

Head-Quarters, Appomattox C. H. Va.

Apr. 9th

1865, 4.30 o'clock, P M.

Gen. Lee surrendered the Army
of Northern Va this afternoon on
terms proposed by myself. The
accompanying additional cor-
respondence will show the
conditions fully.

M. A. Grant
J. C. Lee

By Command of

FAC-SIMILE OF GENERAL GRANT'S DISPATCH ANNOUNCING THE SURRENDER OF GENERAL LEE.

At the request of the Editor, General Badeau has given the history of the dispatch in the following letter:

"On Sunday afternoon, the 9th of April, 1865, as General Grant was riding to his headquarters from the farm-house in which he had received the surrender of Lee, it occurred to him that he had made no report of the event to the Government. He halted at once and dismounted, with his staff, in a rough field, within the National lines. Sitting on a stone, he asked for paper. I happened to be

near, and offered him my memorandum-book, such as staff-officers often carry for orders or reports in the field. He laid the book on his knee and wrote the above dispatch in pencil; he handed it to me and told me to send it to the telegraph operator. I asked him if I might copy the dispatch for the operator and retain the original. He assented and I rewrote the paper, the original of which is in the keeping of THE CENTURY magazine. "TANNERSVILLE, N. Y., July 10, 1885. Adam Badeau."

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT.*

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

THE city of Vicksburg was important to the Confederates on account of its railroad connections; the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad connecting it with all the Southern Confederacy east of the Mississippi river, and the Vicksburg and Shreveport railroad connecting it with all their country west of that great stream. It was important to the North because it commanded the river itself, the natural outlet to the sea of the commerce of all the Northwest.

The Mississippi flows through a low alluvial valley many miles in width, and is very tortuous in its course, running to all points of the compass sometimes within a few miles.

This valley is bounded on the east side by a range of high lands rising in some places more than two hundred feet above the general level of the valley. Running from side to side of the valley, the river occasionally washes the base of the high land, or even cuts into it, forming elevated and precipitous bluffs. On the first of these south of Memphis, and some four hundred miles distant by the windings of the river from that city, stands the city of Vicksburg.

On account of its importance to both North and South, Vicksburg became the objective point of the Army of the Tennessee in the fall of 1862. It is generally regarded as an axiom

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in war that all great armies in an enemy's country should start from a base of supplies, which should be fortified and guarded, and to which the army should fall back in case of disaster. The first movement looking to Vicksburg as an objective point was begun early in November, 1862, and conformed to this axiom. It followed the line of the Mississippi Central railroad, with Columbus, Kentucky, as a base; and soon after it started a coöperating column was moved down the river in transports, with Memphis as its base. Both of these movements failing, the entire Army of the Tennessee was transferred to the neighborhood of Vicksburg and landed on the opposite side of the river at Milliken's Bend.

Here, after spending about three months trying to get upon the high land, and also waiting for the waters of the Mississippi, which were very high this winter, to recede, I determined to march below Vicksburg, take Grand Gulf, hold it, and operate with the aid of Banks's army against Port Hudson, using New Orleans as my base of supplies; then to return against Vicksburg with the combined armies, retaining New Orleans as our base.

In pursuance of this determination, the army was marched to a point below Vicksburg on the Louisiana side, and the batteries were run by the fleet and some of the transports.

On the 29th of April the troops were at Hard Times, and the fleet, under Admiral Porter, made an attack upon Grand Gulf, while I reconnoitered the position of the enemy on a tug, to see if it was possible to make a landing. Finding that place too strong, I moved the army below Grand Gulf to De Shroon's, running the batteries there as we had done at Vicksburg. Learning here from an old negro that there was a good road from Bruinsburg up to Port Gibson, I determined to cross and move upon Grand Gulf from the rear.

April 30th was spent in transporting troops across the river. These troops were moved out towards Port Gibson as fast as they were landed. On the 1st of May the advance met the enemy under Bowen about four miles west of Port Gibson, where quite a severe battle was fought, resulting in the defeat of the enemy, who were driven from the field. On May 2d our troops moved into Port Gibson, and, finding that the bridges over Bayou Pierre were destroyed, spent the balance of the day in rebuilding and crossing them, and marching to the North Fork, where we encamped for the night. During the night we rebuilt the bridge across the North Fork, which had also been destroyed, and the next day (the 3d) pushed on, and, after considerable skirmishing, reached the Big Black,

near Hankinson's Ferry, and the Mississippi at Grand Gulf.


On the 3d I went into Grand Gulf, and spent the afternoon and until late that night in writing letters to Washington and orders for the next movement of the army. Here I also received a letter from Banks stating that he could not be at Port Hudson for some days, and then with an army of only fifteen thousand men. As I did not regard this force of as much value as the time which would be lost in waiting for it, I determined to move on to Vicksburg.

The 4th, 5th, and 6th of May were spent in reconnoitering towards Vicksburg, and also in crossing Sherman's troops over to Grand Gulf. On the 7th, Sherman having joined the main body of the army, the troops across the Big Black were withdrawn, and the movement was commenced to get in position on the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad so as to attack Vicksburg from the rear. This occupied the army from the 7th to the 12th, when our position was near Fourteen Mile creek, Raymond being our right flank, our left resting on the Big Black. To obtain this position we fought the battle of Raymond, where Logan's and Crocker's divisions of McPherson's corps defeated the Confederates under General Gregg, driving him back on Jackson; Sherman and McClernand both having some skirmishing where they crossed Fourteen Mile creek.

As the army under Pemberton was on my left flank, and that under General Joseph E. Johnston on my right at Jackson, I determined to move the army rapidly on Jackson, capturing and destroying that place as a military depot; then turn west and destroy the army under Pemberton, or drive it back into Vicksburg. The 13th was spent in making the first of these moves. On the 14th Jackson was attacked with Sherman's and McPherson's corps. The place was taken, and all supplies that could be of service to the enemy were destroyed, as well as the railroad bridge.

On the 15th the troops were faced to the west and marched towards Pemberton, who was near Edwards's Station. The next day, the 16th, we met the enemy at Champion's Hill, and, after a hard-fought battle, defeated and drove him back towards Vicksburg, capturing eighteen guns and nearly three thousand men. This was the hardest-fought battle of the campaign.

On the 17th we reached the Big Black, where we found the enemy entrenched. After a battle of two or three hours' duration we succeeded in carrying their works by storm, capturing much artillery and about twelve hundred men. In their flight the enemy de-



CAMPAIGN AGAINST
VICKSBURG
 April and May
 1863

From General Badeau's "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant"; D. Appleton & Co., N. Y. (At the request of the Editor of THE CENTURY MAGAZINE.)

stroyed the bridge across the Big Black, so that the balance of the day and night was spent in building bridges across that stream.

We crossed on the morning of the 18th, and the outworks of Vicksburg were reached before night, the army taking position in their front. On the 19th there was continuous skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better positions. The enemy's troops had been much demoralized by their defeats at Champion's Hill and the Big Black, and I believed he would not make much of an effort to hold Vicksburg. Accordingly at two o'clock I ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops, where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy, and the siege of Vicksburg began.

The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position, and in making roads in rear of the army, from Yazoo river or Chickasaw bayou. Most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations issued by the commissary. They had had an abundance of food, however, but had begun to feel the want of bread. I remember that, in passing around to the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in rather a low voice, but yet so that I heard him, "*Hard-tack.*" In a moment the cry was taken up all along the line, "*Hard-tack! hard-tack!*" I told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with everything they needed. The cry was instantly changed to cheers. By the night of the 21st full rations were issued to all the troops. The bread and coffee were highly appreciated.


I now determined on a second assault. Johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one I had with me, and I knew he was being reënforced. There was danger of his coming to the assistance of Pemberton, and after all he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the garrison, if, indeed, he did not prevent the capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg would save sending me the reënforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State. But the first consideration of all was that the troops believed they could carry the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not been allowed to try.

The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock A. M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in position. All the corps commanders

set their time by mine, so that all might open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy, and in planting their battle-flags upon them; but at no place were we able to enter. General McClernand reported that he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wanted reënforcements. I occupied a position from which I believed I could see as well as he what took place in his front, and I did not see the success he reported. But his request for reënforcements being repeated, I could not ignore it, and sent him Quinby's division of the Seventeenth Corps. Sherman and McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a diversion in favor of McClernand. This last attack only served to increase our casualties, without giving any benefit whatever. As soon as it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and had been obliged to remain there for security all day were withdrawn, and thus ended the last assault on Vicksburg.

A regular siege was now determined upon,—to "out-camp the enemy," as it were, and to incur no more losses. The experience of the 22d convinced officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the defenses and approaches with a will. With the navy holding the river, the investment of Vicksburg was complete. As long as we could hold our position, the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men, and munitions of war, to what he had on hand. These could not last always.

The crossing of troops at Bruinsburg had commenced April 30th. On the 18th of May the army was in rear of Vicksburg. On the 19th, just twenty days after the movement began, the city was completely invested and an assault had been made. Five distinct battles—besides continuous skirmishing—had been fought and won by the Union forces; the capital of the State had fallen, and its arsenals, military manufactories, and everything useful for military purposes, had been destroyed; an average of about one hundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged; but five days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over 6000 prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been killed or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field-pieces had fallen into our hands; and four hundred miles of the river, from Vicksburg to Port Hudson, had become ours. The Union force that had crossed the Mississippi river up to this time was less than forty-three thousand men. One division of these, Blair's, only arrived in time to take part in the battle of Champion's Hill, but was not engaged



MAP
OF THE
SIEGE OF
VICKSBURG.

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there, and one brigade, Ransom's, of McPherson's corps reached the field after the battle. The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on the roads between these places, quite sixty thousand men. They were in their own country, where no rear-guards were necessary. The country was admirable for defense, but difficult to conduct an offensive campaign in. All their troops had to be met. We were fortunate, to say the least, in meeting them in detail: at Port Gibson, seven or eight thousand; at Raymond, five thousand; at Jackson, from eight to eleven thousand; at Champion's Hill, twenty-five thousand; at the Big Black, four thousand. A part of those met at Jackson were all that was left of those encountered at Raymond. They were beaten in detail by a force smaller than their own, upon their own ground. Our losses up to this time had been:

	<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>	<i>Missing.</i>
Port Gibson.....	131	719	25
South Fork, Bayou Pierre..		1	
Skirmishes May 3.....	1	9	
Fourteen Mile Creek.....	6	24	
Raymond.....	66	339	37
Jackson.....	42	251	7
Champion's Hill.....	410	1844	187
Big Black.....	39	237	3
Bridgeport.....		1	
Total.....	695	3425	259

Of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty. Not half of them were disabled for any length of time.*

After the unsuccessful assault of the 22d, the work of the regular siege began. Sherman occupied the right, starting from the river above Vicksburg; McPherson the center (McArthur's division now with him); and McClernand the left, holding the road south to Warrenton. Lauman's division arrived at this time, and was placed on the extreme left of the line.

In the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had been constructed from the Yazoo river and Chickasaw Bayou, around the rear of the army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition; ground had been selected and cleared on which the troops were to be encamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up. The troops had been without these from the time of crossing the Mississippi up to this time. All was now ready for the pick and spade. Prentiss and Hurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared. Cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the Big Black, and to observe Johnston. I knew that

Johnston was receiving reënforcements from Bragg, who was confronting Rosecrans in Tennessee. Vicksburg was so important to the enemy that I believed he would make the most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk of losing ground elsewhere.

My line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from Haines's Bluff to Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was about seven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson in our rear, who was being constantly reënforced, we required a second line of defense facing the other way. I had not troops enough under my command to man this. General Halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked for reënforcements, forwarded them with all possible dispatch.

The ground about Vicksburg is admirable for defense. On the north it is about two hundred feet above the Mississippi river at the highest point, and is very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown up with cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with a dense forest. Farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and was in cultivation; but here, too, it was cut by ravines and small streams. The enemy's line of defense followed the crest of a ridge, from the river north of the city, eastward, then southerly around to the Jackson road, full three miles back of the city. Deep ravines of the description given lay in front of these defenses. As there is a succession of gullies, cut out by rains, along the side of the ridge, the line was necessarily very irregular. To follow each of these spurs with intrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would have lengthened their line very much. Generally, therefore, or in many places, their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight to the head of another, and an outer work, triangular in shape, generally open in the rear, was thrown up on the point. With a few men in this outer work, they commanded the approaches to the main line completely.

The work to be done to make our position as strong against the enemy as his was against us, was very great. The problem was also complicated by our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. We had but four engineer officers with us. Captain Prime, of the Engineer Corps, was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him. His health, however, soon gave out, when he was succeeded by Captain Comstock, also of the Engineer Corps. To

* The official revised statements of losses soon to be published by Colonel Robert N. Scott of the War Records Office (of which the above table is a part), show that the aggregate Union losses from May 1 to July 4, were: killed, 1514; wounded, 7395; captured or missing, 453; —total, 9362—EDITOR.

provide assistants on such a long line, I directed that all officers who were graduates at West Point, where they had necessarily to study military engineering, should, in addition to their other duties, assist in the work. The chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates. The chief commissary, now the commissary-general of the army, begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good for, unless he would do for a sap-roller. As soldiers require rations while working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and as we should be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, I let him off. The general is a large man,—weighs two hundred and twenty pounds, and is not tall.

We had no siege-guns except six thirty-two pounders, and there were none at the West to draw from. Admiral Porter, however, supplied us with a battery of navy-guns of large caliber, and with these, and the field-artillery used in the campaign, the siege began. The first thing to do was to get the artillery in batteries where they would occupy commanding positions; then, to establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the enemy, but as near up as possible; and then to construct rifle-pits and covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route. The enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. Probably their artillery ammunition was short, and their infantry was kept down by our sharp-shooters, who were always on the alert and ready to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works.

In no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. It was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than the ordinary parapet. To give additional protection, sand-bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets, far enough apart to make loopholes for musketry. On top of these, logs were put. By these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharp-shooters. The enemy used in their defense explosive musket-balls, thinking, no doubt, that, bursting over our men in the trenches, they would do some execution. I do not remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of these shells. When they were hit, and the ball exploded, the wound was terrible. In these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. Their use is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without any corresponding advantage to those using them.

The enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men, because we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw

upon, and used it freely. Splinters from the timber would have made havoc among their men behind.

There were no mortars with the besiegers, except those that the navy had in front of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of the toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve pounder shells, and binding them with strong iron bands. These answered as coehorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into the trenches of the enemy.

The labor of building the batteries and of intrenching was largely done by the pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who were paid for their work; but details from the line had often to be made. The work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advanced position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy, the batteries were advanced. By the 30th of June there were two hundred and twenty guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of heavy guns belonging to, and manned and commanded by, the navy. We were now as strong for defense against the garrison of Vicksburg as they were against us; but I knew that Johnston was in our rear, and was receiving constant reinforcements from the East. He had at this time a larger force than I had had at any time prior to the battle of Champion's Hill.

As soon as the news of the arrival of the Union army behind Vicksburg reached the North, floods of visitors began to pour in. Some came to gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed through the terrible ordeal; members of the Christian and Sanitary commissions came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. Often those coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. They did not know how little the gift would be appreciated. The soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks, and turkeys, without bread, during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite.

Among the earliest arrivals was the Governor of Illinois, with most of the State officers. I naturally wanted to show them what there was of most interest. In Sherman's front the ground was the most broken and most wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure. I therefore took them to Sherman's headquarters and presented them. Before starting out to look at the lines—possibly while Sherman's horse was being saddled—there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about which the North had been so imperfectly informed. There was a

little knot around Sherman, and another around me, and I heard Sherman repeating in the most animated manner, "Grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign. I opposed it. I wrote him a letter opposing it." But for this speech it is not likely that Sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of. His untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitled him to a full share of all the credit due for its success. He could not have done more if the plan had been his own.

On the 26th of May I sent Blair's division up the Yazoo to drive out a force of the enemy supposed to be between the Big Black and the Yazoo. The country was rich, and full of supplies of both food and forage. Blair was instructed to take all of it. The cattle were to be driven in for the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by our troops or by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and the roads rendered as nearly impassable as possible. Blair went forty-five miles, and was gone nearly a week. His work was effectually done. I requested Admiral Porter at this time to send the Marine Brigade, a floating nondescript force which had been assigned to his command, and which proved very useful, up to Haines's Bluff to hold it until reinforcements could be sent.

On the 26th I received a letter from Banks, asking me to reinforce him with ten thousand men at Port Hudson. Of course I could not comply with his request, nor did I think he needed them. He was in no danger of an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no army organizing in his rear to raise the siege.

On the 3d of June a brigade from Hurlbut's command arrived, General Nathan Kimball commanding. It was sent to Mechanicsburg, some miles north-east of Haines's Bluff, and about midway between the Big Black and the Yazoo. A brigade of Blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, on Blair's return from up the Yazoo, been sent to the same place with instructions to watch the crossings of the Big Black river, to destroy the roads in his (Blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies.

On the 7th of June our little force of colored and white troops across the Mississippi, at Milliken's Bend, were attacked by about three thousand men from Richard Taylor's trans-Mississippi command. With the aid of the gun-boats the enemy were speedily repelled. I sent Mower's brigade over with instructions to drive the Confederates beyond the Tensas Bayou, and we had no further trouble in that quarter during the siege. This was the first important engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire. These men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning of the siege, but they behaved well.

On the 8th of June a full division arrived from Hurlbut's command, under General Sooy Smith. It was sent immediately to Haines's Bluff, and General C. C. Washburn was assigned to the general command at that point.

On the 11th a strong division arrived from the Department of the Missouri under General Herron, which was placed on our left. This cut off the last possible chance of communication between Pemberton and Johnston, as it enabled Lauman to close up on McClernand's left, while Herron intrenched from Lauman to the water's edge. At this point the water recedes a few hundred yards from the high land. Through this opening, no doubt, the Confederate commanders had been able to get messengers under cover of night.

On the 14th General Parke arrived with two divisions of Burnside's corps, and was immediately dispatched to Haines's Bluff. These latter troops — Herron's and Parke's — were the reinforcements, already spoken of, sent by Halleck in anticipation of their being needed. They arrived none too soon.

I now had about seventy-one thousand men. More than half were disposed across the peninsula between the Yazoo, at Haines's Bluff, and the Big Black; while the division of Osterhaus was watching the crossings of the latter river farther south, from the crossing of the Jackson road to Baldwin's Ferry, and below.

There were eight roads leading into Vicksburg, along which, and to their immediate sides, our work was specially pushed and batteries were advanced; but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected.

On the 17th I received letters from Generals Sherman and McPherson, saying that their respective commands had complained to them of a fulsome congratulatory order, published by General McClernand to the Thirteenth Corps, which did great injustice to the other troops engaged in the campaign. This order had been sent north and published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps. The order had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside of McClernand's command, until brought in this way. I wrote at once to McClernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order. He did so, and I immediately relieved him from the command of the Thirteenth Army Corps, and ordered him back to Springfield, Illinois. The publication of his order in the press was in violation of War Department orders and also of mine.

On the 22d of June positive information was received that Johnston had crossed the Big Black river for the purpose of attacking our rear, to raise the siege and release Pemberton. The correspondence between Johnston and

Pemberton shows that all expectation of holding Vicksburg had by this time passed from Johnston's mind. I immediately ordered Sherman to the command of all the forces from Haines's Bluff to the Big Black river. These amounted now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg. Besides these, Herron's and A. J. Smith's divisions were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to reënforce Sherman. Haines's Bluff had been strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from there to the Big Black at the railroad crossing batteries had been constructed. The work of connecting by rifle-pits, when this was not already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them.

Johnston evidently took in the situation, and wisely, I think, abstained from making an assault on us, because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any risk of loosing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston.

From the 23d of May the work of fortifying, and pushing forward our position nearer to the enemy, had been steadily progressing. At the point on the Jackson road in front of Ransom's brigade a sap was run up to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of June we had it undermined and the mine charged. The enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in reaching our mine. At this particular point the hill on which stood the rebel work rises abruptly. Our sap ran close up to the outside of the enemy's parapet. In fact this parapet was also our protection. The soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this barrier: sometimes they would exchange the hard bread of the Union soldiers for the tobacco of the Confederates, and at other times they threw over hand-grenades, the rebels throwing them first, and our men often catching them in their hands and returning them.

Our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequently, when it had extended as far as the parapet, it was many feet below it. This caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy it. On the 25th of June, at 3 o'clock, all being ready, the mine was exploded. A heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to open with the explosion. The effect was to blow the top of the hill off and make a crater where it stood. The breach was not sufficient to enable us to pass a column of attack through. In fact, the enemy, having failed to reach our mine, had thrown up a line farther back, where

most of the men guarding that point were placed. There were a few men, however, left at the advance line, and others were working in the counter-mine, which was still being pushed to find ours. All that were there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive. I remember one colored man who, having been under-ground at work when the explosion took place, was thrown to our side. He was not much hurt, but terribly frightened. Some one asked him how high he had gone up. "Dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile," was his reply. General Logan commanded at this point, and took this colored man to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege.

As soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by two regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they had been placed for the express purpose. The enemy made a desperate effort to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind his new line. From here, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution. The compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. The enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the contestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had to be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. During the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against the missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base of their parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing their grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses of which they would light with port-fires, and throw them by hand into our ranks. We found it impossible to continue this work. Another mine was consequently started, which was exploded on the 1st of July, destroying an entire redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its occupants, and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. No attempt to charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us. Our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. The enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the first. We lost none in the second.

From this time forward the work of mining and pushing our position nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and I determined to explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at different points and assault immediately after. We were up now at three different points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet of the enemy divided us.

About this time an intercepted dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton informed me that

Johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us, in order to relieve the garrison of Vicksburg. I knew the garrison would make no formidable effort to relieve itself. The picket lines were so close to each other—where there was space enough between the lines to post pickets—that the men could converse. On the 21st of June I was informed, through this means, that Pemberton was preparing to escape by crossing to the Louisiana side under cover of night; that he had employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "Yankees" to cut their way out; that they had refused, and had almost mutinied because their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be finished in a week to carry them all over. The rebel pickets also said that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build these boats with. Afterwards this story was verified. On entering the city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats.

All necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt abortive. Our pickets were doubled; Admiral Porter was informed, so that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on the west bank of the river with which to light it up if the attempt was made; and batteries were established along the levee crossing the peninsula on the Louisiana side. Had the attempt been made, the garrison of Vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners on the Louisiana side. General Richard Taylor was expected on the west bank to cooperate in this movement, I believe; but he did not come, nor could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. The river was now in our possession, from its source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson. We had pretty nearly exhausted the country, from a line drawn from Lake Providence to opposite Bruinsburg. The roads west were not of a character to draw supplies over for any considerable force.

By the 1st of July our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a number of places. At ten points we could move under cover to within from five to one hundred yards of the enemy. Orders were given to make all preparations for assault on the 6th of July. The debouches were ordered widened, to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast. Plank, and bags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to enable the troops to cross the ditches.

On the night of the 1st of July Johnston was between Brownsville and the Big Black, and wrote Pemberton from there that about the 7th of the month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to cut his way out. Pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached him.

On July 1st Pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the following letter to each of his four division commanders:

"Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. I see no prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable, obstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, requested to inform me with as little delay as possible as to the condition of your troops, and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation."

Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically did the same. They expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate would fail. Pemberton had previously got a message to Johnston suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the garrison with their arms. The latter replied that it would be a confession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized Pemberton to use his name in making such an arrangement.

On the 3d, about ten o'clock A. M., white flags appeared on a portion of the rebel works. Hostilities along that part of the line ceased at once. Soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing a white flag. They proved to be General Bowen, a division commander, and Colonel Montgomery, aide-de-camp to Pemberton, bearing the following letter to me:

"I have the honor to propose an armistice for ——— hours, with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. This communication will be handed you, under a flag of truce, by Major-General John S. Bowen."

It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the command. The troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases, and worst of all, to the gibes of many Northern papers that came to them saying that all their suffering was in vain—that Vicksburg would never be taken—were at

last at an end, and the Union was sure to be saved.

Bowen was received by General A. J. Smith, and asked to see me. I had been a neighbor of Bowen's in Missouri, and knew him well and favorably, before the war; but his request was refused. He then suggested that I should meet Pemberton. To this I sent a verbal message saying that, if Pemberton desired it, I would meet him in front of McPherson's corps at three o'clock that afternoon. I also sent the following written reply to Pemberton's letter:

"Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners, to be appointed, etc. The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those indicated above."

At three o'clock Pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of the morning. Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan, A. J. Smith, and several officers of my staff, accompanied me. Our place of meeting was on a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines. Near by stood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event. It was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root, and limbs had disappeared, the fragments being taken as trophies. Since then the same tree, like "the true cross," has furnished many cords of wood in the shape of trophies.

Pemberton and I had served in the same division in a part of the Mexican war. I knew him very well, therefore, and greeted him as an old acquaintance. He soon asked what terms I proposed to give his army if it surrendered. My answer was, "The same as proposed in my reply to your letter." Pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "The conference might as well end," and turned abruptly as if to leave. I said, "Very well." General Bowen, I saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be consummated. His manner and remarks while Pemberton and I were talking showed this. He now proposed that he and one of our generals should have a conference. I had no objection to this, as nothing could be made binding upon me that they might propose. Smith and Bowen accordingly had a conference, during which Pemberton and I were in conversation, moving a short distance away towards the enemy's lines.

After a while Bowen suggested that the Confederate army should be allowed to march out with the honors of war, carrying their small arms and field artillery. This was promptly and unceremoniously rejected. The interview then ended, I agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o'clock that night.

Word was sent to Admiral Porter soon after the correspondence with Pemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part of both army and navy. It was agreed on my parting with Pemberton that they should not be renewed until our correspondence ceased.

When I returned to my headquarters I sent for all the corps and division commanders who were with the army immediately confronting Vicksburg. Half the army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for Johnston. I informed these officers of the contents of Pemberton's letter, of my reply, and the substance of the interview, and told them I was ready to hear any suggestion, but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own hands, even against a unanimous judgment. This was the nearest to a "council of war" I ever held. Against the general, almost unanimous, judgment of the council I sent the following letter:

"In conformity with agreement this afternoon, I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed I will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at 8 A.M. to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be made out and paroles be signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them. Thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers are present authorized to sign the roll of prisoners."

By the terms of the cartel then in force prisoners captured by either army were required to be forwarded, as soon as possible, to either Aiken's Landing below Dutch Gap, on the James river, or to Vicksburg, there to be exchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged. There was a Confederate commissioner at Vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange. I did not propose to take him prisoner, but to leave him free to perform the functions of his office. Had I insisted upon an unconditional surrender, there would have been over thirty thousand men to trans-

port up to Cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the Mississippi; thence the prisoners would have had to be transported by rail to Washington or Baltimore; thence again by steamer to Aiken's, at very great expense. At Aiken's they would have had to be paroled, because the Confederates did not have Union prisoners to give in exchange. Then again Pemberton's army was largely composed of men whose homes were in the south-west. I knew many of them were tired of the war, and would get home just as soon as they could. A large number of them had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and had requested to be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and they could go to their homes.

Late at night I received the following reply to my last letter:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. In the main, your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops, manifested in the defense of Vicksburg, I have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us. At ten o'clock A.M. to-morrow, I propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines, after which you will take possession. Officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected."

This was received after midnight; my reply was as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d July. The amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. Again, I can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. While I do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. The property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each. If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at ten o'clock A. M., and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it. Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by nine o'clock A. M., I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified, from firing upon your men."

These terms Pemberton promptly accepted.

During the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between the soldiers of the two armies on picket and where the lines were close together. All rebels were known as "Johnnies," all Union troops as "Yanks."

Often "Johnny" would call, "Well, Yank, when are you coming into town?" The reply was sometimes, "We propose to celebrate the 4th of July there." Sometimes it would be, "We always treat our prisoners with kindness and do not want to hurt them"; or "We are holding you as prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves," etc. The garrison, from the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the 4th. They knew from the temper of their men that it would be successful when made, and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. Besides, it would be attended with severe loss to them. The Vicksburg paper (which we received regularly through the courtesy of the rebel pickets) said prior to the 4th, in speaking of the Yankee boast that they would take dinner in Vicksburg that day, that the best receipt for cooking a rabbit was, "First ketch your rabbit." The paper at this time, and for some time prior, was printed on the plain side of wall paper. The last edition was issued on the 4th, and announced that we had "caught our rabbit."

I have no doubt that Pemberton commenced his correspondence on the 3d for a twofold purpose: first, to avoid an assault, which he knew would be successful; and second, to prevent the capture taking place on the great national holiday. Holding out for better terms, as he did, defeated his aim in the latter particular.

Pemberton says in his report: "If it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the day for surrender, the answer is obvious. I believed that upon that day I should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foe, I knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of July into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time." This does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day he did for surrendering. It must be recollected that his first letter asking terms was received about ten o'clock A. M., July 3d. It then could hardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect a surrender. He knew that Johnston was in our rear for the purpose of raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he could. He knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was expected on the 4th. In our interview he told me he had rations enough to hold out for some time—my recollection is two weeks. It was this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to draw rations for his men from his own supplies.

On the 3d, as soon as negotiations were commenced, I notified Sherman, and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against John-

ston, drive him out of the State, and destroy his army if he could. Steele and Ord were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join Sherman as soon as the surrender should take place, and of this Sherman was notified.

On the 4th, at the appointed hour, the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of their works, formed line in front, stacked arms, and marched back in good order. Our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering, and without a single offensive remark that I ever heard of. Logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was the first to march in, and the flag of one of the regiments of his division was soon floating over the court-house. Our men were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. We had had full rations from the time the siege commenced to the close. The enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last. I myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to those whom they had so recently been engaged in *starving out*. It was accepted with avidity and with thanks.

I rode into Vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. At that time I found that many of the citizens had been living under-ground. The ridges upon which Vicksburg is built, and those back to the Big Black, are composed of a deep-yellow clay, of great tenacity. When roads and streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left, and stand as well as if composed of stone. The magazines of the enemy were made by mining passageways into this clay, at places where there were deep cuts. Many citizens secured places of safety for their families by carving out rooms in these embankments. A doorway, in these cases, would be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street, and after running it in a few feet, a room of the size required would be carved out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the doorway. In some instances I saw where two rooms were cut out for a single family, with a doorway in the clay wall separating them. Some of these were carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration. In these the occupants were fully secure from the shells of their enemy, which were dropped into the city night and day, without intermission.

In the afternoon I returned to my old headquarters outside, and did not move them into the town until the 6th. My dispatch announcing our victory to the Government was started for Cairo, by a dispatch boat (to be telegraphed from there), on the evening of the 4th. It was as follows:

"The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a great advantage to us at this moment. It saves, probably, several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service. Sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on Johnston, to drive him from the State. I will send troops to the relief of Banks, and return the Ninth Army Corps to Burnside."

At the same time I notified Banks, now before Port Hudson, of the capture and terms, and offered to send him all the troops he wanted. Banks had my letter printed, and through the kind offices of the pickets got several copies into the rebel lines. A copy getting into the hands of the commanding officer, General Gardner, he asked to have it authenticated and its reliability substantiated; this being done, he would deem it useless to hold out longer. Banks assured him that the surrender had taken place, and Gardner capitulated unconditionally.

Pemberton and his army were kept in Vicksburg until the whole could be paroled. The paroles were in duplicate, by organization, one copy for each, Nationals and Confederates, signed by the commanding officers of the companies or regiments. Duplicates were also made for each soldier, and signed by each individually, one to be retained by the soldier signing, and one to be retained by us. Several hundred refused to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the North as prisoners to being sent back to fight again. Others again kept out of the way, hoping to escape both alternatives.

Pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign their paroles, but I declined. It also leaked out that many of the men who had signed their paroles intended to desert and go to their homes as soon as they were out of our lines. Pemberton, hearing this, again appealed to me to assist him. He wanted arms for a battalion, to act as guards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp of instruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged. This request was also declined. It was precisely what I had expected and hoped that they would do. I told him, however, that I would see that they marched beyond our lines in good order. By the 11th, just one week after the surrender, the paroles were completed, and the rebel garrison marched out. Many deserted, and fewer of them were ever returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case had the surrender been unconditional and had the prisoners been sent to the James river to be paroled.

As soon as our troops took possession of the city, guards were established along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to

the river below. The prisoners were allowed to occupy their old camps behind the intrenchments. No restraint was put upon them, except by their own commanders. They were rationed about the same as our own men, and from our supplies. The men of the two armies fraternized as if they had been fighting for the same cause. When they passed out of the works they had so long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their late antagonists, not a cheer went up, not a retort was made that would give pain. Really, I believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in the breasts of most of the Union soldiers, at seeing the dejection of their late antagonists.

The day before the departure the following order was issued :

"Paroled prisoners will be sent out here to-morrow. They will be authorized to cross at the railroad-bridge and move from there to Edwards Ferry, and on by way of Raymond. Instruct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensive remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have passed."

On the 8th a dispatch was sent from Washington by General Halleck, saying :

"I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg without actual delivery to a proper agent, as required by the seventh article of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. Such has been the case elsewhere. If these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will detain them until further orders."

Halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the hands of Major Watts, Confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners.

At Vicksburg thirty-one thousand six hundred prisoners were surrendered, together with one hundred and seventy-two cannon, sixty thousand muskets, and a large amount of ammunition. The small arms of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours. Up to this time our troops at the West had been limited to the old United States flint-lock changed into percussion, the Belgian musket imported early in the war—almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimed at—and a few new and improved arms. These were of many different calibers, thus causing much trouble in distributing ammunition during an engagement. The enemy had generally new arms, which had run the blockade, and were of uniform caliber. After the surrender I authorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets to place them in the stack of captured arms, and to replace them with the latter. A large number of arms,

turned in to the Ordnance Department as captured, were arms that had really been used by the Union army in the capture of Vicksburg.

In this narration I have not made the mention I should of officers, dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention. Neither have I made that mention of the navy which its services deserve. I could not do justice to both in the limits of a magazine article. But suffice it to say, the close of the siege of Vicksburg found us with an army unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole, officers and men. A military education was acquired which no other school could have given. Men who thought a company was quite enough for them to command properly at the beginning, would have made good regimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders were equal to the command of a division, and one, Ransom, would have been equal to the command of a corps at least. Logan and Crocker ended the campaign fitted for independent commands.

General F. P. Blair, who commanded a division in the campaign, joined me at Milliken's Bend a full-fledged general, without having served in a lower grade. I had known Blair in Missouri, where I had voted against him for Congress in 1858. I knew him as a frank, positive, and generous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader. I dreaded his coming; I knew from experience that it is more difficult to command two generals desiring to be leaders than to command an army officered intelligently and with subordination. It affords me the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in his character. There was no man braver than he, nor was there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more unquestioning alacrity. He was one man as a soldier, another as a politician.

The navy, under Porter, was all it could be during the entire campaign. Without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged. It could not have been made at all, in the way it was, with any number of men without such assistance. The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service. There never was a request made, that I am aware of, either of the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly complied with.

The campaign of Vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances; and it now looks as though Providence had directed its course, while the Army of the Tennessee executed the decree.

U. S. Grant.

99th Ills, Army in the Field
Camp near Wounded, Feb 16th 1862

Gen. A. B. Buckner,
Confed. Army Sir, Yours of this date proposing
Amistice, and appointment of Commissioners
to settle terms of Capitulation is just received.
No terms except unconditional and immediate
surrender can be accepted.
I propose to move immediately upon
your works. I am Sir, very respectfully
your obt. Servt.
A. S. Bennett
Brig. Gen.

FAC-SIMILE OF THE ORIGINAL "UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER" DISPATCH.

In THE CENTURY for December, 1884, was printed a facsimile of a copy of the famous "Unconditional Surrender" dispatch. That copy was written by General Grant for reproduction in the magazine, and bore the additional words, "copied by me October 29, 1884.—U. S. G.," so that it might not be mistaken for the original, which was supposed to be lost. But the publication of the copy called out information of the original, which is owned by the publishers of the "Memoirs." They obtained it from Dr. James K. Wallace, of Litchfield, Conn., who received it November 28, 1868, from his relative by marriage,

General John A. Rawlins, who, as chief of staff to General Grant, had the custody, after the capture, of General Buckner's papers. General Rawlins told Dr. Wallace that he was receiving the original dispatch, and advised him to take good care of it, as it might become valuable. The above is an exact reproduction of the original dispatch in every particular, except that, in order to adapt it to the width of the page, the word, "Sir," has been lowered to the line beneath, and the words, "I am, sir, very respectfully," have been raised to the line above.—EDITOR.