

THE LEVEE AT NASHVILLE, LOOKING DOWN THE CUMBERLAND. (FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.)

HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE.

ON September 28th, 1864, less than four weeks from the day the Union forces occupied Atlanta, General Sherman, who found his still unconquered enemy, General Hood, threatening his communications in Georgia, and that formidable



BRIDGE OVER THE CUMBERLAND AT NASHVILLE.

raider, General Forrest, playing the mischief in Tennessee, sent to the latter State two divisions — General Newton's of the Fourth Corps, and General J. D. Morgan's of the Fourteenth — to aid in destroying, if possible, that intrepid dragon. To make assurance doubly sure, the next day he ordered General George H. Thomas, his most capable and experienced lieutenant, and the commander of more than three-fifths of his grand army, "back to Stevenson and Decherd . . . to look to Tennessee."

No order would have been more unwelcome to General Thomas. It removed him from the command of his own thoroughly organized and harmonious army, 60,000 veterans, whom he knew and trusted, and who knew and loved him, and relegated him to the position of supervisor of communications. It also sent him to the rear, just when great preparations were making for an advance. But, as often happens,


what seemed an adverse fate opened the door to great, unforeseen opportunity. The task of expelling Forrest and reopening the broken communications was speedily completed; and on the 17th of October General Thomas wrote to General Sherman: "I hope to join you very soon." The latter, however, had other views, and the hoped-for junction was never made. On the 19th he wrote to General Thomas:

"I will send back to Tennessee the Fourth Corps, all dismounted cavalry, all sick and wounded, and all incumbrances whatever, except what I can haul in our wagons. . . . I want you to remain in Tennessee and take command of all my [military] division not actually present with me. Hood's army may be set down at forty thousand (40,000) of all arms, fit for duty. . . . If you can defend the line of the Tennessee in my absence of three (3) months it is all I ask."

With such orders, and under such circumstances, General Thomas was left to play his part in the new campaign.

General Hood, after a series of daring adventures, which baffled all Sherman's calculations ("he can turn and twist like a fox," said Sherman, "and wear out my army in pursuit"), concentrated his entire force, except Forrest's cavalry, at Gadsden, Alabama, on the 22d of October; while General Sherman established his headquarters at Gaylesville, — a "position," as he wrote to General Halleck, "very good to watch the enemy." In spite of this "watch," Hood suddenly appeared on the 26th at Decatur, on the Tennessee River, 75 miles northwest of Gadsden. This move was a complete surprise, and evidently "meant business."

The Fourth Corps, numbering about 12,000 men, commanded by Major-General D. S. Stanley, was at once ordered from Gaylesville, to report to General Thomas. Its leading division reached Pulaski, Tenn., a small town on



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL N. B. FORREST, C. S. A.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

the railroad, about 40 miles north of Decatur, on the 1st of November, where it was joined four days later by the other two.

Making a slight though somewhat lengthened demonstration against Decatur, General Hood pushed on to Tusculum, 45 miles west. Here he expected to find — what he had weeks before ordered — ample supplies, and the railroad in operation to Corinth. But he was doomed to disappointment. Instead of being in condition to make the rapid and triumphant march with which he had inflamed the ardor of his troops, he was detained three weeks, a delay fatal to his far-reaching hopes. Placing one corps on the north side of the river at Florence, he worked and waited for supplies and for Forrest, who had been playing havoc in West Tennessee, and was under orders to join him.

Convinced now of Hood's serious intentions, General Sherman also ordered the Twenty-third Corps, ten thousand men, under command of Major-General J. M. Schofield, to report to General Thomas. Reaching Pulaski, with one division on the 14th of November, General Schofield, though inferior in rank to Stanley, assumed command by virtue of being a department commander. The whole force gathered there was less than 18,000 men; while in

front were some 5000 cavalry, consisting of a brigade of about 1500, under General Croxton, and a division of some 3500, under General Edward Hatch, the latter being fortunately intercepted while on his way to join Sherman.

The Confederate army in three corps (S. P. Lee's, A. P. Stewart's, and B. F. Cheatham's) began its northward march on the 19th of November, in the midst of weather of great severity. It rained and snowed and hailed and froze, and the roads were almost impassable. Forrest had come up, with about 6000 cavalry, and led the advance with indomitable energy. Hatch and Croxton made such resistance as they could; but on the 22d, the head of Hood's column was at Lawrenceburg, some 16 miles due west of Pulaski, and on a road running direct to Columbia, where the railroad and turnpike to Nashville cross Duck River, and where there were less than 800 men to guard the bridges. The situation at Pulaski, with an enemy nearly three times as large fairly on the flank, was anything but cheering. Warned by the reports from General Hatch, and by the orders of General Thomas, who, on the 20th, had directed General Schofield to prepare to fall back to Columbia, the two divisions of General J. D. Cox and General Wagner (the latter Newton's old division) were ordered to march to Lynnville — about half-way to Columbia — on the 22d. On the 23d, the other two divisions, under General Stanley, were to follow with the wagon trains. It was not a moment too soon. On the morning of the 24th, General Cox, who had pushed on to within nine miles of Columbia, was roused by sounds of conflict away to the west. Taking a cross-road, leading south of Columbia, he reached the Mount Pleasant pike just in time to interpose his infantry between Forrest's cavalry and a hapless brigade, under command of Colonel Capron, which was being handled most unceremoniously. In another hour, Forrest would have been in possession of the crossings of Duck River; and the only line of communication with Nashville would have been in the hands of the enemy. General Stanley, who had left Pulaski in the afternoon of the 23d, reached Lynnville after dark. Rousing his command at 1 o'clock in the morning, by 9 o'clock the head of his column connected with Cox in front of Columbia — having marched 30 miles since 2 o'clock of the preceding afternoon. These timely movements saved the army from utter destruction.

When General Sherman had finally determined on his march to the sea, he requested General Rosecrans, in Missouri, to send to General Thomas two divisions, under General A. J. Smith, which had been loaned to General Banks for the Red River expedition, and were

now repelling the incursion of Price into Missouri. As they were not immediately forthcoming, General Grant had ordered General Rawlins, his chief-of-staff, to St. Louis, to direct, in person, their speedy embarkation. Thence, on the 7th, two weeks before Hood began his advance from Florence, General Rawlins wrote to General Thomas that Smith's command, aggregating nearly 14,000, would begin to leave that place as early as the 10th. No news was ever more anxiously awaited or more eagerly welcomed than this. But the promise could not be fulfilled. Smith had to march entirely across the State of Missouri; and instead of leaving St. Louis on the 10th, he did not reach that place until the 24th. Had he come at the proposed time, it was General Thomas's intention to place him at Eastport, on the Tennessee River, so as to threaten Hood's flank and rear if he advanced. With such disposition, the battles of Franklin and Nashville would have been relegated to the category of "events which never come to pass." But, when Smith reached St. Louis, Hood was threatening Columbia; and it was an open question whether he would not reach Nashville before the reënforcements from Missouri.

As fast as the Union troops arrived at Columbia, in their hurried retreat from Pulaski, works were thrown up, covering the approaches from the south, and the trains were sent across



MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN M. SCHOFIELD. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL B. F. CHEATHAM, C. S. A.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

the river. But the line was found to be long than the small force could hold; and the river could easily be crossed, above or below the town. Orders were given to withdraw to the north side on the night of the 26th, but a heavy storm prevented. The next night the crossing was made, the railroad bridge was burned, and the pontoon boats were scuttled. It was an all-night job, the last of the pickets crossing at 5 in the morning. It was now the fifth day since the retreat from Pulaski began, and the little army had been exposed day and night to all sorts of weather except sunshine, and had been almost continually on the move. From deserters it was learned that Hood's infantry numbered 40,000 and his cavalry, under Forrest, 10,000 or 12,000. But the Union army was slowly increasing by concentration and the arrival of recruits. It now numbered at Columbia about 23,000 infantry and some 5000 cavalry — of whom only 3500 were mounted. General J. H. Wilson, who had been ordered by General Grant to report to General Sherman, and of whom General Grant wrote, "I believe he will add fifty per cent. to the effectiveness of your cavalry," had taken command of all General Thomas's cavalry, which was trying to hold the fords east and west of Columbia.

In spite of every opposition, Forrest suc-



MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES H. WILSON. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

ceeded in placing one of his divisions on the north side of Duck River before noon of the 28th, and forced back the Union cavalry on roads leading toward Spring Hill and Franklin. At 1 o'clock on the morning of the 29th General Wilson became convinced that the enemy's infantry would begin crossing at daylight, and advised General Schofield to fall back to Franklin. At 3:30 the same morning General Thomas sent him similar orders. Daylight revealed the correctness of Wilson's information. Cheatham's corps, headed by Cleburne's division,—a division unsurpassed for courage, energy, and endurance by any other in the Confederate army,—before sunrise was making its way over Duck River at Davis's Ford, about five miles east of Columbia. The weather had cleared, and it was a bright autumn morning, the air full of invigorating life. General Hood in person accompanied the advance.

When General Schofield was informed that the Confederate infantry were crossing, he sent a brigade under Colonel P. Sidney Post, on a reconnaissance along the river bank, to learn what was going on. He also ordered General Stanley to march with two divisions, Wagner's and Kimball's, to Spring Hill, taking the trains and all the reserve artillery. In less than half an hour after receiving the order,

Stanley was on the way. On reaching the point where Rutherford Creek crosses the Franklin Pike, Kimball's division was halted, by order of General Schofield, and faced to the east to cover the crossing against a possible attack from that quarter. In this position Kimball remained all day. Stanley, with the other division, pushed on to Spring Hill. Just before noon, as the head of his column was approaching that place, he met "a cavalry soldier who seemed to be badly scared," who reported that Buford's division of Forrest's cavalry was approaching from the east. The troops were at once double-quickened into the town, and the leading brigade, deploying as it advanced, drove off the enemy just as they were expecting, unmolested, to occupy the place. As the other brigades came up, they also were deployed, forming nearly a semicircle,—Opdycke's brigade stretching in a thin line from the railroad station north of the village to a point some distance east, and Lane's from Opdycke's right to the pike below. Bradley was sent to the front to occupy a knoll some three-fourths of a mile east, commanding all the

approaches from that direction. Most of the artillery was placed on a rise south of the town. The trains were parked within the semicircle.




MAJOR-GENERAL JACOB D. COX. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

From Spring Hill roads radiate to all points, the turnpike between Columbia and Franklin being there intersected by turnpikes from Rally Hill and Mount Carmel, as well as by numerous dirt roads leading to the neighboring towns. Possession of that point would not only shut out the Union army from the road to Nashville, but it would effectually bar the way in every direction. Stanley's arrival was not a moment too soon for the safety of the army under Schofield, and his prompt dispositions and steady courage, as well as his vigorous hold of all the ground he occupied, gave his little command all the moral fruits of a victory.

Hardly had the three brigades, numbering, all told, less than 4000 men, reached the positions assigned them, when Bradley was assailed by a force which the men declared fought too well to be dismounted cavalry. At the same time, at Thompson's Station, three miles north, an attack was made on a small wagon train heading for Franklin; and a dash was made by a detachment of the Confederate cavalry on the Spring Hill station, northwest of the town. It seemed as if the little band, attacked from all points, was threatened with destruction. Bradley's brigade was twice assaulted, but held its own, though with considerable loss, and only a single regiment could be spared to reënforce him. The third assault was more successful, and he was driven back to the edge of the village, Bradley himself receiving a disabling wound while rallying his men. In attempting to follow up this temporary advantage, the enemy, in crossing a wide corn-field, was opened upon with spherical case-shot from eight guns, posted on the knoll, and soon scattered in considerable confusion. These attacks undoubtedly came from Cleburne's division, and were made under the eye of the corps commander, General Cheatham, and the army commander, General Hood. That they were not successful, especially as the other two divisions of the same corps, Brown's and Bate's, were close at hand, and Stewart's corps not far off, seems unaccountable. Except this one small division deployed in a long thin line to cover the wagons, there were no Union troops within striking distance; the cavalry were about Mount Carmel, five miles east, fully occupied in keeping Forrest away from Franklin and the Harpeth River crossings. The nearest aid was Kimball's division, seven miles south, at Rutherford Creek. The other three divisions of infantry which made up Schofield's force—Wood's, Cox's, and Ruger's (in part)—were


still at Duck River. Thus night closed down upon the solitary division, on whose boldness of action devolved the safety of the whole force which Sherman had spared from his march to the sea to breast the tide of Hood's invasion.



MAJOR-GENERAL A. J. SMITH. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

When night came, the danger rather increased than diminished. A single Confederate brigade, like Adams's or Cockrell's or Maney's,—veterans since Shiloh,—planted square across the pike, either south or north of Spring Hill, would have effectually prevented Schofield's retreat, and daylight would have found his whole force cut off from every avenue of escape by more than twice its numbers, to assault whom would be madness, and to avoid whom would be impossible.

Why Cleburne and Brown failed to drive away Stanley's one division before dark; why Bate failed to possess himself of the pike south of the town; why Stewart failed to lead his troops to the pike at the north; why Forrest, with his audacious temper and his enterprising cavalry, did not fully hold Thompson's Station or the crossing of the West Harpeth, half-way to Franklin: these are to this day disputed questions among the Confederate commanders; and it is not proposed here to discuss them. The afternoon and night of November 29th, 1864, may well be set down in the calendar of lost opportunities. The heroic valor of those same troops the next day, and their frightful losses, as they attempted to



Franklin, to telegraph the situation to General Thomas, with whom all communication had been cut off since early morning. Captain Twining's dispatch shows most clearly the critical condition of affairs. "The general says he will not be able to get farther than Thompson's Station to-night. . . He regards his situation as extremely perilous. . . Thinking the troops under A. J. Smith's command had reached Franklin, General Schofield directed me to have them pushed down to Spring Hill by daylight tomorrow." This was Tuesday. The day before, General Thomas had telegraphed to General Schofield that Smith had not yet arrived, but would

retrieve their mistake, show what might have been.

By 8 o'clock at night—two hours only after sunset, of a moonless night—at least two corps of Hood's army were in line of battle facing the turnpike, and not half a mile away. The long line of Confederate camp-fires burned brightly, and their men could be seen, standing around them, or sauntering about in groups. Now and then a few would come almost to the pike and fire at a passing Union squad, but without provoking a reply. General Schofield, who had remained at Duck River all day, reached Spring Hill about 7 p. m., with Ruger's division and Whitaker's brigade. Leaving the latter to cover a cross-road a mile or two below the town, he started with Ruger about 9 p. m. to force a passage at Thompson's Station, supposed to be in the hands of the enemy. At 11 p. m. General Cox arrived with his division, and soon after Schofield returned to Spring Hill with the welcome news that the way was open. From Thompson's Station he sent his engineer officer, Captain Wm. J. Twining, to

be at Nashville in three days—that is, Thursday. The expectation, therefore, of finding him at Franklin, was like a drowning man's catching at a straw.


Just before midnight Cox started from Spring Hill for Franklin, and was ordered to pick up Ruger at Thompson's Station. At 1 a. m. he was on the road, and the train, over five miles long, was drawn out. At the very outset, it had to cross a bridge in single file. So difficult was this whole movement, that it was 5 o'clock in the morning before the wagons were fairly under way. As the head of the train passed Thompson's Station, it was attacked by the Confederate cavalry, and for a while there was great consternation. Wood's division, which had followed Cox from Duck River, was marched along the east of the pike, to protect the train, and the enemy were speedily driven off. It was near daybreak when the last wagon left Spring Hill. Kimball's division followed Wood's, and at 4 o'clock Wagner drew in his lines, his skirmishers remaining till it was fairly daylight. The rear-guard

was commanded by Colonel Emerson Opdycke, who was prepared, if necessary, to sacrifice the last man to secure the safety of the main body. So efficiently did his admirable brigade do its work, that, though surrounded by a cloud of the enemy's cavalry, which made frequent dashes at its lines, not a straggler nor a wagon was left behind. The ground was strewn with knapsacks, cut from the shoulders of a lot of raw recruits, weighed down with their unaccustomed burden.

The head of the column, under General Cox, reached the outskirts of Franklin about the same hour that the rear-guard was leaving Spring Hill. Here the tired, sleepy, hungry men, who had fought and marched, day and night, for nearly a week, threw up a line of earthworks on a slight eminence which guards the southern approach to the town, even before they made their coffee. Then they gladly dropped anywhere, for the much-needed "forty winks." Slowly the rest of the weary column, regiment after regiment of worn-out men, filed into the works, and continued the line, till a complete bridge-head, from the river bank above to the river bank below, encircled the town. By noon of the 30th, all the troops had come up, and the wagons were crossing the river, which was already fordable, notwithstanding the recent heavy rainfalls. The rear-guard was still out, having an occasional bout with the enemy.

The Columbia Pike bisected the works, which at that point were built just in front of the Carter house, a one-story brick dwelling west of the pike, and a large gin-house on the east side. Between the gin-house and the river, the works were partly protected in front by a hedge of osage orange, and on the knoll, near the railroad cut close to the

bank, were two batteries belonging to the Fourth Corps. Near the Carter house was a considerable thicket of locust trees. Except these obstructions, the whole ground in front was entirely unobstructed and fenceless, and, from the works, every part of it was in plain sight. General Cox's division of three brigades, commanded that day, in order from left to right, by Colonels Stiles and Casement and General Reilly, occupied the ground between the Columbia Pike and the river above the town. The front line consisted of 8 regiments, 3 in the works and 1 in reserve for each of the brigades of Stiles and Casement, while Reilly's brigade nearest the pike had but 2 regiments in the works, and 2 in a second line, with still another behind that. West of the pike, reaching to a ravine through which passes a road branching from the Carter's Creek Pike, was Ruger's division of two brigades — the third, under General Cooper, not having come up from Johnsonville. Strickland's brigade, of 4 regiments, had 2 in the works and 2 in reserve. Two of these regiments, the 72d Illinois and 44th Missouri, belonged to A. J. Smith's corps, and had reported to General Schofield only the day before. A third, which was in reserve, the 183d Ohio, was a large and entirely new regiment, having been mustered into service only three weeks before, and joining the army for the first time on the 28th. Moore's brigade, of 6 regiments, had 4 in the works and 2 in reserve. Beyond Ruger, reaching from the ravine to the river below, was Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps, — all veterans, — consisting of three brigades com-



VIEW OF THE WINSTEAD HILLS WHERE HOOD FORMED HIS LINE OF BATTLE. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

The right, of Wagner's Union brigade, in the advanced position (see map, previous page), was posted behind the stone wall in the foreground. The Columbia Pike is shown passing over the hills on the left of the picture.

Carter house (under steeple).

Gin-house.

Roper's Knob.

Columbia Pike.




THE BATTLE-FIELD OF FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE, LOOKING NORTH FROM GENERAL CHEATHAM'S HEADQUARTERS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY L. T. SHULL.)

manded by Generals William Grose and Walter C. Whitaker and Colonel Kirby. All the troops in the works were ordered to report to General Cox, to whom was assigned the command of the defenses. General Wood's division of the Fourth Corps had gone over the river with the trains; and two brigades of Wagner's division, which had so valiantly stood their ground at Spring Hill and covered the rear since, were halted on a slope about half a mile to the front. Opdycke had brought his brigade within the works, and held them massed, near the pike, behind the Carter house. Besides the guns on the knoll, near the railroad cut, there were 6 pieces

dark fringe of chestnuts along the river bank, far across the Columbia Pike, the colors gayly fluttering and the muskets gleaming brightly, and advancing steadily, in perfect order, dressed on the center, straight for the works. Meantime, General Schofield had retired to the fort, on a high bluff on the other side of the river, some two miles away, by the road, and had taken General Stanley with him.

From the fort, the whole field of operations was plainly visible. Notwithstanding all these demonstrations, the two brigades of Wagner were left on the knoll where they had been halted, and, with scarcely an apology for works to protect

THE CARTER HOUSE, FROM THE SIDE TOWARD THE TOWN.



THE CARTER HOUSE, FROM THE CONFEDERATE SIDE.

FRONT VIEW OF THE CARTER HOUSE.

(FROM PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN IN 1884.)

in Reilly's works; 4 on Strickland's left; 2 on Moore's left, and 4 on Grose's left—in all, 26 guns in that part of the works, facing south, and 12 more in reserve, on or near the Columbia Pike.

As the bright autumn day, hazy with the golden light of an Indian summer atmosphere, wore away, the troops who had worked so hard looked hopefully forward to a prospect of ending it in peace and rest, preparatory either to a night march to Nashville, or to a reinforcement by Smith's corps and General Thomas. But about two o'clock, some suspicious movements on the hills a mile or two away—the waving of signal flags and the deployment of the enemy in line of battle—caused General Wagner to send his adjutant-general, from the advanced position where his two brigades had halted, to his commanding general, with the information that Hood seemed to be preparing for attack. In a very short time the whole Confederate line could be seen, stretching in battle array, from the


them, had waited until it was too late to retreat without danger of degenerating into a rout.

On came the enemy, as steady and resistless as a tidal wave. A couple of guns, in the advance line, gave them a shot and galloped back to the works. A volley from a thin skirmish line was sent into their ranks, but without causing any delay to the massive array. A moment more, and with that wild "rebel yell" which, once heard, is never forgotten, the great human wave swept along, and seemed to engulf the little force which had so sturdily awaited it.

The first shock came, of course, upon the two misplaced brigades of Wagner's division, which, through some one's blunder, had remained in their false position until too late to retire without disaster. They had no tools to throw up works; and when struck by the resistless sweep of Cleburne's and Brown's divisions, they had only to make their way, as best they could, back to the works. In that wild rush, in which friend and foe were intermingled, and the piercing "rebel yell" rose

high above the "Yankee cheer," nearly seven hundred were made prisoners. But, worst of all for the Union side, the men of Reilly's and Strickland's brigades dared not fire, lest they should shoot down their own comrades, and the guns, loaded with grape and canister, stood silent in the embrasures. With loud shouts of "Let us go into the works with them," the triumphant Confederates, now more like a wild, howling mob than an organized army, swept on to the very works, with hardly a check from any quarter. So fierce was the rush that a number of the fleeing soldiers — officers and men — dropped exhausted into the ditch, and lay there while the terrific contest raged over their heads, till, under cover of darkness, they could crawl safely inside the intrenchments.

On Strickland's left, close to the Columbia Pike, was posted one of the new infantry regiments. The tremendous onset, the wild yells, the whole infernal din of the strife, were too much for such an undisciplined body. As they saw their comrades from the advance line rushing to the rear, they too turned and fled. The contagion spread, and in a few minutes a disorderly stream was pouring down the pike past the Carter house toward the town. The guns were abandoned and the works for a considerable space deserted — only to be occupied a moment later by Cleburne's and Brown's men, who swarmed into the gap. At this critical juncture, Colonel Emerson Opdycke, who, unordered, had brought his command within the works, seeing the fearful peril, ordered forward his well-disciplined brigade, which, deploying




BRIDGE AT FRANKLIN OVER THE HARPETH RIVER —
LOOKING UP-STREAM.

The left of the picture is the north bank of the stream; Franklin is upon the south bank. Fort Granger, where General Schofield had his headquarters, occupied the site of the buildings on the north bank.


as it advanced, was soon involved in as fierce a hand-to-hand fight as ever soldiers engaged in. The regiments which formed Reilly's second line had remained steadfast, and also rallied to the work. A large part of Conrad's and Lane's men, as they came in, though wholly disorganized, turned about and gave the enemy a hot reception. Opdycke's horse was shot under him, and he fought on foot at the head of his brigade. General Cox was everywhere present, encouraging and cheering on his men. General Stanley, who, from the fort where he had gone with General Schofield, had seen the opening clash, galloped to the front as soon as possible and did all that a brave man could until he was painfully wounded. Some of Opdycke's men manned the abandoned guns in Reilly's works; others filled the gap in Strickland's line. These timely movements first checked and then repulsed the assaulting foe, and soon the entire line of works was re-occupied, the enemy sullenly giving up the prize which was so nearly won. Stewart's corps, which was on Cheatham's right, filling the space to the river, kept abreast of its valiant companion, and, meeting no obstacle, reached the works near the Union left before Cheatham made the breach at the Columbia Pike. Owing to the peculiar formation of the field, the left of Stewart's line was thrown upon the same ground with the right of

Cheatham's; the two commands there became much



FRONT VIEW OF THE GIN-HOUSE.

The line of the Union works ran in front of, and only a few feet distant from, the Gin-house; in 1862 a faint depression along the edge of the field still indicated the position. Near the tree seen in the lower picture there is a round, deep hollow which also afforded protection to the Union soldiers. The lower picture was taken from the same point on the pike, looking a little to the right, as the view of "The Carter House, from the Confederate side," on page 605.



VIEW OF THE GIN-HOUSE, FROM THE PIKE.

intermingled. This accounts for so many of General Stewart's officers and men being killed in front of Reilly's and Casement's regiments.

Where there was nothing to hinder the Union fire, the muskets of Stiles's and Casement's brigades made fearful havoc; while the batteries at the railroad cut plowed furrows through the ranks of the advancing foe. Time after time they came up to the very works, but they never crossed them except as prisoners. More than one color-bearer was shot down on the parapet. It is impossible to exaggerate the fierce energy with which the Confederate soldiers, that short November afternoon, threw themselves against the works, fighting with what seemed the very madness of despair. There was not a breath of wind, and the dense smoke settled down upon the field, so that, after the first assault, it was impossible to see at any distance. Through this blinding medium, assault after assault was made, several of the Union officers declaring in their reports that their lines received as many as thirteen distinct attacks. Between the gin-house and the Columbia Pike the fighting was fiercest, and the Confederate losses the greatest. Here fell most of the Confederate generals, who, that fateful afternoon, madly gave up their lives—Adams and Quarles, of Stewart's corps—Adams's horse astride the works, and himself pitched headlong into the Union lines. Cockrell, of the same corps, was severely wounded. In Cheatham's corps, Cleburne and Granberry were killed near the pike. On the west of the pike Strahl and Gist were killed, and Brown was severely wounded. General G. W. Gordon was captured by Opdycke's brigade, inside the works. The heaviest loss in all the Union regiments was in the 44th Missouri, the advance-guard of Smith's long-expected reinforcement, which had been sent to Columbia on the 27th, and was here stationed on the right of the raw regiment, which broke and ran at the first onset of the enemy. Quickly changing front, it held its ground, but with a loss of 34 killed, 37 wounded, and 92 missing, many of the latter being wounded. In the 72d Illinois, its companion, every field-officer was wounded, and the entire color-guard, of 1 sergeant and 8 corporals, was shot down. Its losses were 10 killed, 66 wounded, and 75 missing.

While this infantry battle was going on, Forrest had crossed the river with his cavalry

some distance east of the town, with the evident purpose of getting at Schofield's wagons. But he reckoned without his host. Hatch and Croxton, by General Wilson's direction, fell upon him with such vigor that he returned to the south side, and gave our forces no further



BRIGADIER-GENERAL EMERSON OPDYCKE. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

trouble. At nightfall the victory was complete on every part of the Union lines. But desultory firing was kept up till long after dark here and there on the Confederate side, though with little result.

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, as the Confederate lines were forming for their great assault, General Schofield, in reply to a telegram from General Thomas, asking him if he could "hold Hood at Franklin for three days longer," replied, "I do not think I can. . . . It appears to me I ought to take position at Brentwood at once." Accordingly General Thomas, at 3:30, directed him to retire to Brentwood, which he did that night, bringing away all the wagons and other property in safety. Among the spoils of war were 33 Confederate colors, captured by our men from the enemy. The morning found the entire infantry force safe within the friendly shelter of the works at Nashville, where they also welcomed the veterans of A. J. Smith, who had just arrived from Missouri. Soon after, a body of about five thousand men came in from Chattanooga, chiefly sluggards of General Sherman's army, too late for their proper commands. These were organized into a provisional division under General J. B. Steedman,

and were posted between the Murfreesboro' Pike and the river. Cooper's brigade also came in after a narrow escape from capture, as well as several regiments of colored troops from the railroad between Nashville and Johnsonville. Their arrival completed the force on

story is too painful to dwell upon, even after the lapse of 23 years. From the 2d of December until the battle was fought on the 15th, the general-in-chief did not cease, day or night, to send him from the headquarters at City Point, Va., most urgent and often most uncalled-for



MAJOR-GENERAL PATRICK R. CLEBURNE, C. S. A., KILLED AT FRANKLIN, NOVEMBER 30, 1864. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

orders in regard to his operations, culminating in an order on the 9th relieving him, and directing him to turn over his command and to report himself to General Schofield, who was assigned to his place; an order unprecedented in military annals, but which, if unrevoked, the great captain would have obeyed with loyal single-heartedness. This order, though made out at the Adjutant-General's office in Washington, was not sent to General Thomas, and he did not know of its existence until told of it some years later by General Halleck, at San Francisco. He felt, however, that something of the kind was impending. General Halleck dispatched to him, on the morning of the 9th: "Lieutenant-General Grant expresses much dissatisfaction at your delay in attacking the enemy." His reply shows how entirely he understood the situation: "I feel conscious I have done everything in my power, and that the troops could

which General Thomas was to rely for the task he now placed before himself—the destruction of Hood's army. It was an ill-assorted and heterogeneous mass; not yet welded into an army, and lacking a great proportion of the outfit with which to undertake an aggressive campaign. Horses, wagons, mules, pontoons, everything needed to mobilize an army, had to be obtained. At that time they did not exist at Nashville.

The next day Hood's columns appeared before the town, and took up their positions on a line of hills nearly parallel to those occupied by the Union army, and speedily threw up works, and prepared to defend their ground.

Probably no commander ever underwent two weeks of greater anxiety and distress of mind than General Thomas during the interval between Hood's arrival and his precipitate departure from the vicinity of Nashville. The

not have been gotten ready before this. *If General Grant should order me to be relieved, I will submit without a murmur.*" As he was writing this,—2 o'clock in the afternoon of December 9th,—a terrible storm of freezing rain had been pouring down since daylight, and it kept on pouring and freezing all that day and a part of the next. That night General Grant notified him that the order relieving him—which he had divined—was suspended. But he did not know who had been designated as his successor, nor the humiliating nature of the order. With this threat hanging over him; with the utter impossibility, in that weather, of making any movement; with the prospect that the labors of his whole life were about to end in disappointment, if not disaster,—he never, for an instant, abated his energy or his work of preparation. Not an hour, day or night, was he idle.

Nobody — not even his most trusted staff-officers — knew the contents of the telegrams that came to him. But it was very evident that some-

citizens, begging that wood might be furnished, to keep some poor families from freezing; and, of evenings, Governor Johnson — then Vice-President elect — would unfold to him, with much iteration, his fierce views concerning secession, rebels, and reconstruction. To all he gave a patient and kindly hearing, and he often astonished Governor Johnson by his knowledge of constitutional and international law. But, underneath all, it was plain to see that General Grant's dissatisfaction keenly affected him, and that only by the proof which a successful battle would furnish could he hope to regain the confidence of the general-in-chief.


So when, at 8 o'clock on the evening of December 14th, after having laid his plans before his corps commanders, and dismissed them, he dictated to General Halleck the telegram: "The ice having melted away to-day, the enemy will be attacked to-morrow morning," he drew a deep sigh of relief, and for the first time for a week showed again something of his natural buoyancy and cheerfulness. He moved about more briskly; he put in order all the little last things that remained to be done; he signed his name where it was needed in the letter-book, and then, giving orders to his staff-officers to be ready at 5 o'clock the next morning, went gladly to bed.

The ice had not melted a day too soon; for, while he was writing the telegram to General Halleck, General Logan was speeding his way to Nashville, with orders from General Grant which would have placed him in command of all the Union forces there assembled. General Thomas, fortunately, did not then learn this second proof of General Grant's lack of confidence; and General Logan, on reaching Louisville, found that




LIEUTENANT-GENERAL S. D. LEE. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

thing greatly troubled him. While the rain was falling and the fields and roads were ice-bound, he would sometimes sit by the window for an hour or more, not speaking a word, gazing steadily out upon the forbidding prospect, as if he were trying to will the storm away. It was curious and interesting to see how, in this gloomy interval, his time was occupied by matters not strictly military. Now, it was a visit from a delegation of the city government, in regard to some municipal regulation; again, somebody whose one horse had been seized and put into the cavalry; then, a committee of



COLONEL JOHN OVERTON'S HOUSE, GENERAL HOOD'S HEADQUARTERS BEFORE NASHVILLE.



VIEWS OF FORT NEGLEY ON THE LEFT OF THE UNION INTRENCHMENTS, NASHVILLE, BETWEEN THE FRANKLIN AND NOLENSVILLE PIKES. (FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.)


The lower picture shows a casemate protected with railroad iron. The hills in the distance were the Confederate center and left at the opening of the fight.

the work intended for him was already done—and he came no farther. At the very time that these orders were made out, at Washington, in obedience to General Grant's directions, a large part of the cavalry was unmounted; two divisions were absent securing horses and proper outfit; wagons were unfinished and mules lacking or unbroken; pontoons unmade and pontoniers untrained; the ground was covered with a glare of ice which made all the fields and hillsides impassable for horses and scarcely passable for foot-men. The natives declared that the Yankees brought their weather as well as their army with them. Every corps commander in the army protested that a movement under such conditions would be little short of madness, and certain to result in disaster.

A very considerable reorganization of the army also took place during this enforced delay. General Stanley, still suffering from his wound, went North, and General T. J. Wood, who had been with it from the beginning, suc-

ceeded to the command of the Fourth Corps. General Ruger, who had commanded a division in the Twenty-third Corps, was also disabled by sickness, and was succeeded by General D. N. Couch, formerly a corps commander in the Army of the Potomac, and who had recently been assigned to duty in the Department of the Cumberland. General Wagner was retired from command of his division, and was succeeded by General W. L. Elliott, who had been chief of cavalry on General Thomas's staff in the Atlanta campaign. General Kenner Garrard, who had commanded a cavalry division during the Atlanta campaign, was assigned to an infantry division in Smith's corps. In all these cases, except in that of General Wood succeeding to the command of the Fourth Corps, the newly assigned officers were entire strangers to the troops over whom they were placed.

On the afternoon of the 14th of December General Thomas summoned his corps commanders, and, delivering to each a written



SOUTHWEST FRONT OF THE CAPITOL AT NASHVILLE.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)
Near the base of the first column is seen in the distance
the flag of Fort Negley.

wheel, and to threaten and perhaps attack Montgomery Hill; while General Schofield was to be held in reserve, near the left center, for such use as the exigency might develop.

It was not daylight, on the morning of the 15th of December, when the army began to move. In most of the camps, reveille had been sounded at 4 o'clock, and by 6 everything was ready. It turned out a warm, sunny, winter morning. A dense fog at first hung over the valleys and completely hid all movements; but by 9 o'clock this had cleared away. General Steedman, on the extreme left, was the first to draw out of the defenses, and to assail the enemy, at their works between the Nolensville and Murfreesboro' pikes. It was not intended as a real attack, though it had that effect. Two of Steedman's brigades, chiefly colored troops, kept two divisions of Cheatham's corps constantly busy, while his third was held in reserve; thus one Confederate corps was disposed of. Lee's corps, next on Cheatham's left, after sending two brigades to the assistance of Stewart, on the right, was held in place by the threatening position of the garrison troops, and did not fire a shot during the day. Indeed, both Cheatham's and Lee's corps were held, as in a vise, between Steedman and the Fourth Corps. Lee's Corps was unable to move or to fight. Steedman maintained the ground he occupied till the next morning, with no very heavy loss.

When, about 9 o'clock the sun began to burn away the fog, the sight from General Thomas's position was inspiring. A little to the left, on Montgomery Hill, the salient of the Confederate lines, and not more than six hundred yards distant from Wood's salient, on Lawrens Hill, could be seen the advance line of works, behind which an unknown force of the enemy lay in wait. Beyond, and along the Hillsboro' Pike were stretches of stone wall, with here and there a detached earthwork, through whose embrasures peeped the threatening artillery. To the right, along the valley of Richland Creek, the dark line of Wilson's advancing cavalry could be seen slowly making its difficult way across the wet, swampy, stumpy ground. Close in front, and at the foot of the hill, its right joining Wilson's left, was A. J. Smith's corps, full of cheer and enterprise, and glad to be once more in the open field. Then came the Fourth Corps, whose left, bending back toward the north, was hidden behind Lawrens Hill. Already the skirmishers were engaged, the Confederates slowly falling back before the determined and steady pressure of Smith and Wood.

By the time that Wilson's and Smith's lines were fully extended and brought up to within striking distance of the Confederate works, along the Hillsboro' Pike, it was noon. Post's

brigade of Wood's old division (now commanded by General Sam Beatty), which lay at the foot of Montgomery Hill, full of dash and enterprise, had since morning been regarding the works at the summit with covetous eyes. At Post's suggestion, it was determined to see which party wanted them most. Accordingly, a charge was ordered — and in a moment the brigade was swarming up the hillside, straight for the enemy's advanced work. For almost the first time since the grand assault on Missionary Ridge, a year before, here was an open field where everything could be seen. From General Thomas's headquarters everybody looked on with breathless suspense, as the blue line, broken and irregular, but with steady persistence, made its way up the steep hillside against a fierce storm of musketry and artillery. Most of the shots, however, passed over the men's heads. It was a struggle to keep up with the colors, and, as they neared the top, only the strongest were at the front. Without a moment's pause, the color-bearers and those who had kept up with them, Post himself at the head, leaped the parapet. As the colors waved from the summit, the whole line swept forward and was over the works in a twinkling, gathering in prisoners and guns. Indeed, so large was the mass of prisoners that a few minutes later were seen heading toward our own lines, that it was feared by a number of officers at General Thomas's headquarters that the assault had failed and that the prisoners were Confederate reserves who had rallied and retaken the works. But the fear was only momentary; for the wild outburst of cheers which rang across the valley told the story of complete success.

Meanwhile, farther to the right, as the opposing lines neared each other, the sound of battle grew louder and louder, and the smoke thicker and thicker, until the whole valley was filled with the haze. It was now past noon, and, at every point, the two armies were so near together that an assault was inevitable. Hatch's division of Wilson's cavalry, at the extreme right of the continuous line, was confronted by one of the detached works which Hood had intended to be "impregnable"; and the right of McArthur's division of A. J. Smith's infantry was also within striking distance of it. Coon's cavalry brigade was dismounted and ordered to assault the work, while Hill's infantry brigade received similar orders. The two commanders moved forward at the same time, and entered the work together, Colonel Hill falling dead at the head of his command. In a moment the whole Confederate force in that quarter was routed, and fled to the rear, while the captured guns were turned on them.

With the view of extending the operations of Wilson's cavalry still farther to the right, and if possible gaining the rear of the enemy's left, the two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps, which had been in reserve near Lawrens Hill, were ordered to Smith's right, while orders were sent to Wilson to gain, if possible, a lodgment on the Granny White Pike. These orders were promptly obeyed, and Cooper's brigade on reaching its new position got into a handsome fight, in which its losses were more than the losses of the rest of the Twenty-third corps during the two days' battle.

But though the enemy's left was thus rudely driven from its fancied security, the salient at the center, being an angle formed by the line along Hillsboro' Pike and that stretching toward the east, was still firmly held. Post's successful assault had merely driven out or captured the advance forces. The main line remained intact. As soon as word came of the successful assault on the right, General Thomas sent orders to General Wood, commanding the Fourth Corps, to prepare to attack the salient. The staff-officer by whom this order was sent did not at first find General Wood; but seeing the two division commanders whose troops would be called upon for the work, gave them the instructions. As he was riding along the line, he met one of the brigade commanders — an officer with a reputation for exceptional courage and gallantry — who, in reply to the direction to prepare for the expected assault, said, "You don't mean that we've got to go in here and attack the works on that hill?" "Those are the orders," was the answer. Looking earnestly across the open valley, and at the steep hill beyond, from which the enemy's guns were throwing shot and shell with uncomfortable frequency and nearness, he said, "Why, it would be suicide, sir; perfect suicide." "Nevertheless, those are the orders," said the officer; and he rode on to complete his work. Before he could rejoin General Thomas, the assault was made, and the enemy driven out with a loss of guns, colors, and prisoners, and the whole line was forced to abandon the works along the Hillsboro' Pike, and fall back to the Granny White Pike. The retreating line was followed by the entire Fourth Corps, as well as by the cavalry and Smith's troops; but night soon fell, and the whole army went into bivouac in the open fields wherever they chanced to be.

At dark, Hood, who at 12 o'clock had held an unbroken, fortified line from the Murfreesboro' to the Hillsboro' Pike, with an advanced post on Montgomery Hill, and five strong redoubts along the Hillsboro' Pike, barely maintained his hold of a line from the Murfreesboro'

Pike to the Granny White Pike, near which, on two large hills the left of his army had taken refuge, when driven out of their redoubts by Smith and Wilson. These hills were more than two miles to the rear of his morning position.

front of the enemy's new line, at one point coming within 250 yards of the salient at Overton Hill. Here they were halted, and threw up works, while the artillery on both sides kept up a steady and accurate fire. Steedman also moved forward and about noon joined his right to Wood's left, thus completing the alignment.

On his way to the front General Thomas heard the cannonading, and, as was his custom, rode straight for the spot where the action seemed heaviest. As he was passing a large, old-fashioned house, his attention was attracted by the noise of a window closing with a slam as emphatic as that which the poet Hood has celebrated in rhyme. Turning to see the cause of this wooden exclamation, he was greeted by a look from a young lady, whose expression at the moment was the reverse of angelic. With an amused smile, the general rode on, and soon forgot the incident in the excitement of battle. But this trifling event had a sequel. The young lady, in process of time,

became the affectionate and faithful wife of an officer then serving in General Thomas's army,—though he did not happen to be a witness of this episode.

The ground between the two armies for the greater part of the way from the Franklin to the Granny White Pike is low, open, crossed by frequent streams running in every direction, and most of the fields were either newly plowed or old cornfields, and so, heavy, wet, and muddy from the recent storms. Overton's Hill, Hood's right, is a well-rounded slope, the top of which was amply fortified, while hills held by the left of his line just west of the Granny White Pike are so steep that it is difficult to climb them, and their summits were crowned with formidable barricades, in front of which were *abattis* and masses of fallen trees. Between these extremities the works in many places consisted of stone walls covered with earth, with head logs on the top. To their rear were ample woods, sufficiently open to enable troops to move through them, but thick enough to afford good shelter. Artillery was also posted at every available spot, and good use was made of it.

The morning was consumed in the movements referred to. Wilson's cavalry, by a wide *détour*, had passed beyond the extreme Confederate left, and secured a lodgment on



THE CAPITOL, NASHVILLE.

Strong works, set with cannon, inclosed the foundations of the Capitol. Cisterns within the building held a bountiful supply of water. Owing to its capacity and the massiveness of the lower stories, the Capitol was regarded as a citadel, in which a few thousand men could maintain themselves against an army.

It was to that point that Bate, who had started from Hood's right when the assault was first delivered on the redoubts, now made his way amidst, as he says, "streams of stragglers, and artillerists, and horses, without guns or caissons — the sure indications of defeat."

General Hood, not daunted by the reverses which had befallen him, at once set to work to prepare for the next day's struggle. As soon as it was dusk, Cheatham's whole corps was moved from his right to his left; Stewart's was retired some two miles and became the center; Lee's also was withdrawn, and became the right. The new line extended along the base of a range of hills, two miles south of that occupied during the day, and was only about half as long as that from which he had been driven. During the night, they threw up works along their entire front, and the hills on their flanks were strongly fortified. The flanks were also further secured by return works, which prevented them from being left "in the air." Altogether, the position was naturally far more formidable than that just abandoned.

At early dawn the divisions of the Fourth Corps moved forward, driving out the opposing skirmishers. The men entered upon the work with such ardor that the advance soon quickened into a run, and the run almost into a charge. They took up their positions in


the Granny White Pike. But one avenue of escape was now open for Hood—the Franklin Pike. General Thomas hoped that a vigorous assault by Schofield's corps against Hood's left would break the line there, and thus enable the cavalry, relieved from the necessity of operating against the rebel flank, to gallop down the Granny White Pike to its junction with the Franklin, some six or eight miles below, and plant itself square across the only remaining line of retreat. If this scheme could be carried out, nothing but capture or surrender awaited Hood's whole army.

Meantime, on the national left, Colonel Post, who had so gallantly carried Montgomery Hill the morning before, had made a careful reconnaissance of Overton Hill, the strong position on Hood's right. As the result of his observation, he reported to General Wood, his corps commander, that an assault would cost dear, but he believed could be made successfully; at any rate he was ready to try it. The order was accordingly given, and everything prepared. The brigade was to be supported on either side by fresh troops to be held in readiness to rush for the works the moment Post should gain the parapet. The bugles had not finished sounding the charge, when Post's brigade, preceded by a strong line of skirmishers, moved forward, in perfect silence, with orders to halt for nothing, but to gain the works at a run. The men dashed on, Post leading, with all speed through a shower of shot and shell. A few of the skirmishers reached the parapet; the main

mortal. This slight hesitation and the disabling of Post were fatal to the success of the assault. The leader and animating spirit gone, the line slowly drifted back to its original position, losing in those few minutes nearly 300 men; while the supporting brigade on its left lost 250.

Steedman had promised to coöperate in this assault, and accordingly Thompson's brigade of colored troops was ordered to make a demonstration at the moment Post's advance began. These troops had never before been in action and were now to test their mettle. There had been no time for a reconnaissance, when this order was given, else it is likely a way would have been found to turn the enemy's extreme right flank. The colored brigade moved forward against the works east of the Franklin Pike and nearly parallel to it. As they advanced, they became excited, and what was intended merely as a demonstration was unintentionally converted into an actual assault. Thompson, finding his men rushing forward at the double-quick, gallantly led them to the very slope of the intrenchments. But, in their advance across the open field, the continuity of his line was broken by a large fallen tree. As the men separated to pass it, the enemy opened an enfilading fire on the exposed flanks of the gap thus created, with telling effect. In consequence, at the very moment when a firm and compact order was most needed, the line came up ragged and broken. Meantime Post's assault was repulsed, and the fire which had been concentrated on him was turned against Thompson. Nothing was left, therefore, but to withdraw as soon as possible to the original position. This was done without panic or confusion, after a loss of 467 men from the three regiments composing the brigade.

When it was seen that a heavy assault on his right, at Overton Hill, was threatening, Hood ordered Cleburne's old division to be sent over to the exposed point, from the extreme left, in front of Schofield. About the same time, General Couch, commanding one of the divisions of the Twenty-third Corps, told General Schofield that he believed he could carry the hill in his front, but doubted if he could hold it without assistance. The ground in front of General Cox, on Couch's right, also offered grand opportunities for a successful assault. Meantime, the cavalry, on Cox's right, had made its way beyond the extreme left flank of the enemy, and was moving northward over the wooded hills direct to the rear of the extreme rebel left.



VIEW OF A PART OF THE UNION LINES AT NASHVILLE.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

line came within twenty steps of the works, when, by a concentrated fire of musketry and artillery from every available point of the enemy's line, the advance was momentarily checked, and, in another instant, Post was brought down by a wound, at first reported as

General Thomas, who had been making a reconnaissance, had no sooner reached Schofield's front than General McArthur, who commanded one of Smith's divisions, impatient at the long waiting, and not wanting to spend the second night on the rocky hill he was occupying, told Smith that he could carry the high hill in front of Couch, the same which Couch himself had told Schofield he could carry, and would undertake it unless forbidden. Smith silently acquiesced, and McArthur set to work. Withdrawing McMillen's (his right) brigade from the trenches, he marched it by the flank in front of General Couch's position, and with orders to the men to fix bayonets, not to fire a shot and neither to halt nor to cheer, until they had gained the enemy's works, the charge was sounded. The gallant brigade, which had served and fought in every portion of the South-west, moved swiftly down the slope, across the narrow valley, and began scrambling up the steep hillside, on the top of which was the redoubt, held by Bate's division, and manned also with Whitworth guns. The bravest onlookers held their breath, as these gallant men steadily and silently approached the summit, amid the crash of musketry and the boom of the artillery. In almost the time it has taken to tell the story, they gained the works, their flags were wildly waving from the parapet and the unmistakable cheer, "the voice of the American people," as General Thomas called it, rent the air. It was an exultant moment; but this was only a part of the heroic work of that afternoon. While McMillen's brigade was preparing for this wonderful charge, Hatch's division of cavalry, dismounted, had also pushed its way through the woods, and had gained the top of two hills which commanded the rear of the enemy's works. Here, with incredible labor, they had dragged, by hand, two pieces of artillery, and, just as McMillen began his charge, opened on the hill where Bate was, up the opposite slope of which the infantry were scrambling. At the same time, Coon's brigade of Hatch's division with resounding cheers, charged upon the enemy and poured such volleys of musketry from their repeating rifles as I have never heard equaled. Thus beset on both sides, Bate's people broke out of the works, and ran down the hill toward their right and rear, as fast as their legs could carry them. It was more like a scene in a spectacular drama than a real incident in war. The hillside in front still green, dotted with the boys in blue swarming up the slope; the dark background of high hills beyond; the lowering clouds; the waving flags; the smoke slowly rising through the leafless tree-tops and drifting across the valleys; the won-

derful outburst of musketry; the ecstatic cheers; the multitude racing for life down into the valley below,—so exciting was it all, that the lookers-on instinctively clapped their hands, as at a brilliant and successful transformation scene, as indeed it was. For, in those few minutes, an army was changed into a mob, and the whole structure of the rebellion in the South-west, with all its possibilities, was utterly overthrown. As soon as the other divisions farther to the left saw and heard the doings on their right, they did not wait for orders. Everywhere, by a common impulse, they charged the works in their front, and carried them in a twinkling. General Edward Johnson and nearly all his division and his artillery were captured. Over the very ground where, but a little while before, Post's assault had been repulsed, the same troops now charged with resistless force, capturing 14 guns and 1000 prisoners. Steedman's colored brigades also rallied, and brought in their share of prisoners and other spoils of war. Everywhere the success was complete.

Foremost among the rejoicing victors was General Steedman, under whose command were the colored troops. Steedman had been a life-long Democrat and was one of the delegates, in 1860, to the Charleston convention, at which ultimately Breckinridge was nominated for President. As he rode over the field, immediately after the rout of the enemy, he asked, with a grim smile, as he pointed to the fleeing hosts, "I wonder what my Democratic friends over there would think of me if they knew I was fighting them with 'nigger' troops?"

It is needless to tell the story of the pursuit, which only ended, ten days later, at the Tennessee River. About a month before, General Hood had triumphantly begun his northward movement. Now, in his disastrous retreat, he was leaving behind him, as prisoners or deserters, a larger number of men than General Thomas had been able to place at Pulaski to hinder his advance—to say nothing of his terrific losses in killed at Franklin. The loss to the Union army, in all its fighting,—from the Tennessee River to Nashville and back again,—was less than six thousand killed, wounded, and missing. At so small a cost, counting the chances of war, the whole North-west was saved from an invasion that, if Hood had succeeded, would have more than neutralized all Sherman's successes in Georgia and the Carolinas: saved by the steadfast labors, the untiring energy, the rapid combinations, the skillful evolutions, the heroic courage and the tremendous force of one man, whose name will yet rank among the great captains of all time.

Henry Stone.

chronic law-breaker; over some of them, however, I believe that it would exert considerable deterrent influence. But that has little to do with the case. Primarily the question is not whether this measure will do them any good, but whether it will prevent them from doing harm to the state.

It may be urged, also, that disfranchisement is a severe penalty for the lesser offenses. Permanent disfranchisement would be; temporary disfranchisement is not. In view of the enormous injury inflicted upon the state by these multitudes of petty criminals and misdemeanants it is no more than equitable that the state should inflict upon them this temporary disability. And the enforcement of some such rule could not but react favorably upon public opinion, greatly raising the popular estimate of the value of citizenship. In that excellent article from which I have before quoted, and to which I am greatly indebted, Mr. Colby says:

The establishment of a moral qualification for the suffrage, besides strengthening the state by practically disabling its domestic enemies, could not fail to enhance the value and dignity of the franchise itself to all law-abiding citizens, and to increase their willingness to discharge their duties as soldiers, as jurymen, and as voters. The bestowal and retention

of the ballot once made dependent upon conduct, its possession will become a badge of respectability, if not of honor, and must soon render the country itself worthier of the sacrifices of its citizens.¹

One of the first duties of patriotism is to rescue the suffrage from the influences that are now corrupting it. But this is not the only duty of patriotism. If we could purge our voting-lists of the ignorant and the vicious, these classes would still be here in the midst of us; and our duty to them would still be urgent, after our duty to the state was done. To leave them in their ignorance and vice is not to be thought of; they must be prepared for citizenship. The task is arduous, but it must not be declined. The intelligence and good-will of our Christian citizens are able not only to hold in check the selfishness and brutality of these illiterate and alien elements, but to do something far better—to transform them, or many of them, into patriotic Americans. This may require some revival of our own patriotism and some diminution of our partisanship, and it may call for an order of heroism and consecration not much below that which we look for in war-time; but these requirements will not be thought too hard by men who rightly value the freedom and the peace of their native land.

¹ "Journal of Social Science," Vol. XVII., p. 98.

Washington Gladden.

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

A Question of Command at Franklin.

A NOTE FROM GENERAL STANLEY.

THERE appears in THE CENTURY MAGAZINE for August, 1887, an article by Colonel Henry Stone on Hood's campaign in Tennessee in general, and the battle of Franklin in particular, in which there are two errors to which I deem it proper to call attention.

On page 603 of the magazine Colonel Stone states: "Beyond Ruger, reaching from the ravine to the river below, was Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps,—all veterans,—consisting of three brigades, commanded by Generals William Grose and Walter C. Whitaker and Colonel Kirby. *All the troops in the works were ordered to report to General Cox, to whom was assigned the command of the defenses.*" The italics are mine.

Colonel Stone did not view these statements from the standpoint of an officer well informed as to the rights of command. Had he done so he would have seen that General Cox was in reality only the commander of a division of the Twenty-third (Schofield's) Corps, that for the time being he was in command of that corps, that "all the troops in the works" could not have been ordered to report to him without removing me from the command of the Fourth Corps, and that no one will claim that the latter idea was ever thought of by any one.

Colonel Stone personally knew very little about the matter he described, and perhaps is excusable to some extent, as he easily could have been led into making this misstatement by General Cox himself; for the latter, in the book written by him entitled "The March to the Sea: Franklin and Nashville," on page 86 complacently styles himself "commandant upon the line."

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
FRANKLIN, TENN., Nov. 30, 1864.

GENERAL KIMBALL: The Commanding General directs that you report with your command to Brigadier-General J. D. Cox for position on the line to-day. Very respectfully,
J. A. CAMPBELL,
Major and A. A. G.

This so-called order was as informal as a written order well could be, and was simply a direction to General Kimball as to where he could find information as to the place to which he had been assigned.

General Schofield, in a letter to me of September 5, 1887, says in reference to the order: "*My recollection is, and I infer the same from their language, that the orders had reference solely to the posting of the troops on the designated line.*"

If General Schofield had directed General Kimball to report with his command to one of General Schofield's aides-de-camp for position on the line, that

aide-de-camp could have asserted that he was "the commandant upon the line" with as much propriety as General Cox has now done.

The order, on its face, clearly indicates to a military person, even though he were ignorant of the facts, that the direction was given only for the temporary purpose therein stated.

An orderly or a guide might have been sent to show General Kimball where he was to go, but it is usual to transmit important orders by an officer, and General Cox was the one selected by General Schofield; and in order that there might be no mistake that it was by his order, General Schofield sent the memorandum order to General Kimball.

The Twenty-third (Schofield's) Corps consisted of Cox's and two brigades of Ruger's division, and was the first corps to arrive on the field, about daylight, and was followed in about three hours by the Fourth (Stanley's) Corps, composed of Kimball's, Wagner's, and Wood's divisions. General Kimball's division was the leading division of the Fourth Corps, and it was quite natural that General Schofield should direct General Cox—who had been on the ground since daylight—to show General Kimball his position in line, and having done this, his authority ceased; and this brief authority, little as it was, only lasted a few minutes, and had entirely ceased long before the battle was commenced, and could not warrant the statement that General Cox was "commandant upon the line" even for a minute.

So far as I know and believe, General Cox gave no orders to the Fourth Corps after showing General Kimball where he was to go. It would have made very little difference if he had attempted to assume the authority to give orders, as my division commanders, knowing he could not have had authority to give orders, would have paid no attention to them.

The following is a copy of a letter from General Schofield, which was written in reply to one I wrote to him concerning the misleading statement of Colonel Stone's:

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE ATLANTIC,
GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, NEW YORK CITY, Sept. 5, 1887.
GENERAL D. S. STANLEY, Department of Texas, San Antonio,
Texas.

DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of August 29 was received here September 2. From my best recollection and from examination of my records, I have no doubt General Cox quotes in the Appendix to his "Franklin and Nashville" the only orders given by me at Franklin which could be construed as placing any part of your corps, the Fourth, under his command. Those orders directed General Kimball, commanding your leading division, and Captain Bridges with four batteries of artillery, to report to General Cox "for position on the line."

Those orders were given in the morning, when you were understood to be with your rear-guard retarding the advance of the enemy, and hence not at the head of your column. My recollection is, and I infer the same from their language, that the orders had reference solely to the posting of the troops on the designated line, as they arrived at Franklin, under the direction of General Cox, who was the senior officer then present at that point. How those orders were construed by General Cox I do not know, though I observe that he refers to himself as "the commandant upon the line," by which I suppose he may mean simply the senior officer actually present there at the moment.

Of course it was not intended by me to deprive you at any time of the command of any portion of your corps which might be within reach of your orders. But you will doubtless recall the fact that the movement of the enemy which we had most reason to guard against was not a direct attack in front at Franklin, but one to strike our flank and rear by crossing the Harpeth above that point, and it was necessary to be prepared for either or both of those attacks. Hence it could not have been known in the morning, when those orders were issued, whether you would be in the afternoon on the line south of Franklin with Cox, or on the north side of the river and several miles from Franklin with Wilson, resisting Hood's attempt to cross the river; nor what portion

of your corps would, in the latter case, be with you, and what portion would have to remain with Cox. Therefore the orders given relative to the temporary posting of your troops in the morning could have had nothing to do with the question of your command of them in any battle which did occur, or might have occurred, in the afternoon. The latter question would have been determined in either case by the 122d Article of War, which is applicable to all such cases.

As the enemy chose the direct attack in front at Franklin, you of course remained in command, except perhaps for a moment, of all your troops engaged in resisting that attack, while I assumed immediate command, during the battle, of Wood's division of your corps, which had been stationed on the north bank of the river in readiness to support Wilson, and hence was beyond the reach of your orders while you were engaged in the battle on the south side of the river.

I observe that Cox says, "The commandants of the two corps [you and he] met on the tumpike just as Opdycke and his men were rushing to the front." Assuming this to be exact, there must have been a moment of time before that meeting when Cox had the authority, and it was his duty, to order your reserve brigade [Opdycke's] into action; not by reason of any order I had given, but under the authority and duty imposed upon him by the 122d Article of War.

In respect to your being with me on the north side of the river before the battle, I say most emphatically that was your proper place. The usual preparations for battle on the south side of the river had long since been made. The vital question remaining was to meet in line any attempt of the enemy in force to cross the river above. The moment such attempt was known it would have been your duty to lead Wood's division, followed by Kimball's and in turn by such other troops as I should judge necessary and expedient, as rapidly as possible to the support of Wilson. To do this without delay it was necessary for you to be where you were. And as soon as it became known that Hood had decided to make the attack in front, you rode to that point as rapidly as possible. What more could a corps commander do?

Thoughtless critics seem to assume that all the corps commanders of an army ought to be together at the point where the enemy chooses to make an attack. But I do not think any intelligent reader of military history will question the propriety of your conduct at Franklin.

It has not seemed to me that General Cox intended to do you any injustice. Yet he evidently wrote his account of the events which actually happened without giving so much thought, as you must necessarily have done, to those other probable events which did not happen, and in which, if they had, you would have been called upon to act by far the most important part. All the soldiers of an army can't act the same part in the same battle, nor any soldier the same part in any two consecutive battles.

That Cox happened to form the curtain of the main line at Franklin was because you had done the most vital service all the previous day and night. You acted nobly the part assigned you, so did also Cox. The honor gained was enough for both. I hope there will be no difference between you.

Inclosed you will find an extract from a letter on this subject written by me to General Cox from Rome, Italy, December 5, 1881.

Yours very truly,

[Signed]

J. M. SCHOFIELD.

Again, Colonel Stone states in his article in THE CENTURY, on page 605, "Meantime, General Schofield had retired to the fort, on a high bluff on the other side of the river, some two miles away, by the road, and had taken General Stanley with him."

This statement is erroneous. The facts are that General Schofield's headquarters were not over three-quarters of a mile from the nearest point of our main line.

Before it was certainly known that there was to be an attack, I was with him and went to the front as soon as the firing commenced. When it began General Schofield, who was not far away, came forward to Fort Granger on the bluff, within a quarter of a mile of the nearest line, where he could see the whole field, which was the proper place for him to be.

The following letter from General Kimball fully corroborates the foregoing, as does also my report of the battle which will be published in a future volume of the War Records:

OGDEN, UTAH, May 22, 1888.
GENERAL D. S. STANLEY, U. S. Army, San Antonio, Texas.

DEAR GENERAL: I am in receipt of your letter of the 12th instant, with the "printed correspondence." Referring to the battle at Franklin, Tennessee, on the 30th day of November, 1864, I

have to say that I did not receive any order or other command from General Cox on that day or during the battle, excepting the direction given me as to the position my division was to occupy in the line of battle. I was directed in orders from General Schofield, commanding the army, to "report to General Cox for position on the line to-day." My division was in the lead of our corps from Spring Hill, and the first to arrive at Franklin inside the line already formed by the troops of General Cox's command (Cox's and Ruger's divisions, Twenty-third Corps). While awaiting your arrival with the other divisions of your command, and your orders as to our positions in line of battle, General Cox requested me to form on his right; but not knowing what might be your orders in relation to positions to be occupied by your divisions I was somewhat slow in complying with his request, but soon afterwards, and before your arrival, I received the orders from General Schofield above alluded to. Complying, I immediately formed my division on the line indicated by General Cox, my left forming his right near the locust grove and west of Carter's house, my line extending westward until my right rested near the river below the town, and in this position you found me upon your arrival; and when I informed you of General Cox's request and of General Schofield's order, and my action in the matter, you approved, and directed me to remain in line as formed and to hold it, which I did during the battle and until our withdrawal after midnight by order of General Schofield.

I then understood that General Schofield had command of and directed the movements of our forces from Pulaski to and during the battle at Franklin, and thence to Nashville, and that you had command of the Fourth Corps, and Cox of the troops composing the Twenty-third Corps. I received no orders from General Cox other than the direction as to my position in line heretofore mentioned; after that, none. I did not know that he was, or that he assumed to be, in command of our forces in line during that battle. I know that he did not command nor give me any directions during that battle. I had no orders from any officer until I received the order from General Schofield directing the withdrawal from Franklin and the retirement to Brentwood and Nashville. . . .

Very respectfully yours, etc.,
NATHAN KIMBALL.

(Signed)

D. S. Stanley,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS.

REPLY BY GENERAL COX.

I HAVE hitherto believed that General Stanley and myself were in entire accord as to the facts of the battle of Franklin. The reasons are as follows: In August, 1881, when I was preparing to write the volume in the Scribner war series of histories entitled "The March to the Sea: Franklin and Nashville," General Stanley opened a correspondence with me, kindly offering to assist me by the loan of papers, etc. In a letter dated Cincinnati, 24th of August, 1881, thankfully accepting the offer, I took the opportunity to compare our recollections of the principal facts. I wrote:

Let me state a few consecutive points within my own memory and ask you to compare it with yours, premising that I have not yet begun the systematic review of the documents in my possession.

1. Two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps were present and acting under my command, Ruger's on the right of the Columbia Pike and my own (Reilly commanding) on the left.

2. Schofield had only intended to cover the crossing of trams, and had not meant to fight south of the Harpeth. He had therefore ordered me to send my own artillery and wagons over the river early, and had arranged that Major Goodspeed, your chief of artillery, should detail some batteries as your troops came in, and they reported to me.

3. After putting my own command in position, I reported to General Schofield that my troops were not sufficient to reach the river on the right, and that flank was consequently exposed. Kimball's division reported to me and was assigned that place.

4. I received a written dispatch from General Schofield saying that two brigades of Wagner's were out as rear-guard, and one (Opdycke's) would report within the lines to act as my reserve; that Wagner was ordered to bring the other two brigades in whenever Hood showed a purpose of serious attack. I showed this note to Wagner and found he had such orders.

5. When Hood formed and advanced, Wagner did not order in the two brigades, but ordered them to fight. One of my staff, still living, heard him send the order from the Carter house. In his excitement he had forgotten his orders apparently, and did not change, though reminded of them.

6. Being at the left of the line on the parapet, watching the enemy's advance, I was amazed to see Wagner's two brigades open fire. They were quickly run over by the enemy and came back in confusion.

7. I immediately sent an aide to Opdycke to warn him to be ready to advance in case of a break at the center, and to order the commandants of brigades, etc., to withhold their fire till Wagner's men should get in. The two aides who were with me are both dead, one being killed while performing part of the above duty. Opdycke afterward told me that he got no order and acted on his own judgment, and I have accepted that as the fact.

8. I almost immediately followed my order and rode to the pike. There I met Opdycke advancing, and met you also. We all went forward together. When Opdycke reached the parapet you and I were trying to rally the fugitives immediately in rear of the line. While thus employed you were wounded, and your horse was also hit. You asked me to look at the hurt, and I urged you to go and have surgical attention to it. I dismounted Captain Tracy, one of my aides, and gave you my horse, which he was riding. To say anything *here* of the impression your conduct made on me would violate the old maxim about "praise to face," etc.

9. Opdycke and the artillery continued to act under my orders till we left the lines at midnight. Orders to the rest of Wagner's division and to Kimball went from your headquarters, you continuing in command of the Fourth Corps till we got back to Nashville, notwithstanding your hurt.

As I have already said, I have not yet begun the collation of documents; but I have taken advantage of your kind letter to give the above outline, and to ask for any illustration, correction, or addition which may occur to you, so that I may give careful attention to any point on which my memory should differ from yours.

To this General Stanley replied from Fort Clark, Texas, under date of October 17, 1881, saying, among other things:

The nine points submitted in your letter are, to the best of my memory, exactly correct. I think it may be true that Opdycke did not receive your order. When I arrived at the left of his brigade the men were just getting to their feet, as they had been lying down, I presume to avoid the enemy's bullets.

This outline, thus explicitly agreed upon, is that which I followed in the volume referred to. The use of the designation "commandant upon the line" means, of course, as the context shows, the line south of the Harpeth River, upon which Hood made his principal attack. I may say, with the utmost sincerity, that my personal relation to that line is so clearly shown in the "nine points" that I did not regard the use of the designation as making any claim, but only as a periphrase to avoid repetition of the author's own name in a narrative written in the third person. I should be quite content to have the reader substitute the proper name for the phrase.

I should be equally indifferent to the conclusion that the command I exercised was by virtue of an Article of War instead of by the orders of General Schofield, if it were not that, both from clear memory and many circumstances, I have always felt personally sure that my mode of statement was the true one. The order to the batteries to supply the place of mine, already sent over the river, was identical in form to that to General Kimball. If it put these under my command, it had the same effect in the other case. It has been one of the liveliest surprises of my life to learn that anybody took a different view of the matter.

General Stanley came to the center of the Twenty-third Corps line, on the Columbia Turnpike, when Wagner's two brigades of the Fourth Corps came through it in their retreat. In rallying those brigades he was wounded, and went back to his quarters north of the river. With the exception of those few minutes, there is complete agreement that I was the senior officer on that line from daylight in the morning till midnight, and the agreed "nine points" show whether this was merely nominal.

The same "points" had settled the fact that I sent no orders to Kimball's division during the actual engagement; but it may be proper now to add that no one else did, the original directions to hold the re-

curved extension of our right proving to be all that were necessary.

If any statement of mine could fairly be interpreted to derogate from the full personal command of General Schofield over the whole army, I should indeed feel that it needed correction. In the volume referred to I said, what I have always repeated, that his position in the fort north of the river was almost the only one from which he could survey and guide the whole field. My duty was simply to perform faithfully the part assigned me. The fortune of war brought it about that Hood attacked the Twenty-third Corps line, instead of turning it, as would have been wiser strategy for him. In the latter event no doubt General Stanley would have been in the critical place, and mine would have been comparatively insignificant. It is also true that General Schofield *could* have ordered me to report to General Stanley as my senior, as he ordered portions of the Fourth Corps to report to me; but *he did not*, and I have tried to narrate history as it was, not as it might have been.

CINCINNATI, O.

J. D. Cox.

REPLY BY COLONEL STONE.

I SHALL make no other reply to General Stanley's criticism than to quote from the official reports.

General Schofield, whose report is dated December 31, 1864, says:

General J. D. Cox deserves a very large share of credit for the brilliant victory at Franklin. The troops were placed in position and entrenched under his immediate direction, and *the greater portion of the time engaged was under his command during the battle.*

Of the sixty-two regiments in "the line engaged" only twenty-four belonged to the Twenty-third Corps that day. The rest were of the Fourth Corps, of which General Stanley was commander.

General Kimball, a division commander in the Fourth Corps, whose report is dated December 5, says that he sent a regiment to report to General Ruger at the request of General Cox. This shows that he then recognized General Cox as in command.

General Opdycke, commanding a brigade of the Fourth Corps, states in his report that about 4 P. M. General Cox sent him a request to have his brigade ready, and adds, "I got no other orders till after the battle."

General Ruger, commanding a division in the Twenty-third Corps, states in his report that he was ordered to report to General Cox.

General Wagner, of the Fourth Corps, makes no mention of reporting to any one after reaching his final position.

These are all the commanders of all the troops engaged, except General Cox's own division.

On the 2d of December, General Cox made a full and detailed report, in which he says:

About noon [of November 30] General Kimball, commanding the first division, Fourth Corps, reported to me by order of the commanding general. . . . About 1 o'clock, General Wagner, commanding second division of the Fourth Corps, reported to me his division . . . and informed me that he was under orders to keep out two brigades until the enemy should make advance in line in force, when he was to retire, skirmishing, and become a reserve to the line established by me. . . . Captain Bridges (Fourth Corps artillery) was ordered by the commanding general to report to me with three batteries. . . . About 2 o'clock the enemy . . . came into full view. . . . The fact was reported

to the commanding general, as well as the disposition of our own troops as they were, and his orders received in reference to holding the position.

In a subsequent report, covering the same ground, under date of January 10, 1865, General Cox says:

At 2 o'clock . . . General Wagner presented orders to report to me. . . . At 3 o'clock . . . the order was reiterated to General Wagner to withdraw his brigade. . . . He was at that time in person near the Carter house, my headquarters.

I leave these quotations to speak for themselves. Nothing was further from my intention than to do even a seeming injustice to General Stanley — one of the most gallant, capable, and experienced soldiers in the army. The value of his services during the retreat from Pulaski to Nashville is inestimable. His conduct that day, and all days, was that of a brave, resolute, able commander.

As to the distance between the fort to which General Schofield retired and the battle-ground, I may add that from careful measurement on the maps, from personal observation within a few years, and from the estimates of residents of Franklin, I see no reason to doubt the correctness of my statement that it was "some two miles, by the road." Of course, in an air line it is much less.

Henry Stone.

BOSTON.

Canal at Island No. 10.

IN THE CENTURY for September, 1888, is published a communication relating to the claims for the credit for the construction of the Island No. 10 Canal; and as the details of that work were wholly planned and executed under the direct supervision of Captain Tweeddale and myself, of Bissell's Engineers, it may not be inappropriate to make some historical corrections as to the claims for credit of the initiation of the enterprise. It is probably as difficult to designate the original project of the scheme as it would be now to ascertain who first proposed a canal at the Isthmus of Darien; but certainly De Lesseps designed the Panama Canal. General Hamilton or Mr. Banvard may have first suggested the possibility of the cut-off, but certainly Colonel Bissell was the first to explore the route and to put it in practical operation. The method and practical operations of performing the difficult part of the work, viz., cutting off great forest trees six feet below the surface of the water, was designed and executed by Captain Tweeddale and myself. It is impossible to conjecture how Mr. Banvard can substantiate a claim to any part of the work, for at the time he mentions, August 20, 1861, both ends of the canal were many miles within the rebel lines, which at that time were formed at Columbus, Ky., on the Mississippi River, and therefore the New Madrid Canal at that time would have been of about as much use to the Federal forces as a railroad up the side of Lookout Mountain.

M. Randolph,

Late Captain Co. A, Bissell's Engineers.

NEW YORK.

READING THE CENTURY for August and September, 1885, and September, 1888, I have been amused at the strife for honors with regard to the canal above New Madrid, cutting off Island No. 10. Honors must be scarce when two men, neither of whom is entitled to