connected with the reconstruction law. I did nothing but reduce and group the ideas of others, carefully leaving open to the South the whole machinery of reconstruction. The bill was much injured by the additions in the House, but, after all, there is nothing obnoxious to the South in it but general suffrage. This they must take, and the only question is whether they will take it in their own way by their own popular movements, or whether we will be compelled at the next session to organize provisional governments. I hope and trust they will learn wisdom from the past; can't you in some way give them that advice? Three years ago they hated you and Johnson most of all men; now your advice goes farther than any two men of the nation. We will adjourn soon until November next. The impeachment movement has so far been a complete failure. Butler and Logan are reinforcements, but will effect nothing. The President has only to forward and enforce the laws as they stand, and he is safe. He ought not to, and must not, stand in the way of the determined movement to recognize the rebel States. He has had his way and it failed; he ought now fairly to try the Congressional way. I think some of going to Paris in April. I am tendered an honorary membership of the commission, and a free passage. The occasion is tempting; if I go, it will be about the middle of April. Affectionately, JOHN SHERMAN.

A COMPLIMENT FROM LOUIS NAPOLEON.

AFTER a short and hurried trip abroad, John Sherman writes:

UNITED STATES SENATE, July 15, 1867.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I have no time to write you more as to my trip, except to convey the earnest personal message sent by Emperor Louis Napoleon to you. He asked me to say to you in his name that he considered

you the genius of our war, and that he had for you as a military man the highest regard. He and his court treated me with unusual attention, no doubt partly on your account. You would have been received with much heartiness. While I am glad you abandoned that excursion, yet I hope you will arrange to go this winter to Paris and London.

The Indian war is an inglorious one. We will probably pass a bill to authorize you and others to make a treaty with the Indians, with a view to gather them into reservations. I have many things to write about, but must defer them for the present. Affectionately yours,
JOHN SHERMAN.

ABOUT this time Congress appointed General Sherman a member of a Commission to investigate the Indian troubles, and to make treaties with the Indians.

MADISON, WISCONSIN, August 3, 1867.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . As I expected, I am on the detail,¹ and have official notice that I shall be required in St. Louis, Tuesday, August 6. . . . I got your message from Napoleon. He sent me a similar message by Schofield, but I would hardly venture to France as the representative of our military system, as it would subject me to heavy expense and much trouble.

Grant told me he would not accept a nomination for President, and if he departs from this, his natural conclusion, it will be by side influence, and because no good candidate has thus far been brought forward by the ruling party. I don't think he has clearly defined political opinions, but would let Congress and the departments work out the problem of the future, which is probably better than to form a theory and force matters to conform to it. . . . Yours affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN.

GRANT AS A SPHINX.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, August 9, 1867.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . It is now becoming extremely important to know precisely what Grant wants in connection with the Presidency. If he has really made up his mind that he would like to hold that office he can have it. Popular opinion is all in his favor. His position is the rare one of having that office within his easy reach, and yet it is clear that his interest is against his acceptance. The moment he is nominated he at once becomes the victim of abuse, and even his great services will not shield him. Our politics for years will be a maelstrom, destroying and building up reputations with rapidity. My conviction is clear that Grant ought not to change his present position

¹ Indian Commission.

to that of President; and if he declines, then by all odds Chase is the safest man for the country. He is wise, politic, and safe. Our finances, the public credit, and the general interests of all parts of the country will be safe with him. His opinions are advanced on the suffrage question, but this waived, he would be a most conservative President. He is not a partizan, scarcely enough so for his own interests; still, if Grant wishes to be President, all other candidates will have to stand aside. I see nothing in his way unless he is foolish enough to connect his future with the Democratic party. This party cannot dictate the next President. They would deaden any man they praise. Even Grant could not overcome any fellowship with them. If they should take a wise course in future political questions, their course during the war will bar their way. You may not think so, but I know it. The strength is with the Republicans, not of the Butler stripe, but with just that kind of men who would be satisfied with the position of Grant. The suffrage and reconstruction questions will be settled before the election, and in such a way as to secure the Republican party an even chance in every Southern State except Kentucky. . . .

I agree with you that Indian wars will not cease until all the Indian tribes are absorbed in our population, and can be controlled by constables instead of soldiers.

I mean to remain as quiet as possible this fall. I am not now in high favor with the Radicals, and can afford to wait awhile. The election in Ohio will go as usual. The suffrage amendment will be adopted by a close vote, and that will settle forever the negro question in Ohio. A reaction and struggle may occur in the South, but no change will occur in the loyal States until they divide on financial questions. This is inevitable after the next election. . . . Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

HEADQUARTERS, OMAHA, NEBRASKA,
September 12, 1867.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . As to politics, I hardly know if I should approach Grant, as I can hardly judge of the influences that have operated on him since we were together last November. In accepting the acting office of Secretary of War, I doubt not he realized the delicacy of his position, and was willing to risk the chances. It is not for the interest of the United States that in a temporary political office he should sink his character as a military officer. In the former he should be in harmony with the executive, but in the latter he should be simply a high sheriff to execute the process of the court. My belief is that Congress cannot qualify the President's right to

command the army and navy. He is the constitutional commander-in-chief. But Congress can make rules and laws for the government of the army, and thereby control the President as such commander-in-chief. In trying to arraign the President and General Grant in antagonism Congress did wrong, and reaction is sure to result. It damages all parties, because few people take the trouble to study out the right; yet time moves along so rapidly, and the election of a new President will soon settle these and all kindred questions.

Your course has been fair, and you cannot wish to alter or amend it. Our country ought not to be ruled by the extreme views of Sumner or Stevens any more than by the extreme views of Calhoun, Yancey and Co., that have produced our civil war. There is some just middle course, and events will flow into it whether any one man or set of men is wise enough to foresee it and lay down its maxims. I think Chase is the ablest man of his school, and I would personally prefer him to Wade, Colfax, or any of the men whose names I notice in this connection. Whether the precedent of a chief-justice being a political aspirant may not be bad, I don't know. This is the Mexican rule, and has resulted in anarchy.

I don't think Grant, Sheridan, Thomas, or any real military man wants to be President. All see that however pure or exalted their past reputations may have been, it don't shield them from the lies and aspersions of a besotted press. He¹ writes me in the most unreserved confidence, and never has said a word that looks like wanting the office of President, His whole nature is to smooth over troubles, and he waits with the most seeming indifference under false and unjust assertions till the right time, when the truth peeps out so as to defy contradiction. . . . Affectionately, W. T. SHERMAN.

HOT WATER AND IMPEACHMENT OF THE PRESIDENT.

EARLY in October, 1867, General Sherman was again summoned to Washington by the President.

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1867.

DEAR BROTHER: I have no doubt you have been duly concerned about my being summoned to Washington.

It was imprudently done by the President without going through Grant. But I think I have smoothed it over so that Grant does not feel hurt. I cannot place myself in a situation even partially antagonistic with Grant. We must work together. Mr. Johnson has not offered me anything, only has talked over every subject, and because I listen to him patiently

¹ Grant.

and make short and decisive answers, he says he would like to have me here. Still he does not oppose my going backhome. . . . On Monday I will start for St. Louis by the Atlantic and G. W. road, and pass Mansfield Tuesday. Can't you meet me and ride some miles? I have been away from home so much, and must go right along to Fort Laramie, that I cannot well stop at Cleveland or Mansfield, and would like to see you for an hour or so to hear your views of the coming events. . . . Yours affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

And on his return to St. Louis he continues :

. . . I have always talked kindly to the President, and advised Grant to do so. I do think that it is best for all hands that his administration be allowed to run out its course without threatened or attempted violence. Whoever begins violent proceedings will lose in the long run. Johnson is not a man of action, but of theory, and so long as your party is in doubt as to the true mode of procedure, it would be at great risk that an attempt be made to displace the President by a simple law of Congress. This is as much as I have ever said to anybody. I have never by word or inference given anybody the right to class me in opposition to, or in support of, Congress.

On the contrary, I told Mr. Johnson that from the nature of things he could not dispense with a Congress to make laws and appropriate money, and suggested to him to receive and make overtures to such men as Fessenden, Trumbull, Sherman, Morgan, and Morton, who, though differing with him in abstract views of constitutional law and practice, were not destructive; that if the Congressional plan of reconstruction succeeded, he could do nothing, and if it failed, or led to confusion, the future developed results in his favor, etc., and that is pretty much all I have ever said or done. At the meeting of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee on the 13th inst., I shall be forced to speak, if here, and though I can confine myself purely to the military events of the past, I can make the opportunity of stating that in no event will I be drawn into the complications of the civil politics of this country.

If Congress could meet and confine itself to current and committee business, I feel certain that everything will work along quietly till the nominations are made, and a new Presidential election will likely settle the principle if negroes are to be voters in the States without the consent of the whites.

This is more a question of prejudice than principle, but a voter has as much right to his prejudices as to his vote. . . . Yours affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, November 1, 1867.

DEAR BROTHER: I see no real occasion for trouble with Johnson. The great error of his life was in not acquiescing in, and supporting, the amendment of the first session of Thirty-ninth Congress. This he could easily have carried. It referred the suffrage question to each State, and if adopted long ago, the whole controversy would have culminated; or if further opposed by the extreme Radicals, they could be easily beaten. Now I see nothing short of universal suffrage and universal amnesty as the basis. When you come on I suggest that you give out that you go on to make your annual report, and settle Indian affairs. Give us notice when you will be on, and come directly to my house, where we will make you one of the family. Grant, I think, is inevitably a candidate. He allows himself to drift into a position where he can't decline if he would, and I feel sure he don't want to decline. My judgment is that Chase is better for the country, and for Grant himself, but I will not quarrel with what I cannot control.

JOHN SHERMAN.

And later he writes :

If you can keep free from committals to Johnson, you will, surely as you live, be called upon to act as President. The danger now is that the mistakes of the Republicans may drift the Democratic party into power. If so, the Rebellion is triumphant, and no man active in suppressing it will be trusted or honored. Grant is not injured by his correspondence with Johnson, but no doubt feels annoyed. . . .

ST. LOUIS, February 14, 1868.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I am again in the midst of trouble occasioned by a telegram from Grant saying that the order is out for me to come to the command of the Military Division of the Atlantic, headquarters at Washington. The President repeatedly asked me to accept of some such position, but I thought I had fought it off successfully, though he again and again reverted to it. Now it seems he has ordered it, and it is full of trouble for me. I wrote him one or two letters in Washington which I thought positive enough, but have now written another, and if it fails in its object, I might as well cast about for new employment. There is not room on board of one ship for more than one captain. If Grant intends to run for President, I would be willing to come on, because my duties would then be so clearly defined that I think I could steer clear of the breakers; but now it would be impossible. The President would make use of me to beget violence, a condition of things that ought not to exist now. He has no right to

use us for such purposes, though he is commander-in-chief. I did suppose his passage with Grant would end there, but now it seems he will fight him as he has been doing Congress. I don't object if he does so himself, and don't rope me in. . . .

If the President forces me into a false position out of seeming favor, I must defend myself. It is mortifying, but none the less inevitable. Affectionately, W. T. SHERMAN.

A few days after this General Sherman went to Washington in response to the President's order, and while there had several interviews with the President relating to the change of his command. He objected very strongly to any such change, because he felt that he could not hold a command in Washington without interfering with Grant's interests, and because he had a rooted objection to living in Washington in the midst of the turmoil of politics. These objections were embodied in three letters which General Sherman wrote, and showed to Grant before he sent them to the President. One of them found its way into the public press, and created a disturbance which called forth the following letters:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,

WASHINGTON, D. C., February 22, 1868.

HON. J. SHERMAN, U. S. Senate.

DEAR SIR: The "National Intelligencer" of this morning contains a private note which General Sherman sent to the President whilst he was in Washington, dictated by the purest kindness and a disposition to preserve harmony, and not intended for publication. It seems to me the publication of that letter is calculated to place the general in a wrong light before the public, taken in connection with what correspondents have said before, evidently getting their inspiration from the White House. As General Sherman afterward wrote a semi-official note to the President, furnishing me a copy, and still later a purely official one, sent through me, which placed him in his true position, and which have not been published, though called for by the House, I take the liberty of sending you these letters to give you the opportunity of consulting General Sherman as to what action to take upon them. In all matters where I am not personally interested I would not hesitate to advise General Sherman how I would act in his place. But in this instance, after the correspondence I have had with Mr. Johnson, I may not see General Sherman's interest in the same light that others see it, or that I would see it in if no such correspondence had occurred. I am clear in this however: the correspondence here inclosed to you should not be made public except by the President, or with the full sanction of General Sherman. Prob-

bly the letter on the 31st of January,¹ marked confidential, should not be given out at all. Yours truly,
U. S. GRANT.

The following letter was addressed to the editor of the "National Intelligencer":

UNITED STATES SENATE CHAMBER,
WASHINGTON, February 22, 1868.

GENTLEMEN: The publication in your paper yesterday of General Sherman's note to the President, and its simultaneous transmission by telegraph, unaccompanied by subsequent letters withheld by the President because they were "private," is so unfair as to justify severe censure upon the person who furnished you this letter, whoever he may be. Upon its face it is an informal, private note dictated by the purest motives, a desire to preserve harmony, and not intended for publication. How any gentlemen receiving such a note could first allow vague but false suggestions of its contents to be given out, and then to print it, and withhold other letters because they were "private," with a view to create the impression that General Sherman, in referring to "ulterior measures," suggested the violent expulsion of a high officer from his office, passes my comprehension. Still I know that General Sherman is so sensitive upon questions of official propriety in publishing papers, that he would rather suffer from this false inference than correct it by publishing another private note — and as I knew that this letter was not the only one written by General Sherman to the President about Mr. Stanton, I applied to the President for his consent to publish subsequent letters. This consent was freely given by the President, and I therefore send copies to you, and ask their publication.

These copies are furnished me from official sources, for while I knew General Sherman's opinions, yet he did not show me either of the letters to the President. During his stay here he was nervously anxious to promote harmony,—to avoid strife,—and certainly never suggested or countenanced resistance to law, or violence in any form. He no doubt left Washington with his old repugnance to politics, politicians, and newspapers very much increased by his visit here. JOHN SHERMAN.

UNITED STATES SENATE CHAMBER,
Feb. 23, 1868.

DEAR BROTHER: I received your letters and telegrams, and did not answer because events were moving so rapidly that I could say nothing but might be upset before you got the letter.

Now you can congratulate yourself upon being clear of the worst complications we have

¹ See General Sherman's "Memoirs."

ever had. Impeachment seems to be a foregone conclusion so far as the House of Representatives is concerned, based upon the alleged *forcible* expulsion of Stanton. No one disputes the right of the President to raise a question of law upon his right to remove Stanton, but the forcible removal of a man in office, claiming to be in lawfully, is like the forcible ejection of a tenant when his right of possession is in dispute. It is a trespass, an assault, a riot, or a crime, according to the result of the force. It is strange the President can contemplate such a thing, when Stanton is already stripped of power, and the courts are open to the President to try his right of removal. The President is acting very badly with respect to you. He creates the impression that you acted disingenuously with him. He has published your short, private note before you went to Annapolis, and yet refuses to publish your formal one subsequently sent him, because it was "private." The truth is he is a slave to his passions and resentments. No man can confide in him, and you ought to feel happy at your extrication from all near connection with him. . . . Grant is anxious to have your letters published, since the note referred to was published. I will see Grant and the President this evening, and if the latter freely consents, I will do it informally; but if he doubts or hesitates, I will not, without your express directions. In these times of loose confidence, it is better to submit for a time to a wrong construction than to betray confidential communications. Grant will unquestionably be nominated. Chase acquiesces, and I see no reason to doubt his election. Affectionately,

JOHN SHERMAN.

ST. LOUIS, Mo., Feb. 25, 1868.

DEAR BROTHER: I am in possession of all the news up to date, the passage of the impeachment resolution, etc., but I don't yet know if the nomination of T. Ewing, Sr., was a real thing, or meant to compromise a difficulty.

The publication of my short note of Jan. 18 is nothing to me. I have the original draft which I sent through Grant's hands, with his indorsement back to me. At the time this note must have been given to the reporter the President had an elaborate letter from me, in which I discussed the whole case, and advised against the very course he has pursued; but I don't want that letter or any other to be drawn out to complicate a case already bad enough. You may always safely represent me by saying that I will not make up a final opinion till called on to act, and I want nothing to do with these controversies until the time comes for the actual fight, which I hope to God may be avoided. If the Democratic party intend to fight on this

impeachment, which I believe they do not, you may count 200,000 men against you in the South. The negroes are no match for them. On this question the whites there will be more united than on the old issue of union and secession. I do not think the President should be suspended during trial, and if possible the Republican party should not vote on all side questions as a unit. They should act as judges, and not as partisans. The vote in the House, being a strictly party vote, looks bad, for it augurs a prejudiced jury. Those who adhere closest to the law in this crisis are the best patriots. While the floating politicians here share the excitement at Washington, the people generally manifest little interest in the game going on at Washington. Affectionately yours,

W. T. SHERMAN.

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1868.

DEAR BROTHER: Your letter of the 25th is received. I need not say to you that the new events transpiring here are narrowly watched by me. So far as I am concerned, I mean to give Johnson a fair and impartial trial, and to decide nothing until required to do so, and after full argument. I regard him as a foolish and stubborn man, doing even right things in a wrong way, and in a position where the evil that he does is immensely increased by his manner of doing it. He clearly designed to have first Grant and then you involved in Lorenzo Thomas's position, and in this he is actuated by his resentment against Stanton. How easy it would have been if he had followed your advice to have made Stanton anxious to resign, or, what is worse, to have made his position ridiculous. By his infernal folly we are drifting into turbulent waters. The only way is to keep cool, and act conscientiously. I congratulate you on your lucky extrication. I do not anticipate civil war, for our proceeding is unquestionably lawful, and if the judgment is against the President, his term is just as clearly out as if the 4th of March, 1869, was come. The result, if he is convicted, would cast the undivided responsibility of reconstruction upon the Republican party, and would unquestionably secure the full admission of all the States by July next, and avoid the dangerous questions that may otherwise arise out of the Southern vote in the Presidential election. It is now clear that Grant will be a candidate, and his election seems quite as clear. The action of North Carolina removed the last doubt of his nomination. Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

ST. LOUIS, March 14, 1868.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I don't know what Grant means by his silence in the midst of the very great indications of his receiving the no-

mination in May. Doubtless he intends to hold aloof from the expression of any opinion till the actual nomination is made, when if he accepts with a strong radical platform I will be surprised. My notion is that he thinks that the Democrats ought not to succeed to power, and that he would be willing to stand a sacrifice rather than see that result. . . . I notice that your Republicans have divided on some of the side questions on impeachment, and am glad you concede to the President the largest limits in his defense that are offered. I don't see what the Republicans can gain by shoving matters to an extent that looks like a foregone conclusion. No matter what men may think of Mr. Johnson, his office is one that ought to have a pretty wide latitude of opinion. Nevertheless, the trial is one that will be closely and sternly criticized by all the civilized world. . . . Affectionately yours,
W. T. SHERMAN.

ST. LOUIS, Mo., March 24, 1868.

I have a private letter from Grant as late as March 18, but he says not a word of his political intentions. So far as I know, he would yet be glad of a change that would enable him to remain as now. . . .

On June 11 General Sherman writes :

. . . Of course I have noticed Grant's acceptance. I take it for granted he will be elected, and I must come to Washington. I shall not, however, commit myself to this promotion till he is not only elected, but until he vacates, and I am appointed and confirmed.

And in July he writes again :

Of course Grant will be elected. I have just traveled with him for two weeks, and the curiosity to see him exhausted his and my patience. He is now cached down at his ranch eleven miles below the city.

In September John Sherman writes from Philadelphia :

Grant will surely be elected. If not, we will have the devil to pay, and will have to fight all our old political issues over again. All indications are now in favor of the overwhelming defeat of Seymour on account of the rebel and copperhead stand of the New York convention. . . .

And later he writes from Washington :

. . . I resume at once the canvass, and am working very hard. The election of Grant seems our only salvation from serious trouble.

GENERAL GRANT A PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATE.

JOHN SHERMAN spent the summer of 1868 working hard in the canvass for the State elections in Ohio. He writes on October 14 from Mansfield :

The October election is now over, but I do not yet know precise results. I write supposing that the Republicans have carried Ohio and Pennsylvania, and perhaps Indiana. Grant is much stronger than our State or Congressional ticket, and will get thousands of floating Democratic votes. I regard his election as a foregone conclusion. This canvass has been very hard upon us, and I will now take a rest. If you would like to join me we can go to the Lake, and have some fine sport hunting and fishing. This relaxation will do us both good.

And on October 30 General Sherman writes from St. Louis assuming that Grant will be elected.

The election¹ is so near at hand that further speculations are unnecessary. I have written to Grant that I can readily adjust my interests to his plans; but if he has none fixed, I prefer he should go on and exercise his office of commander-in-chief till the last moment, stepping from one office to the other on the 4th of March next, and calling me there at the last moment. I have told him I don't want to be in Washington till I can assume the command, and exercise the positive duties of commander-in-chief. . . . Yours affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN.

AFTER GRANT'S FIRST ELECTION.

ST. LOUIS, Mo., November 23, 1868.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I know that Grant esteems you highly, and will respect anything you may ask. He may offer you the Treasury Department, but I think not. He will think you more valuable in the Senate, as the Governor of Ohio and the legislature would fill your vacancy with a Democrat.

Don't approach Grant in person if you want anything. Put it in plain writing so emphatic that he will know you are in earnest, and not yielding to personal importunity. Affectionately yours,
W. T. SHERMAN.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 6, 1868.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I never expected to be appointed Secretary of the Treasury, as you suggest he might, for if he thought of it, I could not accept by reason of the political compli-

¹ The Presidential election.—EDITOR.

cation of the Ohio legislature. I would be gratified with the offer and opportunity to decline, but I suppose in this matter he will not choose to deal in compliments. . . . Affectionately,

JOHN SHERMAN.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,

ST. LOUIS, MO., December 20, 1868.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . Grant and I at Chicago had one or two stolen interviews in which he said he would leave me, as I wished, at St. Louis till the last minute, viz., March 4, and he assured me that he would oppose, if it came to him, any change as to the law in the matter of the office of general, or the diminution of salary. The only trouble is in my successor. Halleck is out of the question; Meade comes next on the list, but is not a favorite. Sheridan comes next in order, and is Grant's preference, *I think*. Thomas could not be passed over if by the accidents of war Sheridan had not *already got over him*. Thomas is universally esteemed, but was not made a regular major-general till his battle of Nashville, whereas Sheridan, at least thirteen years younger in service, was made a major-general for his Winchester battle the summer previous. So I think Sheridan will be chosen by Grant as lieutenant-general. Say not a word of this, as Grant will not wish to act till the last minute of time.

We had the most enthusiastic meeting at Chicago possible, and on the whole it was the best meeting we ever had, or ever will have again. All persons, Grant included, volunteered the most fulsome eulogies of my short address of welcome, which is badly reported in the telegraphic despatches; but it was carefully written out, and will be correctly printed when the whole proceedings are booked. Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN.

GENERAL SHERMAN'S RECEPTION IN THE SOUTH.

ST. LOUIS, Feb. 21, 1869.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . My visit South was in every sense agreeable. My old friends in Alexandria did all they could to make us welcome, and I was not allowed to pay a cent on steamboat, at the hotel, or anywhere. I visited several plantations, and saw negroes at work for wages, and seemingly as free and as conscious of their freedom as the blacks of Ohio. Boyd¹ was perfectly grateful for the books you sent him, which were in the library and marked with your name. I found my own portrait in full uniform in the

¹ Successor to General Sherman as president of Louisiana State Military School.

² Former Superintendent.

main hall, and in the library many books on our side of the war. Boyd asked me for army and navy registers, coast surveys, and railroad surveys, and other national books that I have and will send him. Of course they have their old prejudices, and labor to prevent their cause from sinking into one of pure malignity; but as to the future, he promised me to teach his pupils to love and honor the whole country. He preserves all my old letters, and we looked over many, in every one of which I took the highest national grounds, and predicted the ruin of their country.

The marble tablet, which was built over the main door, on which was cut the inscription, "By the liberality of the General Government, The Union—*Esto perpetua*," was taken out, and was found broken in pieces. I saw the deposition to that effect in Boyd's possession, but he could not say if Vallas² did it of himself, or on the order of the board of supervisors.

You remember attention was called to that inscription by my original letter of resignation, and it is probable the rebels made Vallas take it out. Anyhow, Boyd has ordered an iron casting of same size and same inscription, and promised me to place it over the door in lieu of the marble, too much broken up to be replaced.

In New Orleans I was cautioned against going to Alexandria, which was burned down at the time of the Banks expedition; but I never received more marked attention by all classes, and not a word or look reached me but what was most respectful and gratifying. In like manner I had the most pressing invitations to stop at Jackson and Canton, Mississippi, both of which places were destroyed by me. I do think some political power might be given to the young men who served in the rebel army, for they are a better class than the adventurers who have gone South purely for office. Affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

In May, 1869, General Sherman took command of the army, succeeding General Grant, and moved to Washington.

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 12, 1869.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I now do both duties, commander-in-chief and Secretary of War. The truth is, the offices both united are easier of execution than either separate, because the statutes do not clearly define the spheres of each, and a natural conflict or suspicion arises; united in one person settles all disputes. In the present attitude of things it would be a good thing to dispense with a Secretary of War, and unite army and navy in one representative in the cabinet, and let the internal revenue go into the cabinet. . . . Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY FRICTION.

FORT RICHARDSON, TEXAS, May 18, 1871.

DEAR BROTHER: I have been skirting the frontier of Texas from San Antonio to this place. Now for the first time we meet mails coming from the direction of St. Louis, and have New York "Heralds" of May 1, 2, and 3. I see the "Herald" is out in full blast for me as President. You may say for me, and publish it too, that in no event and under no circumstances will I ever be a candidate for President or any other political office; and I mean every word of it. . . . Affectionately, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN.

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 8, 1871.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . I saw General Grant when he was here some days ago, and we talked about that letter sent him, and my published declination of a nomination by either party. I told him plainly that the South would go against him *en masse*, though he counts on South Carolina, Louisiana, and Arkansas; but I repeated my conviction that all that was vital at the South was against him, and that negroes were generally quiescent, and could not be relied on as voters when local questions became mixed up with political matters. I think, however, he will be renominated and reëlected, unless by personally doing small things to alienate his party adherence at the North. . . .

My office has been by law stripped of all the influence and prestige it possessed under Grant, and even in matters of discipline and army control I am neglected, overlooked, or snubbed. I have called General Grant's attention to the fact several times, but got no satisfactory redress.

The old regulations of 1853, made by Jeff Davis, in hostility to General Scott, are now strictly construed and enforced; and in these regulations the War Department is everything, and the name of general, lieutenant-general, or commander-in-chief even, does not appear in the book. Consequently orders go to parts of the army supposed to be under my command, of which I know nothing till I read them in the newspapers; and when I call the attention of the Secretary to it he simply refers to some paragraph of the Army Regulations. Some five years ago, there was a law to revise these regulations and to make them conform to the new order of things, and to utilize the experiences of the war. A board was appointed here in Washington, composed of Sherman, Sheridan, and Auger, that did so revise them, and they were submitted to Congress with the approval of General Grant, but no action was taken. But now a new board is ordered to prepare another set, and this board is composed of a

set of officers hardly qualified to revise the judgment of the former board. I propose patiently to await the action of this board, though now that war is remote, there is little chance of Congress giving the army a thought at all; and if these new regulations are framed, as I suppose, to cripple the power of the General, and foster the heads of staff departments, I will simply notify the President that I cannot undertake to command an army with all its staff independent of the commander-in-chief, and ask him to allow me quietly to remove to St. Louis, to do such special matters as may be committed to me by the President, and leave the army to be governed and commanded, as now, by the Secretary of War in person. This cannot occur for twelve months. I have said nothing of this to anybody, and will not do anything hasty or rash; but I do think that because some newspapers berate Grant about his military surroundings, he feels disposed to go to the other extreme. . . . Affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, July 16, 1871.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . He will be nominated and, I hope, elected. So will I; and it is better for the country that in our relative position we are independent of each other. I hope you and he will preserve your ancient cordiality; for though he seems willing to strip your office of its power, yet I have no doubt he feels as warm an attachment for you as from his temperament he can to any one. You have been forbearing to him, but lose nothing by it. I have seen nothing in the course of the Republican party unfriendly to you. I know you have hosts of friends in our party, who would resent any marked injustice to you. . . . Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

GENERAL SHERMAN IN EUROPE.

PARIS, FRANCE, July 16, 1872.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . Of course I have watched the progress of political events as they appear from this standpoint, and feel amazed to see the turn things have taken. Grant, who never was a Republican, is your candidate; and Greeley, who never was a Democrat, but quite the reverse, is the Democratic candidate. I infer that Grant will be reëlected, though several shrewd judges insist that Greeley will be our next President. Choosing between the two candidates on national grounds, I surely prefer Grant; as to platforms and parties, of course, I regard these as mere traps to catch flies, but with General Grant as President there will likely be more stability and quietude, which the country needs. . . . Affectionately yours,

W. T. SHERMAN.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, Aug. 4, 1872.

DEAR BROTHER: . . . Just now all interest is centered upon the Presidential election. As you say, the Republicans are running a Democrat, and the Democrats a Republican, and there is not an essential difference in the platform of principle. The chief interest I feel in the canvass is the preservation of the Republican party, which I think essential to secure the fair enforcements of the results of the war. General Grant has so managed matters as to gain the very bitter and active hostility of many of the leading Republicans, and the personal indifference of most of the residue. He will, how-

ever, be fairly supported by the great mass of the Republicans, and I still hope and believe will be elected. The defections among Republicans will be made up of Democrats who will not vote for Greeley.

The whole canvass is so extraordinary that no result can be anticipated. You will notice that Sumner, Thurman, Banks, and others are for Greeley, who is probably the most unfit man for President, except Train, that has ever been mentioned. I intend to support Grant fairly and fully, as best for the country and Republican party. . . . Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

CONSOLATION.

O MY belovèd, sweet each hour I know
 Because it brings me closer unto you!
 Boughs make me blithe, and blades give comfort true.
 When down our sea-worn lanes red leaves drop slow,
 Soon on the stalk will not the green leaf show?
 When blows the crocus as long since it blew,
 Or willows bud by reedy wells we knew —
 As went the old, will not the young year go?
 Ah, once, drew the dark day of parting near!
 Each weather was more bitter than the last,
 And fair or sear an added sorrow bore:
 But now, belovèd, breaks that time of cheer
 When I shall see you, hear you, hold you fast;
 And each is sweeter than the one before.

Lizette Woodworth Reese.



IN EXTREMITY.

COME, science, do thy worst or little best;
 Come, patient critic, with thy searching doubt
 From scripture wonder pluck the warrant out;
 And every hope that harbors in the breast
 Be of all right and title dispossessed,
 Till, where heaven was, the dark shall rim about
 A greater darkness, and the fool shall flout
 All thought or dream of the immortal rest.

But thou, my Shakspeare, hast not tasted death:
 God were not good if thou hadst failed to know
 What joy and blessing from thy spirit flow
 For all men drawing glad or painful breath.
 And where thou art all human life must be,
 Heart of thy heart, through all eternity.

John White Chadwick.