

ago. He declared then that the opportunity of a lifetime had come to Chicago, and that if it were improved properly, the outcome would be a museum which would do for Chicago what the British Museum has done for England and the Smithsonian Institution has done for America. The first and most important work of universities, he contended, was that of research, the discovery of new facts, the deduction of new ideas from old facts; the universities of America were behind the great ones of Europe, chiefly because of the lack of libraries and museums; Chicago owed it to herself to provide, in addition to the libraries which she was supplying, a great museum which should furnish the equipment for research and investigation needed for the advancement of education; the establishment of such a museum would be a lasting benefit not only to Chicago, but to the people of neighboring cities and States.

This is a forcible and cogent statement of the case. The plan is simply one for the advancement of education and enlightenment throughout the whole Northwest. The influence of a great museum of the character described is limited only by the country itself. We need one in every group of half-dozen States at most, and if we were to have one in every State, the supply would be none too large, provided the material for their equipment could be found.

Mr. Baker proposes a total expenditure of \$1,000,000 for the building, and declares that if this were furnished, there would be forthcoming contributions of specimens and articles of historic interest aggregating \$3,000,000 in value. The whole State of Illinois ought to unite in subscribing the million desired, for the museum will be an incalculable benefit to the State as well as one of its proudest possessions. Philadelphia rejoices today in the possession of two beautiful memorials of her Exposition — Horticultural Hall and Memorial Hall, both situated in Fairmount Park, and both containing collections which are among the largest and finest of their kind in the country. Nothing would induce her to part with these, to have their beneficent influence eliminated from the community. The city and State contributed through large appropriations to the erection

of these institutions, nearly two millions of dollars going into the construction of them, but the outlay has never been regretted. It will be all the greater honor to Chicago and Illinois if they can erect their memorial by private aid alone.

#### National Justice to Postal Clerks.

THE bill for the classification of clerks in first and second class post-offices, which Congress is considering, ought to become a law without opposition. It was prepared by the National Association of Post-office Clerks, and is a measure conceived and designed for the sole purpose of securing just and fair treatment to a very hard-working and meritorious body of public servants. It fixes their compensation upon an equitable and reasonable basis, insures promotion according to service and ability, and makes faithfulness and efficiency the sole requisites for permanent employment. It is a measure in the interest of true civil-service reform, as well as national justice, since it classifies the service, makes it mandatory that all appointments to the higher grades shall be from the lower grades, on the ground of proficiency and length of service, and requires that all new appointments shall be to the lower grades after competitive examinations as required by the Civil Service Act.

Under the present system, or rather lack of system, the clerks have no classification which insures promotion according to service and ability, have long hours of labor, are poorly paid, and have no annual vacation. To say that a great and rich government like ours is justified in treating its employees in this heartless, unfair, and parsimonious manner is obviously absurd. A private employer who pursued such a course would be censured roundly by all reputable men. As a nation we are abundantly able to pay our servants fair wages, and we ought to see that it is for the best interest of the whole public to have our post-office clerks a permanent, well-drilled, intelligent, capable, and contented body of servants, for it is only from such a body that the best service can be obtained.

## OPEN LETTERS.

### The Numerical Strength of the Confederate Army.

THE total number of men who served in the Confederate army in the late war has never been ascertained. The number cannot be ascertained exactly, and perhaps cannot be very closely approximated. But there are certain evidentiary facts which have an obvious and important bearing upon the subject, but which, it appears, have not been duly weighed or understood by historians of the war.

The numerical strength of an army ought to be ascertainable in one way — that is, by enumerating the names borne upon its muster-rolls, provided, of course, that such rolls are complete and true; but if they are not, then the actual strength of such army cannot be exactly determined.

Let us refer, by way of illustration, to the Federal army rolls. Probably the rolls of a great army were never more accurate or complete. Various facts might

be cited in proof of this assertion. It will suffice to state that in the repeated inspection of these rolls from day to day in the War Department, during the whole period since the war, in order to furnish evidence to the Commissioner of Pensions relative to the claims filed in his bureau, it is of the rarest occurrence — in fact, it may be said that it is unknown and unheard of — that such rolls are ever found to omit the name of any person who served in that army. It will be perceived that this is a thorough and conclusive test. About twelve hundred thousand claims for pension have been filed since 1861. The report furnished to the Commissioner by the War Department from its records is conclusive in determining whether a claimant, or his or her deceased relative, actually served in the army of the United States in the late war. No testimony except the record is admissible. Since, therefore, in 1,200,000 claims, filed from every State and Territory, there is never a complaint upon the ground of omission of a



name from the records, it must be taken as infallible evidence that those records are correct and true. And such, beyond doubt, is the fact. The records are of course found in some cases to be meager or deficient in respect to casualties, or other facts in a soldier's history; but in preserving the *names* of those who served at one time or another, the muster-rolls have been found and demonstrated to be practically perfect, omitting the name of no man who ever served, even for a day, as a soldier in the Federal army. If this sweeping statement is subject to any rare exceptions, they are so few that they do not require to be taken into account.

It was therefore easy to determine from these rolls that the total number of *enrolments* in the Federal army for the war (counting all enlistments for short and long periods of service, and all reënlistments) was 2,672,341. This, however, is largely in excess of the total number of Federal soldiers, since a considerable percentage served under two or more terms of enlistment, so that their names are duplicated on the rolls. The terms of enlistment were for three, six, nine, and twelve months, two and three years; and many were enrolled as often as three or four times. Making allowance for the large number of reënlistments, and counting each soldier but once, it is estimated that the total number of men who served in the Federal army from first to last was about 2,200,000.

These references to the Federal rolls are made by way of illustration, and because of the contrast existing between them and the rolls of the Confederate army.

The original muster-rolls of the Confederate army, so far as they are preserved, are in the Confederate Archives Office of the War Department, having been captured with the other official records of the Confederate government at the fall of Richmond. There has never been occasion or necessity to examine these Confederate rolls in the transaction of the public business, as has been the case with respect to the Federal rolls. So far as I can learn, no officer of the War Department or other person has ever been charged with the official duty of enumerating the names upon these rolls to determine their aggregate number, and no such enumeration has ever been made. No official or other test has been applied to such rolls, to determine whether they are true and complete. The Government is publishing the "Rebellion Records," a numerous and valuable series of volumes, which will embrace the official military reports and records of both armies; the purpose being to publish the naked official records without addition or comment. But this publication will of course not contain the muster-rolls,—the mere names of the men of either army,—and therefore will not necessitate the examination of such rolls. Furthermore, the Confederate rolls were never published in any Southern State during the war; whereas, on the contrary, the Federal rolls were published in every Northern State.

While we therefore have abundant and accurate information concerning the Federal rolls and numbers, there is a corresponding dearth of information or data relative to the rolls or the true numerical strength of the Confederate army.

In North Carolina, and in some other Southern States, recent efforts have been made to compile and publish rosters of the troops furnished by such States to the Confederate army. These efforts have thrown a great

deal of light upon the subject, and have disclosed deficiencies in the rolls which are very surprising.

North Carolina is the only Southern State in which there has yet been published anything approaching a complete roster of Confederate troops. The roster in that State was published in 1882, in pursuance of an act of the State legislature, which designated Major John W. Moore, late of the 3d North Carolina Battalion, to compile and publish the same. Finding no complete rolls at the capitol, Major Moore visited Washington, and, by permission of the Secretary of War, transcribed the names from the captured rolls, and published them in four volumes. In his preface to the first volume he announces as his estimate that the State furnished to the Confederate army 150,000 troops. But his four volumes show only 104,498 names. In the preface to his last volume he revises his estimate, which he says was originally too high; but he declares his opinion that the muster-rolls omit the names of not less than twenty thousand North Carolinians who served in the Confederate army, an estimate which indicates a total of 125,000 for that State. These two official estimates, which differ by twenty-five thousand,—one of which may, perhaps, be received with as much confidence as the other,—should suffice to show the extremely dubious value of such rolls as evidence of the true strength of the Confederate army. Major Moore's statements regarding the deficiencies in the rolls are made from personal knowledge. He states, of his own knowledge, that the rolls of certain named regiments do not contain the names of "one half" of the men who actually served in them. Investigation shows that the same is true of other regiments of which he makes no mention. I will refer to the 60th, which was recruited mainly in Buncombe County, where many of its surviving officers yet reside. I am reliably informed by survivors of that regiment that at the time it was organized, in the fall of 1862, being at that time transformed from a battalion into a regiment, it numbered not far from 1200 men; and that, with subsequent recruits and conscripts added, its total strength for the war was probably upward of 1500. Yet its muster-rolls, as published in Major Moore's roster, show only 458 names—an omission of 1000 names from the rolls of one regiment!

There is another and conclusive test by which the North Carolina rolls may be judged—the test which is applied in administering the pension laws of that State. The persons entitled to pension under the laws of the State of North Carolina are principally those who were seriously wounded, and the widows of those who were killed in battle, in the Confederate army. In determining the question of service in such cases, it has been found that the published muster-rolls are wholly unreliable as evidence; that hundreds of men are known to have been killed in battle while serving in North Carolina regiments whose names are omitted from the rolls. The North Carolina pension officers, therefore, instead of accepting the muster-rolls as conclusive evidence, as such rolls are accepted by the United States Commissioner of Pensions, are compelled to disregard the rolls and to accept parole testimony to prove the fact of military service, and of death or wounds received while thus serving in the Confederate army. I am advised that there are on the pension-rolls of North Carolina 2798 widows whose husbands were



either killed in battle or died of wounds or disease while serving in that army, and that fully one third of such pensioners were enrolled without any record evidence that their husbands had ever served in the Confederate army, their names not appearing on the published muster-rolls.

The importance of these facts and the bearing which they must ultimately have in determining disputed points in the military history of the war are plainly apparent. There is one conclusion which, independent of any direct testimony bearing upon the subject, has long been settled in the minds of the principal Union commanders; namely, that the strength of the Confederate army was habitually understated in the official reports of its commanders, and has in like manner been understated since by ex-Confederate historians. This conclusion is advanced by General Grant, in his "Memoirs," as follows:

There has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number of troops engaged in every battle, or all the important battles, fought between the sections, the South magnifying the number of Union troops engaged, and belittling their own. Northern writers have fallen, in many instances, into the same error. The whole South was a military camp.

Conscription was resorted to early, and embraced every male from the age of eighteen to forty-five years. The slaves, the non-combatants, one third of the whole, were required to work in the field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to age. The four million colored non-combatants were equal to more than three times their number in the North, age for age, and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to support armies. Women did not work in the fields in the North, and children attended school. The press was free (in the North) up to the point of open treason. The copperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel successes and belittled those of the Union army.

Before the war was over, further conscription (in the South) took those between fourteen and eighteen years of age as Junior Reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty as Senior Reserves. Under such circumstances it is hard to conceive how the North showed such superiority of force in every battle fought. I know they *did not*.

General Grant's opinion was shared by other Federal commanders. Their opinions were not based upon direct evidence relating to the records, but upon their observations, and their knowledge of the resources of the Southern States in men and slaves, and of the fact that those resources were exhausted and drained to the utmost by sweeping measures of conscription. The first Confederate conscript law was enacted before the war had been in progress a year,—March, 1862,—and required the services of all white males, with few exceptions, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. In February, 1864, the law required the services of all white males between seventeen and fifty, "for the war," while boys under seventeen and men past fifty were organized into regiments of Junior and Senior Reserves. Even the "free negroes" and a certain number of "slaves" were held liable by this law for the performance of auxiliary military service.

This Confederate statute, approved February 17, 1864, entitled "An Act to increase the Efficiency of the Army," etc., provided: "That all male free negroes, and other free persons of color, between the ages of eighteen and fifty years, shall be held liable to perform such duties with the army, or in connection with the military defenses of the country, as the Secretary of War or the

commanding general of the trans-Mississippi department may from time to time prescribe; and shall receive rations and clothing and compensation at the rate of eleven dollars a month." The same act also provides for the impressment of "slaves" for the same duties, to the number of 20,000.

How many "male free negroes" or "other free persons of color" were impressed under this act, for auxiliary military service with the Confederate army, I have no means of determining.

There is another important fact touching the question of the value of the Confederate records. The records of the Confederate "conscript department" at Richmond appear to have been kept separate and apart from the muster-rolls. These appear to have been deliberately destroyed by order of the Confederate government, to prevent their falling into the hands of the Federal authorities. I have heard this statement made by Major Duffield, a Virginia officer, who declared that he had executed such orders by burning the records in the fireplaces of the building which was occupied by that department, of which he was in temporary charge.

It is easily understood that the total strength of the Confederate army from 1861 to 1865 far exceeded the number of white males in the seceded States "who were between the ages of eighteen and forty-five" as shown by the census of 1860; for that army included, in the last year of the war, men of sixty, as well as boys of sixteen, who were therefore only eleven years old at the census of 1860. The number of white males between eighteen and forty-five in North Carolina in 1860 was 115,369; yet no one pretends to estimate the North Carolina contingent to the Confederate army at less than 125,000, while Major Moore has placed on record an estimate that the State furnished 150,000. The number of white males between eighteen and forty-five in the eleven seceded States in 1860 was 1,064,253. In the three border slave States, Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland, there was the additional number of 516,175. The people of these three border States were not unevenly divided, and gave about an equal number of men to each army. It is fair to assume from these data that the State of North Carolina could not have furnished more than one tenth of the strength of the Confederate army, which, therefore, in its total aggregate must have numbered not far from a million and a half of men.

The Federal aggregate is of course conceded to have been larger, though it included many who served under short terms of enlistment, and many who, enlisted in the last year of the war, never reached the front; whereas, in the South, substantially all of the fighting men were in the ranks long before the war ended.

The larger percentage of men furnished by Southern States to the Confederate army, in proportion to the population, than was furnished by Northern States to the Union army, may be shown by a comparison of the States of North Carolina and Iowa, which were nearly equal in white population, as shown by the following figures from the census of 1860:

## TOTAL WHITE POPULATION.

North Carolina .....	629,942
Iowa .....	673,779

## TOTAL WHITE MALES BETWEEN 18 AND 45.

North Carolina .....	115,369
Iowa .....	139,316



## NUMBER OF TROOPS FURNISHED.

North Carolina, incomplete records show.....	104,498
Estimated total.....	{ 125,000
	or
Iowa, complete records.....	76,242

In the consideration of particular battles or campaigns, we naturally reflect that the disparity in numbers present at any specified battle, or in the field at a certain period, cannot be estimated by reference to the total number enrolled in either army for the war.

The disparity in strength of the opposing armies was greatest in the last year of the war, and it never could have been very great until the last year. The Confederate government drew upon their resources far more rapidly than the North; they forced their fighting men early into the field; and this in part accounts for the heroic resistance against odds which they were enabled to display more conspicuously in the closing campaigns, when nine tenths of the Confederate army were the seasoned veterans of many campaigns, while they were opposed, to a considerable extent, by raw recruits freshly drawn from the plentiful and unexhausted resources of the North. However the subject is viewed, it leads to the conclusion that General Grant was right when he emphatically denied that the Confederates were outnumbered in all the important battles of the war. It is certainly true that their muster-rolls were incomplete, and that the official reports of their commanders, therefore, could not have been exact.

Major Moore's published roster of North Carolina troops purports to show the date of enrolment of nearly all of the 104,000 men whose names are preserved on the rolls of that State. I have made a careful examination of this roster, in order to determine approximately the number who appear to have been enrolled during the years 1861 and 1862, and the number stated to have been enrolled subsequent to that period. This roster shows that of the 104,000 men whose names appear therein, about 85,000 (in round numbers) were enrolled in 1861 and 1862, and only about 19,000 subsequent to 1862. Assuming, as above stated, that the State of North Carolina furnished about one tenth of the Confederate troops, these figures indicate an aggregate of Confederate troops for the years 1861 and 1862 of about 850,000; and also that only about 190,000 were added to the Confederate army subsequent to the year 1862. It seems wholly unreasonable to assume that the Confederates raised 850,000 troops in 1861 and 1862, and only 190,000 thereafter, and yet this is the conclusion to which the North Carolina records lead. And I may add that it appears to me suggestive that these North Carolina records should thus appear to have been so full and complete for the first two years of the war, but deceptive for the last two years.

The facts here referred to point to another aspect of the subject, and suggest several inquiries: The Federal army rolls being perfect, why are the Confederate rolls so defective? How can it be accounted for that the rolls of one North Carolina regiment omit more names than are omitted from the rolls of the entire Federal army? Why did the Confederates, as stated by General Grant, "belittle their numbers in every important engagement"?

The principal ex-Confederate historians are those who held high civil or military rank in the Confeder-

ate government. They must necessarily have had knowledge of the resources of their Government, of the actual or approximate strength of their army, and of the character of their official records, whether true and accurate, or the reverse. Great inaccuracy of statement upon these points by such historians can hardly be accounted for upon the ground of ignorance.

The statements usually made by ex-Confederates regarding the strength of their army place the total at about 600,000 or 700,000; whereas, I do not think it would be difficult to demonstrate that the number was not far from 1,500,000.

Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, in his "History of the War between the States," says, "The Confederates, all told, could not have much if any exceeded 600,000." How does this statement of the historian coincide with the estimate of Major Moore that the single State of North Carolina alone furnished 150,000 troops, or with his revised estimate of 125,000, or even with the incomplete records, which show the names of 104,000 men furnished by that State?

The facts herein stated lead me to submit one suggestion, looking to further and more thorough research upon this subject. The "Rebellion Records," so called, comprising the immense mass of Federal and Confederate official reports and correspondence touching the conduct and events of the war, valuable as that publication will be, will not settle this question; and this for the reason that the official records do not show, and perhaps were not designed to show, the true, actual strength of the Confederate army. There is, I believe, but one way in which the question can ever be really settled and removed from the field of doubt and controversy, and that is by an investigation authorized by law, made by the Government, and directed especially to that object. The efforts of ordinary individual research will only invite controversy, and prove unsatisfactory. The Government has in its custody all the captured muster-rolls, but it has made no use of these invaluable historical data. The names upon these rolls should be enumerated by regiments. Investigation would then easily determine how far the rolls of any given regiment fall short of showing its true strength for the war, and how many regiments, like the 60th North Carolina, had three times as many men in their ranks as they had names upon their rolls. The Government has also, in the records of the last census, data which should show the number of Confederate survivors in 1890. The census law of 1889 did not provide for obtaining these data; but I understand that the Superintendent of the Census, in the exercise of the discretion vested in him, found that in enumerating the Federal survivors, as the law required, he could with little inconvenience also enumerate the Confederate; and that, if the other duties of his bureau do not prevent, he will compile and publish the result of such enumeration.

I am deeply impressed with the conviction that the Government at Washington, possessing as it does these important historical data, and the means which would enable it to settle this question, so far at least as it will admit of definite solution, owes it to itself, to the cause of truth and justice, and to the good name of those who fought for its preservation, thoroughly to investigate this question. It ought, at least, to authenticate and



publish every known fact and record in its custody that may throw light upon the question, to the end that history may speak the truth, and may not become the mere trumpet of ignorance and of vague conjecture.

A. B. Casselman.

#### The Illinois of Lincoln's Time.

PORTIONS of the Lincoln "Life" recall most vividly my childish recollection of the time and the people mentioned there, as well as many points told me by my mother and father.

My father was the A. T. Bledsoe referred to in the history. He practised law in the Supreme Court of Illinois, of which my grandfather, Moses O. Bledsoe, was clerk. He was an intimate associate of most of the men mentioned in this open letter as being prominent in the Springfield of that date, and I have heard him talk by the hour and tell stories of that time.

In those days the character of the courts in which my father, as well as Mr. Lincoln, practised was very primitive, and the stories told by my father are perhaps worth recording.

In one case a livery-stable horse had died soon after being returned, and the person who had hired it was sued for damages. The case finally required some proof that the defendant was a hard rider. A witness was called—a long, lanky Westerner. The lawyer said, "How does Mr. So-and-so usually ride?"

Without a gleam of intelligence, the witness replied, "A-straddle, sir."

"No, no," said the lawyer; "I mean, does he usually walk, or trot, or gallop?"

"Wall," said the witness, apparently searching in the depths of his memory for facts, "when he rides a walkin' horse he walks, when he rides a trottin' horse he trots, when he rides a gallopin' horse he gallops, when—"

The lawyer, irately, "I want to know what gait the defendant usually takes, fast or slow."

"Wall," said the witness, still meditating, "when his company rides fast he rides fast, and when his company rides slow he rides slow."

"I want to know, sir," the lawyer said, very much exasperated, and very stern now, "how Mr. So-and-so rides when he is alone."

"Wall," said the witness, more slowly and meditatively than ever, "when he was alone I wa'n't along, and I don't know."

The laugh of the court at the baffled questioner ended the cross-examination.

A case of sheep-killing came up. The defendant was a rustic, and the charge was, "Killed with malicious mischief." When asked, "Guilty or not guilty?" the defendant would give no direct answer. "I *did* kill that sheep, but I did n't kill him with no malicious mischief." Nothing else could be extracted from him. Finally he was told that he must plead something, "guilty or not guilty." He refused to acknowledge himself either. "You must do something," said the judge. "What do you do?" "I stands mute," was all that could be extracted from him. In the end, the case was decided against him, but he was told that he could take it up to the Court of Errors. "If this here ain't a court of errors," said the phlegmatic victim

of the law, "I 'd jest like to know where you kin find one."

In a case (I have forgotten the charge) which went against the defendant, who rose up and gave his opinion of the judgment, and was fined ten dollars for contempt of court, a bill was handed over to the clerk which proved to be twenty dollars.

"I have no change," said the clerk, tendering it to the offender.

"Never mind about the other ten dollars," was the retort. "Keep it; I'll take it out in contempt."

There was in those early days a curious character who presided at the bar; his name I have forgotten, but I remember my father's characterizing him, in Lord Chesterfield's phrase, as "dullness blundering upon vicacities." In a certain case in which this person acted as counsel for the plaintiff, a five-dollar note had been stolen. That fact was proved beyond question. The point at issue finally was one of grand or petit larceny. The counsel for the defendant made the ingenious plea that the bill was an Indiana bill, and worth four dollars and ninety-five cents, and therefore was below the limit of petit larceny, five dollars being that limit. The jury seemed quite impressed by the argument, when the counsel for the plaintiff rose, and in the peculiar drawl and nasal intonation characteristic of his speech said: "Gentlemen of the jury, if any one of you was to take that Indian five-dollar bill to market, there 's not a butcher there that would not be glad to take it at pa-a-ar. If you was to go to any of the stores on the square here, they 'd be willing and more 'n willing to take it at pa-a-ar; but this mean, confounded sneak could n't afford to steal it at pa-a-ar." The jury rendered a verdict of "guilty of grand larceny."

After General Shields had challenged Mr. Lincoln, and before the preliminaries had been arranged, Mr. Lincoln came into my father's office. He said: "I don't like this duel business. It is very foolish; but I can't show the white feather, and I don't know what I ought to do." My father said: "Lincoln, you are the challenged party, and can choose the weapons. Choose broadswords, and I'll be qualified Shields will never fight you." Mr. Lincoln was very much amused with the notion, and instructed his second to name broadswords as the weapons. When the seconds met and broadswords were proposed, General Shields's second demurred. He said, "Barbarous weapons for the nineteenth century." "Yes," said Mr. Lincoln's second; "they are barbarous; so is duelling, for that matter. It is just as well to have the whole thing of a piece," or words to that effect. When the time for the duel came, my grandfather, father, Dr. Merryman, and some others went to the scene of action. In those days stage-coaches were the only public conveyances overland, and the party had to spend at least one night on the way. The men, as was not uncommon in those days, found very limited accommodations, so four, I think, had to sleep in a bed. My father said that during the night he found himself in very narrow quarters as to the shoulders, while below there seemed ample room to expatiate. In the morning he discovered that his right hand bedfellow, a perfect stranger, had lost his left leg. Dr. Merryman called out in the night to my grandfather, "Wake up, Bledsoe; wake up." Grandpa said, "Dr. Merryman, are you a doctor and don't know that when a man snores it is a sign that he is asleep, *not*



## OPEN LETTERS.

### "The Numerical Strength of the Confederate Army."

#### I. A SOUTHERN VIEW OF THE QUESTION.

IN THE CENTURY for March I find an article entitled "The Numerical Strength of the Confederate Army," in which the author, Mr. A. B. Casselman, expresses the opinion that it would not be difficult to prove that the total number of men enrolled in the Confederate army from the beginning to the close of the war was not far from 1,500,000. He bases this opinion upon the number of troops which, according to his estimate, North Carolina furnished to the Confederacy, his supposition being that North Carolina furnished one tenth of the strength of the Confederate army. That this estimate of Mr. Casselman is far too high is easy to see, if certain facts are taken into consideration. I purpose stating these facts and the conclusions to be drawn from them.

The total population of the eleven States that seceded was 9,100,789, of which 5,446,919 were white and 3,653,870 were colored. But West Virginia, as is well known, seceded from Old Virginia and from the Confederacy. The population of West Virginia at that time was 376,488, which, being deducted from the population of the eleven seceded States, leaves 8,724,301 as the total population of those States. As the white population of West Virginia was at that time about 361,000, the total white population of the Confederate States was 5,085,919. Now North Carolina's white population was 629,942. Only two other States of the Confederacy had so large a white population as North Carolina. These were Tennessee and Virginia, the former having 826,722 white inhabitants, and the latter 686,299 (after deducting the white population of West Virginia).

Mr. Casselman states that Major John W. Moore, late of the 3d North Carolina Battalion, made an estimate that his State furnished to the Confederacy 150,000 men; but admits that Major Moore, after the most careful investigation, changed his estimate to 125,000. Now if we take the highest estimate for North Carolina, as Mr. Casselman prefers, and assume that each of the other Confederate States furnished troops in the same ratio, we will find the total number of troops raised by the eleven Confederate States to be 1,211,000.

But there are some things to be considered which Mr. Casselman seems to have lost sight of entirely. During 1861 it was impossible for the Confederacy to put large armies into the field, because arms were not to be had. Of more than 300,000 enrolled, many thousands were in camps of instruction waiting for arms. The result was that in the early spring of 1862 the Confederate armies were so greatly outnumbered that they could do nothing but retire before the Union armies as they advanced. Had the other Union generals possessed Grant's energy, and been untrammelled by their Government, the Confederacy might have been crushed early in 1862. But when the fall of Donelson came like a thunderclap, the Confederacy was aroused to prompt and energetic action. The Con-

script Act was passed in April, 1862, two months after the fall of Donelson. The old regiments were rapidly filled up, new ones were formed, and throughout the South the greatest activity prevailed. By this time large supplies of arms began to pour in, brought by the blockade-runners, and others were manufactured in the newly established workshops of the South. The Southern armies were largely increased in numbers and efficiency, and, had the South retained all the territory that she held in 1861, her armies might have come somewhat nearer than they actually did to the figures claimed by Mr. Casselman for 1861 and 1862, viz., 850,000. But it must not be forgotten that before the passage of the Conscript Act the western Confederate armies had been forced back to the borders of Alabama and Mississippi; that the larger portion of Tennessee was in the grasp of the Union armies, and that before the month of May the city of New Orleans, containing more than a third of the white population of Louisiana, was also under Federal control. A large part of Northern and Eastern Virginia, containing several of the large towns of the State, was also occupied by the forces of the Union early in May. The Kentucky campaign of Bragg and Kirby Smith recovered a part of Middle Tennessee, but at least one third of the State was in Federal possession during 1862, and three fourths of it after the summer of 1863. Early in 1863 the larger part of Arkansas was occupied by the Federal armies. The first Conscript Act was passed April 16, 1862. This embraced all the white men in the Confederacy between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. On September 27 of the same year all white men between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five were placed in the military service for three years. On February 11, 1864, the Conscript Act was further extended to embrace all white men between the ages of seventeen and fifty. By this time almost the entire State of Tennessee was occupied by the Federal armies. Surely it will not be claimed that every man or boy capable of bearing arms throughout all this lost territory was enrolled in the Confederate armies. The eleven seceded States furnished to the Union 54,000 white troops, of whom 31,000 were furnished by the State of Tennessee. Of course they should be deducted from the aggregate of the Confederate armies. Making all proper allowances, the South lost the services of more than 200,000 men, who otherwise might have been enrolled in her armies. One million men is therefore a liberal estimate for the total enrollment in the Confederate armies, counted at the very highest figures. But in reality 125,000 men is a liberal estimate for the number of troops furnished by North Carolina. On this basis, making the same calculations and allowances as before, the Confederacy could not have brought into the field, from first to last, including all sorts of troops, much more than 800,000 men.

Mr. Casselman says that the people of the border slave States—Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri—"were not unevenly divided, and gave about an equal number of men to each army." If Mr. Casselman will



give this assertion careful thought, he will be convinced that it is not borne out by the facts. Maryland gave 34,000 men to the Union armies, Kentucky 51,000, and Missouri 100,000. Maryland was too firmly held by the Federal armies to furnish any considerable number of men to the cause of the South. The same is true, for the greater part of the war, of Kentucky and Missouri. While there were earnest Southern sympathizers in Kentucky and Missouri, the great mass of the people in those States stood firmly on the side of the Union. General Albert Sidney Johnston, in a letter to Mr. Davis written in March, 1862, says that no enthusiasm for the Confederacy, but hostility, was manifested during his stay in Kentucky: hence but few Kentuckians joined his standard. We have the testimony of Union and Confederate officers for the statement that the Bragg and Kirby Smith expedition did not add more than a brigade to the Confederate strength. Search the published records of the composition of the respective armies, and it is easy to see how greatly the number of Union regiments from those States exceeded the number of Confederate regiments. There was never a possibility of enforcing the Conscript Act in those States, and but very little chance after February, 1862, for any of their citizens who desired so to do, to enlist in the armies of the Confederacy. As to Maryland, there was exceedingly small opportunity for such a thing even in 1861. I cannot find from the records that these three States furnished even as high as 60,000 men to the Confederacy.

"The principal ex-Confederate historians . . . who held high civil or military rank in the Confederate government" were as high-minded and honorable men as any that this world can boast, and would not stoop to misrepresent facts. Their estimate of Confederate strength (*viz.*, about 700,000 men) comes much nearer the mark than the excessive estimates made by some writers on the other side. The Confederate armies reached their maximum effective strength for the field during 1862. After that year there was a steady decline in their numbers, and all the efforts of the Confederate government to fill up their depleted ranks were unavailing. Adjutant-General S. Cooper says that for the last two years of the war the active force present in the field was nearly one half less than the returns called for. As to the incompleteness of Confederate muster-rolls, is not this mainly due to losses of official papers that must have occurred on the sudden collapse of the Confederacy? But the rolls in possession of the officers in the field, on which depended the necessary knowledge of the condition of their commands, were correct, and the official reports of Confederate strength in the several battles of the war, as made by their commanders, can be relied upon as accurate.

The thought that one is standing between his loved home and war's desolation will nerve even a timid heart, and make strong a feeble arm. What wonder then that brave men fired by such a conviction should so often have proved more than a match for superior numbers of men equally as brave, but without the same conviction of ruin threatening their homes and loved ones? It was the conviction that on them depended the very existence of Southern civilization, and the salvation of their homes from utter ruin, that caused the thousands of raw recruits in the Seven Days' Battles around Richmond to rival the valor of seasoned veterans. It was

this same conviction that made such heroes of the boys of the Virginia Military Institute at New Market in May, 1864, and of the mere striplings of fifteen and sixteen years of age at Honey Hill in South Carolina on November 30 of the same year.

Our Northern brethren need not wonder that heavy odds were required to crush the South. The record of the race to which they and we belong proves that under like circumstances it would take as heavy odds to conquer them.

MACON, GA.

*Joseph T. Derry.*

#### II. MR. CASSELMAN'S REJOINER.

IN my original paper I alluded to the well-known fact that the records of the Confederate army are so incomplete that it is impossible to state exactly, or even to estimate very closely, its total strength; which, however, I expressed the opinion was not very far from 1,500,000. I alluded also to the fact, equally well understood, and specifically referred to by General Grant in his "Memoirs," that Confederate historians have always understated its strength,—a fact which is further shown, I think, by Mr. Derry's article. In the absence of sufficient available data for a close estimate, I should not now add further argument but for the reason that the subject plainly deserves more attention than it has ever received, and hence any discussion which serves to bring into prominence the salient facts must result, eventually, in benefit to the cause of historical truth.

Mr. Derry estimates that the total strength of that army could not have been much above 800,000. This is a gain of 200,000 over the figures of A. H. Stephens. But in this estimate he excludes altogether all of the troops furnished by four Southern States—West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland. He seeks to justify this by asserting that the number of Confederate troops from those States did not more than equal the 54,000 Union troops from the other Southern States, 31,000 of whom were from East Tennessee; and that "the great mass of the people of those States were firmly on the side of the Union." Other Southern writers likewise assume that the border slave States furnished only a few thousand troops to the Confederate army,—far less than to the Union army: an assumption which is certainly contrary to the fact, as I shall undertake to show.

In the Senate of the United States at this time, West Virginia is represented by two ex-Confederate soldiers; Missouri is represented by an ex-Confederate soldier and an ex-member of the Confederate Senate; Kentucky, by an ex-Confederate soldier. Thus, five of the eight United States senators from those States are ex-Confederates. Not one of the eight was a Union soldier, nor otherwise distinctively identified as a Unionist. It is remarkable, therefore, that ex-Confederates should be thus preferred for offices of trust and honor, if, as Mr. Derry contends, "the great mass of the people of those States were firmly on the side of the Union."

Four fifths of the people of those States were of Southern birth. Socially and politically their sympathies were all with the South, with which they were likewise identified in their material interests, in the institution of slavery. Whatever cause existed to justify the South in the war affected the border slave States as well as those of the interior. They had a slave population of 427,000, representing a value of two hundred million dollars. In



1861 the governors of Kentucky and Missouri both at heart favored secession; the latter renounced his office, left his State, and gave his personal services to the Confederacy; and subsequently the Confederate Congress admitted both of those States as members of the Confederacy, to which, with their slaves, they would certainly now belong, had the South succeeded. Politically, these States constitute, at this time, parts of the "Solid South," the same as Georgia and Virginia, and for the same reason,—because of the race question, growing out of the freeing and enfranchisement of their slaves. It is indeed true that in the beginning the people of the border States strongly opposed secession; but the same was also true of Virginia, North Carolina, and other Southern States.

The census of 1860 shows that the three States, Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland, had white males of military age—*i. e.*, between 18 and 45—to the number of 516,000. Allowing for the youths who attained to the military age from 1861 to 1864 inclusive, the number would reach nearly 600,000. Of these, 180,000 served in the Union army. There were, therefore, fully 400,000 Southern men of military age in those three States, who were not in the Union army, as against 180,000 who were. In the year 1861, most of the important military operations were those in the border States; and throughout the war they were overrun or infested by partisan troops, so that the war spirit was more intense in those States than elsewhere.

These facts, when fairly considered, leave room for only one of two conclusions: either those States furnished, at the lowest calculation, as many men to the Southern as to the Northern army, or else the men whose sympathies and interests were with the South, in those States, were greatly wanting in military spirit, and were without the courage to fight for their convictions. The latter conclusion I do not entertain. On the contrary, I doubt not the truth of the famous declaration of a Kentucky senator, that "Kentucky has its quota full on both sides." And the same was doubtless true, at least so far as the South was concerned, of all the border slave States. The fact that there are no complete records of the Southern troops proves nothing, and is not a fair or legitimate argument.

Mr. Derry, after having excluded from his estimate all the troops from four Southern States, deducts from my estimate the further number of 200,000 upon the assertion that in certain portions of Virginia, Tennessee, and in the city of New Orleans, which early in 1862 were occupied by the Union forces, the Confederate government could not enforce the conscript laws. In this statement he makes little or no allowance for volunteers, but seems to assume that none served in the Confederate army except the conscripts. Virginia and Tennessee were in great part the battle-grounds of the war, and they were overrun and occupied in turn by both armies. The men in those States, more than those of any other, were compelled to serve on one side or the other, and they did so to the last man, as everybody knows. To assert that 200,000 men, principally of Virginia and Tennessee, either from cowardice or want of convictions, looked idly on at the heroic struggle that was being waged upon the soil of those States, taking no part on either side, is so manifestly unreasonable, and the accusation is so new, that it seems scarcely necessary to deny it.

Two of Mr. Derry's arguments appear to be inconsistent. In one he assumes, what I concede, that the Confederate army was composed in a great measure of conscripts, whose service in that army, therefore, was involuntary. But on the other hand he contends that this army was inspired by such lofty convictions of duty that, under this inspiration, they "often have proved more than a match for superior numbers of men equally as brave, but without the same conviction of ruin threatening their homes and loved ones." I regret that Mr. Derry has repeated an argument, which is not uncommon with Southern writers, in which he sets up this comparison which seeks to disparage the patriotism and sense of duty of the Union army. I have tried in vain to comprehend how brave and honorable men of the South can insist upon such a comparison. Let us consider a few facts touching the question of the patriotism of the Confederate army. It is an undoubted fact that tens of thousands of the men in that army had opposed, and voted against, secession, and in their hearts believed it to be wrong. The State of North Carolina, for instance, never adopted an ordinance of secession by direct popular vote. It was once submitted to the people of that State, who voted against it; although it is true that when the war was fairly begun they were well united in its support.

In 1863 and 1864 six regiments of United States troops, organized for service against the Indians, were composed entirely of Confederate prisoners, who thus returned to an allegiance which in their hearts they had never wholly forsaken.

In the great battles which decided the war, "the thought of loved ones at home" wrought no greater effect with one army than with the other; and a majority of the troops on either side were not natives of the State on whose soil the battle was fought. The Southern troops displayed as magnificent courage on the soil of Pennsylvania, at Gettysburg, as they ever did in Virginia; and why should they not?

Putting aside this argument as to the comparative devotion of the opposing armies, let us turn again to the legitimate argument of figures.

The State of North Carolina furnished, in the year 1861, forty-two regiments of Confederate volunteers, the minimum number in a regiment, according to the regulations, being one thousand. Moore's roster preserves the names of over 32,000 of those who enlisted in that year; but allowing for the numerous admitted deficiencies in the rolls, the number doubtless exceeded 40,000. In that first year, after the war had fairly begun, the South displayed a zeal and enthusiasm in the conflict beyond that which was then shown in the North. Counting the troops from the border States, who were all or nearly all volunteers, and who enlisted early in the war, the forty-two regiments of North Carolina troops constituted perhaps less than a tenth part of the Confederate army for that first year. The act of the Confederate Congress of August 8, 1861, authorized a call for 400,000 volunteers; and without doubt the army for that year comprised over 400 regiments and upward of 400,000 men,—all volunteers.

Before the end of 1862, under the conscript laws then in force, the North Carolina contingent had more than doubled. Moore's roster preserves the names of about 85,000 men who were enrolled in the years 1861 and 1862. But this roster omits thousands of names; the



actual number, therefore, must have been almost 100,000. And what reason is there to doubt these figures, when, after 40,000 volunteers had enlisted from that State, the Confederate government called for all who remained between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years? These figures indicate, unmistakably, a Confederate army of more than 800,000 men, before the war was half over, and before that army had met its first great defeat. In the last two years of the war, all know what heroic measures were adopted to fill the ranks of that army: how regiments were organized of stripling boys and aged men; and how the "slaves," the "free negroes," and "other free persons of color" were conscripted under the act of February 17, 1864, for the performance of "auxiliary military duty."

The eleven States had, in 1860, a free colored population of 132,660. Of these there were probably 25,000 males of military age. In 1864, owing to contraction of the Confederate lines, the number was less. This item in itself, therefore, is insignificant. But the fact that the Confederate Congress enacted a law to conscript the few scattering free colored men of the South, as well as the slaves, serves to illustrate the desperate measures that were employed to utilize the services of every human being within the Southern territory who was capable of carrying a gun or digging a trench.

Mr. Derry's estimate takes, as the basis of his calculation, 125,000 as the number of troops furnished by North Carolina. But that is the lowest possible estimate for the troops of that State. I am certain it is too low, even if the estimate of 150,000 is too high.

After a careful review of Mr. Derry's article, I think it will be seen that upon the whole it confirms my main conclusions, in which, however, I do not assume to have been exact. It shows that, starting with the lowest basis of calculation, excluding all the troops of four Southern States, and then deducting 200,000 more upon an assumption which seems to impeach the courage and manhood of a large proportion of the men of the South, it still leaves, according to his figures, an army of "not much more than 800,000."

This, it seems to me, concedes much of what I claim. If impartial investigators shall ever be able fairly to count all the Confederate troops, without such manifestly unreasonable deductions, I still think it will be found that the number was not very far from 1,500,000. In any close estimate, due allowance must be made for the 54,000 Union troops from the seceding States.

One thing seems clear. The statements commonly made by leading Southern writers, that the Confederates numbered in all only six or seven hundred thousand, against over two million Federals, are widely at variance with the facts, and are more extraordinary because they are made by those writers who, above all others, ought to know the truth. It is impossible that

the men of the South, whose courage and honor have never been called in question, can sanction the efforts which some have made to juggle with this question, or to disparage the patriotism and courage of the brave men who opposed them.

*A. B. Casselman.*

"The Century's" American Artists Series.

WYATT EATON.

It is hard to realize the change which has taken place in American art during the last fifteen years. In 1877 the principal exhibition of the country, the National Academy of Design, admitted three works which, although different in style, were each equally revolutionary: "The Dowager," by William M. Chase; "A Britany Woman," by Alden Weir; and "Revery," by Wyatt Eaton. The first of these bore the stamp of Munich, the last two that of Paris. Each was the work of an American who, unknown in our art circles, had been long enough abroad to assimilate the newest art movements of Europe. This was the beginning of the change.

In 1877 Wyatt Eaton had been studying art for eleven years: the first five in New York as a student of the National Academy of Design, and as a pupil of the late J. O. Eaton, who had befriended him when, a lad of eighteen, he had left his native village on the shores of Lake Champlain for New York; later, from 1872 to 1876, as a pupil of Gérôme at L'École des Beaux Arts, Paris. During this period he painted the "Revery" and "Harvester at Rest," both of which were exhibited at the Salon, the latter being now in Smith College, Northampton, Mass.

Some of his first work after his return home was done for this magazine, including a series of remarkable portraits of Bryant, Emerson, Longfellow, Whittier, and Holmes, for which these gentlemen gave him sittings, and which were engraved by Cole. These were perhaps as remarkable for their engraving as for their drawing, and were a veritable new departure in magazine work. He also made a drawing from life of Dr. J. G. Holland.

In 1877 Wyatt Eaton, with Walter Shirlaw, Augustus St. Gaudens, and Helena de Kay Gilder, founded the Society of American Artists, of which Mr. Eaton was the first secretary and Mr. Shirlaw the first president.

Although Wyatt Eaton is an accomplished landscape-painter and a brilliant painter of the nude, he is known principally by his portraits. Among those who have sat to him are the Right Rev. Horatio Potter, Mr. Roswell Smith, and Sir William Dawson. He also painted a portrait of Garfield (after the President's death) for the Union League Club of New York. "The Man with a Violin" (a portrait of the engraver Timothy Cole), which is printed on page 882 of the present number, was painted in Florence, Italy.

*W. Lewis Fraser.*

## IN LIGHTER VEIN.

### The Happy Poet.

HIS moods are mirrored in his songs,  
Hence gladness to his verse belongs:  
Looking into his heart to write,  
All that he finds there is Delight!

*Frank Dempster Sherman.*

### Mistaken Magnanimity.

THE storm of words was past, the air was cleared,  
When "I forgive you!" thus he volunteered.  
"If any one forgives," she said, "'t is I!"—  
The storm returned, and murky grew the sky.

*Edith M. Thomas.*