

MANASSAS TO SEVEN PINES.

A REPLY TO JEFFERSON DAVIS,—INCLUDING DESCRIPTIONS OF THE BATTLES OF BULL RUN AND SEVEN PINES.



SUDLEY SPRINGS FORD, LOOKING SOUTH.

On the right, ruins of Sudley mineral springs. On the hill, Sudley Church—a hospital in the two battles of Bull Run. The wagon is on the Sudley and Manassas road. It is a mile from the ford to where Ricketts first planted his battery.—ED.

WHEN the State of Virginia seceded, being a citizen of that State, I resigned my office in the United States Army. And as I had seen a good deal of military service, in the Seminole and Mexican wars and in the West, the President of the Confederacy offered me a commission in the highest grade in his army. I accepted the offer because the invasion of the South was inevitable. But I soon incurred Mr. Davis's displeasure by protesting against an illegal act of his by which I was greatly wronged. Still he retained me in important positions, although his official letters were harsh. In 1864, however, he degraded me to the utmost of his power by summarily removing me from a high command. Believing that he was prompted to this act by animosity, and not by dispassionate opinion, I undertake to prove this animosity by many extracts from his "Rise and Fall of the Confederacy" (D. Appleton & Co.: 1881), and my comments thereon.

A QUESTION OF RANK.

MR. DAVIS recites (Vol. I., p. 307) the law securing to officers who might leave the United States Army to enter that of the Confederacy the same relative rank in the latter which they had in the former, provided their resignations had been offered in the six months next following the 14th of March, and then adds:

"The provisions hereof are in the view entertained, that the army was of the States, not of the Government, and was to secure to officers adhering to the

Confederate States the same relative rank which they had before those States had withdrawn from the Union. . . .

"How well the Government observed both the letter and spirit of the law will be seen by reference to its action in the matter of appointments."

Those of the five generals were the most prominent, of course. All had resigned within the time prescribed. Their relative rank in the United States Army just before secession was: 1st, J. E. Johnston, Brigadier-General; 2d, S. Cooper, Colonel; 3d, A. S. Johnston, Colonel; 4th, R. E. Lee, Lieutenant-Colonel; and 5th, G. T. Beauregard, Major. All of them but the 3d had previous appointments, when, on the 31st of August, the Government announced new ones: S. Cooper's being dated May 16, A. S. Johnston's May 28, R. E. Lee's June 14, J. E. Johnston's July 4, and G. T. Beauregard's July 21. So the law was violated, 1st, by disregarding existing commissions; 2d, by giving different instead of the same dates to commissions; and 3d, by not recognizing previous rank in the United States Army. The only effect of this triple violation of law was to reduce J. E. Johnston from the first to the fourth place, which, of course, must have been its object.

"It is a noteworthy fact [he continues] that the three highest officers in rank . . . were all so indifferent to any question of personal interest that they had received their appointment before they were aware it was to be conferred."

This implies that the conduct described was unusual. On the contrary, it was that of the body of officers who left the United States Army to enter that of the Confederacy. It is strange that the author should disparage so many honorable men. He states (page 309) that General Lee, when ordered from Richmond to the South for the first time, asked what rank he held in the army: "So wholly had his heart and his mind been consecrated to the public service that he had not remembered if he ever knew of his advancement."

As each grade has its duties, an officer cannot know his duty if ignorant of his rank. Therefore General Lee always knew his rank, for he never failed in his duty. Besides, his official correspondence at the time referred to shows that he knew that he was major-general of the Virginia forces until May 25, 1861, and a Confederate general after that date.

THE MOVEMENT FROM THE SHENANDOAH
TO MANASSAS.

DESCRIBING the events which immediately preceded the battle of Manassas, Mr. Davis says (page 340):

"The forces there assembled [in Virginia] were divided into three armies, at positions the most important and threatened. One, under General J. E. Johnston, at Harper's Ferry, covering the valley of the Shenandoah. . . .

"Harper's Ferry was an important position both for military and political considerations. . . . The demonstrations of General Patterson, commanding the Federal army in that region, caused General Johnston earnestly to insist on being allowed to retire to a position nearer to Winchester."

Harper's Ferry is twenty-two miles east of the route into the Shenandoah Valley, and could be held only by an army strong enough to drive an enemy from the heights north and east of it. So it is anything but an important position. These objections were expressed to the Government two days after my arrival, and I suggested the being permitted to move the troops as might be necessary. All this before General Patterson had advanced from Chambersburg.

The assertion in the first sentence of General Cooper's letter (page 341)—"You had been heretofore instructed to exercise your discretion as to retiring from your position at Harper's Ferry"—is incorrect. No such instructions had been given. The last instructions on the subject received by me are in General Lee's letter of June 7. ("War Records," Vol. II, page 910.)

On page 341 Mr. Davis says: "The temporary occupation [of Harper's Ferry] was especially needful for the removal of the valuable machinery and material in the armory located there." The removal of the machinery was not an object referred to in General Cooper's letter. But the presence of our army anywhere in the Valley within a day's march of the position, would have protected that removal.

That letter (page 341) was received two days after the army left Harper's Ferry to meet General McClellan's troops, believed by intelligent people of Winchester to be approaching from the west.

On page 345 he says it was a difficult problem to know which army, whether Beauregard's at Manassas or Johnston's in the Valley, should be reinforced by the other, because these generals were "each asking reinforcements from the other." All that was written by me on the subject is in the letter (page 345) dated July 9: "I have not asked for reinforcements because I supposed that the War Department, informed of the state of

affairs everywhere, could best judge where the troops at its disposal are most required. . . . If it is proposed to strengthen us against the attack I suggest as soon to be made, it seems to me that General Beauregard might with *great expedition* furnish five or six thousand men for a few days."

Mr. Davis says, after quoting from this letter:

"As soon as I became satisfied that Manassas was the objective point of the enemy's movement, I wrote to General Johnston urging him to make preparations for a junction with General Beauregard."

There is abundant evidence that the Southern President never thought of transferring the troops in the "Valley" to Manassas until the proper time to do it came—that is, when McDowell was known to be advancing. This fact is shown by the anxiety he expressed to increase the number of those troops.* And General Lee, writing to Mr. Davis in November, 1861 ("War Records," Vol. II, p. 515), says in regard to General Beauregard's suggestion that he be reinforced from his army:

"You decided that the movements of the enemy in and about Alexandria were not sufficiently demonstrative to warrant the withdrawing of any of the troops from the Shenandoah Valley. A few days afterwards, however,—I think three or four,—the reports from General Beauregard showed so clearly the enemy's purpose, that you ordered General Johnston, with his effective force, to march at once to the support of General Beauregard."

This letter is in reply to one from Mr. Davis, to the effect that statements had been widely published to show that General Beauregard's forces had been held inactive by his (Mr. Davis's) rejection of plans for vigorous offensive operations proposed to him by the general, and desiring to know of General Lee what those plans were, and why they were rejected.

"On the 17th of July, 1861," says Mr. Davis (page 346), "the following telegram was sent by the adjutant-general" to General J. E. Johnston, Winchester, Va.:

"General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper Court House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrangements exercise your discretion. [Signed] S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector General."

Mr. Davis asserts that I claim that discretion was given me by the words "all the arrangements." I claimed it from what he terms the only positive part of the order, viz., "If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick to Culpeper Court House."

"The sending the sick to Culpeper Court House [Mr. Davis adds] might have been after or before the effective force had moved to the execution of the main and only positive part of the order."

* See "War Records," Vol. II., letters on pages 924, 935, 940, 973, 976, 977.

"Make the movement" would have been a positive order, but "if practicable" deprived it of that character, and gave the officer receiving it a certain discretion. But, as the movement desired was made promptly, it was surely idle to discuss, twenty years after, whether the officer could lawfully have done what he *did not do*. At the time the decision of such a question might have been necessary; but, as Mr. Davis will give no more orders to generals, and as the officer concerned will execute no more, such a discussion is idle now. The use of the wagons required in the march of the army would have been necessary to remove the sick to the railroad station at Strasburg, eighteen miles distant; so this removal could *not* have been made *after* the march. There being seventeen hundred sick, this part of their transportation would have required more time than the transfer of the troops to Manassas, which was the important thing. The sick were, therefore, properly and quickly provided for in Winchester. I was the only judge of the "practicable"; and "if practicable" refers to the whole sentence — as much to sending the sick to Culpeper as to "make the movement." Still he says (page 347):

"His [my] letters of the 12th and 13th expressed his doubts about his power to retire from before the superior force of General Patterson. Therefore, the word 'practicable' was in that connection the equivalent of 'possible.'"

It is immaterial whether "if practicable" or "if possible" was written. I was the only judge of the possibility or practicability; and, if General Patterson had not changed his position after the telegram was received, I might have thought it necessary to attack him, to "make the movement practicable." But as to my power to retire. On the 15th General Patterson's forces were half a day's march from us, and on the 12th more than a day's march; and, as Stuart's cavalry did not permit the enemy to observe us, retreat would have been easy, and I could not possibly have written to the contrary.*

As to Mr. Davis's telegram (page 348), and the anxiety in Mr. Davis's mind lest there should be some unfortunate misunderstanding between General Beauregard and me,—my inquiry was intended and calculated to establish beyond dispute our relative positions. As a Confederate brigadier-general I had been junior to General Beauregard, but was cre-

ated general by act of Congress. But, as this had not been published to the army, it was not certain that it was known at Manassas. If it was not, the President's telegram gave the information, and prevented what he seems to have apprehended.

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.†

ON page 349 to the end of the chapter, the President describes his visit to the field of battle near Manassas. "As we advanced," he says, "the storm of battle was rolling westward." But, in fact, the fighting ceased before he left Manassas. He then mentions meeting me on a hill which commanded a general view of the field, and proceeding farther west, where he saw a Federal "column," which a Confederate squadron charged and put to flight. But the captain in command of this squadron says in his report that the column seen was a party of our troops. Mr. Davis also dilates on the suffering of our troops for want of supplies and camp equipage, and on his efforts to have them provided for. After the battle ended, officers were duly directed by me to have food brought to the ground where the troops were to pass the night.

I was not in the conference described by Mr. Davis (pages 353, 354, 355). Having left the field after ten o'clock, and ridden in the dark slowly, it was about half-past eleven when I found the President and General Beauregard together, in the latter's quarters at Manassas. We three conversed an hour or more without referring to pursuit or an advance upon Washington. The "conference" described by him must have occurred before my arrival, and Mr. Davis may very well have forgotten that I was not present then.

But, when the President wrote, he had forgotten the subject of the conference he described; for the result, as he states it, was an order, not for pursuit by the army, but for the detail of two parties to collect wounded men and abandoned property near the field of battle. This order (pages 355, 356) is "to the same effect," Mr. Davis says, as the one he wrote, and which he terms a direction to pursue the Federal army at early dawn.

It is asserted (page 354) that I left the command over both Confederate armies in General Beauregard's hands during the engagement. Such conduct would have been as base as flight from the field in the heat of

* Mr. Davis has a few words of praise for General Johnston, which, in this connection, will be of interest to the reader: "It gives me pleasure to state that, from all the accounts received at the time, the plans of General Johnston for masking his withdrawal to form a junction with General Beauregard were conducted with marked skill" (page 347).—ED.

† For views of the field and pictorial incidents of the battle of Bull Run, see General Beauregard's paper in *THE CENTURY* for November, 1884.

battle, and would have brought upon me the contempt of every honorable soldier. It is disproved by the fact that General Beauregard was willing to serve under me there, and again in North Carolina, near the close of the war; and associated with me. As this accusation is published by the Southern President, and indorsed by General Beauregard, it requires my contradiction.

Instead of leaving the command in General Beauregard's hands, I assumed it over both armies immediately after my arrival on the 20th, showing General Beauregard as my warrant the President's telegram defining my position. The usual order* assuming command was written and sent to General Beauregard's office for distribution. He was then told that as General Patterson would no doubt hasten to join General McDowell as soon as he discovered my movement, we must attack the Federal army next morning. General Beauregard then pointed out on a map of the neighborhood the roads leading to the enemy's camp at Centreville from the different parts of our line south of the stream, and the positions of the brigades near each road; and a simple order of march, by which our troops would unite near the Federal position, was sketched. Having had neither sleep nor recumbent rest since the morning of the 17th, I begged General Beauregard to put this order of march on paper, and have the necessary copies made and sent to me for inspection in a grove, near, where I expected to be resting; this in time for distribution before night. This distribution was to be by him, the immediate commander of most of the troops. Seeing that eight brigades were on the right of the line to Centreville, and but one to the left of it at a distance of four miles, I desired General Beauregard to have Bee's and Jackson's brigades placed in this interval near the detached brigade.

The papers were brought to me a little before sunrise next morning. They differed greatly from the order sketched the day before; but as they would put the troops in motion if distributed, it would be easy then to direct the course of each division. By the order sketched the day before, all our forces would have been concentrated near Centreville, to attack the Federal army. By that prepared by General Beauregard but four brigades were directed "to the attack of Centreville," of which one and a half had not yet arrived from the Valley, while six brigades were to move forward to the Union Mills and Centreville road, there to hold themselves in readi-

ness to support the attack on Centreville, or to move, two to Sangster's cross-roads, two to Fairfax Station, and two to Fairfax Court House. The two and a half brigades on the ground, even supported by the half brigade of the reserve also on the ground, in all probability would have been defeated by the whole Federal army before the three bodies of two brigades each could have come to their aid, over distances of from three to five miles. Then, if the enemy had providentially been defeated by one-sixth or one-eighth of their number, Sangster's cross-roads and Fairfax Station were out of their line of retreat.


Soon after sunrise on the 21st, it was reported that a large body of Federal troops was approaching on the Warrenton Turnpike. This offensive movement of the enemy would have *frustrated our plan of the day before*, if the orders for it had been delivered to the troops. It appears from the reports of the commanders of the six brigades on the right that but one of them, General Longstreet, received it. Learning that Bee's and Jackson's brigades were still on the right, I again desired General Beauregard to transfer them to the left, which he did, giving the same orders to Hampton's Legion, just arrived. These, with Coker's brigade then near the turnpike, would necessarily receive the threatened attack.

General Beauregard then suggested that all our troops on the right should move rapidly to the left and assail the attacking Federal troops in flank. This suggestion was accepted; and together we joined those troops. Three of the four brigades of the first line, at Mitchell's, Blackburn's, and McLean's fords, reported strong bodies of United States troops on the wooded heights before them. This *frustrated the second plan*. Two Federal batteries—one in front of Bonham's brigade at Mitchell's ford, the other before Longstreet's at Blackburn's ford—were annoying us, although their firing was slow.

About 8 o'clock, after receiving such information as scouts could give, I left General Beauregard near Longstreet's position, and placed myself on Lookout Hill, in rear of Mitchell's ford, to await the development of the enemy's designs. About 9 o'clock the signal officer, Captain Alexander, reported that a column of Federal troops could be seen crossing the valley of Bull Run, two miles beyond our left.

General McDowell had been instructed by the general-in-chief to pass the Confederate right and seize the railroad in our rear. But, learning that the district to be passed

* General J. A. Early, in his narrative of these events, says: "During the 20th, General Johnston arrived at Manassas Junction by the railroad, and that day we received the order from him assuming command of the combined armies of General Beauregard and himself."—J. E. J.



GENERAL MAP OF THE BATTLE-FIELD OF MANASSAS.

STRUTHERS, SERVOS & CO., ENGR'S, N. Y.

(For full-page topographical map of the field, see THE CENTURY for November, 1884.)

through was rugged and covered with woods, and therefore unfavorable to a large army, he determined, after devoting three days to reconnoissance, to operate on the open and favorable ground to his right, and turn our left. He had another object in this second plan, and an important one—that this course would place his between the two Confederate armies, and prevent their junction; and if it had been made a day or two sooner, this manœuvre would have accomplished that object.

General McDowell marched from Centreville by the Warrenton turnpike with three divisions, sending a fourth division to deceive us by demonstrations in front of our main

body. Leaving the turnpike a half mile from the Stone Bridge, he made a long detour to Sudley ford, where he crossed Bull Run and turned towards Manassas. Colonel Evans, who commanded fourteen companies near the Stone Bridge, discovered this manœuvre, and moved with his little force along the base of the hill north of the turnpike, to place it before the enemy near the Sudley and Manassas road. Here he was assailed by greatly superior numbers, which he resisted obstinately.

General Beauregard had joined me on Lookout Hill, and we could distinctly hear the sounds and see the smoke of the fight. But they indicated no hostile force that Evans's troops and those of Bee, Hampton and Jackson,

which we could see hurrying towards the conflict in that order, were not adequate to resist.

On reaching the broad, level top of the hill south of the turnpike, Bee, appreciating the strength of the position, formed his troops (half of his own and half of Bartow's brigade) on that ground. But seeing Evans struggling against great odds, he crossed the valley and formed on the right and a little in advance of him. Here the five or six regiments, with six field-pieces, held their ground for an hour against 10,000 or 12,000 United States troops, when, finding they were overlapped on each flank by the continually arriving enemy, General Bee fell back to the position from which he had moved to rescue Evans—crossing the valley, closely pressed by the Federal army.

Hampton with his legion reached the valley as the retrograde movement began. Forming it promptly, he joined in the action, and contributed greatly to the orderly character of the retreat by his courage and admirable soldierly conduct, seconded by the excellent conduct of the gentlemen composing his legion. Imboden and his battery did excellent service on this trying occasion. Bee met Jackson at the head of his brigade, on the position he had first taken, and he began to re-form and Jackson to deploy at the same time.

In the mean time I had been waiting with General Beauregard on Lookout Hill for evidence of General McDowell's design. The violence of the firing on the left indicated a battle, but the large bodies of troops reported by chosen scouts to be facing our right kept me in doubt. But near eleven o'clock reports that those troops were felling trees showed that they were standing on the defensive; and new clouds of dust on the left proved that a large body of Federal troops was arriving on the field. It thus appeared that the enemy's great effort was to be against our left. I expressed this to General Beauregard, and the necessity of reënforcing the brigades engaged, and desired him to send immediate orders to Early and Holmes, of the second line, to hasten to the conflict with their brigades. General Bonham, who was near me, was desired to send up two regiments and a battery. I then set off at a rapid gallop to the scene of action. General Beauregard joined me without a word. Passing on the way Colonel Pendleton with two batteries, I directed him to follow with them as fast as possible.

It now seemed that a battle was to be fought entirely different in place and circumstance from the two plans previously adopted, and abandoned as impracticable. Instead of taking the initiative and operating in front of our line, we were compelled to fight on the defensive more than a mile in rear of that line,

and at right angles to it, on a field selected by General Bee,—with no other plans than those suggested by the changing events of battle.

While we were riding forward General Beauregard suggested to me to assign him to the immediate command of the troops engaged, so that my supervision of the whole field might not be interrupted, to which I assented. So he commanded those troops under me; as elsewhere, lieutenant-generals commanded corps, and major-generals divisions, under me.

When we were near the ground where Bee was re-forming and Jackson deploying his brigade, I saw a regiment in line with ordered arms and facing to the front, but two or three hundred yards in rear of its proper place. On inquiry I learned that it had lost all its field-officers; so, riding on its left flank, I easily marched it to its place. It was the Fourth Alabama, an excellent regiment; and I mention this because the circumstance has been greatly exaggerated.

After the troops were in good battle order I turned to the supervision of the whole field. The enemy's great numerical superiority was discouraging. Yet, from strong faith in Beauregard's capacity and courage, and the high soldierly qualities of Bee and Jackson, I hoped that the fight would be maintained until I could bring adequate reënforcements to their aid. For this Holmes and Early were urged to hasten their march, and Ewell was ordered to follow them with his brigade with all speed. Broken troops were reorganized and led back into the fight with the help of my own and part of General Beauregard's staff. Coker's brigade was held in rear of the right to observe a large body of Federal troops in a position from which Bee's right flank could have been struck in a few minutes.

After these additions had been made to our troops then engaged, we had nine regiments of infantry, five batteries, and three hundred cavalry of the Army of the Shenandoah, and about two regiments and a half of infantry, six companies of cavalry, and six field-pieces of the Army of the Potomac, holding at bay three divisions of the United States army. The Southern soldiers had, however, two great advantages in the contest: greater skill in the use of fire-arms, and the standing on the defensive, by which they escaped such disorder as advancing under fire produced in the ranks of their adversaries, undisciplined like themselves.

A report received about two o'clock from General Beauregard's office that another United States army was approaching from the north-west, and but a few miles from us, caused me to send orders to Bonham, Longstreet, and Jones to hold their brigades south of Bull Run, and ready to move.

When Bonham's two regiments appeared soon after, Cocke's brigade was ordered into action on our right. Fisher's North Carolina regiment coming up, Bonham's two regiments were directed against the Federal right, and Fisher's was afterwards sent in the same direction; for the enemy's strongest efforts seemed to be directed against our left, as if to separate us from Manassas Junction.

About half-past three o'clock, General E. K. Smith arrived with three regiments of Elzey's brigade, coming from Manassas Junction. He was instructed, through a staff officer sent forward to meet him, to form on the left of our line, his left thrown forward, and attack the enemy in flank. At his request I joined him, directed his course, and gave him these instructions. Before the formation was completed, he fell severely wounded, and while falling from his horse directed Colonel Elzey to take command. That officer appreciated the manœuvre and executed it gallantly and well. General Beauregard promptly seized the opportunity it afforded, and threw forward the whole line. The enemy was driven from the long-contested hill, and the tide of battle at length turned. But the first Federal line driven into the valley was there rallied on a second, the two united presenting a formidable aspect. In the mean time, however, Colonel Early had come upon the field with his brigade. He was instructed by me to make a detour to the left and assail the Federal right in flank. He reached the ground in time, accompanied by Stuart's cavalry and Beckham's battery, and made his attack with a skill and courage which routed the Federal right in a moment. General Beauregard, charging in front, made the rout complete. The Federal right fled in confusion toward the Sudley ford, and the center and left marched off rapidly by the turnpike.

Stuart pursued the fugitives on the Sudley road, and Colonel Radford, with two squadrons I had held in reserve near me during the day, was directed to cross Bull Run at Ball's ford, and strike the column on the turnpike in flank. The number of prisoners taken by these parties of cavalry greatly exceeded their own numbers. But they were too weak to make a serious impression on an army, although a defeated one.

At twenty minutes before five, when the retreat of the enemy toward Centreville began, I sent orders to Brigadier-General Bonham by Lieutenant-Colonel Lay, of his staff, who happened to be with me, to march with his own and Longstreet's brigade (which were nearest Bull Run and the Stone Bridge), by the quickest route, to the turnpike, and form them across it to intercept the retreat of the Federal troops.

But he found so little appearance of rout in those troops as to make the execution of his instructions seem impracticable; so the two brigades returned to their camps. When the retreat began, the body of United States troops that had passed the day on the Centreville side of Bull Run made a demonstration on the rear of our right; which was repelled by Holmes's brigade just arrived.

Soon after the firing ceased, General Ewell reported to me, saying that his brigade was about midway from its camp near Union Mills. He had ridden forward to see the part of the field on which he might be required to serve, to prepare himself to act intelligently.

The victory was as complete as one gained in an open country by infantry and artillery can be. Our cavalry pursued as far as they could effectively; but when they encountered the main column, after dispersing or capturing little parties and stragglers, they could make no impression.

General McDowell marched from the Potomac with 35,000 men in five divisions, three of which (three-fifths) were engaged (about 21,000).

On our side the Army of the Shenandoah had on the field 8000 men; that of the Potomac, as reported, 9477 men; total, 17,477.

	<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wound- ed.</i>	<i>Miss- ing.</i>
The Army of the Shenandoah lost	282	1582	1
“ “ “ Potomac “	105	519	12

General Beauregard's first plan of attack was delivered to me by his aide-de-camp, Colonel Chisolm, when I was thirty-four miles from Manassas. It was, that I should leave the railroad at Piedmont Station, thirty-six miles from the enemy at Centreville, and attack him in rear, and when our artillery announced that we had begun the fight, General Beauregard would move up from Bull Run and assail the enemy on that side. I rejected the plan, because such a one would enable an officer of ordinary sense and vigor to defeat our two armies one after the other. For McDowell, by his numerical superiority, could have disposed of my forces in less than two hours, that is to say, before Beauregard could have come up, when he also could have been defeated and the campaign ended.

An opinion seems to prevail with some persons who have written about the battle, that important plans of General Beauregard were executed by him. It is a mistake; the first intention, announced to General Beauregard by me when we met, was to attack the enemy at Centreville as early as possible on the twenty-first. This was anticipated by McDowell's early advance. The second, to attack the Federals in flank near the turnpike with

our main force, suggested by General Beauregard, was prevented by the enemy's occupation of the high ground in front of our right.

As fought, the battle was made by me; Bee's and Jackson's brigades were transferred to the left by me. I decided that the battle was to be there, and directed the measures necessary to maintain it; a most important one being the assignment of General Beauregard to the immediate command of this left which he held. In like manner the senior officer on the right would have commanded there, if the Federal left had attacked.

These facts in relation to the battle are my defense against the accusation indorsed by General Beauregard and published by Mr. Davis.

In an account of the battle published in the November number of *THE CENTURY*, General Beauregard mentions offensive operations he "had designed and ordered against his [adversary's] left flank and rear at Centreville," and censures my friend General R. S. Ewell for their failure. At the time referred to, three of the four Federal divisions were near Bull Run, above the turnpike, and the fourth facing our right, so that troops of ours, going to Centreville then, if not prevented by the Federal division facing them, would have found no enemy. And General Ewell was not, as he reports, "instructed in the plan of attack"; for he says in his official report: ". . . I first received orders to hold myself in readiness to advance at a moment's notice. I next received a copy of an order sent to me by General Jones, in which it was stated that I had been ordered to his support." Three other contradictory orders, he says, followed. As to the comparison with Desaix at Marengo, made by General Beauregard, the circumstances had no resemblance. Desaix was separated from the French army, heard the sounds of battle, knew that he was wanted there, and went there. General Ewell knew that a battle was raging; but knew, too, that all the unengaged brigades were between him and it, and his commander was near enough to give him orders. But he had no reason to suppose that his commander desired him to move to Centreville, where there was then no enemy. There could have been no greater mistake on General Ewell's part than making the movement to Centreville.

A brief passage in my official report of this battle displeased President Davis. In referring to his telegraphic order I gave its meaning very briefly, but accurately — "directing me, if practicable, to go to General Beauregard's assistance, after sending my sick to Culpeper Court House." Mr. Davis objected to the word *after*. Being informed of this by a friend, I cheerfully consented to his expunging the word, be-

cause that would not affect the meaning of the sentence. But the word is still in his harsh indorsement. He also had this passage stricken out: "The delay of sending the sick, nearly 1700 in number, to Culpeper, would have made it impossible to arrive at Manassas in time. They were therefore provided for in Winchester;" and substituted this: "Our sick, nearly 1700 in number, were provided for in Winchester." Being ordered to send the sick to Culpeper, as well as to move to Manassas, it was necessary to account for disobedience, which my words did, and which his substitute for them did not.

Mr. Davis (page 359) expresses indignation that, as he says, "Among the articles abandoned by the enemy on the field of Manassas, were handcuffs, the fit appendage of a policeman, not of a soldier." I saw none, nor did I see any one who had seen them.

Mr. Davis states (page 359) that "On the night of the 22d, I held a second conference with Generals Johnston and Beauregard." I was in no conference like that of which account is given on page 360. And one that he had with me on that day proved conclusively that he had no thought of sending our army against Washington; for in it he offered me the command in West Virginia, promising to increase the forces there adequately from those around us.

He says (page 361):

"What discoveries would have been made, and what results would have ensued from the establishment of our guns upon the south bank of the river to open fire upon the capital, are speculative opinions upon which it would be useless to enter."

Mr. Davis seems to have forgotten what was as well known then as now — that our army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat; that there were strong fortifications, well manned, to cover the approaches to Washington and prevent the establishment of our guns on the south bank of the river. He knew, too, that we had no means of cannonading the capital, nor a disposition to make barbarous war. He says (page 362):

"When the smoke of battle had lifted from the field . . . some . . . censoriously asked why the fruits of the victory had not been gathered by the capture of Washington City. . . . Then some indiscreet friends of the generals commanding in the battle . . . induced the allegation that the President had prevented the generals from making an immediate and vigorous pursuit of the routed enemy."

Mr. Davis has no ground for this assertion; the generals were attacked first and most severely. It was not until the press had exhausted itself upon them, that some of them turned upon him. On November 3 he wrote to me that reports were circulated to the effect

that he "prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the enemy after the battle of Manassas, and had subsequently restrained him from advancing upon Washington City. . . . I call upon you to say whether I obstructed the pursuit of the enemy after the victory at Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance, or other active operation, which it was feasible for the army to undertake."

I replied on the 10th, answering the first question in the negative, and added an explanation which put the responsibility on myself. I replied to the second question, that it had never been feasible for the army to advance farther toward Washington than it had done, and referred to a conference at Fairfax Court House (Oct. 1, 1861) in reference to leading the army into Maryland, in which he informed the three senior officers that he had not the means of giving the army the strength they considered necessary for offensive operations.

Mr. Davis was displeased by my second reply, because in his mind there was but one question in his letter. I maintain that there are two, namely: (1) Did he obstruct the pursuit of the enemy after the victory at Manassas? (2) Had he ever objected to an advance, or other active operation, which it was feasible for the army to undertake?

The second matter is utterly unconnected with the battle of Manassas, and as the question of advance or other active operation had been discussed nowhere by him, to my knowledge, but at the conference at Fairfax Court House, I supposed that he referred to it. He was dissatisfied with my silence in regard to the conferences he avers took place on July 21 and 22, the first knowledge of which I have derived from his book.

Near the foot of page 365 Mr. Davis represents me as reflecting upon him, in expressing in my report the belief that General Cooper's telegram of July 17 did not convey a positive order. As what he says, immediately following, has been reviewed before, it may be passed over now.

This passage appears on page 369: "The words 'if practicable' had reference to letters of General Johnston of the 12th and 15th of July. . ." They had reference to "make the movement, sending the sick and baggage to Culpeper," and to those words only. I alone was to judge of the practicable.

THE WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTREVILLE TO THE PENINSULA.

MR. DAVIS refers (pages 444-5) to the instructions for the reorganization of the army given by him to the three general officers

he met in conference at Fairfax Court House on October 1, 1861. But the correspondence urging the carrying out of the orders was carried on with Generals Beauregard and G. W. Smith (my subordinates) in that same October. He neither conversed nor corresponded with me on the subject then, the letter to me being dated May 10, 1862. The original order was dated October 22, 1861, to be executed "as soon as, in the judgment of the commanding general, it can be safely done under present exigencies." As the enemy was then nearer to our center than that center to either flank of our army, and another advance upon us by the Federal army was not improbable on any day, it seemed to me unsafe to make the reorganization then. From May 10 to 26, when the President renewed the subject, we were in the immediate presence of the enemy, when reorganization would have been infinitely dangerous, as was duly represented by me. But, alluding to this conference at Fairfax Court House, he says (page 449): "When, at that time and place, I met General Johnston for conference, he called in the two generals next in rank to himself, Beauregard and G. W. Smith." These officers were with Mr. Davis in the quarters of General Beauregard, whose guest he was, when I was summoned to him. I had not power to bring any officer into the conference. If such authority had belonged to my office, the personal relations lately established between us by the President would not have permitted me to use it.

He says (page 448): "I will now propose to notice the allegation that I was responsible for the inaction of the army in the latter part of 1861 and early part of 1862."

I think Mr. Davis is here fighting a shadow. I have never seen or heard of the "allegation" referred to; I believe that that conference attracted no public attention and brought criticism upon no one. I have seen no notice of it in print, except the merely historical one in a publication made by me in 1874,* without criticism or comment. Mr. Davis expresses surprise at the weakness of the army. He has forgotten that in Richmond he was well informed of the strength of the army by periodical reports, which showed him the prevalence of epidemics which, in August and part of September, kept almost thirty per cent. of our number sick. He must have forgotten, too, his anxiety on this subject, which induced him to send a very able physician, Dr. Cartwright, to find some remedy or preventive.

He asserts also that "the generals" had made previous suggestions of a "purpose to advance into Maryland." There had been no

* See "Johnston's Narrative," pages 78, 79.

such purpose. On the contrary, in my letter to the Secretary of War, suggesting the conference, I wrote: "Thus far the numbers and condition of this army have at no time justified our assuming the offensive. . . . The difficulty of obtaining the means of establishing a battery near Evansport . . . has given me the impression that you cannot at present put this army in condition to assume the offensive. If I am mistaken in this, and you can furnish those means, I think it important that either his Excellency the President, yourself, or some one representing you, should here upon the ground confer with me on this all-important question." In a letter dated September 29, the Secretary wrote that the President would reach my camp in a day or two for conference. He came for that object September 30, and the next evening, *by his appointment*, he was waited on by Generals Beauregard, Smith, and myself. In discussing the question of giving our army strength enough to assume the offensive in Maryland, it was proposed to bring to it from the South troops enough to raise it to the required strength. The President asked what was that strength. General Smith thought 50,000 men, General Beauregard 60,000, and I 60,000, all of us specifying soldiers like those around us. The President replied that such reinforcements could not be furnished; he could give only as many recruits as we could arm. This decided the question. Mr. Davis then proposed an expedition against Hooker's division, consisting, we believed, of 10,000 men. It was posted on the Maryland shore of the Potomac opposite Dumfries (see map, page 113.—ED.) But I objected that we had no means of ferrying an equal number of men across the river in a day, even if undisturbed by ships of war, which controlled the river; so that, even if we should succeed in landing, those vessels of war would inevitably destroy or capture our party returning. This terminated the conference. Mr. Davis says, in regard to the reinforcements asked for (page 449): "I had no power to make such an addition to that army without a total disregard of the safety of other threatened positions." We had no threatened positions; and we could always discover promptly the fitting out of naval expeditions against us. And he adds (page 452), with reference to my request for a conference in regard to reinforcements:

"Very little experience, or a fair amount of modesty without experience, would serve to prevent one from announcing his conclusion that troops could be withdrawn from a place or places without knowing how many were there, and what was the necessity for their presence."

The refutation of this is in General G. W. Smith's memorandum of the discussion:

"General Johnston said that he did not feel at liberty to express an opinion of the practicability of reducing the strength of our forces at points not within the limits of his command." On the same page (452) Mr. Davis says:

". . . and particularly indicated the lower part of Maryland, where a small force was said to be ravaging the country."

He suggested nothing so impossible. Troops of ours could not have been ferried across the broad Potomac then. We had no steamer on that river, nor could we have used one.

Mr. Davis says (page 452):

". . . Previously, General Johnston's attention had been called to possibilities in the valley of the Shenandoah, and that these, and other like things, were not done, was surely due to other causes than the policy of the Administration . . . [Then in a letter to me, dated Aug. 1, 1861, which follows the above.] . . . The movement of Banks will require your attention. It may be a *ruse*, but if a real movement, when your army has the requisite strength and mobility, you will probably find an opportunity, by a rapid movement through the passes, to strike him in rear or flank."

It is matter of public notoriety that no incursion into the "Valley," worth the notice of a Confederate company, was made until March, 1862. That the Confederate President should be ignorant of this is inconceivable.

Mr. Davis says (page 462):

". . . I received from General Johnston notice that his position [at Centreville] was considered unsafe. Many of his letters to me have been lost, and I have thus far not been able to find the one giving the notice referred to, but the reply which is annexed clearly indicates the substance of the letter which was answered: 'General J. E. Johnston: . . . Your opinion that your position may be turned whenever the enemy chooses to advance,' etc."

The sentence omitted by him after my name in his letter from which he quotes as above contains the dates of three letters of mine, in neither of which is there allusion to the safety, or reverse, of the position. They are dated, 22d, 23d, and 25th of February, and contain complaints on my part of the dreadful condition of the country, and vast accumulation by the Government of superfluous stores at Manassas. There is another omission in the President's letter quoted, and the omission is this:

". . . With your present force, you cannot secure your communications from the enemy, and may at any time, when he can pass to your rear, be compelled to retreat at the sacrifice of your siege train and army stores. . . . Threatened as we are by a large force on the south-east, you must see the hazard of your position, by its liability to isolation and attack in rear."

By a singular freak of the President's memory, it transferred the substance of these passages from his letter to my three. Referring again to the conference at Fairfax Court House, Mr. Davis says (page 464):

"Soon thereafter, the army withdrew to Centreville, a better position for defense, but not for attack, and thereby suggestive of the abandonment of an intention to advance."

The President forgets that in that conference the intention to advance was abandoned by him first. He says on the same page:

"On the 10th of March I telegraphed to General Johnston: 'Further assurance given to me this day that you shall be promptly and adequately reënforced, so as to enable you to maintain your position, and resume first policy, when the roads will permit.' The first policy was to carry the war beyond our own border."

The roads then permitted the marching of armies, so we had just left Manassas.

On the 20th of February, after a discussion in Richmond, his Cabinet being present, the President directed me to prepare to fall back from Manassas, and do so as soon as the condition of the country should make the marching of troops practicable. I returned to Manassas on February 21, and on the 22d ordered the proper officers to remove the public property, which was begun on the 23d, the superintendent of the railroad devoting himself to the work under the direction of its president, the Hon. John S. Barbour. The Government had collected three million and a quarter pounds of provisions there, I insisting on a supply of but a million and a half. It also had two million pounds in a meat-curing establishment near at hand, and herds of live stock besides. On the 9th of March, when the ground had become firm enough for military operations, I ordered the army to march that night, thinking then, as I do now, that the space of fifteen days was time enough in which to subordinate an army to the Commissary Department. About one million pounds of this provision were abandoned, besides half as much more spoiled for want of shelter. This loss is represented (page 468) as so great as to embarrass us to the end of the war, although it was only a six days' supply for the troops then in Virginia. Ten times as much was in railroad stations of North Carolina at the end of the war.

Mr. Davis says (page 467):

"It was regretted that earlier and more effective means were not employed for the mobilization of the army, . . . or at least that the withdrawal was not so deliberate as to secure the removal of our ordnance, subsistence, and quartermaster's stores."

The quartermaster's and ordnance stores were brought off; and as to subsistence, the Government, which collected immediately on the frontier five times the quantity of provisions wanted, is responsible for the losses. The President suggested the time of the withdrawal himself, in the interview in his office that has been mentioned. The means taken, was the only one available,—the Virginia Midland Railroad.

Mr. Davis says (page 465):

"To further inquiry by General Johnston as to where he should take position, I replied that I would go to his headquarters in the field, and found him on the south bank of the river to which he had retired, in a position possessing great natural advantages."

There was no correspondence in relation to selecting a defensive position. I was not seeking one; but, instead, convenient camping-grounds, from which my troops could certainly unite with other Confederate forces to meet McClellan's invasion. I had found and was occupying such grounds, one division being north of Orange Court House, another a mile or two south of it, and two others some six miles east of that place; a division on the south bank of the Rappahannock, and the cavalry beyond the river, and about 13,000 troops in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. Mr. Davis's narrative that follows is disposed of by the proof that, after the army left Manassas, the President did not visit it until about the 14th of May. But such a visit, if made, could not have brought him to the conclusion that the weakness of Fredericksburg as a military position made it unnecessary to find a strong one for the army. That he did not make such a visit is proved by Major J. B. Washington, aide-de-camp, now president of the Baltimore and Philadelphia Railroad, who wrote me, under date of January 17, 1885: "In answer to your question, I have to say that the President did not visit the Army of Northern Virginia between the 10th of March, 1862, when it left Manassas, and about May 14 following, when it was between Baltimore Cross Roads and the Long Bridge over the Chickahominy. That army was at no time united after leaving Manassas, before going to Yorktown, neither on the elevated bank of a river nor elsewhere."

To the question, "After the army left Manassas in March, 1862, was it visited by the President at any time before being ordered to Yorktown?" Dr. A. M. Fauntleroy, of Staunton (then surgeon on my staff), answered: "No; I feel quite sure that the army was not visited by the President during the period specified." To the question, "Was the army, after leaving Manassas, ever united before the retreat from Yorktown?" he answered: "Emphatically no. According to a pretty clear recollection of the location and movements of the several divisions of the army, I can recall the fact that Generals Early and Ewell halted on the south bank of the Rappahannock about the 11th of March, and G. W. Smith and Longstreet near Culpeper; and, after crossing the Rapidan, G. W. Smith and Longstreet encamped near Orange Court House, and Early and Hill not more than

three miles from the Rapidan bridge, in the direction of Fredericksburg, Ewell remaining on the Rappahannock River."

Colonel E. J. Harvie writes (January 28, 1885): "In reply to your question, 'Did the President visit the army at any time between March 9, 1862, when it left Manassas, and about May 14, when it was between Baltimore Cross Roads and Long Bridge?' I answer: Unless my memory fails me more than it has ever done before, I am positive he did not. I was with you all the time as your staff officer, and no visit of this character could have been made to the army without my knowing it."

Mr. Davis (Vol. II., p. 81) credits me with expecting an attack, which he shows General McClellan never had in his mind:

"In a previous chapter, the retreat of the army from Centreville has been described, and reference has been made to the anticipation of the commanding general, J. E. Johnston, that the enemy would advance to attack that position."

This refers, I suppose, to a previous assertion (Vol. I., p. 462), my comments upon which prove that this "anticipation" was expressed in the President's letter to me, dated February 28. He says (Vol. II., p. 83):

"The withdrawal of our forces across the Rappahannock was fatal to the [Federal] programme of landing on that river and marching to Richmond before our forces could be in position to resist an attack on the capital."

This withdrawal was expressly to enable the army to unite with other Confederate troops to oppose the expected invasion. I supposed that General McClellan would march down the Potomac on the Maryland side, cross it near the mouth of Acquia Creek, and take the Fredericksburg route to Richmond. The position of Hooker's division, about midway between Washington and this crossing-place, might well have suggested that he had this intention.

Mr. Davis says (Vol. II., p. 84): "Early in April General McClellan had landed about 100,000 at or near Fortress Monroe." According to John Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, 121,000 Federal troops landed before the 5th of April.

And (page 84): "At this time General Magruder occupied the lower Peninsula with his force of seven or eight thousand men." General Magruder reported that he had eleven thousand men.

Mr. Davis says (page 85): "After the first advance of the enemy, General Magruder was reinforced by some troops from the south side of James River, and General Wilcox's brigade, which had been previously detached from the army under General Johnston." These reinforcements, together, made about 5000 men.

He says, on the same page:

"On the 9th of April General Magruder's army, thus reinforced, amounted to about 12,000. On that day General Early joined with his division from the Army of Northern Virginia. This division had about 8000 officers and men for duty. General Magruder's force was thus increased to about 20,000."

The same order detached Early's, D. R. Jones's, and D. H. Hill's divisions from the Army of Northern Virginia, and they were transported as fast as the railroad trains could carry them. The two latter divisions had together about 10,000 men, so that Magruder's army was raised to about 33,000 men, instead of 20,000, as Mr. Davis said.

THE WITHDRAWAL FROM YORKTOWN.

MR. DAVIS says (Vol. II., p. 86):

"As soon as it was definitely ascertained that General McClellan, with his main army, was on the Peninsula, General J. E. Johnston* was assigned to the command of the department of the Peninsula and Norfolk, and directed to proceed thither to examine the condition of affairs there. After spending a day on General Magruder's defensive line, he returned to Richmond and recommended the abandonment of the Peninsula, and that we should take a defensive position nearer to Richmond."

The President has forgotten my recommendation, or misunderstood it at the time. I represented to him that General McClellan's design was, almost certainly, to demolish our batteries with his greatly superior artillery, and turn us by the river, either landing in our rear or moving directly to Richmond; so that our attempting to hold Yorktown could only delay the enemy two or three weeks. Instead of that, I proposed that all our available forces should be united near Richmond, Magruder's troops to be among the last to arrive; the great army thus formed about Richmond not to be in a defensive position, as Mr. Davis supposes, but to fall with its whole force upon McClellan when the Federal army was expecting to besiege only the troops it had followed from Yorktown. If the Federal army should be defeated a hundred miles away from its place of refuge, Fort Monroe, it could not escape destruction. This was undoubtedly our best hope.

In the conference that followed, the President took no part. But the Secretary of War, once a naval officer, opposed the abandonment of the valuable property in the Norfolk Navy Yard; and General Lee opposed the plan proposed, because it would expose Charleston and Savannah to capture. I maintained that if those places should be captured, the defeat of the principal Federal army would enable us to recover them; and that, unless that army should be defeated, we should lose those sea-ports in spite of their garrisons.

* That assignment was made after "the conference."

Mr. Davis says (Vol. II., p. 87):

"After hearing fully the views of the several officers named, I decided to resist the enemy on the Peninsula. . . . Though General Johnston did not agree with this decision, he did not ask to be relieved. . . ."

Not being in command, I could not be relieved. My assignment was included in the order to oppose McClellan at Yorktown; that order added to my then command the departments of Norfolk and the Peninsula. It is not easy to reconcile this increase of my command by the President, with his very numerous disparaging notices of me.

General Keyes, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, confirmed my opinion in saying that "Gloucester must have fallen upon our getting possession of Yorktown, and the York River would then have been open."

Mr. Davis expresses the opinion (Vol. II., p. 90) that "General McClellan might certainly have sent a detachment from his army, which, after crossing York River, could have turned the position at Gloucester Point." It was needless; the driving us from Yorktown would have compelled us to abandon Gloucester Point. Then (Vol. II., p. 91) he says:

"Whether General McClellan . . . would have made an early assault . . . or have waited to batter our earth-works in breach . . . is questionable."

We did not apprehend "battering in breach," but believed that the heavy sea-coast rifles to be mounted in the batteries, about completed, would demolish our water batteries, drive us from the intrenchments at Yorktown, and enable the enemy to turn us by the river. Mr. Davis quotes from one of his dispatches to me (Vol. II., p. 92):

"Your announcement to-day [May 1] that you would withdraw to-morrow night takes us by surprise, and must involve enormous losses, including unfinished gun-boats. Will the safety of your army allow more time?"

My own announcement was made April 27, not May 1, and reached Richmond in ten hours; so the President had abundant time to prevent the withdrawal. The appearance of the enemy's works indicated that fire from them might open upon us the next morning. The withdrawal just then was to avoid waste of life.

He says (Vol. II., p. 94):

"The loss of public property, as was anticipated, was great, the steamboats expected for its transportation not having arrived before the evacuation was made. From a narrative by General Early I make the following extract: 'A very valuable part of the property lost consisted of a very large number of picks and spades. . . . All of our heavy guns, including some recently arrived and not mounted, together with a good deal of ammunition piled upon the wharfs, had to be left behind.'"

The steamboats he mentions were controlled in Richmond. As to the loss of very

valuable picks and spades, Colonel Douglas, chief engineer there, wrote to me May 12th, 1883: "I was at Yorktown the evening before the evacuation commenced. I did not see any quantity of picks and shovels there, and cannot understand how they could have accumulated there when they were needed so much from Redoubt Number Five to Lee's Mills—that is, on the extreme right of our line." General D. H. Hill, who commanded in and near Yorktown, said, in his official report: "We lost very little by the retreat, save some medical stores which Surgeon Coffin deserted in his flight, May 1. The heavy guns were all of the old navy pattern." We had very little ammunition on hand at the time. The heavy guns could have been saved only by holding the place, which was impossible.

Mr. Davis says (Vol. II., p. 94) that General Magruder's "absence at this moment was the more to be regretted, as it appears that the positions of the redoubts he constructed (before Williamsburg) were not all known to the commanding general." The positions of the redoubts were "all known." But to a body of troops serving merely as a rear-guard, it was necessary to occupy only those nearest the road. A rear-guard distributed in all the redoubts intended for an army could have held none of them. The event showed that the proper redoubts were occupied. It is singular that Mr. Davis's only notice of the conflict at Williamsburg, in which our troops behaved admirably, relates to a detached affair, unimportant, because it had, and could have, no influence upon the real event. Mr. Davis says of General Early's account of his attack upon Hancock at Williamsburg (Vol. II., p. 96):

"He [Early] confidently expresses the opinion that had his attack been supported promptly and vigorously, the enemy's force there engaged must have been captured."

General Early sent an officer to report that there was a battery in front of him which he could take, and asked authority to do so. The message was delivered to General Longstreet, who referred the messenger to me, we being together. I authorized the attempt, but desired the general to look carefully first. Under the circumstances he could not have expected support, for he moved out of reach of it.

Mr. Davis speaks (Vol. II., p. 97) of the employment of sub-terra shells to check a marching column, and quotes from General Rains as follows:

"Fortunately we found in a mud hole a broken ammunition wagon containing five loaded shells. Four of these, armed with a sensitive fuse-primer, were planted in our rear, near some trees cut down as obstructions to the road. A body of the enemy's cavalry came upon these sub-terra shells, and they exploded with terrific effect."

This event was not mentioned in General D. H. Hill's report, although General Rains belonged to his division, nor was it mentioned by our cavalry which followed Hill's division. Such an occurrence would have been known to the whole army, but it was not; so it must have been a dream of the writer.

Mr. Davis says (Vol. II., p. 98): "The next morning after the battle of the 5th, at Williamsburg, Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions being those then engaged," etc. But one regiment of Hill's division was engaged.

In the Federal reports of this action, it is treated as a battle in which the whole Confederate army was engaged. It was an affair with our rear-guard, the object of which was to secure our baggage trains. For that, it was necessary to detain the Federal army a day, which was accomplished by the rear-guard. In those Federal reports a victory is claimed. The proofs against that are: (1) That what deserves to be called fighting ceased at least two hours before dark, yet the Confederates held the ground until the next morning, having slept on the field, and then resumed their march; (2) that they fought only to protect their trains, and accomplished the object; (3) that although they marched but twelve miles the day after the affair, they saw no indications of pursuit, unless the seeing a scouting party once can be so called; (4) that they inflicted a loss much greater than that they suffered; (5) and that in the ten days following the fight, they marched but thirty-seven miles. They left four hundred wounded in Williamsburg, because they had no means of transporting them. But they captured five cannon and destroyed the carriages of five more, and took four hundred prisoners and several colors.

Mr. Davis says (Vol. II., p. 98):

"In the mean time, Franklin's division had gone up the York River [McClellan wrote that the divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, and Richardson were sent from Yorktown by water to the right bank of the Pamunkey near West Point.—J. E. J.], and landed a short distance below West Point, on the south side of York River, and moved into a thick wood in the direction of the New Kent road, thus threatening the flank of our line of march. Two brigades of General G. W. Smith's division, Hampton's and Hood's, were detached under the command of General Whiting to dislodge the enemy, which they did after a short conflict, driving him to the protection of his gun-boats in York River."

The Federal force engaged was very much less than a division.

Mr. Davis says, lower down: "The loss of the enemy [in the battle of Williamsburg] greatly exceeded our own, which was 1200." He means exclusive of General Early's loss. According to General McClellan's report his loss was 2228. General Hooker stated under oath that his was 1700. But Kearny's

Couch's, and two-thirds of Smith's division, and Peck's brigade were engaged also. A loss of 528 is very small among so many.

Mr. Davis says (Vol. II., p. 101):

"Soon after General Johnston took position on the north of the Chickahominy, accompanied by General Lee, I rode out to his headquarters. . . . A long conversation followed, which was so inconclusive that it lasted until late in the night, so late that we remained until the next morning. As we rode back to Richmond, . . . General Lee confessed himself, as I was, unable to draw from it any more definite purpose than that the policy was to . . . improve his [Johnston's] position as far as practicable, and wait for the enemy to leave his gun-boats, so that an opportunity might be offered to meet him on land."

I explained that I had fallen back that far to clear my left flank of the navigable water, and so avoid having it turned; that as we were too weak to assume the offensive, and as the position I then held was an excellent one, I intended to await the Federal attack there. These explanations covered the whole ground, so that the President had no cause to complain, especially as he suggested nothing better. And he was satisfied then; for, three days later, he wrote to me by Colonel G. W. C. Lee: ". . . If the enemy proceed as heretofore indicated, your position and policy, as you stated it in our last interview, seems to me to require no modification." This is the interview called "inconclusive."

Mr. Davis says (Vol. II., p. 103):

"After the repulse of the enemy's gunboats at Drewry's Bluff, I wrote to General Johnston a letter to be handed to him by my aide, Colonel G. W. C. Lee.


". . . . I soon thereafter rode out to visit General Johnston at his headquarters, and was surprised in the suburbs of Richmond . . . to meet a portion of the light artillery, and to learn that the whole army had crossed the Chickahominy."

The army crossed the Chickahominy immediately after the affair of Drewry's Bluff. So that if Colonel Lee delivered a letter to me then, he of course reported to the President that I had crossed the river. And as the army's nearest approach to Richmond was on the 17th, his meeting with the light artillery must have occurred that day. So one cannot understand his surprise.

He says on the same page:

"General Johnston's explanation of this (to me) unexpected movement was, that he thought the water of the Chickahominy unhealthy. . . . He also adverted to the advantage of having the river in front rather than in the rear of him."

The army crossed the Chickahominy because the possession of James River by the enemy suggested the probability of a change of base to that river. And it was necessary that we should be so placed as to be able to meet the United States army approaching either from York River or along the James.



MAP OF THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGNS.

Water was not considered, for we did not use that of the Chickahominy; nor the position of the little stream behind us, for we had four bridges over it. The position of Seven Pines was chosen for the center, the right somewhat thrown back. But the scarcity of water induced me to draw nearer to Richmond, which was done on the 17th.

Mr. Davis makes statements (Vol. II., p. 106) regarding the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia on the 21st and 31st of May; but as he treats the subject more minutely farther on, we will examine what he says (p. 153):

"In the Archives Office of the War Department in Washington, there are on file some of the field and monthly returns of the Army of Northern Virginia. . . . The following statements have been taken from those papers by Major Walter H. Taylor, of the staff of General Lee. . . .

"A statement of the strength of the troops under General Johnston shows that on May 21st, 1862, he had present for duty: Smith's division 10,592; Longstreet's division, 13,816; Magruder's division, 15,680, [240 too little]; D. H. Hill's division, 11,151; cavalry brigade, 1289; reserve artillery, 1160; total 53,688."

The above is from Major Taylor's memorandum given the President, made from estimates of brigades, not from returns. Without



MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN B. MAGRUDER.

being accurate, it is not far from the truth. In the memorandum Magruder is given 15,920 men. Mr. Davis continues:

"Major Taylor in his work ('Four Years with General Lee') states: 'In addition to the troops above enumerated, there were two brigades subject to his orders, then stationed in the vicinity of Hanover Junction, one under the command of General J. R. Anderson, and the other under the command of General Branch. They were subsequently incorporated into the division of General A. P. Hill.' [Mr. Davis continues:] . . . He estimates the strength of the two at 4000 effective.

" . . . Previous to the battle of Seven Pines, General Johnston was reinforced by General Huger's division of three brigades. The total strength of these three, according to the 'Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia,' was 5008 effectives. Taylor says: 'If the strength of these five be added to the return of May 21, we shall have 62,696 as the effective strength of the army under General Johnston on May 31, 1862.'"

But according to General Huger's report to me, there were 7000 men (instead of 5008) in his three brigades, which does not exceed the ordinary strength of brigades then (that is to say, three average brigades would have had not less than 7000 men); and what Mr. Davis calls two brigades of "4000 effective" were, in fact, Anderson's division sent to observe McDowell's corps at Fredericksburg, and so large that General Lee called it the army of the North, and estimated it as 10,000 men;* and the second, Branch's brigade, greatly strengthened to protect the railroad at Gordonsville, and estimated by General Lee as

* "I advised you, April 23d, of certain troops ordered to report to General Field, viz.: two regiments from Richmond, two light batteries, a brigade from South Carolina, and one from North Carolina (Anderson's), in all 8000, in addition to those [2500.—J. E. J.] previously there."—General Lee's letter, May 8—"War Records," series I., vol. XI., part III., pages 500-1.

† "Two brigades, one from North Carolina (Branch's) and one from Norfolk, have been ordered to Gordonsville to reinforce that line."—General Lee's letter, as above.

5000 men.† When these troops were united on the Chickahominy, General Anderson's estimate of their numbers was, of the first, 9000, and of the other, 4000; 20,000 then, and not 9008, is the number to be added to the return of May 21, 1862, to show the effective strength of that army May 31, viz.: 73,928, including the correction of the number in Magruder's division.

Referring to our withdrawal from the north side of the Chickahominy to the vicinity of Richmond, Mr. Davis says (Vol. II., p. 120):

"Remembering a remark of General Johnston's that the Spaniards were the only people who now undertook to hold fortified towns, I had written to him that he knew the defense of Richmond must be made at a distance from it."

Mr. Davis is mistaken. No such letter was sent to me then. We communicated with each other only orally, excepting a note he sent me to point out that I had been absent from a skirmish the day before. He knew that the fact that the enemy was then able to approach Richmond either from York River or by the James compelled me to prepare for either event, by placing the army near the city. A short time before, he wrote: "To you it is needless to say that the defense must be made outside of the city." His next sentence, approving the course I was pursuing, has been quoted in connection with what the President said of an "inconclusive" conversation with me.

Mr. Davis continues, a little farther down:

"It had not occurred to me that he [Johnston] meditated a retreat which would uncover the capital, nor was it ever suspected until, in reading General Hood's book, published in 1880, the evidence was found that General Johnston when retreating from Yorktown, told his volunteer aide, Mr. McFarland, that 'he expected or intended to give up Richmond.'"

This story of Mr. McFarland is incredible. He, a very rich, fat old man, could not have been an aide-de-camp. As I did not know him at all until four years later, and then barely, he could not have been my aide-de-camp. And lastly, I had no volunteer aide. Besides, the Confederate President had abundant evidence that I had no such expectation, in the fact that, so far from giving up Richmond, I stood between it and the Federal army for three weeks, until I was disabled by desperate wounds received in its defense. Under such circumstances his accusation is, to say the least, very discreditable. E. J. Harvie, late Colonel and Assistant Inspector-General C. S. A., now in the War Records Office, Washington, in answer to my question, "Had I ever a volunteer

aide-de-camp named McFarland, or any volunteer aide-de-camp after leaving Manassas, while serving in Virginia?" wrote me, under date of January 28, 1885, as follows: "To my knowledge, you certainly had not. My position as your staff officer justifies me in saying that Mr. McFarland was not with you in any capacity."

Surgeon A. M. Fauntleroy, in answer to my question, "Had I a volunteer aide-de-camp in May, 1862, especially when the army was moving from Yorktown towards Richmond? Or did you ever in that time see an old gentleman of Richmond, named McFarland, about my headquarters?" writes: "I never did. I cannot well see how such a person could have escaped my observation, if he was there at any time."

And J. B. Washington, president of the Baltimore and Philadelphia Railway, writes me as follows:

"You had not on your staff after leaving Manassas a volunteer aide-de-camp, especially during May, 1862, when the army was between Yorktown and Richmond. I was personally acquainted with Mr. McFarland of Richmond, but never saw him at our headquarters, nor heard of his ever having been there.

"Having served as aide-de-camp on your staff from May, 1861, to February, 1864, I was in a position to know of the circumstances of which I have written."

Mr. Davis says (Vol. II., p. 120):

"Seeing no preparation to keep the enemy at a distance, . . . I sent for General Lee . . . and told him how I was dissatisfied with the condition of affairs. He asked me what I thought it was proper to do. . . . I answered that McClellan should be attacked on the other side of the Chickahominy, before he matured his preparations for a siege of Richmond. To this he promptly assented. . . . He then said: 'General Johnston should, of course, advise you of what he proposes to do. Let me go and see him.' . . . When General Lee came back, he told me that General Johnston proposed, on the next Thursday, to move against the enemy, as follows: General A. P. Hill was to move down on the right flank and rear of the enemy. General G. W. Smith, as soon as Hill's guns opened, was to cross the Chickahominy at the Meadow Bridge, attack the enemy in flank, and, by the conjunction of the two, it was expected to double him up. Then Longstreet was to cross on the Mechanicsville bridge and attack him in front. From this plan the best results were hoped by both of us."

It is certain that General Lee could have had no such hopes from this plan, nor have been a party to it; for it would not only have sent our army where there was no enemy, but left open the way to Richmond. For the Meadow Bridge is two and a half miles from Mechanicsville, and that place about six miles above the Federal right. So, after two-thirds of our troops had crossed the Chickahominy, the Federal army could have marched straight to Richmond, opposed by not more than one-fifth of its number in Magruder's and D. H. Hill's divisions. This plan is probably the wildest on record.


As to what is described (Vol. II., p. 121),

G. W. Smith's division was never in the place indicated, and General Longstreet's was never on the Mechanicsville road near the bridge, before General Lee crossed the Chickahominy to fight at Gaines's Mills.

A glance at the map will show how singularly incorrect is Mr. Davis's description (Vol. II., pp. 122-3) of the vicinity of Seven Pines and of the disposition of the Federal troops.

THE BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES.

On the 23d of May Keyes's Federal corps crossed to the south side of the Chickahominy, and a detachment attacked Hatton's Confederate brigade, which was in observation near Savage's Station. The detachment was driven back, and, Hatton's object having been accomplished (learning that the enemy had



MAJOR-GENERAL BENJAMIN HUGER.
(AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

crossed the stream), he was recalled. I was advised to hold that position with the army, but preferred to let the enemy advance, which would increase the interval between his left and the right, which was beyond the Chickahominy. McDowell's corps of 40,000 men was then at Fredericksburg, observed by a division under Brigadier-General J. R. Anderson; and a large Confederate brigade, under Brigadier-General Branch, was at Gordonsville.

On the 24th our cavalry was driven across the Chickahominy, principally at Mechanicsville. This extension of the right wing of the enemy to the west made me apprehend that the two detachments (Anderson and Branch) above mentioned might be cut off.



MAJOR-GENERAL GUSTAVUS W. SMITH.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY GURNEY & SON.)


They were therefore ordered to fall back to the Chickahominy. Near Hanover Court House the brigade was attacked by Porter's corps and driven off, escaping with a loss of sixty-six killed and one hundred and seventy-seven wounded, as General Branch reported. A division was formed of Anderson's and Branch's troops, to the command of which Major-General A. P. Hill was assigned.

That evening General Anderson sent word that his scouts left near Fredericksburg reported that McDowell's troops were marching southward. As the object of this march was evidently the junction of this corps with the main army, I determined to attack McClellan before McDowell could join him; and the major-generals were desired to hold their troops ready to move. But at night, when those officers were with me to receive instructions for the expected battle, General J. E. B. Stuart, who also had a detachment of cavalry observing McDowell's corps, reported that it had returned to Fredericksburg. As my object was to bring on the inevitable battle before McClellan should receive an addition of 40,000 men to his forces, this intelligence made me return to my first design—that of attacking McClellan's left wing on the Williamsburg road as soon as, by advancing, it had sufficiently increased its distance from his right, north of the Chickahominy.

The morning of the 30th, armed reconnaissances were made under General D. H. Hill's direction—on the Charles City road by Brigadier-General Rodes, and on the Williamsburg road by Brigadier-General Garland. The lat-

ter found Federal outposts five miles from Richmond—or two miles west of Seven Pines—in such strength as indicated that a corps was near. On receiving this information from General Hill, I informed him that he would lead an attack on the enemy next morning. Orders were given for the concentration of twenty-two of our twenty-eight brigades against McClellan's left wing, about two-fifths of his army. Our six other brigades were guarding the river from New Bridge to Meadow Bridge, on our extreme left. Longstreet and Huger were directed to conduct their divisions to D. H. Hill's position on the Williamsburg road, and G. W. Smith to march with his to the junction of the Nine-mile road with the New Bridge road, where Magruder was with four brigades.

Longstreet, as ranking officer of the troops on the Williamsburg road, was instructed verbally to form D. H. Hill's division as first line, and his own as second, across the road at right angles, and to advance in that order to attack the enemy; while Huger's division should march by the right flank along the Charles City road, to fall upon the enemy's flank when our troops were engaged with him in front. Federal earthworks and abattis that might be found were to be turned. G. W. Smith was to protect the troops under Longstreet from attack by those of the Federal right wing across the Chickahominy; and, if such transfer should not be threatened, he was to fall upon the enemy on the Williamsburg road. Those troops were formed in four lines, each being a division. Casey's was a mile west of Seven Pines, with a line of




MAJOR-GENERAL DANIEL H. HILL.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY COOK.)

skirmishers a half mile in advance; Couch's was at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks—the two forming Keyes's corps. Kearny's division was near Savage's Station, and Hooker's two miles west of Bottom's Bridge—the two forming Heintzelman's corps.

Longstreet's command of the right was to end when the troops approached Seven Pines, and I should be present to direct the movements, after which each major-general would command his own division. The rain began to fall violently in the afternoon of the 30th, and continued all night. In the morning the little streams near our camps were so much swollen as to make it probable that the Chickahominy was overflowing its banks and cutting the communication between the wings of the Federal army. Being confident that Longstreet and D. H. Hill, with their forces united, would be successful in the earlier part of the action against adversaries formed in several lines, with wide intervals between them, I left the immediate control on the Williamsburg road to them, under general instructions, and placed myself on the left, where I could soonest learn of the approach of Federal reinforcements from their right. For this scouts were sent forward to discover all movements that might be made by the enemy.

The condition of the ground and little streams delayed the troops in marching; yet those of Smith, Longstreet, and Hill were in position quite early enough. But the soldiers from Norfolk, who had seen garrison service only, were unnecessarily stopped in their march by a swollen rivulet. This unexpected delay led to interchange of messages for several hours between General Longstreet and myself, I urging Longstreet to begin the fight, he replying. But, near two o'clock, that officer was requested to go forward to the attack; the hands of my watch marked three o'clock at the report of the first field-piece. The Federal advanced line—a long line of skirmishers, supported by several regiments—was encountered at three o'clock. The greatly superior numbers of the Confederates soon drove them back to the main position of Casey's division. It occupied a line of rifle-pits, strengthened by a redoubt and abattis. Here the resistance was very obstinate; for the Federals, commanded by an officer of skill and tried courage, fought as soldiers generally do under good leaders; and time and vigorous efforts of superior numbers were required to drive them from their ground. But the resolution of Garland's and G. B. Anderson's brigades, that pressed forward on our left through an open field, under a destructive fire, the admirable service of Carter's and Bondurant's batteries, and a skillfully

combined attack upon the Federal left, under General Hill's direction, by Rodes's brigade in front and that of Rains in flank, were at last successful, and the enemy abandoned their intrenchments. Just then reinforcements from Couch's division came up, and an effort was made to recover the position. But it was to no purpose; for R. H. Anderson's brigade




MAJOR-GENERAL DARIUS N. COUCH.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

reinforced Hill's troops, and the Federals were driven back to Seven Pines.

Keyes's Corps (Casey's and Couch's divisions) was united at Seven Pines and reinforced by Kearny's division, coming from Savage's Station. But the three divisions were so vigorously attacked by Hill that they were broken and driven from their intrenchments, the greater part along the Williamsburg road to the intrenched line at Savage's Station. Two brigades of their left, however, fled to White Oak Swamp.

General Hill pursued the enemy a mile; then, night being near, he re-formed his troops, facing towards the Federals. Longstreet's and Huger's divisions, coming up, were formed between Hill's line and Fair Oaks.

For some cause the disposition on the Charles City road was modified. Two of General Huger's brigades were ordered to advance along that road, with three of Longstreet's under Brigadier-General Wilcox. After following that road some miles, General Wilcox received orders to conduct his troops to the Williamsburg road. On entering it, he was ordered to the front, and joined Hill's troops near and approaching Seven Pines with his own brigade, and aided in the defeat of the three divisions struggling to hold the intrenchments there.




MAJOR-GENERAL EDWIN V. SUMNER.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

When the action just described began, the musketry was not heard at my position on

the Nine-mile road, from the unfavorable condition of the air; and I supposed for some time that we were hearing only an artillery duel. But a staff officer was sent to ascertain the facts. He returned at four o'clock with intelligence that our infantry as well as artillery had been engaged an hour, and all were pressing on vigorously. As no approach of troops from beyond the Chickahominy had been discovered, I hoped that the enemy's bridges were impassable, and therefore desired General Smith to move towards Seven Pines, to be ready to coöperate with our right. He moved promptly along the Nine-mile road, and his leading regiment soon became engaged with the Federal skirmishers and their reserves, and in a few minutes drove them off.

On my way to Longstreet's left, to combine the action of the two bodies of troops, I passed the head of General Smith's column near Fair Oaks, and saw the camps of about a brigade in the angle between the Nine-mile road and the York River Railroad, and the rear of a column of infantry moving in quick time



RELATIVE POSITIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ATTACK, AND AFTER DARK ON MAY 31.

[During the morning of May 31, Huger's division was on the railroad a mile out of Richmond. About the same time Longstreet's division was at the fork of the Williamsburg and Charles City roads; Hill's division on the Williamsburg road half a mile in advance of Longstreet; and Magruder's and G. W. Smith's divisions near Old Tavern.

When the attack was made on the Union forces, Casey's division was three-quarters of a mile in advance of Seven Pines. He was supported on his right by Abercrombie's brigade (of Couch's division) at Fair Oaks Station, and behind him by the remainder of Couch's division at Seven Pines and on the Nine-mile road. These two divisions of Keyes's corps were reinforced late in the afternoon, near Seven Pines, by Kearny's division, which, at the time of the attack, was near Savage's Station;—Couch's troops at Fair Oaks fell back a short distance to meet Sedgwick's division approaching from the "Grapevine" bridge, and before dark recovered a part of the ground lost at the Station.

Huger's (Confederate) division and Richardson's and Hooker's divisions did not get into position near the line of fighting until after dark. A part of Hooker's troops were at the White Oak bridge (not indicated in the map), to the left of his other positions. On the Union side, Richardson and Hooker did most of the fighting on the second day.—ED.]

from that point towards the Chickahominy, by the road to the Grapevine ford. A few minutes after this, a battery near the point where this infantry had disappeared commenced firing upon the head of the Confederate column. A regiment sent against it was received with a volley of musketry, as well as canister, and recoiled. The leading brigade, commanded by Colonel Law, then advanced, and so much strength was developed by the enemy that General Smith brought his other brigades into action on the left of Law's. An obstinate contest began, and was maintained on equal terms, although we engaged superior numbers on ground of their own choosing.

I had passed the railroad a few hundred yards with Hood's brigade when the firing commenced, and stopped to see it terminated. But being confident that the enemy opposing us were those whose camp I had just seen, and therefore only a brigade, I did not doubt that General Smith was more than strong enough to cope with them. Therefore General Hood was directed to go on in such a direction as to connect his right with Longstreet's left and take his antagonists in flank. The direction of that firing was then nearly south-west from Fair Oaks. It was then about 5 o'clock.

In that position my intercourse with Longstreet was maintained through staff officers, who were assisted by General Stuart of the cavalry, which was then unemployed; their reports were all of steady progress.

At Fair Oaks, however, no advantage was gained on either side, and the contest was continued with unflinching courage. It was near half-past six o'clock before I admitted to myself that Smith was engaged, not with a brigade, as I had obstinately thought, but with more than a division; but I thought that it would be injudicious to engage Magruder's division, our only reserve, so late in the day.

The firing was then violent at Seven Pines, and within a half hour the three Federal divisions were broken and driven from their position in confusion. It was then evident, however, from the obstinacy of our adversaries at Fair Oaks, that the battle would not be decided that day. I said so to the staff officers near me, and told them that each regiment must sleep where it might be standing when the firing ceased for the night, to be ready to renew it at dawn next morning.

About half-past seven o'clock I received a musket-shot in the shoulder, and was unhorsed soon after by a heavy fragment of shell which struck my breast.

I was borne from the field—first to a house on the roadside, thence to Richmond. The firing ceased before I had been carried a

mile from it. The conflict at Fair Oaks was terminated by darkness only.

Mr. Davis's account of what he saw and did at Fair Oaks (Vol. II., p. 123) indicates singular ignorance of the topography of the vicinity, as well as of what was occurring. He says that the enemy's line was on the bank of the river. It was at right angles to and some three miles from it. He says that soon after his arrival I was brought from the right



MAJOR-GENERAL ERASMUS D. KEYES.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

wounded. This proves that his "arrival" was near sunset. He also describes the moving of reinforcements from the left to the right. This was not being done. The right was abundantly strong. He says that he made a reconnaissance—then sent three couriers one after the other, with an order to Magruder "to send a force" by the wooded path under the bluff, to attack the enemy in flank and reverse. If the first courier had been dispatched before the reconnaissance, and delivered the order to Magruder promptly, his "force" marching little more than a mile by the straight Nine-mile road could scarcely have come up before dark. The route described would have been (if found) five or six miles long.

The only thing he ought to have done, or had time to do, was postponed almost twenty hours—the putting General Lee, who was near, in command of the army.

The operations of the Confederate troops in this battle were very much retarded by the broad ponds of rain-water,—in many places more than knee-deep,—by the deep mud, and by the dense woods and thickets that covered the ground.

G. W. Smith's division lost 1283 in killed, wounded, and missing. Brigadier-General



MAJOR-GENERAL SAMUEL P. HEINTZELMAN.

Hatton was among the killed, and Brigadier-Generals Pettigrew and Hampton were severely wounded. The latter kept his saddle, and served to the end of the action. General Longstreet reported that the loss of the troops on the Williamsburg road in killed, wounded, and missing was about 3000, of which 2700 was in Hill's division. Among the killed were Colonels Moore, of Alabama, Jones, and Lomax. These reports refer to the battle of Seven Pines, which was fought and ended on the 31st of May.

The Federal loss, including that on June 1st, according to General McClellan's "Report on . . . The Army of the Potomac," page 227, was 7000.*

Prisoners to the number of 350, 10 pieces of artillery, 6700 muskets and rifles in excellent condition, a garrison flag and 4 regimental colors, medical, commissary, quartermaster and ordnance stores, tents and sutler's property, were captured and secured.

The troops on the ground at nightfall were: on the Confederate side, twenty-two brigades, more than half of which had not been in action; and on the Federal side six divisions in three corps, two-thirds of which had fought, and half of which had been totally defeated. Two Federal divisions were at Fair Oaks, and three and a half at Savage's, three miles off, and half a one two miles nearer Bottom's Bridge. The Southern troops were united, and in a position to overwhelm either fraction of the Northern army, while holding the other in check.

Officers of the Federal army have claimed a victory at Seven Pines. The Confederates had such evidences of victory as cannon, captured intrenchments, and not only sleeping on the field, but passing the following day

there, so little disturbed by the Federal troops as to gather, in woods, thickets, mud, and water, 6700 muskets and rifles. Besides, the Federal army had been advancing steadily until the day of this battle; after it they made not another step forward, but employed themselves industriously in intrenching.

In a publication of mine made in 1874, I attempted to show that General Lee did not attack the enemy until June 26, because he was engaged from June 1 until then in forming a great army, bringing to that which I had commanded 15,000 men from North Carolina under General Holmes, 22,000 from South Carolina and Georgia, and above 16,000 in the divisions of Jackson and Ewell.

My authority for the 15,000 was General Holmes's statement, May 31, that he had that number waiting the President's order to join me. When their arrival was announced, I supposed that theirs was as stated.

General Ripley, their best-informed and senior officer, was my authority for the 22,000 from South Carolina and Georgia. I thought, as a matter of course, that all of these troops had been brought up for the great crisis. Mr. Davis is eager to prove that but two of the four bodies of them came to Richmond in time. One who had opportunity to observe that Mr. Davis was almost invariably too late in reënforcing threatened from unthreatened points, has no apology for the assumption that this was an exception.

General Ripley reported officially that he brought 5000 from Charleston, and explained in writing that, arriving before them, he was assigned to the command of the brigade of 2366, his 5000 being distributed in the army as they arrived in detachments.


General Lawton stated in writing that he brought about 6000 men from Georgia to the Valley; but as they had never marched before, they were incapable of moving at Jackson's rate, and he estimated that 2500 had been unable to keep their places when they arrived on the field of Gaines's Mills. Hence his statement that he had 3500 in line in that battle. But the laggards rejoined him in two or three days.

I estimated Jackson's and Ewell's forces at 16,000, because Ewell told me that his was 8000, and Jackson's had been usually about twenty-five per cent. larger. Mr. Davis puts the joint force at 8000. His authority has stated it also at 12,000 (see "Personal Reminiscences of General Lee," p. 6), and this is far below the fact.

My object in this is to show that I consulted respectable authorities. Mr. Davis proves that his forces were not well employed.

J. E. Johnston.

* From a dispatch of June 4. Earlier the same day, McClellan reported that the loss would exceed 5000, but said he had not yet full returns. On June 6 he sent to the Secretary of War a statement of losses of each corps—total 5739. The official revised returns make the total 5031.—EDITOR C. M.



R. Lee J. E. Johnston

(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN AFTER THE WAR.)