



## THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.



THE Chancellorsville campaign was the most eventful one of the late civil war. It brought out in bolder relief the advantages and also the deficiencies in both armies, than any other campaign. In this sketch it is proposed to note salient points without encumbering the narrative with the subordinate details that render military history so intricate and uninteresting to the unprofessional reader.


There are two branches of the military profession upon which success depends. They are essentially different from each other, and yet so dependent, that a commander of an army, who is not master of both, is not master of the situation. These two branches are styled strategy and tactics. Strategy embraces the movements and manœuvres of the different parts of an army, outside of the reach of the enemy's cannon; or, in other words, out of his sight. Tactics is confined to the movements of an army under fire.

The strategy of a commander may be of a high order, but he will lose all the advantages he has obtained by it if he is unable to manœuvre his army, under fire, in such a manner as to strike his opponent in his weakest points, and at the same time prevent him from using to advantage his strongest ones.

PERHAPS the best way to illustrate this is to take as a standard a campaign in which the strategy as well as the tactics were of the highest order; where the splendid fighting tactics supplemented perfectly the strategy by which it was brought about, and culminated in complete success.

The campaign and battle of Wagram, fought by the French army under the command of the Emperor Napoleon, and the Austrian army commanded by the Archduke Charles,—one of the ablest generals in Europe,—has many features in common with those of the campaign of Chancellorsville, and by noting how the Emperor Napoleon conducted his campaign, a comparison and conclusion can be obtained showing how the varied successes and failures at Chancellorsville occurred. Napoleon having conquered Vienna found the Archduke Charles on the other side of the Danube River with an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men. He attempted to cross the Danube from the island of Lobau, and succeeded in throwing across the two corps of Lannes and Masséna which held the two villages of Essling and Aspern, and withstood the attack of the Austrian army. The Emperor Napoleon, however, was unable to cross the remainder of his army, as the Archduke Charles sent down fire ships, and immense rafts, which the force of the current of the Danube caused to break the bridges of Napoleon faster than he could replace them; so he was forced to retreat to the island of Lobau. He then began to draw his troops from Italy, from Spain, and from France, and in six months an army of one hundred and eighty thousand men was concentrated in the vicinity of the island of Lobau. With the greatest care and scientific execution, Napoleon had his bridges so constructed and defended that the Austrians were unable to injure them. One of the most difficult and dangerous of the operations in war is the crossing of an army over a river like the Danube, with a powerful enemy on the other side. Napoleon, however, displayed so much genius in the movements of his army, that he effected a crossing without much loss.





ABANDONING THE WINTER CAMP AT FALMOUTH. (BY EDWIN FORBES, FROM HIS SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)

The Archduke Charles had his army in a strong and commanding position, one flank resting on the Danube, the other extending out to the vicinity of the village of Wagram. The flank in the vicinity of Wagram was the weak point of the position, which Napoleon detected at once; he, therefore, ordered the two corps of Bernadotte and Masséna, to make a circuitous march around Wagram, and attack the flank and rear of the Austrians.

At the same time to prevent the Austrian army from changing front or sending any force to interfere with the march of these two corps, he attacked the Austrians in front with the bulk of his army. The splendid fighting of the Archduke Charles held the French army in check, and Napoleon, seeing a desperate effort must be made, organized a select corps of eleven thousand men with one hundred pieces of artillery, which he placed under



THE RIGHT WING CROSSING THE RAPPAHANNOCK AT KELLY'S FORD. (BY EDWIN FORBES, FROM HIS SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)



the command of General Macdonald, with orders to charge the Austrian center. The charge was a success, but Macdonald lost ten men out of every eleven, and had every piece of his artillery dismounted. For this charge Napoleon made Macdonald a marshal of France on the field of battle.

It had enabled the two corps of Bernadotte and Masséna to prosecute their march undisturbed; Bernadotte's corps was in front and struck the Austrians first, but, by one of those unexpected occurrences that often baffle the finest operations in war, his troops became

Macdonald, and the crushing blow given by the magnificent fighting of Masséna. Without the fighting of Macdonald and Masséna, the campaign would have failed, and to Napoleon, who selected those men to do such desperate fighting, belongs the honor of the victory his genius created by his strategy and grand tactics.

GENERAL HOOKER, who after the disaster of Fredericksburg was appointed to the command of the Army of the Potomac in place of General Burnside, decided in the latter



CROSSING THE RAPIDAN AT ELY'S FORD. (BY EDWIN FORBES, FROM HIS SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)


panic-stricken, like the Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville, and fled in confusion back upon the corps of Masséna. This so enraged that marshal, that he ordered his troops to fire upon them, charge them, and drive them back upon the Austrians. This was done with the impetuosity, determination, and genius that always characterized Masséna's greatest efforts; the Austrians, thrown into confusion, began retreating, and the field of Wagram was won. For this service Napoleon gave Masséna the title of Prince of Essling.

This campaign shows the strategy of Napoleon: How he crossed his army over the Danube, while his enemy was unable to prevent it; how his further strategy of detaching the two corps of Bernadotte and Masséna, to attack the enemy's weak point, was made successful by the splendid tactics of Mac-

part of the month of April, 1863, to undertake an offensive campaign with the Army of the Potomac against the Army of Northern Virginia, under General Lee.

The two armies faced each other; Lee's, numbering about 60,000 men, being at Fredericksburg, and the Army of the Potomac, numbering about 130,000 men, at Falmouth, on the north side of the Rappahannock River opposite Fredericksburg. The plan of his campaign was based on the same principles of war which Napoleon had applied at Wagram. He directed three corps of the army, the First, the Third, and the Sixth, comprising 59,000 men, under the command of General Sedgwick, to cross the Rappahannock River below Fredericksburg, and hold Lee's army in that position, while he moved secretly and with celerity three corps, the Fifth, the Eleventh,






*P. Sheridan*

FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.



and Twelfth, numbering 42,000 men, up the river, crossing and concentrating them at Chancellorsville, ten miles west of Fredericksburg, with the purpose of moving down upon General Lee's army to take it in rear and flank—two divisions of the Second Corps being placed to cover Banks's Ford, the third division being left at Falmouth, while a brigade and battery were stationed at United States Ford to facilitate the crossing. The Cavalry Corps, with the exception of one small brigade of three regiments and a battery of horse artillery, which was left under my command with

The left wing of the army, under General Sedgwick, was ordered to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, on the morning of the 29th; its duty was to keep the enemy as long as possible before Fredericksburg, to pursue him if he attempted to fall back on Richmond, but to take possession of his works and his line of retreat if he marched upon Chancellorsville. Or, in other words,



PARADE AT FALMOUTH OF THE 110TH PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

This regiment (of Whipple's division, Third Corps) with the 84th Pennsylvania performed desperate service near Fairview on Sunday morning, May 3d, the 84th losing 215 men and the 110th losing 45 men.—EDITOR.

the army, was ordered under the command of General Stoneman to make a raid in rear of Lee's army, and destroy his railroads and communications with Richmond.

While there have been many criticisms on the propriety of detaching this large body of cavalry from the army, I desire to state that this cavalry did most valuable service, by drawing off General Lee's cavalry, under General J. E. B. Stuart, to Brandy Station and Culpeper, and thus depriving General Lee of their services; for General Hooker moved the three corps with him with such celerity that they passed between Stuart and General Lee's army, and Stuart could not get through to communicate to General Lee what was going on. It will be seen later on what a loss this was to Lee, and what a great advantage it was to the Army of the Potomac.

On the 26th of April General Hooker gave his orders for the right wing of the army to move, the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps to be followed by the Fifth; the Eleventh and Twelfth to cross the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, and the Rapidan River at Germanna Ford; the Fifth Corps, marching from Kelly's Ford to Ely's Ford, nearer to the mouth of the Rapidan and to Chancellorsville.

Sedgwick was to hold Lee at Fredericksburg until Hooker could come down upon him from Chancellorsville and crush him; Sedgwick was to play the part of Macdonald and Hooker that of Masséna.

The right wing of the army crossed Kelly's Ford on the morning of the 29th, and the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps reached Germanna Ford that evening. I had the advance of this column with two regiments of cavalry and a battery of horse artillery; the third regiment of the cavalry brigade I sent with the Fifth Corps to Ely's Ford.

In the afternoon, at Germanna Ford, I surprised and captured a picket of some fifty of Stuart's cavalry soldiers. With them was an engineer officer belonging to Stuart's staff. On searching the party, which is done with all prisoners, I found on this engineer officer a very bulky volume, which proved to be a diary which he had been keeping throughout the war. I spent the greater part of the night in reading it, in hopes of finding something that would be of advantage to us; nor was I disappointed. This diary stated that in the first week in March there had been a council of war held at General Stuart's headquarters, at which council Generals Jackson, A. P.




# CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN,

April 27th to May 5th, 1863.


## REFERENCES.

Union.




Lines of battle May 1st  
 Lines of Battle May 2d  
 Lines of Battle May 3d  
 Lines of Battle May 4th

Confederate.



GENERAL HOOKER'S ARMY.  
 1st Corps, Reynolds ..... 1  
 2d Corps, Couch ..... 2  
 3d Corps, Sickles ..... 3  
 5th Corps, Meade ..... 5  
 6th Corps, Sedgwick ..... 6  
 11th Corps, Howard ..... 11  
 12th Corps, Slocum ..... 12

GENERAL LEE'S ARMY.  
 R. H. Anderson's Division ..... a  
 McLaws's Division ..... b  
 A. P. Hill's Division ..... c  
 Colston's Division ..... d  
 Rodes's Division ..... e  
 Early's Division ..... f



SCALE OF MILES

Hamilton's Crossings



Hill, Ewell, and Stuart attended. They were in conference over five hours, and came to the decision that the next battle would be at or near Chancellorsville, and that that position must be prepared.

The next day, the 30th of April, I moved on towards Chancellorsville, and at one o'clock in the day I captured a courier or orderly from General Lee, who had a dispatch from Lee, dated at Fredericksburg, noon of that day, and addressed to Major-General McLaws, stating that he had just been informed that the enemy had concentrated in force near Chancellorsville, inquiring why he had not been kept advised, and saying that he wished to see McLaws as soon as possible at headquarters.


At two o'clock, P. M., one hour later, I reported to General Hooker at Chancellorsville, and submitted to him the diary and General Lee's dispatch, both of which he retained, and I suggested that we had evidently surprised General Lee by our rapid movements across the river, and, as Lee had prepared for a battle at Chancellorsville, we had better anticipate him by moving on towards Fredericksburg. A march of three or four miles would take us out of the woods into a more open country, where we could form our line of battle, and where our artillery could be used to advantage; we would then be prepared to move on Fredericksburg in the morning. Besides, such a movement would enable



MAJOR-GENERAL AMIEL W. WHIPPLE, COMMANDER OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE THIRD CORPS, MORTALLY WOUNDED BY A SHARP-SHOOTER ON THE MORNING OF MAY 4TH.


us to uncover Banks's Ford, which would shorten our communication with General Sedgwick over five miles, and bring us within three and a half miles of Falmouth by that ford.

I was much surprised to find that General Hooker, who up to that time had been all vigor, energy, and activity, received the suggestion as a matter of secondary importance, and that he considered the next morning sufficiently early to move on Fredericksburg.



SCENE AT HOOKER'S HEADQUARTERS, CHANCELLORSVILLE, SATURDAY MORNING, MAY 2D.  
(BY EDWIN FORBES, FROM HIS SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)





MAJOR-GENERAL O. O. HOWARD. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)



Up to that time General Hooker's strategy was all that could have been desired. He had outflanked the enemy and had surprised him by the rapidity of his movements. At two o'clock, P. M., on the 30th of April, General Hooker had ninety chances in his favor to ten against him. The very cavalry under Stuart that Lee depended on to keep him advised had been cut off by the prompt action of the

tween Chancellorsville and the Rappahannock River, in our rear, was rough, broken, and not at all suitable for operations required of an army. The position of the army at Chancellorsville extended about three miles from east to west in the narrow clearings, which did not afford sufficient ground to manœuvre an army of the size of the Army of the Potomac. Besides this, we were ignorant of what might



STAMPEDE OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.

army, and we had it over the signature of General Lee himself that his army had been surprised. General Hooker had it in his power at that time to have crushed Lee's army and wound up the war. The Army of the Potomac never had a better opportunity, for more than half its work had been done before a blow had been struck, by the brilliancy of its strategy in moving upon Chancellorsville.

I camped my command about a mile from General Hooker's headquarters, which were at the Chancellor house, and such were my misgivings as regarded the situation of the army that about dusk I called upon the general again and stated to him our perilous position.

To the east, towards Fredericksburg, the woods were thick for three or four miles; to the south, towards Spotsylvania Court House, the woods extended about the same distance; to the west, from Hazel Grove, the same condition of things existed; while the country be-

between going on outside of this cordon of woods, and were giving the enemy every opportunity to take us at a disadvantage. Every instinct induced me to suggest to General Hooker, to relieve ourselves from our embarrassments, to send the Eleventh Corps, which was in a miserable position in the woods, down to Spotsylvania Court House by the Jack Shop road and make the line of battle from Chancellorsville to Spotsylvania. This proposition was not approved, and I then asked permission to send some cavalry to Spotsylvania to find out what was going on in the open country beyond the woods. General Hooker assented to this, and I ordered the Sixth New York Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan McVicar, to proceed down the road from Chancellorsville to Spotsylvania, ascertain if the enemy were anywhere in that vicinity, and having done so return before daybreak. This could easily be done as the distance was







mounted men, generally so brave and so steadfast, no longer obey the orders of their officers, and gallop off in great disorder. At last quiet is restored, and the brigade finally reaches Spotsylvania Court House, while the small band which has caused so much alarm to Stuart was quietly retiring to Chancellorsville."


The next morning at daylight (Friday, May 1st) I reported to General Hooker the result of this reconnoissance, and he began to realize the importance of the information that had been conveyed the day before in the diary of Stuart's engineer officer. The Sixth New York Cavalry were only able to report that they had cut their way through a heavy body of cavalry, and this by moonlight; they were unable to say whether any infantry or artillery were in that direction.

To move the army down on Fredericksburg with an unknown force on its rear and flank was a hazardous experiment. What could have been done with safety the day before, now became doubtful, and it was this uncertainty that paralyzed the vigor and action of General Hooker throughout the 1st of May. Although he started the Second, Fifth, Twelfth, and Third Corps in the direction of Tabernacle Church on the way to Fredericksburg the movement was not of such a character as to bring success. Upon meeting a stubborn resistance from General Jackson's forces, and fearing that if he should become deeply engaged a force from Spotsylvania would take him in the rear flank, he withdrew the army and placed it in position at Chancellorsville.

From that time the whole situation was changed. Without striking a blow, the army was placed on the defensive. The golden moment had been lost, and it never appeared again to the same extent afterwards—another illustration that soldiers' legs have as much to do with winning great victories as their arms.

General Lee knew that General Hooker had taken his army back to its position at Chancellorsville. The Third Corps had already been taken from General Sedgwick at Fredericksburg, and at two o'clock on the morning of May 2d the First Corps was also ordered up to Chancellorsville, leaving Sedgwick with the Sixth Corps. These movements did not escape the attention of General Lee, so he decided to assume the offensive, and put in operation the plan which was suggested by Generals Jackson, A. P. Hill, Ewell, and Stuart, at their council of war in the first week in March. He left a sufficient force at Fredericksburg to watch Sedgwick, while with the bulk of his army he should move on Chancellorsville, sending a force under Generals Jackson, A. P. Hill, and Stuart, to make a turning movement and attack the Union army

in the rear and right flank, and roll them up as Masséna did the Austrians at Wagram. Lee, himself, in the mean time, with the remainder of his forces, occupied the attention of the left and center of Hooker's army to prevent any interference with the flank movement. General Lee's strategy was the same



MAJOR PETER KEENAN, KILLED IN THE CHARGE OF THE EIGHTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.

that General Hooker had carried out so successfully until he stopped at Chancellorsville. General Lee was equally successful in his movements, and we will now investigate the causes of his failure to give the Army of the Potomac a crushing blow.

On the 2d day of May, the right of the Army of the Potomac was the Eleventh Corps, in the woods near Dowdall's Tavern (Melzi Chancellors); the Third Corps connected it with the Twelfth Corps at Fairview and Chancellorsville, facing south towards the woods; while the Second and Fifth Corps were posted to prevent any attack taking the position in the rear and flank from the east. Throughout the morning of the 2d of May, attacks were made on different portions of our line from the east to the west. These attacks occurred at intervals of an hour or more, but always farther to the west. I was satisfied this was done to withdraw our attention from the real point of attack, and I mentioned this to General Hooker, who had become more and more impressed that the information contained in the diary of Stuart's engineer officer was correct, and that General Lee had adopted a plan to carry it out.

In the afternoon of May 2d General Sickles, commanding the Third Corps, sent





REPULSE OF JACKSON'S MEN AT HAZEL GROVE, BY ARTILLERY UNDER GENERAL PLEASANTON.




in word that the enemy were retreating towards Gordonsville, and that their wagons and artillery could be seen passing by the Furnace road some three miles to the south. General Hooker sent for me on receiving this report, and stated he was not sure the enemy were retreating; that he wanted an officer of experience in that part of the field, and he wished me to take my command there and keep him promptly informed of everything that was going on. I asked him if he considered me to be under the orders of any one. He replied quickly, "You are under my orders only; use your best judgment in doing whatever you think ought to be done."

On arriving at Hazel Grove, about one mile from Chancellorsville, I found that General Sickles was moving two of the divisions of the Third Corps in the direction of Catherine Furnace and shortly after became engaged there with a strong rear-guard. Hazel Grove was the highest ground in the neighborhood and the key of our position, and I saw that if Lee's forces gained it the Army of the Potomac would be worsted.

General Sickles wanted some cavalry to protect his flanks, and I gave him the Sixth New York. This left me with only the Eighth Pennsylvania and Seventeenth Pennsylvania regiments and Martin's New York battery of horse artillery. I posted this command at the extreme west of the clearing, about two hundred yards from the woods in which the Eleventh Corps was encamped. This position at Hazel Grove was about a quarter of a mile in extent, running nearly north-east and south-west, but was in no place farther than two hundred yards from the woods, and on the south and east it sloped off into a marsh and a creek. It commanded the position of the army at Fairview and Chancellorsville and enfiladed our line. The moving out to the Furnace of the two divisions of the Third Corps left a gap of about a mile from Hazel Grove to the right of the Twelfth Corps. Shortly after General Sickles had been engaged at the Furnace, he sent me word that the enemy were giving way and cavalry could be used to advantage in pursuit. Before moving my command I rode out to the Furnace to comprehend the situation. It was no place for cavalry to operate, and as I could hear spattering shots going more and more towards the north-west, I was satisfied the enemy were not retreating. I hastened back to my command at Hazel Grove; when I reached it, the Eleventh Corps to our rear and our right was in full flight, panic-stricken beyond description. We faced about, having then the marsh behind us. It was an ugly marsh, about fifty yards wide, and in the stampede of the

Eleventh Corps beef cattle, ambulances, mules, artillery, wagons, and horses became stuck in the mud, and others coming on crushed them down so that when the fight was over the pile of *débris* in the marsh was many feet high. I saw that something had to be done, and that very quickly, or the Army of the



MAJOR-GENERAL HIRAM G. BERRY, COMMANDING SECOND DIVISION, THIRD CORPS, KILLED SUNDAY, MAY 3D.  
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

Potomac would receive a crushing defeat. The two cavalry regiments were in the saddle, and as I rode forward Major Keenan of the Eighth Pennsylvania came out to meet me, when I ordered him to take the regiment, charge into the woods, which, as we had previously stood, were to our rear, and hold the enemy in check until I could get some guns into position. He replied, with a smile at the size of the task, that he would do it, and started off immediately. Thirty men, including Major Keenan, Captain Arrowsmith, and Adjutant Haddock, never came back. I then directed Captain Martin to bring his guns into battery, load with double charges of canister, and aim them so the shot would hit the ground half-way between the guns and the woods. I also stated that I would give the order to fire. Just then a handsome young captain of a New



York battery, Frank Crosby (son of a distinguished lawyer of New York city), who was killed the next day, galloped up and said, "General, I have a battery of six guns, where shall I go, what shall I do?" I told him to

five and six deep, with but one flag, a Union flag dropped by the Eleventh Corps.

I suspected deception and was ready for it. They called out not to shoot, they were friends; at the same time they gave us a volley from

at least five thousand muskets. As soon as I saw the flash I gave the command to fire, and the whole line of artillery was discharged at once.\* It fairly swept them from the earth; before they could recover themselves the line of artillery had been loaded and was ready for a second attack. After the second discharge, suspecting that they might play the trick of having their men lie down, draw the



RESCUING THE WOUNDED ON SUNDAY FROM THE BURNING WOODS.

place his battery in line on the right of Martin's battery, and gave him the same instructions I gave Martin, as to how I wanted him to serve his guns. These two batteries gave me twelve guns, and to obtain more I then charged three squadrons of the Seventeenth Pennsylvania cavalry on the stragglers of the Eleventh Corps, to clear the ground, and with the assistance of the rest of the regiment succeeded in placing ten more pieces of artillery in line. The line was then ready for Stonewall Jackson's onset. It was dusk when his men swarmed out of the woods for a quarter of a mile in our front (our rear ten minutes before). They came on in line,

fire out of the artillery, then jump up and charge before the pieces could be reloaded, I poured in the canister for about twenty minutes, and the affair was over.

When the Eleventh Corps was routed, the situation was this: The nearest infantry to me was the right of the Twelfth Corps, over a mile off, and engaged by the forces under General Lee, who was trying to prevent them from impeding the movements of General Jackson. The two divisions of the Third Corps were nearly a mile to the west at the Furnace. Had Jackson captured the position at Hazel Grove, these two divisions would have been cut off from


\* Major Clifford Thomson, aide-de-camp on General Pleasonton's staff, in a recent letter gives the following account of the fight at Hazel Grove: "General Pleasonton rode from gun to gun, directing the gunners to aim low, not to get excited, to make every shot tell; the staff-officers, catching their cue from him, did the same, and while at first there had been considerable excitement and apprehension among us, it soon quieted down, and every thought and action was directed to getting the best service out of those guns that they were capable of rendering. Recovering from the disorder into which Keenan's charge had thrown them, the enemy could be seen forming line of battle in the edge of woods now in our front. They were scarcely two hundred yards distant; yet such was the gloom that they could not be clearly distinguished. General Pleasonton was about to give the order to fire, when a sergeant at one of the guns said:

"General, aren't those our troops? I see our colors in the line!" This was true, for where he pointed our colors could be seen — trophies picked up on the field. General Pleasonton turned to me and said:

"Mr. Thomson, ride out there and see who those people are."

"For myself, I was not at all curious about 'those people,' being perfectly willing to wait till they introduced themselves. Riding out between our guns, I galloped to within thirty or forty yards of them; all along the line they cried out to me: 'Come on; we're friends!' It was quite dark and I could not make out their uniforms, but I could see three of our flags, and these caused me to hesitate; I came to a halt, peering into the darkness to make sure, when a bullet whistled by me, and then came 'the rebel yell.' The line charged up the hill towards our guns, and I led it! Lying down upon my horse's neck, I gave him the spur, and the yells of the 'Johnnies' behind further stimulated him, so that we got over the ground pretty lively. But with the report of the first shot fired at me, General Pleasonton had opened fire, and those twenty-two guns belched forth destruction at a fearfully rapid rate. Although lying down on my horse, I kept an eye on the guns, and guided my horse between the flashes, and in less time than it takes to tell it, I was on the safe side of them. It was load and fire at will for some minutes; the enemy was mowed down in heaps; they could make no headway against such a cyclone, and ran back down the slope to the cover of the woods.





SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE AT THE JUNCTION OF THE ROADS TO ELY'S AND UNITED STATES FORDS.  
(BY EDWIN FORBES, FROM HIS SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)

the army. He would have seen General Hooker and his staff getting what troops he could to prevent the routed Eleventh Corps from demoralizing the rest of the army, and the fatal position which that portion of the army occupied rendered it an easy task to have crushed it. Neither the Second Corps nor the Twelfth Corps was in position to have defended itself against an attack by Jackson from Hazel Grove.

For half an hour General Jackson had the Army of the Potomac at his mercy. Why he halted to re-form his troops in the woods, instead

of forging ahead into the clearing, where he could re-form his troops more rapidly, and where he could have seen he was master of the situation, can only be accounted for as one of those fatal mistakes by which the most brilliant prospects are sacrificed.

When he advanced upon the artillery at Hazel Grove Jackson had another opportunity to win, if his infantry had been properly handled. The fire of his infantry was so high it did no harm; they should have been ordered to fire so low as to disable the cannoniers at the

But still the canister was poured into them, and a second attempt to charge the guns failed. Soon Sickles's corps moved from its advanced position and interposed between us and the woods; parties sent out over the field which had been swept by our guns found the dead and dying lying in heaps. Old artillery officers have informed me that they never before heard such rapid firing as occurred at that engagement; the roar was a continuous one, and the execution terrific. After it had ceased I rode up to General Pleasonton and said:

"General, those people out there are rebels!"

"There was a grave twinkle in his eye as he held out his hand and replied:

"Thomson, I never expected to see you again; I thought if they didn't kill you I should, but that was no time to stop for one man."

"I should have agreed with him more cordially if that one man had been somebody else. After Sickles had made his dispositions in our front, we were withdrawn to get forage for our horses, and our part in the battle of Chancellorsville was done. Word had gone out, through the army, that Pleasonton and his staff had been killed; so, when tired, sleepy, very

dirty, and extremely hungry, we next morning rode quietly into our headquarters camp, at the rear, we were looked upon as persons risen from the dead. One thing I have forgotten to mention, and that is that we had virtually no support for those twenty-two guns during the action. There was a portion of the Seventeenth Pennsylvania cavalry under the hill, but the men were new recruits and had not, I believe, been under fire previous to that occasion. Had the enemy succeeded in gaining the crest of the knoll, the support would not have made a mouthful for a single company of Jackson's men. When President Lincoln visited the army a day or two after this fight, General Pleasonton chanced to call at Hooker's headquarters, when that officer said:

"Mr. President, this is General Pleasonton, who saved the Army of the Potomac the other night."

"The President acknowledged the service in his usual grateful manner. Only inspiration, or the instinct of a natural soldier, could have enabled Pleasonton to accomplish so much in so short a time with so small a force. The fight at Hazel Grove was one of those sharp and decisive actions pregnant with great results."




guns. Had the infantry fire been as effective as that of the artillery, Jackson would have carried the position. The artillery fire was effective because I applied to it that principle of dynamics in which the angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflection,—that is to say, if the muzzle of a gun is three feet from the ground and it is discharged so that the shot will strike the ground at a distance of one hundred yards, it will glance from the earth at the same angle at which it struck it, and in another one hundred yards will be three feet from the ground. I knew my first volley must be a crushing one, or Jackson, with his superior numbers, would charge across the short distance which separated us and capture the artillery before the guns could be reloaded.

After the fight at Hazel Grove I sent into the woods and captured a number of Jackson's men. I asked them to what command they belonged. One of them said to General A. P. Hill's corps, and added, "That was a pretty trick you played us this evening." I asked to what he referred. He replied, "By withdrawing your infantry, and catching us on your guns." Thus showing that the flight of the Eleventh Corps was looked upon as a ruse. To my question, if they had suffered much, he said that they had been badly cut up; that General Jackson had been badly wounded, also General A. P. Hill, and their chief of artillery. I asked how he knew General Jackson had been wounded. He stated

that he saw him when he was carried off the field in a litter. This information I immediately reported to General Hooker, when he directed me to withdraw my command from that position, and go into camp on the north side of the Rappahannock River. It was 4 A. M. of the 3d of May when I moved from Hazel Grove.

General Sickles, with the two divisions of the Third Corps, reached Hazel Grove from the Furnace between half-past nine and ten on the night of the 2d of May. Some of his troops had fighting in the woods before I left, but I am unable to say what was its character.

On the morning of the 3d of May (Sunday) General Stuart was in command of Jackson's forces, Jackson and A. P. Hill having been wounded as reported by the prisoner taken the night before. Stuart prepared, with his usual impetuosity, to renew the attack early that morning, and by one of those unfortunate occurrences so prevalent during the war, he caught the Third Corps in motion to take up a new position, connecting with the Twelfth Corps at Fairview, and facing to the west. This withdrawal enabled Stuart to take the position at Hazel Grove, from which Jackson had been repulsed the evening before. He saw its advantages at once, and, placing some thirty pieces of artillery there, he enfiladed the Twelfth Corps at Fairview and Chancellorsville, and punished the Third Corps severely. The Third Corps was fighting throughout the day under great disadvan-



RETREAT OF THE ARMY ACROSS THE RAPPAHANNOCK AT UNITED STATES FORD. \*  
(BY EDWIN FORBES, AFTER HIS SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)



tages. To add to the embarrassments of the army, General Hooker that morning was disabled by a concussion, and the army was virtually without a head, the different corps commanders fighting their commands on the defensive. Such extraordinary conditions forced the Army of the Potomac to fall back from Chancellorsville and Fairview, and form a new line of battle to the north and some distance from Chancellorsville. This line presented a front to the enemy that could not be enfiladed or turned. Desultory fighting, especially with artillery, was kept up on the 4th of May; but Hooker's battle ended on the 3d, after the army had gained its new position.

It is useless to speculate what General Hooker would have done if he had not been disabled. Up to the evening of the 2d of May the enemy had suffered severely, while the Army of the Potomac had but few killed and wounded comparatively; while the unfortunate circumstances which contracted the lines of our army enabled the enemy to inflict the severest punishment upon all the troops that were engaged. In fact, the greatest injury was inflicted on the 3d of May, while the army had no commander. Had the First Corps, that had not been engaged, and the Fifth Corps, that was still fresh, been thrown into the action in the afternoon of Sunday the 3d of May, when Lee's troops were exhausted from the struggle, they would certainly have made Chancellorsville what it was intended to have been, a complete success. These two corps mustered from twenty-five to thirty thousand

men. There was no one to order them into the fight, and a second golden opportunity was lost. The army recrossed the Rappahannock River on the night of the 5th of May, and renewed the position at Falmouth which they had occupied before the campaign.

IN this campaign both armies failed to achieve what they attempted to accomplish. Both were equally successful in their strategy; both were equally poor in their tactics and fighting. Had General Hooker carried out his original plan and crushed General Lee's army, the war would have ended. Had General Lee, after General Hooker's mistake of stopping at Chancellorsville, been successful in delivering a crushing blow to the Army of the Potomac, he would in all probability have made a great step towards establishing the Southern Confederacy.

Why did the measures of these two generals fail? The answer is simply this: bad tactics and poor fighting. Had either general emulated the tactics and fighting of Desaix at Marengo, Masséna at Wagram, Davoust at Eckmühl, where, with thirty thousand Frenchmen, he defeated ninety thousand Austrians; Marshall Ney at the Moskwa, McMahon at Magenta, Skobelev at Plevna, or the Grand Duke Michael at Kars, either would have won. Great victories have never been won except by great generals.

Chancellorsville was typical of all the campaigns and battles of the war of the Army of the Potomac.

*Alfred Pleasonton.*



Race for right of way, between the Ninth Massachusetts Battery and a baggage train.

## JACKSON'S ATTACK UPON THE ELEVENTH CORPS.

IN order that the student of a battle-scene may gather clear views, he must acquaint himself with the region of country where the battle occurred. The country around Chancellorsville for the most part is a wilderness, with but here and there an opening. If we consult the recent maps (no good ones existed before the battle), we notice that the two famous rivers, the Rapidan and the Rappahannock, join at a point due north of Chan-

cellorsville; thence the Rappahannock runs easterly for two miles, till suddenly at the United States ford it turns and flows south for a mile and a half, and then, turning again, completes a horseshoe bend.

Here, on the south shore, was General Hooker's battle-line on the morning of the 2d of May, 1863. Here his five army corps, those of Meade, Slocum, Couch, Sickles, and Howard, were deployed. The face was toward