



Our March Against Pope


It may be of interest at the outset to relate an incident which illustrates the pious condition of the Confederacy even as early as 1862—

The Federals had been using balloons in examining our positions, and we watched with envious eyes their beautiful observations

as they floated high up in the air, and well out of the range of our guns. We longed for the balloons that poverty denied us. A genius arose for the occasion and suggested that we send out and gather together all the silk dresses in the Confederacy and make a balloon. It was done, and soon we had a great patchwork ship of many and varied hues. The balloon was ready for use in the Seven Days' campaign. We had no gas except in Richmond, and it was the custom to inflate the balloon there, tie it securely to an engine, and run it down the York River railroad to any point at which we desired to send it up. One day it was on a steamer down the

had assigned General Pope, fresh from the West, with clever laurels, to command this select organization. This army, under its dashing leader, was at the same time moving towards Richmond by the Orange and Alexandria railway, so that our move by the left had also in view the Army of Virginia, as the first obstacle in the way of relief to Richmond — an obstacle to be removed if possible, before it could be greatly reinforced from other commands.

The assignment of General Pope to command was announced in Richmond three days after the orders were issued in Washington, and the flourish of trumpets over the manner in which the campaign was to be conducted, soon followed. He was reported to have adopted a favorite expression of General Worth's, "Head-quarters in the saddle, sir!" and to be riding with as much confidence as that old chieftain when searching the everglades of Florida for the Seminole Indians.* Lee had not known Pope intimately, but accepted the popular opinion of him as a boastful man, quite ambitious to accom-



POPE'S RETREAT ACROSS THE RAPPAHANNOCK AT RAPPAHANNOCK STATION.
(BY EDWIN FORBES, AFTER HIS SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)

James when the tide went out and left vessel and balloon high and dry on a bar. The Federals gathered it in, and with it the last silk dress in the Confederacy. This capture was the meanest trick of the war and one I have never yet forgiven.


By the seven days' fighting around Richmond General Lee frustrated McClellan's plans for a siege. At the end of that campaign Lee retired to Richmond and McClellan withdrew his forces to Westover Landing, where intrenchments and gun-boats made him secure from attack. As his new position, thus guarded and protected by the navy, was not assailable, General Lee, resuming the defensive at Richmond, resolved to strike out by his left in the direction of Washington, with the idea that the Army of the Potomac might be forced to abandon the James River, in defense of its own capital, threatened by this move.

Contemporaneously with our operations on the Chickahominy, the Washington authorities had been organizing the Army of Virginia of three efficient Corps d'Armée; and continuing the search for a young Napoleon,

plish great results, but unwilling to study closely and properly the means necessary to gratify his desires in that direction. Pope was credited with other expressions, such as that he cared not for his rear; that he hoped in Virginia to see the faces of the rebels, as in the West he had been able to see only their backs.

When General Lee heard of these strange utterances his estimate of Pope was considerably lessened. The high-sounding words seemed to come from a commander inexperienced in warfare. For centuries there has been among soldiers a maxim: "Don't despise your enemy." Pope's words seemed to indicate that he had great contempt for his enemy. Unfortunately for him our troops, at that time, were not so well clad that they cared to show their backs. With the double purpose of drawing McClellan away from Westover, and of checking the advance of the new enemy then approaching from Washington by the Orange and Alexandria railroad, General Lee sent Stonewall Jackson to Gordonsville, while I remained near Richmond to engage McClellan in case he should attempt an advance upon the Con-

* See General Pope's article in the January CENTURY for his denial; also for additional maps and pictures.



VIEW IN CULPEPER DURING THE OCCUPATION BY POPE. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

Confederate prisoners were confined in the court house, which is the building with ball and vane above the tower.

federate capital. Jackson had his own division and that of Ewell, and later A. P. Hill was sent to reënforce him. McDowell was already in coöperation with Pope, part of his command, however, being still at Fredericksburg. On the 9th of August Jackson encountered the enemy near Slaughter or Cedar Mountain. (See map, page 609.) There the battle of Cedar Run was fought and the Federals were repulsed. In this fight, about five o'clock in the afternoon, the Federals, by a well-executed move, were pressing the Confederates back, when the opportune approach of two brigades changed the scene, and a counter-attack from our side drove them back in disorder and left us masters of the field. We followed them some distance, but Jackson thought them too strongly reënforced for us to continue the pursuit and risk severe battle in a disjointed way; so, after caring for our wounded and dead, we retired to a position behind the Rapidan to await the arrival of General Lee with other forces. Thus on his first meeting with the Confederates in Virginia the new Federal commander went to the rear—a direction he was wholly unused to. At that time General Lee was feeling very certain that Richmond was in no immediate danger from an advance by McClellan's forces. He therefore began at once preparations for a vigorous campaign against Pope. Divisions under Anderson, McLaws, Walker, and D. H. Hill were left to watch McClellan, with instructions to follow the main body of the army as soon as the Federals were drawn away from Westover.


On the 13th of August, my command

was ordered to Gordonsville, and General Lee accompanied me there. Jackson's troops were stationed on the left of the Orange and Alexandria railroad, and I went into camp on the right of Gordonsville. Eastward was the Rapidan River, several miles distant. Farther on, at Culpeper Court House, was the army of Pope, and farther still was the Rappahannock River. A little in advance of my position was Clark's Mountain, rising several hundred feet above the surrounding hills. With General Lee I

proceeded to the mountain, and climbing to its summit we raised our glasses and turned them to the east. There, between the two rivers, clustering around Culpeper Court House and perhaps fifteen miles away, we saw the flags of Pope's army floating placidly above the tops of the trees. From the summit of the mountain we beheld the enemy occupying ground so weak as to invite attack. Realizing the situation, General Lee determined on speedy work, and gave orders that his army should cross the Rapidan on the 18th



GENERAL CHARLES S. WINDER, C. S. A.
KILLED AT CEDAR MOUNTAIN, AUGUST 9, 1862.



THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. (BY EDWIN FORBES, AFTER HIS SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.)
View from the Union lines, east of the turnpike.

and make battle. He was exceedingly anxious to move at once, before Pope could get reinforcements. For some reason I have never known explained, our supplies were delayed and we did not cross the Rapidan until the 20th. In the mean time a dispatch to General Stuart was captured by Pope, and gave information of our presence and contemplated advance. This, with information Pope already had, caused him to withdraw to a very strong position behind the Rappahannock River, and there General Lee found him instead of at Culpeper Court House, where the attack was first meant to be made. I approached the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, and Jackson approached higher up at Beverly Ford, near the Orange and Alexandria railroad bridge.

We arrived there on the morning of the 21st without serious opposition and found Pope in an almost unassailable position, with heavy reinforcements summoned to his aid. General Lee's intention was to force a passage and make the attack before Pope could concentrate. We hoped to be able to interpose, and to strike Pope before McClellan's reinforcements could reach him. We knew at that time McClellan was withdrawing from Westover. I was preparing to force a passage at Kelly's Ford, when I received an order from General Lee to proceed to Beverly Ford and mask the movements of Jackson, who was to be sent up the river to cross by a left flank movement. On the 22d Jackson carefully withdrew and went on the proposed move. He sought an opportunity to cross farther up the stream, and succeeded in putting part of his command across at Warrenton Springs Ford and in occupying a position

there. The flooding rains interrupted his operations, making the river past fording and crippling all attempts at forcing a passage. Jackson therefore withdrew his forces at night by a temporary bridge. As the lower fords became impassable by reason of the floods, the Federals seemed to concentrate against Jackson's efforts.

On the 23d I had quite a spirited artillery combat at Beverly Ford with a force of the enemy that had crossed at the railroad bridge near where I was stationed. The superior position and metal of the Federals gave them an advantage, which they improved by skillful practice. We had more guns, however, and by equally clever practice at length gained the advantage. A little before night the Federals withdrew from the combat, and finding that we had gotten the better of them, spitefully and without excuse set fire to a number of farm-houses in the locality.

Pending our movements west of the Rappahannock, General Stuart had been making an effort to go around Pope's army, but fearing to remain on the Washington side of the river in the face of such floods as had come, recrossed with some important dispatches he had captured by a charge upon Pope's headquarters train. This correspondence confirmed the information we already had, that the Federal army on the James under McClellan and the Federal troops in the Kanawha Valley had been ordered to reinforce Pope. Upon receipt of that information, General Lee was more anxious than ever to cross at once. Pope, however, was on the alert, and Lee found he could not attack him to advantage in his stronghold behind the Rappahannock.

Lee therefore decided to change his whole plan, and was gratified, on looking at the map, to find a very comfortable way of turning Pope out of his position. It was by moving Jackson off to the left and far to the rear of the Federal army, while I remained in front

fought. When he arrived at Bristoe Station, just before night, the greater part of the Federal guard at that point fled, and two trains of cars coming from the direction of Warrenton were captured. Jackson sent a force forward seven miles and captured Manassas



STONEWALL JACKSON AS FIRST LIEUTENANT OF ARTILLERY.
(FROM AN AMBROTYPE TAKEN AUGUST 20, 1847, IN THE POSSESSION OF HIS NIECE, MISS ALICE E. UNDERWOOD.)

with thirty thousand men to engage him in case he offered to fight.

On the 25th Jackson crossed the Rappahannock at Hinson's Mill, four miles above Waterloo Bridge, and that night encamped at Salem. The next day he passed through Thoroughfare Gap and moved on by Gamesville, and when sunset came he was many miles in the rear of Pope's army, going in the direction of Washington City. This daring move must have staggered the Federal commander. From the Rappahannock, Jackson had gone without serious opposition to within a stone's throw of the field where the first battle of Manassas was

Junction, taking eight pieces of artillery, a lot of prisoners, and great quantities of commissary and quarter-master's stores. He left a force at Bristoe Station and proceeded to the junction, arriving there himself on the morning of the 27th. During the afternoon the enemy attacked our troops at Bristoe Station, coming from the direction of Warrenton Junction in such force that it was evident Pope had discovered the situation and was moving with his entire army upon Jackson. The Confederates at the station withdrew, and the Federals halted there. Jackson took all he wanted of the supplies captured at Manassas and burned



THE STONE BRIDGE ACROSS BULL RUN AS IT APPEARED IN 1884—LOOKING TOWARD CENTREVILLE.


the rest. He then moved over to a position west of the turnpike leading from Warrenton to Alexandria. There on the old battle-field Jackson waited for the Federals. On the evening of the 28th King's division came moving eastward down the turnpike and Jackson met them. A bloody fight ensued, lasting until nine o'clock at night. The enemy withdrew, leaving the Confederates in possession of the field.

That same evening I arrived at Thoroughfare Gap. But I should say that during Jackson's march I had been engaging Pope at different points along the Rappahannock, to impress him with the idea that I was attempting to force a passage in his front. On the afternoon of the 26th, Pope's army broke away from its strong position to meet Jackson's daring and unexpected move. General Lee decided I should follow at once, and asked whether I would prefer to force a passage of the river,

now rapidly falling, or take the route Jackson had gone. From the crossing along the route to Warrenton were numerous strongly defensive positions where a small force could have detained me an uncertain length of time. I therefore decided to take the same route Jackson had gone over. On the 26th I also started to overtake Jackson. On the 28th, just before night, I arrived at Thoroughfare Gap. As we approached, a report was made to me that the pass was unoccupied, and we went into

bivouac on the west side of the mountain, sending a brigade under Anderson down to occupy the pass.

As the Confederates neared the gap from one side, Ricketts's division of Federals approached from the other and got possession of the east side. Thoroughfare Gap is a rough pass in the Bull Run mountains, at some points not more than a hundred yards wide. A turbid stream rushes over its rugged bottom, on both sides of which the mountain rises several hundred feet. On the north the face of the gap is almost perpendicular. The south face is less precipitous, but is covered with tangled mountain ivy and projecting bowlders, forming a position unassailable when occupied by a small infantry and artillery force. Up to this moment we had received reports from General Jackson, at regular intervals, assuring us of his successful operations, and of confidence in his ability to baffle all efforts of the enemy till we should reach him. This sudden interposition of a formidable force at a mountain-pass indicated a stern resolve on the part of the adversary to make desperate efforts to hold me in check, while overwhelming forces were being brought against Jackson. This placed us in a more desperate strait than Jackson; for we were in relieving distance, and must adopt prompt and vigorous measures, that would burst through all opposition.



the diary of the Washington Artillery we filed down the turnpike at Gainesville at 11.30 A. M. The general impression was that we were there earlier; but as this is the only record of time made on the ground we cannot gainsay it. We marched steadily from daylight till we reached the field, with the exception of an hour's halt to permit Stuart's cavalry to file from west to east of us. There were many of Jackson's men—several thousand—straggling at points along the road, who were taken for my men, and reported as such.

Three miles north was Hopewell Gap, but not so strong. It was necessary to get possession of this in advance of the Federals, in order to have that vantage ground for a flank movement at the same time that we forced our way by footpaths over the mountain heights at Thoroughfare Gap. During the night I sent Wilcox with three brigades through that pass, while Hood was climbing over the mountain by a trail. We had no trouble in getting over. Our apprehensions were relieved at the early dawn of the 29th by finding that Ricketts had given up the east side of the gap and was many hours in advance of us, moving in the direction of Manassas Junction. His force, instead of marching around Jackson, could have been thrown against his right and rear. If Ricketts had made this move and the forces in front of Jackson had cooperated with him, such an attack, well handled, might have given us serious trouble before I reached the field.


As we found the pass open at early dawn and a clean road in front, we marched leisurely to unite our forces on Manassas plains. Before reaching Gainesville we heard the artillery combat in front, and our men involuntarily quickened their steps. Our communications with Jackson were quite regular, and as he had not expressed a wish that we should hurry, our troops were allowed to take their natural swing under the inspiration of impending battle. As we approached the field the fire seemed to become more spirited, and gave additional impulse to our movements. According to

Passing through Gainesville we filed off to the left down the turnpike, and soon came in sight of the troops held at bay by Jackson. Our line of march brought us in on the left and rear of the Federals. At sight of this favorable opportunity our artillery was ordered up, with the leading brigades for its support. Our advance was discovered, however, and the Federals withdrew from attack, retiring their left across the pike behind Groveton, and taking strong defensive ground. The battalion of Washington Artillery was thrown forward to a favorable position on Jackson's right, and from near its position my line was deployed, extending to the right some distance beyond the Manassas Gap railroad. An army corps was reported to be at Manassas Junction that morning, and we trail-traced Ricketts's division toward the same point; so that my line was arranged for attack in front and also to guard against the force in direction of the Junction. This preparation must have taken an hour, possibly more.

As soon as the troops were arranged, General Lee expressed his wish to have me attack. The change of position on the part of the Fed-



LONGSTREET'S MARCH THROUGH THOROUGHFARE GAP.



GENERAL RICHARD S. EWELL. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY COOK.)

General Ewell, of Jackson's Corps, was severely wounded in the conflict with King's division on August 28.

erals, however, involved sufficient delay for a reconnoissance on our part. To hasten matters I rode over in the direction of Brewer's Spring, east of the Hampton Cole House (see map, page 611), to see the new position, and had a fair view of the Federal line, then extending some distance east of the turnpike. The position was not inviting, and I so reported to General Lee.

The two great armies were now face to face upon the memorable field of 1861; both in good defensible positions and both anxious to find a point for an entering wedge in the stronghold of the adversary. It appeared easy for us, but for the unknown quantity at Manassas Junction, to overleap the Federal left and strike a decisive blow. This force was a thorn in our side which could not be ignored. General Lee was quite disappointed by my report against immediate attack along the turnpike, and insisted that by throwing some of the brigades beyond the Federal left their posi-


tion would be broken up and a favorable field gained. While talking the matter over, General Stuart reported the advance of heavy forces from the direction of Manassas Junction against my right. It proved to be McDowell and Porter. I called over three brigades, under Wilcox, and prepared to receive the attack. Battle was not offered, and I reported to General Lee some time afterward that I did not think the force on my right was strong enough to attack us. General Lee urged me to go in, and of course I was anxious to meet his wishes. At the same time I wanted, more than anything else, to know that my troops had a chance to accomplish what they might undertake. The ground before me was greatly to the advantage of the Federals, but if the attack had come from them it would have been a favorable opportunity for me. After a short while McDowell moved toward the Federal right,

leaving Porter in front of my right with nine thousand men. My estimate of his force, at the time, was ten thousand. General Lee, finding that attack was not likely, again became anxious to bring on the battle by attacking down the Groveton pike. I suggested that, the day being far spent, it might be as well to advance just before night upon a forced reconnoissance, get our troops into the most favorable positions, and have all things ready for battle at daylight the next morning. To this he gave reluctant consent, and our plans were laid accordingly. Wilcox returned to position on the left of the turnpike. Orders were given for an advance, to be pursued under cover of night till the main position could be carefully examined. It so happened that an order to advance was issued on the other side at the same time, so that the encounter was something of a surprise on both sides. A very spirited engagement was the result, we being successful, so far at least as to carry our point, capturing a piece of artillery and making our reconnoissance before midnight. As none of the reports of the Federal positions favored attack, I so reported to General Lee, and our forces were ordered back to their original positions. The captured gun was ordered cut down, spiked, and left on the ground.

When Saturday the 30th broke we were a little apprehensive that Pope was going to get away from us, and Pope was afraid we were going to get away from him. He telegraphed to Washington that I was in full retreat and he was preparing to follow, while we were making arrangements for moving by our left across Bull Run, so as to get over on the Little River pike and move down parallel to his lines and try to interpose between him and Washington, thinking he was trying to escape. We had about completed our arrangements, and took it for granted that Pope would move out that night by the Warrenton and Centreville pike, while we moved along with him by the Little River pike. General Lee was still anxious to give Pope battle on Manassas plains, but had given up the idea of attacking him in his strong position.

Shortly before nine on the 30th Pope's artillery began to play a little, and not long afterward some of his infantry force was seen in motion. We did not understand that as an offer of battle, but merely as a display to cover his movements to the rear. Later a considerable force moved out and began to attack us on our left, extending and engaging the whole of Jackson's line. Evidently Pope supposed I was gone, as he was ignoring me entirely. His whole army seemed to surge up against Jackson as if to crush him with an overwhelming mass. At the critical moment I happened to

be riding to the front of my line to find a place where I might get in for my share of the battle. I reached a point a few rods in front of my line on the left of the pike where I could plainly see the Federals as they rushed in heavy masses against the obstinate ranks of the Confederate left. It was a grand display of well-organized attack, thoroughly concentrated and operating cleverly. So terrible was the onslaught that Jackson sent to me and begged for reinforcements. About the same time I received an order from General Lee to the same effect. To retire from my advanced position in front of the Federals and get to Jackson would have taken an hour and a half. I had discovered a prominent position that commanded a view of the great struggle, and realizing the opportunity, I quickly ordered out three batteries, making twelve guns. They were placed in position to rake the Federal ranks that seemed determined to break through Jackson's lines. In a moment crash after crash of shot and shell was being poured into the thick ranks of the Federals. In ten minutes the stubborn Federals began to waver and give back. For a moment the mass was chaos;



OUTLINE MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN.

then order returned and they re-formed, apparently to renew the attack. Again from the crest of my little hill the fire of the twelve guns cut them down. As the cannons thundered the ranks broke, only to be formed again with dogged determination. A third time the batteries tore the Federals to pieces, and as they fell back under this terrible fire, I sprang everything to the charge. My troops leaped forward with exultant yells, and all along the line we pushed forward. Back and still farther back we pressed them, until at ten o'clock at night we had the field; Pope was across Bull Run, and the victorious Confederates lay down on the battle-field to sleep, while all around were strewn thousands of friend and foe sleeping the last sleep together.

The next morning the Federals were in a strong position at Centreville. I sent a brigade across the stream under General Pryor and occupied a point over there near Centreville. As our troops proceeded to bury their dead, it began to rain just as it had done on the day after the first battle of Manassas. As soon as General Lee could make his preparations, he ordered Jackson to cross Bull Run near Sudley's and turn the position of the Federals occupying Centreville; and the next day, Sept. 1, I followed him. As soon as the enemy found we were turning his position at Centreville, he abandoned it and put out toward Washington. Jackson, toward evening, encountered at Ox Hill a part of the Federal force, and attacking it, had quite a sharp engagement. I came up just before night and found his men coming back in a good deal of confusion. I asked Jackson what the situation was, and added that his men seemed to be pretty well dispersed. He said, "Yes, but I hope it will prove a victory."


I moved my troops out and occupied the lines where he had been, relieving the few men who were on picket. Just as we reached there General Kearny, a Federal officer, came along looking for his line, which had gone. It was raining in the woods, and late in the day, so that a Federal was not easily distinguished from a Confederate. Kearny did not seem to know he was in the Confederate line, and our troops did not notice that he was a Federal. He began to inquire about some command, and in a moment or so the troops saw he was a Federal officer. At the same moment he realized where he was. He was called upon to surrender, but instead of doing so he wheeled his horse, lay flat on the animal's neck, clapped spurs into his sides and dashed off. Instantly a half dozen shots rang out, and before he had gone thirty steps poor Kearny fell. He had been in the army all his life, and we all knew and respected

him. His body was sent over the lines under a flag of truce.

The forces we had been fighting at Ox Hill proved to be the rear-guard covering the retreat of the Federals into Washington. They escaped and we abandoned further pursuit.

The entire Bull Run campaign up to Ox Hill was clever and brilliant. It was conceived entirely by General Lee, who held no such consultation over it as he did in beginning the Seven Days' campaign. The movement around Pope was not as strong as it should have been. A skillful man could have concentrated against me or Jackson, and given us severe battles in detail. I suppose Pope tried to get too many men to Jackson before attacking him. If he had been satisfied with a reasonable force he might have overwhelmed Jackson.

General Pope, sanguine by nature, was not careful enough to keep himself informed about the movements of his enemy. At half-past four on the afternoon of the 29th, he issued an order for Porter to attack Jackson's right, supposing I was at Thoroughfare Gap, when in fact I had been in position since noon, and was anxiously awaiting attack. It has been said that General Stuart, by raising a dust in front of Porter, so impressed him that he did not offer battle. I know nothing of the truth of the story, and never heard of it till after the war. If from any such cause Porter was prevented from attacking me it was to our disadvantage, and delayed our victory twenty-four hours. Porter knew I was in his front. He had captured one or two of my men, which gave him information of my position before he actually saw me. If Porter had not appeared when he did I would have attacked by our right early in the afternoon. In that event Porter would have had a fine opportunity to take me on the wing and strike a fearful blow. As it was, he was a check upon my move against Pope's main position. If I had advanced upon Pope I would have been under an enfilade fire from Porter's batteries, and if I had advanced upon Porter I would have been under a fire from the batteries on Pope's front as severe as the raking fire from my batteries the next day, when Pope was massed against Jackson. Had Porter attacked me between noon and night on the 29th, I should have received his nine thousand with about double that number. I would have held my line to receive the attack, and as soon as his line developed its strength, I would have thrown three brigades forward beyond his extreme left. When my line of battle had broken up the attack, as it certainly would have done, these three brigades would have been thrown forward at the flank,



MAP OF THE LAST DAY'S FIGHTING.

When darkness ended the battle the Confederates were somewhat in advance of the places indicated as their last positions.—EDITOR.

and at the same time my main line would have pushed on in the pursuit. The result would have been Porter's retreat in confusion, and I might possibly have reached Pope's left and rear in time to cut him off. When his army was well concentrated on the 30th he was badly cut up and defeated. It does not seem unreasonable to conclude that attack on the 29th in his disjointed condition would have been attended with more disastrous

results to him. If I had been attacked under the 4:30 order the result might have been less damaging, as Porter would have had the night to cover his retreat, and the Federal army could have availed itself of the darkness to screen its move back across Bull Run. But Porter's attack at night, if not followed by the retreat of the army, would have drawn me around the Federal left, and put me in a position for striking the next day.

Colonel Marshal, of General Lee's staff, in his evidence before the Fitz John Porter Board puts my forces on the 29th at thirty thousand. It is difficult to see how Porter with nine thousand men was to march over thirty thousand of the best soldiers the world ever knew. Any move that would have precipitated battle would have been to our advantage, as we were ready at all points and waiting for an opportunity to fight. The situation will be better understood when we reflect that the armies were too evenly balanced to admit mistakes on either side. I was waiting for an opportunity to get into the Federal lines close upon the heels of their own troops. The opportunity came on the 30th, but the Federal army was then concentrated; had it come on the 29th I would have been greatly pleased.

It is proper to state that General Lee, upon hearing my guns on the 30th, sent me word if I had anything better than reinforcing Jackson to pursue it, and soon afterward rode forward and joined me. Jackson did not respond with spirit to my move, so my men were subjected to a severe artillery fire from batteries in front of him. General Lee, seeing this, renewed his orders for Jackson to press on to the front. The fire still continued severe, however, and General Lee, who remained with me, was greatly exposed to it. As we could not persuade him to drop back behind it, I finally induced him to ride into a ravine which threw a traverse between us and the fire, which was more annoying than fire from the front.

On the 31st we were engaged in caring for our wounded and cleaning up the battle-field. General Lee was quite satisfied with the results of the campaign, though he had very little to say. He was not given to expressions of pride. Under all circumstances he was a moderate talker, and in everything was unassuming. His headquarters were exceedingly simple. He had his tents just as the other officers — perhaps a few more, to accommodate his larger staff. There was no display of position or rank about him. Only when specially engaged could a sentinel be seen at the door of his tent. On the march he usually had his headquarters near mine.

I graduated with Pope at West Point. He was a handsome, dashing fellow, a splendid cavalryman, sitting his horse beautifully. I think he stood at the head for riding. He did not apply himself to his books very closely. He studied about as much as I did, but knew his lessons better. We graduated in 1842, but Pope saw little of active service till the opening of the Civil War. When he assumed command of the Army of Virginia he was in the prime of life, less than forty years old, and

had lost little if any of the dash and grace of his youth.

D. H. Hill, Lafayette McLaws, Mansfield Lovell, Gustavus W. Smith, R. H. Anderson, A. P. Stewart, and Earl Van Dorn were among the Confederate commanders who graduated in the same class with me. Of the Federal commanders, there were of that class — beside Pope — Generals John Newton, W. S. Rosecrans, George Sykes, Abner Doubleday, and others less prominent.

Stonewall Jackson came on four years after my class, and General Lee had preceded us about fourteen years. General Ewell, who was hurt at Bull Run, was in the same class with Tecumseh Sherman, and George H. Thomas, than whom a truer soldier and nobler spirit never drew sword.

"Jeb Stuart" was a very daring fellow and the best cavalryman America ever produced. At the Second Manassas, soon after we heard of the advance of McDowell and Porter, Stuart came in and made a report to General Lee. When he had done so General Lee said he had no orders at that moment, but he requested Stuart to wait awhile. Thereupon Stuart turned round in his tracks, lay down on the ground, put a stone under his head and instantly fell asleep. General Lee rode away and in an hour returned. Stuart was still sleeping. Lee asked for him, and Stuart sprang to his feet and said, "Here I am, General."

General Lee replied, "I want you to send a message to your troops over on the left to send a few more cavalry over to the right."

"I would better go myself," said Stuart, and with that he swung himself into the saddle and rode off at a rapid gallop, singing as loudly as he could, "Jine the cavalry."

General Toombs, our Georgia fire-eater, was given to criticising pretty severely all the officers of the regular army who had joined their fortunes with those of the Confederacy. He was hot-blooded and impatient, and chafed at the delays of the commanders in their preparations for battle. His general idea was that the troops went out to fight, and he thought they should be allowed to go at it at once. An incident that occurred in the second Manassas campaign will serve to illustrate his characteristic hot-headedness. As we were preparing to cross the Rapidan, Stuart sent me word that he had cut off a large cavalry force and had all the fords guarded except one. He asked that I detail a force to guard that point of escape. The work was assigned to the command under General Toombs, who was absent at the time. He had met a kindred spirit in the person of a wealthy Virginian named Morton, whom he had known in Congress, and was out dining with him.



DEATH OF GENERAL PHILIP KEARNY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1862.

They were both good livers and loved to have their friends with them. In going back to his command General Toombs came upon his troops on the road and inquired what they were doing there. The explanation was made. Toombs had had a good dinner and felt independent. He said he would give the general to understand that he must consult him before sending his troops out to guard a ford, and thereupon ordered them back to camp. As the mystified troops marched solemnly back, the matter was reported to me and I ordered Toombs under arrest. I allowed him to ride with his command as we

marched against Pope and expected that he would make some explanation of his conduct. He did not do so, and the next I heard of him he was stopping along the route making stump speeches to the troops and referring in anything but complimentary terms to the commander of his division. I sent him back to Gordonsville, with instructions to confine himself to the limits of that town in arrest until further orders. He obeyed the command and went to Gordonsville. Just as I was leaving the Rappahannock I received a long letter of apology from him, and directed him to join his command. As we were pre-

paring for the charge at Manassas, Toombs got there. He was riding rapidly, with his hat in his hand, and was much enthused. I was just sending a courier to his command with a dispatch.

"Let me carry it!" he exclaimed.

"With pleasure," I responded, and handed him the paper.

He put spurs to his horse and dashed off, accompanied by a courier. When he rode up and took command of his brigade there was wild enthusiasm, and everything being ready, an exultant shout was sent up, and the men sprang to the charge. I never had any more trouble with Toombs.

*We were ever afterwards
 warm personal friends
 James Longstreet.*

WITH JACKSON'S "FOOT-CAVALRY" AT THE SECOND MANASSAS.



IN the operations of 1862, in Northern Virginia, the men of Jackson's corps have always claimed a peculiar proprietorship. The reorganization of the disrupted forces of Banks, Frémont and McDowell under a new head seemed a direct challenge to the soldiers who had made the Valley Campaign, and the proclamation of the general with the itinerant head-

quarters betokened to the "foot-cavalry" an infringement of their specialty, demanding emphatic rebuke. Some remnant of the old *esprit de corps* yet survives, and prompts this narrative.

After the check to Pope's advance at Cedar Mountain, on the 9th of August, and while we awaited the arrival of Longstreet's troops, A. P. Hill's division rested in camp at Crenshaw's

Farm. Our brigade (Field's) was rather a new one in organization and experience, most of us having "smelt powder" for the first time in the Seven Days before Richmond. We got on the field at Cedar Mountain too late to be more than slightly engaged, but on the 10th and 11th covered the leisurely retreat to Orange Court House without molestation. When about a week later Pope began to retreat in the direction of the Rappahannock, we did some sharp marching through Stevensburg and Brandy Station, but did not come up with him until he was over the river. While our artillery was duelling with him across the stream, I passed the time with my head in the scant shade of a sassafras bush by the roadside, with a chill and fever brought from the Chickahominy low-grounds. In the latter connection, I improved the shining hours by inditing a pathetic request in my note-book, to whom it might concern, that my body might be decently buried.

For the next few days there was skirmishing at the fords, we moving up the south bank of the river, the enemy confronting us on the opposite side. The weather was very sultry, and the troops were much weakened by disorders induced by their diet of unsalted beef, eked out with green corn and unripe apples; as a consequence there was a good deal of straggling. I got behind several times, but managed to catch up from day to day. Once