

and threw up rockets to mark our position. Immediately the enemy's artillery responded to the signal, shelling both troops and bridges, but with little injury. During the night Sedgwick's corps recrossed the river and took position to meet the enemy, should they, as expected at the time, cross to the north side to renew their attack, or attempt to destroy our depots for supplies near Fredericksburg.

According to Sedgwick the losses of the Sixth Corps in killed, wounded, and captured were 4925 [revised tables, 4,610]. The corps

captured five battle-flags and fifteen pieces of artillery, nine of which were brought off, the others falling into the hands of the enemy upon the subsequent reoccupation of Fredericksburg. 1400 prisoners were also taken, including many officers of rank.

The Sixth Corps was fortunate in having for its commander John Sedgwick, a true soldier and patriot, who in appearance and character was not unlike General George H. Thomas.

Huntington W. Jackson.

ESTIMATE OF FORCES AND LOSSES IN THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN.

ABSTRACT from the return of the Army of the Potomac for April 30, 1863:

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Total.
Provost Guard.....	1,868	95	254	2,217
Artillery Reserve ..	320	..	1,290	1,610
First Corps.....	15,782	65	1,061	16,908
Second Corps.....	15,907	9	977	16,893
Third Corps.....	17,568	..	1,153	18,721
Fifth Corps.....	14,867	..	857	15,724
Sixth Corps.....	22,427	104	1,136	23,667
Eleventh Corps.....	12,170	50	757	12,977
Twelfth Corps.....	12,929	..	521	13,450
Cavalry Corps.....	..	11,079	462	11,541
Aggregate ..	113,838	11,402	8,468	133,708

Exclusive of the provost guard (reported above) and the engineers (not entered on the return among the number available for line of battle), the Union army, in round numbers, consisted of about 130,000 effectives, with 404 pieces of artillery.

Abstract from the return of the Army of Northern Virginia for March 31, 1863 (there is no return for April in the possession of the Government):

Anderson's Division.....	7,665
McLaws's Division.....	7,984
Jackson's Corps.....	33,333
Stuart's Cavalry.....	6,509
Reserve Artillery.....	1,621
Total of all arms.....	57,112

To this should fairly be added the increase during the month of April, a period of "rest and recruiting," of perhaps 3000, and perhaps 1500 for the reserve artillery of Jackson's corps, which is not accounted for on the return, as shown by a note thereon.

This would give a total of 61,612, from which should be deducted Hampton's brigade of Stuart's cavalry, which we estimate at 1600, and which had been sent to the interior to recruit. These estimates make about 60,000 as the effective force under General Lee, with about 170 pieces of artillery. (Hood's and Pickett's divisions and Dearing's and Henry's artillery battalions were absent with General Longstreet in south-eastern Virginia.)

UNION ARMY.	Killed.	Wounded.	Captured or Missing.	Total.
General Headq's....	..	1	..	1
First Corps.....	27	218	54	299
Second Corps.....	149	1,042	732	1,923
Third Corps.....	378	2,645	1,096	4,119
Fifth Corps.....	69	472	159	700
Sixth Corps.....	487	2,638	1,485	4,610
Eleventh Corps.....	217	1,221	974	2,412
Twelfth Corps.....	261	1,442	1,121	2,824
Engineers.....	1	6	1	8
Cavalry Corps.....	17	75	297	389
Aggregate.....	1,606	9,760	5,919	17,285

CONFEDERATE ARMY.	Killed.	Wounded.	Captured or Missing.	Total.
McLaws's Division....	217	1,278	394	1,889
Anderson's Division....	186	1,049	210	1,445
Artillery Reserve....	9	43	21	73
Jackson's Headq's....	2	3	..	5
A. P. Hill's Division....	412	2,171	279	2,862
D. H. Hill's Div. (Rodes)	397	1,866	713	2,976
Early's Division.....	136	838	500	1,474
Trimble's Div. (Colston)	272	1,596	100	1,968
Corps Artillery.....	26	124	26	176
Stuart's Control.....	5	13	12	30
Aggregate.....	1,662	8,981	2,255	12,898

The above statements of losses during the Chancellorsville campaign, beginning April 27, and ending May 11, 1863, are compiled from the Official Records.—EDITOR.

CHANCELLORSVILLE REVISITED BY GENERAL HOOKER.

IN October, 1876, I accompanied General Hooker to the battle-fields of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Antietam, fields on which he had borne conspicuous parts. It was the first and only occasion on which he visited them after the battles. Previously he had placed in my hands his official papers and memoranda for the preparation of a history of the Battle of Chancellorsville, at the same time requesting me to make this journey with him,

that I might have the advantage of a thorough knowledge of the field, and of his interpretation of the manner in which the battle was fought. At this period he was partially paralyzed, from the injury received in the Chancellorsville battle, and he could move only with great difficulty by the aid of his valet.

Some Southern ladies were on the boat which carried us down the Potomac, and the merits of the Confederate generals were, in

a friendly way, discussed. In the free exuberance of conversation, the subject was inadvertently broached why the general had postponed marriage till so late in life. He responded very frankly that service in the Florida war and in the war with Mexico was not favorable to a matrimonial alliance; that in the ten years or more of his residence in California and Oregon, during the early gold craze, few ladies made their way to the Pacific coast, and upon his return to Washington in 1861, he had entered immediately the active service of his country. When the war was over and peaceful days returned, he felt that the time had come to seek a wife. A common friend had mentioned the name of Miss Olivia Groesbeck of Cincinnati, a refined and accomplished lady, and he determined to make her acquaintance; he learned that she was spending the season at Niagara Falls, and thither he went. As the conveyance reined up in front of the hotel, the very first person upon whom his eyes fell, was Miss Groesbeck seated upon the veranda.

General Hooker at that time was in the pride of manly beauty. Old soldiers have said that of the multitude of officers whom the war brought into prominence, none realized their ideal of a soldier in an equal degree with him. Noble in form, erect in carriage, he sat his horse like the fabled centaur. It was, therefore, in the course of nature that he should win the heart and the hand of the woman whom he had come to woo.

After our arrival at Fredericksburg, General Hooker was the recipient of many courteous attentions from the leading citizens, and at night he was serenaded, when a great crowd assembled in front of the hotel, to whose repeated cheers he made a brief response, in which he said that he had never visited their city but once before, and although his reception now was not nearly so warm as on that former day, yet it was far more agreeable to him,—a conceit which greatly pleased his audience.

Our drive over the Fredericksburg field was on one of the most perfect of autumnal days, and at every turn fresh reminiscences of the battle were suggested. As we approached the flag-staff of the National Cemetery, on the hill adjoining the Marye Heights, where 15,257 of the Union dead of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the Wilderness, and Spotsylvania are buried, General Hooker said: "I never think of this ground but with a shudder. The whole scene is indelibly fixed in my mind, as it appeared to me on that fatal day. Here on this ground were ranged the enemy's cannon, and the heights further to his left were thickly planted with pieces; all the infantry he could use was disposed behind earthworks and

stone walls. How this could have been selected as the point, above all others, for attack, and followed up until four whole divisions had been sacrificed, I cannot comprehend. As I stand here this day, the impossibility of carrying this ground by direct assault is no more apparent than it was when I made my observation preparatory to ordering Humphrey's division forward. But it is evident that General Burnside never forgave me for counseling him on that occasion as I did, for on January 23d, he drew up an order, known as Order No. 8, of his series, dishonorably dismissing me from the service, together with three other prominent general officers, at the same time relieving five other officers from duty. I was grossly maligned by the press of that day, and it was generally believed by the people at the North that I had not faithfully supported General Burnside in this battle, and that I was aiming thereby to supplant him. If these brave men who are sleeping here beneath our feet could speak, they would bear testimony to my sincerity and fidelity to the cause we were battling for; and though I have suffered in silence and my reputation has been grossly aspersed, I have rested in the firm belief that my conduct on that day would be justified by the American people."

This order, No. 8, was prepared on the 23d of January, 1863, and would have been immediately promulgated had not General Burnside been counseled first to lay it before President Lincoln, of whom he asked that it be approved, as drawn, or that his own resignation be accepted. The President refused to accept his resignation, but relieved him of the command of the Army of the Potomac; and so little effect had the order upon the mind of Mr. Lincoln that he decided to place Hooker, at whom the shaft was chiefly aimed at the head of the army. And yet so strong a hold had this unjust opinion on the public mind that even the President was tainted with it, and in his remarkable letter to General Hooker, informing him of his appointment, he said:

"I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not an indispensable, quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such way as to believe it, of your recently saying

that both the Army and the Government needed a Dictator. Of course it was not *for* this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it.

"And now beware of rashness — Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward, and give us victories."

The caution against rashness may have been suggested to the mind of Mr. Lincoln by the epithet of "Fighting Joe Hooker," which the general never heard without expressing his deep regret that it was ever applied to him. "People will think I am a highwayman or a bandit," he said; when in fact he was one of the most kindly and tenderhearted of men.

We were accompanied on our ride to the Chancellorsville field, some ten or twelve miles above Fredericksburg, by Major George E. Chancellor, a son of Melzi Chancellor, whose home at the time of the battle was at Dowdall's tavern, where General Howard had his headquarters. On setting out, General Hooker suggested that we should take some lunch along with us, as, when he was there last, there was very little to eat in all that region. Major Chancellor thought it unnecessary, and, in fact, we were feasted most sumptuously at his father's house.

Upon our arrival at the broad, open, rolling fields opposite Banks's Ford, some three or four miles up the stream, General Hooker exclaimed, waving his hand significantly: "Here, on this open ground, I intended to fight my battle. But the trouble was to get my army on it, as the banks of the stream are, as you see, rugged and precipitous, and the few fords were strongly fortified and guarded by the enemy.

"By making a powerful demonstration in front of and below the town of Fredericksburg with a part of my army, I was able, unobserved, to withdraw the remainder, and, marching nearly thirty miles up the stream, to cross the Rappahannock and the Rapidan unopposed, and in four days' time to arrive at Chancellorsville within five miles of this coveted ground, and all this without General Lee having discovered that I had left my position in his front. So far, I regarded my movement as a great success.

"On the morning of the fifth day my army was astir, and was put in motion on three

lines through the tangled forest (the Wilderness) which covers the whole country around Chancellorsville, and in three hours' time I would have been in position on these crests, and in possession of Banks's Ford in short and easy communication with the other wing of my army. But at midnight of that morning General Lee moved out with his whole army, and by sunrise had firm possession of Banks's Ford, had thrown up this line of breastworks which you can still follow with the eye, and had it bristling with cannon from one end to the other. Before I had proceeded two miles the heads of my columns, while still upon the narrow roads in these interminable forests, where it was impossible to manœuvre my forces, were met by Jackson with a full two-thirds of the entire Confederate army. I had no alternative but to turn back as I had only a fragment of my command in hand and take up the position about Chancellorsville which I had occupied during the night, as I was being rapidly outflanked upon my right, the enemy having open ground on which to operate.

"And here again my reputation has been attacked because I did not undertake to accomplish an impossibility, but turned back at this point; and every history of the war that has been written has soundly berated me because I did not fight here in the forest with my hands tied behind me, and allow my army to be sacrificed. I have always believed that impartial history would vindicate my conduct in this emergency."

Soon after leaving the open ground opposite Banks's Ford we entered the dense forest, or "Wilderness," which covers the entire Chancellorsville battle-ground. "A dense forest," says General Warren, "of not very large trees, but very difficult to get through; mainly of scrubby oak, what they call black-jack there, so that a man could hardly ride through it, and a man could not march through it very well with musket in hand, unless he trailed it."

Every important position was observed and commented upon by the man who on those fierce battle-days had wielded, on this very ground, an army of a hundred thousand men. On approaching the pine-tree under which Generals Lee and Jackson had planned the mode of attack, General Hooker observed, "It was under that tree that the mischief was devised which came near ruining my army. My position at Chancellorsville was a good one for this monotonous country. I felt confident when I reached it that I had eighty chances in a hundred to win. To make sure that everything was firm and strong, very early on the 2d of May, the first day of the battle, I rode along the whole line, and per-

sonally examined every part, suggesting some changes and counseling extreme vigilance. Upon my return to headquarters I was informed that a continuous column of the enemy had been marching past my front since early in the morning, as of a corps with all its *impedimenta*. This put an entirely new phase upon the problem, and filled me with apprehension for the safety of my right wing, which was posted to meet a front attack from the south, but was in no condition for a flank attack from the west; for this marching of the enemy's corps, to my mind, meant a flank movement upon my right. I immediately dictated a dispatch* to "Generals Slocum and Howard," the latter commanding the Eleventh Corps, which stood upon the extreme right, saying that I had good reason to believe that the enemy was moving to our right, and that they must be ready to meet an attack from the west. This was at half-past nine in the morning. In the course of two hours I got a dispatch from General Howard, saying that he could see a column of the enemy moving westward, and that he was taking the precautions necessary 'to resist an attack from the west.'† I had previously put Williams's division of the Twelfth Corps on an interior line looking westward, and had it fortified, so that if Howard should give way, this interior line would be for safety, as it afterwards proved my salvation.

"I sent Sickles to pierce this moving column of the enemy, and made preparations to flank the portion of Lee's army which was still upon my front, in the direction of Fredericksburg, and, sweeping down in reverse, destroy it if possible. But a swamp intervened which had to be corduroyed, and a small stream had to be bridged, which consumed time; and though Sickles was successful in breaking in upon the enemy's column and making some captures, yet, before he was in position to make his decisive attack, Jackson, who had led his column by a long circuit out of sight and hearing, through the dense forest, came in upon my right flank, and by one concentrated blow of his whole corps, some twenty-five thousand men, had crushed and put to flight almost the entire corps of Howard, and it was with the utmost difficulty that I could lead up my reserves to the interior line of Williams, and bring Jackson's victorious forces to a halt. This failure of Howard

to hold his ground cost us our position, and I was forced, in the presence of the enemy, to take up a new one. Upon investigation I found that Howard had failed properly to obey my instructions, to prepare to meet the enemy from the west." In this connection the following extracts from a letter to General Hooker from General Schurz (who subsequently gave General Hooker leave to print) will be read with interest:

40 W. 32d ST., NEW YORK, April 22, 1876.

"MY DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 8th inst. was forwarded to me from St. Louis, and reached me here early this morning, and I hasten to reply. I regret very much that, my papers being boxed up, I have no access to a memorandum of the circumstances connected with the battle of Chancellorsville, as they came under my observation, which memorandum I put on paper shortly after that event. So I have to depend upon my memory in answering your questions. According to my recollection you are mistaken in your impression that General Howard put your dispatches and orders into his pocket without communicating them to his division-commanders. About noon or a little after on the day of the attack on the Eleventh Corps I was at General Howard's headquarters, a house on the Chancellorsville road near the center of our position. General Howard, being very tired, wanted to rest a little, and asked me as next in rank to open dispatches that might arrive and to wake him in case they were of immediate importance. Shortly after a courier arrived with a dispatch from you calling General Howard's attention to the movement of the enemy toward our right flank, and instructing him to take precautionary measures against an attack from that quarter. I went in to General Howard at once and read it to him, and if I remember rightly, while we were speaking about it, another courier, or one of your young staff-officers, arrived with a second dispatch of virtually the same purport. We went out and discussed the matter on the porch of the house. I am not sure whether General Steinwehr was present or not. . . .

"I have seen it stated that my troops were already gone when General Devens's division in its hurried retreat reached my position. This is utterly untrue. Some of my regiments which had remained in their old position, succeeded in wheeling round under the fire of the enemy, others were swept away, but those whose front I had changed during the afternoon in anticipation of the attack held their ground a considerable time after the debris of General Devens's division had swept through our line. I saw General Devens, wounded, carried by, and he had long been . . . in the rear when we were overpowered and fell back upon Colonel Buschbeck's position, where General Howard in the meantime had been trying to rally the routed troops. This also you will find in my report. My loss in killed and wounded was quite heavy, if I remember rightly about twenty per cent.

"I ought to add that he [General Howard] thought he could not carry out as well as he desired your instruction to hold a strong reserve in hand, for the reason that General Barlow's brigade of Steinwehr's

be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the general's opinion, as favorably posted as might be. We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their approach. J. H. VAN ALLEN, Brigadier-General and Aid-de-Camp."

† "HEADQUARTERS 11th CORPS, May 2d, 10 m. to 11 o'clock [10:50 A. M.] MAJ.-GENL. HOOKER, Comd'g Army. GENERAL: From Gen. Devens's headquarters we can observe a column of infantry moving westward on a road parallel with this on a ridge about 1 1/2 to 2 miles south of this. I am taking measures to resist an attack from the west. Respectfully, O. O. HOWARD, Maj.-Gen.

* "H'DQRS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 2, 1863, 9:30 A. M. Circular. MAJOR-GENERALS SLOCUM AND HOWARD: I am directed by the Major-General commanding to say that the disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the position you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency. The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial defenses worth naming have been thrown up, and there appears to

division had been ordered to the support of Sickles. All the precaution that was taken against a flank attack, aside from what I did without orders, was the construction of a small rifle-pit across the Chancellorsville road in the rear of my division, near the house [Dowdall's tavern] occupied by General Howard as headquarters. If you should desire information on any particular point I may not have touched here, I shall be glad to give it if possible. Your letters will find me at 40 West 32d St., New York, until June 8th. Of course this hasty note is not written with any expectation on my part to see it printed as part of an historical narrative. It is simply to give *you* the information you wish for, and which it gives me pleasure to furnish.

"Very truly yours,
C. SCHURZ.

"MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER.

"P. S. Whether General Howard received on that day any dispatches or instructions from you subsequent to those mentioned, I do not know."*

When we arrived at the Chancellor House, (which is all there is of Chancellorsville,) where General Hooker had his headquarters, and where he received the hurt which came near proving mortal, General Hooker said, "I was standing on this step of the portico on the Sunday morning of the 3d of May, and was giving direction to the battle, which was now raging with great fury, the cannon-balls reaching me from both the east and the west, when a solid shot struck the pillar near me, splitting it in two, and throwing one-half longitudinally against me, striking my whole right side, which soon turned livid. For a few moments I was senseless, and the report spread that I had been killed. But I soon revived, and to correct the misapprehension, I insisted on being lifted upon my horse, and rode back towards the white house, which subsequently became the center of my new position. Just before reaching it, the pain from my hurt became so intense, that I was likely to fall, when I was assisted to dismount, and was laid upon a blanket spread out upon the ground, and was given some brandy. This revived me, and I was assisted to remount. Scarcely was I off the blanket, when a solid shot, fired by the enemy at Hazel Grove, struck in the very center of that blanket, where I had a moment

before been lying, and tore up the earth in a savage way." Turning to Major Chancellor, who was standing by, General Hooker said, "Ah, Major! Your people were after me with a sharp stick on that day."

But a short distance from the Chancellor House, in the direction of Dowdall's tavern, our carriage was halted, and dismounting, Major Chancellor led us a few paces out of the road, along a faint cart-path, when he said, "This is the place where Stonewall Jackson received the wounds which proved mortal." "I have always been struck," observed General Hooker, "with the last words of General Jackson, evincing how completely he was absorbed in the progress of the battle. In his delirium he was still upon the field, and he cried out, 'Order A. P. Hill to prepare for action — pass the infantry to the front rapidly — tell Major Hawks —' when he stopped with the sentence unfinished. After a little his brow relaxed, as if from relief, and he said, 'Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees,'—and these were his last words."

Arriving at Dowdall's tavern, General Hooker pointed out the excellent position which was here afforded for Howard's corps to have made a stout defense. "Buschbeck's brigade of that corps," said he, "did do wonders here, and held the whole impetuous onset of the enemy in check for an hour or more, which gave me opportunity to bring my reserves into position. The loss of this ground brought me into so cramped a condition that I was obliged to take up a new position, which I successfully accomplished. I now ordered Sedgwick, who commanded the Sixth Corps, the largest in my army, some twenty-two thousand men, which had been left to demonstrate in front of Fredericksburg, to cross the river and move rapidly up to my left. The effect of so heavy a body of fresh troops coming in upon the enemy's flank, I calculated would be decisive. But Sedgwick was dilatory in moving, which gave the enemy time to con-

* The following are extracts from the official report to General Howard of General Schurz, who shows, besides, that his division made strenuous efforts to stem the assaults of Jackson's men: "In the course of the forenoon I was informed that large columns of the enemy could be seen from General Devens's headquarters, moving from east to west. . . . I observed them plainly as they moved on. I rode back to your [General Howard's] headquarters, and on the way ordered Captain Dilger to look for good artillery positions on the field fronting west, as the troops would, in all probability, have to execute a change of front. The matter was largely discussed at your headquarters, and I entertained and expressed in our informal conversations, the opinion that we should form upon the open ground we then occupied, with our front at right angles with the plank road, lining the church grove and the border of the woods east of the open plain with infantry, placing strong echelons behind both wings, and distributing the artillery along the front on ground most favorable for its action, especially on the eminence on the right and left of Dowdall's tavern. . . . In the absence of orders, but becoming more and more convinced that the enemy's attack would come from the west and fall upon our right and rear, I took it upon my own responsibility to detach two regiments from the second line of my second brigade and to place them in a good position on the right and left of Ely's Ford road, west of Hawkins's

farm, so as to check the enemy if he should attack our extreme right and penetrate through the woods at that point. This was subsequently approved by you. . . . With these exceptions, no change was made in the position occupied by the corps. The losses suffered by my division in the action of May 2d were very severe in proportion to my whole effective force. I had 15 officers killed, 23 wounded, and 15 missing, and 102 men killed, 365 wounded, and 441 missing; total, 953. . . . My whole loss amounted to about 23 per cent. . . . In closing this report I beg leave to make one additional remark. The Eleventh Corps, and, by error or malice, especially the Third Division, has been held up to the whole country as a band of cowards. My division has been made responsible for the defeat of the Eleventh corps, and the Eleventh Corps for the failure of the campaign. Preposterous as this is, yet we have been overwhelmed by the army and the press with abuse and insult beyond measure. We have borne as much as human nature can endure. I am far from saying that on May 2d everybody did his duty to the best of his power.

But one thing I will say, because I know it: these men are no cowards. . . . I have seen with my own eyes, troops who now affect to look down upon the Eleventh Corps with sovereign contempt, behave much worse under circumstances far less trying. . . ."—EDITOR.

centrate and stop him before he had moved over half the distance, and I consequently got no help from him."

I ventured to ask why he did not attack when he found that the enemy had weakened his forces in the immediate front and sent them away to meet Sedgwick. "That," said he, "would seem to have been the reasonable thing to do. But we were in this impenetrable thicket. All the roads and openings leading through it, the enemy immediately fortified strongly, and planted thickly his artillery commanding all the avenues, so that with reduced numbers he could easily hold his lines, shutting me in, and it became utterly impossible to manœuvre my forces. My army was not beaten. Only a part of it had been engaged. The First Corps, commanded by Reynolds, whom I regarded as the ablest officer under me, was fresh, and ready and eager to be brought into action, as was my whole army. But I had been fully con-

vinced of the futility of attacking fortified positions, and I was determined not to sacrifice my men needlessly, though it should be at the expense of my reputation as a fighting officer. We had already had enough grievous experience in that line. I made frequent demonstrations to induce the enemy to attack me, but he would not accept my challenge. Accordingly, when the eight days' rations with which my army started out were exhausted, I retired across the river. Before doing so I sent orders to General Sedgwick to hold his position near Banks's Ford, on the south side of the stream, and I would bring my whole army to his support; but the order failed to reach him until he had already recrossed the river. Could I have had my army on the open grounds at that point where I could have manœuvred it properly, I felt assured that I could have gained a decisive victory. But this, my last chance, was frustrated."

Samuel P. Bates.

MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

Lee's Knowledge of Hooker's Movements.

THE assertion that Hooker's move upon Chancellorsville was a surprise to General Lee is a great mistake. Every day, Lee had information of Hooker's movements. The following letter, sent by Lee to Jackson and by the latter to me, has never been out of my possession since. It shows the remarkable intuition which enabled General Lee on so many occasions to foresee and penetrate the intentions of his antagonist. In this case a demonstration had been made on our extreme right at Port Royal, and without waiting for orders I had gone with a brigade and battery to meet it. I reported the facts to General Jackson, and it is my letter to him to which General Lee refers:

"HEADQUARTERS A. N. VA., April 23, 1863. LIEUT.-GEN'L T. J. JACKSON, Com'g Corps. GEN'L: I have received General Colston's letter of 8½ o'clock to-day which you forwarded to me. I think from the account given me by L't-Col. Smith of the Engineers, who was at Port Royal yesterday, of the enemy's operations there, the day and night previous, that his present purpose is to draw our troops in that direction while he attempts a passage elsewhere. I would not then send down more troops than are actually necessary. I will notify Gen'ls McLaws and Anderson to be on the alert, for I think that if a real attempt is made to cross the river it will be above Fredericksburg. Very respectfully, R. E. LEE, Gen'l."

The back of the letter was endorsed by Jackson, "Respectfully referred to General Colston for his guidance." It was also marked "confidential," and both the front and the back of the envelope were marked "private," so that not even my Adjutant General should open it in case of my absence.

The Federal writers have wondered why Jackson's corps did not complete its work on the evening of May 2d. They do not realize the condition of our troops after their successful charge on Howard. We had forced our way through brush so dense that the

troops were nearly stripped of their uniforms. Brigades, regiments, and companies had become so mixed that they could not be handled; besides which the darkness of evening was so intensified by the shade of the dense woods that nothing could be seen a few yards off. The halt at that time was not a mistake, but a necessity. So far from intending to stop, Jackson was hurrying A. P. Hill's division to the front to take the place of Rodes's and mine and to continue the attack, when he was wounded; A. P. Hill was also wounded soon afterwards, and the advance of his troops in the narrow road on which alone they could move, was checked by the shell and canister of twelve Napoleon guns, from an elevation within five hundred yards. The slaughter and confusion were greatly increased by this terrible fire in the darkness of the night, so that the pause in the attack was one of those fatalities of war that no skill or foresight can prevent.

It was about one o'clock on Sunday that Lee received information that Early had been driven from Marye's Heights and was falling back before Sedgwick. Jackson's corps, which had been fighting since six o'clock the previous evening, with very little rest during the night, renewing the conflict at daylight, and capturing the positions at Chancellorsville, was by this time much diminished by casualties and much exhausted by fatigue, hunger, and thirst; but it was preparing to move upon Hooker's last line of intrenchments, erected during the night on very strong positions. My division was in the lead in line of battle. It was then that I received an order to report at once in person to General Lee. I found him standing in a small tent pitched by the roadside. His plain gray sack-coat with only three stars on the rolling collar, was, like his face, well sprinkled with the dust of the battlefield. In low, quiet tones he said to me: "General, I wish you to advance with your division on