



ADVANCING UNDER DIFFICULTIES.

SHERMAN'S MARCH FROM SAVANNAH TO BENTONVILLE.



GENERAL SHERMAN'S army commenced its march from "Atlanta to the Sea" on the morning of November 15th, and arrived in front of the defenses of Savannah on the 10th of December, 1864. No news had been received from the North during this interval, except such as could be gleaned from Southern papers picked up by the soldiers on the line of our march. Our fleet was in Ossabaw Sound with supplies of food and clothing, and an immense mail, containing letters from home for nearly every one in the army, from the commanding general down to the private soldier. All that blocked our communication with the fleet was Fort McAllister on the Ogeechee River. This fort was captured by Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps on December 13th, and the 15th brought us our mails and an abundant supply of food and ammunition, making this one of the happiest days experienced by the men of Sherman's army. Preparations were at once commenced for assaulting the Confederate works, and were nearly completed when the Confederates evacuated Savannah. Our troops entered the city before daybreak on the 21st of December. The fall of Fort McAllister placed General Sherman in communication with

General Grant and the authorities at Washington. Prior to the capture of Savannah, the removal of the infantry of Sherman's army to City Point by sea was the plan contemplated by General Grant. On December 6th General Grant wrote to Sherman:

"My idea now is that you establish a base on the sea-coast, fortify and leave all your artillery and cavalry and enough infantry to protect them, and at the same time so threaten the interior that the militia of the South will have to be kept home. With the balance of your command come here with all dispatch."

In reply, under date of December 13th, Sherman said:

"I had expected, after reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and then to report to you."


The fall of Savannah resulted in the adoption of the plan which Sherman had contemplated. In a letter dated December 24th Sherman says:

"Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why I did not go to South Carolina, and when I answered that we were *en route* for that State, the invariable reply was, 'Well, if you will make those people feel the utmost severities of war we will pardon you for your desolation of Georgia.'"

About one month was spent in Savannah in clothing the men, and filling the trains with ammunition and rations. Then commenced the movement which was to make South Carolina

feel the severities of war.* The right wing, with the exception of Corse's division of the Seventeenth Corps, moved *via* Hilton Head to Beaufort. The left wing with Corse's division and the cavalry moved up the west bank of the Savannah River to Sister's Ferry, distant about forty miles from Savannah. Sherman's plan was similar to that adopted on leaving Atlanta. When the army started from Atlanta, the right wing moved directly towards Macon, and the left towards Augusta. Both cities were occupied by Confederate troops. The movements of our army caused the Confederate authorities at each of these important cities to demand not only the retention of the troops at each place, but induced them to demand help from every quarter. Sherman had no

and leave both cities in our rear, with little or no force in our front. On leaving Savannah our right wing threatened Charleston and the left again threatened Augusta, the two wings being again united in the interior of South Carolina, leaving the Confederate troops at Augusta with almost a certainty that Charleston must fall without a blow from Sherman. On the arrival of the left wing at Sister's Ferry on the Savannah, instead of finding, as was anticipated, a river a few yards in width which could be easily crossed, they found a broad expanse of water which was utterly impassable. The continuous rain-fall had caused the river to overflow, so that the lowland on the South Carolina side was covered with water, extending nearly half a mile from the




SKIRMISHERS CROSSING THE NORTH EDISTO, S. C., ON A FLOATING FOOT-BRIDGE. (FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)

thought of attacking either place, and at the proper time the movements of both wings of the army were so directed as to unite them

river. We were delayed several days in vain efforts to effect a crossing, and were finally compelled to await the falling of the waters.

* At this time General Lee addressed the following letter to the Governor of South Carolina: HEADQUARTERS ARMY N. VA., 27 January, '65. HIS EXCELLENCY A. G. MAGRATH, Governor of South Carolina, Columbia. SIR: I received to-day your letter of the 16th inst., and regret exceedingly to learn the present condition of affairs in the South. I infer from your letter that you consider me able to send an army to arrest the march of General Sherman. If such was the case I should not have waited for your application, for I lament as much as you do his past success, and see the injury that may result from his further progress. I have no troops except those within this department within which my operations are confined. According to your statement of General Sherman's force, it would require this whole army to oppose him. It is now confronted by General Grant with a far superior army. If it was transferred to South Carolina, I do not believe General Grant would remain idle on the James River. It would be as easy for him to move his army south as for General Sherman to advance north. You can judge whether the condition of affairs would be benefited by a concentration of the two large Federal armies in South Carolina, with the rest of the Confederacy stripped of defense. But should Charleston fall into the hands of the enemy, as grievous as would be the blow and as painful the result, I cannot concur in the opinion of your Excellency that

our cause would necessarily be lost. Should our whole coast fall in the possession of our enemies, with our people true, firm, and united, the war could be continued and our purpose accomplished. As long as our armies are unsubdued and sustained, the Confederacy is safe. I therefore think it bad policy to shut our troops within intrenchments, where they can be besieged with superior forces, and prefer operating in the field. I recommend this course in South Carolina, and advise that every effort be made to prevent General Sherman reaching Charleston by contesting his advance. The last return made by General Hardee of his force which I have seen, gave his entire strength 20,500 of all arms; with 5000 South Carolina militia which he expected, and 1500 Georgia troops under General G. W. Smith, he would have 27,000. This is exclusive of Connor's brigade and Butler's division sent from this army, which ought to swell his force to thirty-three thousand. But I think it might be still further increased by a general turn out of all the men in Georgia and South Carolina, and that Sherman could be resisted until General Beauregard could arrive with reinforcements from the West. I see no cause for depression or dependency, but abundant reason for renewed exertion and unyielding resistance. With great respect, your Excellency's obedient servant, R. E. LEE, General. [Printed from the MS.—EDITOR.]




RAILWAY DESTRUCTION AS A MILITARY ART.†

Our pontoon-bridge was finally constructed and the crossing commenced. Each regiment as it entered South Carolina gave three cheers. The men seemed to realize that

† A knowledge of the art of building railroads is certainly of more value to a country than that of the best means of destroying them; but at this particular time the destruction seemed necessary, and the time may again come when such work will be necessary. Lest the most effectual and expeditious method of destroying railroad tracks should become one of the lost arts, I will here give a few rules for the guidance of officers who may in future be charged with this important duty. It should be remembered that these rules are the result of long experience and close observation. A detail of men to do the work should be made on the evening before operations are to commence. The number to be detailed being, of course, dependent upon the amount of work to be done, I estimate that one thousand men can easily destroy about five miles of track per day, and do it thoroughly. Before going out in the morning the men should be supplied with a good breakfast, for it has been discovered that soldiers are more efficient at this work, as well as on the battle-field, when their stomachs are full than when they are empty. The question as to the food to be given the men for breakfast is not important, but I suggest roast turkeys, chickens, fresh eggs, and coffee, for the reason that in an enemy's country such a breakfast will cause no unpleasantness between the commissary and the soldiers, inasmuch as the commissary will only be required to provide the coffee. In fact it has been discovered that an army moving through a hostile but fertile country, having an efficient corps of foragers (vulgarly known in our army as bummers), requires but few articles of food, such as hard-tack, coffee, salt, pepper, and sugar. Your detail should be divided into three sections of about equal numbers. I will suppose the detail to consist of three thousand men. The first thing to be done is to reverse the relative positions of the ties and

at last they had set foot on the State which had done more than all others to bring upon the country the horrors of civil war. In the narrow road leading from the ferry on the

iron rails, placing the ties up and the rails under them. To do this, Section No. 1, consisting of one thousand men, is distributed along one side of the track, one man at the end of each tie. At a given signal each man seizes a tie, lifts it gently till it assumes a vertical position, and then at another signal pushes it forward so that when it falls the ties will be over the rails. Then each man loosens his tie from the rail. This done, Section No. 1 moves forward to another portion of the road, and Section No. 2 advances and is distributed along the portion of the road recently occupied by Section No. 1. The duty of the second section is to collect the ties, place them in piles of about thirty ties each—place the rails on the top of these piles, the center of each rail being over the center of the pile, and then set fire to the ties. Section No. 2 then follows No. 1. As soon as the rails are sufficiently heated Section No. 3 takes the place of No. 2, and upon this devolves the most important duty, viz., the effectual destruction of the rail. This section should be in command of an efficient officer who will see that the work is not slighted. Unless closely watched, soldiers will content themselves with simply bending the rails around trees. This should never be permitted. A rail which is simply bent can easily be restored to its original shape. No rail should be regarded as properly treated till it has assumed the shape of a doughnut; it must not only be bent but twisted. To do the twisting Poe's railroad hooks are necessary, for it has been found that the soldiers will not seize the hot iron bare-handed. This, however, is the only thing looking towards the destruction of property which I ever knew a man in Sherman's army to decline doing. With Poe's hooks a double twist can be given to a rail which precludes all hope of restoring it to its former shape except by recasting.—H. W. S.



THE RIGHT WING UNDER HOWARD CROSSING THE SALUDA RIVER. (FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)


South Carolina side torpedoes had been planted, so that several of our men were killed or wounded by treading upon them. This was unfortunate for that section of the State. Planting torpedoes for the defense of a position is legitimate warfare, but our soldiers regarded the act of placing them in a highway where no contest was anticipated as something akin to poisoning a stream of water. It is not recognized as fair or legitimate warfare. If that section of South Carolina suffered more severely than any other, it was due in part to the blundering of people who were more zealous than wise.

About February 10th the two wings of the army were reunited in the vicinity of Branchville, a small village on the South Carolina Railroad at the point where the railroad from Charleston to Columbia branches off from Charleston to Augusta. Here we resumed the work which had occupied so much of our time in Georgia, viz., the destruction of railroads.

Having effectually destroyed over sixty miles of railroads in this section, the army

started for Columbia, the capital of South Carolina, each corps taking a separate road. The left wing (Slocum) arrived at a point about three miles from Columbia on the 16th, and there received orders to cross the Saluda River, at Mount Zion's Church. The Fourteenth moved to the crossing, built a bridge during the night, crossed the river next day, and was followed by the Twentieth Corps and Kilpatrick's cavalry. The right wing (Howard) moved directly to Columbia, the Fifteenth Corps moving through the city and camping outside on the Camden road. The Seventeenth Corps did not enter Columbia. During the night of February 17th the greater portion of the city of Columbia was burned. The lurid flames could easily be seen from my camp, many miles distant. Nearly all the public buildings, several churches, an orphan asylum, and many of the residences were destroyed. The city was filled with helpless women and children and invalids, many of whom were rendered houseless and homeless in a single night. No sadder scene was presented during the war. The suffering of so many helpless and innocent persons could not but move the hardest heart.


The question as to who was immediately responsible for this disaster has given rise to some controversy. I do not believe that General Sherman countenanced or was in any degree responsible for it. I believe a free use of whisky (which was supplied to the soldiers by citizens with great liberality) was the immediate cause of the disaster. Primarily the responsibility must forever rest upon those who should have been the protectors of these helpless people. For more than a quarter of a century South Carolina had, to use a common expression, been absolutely "spoiling for a fight." No statesman, however eminent, could do anything which rendered him so



SHERMAN'S SOLDIERS GUARDING THE PALMETTO MONUMENT, COLUMBIA. (FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)

odious to that State, as to propose compromise measures which contemplated a peaceful solution of the troubles between the two sections of our country. Clay and Webster both tried it, only to be condemned by these people. She

the war fever, they will do well to remember that while politicians can inaugurate a war they can seldom close one. While they can predict with great accuracy the vicinity in which the first battle will be fought, they can never tell where the last one is to occur. A drunken soldier with a musket in one hand and a



VIEW FROM THE UNFINISHED CAPITOL.
VIEWS OF THE RUINS OF COLUMBIA.
(FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.)



THE UNFINISHED CAPITOL, COLUMBIA.

attempted the destruction of the Union during the presidency of Jackson. Upon the election of Lincoln she could not wait to learn his policy; she could not wait even to consult with her sister States of the South,—she took the initiative. Now that the result for which she had labored so long had been accomplished, it would have been regretted by the entire North, and I think by many at the South, had the performance closed without giving her an opportunity to witness the results and feel the effects of her long-continued efforts.

If the people of any section of our country should in the future become infected with


match in the other is not a pleasant visitor to have about the house on a dark, windy night, particularly when for a series of years you have urged him to come, so that you might have an opportunity of performing a surgical operation on him.

From Columbia the army moved towards Fayetteville—the left wing crossing the Catawba River at Rocky Mount. While the rear of the Twentieth Corps was crossing, our pon-

toon-bridge was swept away by flood-wood brought down the river, leaving the Fourteenth Corps on the south side. This caused a delay of three days, and gave rise to some emphatic instructions from General Sherman to the commander of the left wing of his army—which instructions resulted in our damming the flood-wood to some extent, but not in materially expediting the march.


We arrived at Cheraw on the 3d of March, where we found a large supply of stores sent from Charleston for safe-keeping. Among the stores was a large quantity of very old wine of the best quality, which had been kept in the cellars of Charleston many years, with no thought on the part of the owners that in its old age it would be drunk from tin cups by Yankee soldiers. Fortunately for the whole army the wine was discovered by the Seventeenth Corps and fell into the hands of the generous and chivalrous commander of that corps,—General Frank P. Blair,—who distributed it with the spirit of liberality and fairness characteristic of him. On the 6th we moved towards Fayetteville, where we arrived on the 10th. The march through South Carolina had been greatly delayed by the almost incessant rains and the swampy nature of the country. More than half the way we were compelled to corduroy the roads before our trains could be moved. To accomplish this work we had been supplied with an abundance of axes, and the country was covered with saplings well suited to the purpose.

Three or four days prior to our arrival at Fayetteville General Sherman had received



MAJOR-GENERAL FRANK P. BLAIR, COMMANDING SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

information that Wilmington was in possession of General Terry, and had sent two messengers with letters informing Terry when he would probably be at Fayetteville.* Both messengers arrived safely at Wilmington, and on Sunday, the day after our arrival at Fayetteville, the shrill whistle of a steamboat floating the Stars and Stripes announced that we were once more in communication with our own friends. As she came up, the banks of the river were lined by our soldiers, who made the welkin ring with their cheers. The opening of communication with Wilmington not only brought us our mails and a supply of clothing, but enabled us to send to a place of safety thousands of refugees and contrabands who were following the army and seriously embarrass-



RAISING THE UNION FLAG OVER THE OLD STATE-HOUSE, COLUMBIA. (FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)

* After General Hood had been driven from Tennessee, General Schofield was ordered to bring the Twenty-third Corps, General Cox, to Washington, whence it was sent to Fort Fisher, N. C., which had been captured by General A. H. Terry's Tenth Corps, in cooperation with Admiral Porter's fleet, on January 15th, 1865. Schofield assumed command of both corps, and captured Wilmington, February 22d. Thence Cox was sent to Newbern, while the greater part of Schofield's forces advanced to Goldsboro'.—EDITOR.



CROSSING A BURNING BRIDGE AT JUNIPER CREEK, MARCH 9TH, 1865. (FAC-SIMILE OF A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)

ing it. We were dependent upon the country for our supplies of food and forage, and every one not connected with the army was a source of weakness to us. On several occasions on the march from Atlanta we had been compelled to drive thousands of colored people back, not from lack of sympathy with them, but simply as a matter of safety to the army. The refugee-train following in rear of the army was one of the most singular features of the march. Long before the war, the slaves of the South had a system of communication by which important information was transmitted from one section of the country to another. The first gun at Sumter announced to every slave of the South that a great struggle had commenced in the result of which his own fate was in some degree at stake. The advance of Sherman's army through a section never before visited by a Union soldier was known far and near many miles in advance of us. It was natural that these poor creatures, seeking a place of safety, should flee to the army, and endeavor to keep in sight of it. Every day as we marched on, we could see, on each side of our line of march, crowds of these people coming to us through roads and across the fields, bringing with them all their earthly goods, and many goods which were not theirs. Horses, mules,

cows, dogs, old family carriages, carts, and whatever they thought might be of use to them were seized upon and brought to us. They were allowed to follow in rear of our column, and at times they were almost equal in numbers to the army they were following. As singular, comical, and pitiable a spectacle was never before presented. One day a large family of slaves came through the fields to join us. The head of the family, a venerable negro, was mounted on a mule, and safely stowed away behind him in pockets or bags attached to the blanket which covered the mule were two little pickaninnies, one on each side. This gave rise to a most important invention, *i. e.*, "the best way of transporting pickaninnies." On the next day a mule appeared in column, covered by a blanket with two pockets on each side, each containing a little negro. Very soon old tent-flies or strong canvas was used instead of the blanket, and often ten or fifteen pockets were attached to each side, so that nothing of the mule was visible except the head, tail, and feet, all else being covered by the black woolly heads and bright shining eyes of the little darkies. Occasionally a cow was made to take the place of the mule; this was a decided improvement, as the cow furnished rations as well as transportation for the

babies. Old stages, family carriages, lumber, wagons and carts filled with bedding, cooking-utensils and "traps" of all kinds, with men, women, and children loaded with bundles, made up the balance of the refugee-train which followed in our rear. As all the bridges were burned in front of us, our pontoon trains were in constant use, and the bridges could be left but a short time for the use of the refugees. A scramble for precedence in crossing the bridge always ensued. The firing of a musket or pistol in rear would bring to the refugees visions of guerrillas, and then came a panic. As our bridges were not supplied with guard-rails, occasionally a mule would be crowded off and with its precious load would float down the river.

Having thoroughly destroyed the arsenal buildings, machine-shops, and foundries at Fayetteville, we crossed the Cape Fear River on the 13th and 14th and resumed our march. We were now entering upon the last stage of the great march which was to unite the Army of the West with that of the East in front of Richmond. If this march could be successfully accomplished the Confederacy was doomed. General Sherman did not hope or expect to accomplish it without a struggle. He anticipated an attack and made provision for it. He ordered me to send all my baggage trains under a strong escort by an interior road on my


right, and to keep at least four divisions with all their artillery on my left, ready at all times for an attack.

During the 15th of March, Hardee was retreating before us, having for his rear-guard a brigade composed of the troops which had garrisoned Charleston, commanded by General Alfred Rhett. Kilpatrick's cavalry was in advance of the left wing, and during the day some of the skirmishers had come suddenly upon General Rhett, accompanied by a few of his men, and had captured him. Rhett before the war had been one of the editors of the Charleston "Mercury," one of the strongest secession papers of the South. He was sent by Kilpatrick to General Sherman. Sherman while stationed in Charleston before the war had been acquainted with Rhett, and not wishing to have him under his immediate charge, he sent him to me. Rhett spent that night in my tent, and as I had also been stationed at Fort Moultrie in 1854 and '55, and had often met him, we had a long chat over old times and about common acquaintances in Charleston. The following morning Rhett was sent to the rear in charge of the cavalry. He was handsomely dressed in the Confederate uniform, with a pair of high boots beautifully stitched. He was deeply mortified at having been "gobbled up" without a chance to fight. One of my staff told me that he saw Rhett a few days later, trudging along under guard, but the beautiful boots were missing,—a soldier had exchanged a very coarse pair of army shoes for them. Rhett said that in all his troubles he had one consolation, that of knowing that no one of Sherman's men could get on those boots.

ARSENAL AT FAYETTEVILLE.



SHERMAN'S MEN DRIVING THE ENEMY OUT OF FAYETTEVILLE. (FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)



THE FOURTEENTH CORPS ENTERING FAYETTEVILLE. (FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)

On the following morning Kilpatrick came upon the enemy behind a line of intrenchments. He moved his cavalry to the right, and Jackson's and Ward's divisions of the Twentieth Corps were deployed in front of the enemy's line. General Sherman directed me to send a brigade to the left in order to get in rear of the intrenchments, which was done, and resulted in the retreat of the enemy and in the capture of Macbeth's Charleston Battery and 217 of Rhett's men. The Confederates were found behind another line of works a short distance in rear of the first, and we went into camp in their immediate front. During the night Hardee retreated, leaving 108 dead for us to bury, and 68 wounded. We lost 12 officers and 65 men killed and 477 men wounded. This skirmish was known as the battle of Averysboro'.

Our march to this point had been toward Raleigh. We now took the road leading to Goldsboro'. General Sherman rode with me on the 18th and left me at 6 A. M. on the 19th to join General Howard, who was marching on roads several miles to our right. On leaving me General Sherman expressed the opinion that Hardee had fallen back to Raleigh, and that I could easily reach the Neuse


River on the following day. I felt confident I could accomplish the task. We moved forward at 6 A. M., and soon met the skirmishers of the enemy. The resistance to our advance became very stubborn. Carlin's division was deployed and ordered to advance. I believed that the



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, C. S. A., COMMANDING THE CAVALRY OF JOHNSTON'S ARMY. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

force in my front consisted only of cavalry with a few pieces of artillery. Fearing that the firing would be heard by General Sherman and cause the other wing of the army to delay its march, I sent Major E. W. Guindon of my staff to General Sherman, to tell him that I had met a strong force of cavalry, but that I should not need assistance, and felt confident I should be at the Neuse at the appointed time. Soon after the bearer of the message to General Sherman had left me, word came from Carlin that he had developed a strong force of the enemy in an intrenched position.

pany and regiment. While I was talking with him one of my aides, Major William G. Tracy, rode up and at once recognized the deserter as an old acquaintance, whom he had known at Syracuse before the war. I asked how he knew General Johnston was in command and what he knew as to the strength of his force. He said General Johnston rode along the line early that morning, and that the officers had told all the men that "Old Joe" had caught one of Sherman's wings beyond the reach of support, that he intended to *smash* that wing and then go for the other. The man stated



CONTRABANDS IN THE WAKE OF SHERMAN'S ARMY.

About the same time one of my officers brought to me an emaciated, sickly-appearing young man about twenty-two or twenty-three years of age, dressed in the Confederate gray. He had expressed great anxiety to see the commanding officer at once. I asked him what he had to say. He said he had been in the Union army, had been taken prisoner, and while sick and in prison had been induced to enlist in the Confederate service. He said he had enlisted with the intention of deserting when a good opportunity presented itself, believing he should die if he remained in prison. In reply to my questions he informed me that he formerly resided at Syracuse, New York, and had entered the service at the commencement of the war, in a company raised by Captain Butler. I had been a resident of Syracuse and knew the history of his com-

pany and regiment. While I was talking with him one of my aides, Major William G. Tracy, rode up and at once recognized the deserter as an old acquaintance, whom he had known at Syracuse before the war. I asked how he knew General Johnston was in command and what he knew as to the strength of his force. He said General Johnston rode along the line early that morning, and that the officers had told all the men that "Old Joe" had caught one of Sherman's wings beyond the reach of support, that he intended to *smash* that wing and then go for the other. The man stated

that he had no chance of escaping till that morning, and had come to me to warn me of my danger. He said, "There is a very large force immediately in your front, all under command of General Joe Johnston." While he was making his statement General Carlin's division with four pieces of artillery became engaged with the enemy. A line for defense was at once selected, and as the troops came up they were placed in position and ordered to collect fence rails and everything else available for barricades. The men used their tin cups and hands as shovels and needed no urging to induce them to work. I regretted that I had sent the message to General Sherman assuring him I needed no help, and saw the necessity of giving him information at once as to the situation. This information was carried to General Sherman by a young man, not then twenty years of



MAJOR-GENERAL R. F. HOKE, C. S. A., COMMANDING A DIVISION IN HARDEE'S CORPS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

age, but who was full of energy and activity and was always reliable. He was then the youngest member of my staff. He is now governor of Ohio—Joseph B. Foraker. His work on this day secured his promotion to the rank of captain. Some years after the close of the war Foraker wrote to me calling my attention to some errors in a published account of this battle of Bentonville, and although his letter was private, his statements are so full of interest that I feel certain I shall be pardoned for giving an extract from it:

"Firing between the men on the skirmish line commenced before Sherman had left us on the morning of the 19th, but it was supposed there was nothing but cavalry in our front. It was kept up steadily, and constantly increased in volume. Finally there was a halt in the column. You expressed some anxiety, and Major W. G. Tracy and I rode to the front to see what was going on. At the edge of open fields next to the woods in which the barricades were we found our skirmish line halted. . . . In a few minutes it moved forward again. The enemy partly reserved their fire until it got half-way or more across the field. This induced Tracy and me to think there was but little danger, and so we followed up closely, until suddenly they began again a very spirited firing in the midst of which we were sorry to find ourselves. I remember we hardly knew what to do—we could do no good by going on and none by remaining. To be killed under such circumstances would look like a waste of raw material, we thought. But the trouble was to get out. We didn't want to turn back, as we thought that would not look well. While we were thus hesitating a spent ball struck Tracy on the leg, giving him a slight but painful wound. Almost at the same moment our skirmishers charged and drove the rebels. . . . I rode back with Tracy only a very short distance, when we

met you hurrying to the front. I found you had already been informed of what had been discovered and that you had already sent orders to everybody to hurry to the front. I remember, too, that a little later Major Mosely, I think, though it may have been some other member of your staff, suggested that you ought to have the advance division charge and drive them out of the way; that it could not be possible that there was much force ahead of us, and that if we waited for the others to come up we should lose a whole day, and if it should turn out that there was nothing to justify such caution, it would look bad for the left wing; to which you replied in an earnest manner, 'I can afford to be charged with being dilatory or over-cautious, but I cannot afford the responsibility of another Ball's Bluff affair.' Do you remember it? I presume not, but I was then quite young, and such remarks made a lasting impression. It excited my confidence and admiration, and was the first moment that I began to feel that there was really serious work before us. . . . You handed me a written message to take to General Sherman. The last words you spoke to me as I started were, 'Ride well to the right so as to keep clear of the enemy's left flank, and *don't spare horse-flesh.*' I reached General Sherman just about sundown. He was on the left side of the road on a sloping hillside, where, as I understood, he had halted only a few minutes before for the night. His staff were about him. I think General Howard was there, but I do not now remember seeing him,—but on the hillside twenty yards farther up Logan was lying on a blanket. Sherman saw me approaching and walked briskly towards me, took your message, tore it open, read it, and called out, 'John Logan! where is Logan?' Just then Logan jumped up and started towards us. He too walked briskly, but before he had reached us Sherman had informed him of the situation and ordered him to turn Hazen back and have him report to you. It was not yet dark when I rode away carrying an answer to your message. It was after midnight when I got back, the ride back being so much longer in point of time because the road was full of troops, it was dark, and my 'horse-flesh' was used up."

General Carlin's division of the Fourteenth Corps had the advance, and as the enemy exhibited more than usual strength, he had deployed his division and advanced to develop the position of the enemy. Morgan's division of the same corps had been deployed on Carlin's right. Colonel H. G. Litchfield, inspector-general of the corps, had accompanied these troops. I was consulting with General Jeff. C. Davis, who commanded the Fourteenth Corps, when Colonel Litchfield rode up, and in reply to my inquiry as to what he had found in front he said, "Well, General, I have found something more than Dibrell's cavalry—I find infantry intrenched along our whole front and enough of them to give us all the amusement we shall want for the rest of the day."

Foraker had not been gone half an hour when the enemy advanced in force, compelling Carlin's division to fall back. They were handled with skill and fell back without panic or demoralization, taking places in the line established. The Twentieth Corps held the left of our line with orders to connect with the Fourteenth. A space between the two corps had been left uncovered, and Cogswell's

brigade of the Twentieth Corps, ordered to report to General Davis, filled the gap just before the enemy reached our line.

The enemy fought bravely, but their line had become somewhat broken in advancing through the woods, and when they came up to our line, posted behind slight intrenchments, they received a fire which compelled them to fall back. The assaults were repeated over and over again until a late hour, each assault finding us better prepared for resistance. During the night Hazen reported to me and was placed on the right of the Fourteenth Corps. Early on the next morning Generals Baird and Geary, each with two brigades, arrived on the field. Baird was placed in front of our works and moved out beyond the advanced position held by us on the preceding day. The 20th was spent in strengthening our position and developing the line of the enemy. On the morning of the 21st the right wing arrived. This wing had marched

twenty miles over bad roads, skirmishing most of the way with the enemy. On the 21st General Johnston found Sherman's army united, and in position on three sides of him. On the other was Mill Creek. Our troops were pressed closely to the works of the enemy, and the entire day was spent in skirmishing. During the night of the 21st the enemy crossed Mill Creek and retreated towards Raleigh. I have not attempted to give such a description of the battle as its importance would justify. The plans of the enemy to surprise us and destroy our army in detail were well formed and well executed, and would have been more successful had not the men of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps been veterans who had passed the days when they were liable to become panic-stricken. They were soldiers who had passed through many hard-fought battles and were the equals in courage and endurance of any soldiers of this or any other country.

H. W. Slocum.



BENTONVILLE THE MORNING AFTER THE BATTLE—THE SMOKE IS FROM RESIN THAT WAS FIRED BY THE CONFEDERATES. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

THE BATTLE OF BENTONVILLE.

THE battle of Bentonville was in many particulars one of the most remarkable which occurred during the late Civil War, and though the report of this fight made by the commander of the Confederate forces, General Joseph E. Johnston, is clear and accurate, there may be some minor details which would be of interest to the general reader, as throwing light on this battle, which was the last important one of the war. When the disparity of the numbers engaged is taken into consideration, it must be regarded also as one of the most brilliant, and its conduct and its results added luster to the fame of the great soldier who commanded the Southern troops. In order to have a clear conception of this battle, the reader should understand the con-

dition of affairs in the South at the time it occurred and just previous to it. A few words on this point are also necessary, to give the reasons which induced General Johnston to deliver battle.

When Sherman cut loose from Atlanta, after expelling the inhabitants and burning a part of the city, it was evident to every one who had given a thought to the subject, that his objective point was a junction with General Grant's army. The Army of Tennessee, after its disastrous repulse before Franklin, was, with its shattered columns, in rear of instead of in front of Sherman's advancing forces, and thus he was allowed to make his march to Savannah a mere holiday excursion. At this latter point there was no adequate force to oppose him, and