LIEUT.-GENERAL SHERIDAN.

HANNIBAL, having been sent into Spain, from his very first arrival drew the eyes of the whole army upon him. And there never was a genius more fitted for the two most opposite duties of obeying and commanding, so that you could not easily decide whether he were dearer to the general or the army; and neither did Hasdrubal prefer giving the command to any other when anything was to be done with courage and activity, nor did the soldiers feel more confidence and boldness under any other leader. LIVY, B. xxi.

PHILIP HENRY SHERIDAN was born March 6, 1831, in the village of Somerset, Perry county, Ohio. He lived there continuously until he was seventeen years of age. His father was a contractor for the construction of various important roads at the West, and spent most of his time away from home. Young Sheridan lived with his mother and went to the village school, where he learned reading, writing, spelling, English grammar, arithmetic, and geography. This was all the education he received until he entered the Military Academy at West Point. He was, however, an attentive student of history, and especially of military history and biography; military matters indeed filled his mind, and his dream was always to become a soldier. There seemed, however, little prospect of this, and as soon as he was able to do anything for himself he entered the country "store" of Mr. John Talbot, in Somerset, at a salary of twenty-four dollars a year, his home being still with his mother. In due course he was promoted to a situation in another "store," where his pay was sixty dollars, and finally arrived at the point where his services were worth one hundred and twenty dollars a year. For this sum he acted as book-keeper, and managed what, for the time and region, constituted an extensive trade. He had never been ten miles from the place of his birth until he was sixteen years of age; then he was sent occasionally, for his employers, distances of sixteen and eighteen miles, but this was the extent of his travel.

During all this while the future general-in-chief had not neglected his books, and he was well up in all the English studies already mentioned; but he still kept his mind bent on a military career. A vacancy occurring at West Point when he was seventeen, Sheridan applied to the member of Congress from his district for the appointment. The answer inclosed his warrant as cadet, and directed him to report at West Point, June 1, 1848. He brushed up his spelling and grammar, and passed his preliminary examinations without trouble. When he entered the Academy he knew nothing of algebra, geometry or any of the higher branches of study. But cadet Henry W. Slocum, since major-general of volunteers and member of Congress from New York, was his room-mate. Slocum was an industrious, hard-working student, and from him Sheridan derived much assistance, especially in the solution of knotty points of algebra. The two boys were very much in earnest, and after taps, when the lights were put out and every cadet was expected to remain in bed, Slocum and Sheridan were in the habit of hanging a blanket over the window, and then lighting their lamp and pursuing their studies. At the first examination Slocum went up toward the head of the class, and Sheridan stood several files higher than he had expected with his disadvantages.

In 1852, in his graduating year, he had some trouble of a belligerent sort with another cadet, which resulted in his suspension. He thought at the time the punishment was unjust, but riper experience convinced him that the authorities were right and he was wrong. He was suspended for a year, after which he joined the class of 1853, and in this he was graduated. He was at first assigned to the First Infantry, but soon afterward was transferred to the Fourth.

He was not long in developing the traits which have since made him famous. In 1856 he was stationed in Washington Territory, and while there was engaged in defending the Cascades of the Columbia River against Indians. At one point the enemy were posted on an island, and the troops were obliged to land under heavy fire; but Sheridan took a little force down the stream unperceived by the Indians, crossed the river, and got around in their rear, and by this maneuver rendered the success of his command practicable. He was especially commended in orders by General Scott for this achievement, which not only foiled the savages in their own strategy, but was the exact device he afterward employed in several of his most important battles on a very much larger scale.

When the war of the Rebellion broke out, Sheridan was on the Pacific coast, but found his way eastward as soon as possible; for he snuffed the battle from afar, and was from the

first heart and soul for the Union. In May, 1861, he became a captain, and in December was appointed Chief Quartermaster and Commissary in Southwest Missouri, on the staff of Major-General Curtis. The service at that time and in that region was, in some respects, in a deplorable condition. Many officers of high rank were concerned in dealings not at all creditable. Valuable property of the region was regarded as a private prize, and much that was ostensibly taken for the use of the quartermaster's department was really secured in the private interest of high officers. Sheridan, as chief quartermaster, determined to put a stop to these proceedings. He prohibited the use of government wagons for private purposes whatsoever, and required that all horses and mules taken from the country should be immediately branded U. S. This brought him into collision with many officers, and he was directed to rescind the instructions he had given his subordinates. He protested, but in vain; and feeling that his usefulness would be impaired by a course which tended to demoralize the officers of his department, he applied to be relieved from duty with General Curtis's army. This request was shortly afterward complied with, and, reporting at St. Louis, he was assigned by General Halleck to another field.

In April, 1862, Halleck assumed command in person of the army in Tennessee, taking Sheridan with him on his staff. Shortly afterward the colonelcy of one of the Michigan regiments fell vacant, and the Governor of the State wrote to Halleck to name a good man for the post; it was immaterial whether he was from Michigan or not, so that he was an educated soldier. Halleck at once nominated Sheridan, who thus received his first command, as colonel of the Second Michigan Cavalry. He participated in several engagements during the advance on Corinth, and on the 2d of June was given command of the Second Cavalry Brigade of the Army of the Mississippi.

On the 1st of July he was attacked at Booneville by a force at least forty-five hundred strong, and at once displayed the qualities of steady determination and fertility of resource in emergencies for which he was afterward so preëminent. After a stiff resistance he fell back to an advantageous position on the edge of a swamp, where he could hold the assailants at bay. Finding, however, that the enemy was passing around his left and threatening his camp, he determined to make a bold dash on the right and convert the defense into an offensive movement. Selecting four of his best saber companies, he sent them several miles around the enemy's left to attack in rear and flank, while he was to make a simultaneous charge in front.

The plan worked admirably. The four companies appeared suddenly in the enemy's rear, not having been seen till near enough to fire their carbines, and, having emptied these, they charged with drawn sabers on the astonished enemy, who doubtless took them for the advanced guard of a very much larger force; for it was not to be supposed that so small a body would have the audacity to throw themselves against a force of forty-five hundred men without the promise of speedy support.

Before the enemy could recover from the confusion of this attack they were fiercely charged by Sheridan with his remaining handful of men, and, utterly routed, fled from the field. This engagement, in which two small regiments of cavalry defeated nine, won for Colonel Sheridan his first star,— his commission as brigadier-general dating from the battle of Booneville. Those who study his after career will find numerous examples of the same peculiarities so strikingly illustrated in this his earliest independent fight.

The reputation he acquired by this affair made Sheridan known to all his superiors at the West. Halleck, Rosecrans, H. G. Wright, and Gordon Granger all recommended his promotion. Several expeditions in which he was engaged still further developed his powers; and when Halleck was transferred to Washington, leaving Grant at the head of the Western army, the new commander fully appreciated his subordinate. In September, 1862, the situation of Buell in Kentucky was such that Grant was ordered to reënforce him. Grant selected some of his best troops for the purpose. He was superintending the movement himself when he perceived Sheridan at the head of his command, about to march. "What!" exclaimed Grant, "are you here, Sheridan? I did not intend that you should leave this army." He had not remembered that the colonel commanding a brigade in reality belonged to the Second Michigan Cavalry, and had purposed to keep a man whose ability he so highly esteemed in his own command. But Sheridan had no desire to remain. He had been ordered to the field where fighting was most imminent, and he said nothing to Grant to induce him to change his destination. Grant was a little touched at this indifference, and Sheridan went on to join Buell. Neither suspected then how close and intimate their relations would become in the wider spheres that awaited them.

Arriving at Louisville, Sheridan was assigned to the command of a division, and with this force constructed in a single night the whole series of rifle-pits from the railroad

station in Louisville to the vicinity of Portland, a distance of five or six miles. In October he accompanied Buell in his advance against Bragg, and on the 8th of that month he bore a conspicuous part in the battle of Perryville, holding the key-point of the position, and successfully defending it against several attacks of the enemy. Hardee repeatedly charged him with fixed bayonets, but was invariably driven back in disorder from the open ground in front of the heights where Sheridan was posted.

He remained in command of a division in the Army of the Cumberland until the battle of Murfreesboro, in which he sustained four separate attacks, and four times repulsed the enemy, when his ammunition became exhausted, and he was compelled to fall back from his original position. Even after this he engaged the advancing enemy, recapturing two pieces of artillery, and absolutely routing the force that had driven him. For his conduct in this battle he was made major-general of volunteers, on the recommendation of Rosecrans.

He participated in the march on Chickamauga, and on the 2d of July arrived at the Elk River, but found the stream so swollen by recent and heavy rains as to be impassable. He thereupon turned the head of his column and marched it parallel with the river till he discovered what seemed to be a practicable ford. But the enemy was guarding it with a cavalry regiment; the stream was waist deep, and the current was quite too impetuous for infantry to pass unaided; it would have separated and swept away his column. In this emergency Sheridan's invention came to his aid, and a device worthy of Hannibal indicated the genius of the Union commander. He first drove the enemy from the opposite shore, and after a sharp skirmish crossed his cavalry. A cable was next stretched across the river, by the aid of which the weak men of the division were passed. The remainder of the command was then formed in solid phalanx to resist the stream. With muskets and cartridge-boxes on their shoulders, and their hands resting on the knapsacks of the rank in front, they went in with a cheer, supporting each other, and the entire division crossed the deep and rapid stream without the loss of a man.*

In the battle of Chickamauga, Sheridan shared the terrible fighting and the disasters of the army. He was on the extreme right on the second day, and entirely disconnected from the remainder of the command. At eleven o'clock he was directed to move to the left to the support of Thomas; and, while marching at the double quick to carry out the order, he received an overwhelming assault, and was driven back three hundred yards. In the meantime he was receiving the most urgent orders to throw in his entire command; and, rallying his men, he drove the enemy in his turn, inflicting immense slaughter, and regaining the line he had originally held; but the enemy had strong supports and Sheridan none, and he was driven back again. But the assailants showed no disposition to follow up their advantage, and Sheridan had learned positively that the divisions on his left had also been driven, so that he was completely cut off. He therefore determined to connect himself with Thomas by moving back on the arc of a circle until he was able to form a junction. But the enemy moved parallel with him, and arrived first at the point at which he was aiming. Sheridan then moved quite around in the rear of Thomas, and at last came in on his left flank. Shortly after, the whole command was retired.

Sheridan's part of this disastrous battle was fought under the most disadvantageous circumstances. No time was given to form line of battle, he had no supports, and one division contended against four or five. His command numbered four thousand bayonets, and he lost ninety-six officers and one thousand four hundred and twenty-one private soldiers. He did his best to beat back the furious storm which so nearly destroyed the army, and never displayed more stubborn courage or military skill in a subordinate sphere than on this terrible day.

Hitherto his fighting had all been on the defensive. He had served under unsuccessful soldiers, and his ability was directed rather to efforts to repel and resist than to those more congenial to his nature — to assault and advance. These were to find their scope and opportunity under Grant.

The battle of Chattanooga, two months later, redeemed that of Chickamauga, and in this it fell to Sheridan to lead a division in the famous charge on Missionary Ridge. The situation at Chattanooga was simple, and can be understood by the most unmilitary reader. The town lies on the south bank of the Tennessee, with a vast plain extending toward the hills in front and on either side. On the right is Lookout Mountain, rising abruptly two thousand feet, while the southern limit of the plain is Missionary Ridge, so called by the Indians, who allowed the missionaries to pass no farther. Grant was in possession of Chattanooga, and the enemy held Missionary Ridge

* The Spaniards, without making any difficulty, having put their clothes in bags of leather, and themselves leaning on their bucklers placed beneath, swam across the river. LIVY.

and Lookout Mountain. On the 24th of November Sherman carried the hills at the end of the ridge on the left, and Hooker stormed the works on Lookout Mountain. Thomas had already moved out from Chattanooga to a point in front of the center of the ridge. Sheridan held the extreme right of Thomas's command. Grant's plan was to move Sherman and Hooker simultaneously against the enemy's flanks, and, when Bragg was weakened or distracted by these attacks on right and left, to assault his center on the ridge. The movements on either flank occurred. Sherman's attack was very vigorous, but the enemy were obliged to maintain the point in his front, for it commanded their trains and their only possible line of retreat. Bragg, therefore, reënforced heavily from the center, and when Grant perceived this movement he ordered Thomas to assault.

Thomas's command consisted of four divisions, with Sheridan, as already stated, on the extreme right. The center of his division was opposite Bragg's head-quarters on Missionary Ridge. The ground in his front was, first, open timber; then, a smooth and open plain, the distance across which, to the first line of the enemy's rifle-pits, varied from five hundred to nine hundred yards; next, a steep ascent of about five hundred yards to the top of the ridge, the face of which was rugged and covered with fallen timber. About half-way up the ridge was a partial line of pits, and, last of all, the works on the crest of the mountain.

While Sheridan was making his dispositions to attack, the enemy's regiments could be plainly seen moving to the still unoccupied rifle-pits on the summit, their blue battle-flags waving as they marched. As he rode in front of his line to examine the works, which looked as if they would prove untenable if carried, a doubt arose in his mind as to whether he had understood his order, and he sent an officer to ascertain if it was the first line only that was to be carried, or the ridge itself. Grant had intended to carry the works at the foot of the ridge, and, when this was done, to reform the lines in the rifle-pits, with a view to carrying the top. But Sheridan's aide-de-camp had scarcely left his side when the signal was given, and the division rushed to the front under a terrific burst of shot and shell. Nevertheless, it moved steadily on, Sheridan in front of the line, and, emerging from the timber, took up the double-quick step and dashed over the open plain and at the enemy's first line with a mass of glittering bayonets that was irresistible. Many of the enemy fled; the remainder threw themselves prostrate before the assaulting line and were either killed or captured, and the national troops rushed over. The three brigades had reached the first line of pits simultaneously. The enemy's fire from the top now changed from shot and shell to canister and musketry.

At this moment Sheridan's officer returned and brought word that it was the first line only that was to be carried. He first reached the left of Sheridan's command; and one brigade on the left was accordingly withdrawn to the rifle-pits which they had already crossed. The officer then rode up to Sheridan himself with the order, but the attack had by this time assumed a new and unexpected phase. Sheridan saw that he could carry the ridge, and he could not order officers and men who were already gallantly ascending the hill, step by step, to return. He rode from the center to the left, and saw disappointment on the faces of the men who had been withdrawn; he told them to rest for a few moments, and they should "go at it" again.

Meanwhile the right and right center were nearly half-way up the hill, and approaching the second line of pits, led by twelve sets of regimental colors. First, one flag would be advanced a few feet, then another would come up to it, each vying with the other to be foremost, until the entire twelve were planted on the crest of the second line of works. Now came another aide-de-camp to say that the original order had been to carry the first line; but that if, in Sheridan's judgment, the ridge could be carried, he was to take it. Sheridan's judgment was that Missionary Ridge could be carried, and he gave the order. "When I saw those flags going up," he said to me, in describing the fight, "I knew we should carry the ridge, and I took the responsibility." The men obeyed with a cheer.

Thirty pieces of artillery now opened on the assailants with direct, plunging, cross, and enfilading fire, and a tempest of musketry from the still well-filled rifle-pits on the summit; but the men put their faces to the breast of the mountain to avoid the storm, and thus worked their way up its front, till at last the highest crest was reached. Sheridan's right and right center were the first, being nearest. They crossed at once to Bragg's head-quarters, but the rebel chief had fled. The contest, however, was maintained for several minutes, when the enemy was driven from his artillery, and guns and supports were captured together. Whole regiments threw down their arms, others fled headlong down the further slope, the national soldiers not waiting to reload their pieces, but driving the enemy with stones. Before the entire division had reached the crest, the disorganized troops of Bragg could be plainly seen, with a large wagon-train and several pieces

of artillery, flying through the valley below, within a distance of half a mile.

Sheridan, however, had no idea of resting upon his laurels. The victory was gained, but the results must be secured. He at once directed two of his brigades to press the flying rear-guard and capture their wagon trains and artillery. Nine guns were speedily taken; but, about a mile beyond the ridge, the road ran over a high and formidable crest on which the enemy had posted eight guns, supported by a large infantry force. Sheridan at once rode to the front with a couple of regiments, and found the advance contending against greatly superior numbers, the men clinging to the face of the hill, as they had done a few hours before on Missionary Ridge. It was dusk, but he determined to flank the enemy with the fresh regiments he had brought. In order to accomplish the flanking movement, a high bluff, where the ridge on the left terminated, had to be carried. When the head of the column reached the summit of this hill, the moon was rising from behind, and a medallion view of the column was disclosed as it crossed the moon's disk and attacked the enemy, who, outflanked on right and left, fled hurriedly, leaving two pieces of artillery and many wagons behind. "This," says Sheridan in his report, "was a gallant little fight."

One hundred and twenty-three officers and eleven hundred and seventy-nine men of the division bathed Missionary Ridge with their blood. For one and one-eighth miles, emerging from the timber, and crossing the open plain, the troops were subjected to as terrible a cross fire of artillery and musketry as any in the war.

It was Sheridan's conduct during this battle and the pursuit, which inspired Grant with the supreme confidence he always afterward felt in his great subordinate. This was the first time that Sheridan had fought immediately under the eyes of Grant, who has often told me of the impression made on him by Sheridan's determination to advance up the mountain, his gallantry in leading the charge, and, quite as much as either, the remorseless energy with which he pursued the routed enemy. This last trait is most uncommon even with brilliant soldiers; for many are apt to sit contented with an incomplete victory. In this very battle more than one of Sheridan's superiors displeased or dissatisfied the chief by a willingness to rest before the fruits of success were all secured; but Sheridan never displayed this fault; and on this occasion he earned the advancement which he afterward received, and which gave him the opportunity to achieve what has made him world-renowned. At Chattanooga he really did as much as in any other battle to earn the generalship of the army.

Only two or three months later, Grant was made general-in-chief of the armies, and determined to take command in person at the East. He was dissatisfied with the results accomplished by the cavalry in Virginia, and was talking with the President and the Secretary of War of his designs. "I want," he said, "an active, energetic man, full of life, and spirit, and power." Halleck, who was present, inquired: "How would Sheridan do?" "The very man I want," said Grant, and telegraphed for him that hour.

But, with the ignorance of the future that besets us all, Sheridan was unwilling to leave. He had won his laurels at the West; he had fought only with Western troops; success at last seemed opening there, and he was loth to change his sphere and come to untried men and unknown theaters. Of course, he was too good a soldier to express unwillingness, but the honors pressed on him by Grant were all unwelcome; and he left the West with regret to enter upon those fields where he was destined to gather so splendid a harvest of renown.

When Sheridan took command of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, it numbered from ten to twelve thousand effective men, and was employed to encircle the infantry and artillery with a picket line which, if continuous, would have stretched out nearly sixteen miles. This was a use of the force which Sheridan disapproved. It was shortly after dispensed with, and the horses instead were nursed for the coming campaign. It was Sheridan's idea that cavalry should fight the enemy's cavalry, and infantry the enemy's infantry. He thought, too, that he perceived a lack of appreciation of the power of a large and well-managed body of horse. This power he was destined himself to display in a striking manner in the events of the following year.

He participated in the battle of the Wilderness, opening a way for the movement of the various columns, crossing the Rapidan in advance, and guarding the trains and the left of the army. This battle was fought on the 5th and 6th of May, 1864; on the 7th Sheridan again led the way to Spottsylvania, fighting the battle of Todd's Tavern to clear the road for the infantry. On the 8th he was sent for by Grant, and received orders to go out and engage the rebel cavalry; and when out of forage, of which *he had half rations for one day*, he was to proceed to the James River, sixty miles away, and replenish from Butler's stores at Bermuda Hundred. This was carry-

ing out Sheridan's own idea that cavalry should fight cavalry. The details of the movement were left to himself, and he at once determined to march around the right of Lee's army, and put his command, before fighting, in a region where he could find grain. There he believed that the enemy's infantry would not molest him, and he felt fully able to contend with Lee's cavalry.

This plan was executed. He moved his three divisions on a single road, making a column thirteen miles long; "for," he said, "I preferred this to the combinations arising from separate roads—combinations rarely working as expected, and generally failing, unless subordinate officers are prompt and fully understand the situation": a maxim which, coming from a master of the art, is worthy commemoration. He soon came into a green country where, as he expected, he found supplies, and also destroyed immense quantities of grain and ammunition intended for Lee.

The enemy's cavalry, under Stuart, at once started in pursuit, and threw themselves between the national forces and Richmond; but their leader unwisely divided his command, sending a large party to attack Sheridan in rear. He, on the contrary, threw his principal strength against the force which attacked him in front, and fought the remainder with a small rear-guard. He was completely successful; the enemy were beaten front and rear. Stuart was killed, and Richmond itself exposed to the victorious troops. A reconnoitering party indeed dashed over the outer works of the town.

It was no part, however, of Grant's design that Sheridan should enter Richmond at this time. He could not possibly have held the place, and though Jefferson Davis and his Congress were greatly alarmed, the cavalry leader obeyed his orders and turned his column eastward. He was now between the Chickahominy and the James, and as soon as the enemy ascertained that Sheridan had no intention of attacking Richmond, they came out in force to assail him. The bridges on the Chickahominy were destroyed and had to be rebuilt under fire, while the enemy were advancing on the other side from Richmond. But the opposition in front was repelled while the work on the bridges continued, and a severe encounter in the rear also resulted favorably for Sheridan, who then proceeded to the James River and went into camp. After resting three days he set out to return to Grant. The enemy molested him again, and at a point on the York River he once more found the bridges burned. But he sent out mounted parties, each man to bring back a board, and made the river passable in a day. In sixteen days from leaving the army he rejoined it at Chesterfield.

The skill and pluck he had displayed in this expedition, eluding the enemy when it was necessary, attacking and beating him at the right moment, destroying stores, burning and building bridges with almost equal facility, greatly delighted Grant, and amply justified that general in the choice he had made of a cavalry commander.

During the remainder of the Wilderness campaign, the cavalry was engaged in the battles of Hawe's shop, Totopotomoy, and Cold Harbor, and always satisfied the expectations of the general-in-chief, whether in active battle, or on the march, or in the strategic maneuvers of the campaign.

On the 6th of June Sheridan was ordered to proceed with two divisions to cut the Virginia Central Railroad near Charlottesville, and, if possible, unite with General Hunter, at that time moving up the Valley of Virginia. Another object of the maneuver was to entice the enemy's cavalry from the Chickahominy during Grant's contemplated passage of the James. The latter part of the scheme was entirely successful, for the greater portion of Lee's cavalry set out to follow Sheridan, and the Army of the Potomac achieved its difficult passage of the James without molestation or hinderance. Eight or ten miles of the railroad were also destroyed by Sheridan, after a smart battle at Trevillian's station, in which the enemy was driven off in a panic; but at this time Sheridan learned that Hunter had moved in a different direction from that proposed, and the junction between the two commands became impracticable. He accordingly returned to Grant. When near the James River, a cavalry force attempted to obstruct him, but he placed his trains at the rear, and threw out his troops toward the enemy, fighting heavily in front, while the trains under cover of the battle marched safely by.

In July Sheridan took part in the movements around Deep Bottom, preliminary to the explosion of Burnside's famous mine. He was sent to the north bank of the James with Hancock, to distract the attention of the enemy while the real movement against Petersburg took place on the opposite side of the river. His force was attacked by a large body of infantry, and at first he was driven back over a ridge; but he made his men lie quickly down in line of battle about fifteen yards behind the crest, and, when the enemy reached this crest, he opened fire with his repeating carbines, and the assailants gave way in disorder. The cavalry followed them over the plain, capturing two hundred and fifty men,

besides those that they killed and wounded. In this affair, which is known as the battle of Darbytown, the cavalry repulsed a superior force of infantry, a circumstance most unusual in recent war.

The enemy, as Grant had hoped, was completely deceived by the long front presented by Hancock and the cavalry, and supposed that nearly the entire army had been moved to the north side of the James. Lee therefore transferred a large body of his own troops to oppose them, thus leaving a way open for the national advance on the southern side.

The object of the movement being accomplished, Hancock was moved back to the river, near the bridge-head; but, to continue the deception of the enemy, Sheridan during the night sent one of his divisions to the opposite bank of the James, first covering the bridge with moss and grass to prevent the tramp of horses being heard, and at daylight marched it back again on foot in full view of the enemy, to create the impression that a large and continuous movement to the north side was still going on. On the second night Hancock was withdrawn to take part in the engagement expected to follow the mine explosion. Sheridan was directed to follow and withdraw by brigades from the right, successively passing them over the bridge. This movement was one of extreme delicacy, as, after Hancock had crossed, the space at the mouth of the bridge, occupied by Sheridan, was so circumscribed that an attack by the enemy in force might have resulted in the annihilation of his entire command. The whole operation, however, was successfully executed, and every point made; but it was attended with such anxiety and sleeplessness as to prostrate nearly every officer and man in the command.

From May to August Sheridan had lost between five thousand and six thousand men, killed, wounded, and missing; but he captured more than two thousand prisoners. In his marches he had been obliged to live, to a great extent, off the country; his hardships were great, but the men endured willingly under a leader who shared alike their dangers and their toils. He had already made them know that he led them to victory, and had aroused that feeling which enables a commander to take his troops whithersoever he accompanies them. His cavalry had indeed fought the enemy's cavalry. He had always been the attacking party, and had achieved almost constant success. The enemy's force he believed superior to his own; but their spirit diminished daily, while that of his command increased. All this was apparent to Grant, who was now in want of a commander for one of his independent and most important armies.

After the advance of Early upon Washington in 1864, the greatest alarm and confusion prevailed at the national capital. The Government was disturbed, the people of the North mortified, and apprehensions for the safety not only of Washington and Baltimore, but even of Philadelphia, were rife. Grant was in front of Richmond, and Halleck, the ranking officer at Washington, declined positively to take any responsibility. At no time during the war did the prospect of disaster seem closer or more imminent. Grant had been for weeks urging that a single and competent commander should be opposed to Early; but his suggestions were unnoticed, and he finally started himself for the north, having previously ordered Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to the same field. He went directly to the front, not stopping at Washington on the way, and then, without consulting the Government, put Sheridan in command.

His orders were to protect the capital, to drive Early back, and to hold and strip the Valley of Virginia, which had afforded supplies so long to the enemy, so that it never again should be a base or a granary for Lee's soldiers. "Put yourself south of the enemy," said Grant, "and follow him to the death." After laying down these general aims, he added: "I feel every confidence that you will do the best, and will leave you as far as possible to act on your own judgment, and not embarrass you with orders and instructions."

For nearly six weeks the new commander moved cautiously about at the entrance to the Valley. He was unwilling to fight until he could get Early at a disadvantage, and till he should receive whatever reënforcements Grant could allow him. His operations, besides, were a part of the great strategy in which all the armies were involved, and he was sometimes obliged to move in accordance with necessities hundreds of miles away. Still, the general control of his army was his own. He corresponded daily with the general-in-chief, and the two were in perfect accord. The country meanwhile was impatient, and the enemies of the Government at the North made the most of the delay. Sheridan was pronounced another failure, and the capital was said to be still in danger. But Sheridan was not to be forced inopportunely or while unready into battle.

Finally, Grant paid him another visit, near Winchester, to decide, after conference with his lieutenant, what order should be made. As before, he went direct from his own army to Sheridan, without consulting the Government. Sheridan he found ready for battle. The

enemy were weakening their force, and he felt able to contend with the remainder. He had, however, never commanded so large a body before, and in fact had never been at the head of an independent army, and he says in his report: "I was a little timid about this movement until the arrival of General Grant, who indorsed it." Grant, on the other hand, informed the writer of this article that he had a plan of battle for Sheridan in his pocket; but he found him so ready to advance, so confident of success, and his plans so matured, that he gave him no orders except the authority to move, and hurried away lest the credit should be given to him for the success he foresaw, and not to Sheridan. On Friday he asked Sheridan if he could be ready by Tuesday, and Sheridan replied he would be ready by daylight on Monday.

On the 17th of September Early unwisely divided his command, sending two divisions to Martinsburg, twenty-two miles away. Sheridan at once detected this blunder, and determined to attack the enemy in detail. Early, however, learned that Grant had been with Sheridan, and therefore concluded that he would be speedily attacked, and ordered back his detachment. Sheridan nevertheless proceeded with his plan. This was to assault with the greater part of his force, holding one division in reserve to be used as a turning column when the crisis of the battle occurred. The cavalry were on the right and left of the infantry. The attack was made as proposed; but Early's detachments had now returned, and after a serious fight the national center was first forced back and then regained its ground. Sheridan now brought forward the reserve under Crook, and directed it to find the rebel left and strike it in flank and rear, while he himself made a left half wheel of his main line in support. The maneuver was executed with complete success; the reserve advanced with spirit, forcing the enemy from their position, and the cavalry on the right at the same moment came sweeping up, overlapping the enemy's left and driving their cavalry in confusion through the infantry. Sheridan now advanced himself, and the rout of the enemy was complete. Crowded in on both flanks, their lines were broken in every direction, and, as Sheridan said in his famous dispatch, he "sent them whirling through Winchester." Early lost four thousand five hundred men, of whom two thousand two hundred were prisoners. "The result," said Grant, "was such that I have never since deemed it necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders." This battle was fought September 19th.

Sheridan, however, was not content with victory. He pushed rapidly after Early, twenty or thirty miles, and came up with him on the night of the 20th at Fisher's Hill, where the Valley is only three miles wide; and here, behind a stream called Tumbling River, the enemy had erected a line. Early, indeed, felt so secure that he unloaded his ammunition boxes and placed them behind his breastworks. But he did not know his antagonist.

On the 21st the eager Sheridan determined to use Crook's command as a turning column again, and strike the enemy in left and rear, while the remainder of the army made a left half wheel in his support. This maneuver, however, demanded secrecy, and Crook was concealed in the forest till the main line had moved up in front of the enemy's position. Before daylight on the 22d, Crook was massed in the heavy woods on the face of the mountain on the west of the Valley, and the main line moved ostentatiously forward toward Early's right and center. When the enemy's attention was thus attracted on the east, Crook suddenly burst from the hill-side on the west, striking them in flank and rear, doubling up their line, and sweeping down behind the breastworks. The main line at once took up the movement in front; the works were everywhere carried, and the enemy again completely routed. Many threw down their arms, abandoning their artillery, and sixteen guns with eleven hundred prisoners fell into the national hands, though Early reported a loss of only two hundred and forty killed and wounded. It was dark before the battle was ended, but the flight was continued during the night and on the following day. Sheridan pursued, and drove his antagonist completely out of the main valley into the gaps of the Blue Ridge, while his own infantry took possession of the country as far as Staunton and Waynesboro, and advanced a hundred miles from Harper's Ferry. "Keep on," said Grant, "and your good work will cause the fall of Richmond."

The effect of these double victories was startling upon the army and the people of the North, and even greater on the Southern soldiery and the population behind them. The troops of Early were disheartened; he himself reported a panic, and was directly censured by Lee; while the Richmond mob painted on the fresh artillery ordered to his support: "General Sheridan, care of General Early."

Till October 1st Sheridan was occupied in carrying out Grant's directions for the destruction of crops and mills; and having accomplished this most thoroughly, he himself recommended that his command should be

educed and his troops distributed elsewhere. "The Valley of Virginia," he said, "can now be held with a small force." But Lee was not yet ready to abandon the important region beyond the Blue Ridge, and determined to make one more effort to recover what had been lost. He sent reënforcements to Early of ten thousand men, and a new commander for his cavalry, and when Sheridan fell back Early advanced. At Tom's Brook, however, Sheridan deemed it best to delay one day, "to settle," he said, "this new cavalry general." Torbert, with all the national horse, was ordered to engage the enemy's cavalry, and Sheridan reported the result as follows: "The enemy, after being charged by our gallant cavalry, were broken and ran; they were followed by our men on the jump twenty-six miles, through Mount Jackson and across the north fork of the Shenandoah." Early lost eleven guns, with caissons, battery forges, head-quarters' wagons, and everything else that was carried on wheels.

Sheridan, however, had so devastated the valley that it could furnish him no supplies, and he was fifty miles from a base. He therefore continued his retrograde movement as far as Cedar Creek. From this point, on the 15th of October, he was summoned by the Government to Washington for consultation, and during his absence Early determined once more to attack the national army. The plan was well conceived. The enemy advanced in the night, and before dawn surprised and attacked the national forces still in camp. The army was driven back, portions of it in great disorder, six or seven miles. Eighteen guns were captured, and nearly a thousand prisoners, a large part of the infantry not preserving even a company organization.

Sheridan had left Washington on the 18th, and slept at Winchester, twenty miles from his command. Artillery firing was reported early on the 19th, but it was supposed to proceed from a reconnoissance, and at nine o'clock Sheridan rode out of Winchester, all unconscious of the danger to his army. Soon, however, the sound of heavy battle was unmistakable, and half a mile from the town the fugitives came in sight with appalling rapidity. He at once ordered the trains halted and parked, and stretched a brigade of his troops at Winchester across the country to stop the stragglers. Then, with an escort of twenty men, he pushed to the front. The effect of his presence was electrical. He rode hot haste, swinging his hat, and shouting as he passed, "Face the other way, boys! face the other way!" And hundreds of the men turned at once and followed him with cheers.

After reaching the army he gave some hurried directions, and returned to collect the fugitives. He was in major-general's uniform, mounted on a magnificent horse, man and beast covered with dust and foam; and as he rose in his stirrups, waving his hat and his sword by turns, he cried again and again: "If I had been here, this never would have happened. We are going back. Face the other way, boys! face the other way!" The scattered soldiers recognized their general, and took up the cry: "Face the other way!" It passed along from one to another, rising and falling like a wave of the sea, and the men returned in crowds, falling into ranks as they came. They followed him to the front, and many who had fled, panting and panic-stricken, in the morning, under Sheridan's lead had covered themselves with the glory of heroes long before night. Such a reënforcement may one man be to an army.

A few dispositions, and the battle began afresh. But now all was changed. The enemy advanced, it is true, but were at once repelled, and the national line, in its turn, became the assailant. Sheridan led a brigade in person, and the enemy everywhere gave way. Their officers found it impossible to rally them; a terror of the national cavalry had seized them. The captured guns were all retaken, and twenty-four pieces of artillery besides. Sixteen hundred prisoners were brought in, and Early reported eighteen hundred killed and wounded. Two thousand made their way to the mountains, and for miles the line of retreat was strewn with the débris of a beaten army. Early himself escaped under cover of darkness to Newmarket, twenty miles away.

This battle ended the campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. The enemy made no subsequent attempt to invade the North; Lee withdrew the greater part of Early's troops, and Sheridan's detachments marched when and whither they wished. The whole country south of the Potomac was in his hands. In a short time more than half of his army was restored to Meade's command, for its presence in the Valley was no longer necessary.

Sheridan was made a major-general in the regular army, as he was informed, in Lincoln's own words, "for the personal gallantry, military skill, and just confidence in the courage and gallantry of your troops, displayed by you on the 19th day of October, at Cedar Run, whereby, under the blessing of Providence, your routed army was reorganized, a great national disaster averted, and a brilliant victory achieved over the rebels for the third time in pitched battle within thirty days."

It was just eleven weeks since Sheridan had assumed command in the Valley. In that

time he had taken thirteen thousand prisoners, forty-nine battle flags, and sixty guns, besides recapturing eighteen cannon at Cedar Creek. He must besides have killed and wounded at least nine thousand men, so that he destroyed for the enemy twenty-two thousand soldiers. "Turning what bid fair to be disaster into glorious victory stamps Sheridan," said Grant, "what I have always thought him, one of the ablest of generals."

During the winter he remained near Winchester, but as soon as the roads and the rains allowed, Grant directed him to push once more up the Valley — this time not to return. He was to advance in the direction of Richmond, destroying the railroads in every direction, as well as all stores that could possibly be of use to the enemy. In order to conceal his purpose, Sheridan resorted to one of those ingenious devices in which he was unrivaled since the days of Hannibal. He learned that the people of the neighborhood were fond of hunting, and encouraged his staff to make their acquaintance and talk of foxes and hounds. A pack of hounds was found, and a day set for the chase. The hounds were brought into Winchester, the horses were shod, and all the talk of the country around was of Sheridan's hunt. On the appointed day the whole neighborhood came to the meet, the general and his staff conspicuous. The start was made and the run was good, but the general and staff went further than the Virginians, and the army followed. They rode after the enemy, and never returned. The stratagem had kept all news of Sheridan's intentions secret, as all preparations were attributed to the hunt, and he was far on his way before the wile was discovered. He took rations for only four days in haversacks, and coffee, sugar, and salt for fifteen days in wagons; and with this provision, and thirty pounds of forage for each horse, ten thousand men moved into an enemy's country, already stripped bare, for a campaign whose objective point was two hundred miles away, and expecting to march at least two hundred more.

The weather was bad, the rains and thaws of spring had begun, the streams were too high to ford, and most of the bridges were burned. But they marched sixty miles in two days, swimming the streams and molested by partisan troops. Horses and men could hardly be recognized for the mud that covered them. Early was found at Waynesboro, with his back to the Shenandoah, and here the last battle between the two commanders was fought. The attack was impetuous and irresistible. The troopers charged through the town and over the breastworks, sabering the enemy as they passed, and forced their way to the rear of Early's command, where they turned with drawn sabers and held the approach to the Shenandoah. Early's entire force threw down their arms and surrendered with a cheer. The leader himself and a handful of officers escaped, hiding in the houses of the town or in the neighboring woods until dark. Sixteen hundred prisoners and eleven guns fell into Sheridan's hands. After his defeat, Early was relieved by Lee of all command. His army and his reputation had both been destroyed by Sheridan.

The victorious general pursued his now unmolested march, and fulfilled his orders literally, destroying railroads and canals, mills, factories, and bridges, and finally determined to join Grant at Richmond, fortunately for himself as well as his commander. The rain and mud again impeded him; but Sheridan replaced his worn-out mules with those he had captured from Early, and set two thousand negroes who had joined him to work destroying the roads. As he approached the Pamunkey River, he was notified that Longstreet intended to dispute the passage. He was still west of Richmond, and at once determined to push toward the city and attack the enemy in that direction, and, when they came out to meet him, to move rapidly round by a circuitous route to a point where the river could be crossed. The feint completely succeeded. A brigade was left to amuse the enemy, and the remainder of the command made haste to White House, whither Grant had sent a force to repair the bridges and await them with supplies.

He had annihilated whatever was useful to the enemy between Richmond and Lynchburg; besides capturing prisoners and munitions of war, he had destroyed forty-six canal locks, five aqueducts, forty canal and road bridges, twenty-three railroad bridges, twenty-seven warehouses, forty-one miles of railroad, and fourteen mills. These are some of the results of war. He had been nineteen days on the march, and had lost only one hundred soldiers; many of these were men unable to bear the fatigues of the road.

His command arrived at the James on the 25th of March, and after halting a few days to shoe his horses and rest both them and the men, he was ordered to take the left of the army with which Grant meant to make his final movement against Lee. That army lay in front of Petersburg, and Grant's plan was to stretch westward until he should turn the enemy's right, while Sheridan was to destroy entirely the two railroads by which alone Lee was now supplied. Lee could not possibly allow these roads to be interrupted, and must either

fight to save them, or fly. Grant read his instructions to Sheridan in person. Toward the close there was a passage directing him in certain contingencies to proceed to North Carolina and join Sherman. Grant perceived that this passage was distasteful to Sheridan, and quickly added: "Although I have provided for your joining Sherman, I have no idea that it will be necessary. I mean to end this business here." Sheridan's face brightened at once, and he replied: "That's what I like to hear you say. Let us end this business here." The instincts of the two were in complete accord, and their natures struck fire from each other in the contact.

The army moved on the 29th of March, and that night Grant sent word to Sheridan, "I feel now like ending the matter, if it is possible, before going back." He therefore modified his order, directing Sheridan to remain with the main army, but to "push around the enemy and get on his right rear."

The rain that night fell heavily, and before morning it became impossible to move anything on wheels. The soil was like quicksand, the frosts were disappearing, and the roads became a soft and shifting mass. The advance of the troops seemed nearly impracticable, and some of those nearest to Grant strove hard to induce him to return. The gloom of the morning penetrated the minds of all, until, like a gleam of light, Sheridan came riding up to confer with Grant about "ending the matter." He was full of spirit, anxious for orders, certain of success if only an attack were made. The officers felt the influence of his magnetic temper, and knew how Grant appreciated the soldierly instinct and judgment of his great subordinate. They urged Sheridan to say the same to the chief that he had said to them. But he, for all his victories and his fame, was modest and subordinate. He thought it his duty to take orders from Grant, not to offer advice. But those who had the right took the great trooper in to Grant, who saw at once that, with such a lieutenant, advance was the wisest course. He sympathized with his ardor for battle, and Sheridan went back with orders to attack the enemy.

He pushed out at once from Dinwiddie Court-House to a point called Five Forks, because of the meeting of so many roads. Grant was to support him by an attack on his right with two infantry corps. Sheridan, however, was separated by eight or ten miles from the left of the army, and Lee, perceiving this isolation, at once sent a large force under Pickett to crush him before he could be reënforced. Sheridan reported this to Grant, who made further dispositions to support the cavalry. These movements occupied the 30th of March.

On the morning of the 31st the enemy had eighteen thousand men in front of Sheridan's ten thousand. The national general, however, moved simultaneously with his opponent, but, being heavily outnumbered, was forced to retire. His line was penetrated, and two entire brigades on the right were isolated from the command. But Sheridan at once ordered this detached force to move still further to the right, and march around to join the reserve in rear. The enemy, deceived by this retrograde maneuver, which they mistook for a rout, followed it up rapidly, making a left wheel, and presenting their own rear to Sheridan. He of course perceived his opportunity, and ordered the remainder of the command to advance; and then, as the enemy went crashing through the woods in pursuit of the detached portion of the cavalry, Sheridan struck them in flank and rear. This movement compelled them to abandon the pursuit and face by the rear rank.

But now the entire force of Pickett, foot and horse, had turned on the national cavalry; and "here," said Grant, "Sheridan displayed great generalship." Instead of retreating with his whole command to tell the story of superior forces, he deployed the cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take care of the horses. This compelled the enemy also to deploy over a vast extent of woods and broken country. Thus, holding off the enemy and concentrating his own men, Sheridan fell back to an advantageous position at Dinwiddie, where he repelled every assault until dark. His detached command came up all safe, but the enemy lay on their arms, not a hundred yards from his line.

He had extricated his force for the time from formidable dangers and difficulties, and had displayed extraordinary genius and audacity in all the movements of the day; but he had been driven back five miles, and was confronted by a vastly outnumbering force of infantry as well as cavalry. His danger was still imminent, and he sent word to Grant: "The enemy have gained some ground, but we still hold in front of Dinwiddie. This force is too strong for us. I will hold Dinwiddie until I am compelled to leave." He asked for no help, and made no suggestions, but simply reported the situation, leaving Grant to determine how to aid him. He and Grant were not obliged to explain to each other in detail their necessities or their dangers.

Later, however, an aide-de-camp brought further word to the general-in-chief from his beleaguered subordinate. Sheridan, being driven back and hard beset, naturally, for him, considered the time had come when the enemy should be forced to fight outside of cover,

where the national troops could make their blows decisive. Grant fully sympathized with the feeling, and sent an entire corps of infantry that night to Sheridan, determining to convert his defense into an offensive movement. Still later he dispatched a cavalry force to support the movement.

On the 1st of April the reënforcements had not arrived, but Sheridan nevertheless moved out against the enemy. The rebels, however, had learned of the approach of national infantry, and gave way rapidly, reaching the position of Five Forks before Sheridan was able to intercept them. Warren, who commanded the infantry reënforcements, and Mackenzie, with the cavalry supports, came up; and when his force was all in hand, Sheridan devised a brilliant scheme. It was his old maneuver, a feint upon the enemy's front and right, and suddenly a turning movement to overwhelm the left. But in this instance its application was more felicitous than ever before; for the success of the movement would isolate those of the enemy who might escape, and separate them entirely from Lee. It would thus not only secure victory in the immediate field where Sheridan fought, but break the entire right wing of Lee, and open the way for Grant to destroy the army of Northern Virginia.

These tactics were executed as brilliantly as they had been conceived. It was late before the troops were in position, but at five o'clock the cavalry moved briskly forward on the left and attracted the enemy, while the infantry, marching at right angles, took the rebel line in flank. There was hard fighting in front and flank, and the infantry at first wavered; but Sheridan himself seized a battle flag and plunged into the charge. The man who had borne the flag was killed, and one of Sheridan's staff was wounded; but the fiery enthusiasm of the leader was contagious. The bands were ordered to play, and the division burst on the enemy's left like a tornado, sweeping everything before them, overrunning the works at the bayonet point, breaking the enemy's flank past mending, and capturing one thousand five hundred prisoners.

The cavalry in front advanced simultaneously, and the battle was won. The troopers had been dismounted, but many were now mounted and rode into the broken ranks of the enemy. Pickett himself was nearly captured, and galloped off with a mere remnant of his force; six thousand prisoners were taken, and six pieces of artillery, and the fugitives were driven north and west, miles away from Lee, Sheridan pursuing until long after dark. This was the last battle of the war in which the enemy fought for victory; after this their struggle was to escape.

As soon as the news reached Grant, he ordered an immediate assault all along the lines. To Sheridan he said: "From your isolated position I can give you no positive directions, but leave you to act according to circumstances." Sheridan accordingly moved up against the right flank of Lee. But the crash had come before he arrived. On the morning of April 2d the works in front of Petersburg were carried. During the day Grant telegraphed to the President: "I have not yet heard from Sheridan, but I have an abiding faith that he is in the right place and at the right time." He had found out his man.

That night the army of Lee fled westward from the defenses of its capital. Lee's object was to reach Burksville Junction, where two railroads meet, and thence either to join Johnston's army in front of Sherman, or, if this proved impracticable, to escape to the mountains of West Virginia. Grant followed with his whole command to intercept the fugitive army. Sheridan, being on the extreme left, and at the head of the cavalry, was ordered to take the advance, and the Fifth Corps of infantry was added to his command. But he replied to Grant: "Before receiving your dispatch, I had anticipated the evacuation of Petersburg, and commenced moving west." Thus it was till the end. Sheridan anticipated Grant, and Grant confirmed Sheridan. The same idea, the same instinct, animated both. They moved with one impulse, like the brain and arm of one strong man.

That day and the next Sheridan moved with superhuman energy, but the enemy fled with the eagerness of despair. At times the cavalry came up with the fugitives in the chase, driving them from fords, picking up thirteen hundred prisoners, and not stopping to count the abandoned cannon. On the 4th Grant got word of a railroad train loaded with supplies on the way from the south for Lee, and at once sent the information to Sheridan. But before receiving the dispatch Sheridan had come up with Lee. At a place called Jetersville, about forty miles from Petersburg, he captured a telegraphic message not yet sent over the lines, ordering three hundred thousand rations immediately to feed Lee's army. He forwarded the message in the hope that the rations would be sent and received by the national army. At this point Sheridan was planted directly across Lee's path, on the only road by which the enemy could obtain supplies; and the unhappy leader halted and sent out his men in every direction to gather what they could for food. The fortunate ones had two ears of Indian corn apiece uncooked,

and others plucked the buds and twigs just swelling in the early spring, and strove with these to assuage their hunger. Half of the artillery was dismissed to relieve the famished horses.

Sheridan had only the Fifth Corps and the cavalry, and was still far inferior to Lee in numbers; but he intrenched across the railroad, and sent word to Grant that he had intercepted the enemy. He had accomplished exactly what Grant intended. The chief, of course, hurried up with his whole command; but, before the army could all arrive and take position, Lee became aware of his danger and marched with the keenness and eagerness of those who fly for life, moving by a circuitous route that brought him a few miles west of Sheridan. Grant at once detected the maneuver, and faced his army about to the left, dispatching Sheridan again in the advance. The fiery trooper struck the flying column of Lee in flank near Sailor's Creek, and then disposed his troops with marvelous skill and celerity. His cavalry was sent around in front of the enemy, and the remainder pushed against the flank. Grant had by this time dispatched the Sixth Corps to reënforce Sheridan, and it was important to detain the enemy until the cavalry could make its detour and appear in front and the Sixth Corps arrive. Sheridan therefore sent a single brigade to make a mounted charge against Lee's line. The daring demonstration accomplished its object and delayed the movement of any large force against the cavalry.

As soon as the Sixth Corps came up, Sheridan advanced in force. The enemy pushed on to the creek, and, facing about, made a stand on the further side. There was a severe fight of some minutes. The stream was muddy and difficult, and the position strong; but the cavalry had now attained the point where they were in rear of the enemy, and a simultaneous attack was made on every side. The national troops closed in, like gates, upon the entire force of the enemy. There was one bewildering moment of fighting on every hand, and then seven thousand men, seven generals, and fourteen guns were surrendered in the open field. The general officers were taken to Sheridan's head-quarters, and shared the supper and blankets of their conquerors, but Sheridan started before daybreak in pursuit of what was left of Lee's army. He sent word to Grant: "If the thing is pressed, I think that Lee will surrender." Grant forwarded the dispatch and an account of the victory to Lincoln, at City Point, and the President replied: "Let the thing be pressed."

There were other battles and other movements after this and simultaneous with it, but Sheridan always had the advance. He was always on the left to head the fugitives, and the remainder of the army followed on the right and rear. Lee was literally between them. Grant was plotting to drive the enemy into Sheridan's grasp, and Sheridan was striving to outmarch Lee and receive him in his flight.

Sheridan soon learned that supplies were awaiting Lee at Appomattox Junction, the same that had been ordered and driven so often and so far; it was certain, therefore, that Lee would make for that point to obtain the stores. He notified Grant of the news, and the chief ordered up all his columns. The Fifth Corps and the army of the James, under Ord, were now following Sheridan on the south side of the Appomattox, while the remainder of the army of the Potomac came up on the 8th of April within a few miles of Lee, north of the river. That night Custer, with the advance of the cavalry, rode into Appomattox and captured four heavily loaded trains,—cars, engines, and supplies. They were hardly in his hands when a force of the enemy, infantry and artillery, appeared. Twenty-five guns were captured and a large number of prisoners, the advance of a heavy column. Sheridan had headed Lee's army.

At this great news, though he had only cavalry to oppose to all that was left of the army of Northern Virginia, Sheridan held fast to what he had gained, and, at 9.20 P. M., sent word to Grant: "If Gibbon and the Fifth Corps can get up to-night, we will perhaps finish the job in the morning." Gibbon and the Fifth Corps got the message, and moved with terrible speed, marching from daylight on the 8th to daylight again on the 9th, halting only three hours on the road. They reached Sheridan's position just as Lee was approaching in heavy force to batter his way through the cavalry. Ord and Sheridan held a short consultation, and the cavalry leader proceeded to the front, while the infantry was deployed across the valley through which Lee must pass. The cavalry advanced to engage the enemy, and then fell back gradually, so as to give time for Ord to dispose his men in the woods out of sight of Lee. This last ruse of Sheridan succeeded. The enemy, with the energy of desperate men, rushed on, thinking they had only cavalry in front. Sheridan fell back, to deceive them further, and the soldiers of the rebellion gave one more battle yell — when suddenly the infantry emerged from the woods, their line wavered, and Lee sent forward a white flag with a request for a cessation of hostilities.

I have thought the best way to indicate and illustrate Sheridan's traits as a man and a soldier was to tell his story. No reader can

have failed to perceive wherein his greatness consists. From first to last, the same peculiarities are apparent. In his earliest fight, as a second lieutenant, with the Indians, he showed the same determination and the same ingenious readiness of device as in the pursuit of Lee and the final stratagem of Appomattox. He was, indeed, the Hannibal of the American war. Full of the magnificent passion of battle, as every one knows, riding around with his sword drawn, rising in his stirrups, grasping a battle flag, turning disaster into victory, or pursuing the enemy with the terror and speed of a Nemesis, he was also abundant in caution, wily as an Indian, original and astounding in his strategy—always deceiving as well as overwhelming the enemy. It was not only his personal courage and magnetic bearing, his chivalric presence and intense enthusiasm, which produced his great results. He was more than one of Froissart's paladins, although in many traits he recalled the heroes of the ancient chronicler. He was a great commander of modern times; learned in the maneuvers and practice which require intellectual keenness and comprehensive calculation. The combinations which he employed in all his greatest battles are strokes of military genius almost matchless in our time. The daring with which at Dinwiddie he seized the critical moment, and, when the enemy had driven a part of his force, and thus presented their own rear, advanced and compelled the pursuing column, all superior in numbers, to desist and defend itself, was hardly paralleled during the war. The repeated maneuver to which he resorted of attacking with a smaller portion of his force, and, when the enemy's attention was attracted by the feint, hurling an irresistible column upon an unexpected point elsewhere, and that point always a flank which could be turned, is in accordance with the best canons of military science, and the practice of the greatest masters of the art.

His strategy was fully equal to his tactics in battle. The prudent skill with which he delayed in the Valley, not allowing himself to be enticed into attacking Early until he was ready, and the series of evolutions by which he held off the enemy, advancing and withdrawing, and only fighting when it was necessary, till at last the great moment came, are as worthy of study as the brilliant achievements at Cedar Creek and Fisher's Hill; while the keenness with which he detected every movement of Lee in that remorseless chase after Appomattox,—than which the world has never seen an instance of more terrible and consummate energy and power,—and the skill with which he followed and finally headed Lee, are instances of strategic ability in action unsurpassed since the time of Napoleon.

In that power of skillful and audacious combination in the immediate presence of the enemy, which above and beyond every other trait is highest and most essential in a general, he approached the greatest. His mind was always clearest in emergencies. He never forgot in the turmoil of the fight to consider every possibility; to watch and guard and work and plan, while in the thickest *mêlée.* He was once describing to me the battle of Cedar Creek, and told how at a certain juncture, when the tide had set in favor of victory, Custer came riding up and kissed him on the field. "And so," said Sheridan, "he lost time; he lost time." There could hardly be a better illustration of his self-control, of the steadiness of his intention, of his appreciation of every necessity of the moment. He loved Custer, and understood the enthusiasm which prompted the boyish general to embrace his chief on the instant of victory; but "he lost time."

Among other smaller, though far from unimportant, traits may be mentioned his wonderful knowledge of what the enemy was doing. Livy says of Hannibal: "Nothing which was going on among the enemy escaped him, the deserters revealing many things, and he himself examining by his scouts." The words apply exactly to Sheridan. His scouts were famous throughout the army, and his information was exact. It was always relied upon by Grant as absolute, and it never misled him.

Grant and Sheridan indeed always concurred. It is true that Sheridan was disinclined to stay with Grant at the West or to come with him to the East; but that was before he personally knew his chief,—before he thought that Grant had that intimate acquaintance with his qualities which Sheridan doubtless felt that they deserved,—before their natures were brought into absolute contact. Their friendship was first military, and afterward personal. It continued after the war. Grant sent Sheridan at once to the Rio Grande when the rebellion was over, because he considered the Mexican enterprise of the second Napoleon only a part of the struggle, and in this conviction Sheridan fully shared. So, also, although Sheridan was no politician, he was in complete sympathy with the policy of reconstruction adopted by Congress, and his course at New Orleans was entirely in harmony with the views of Grant. When Andrew Johnson removed him, Grant protested, and the career of Sheridan in Louisiana was one circumstance in the chain which led to the impeachment of Johnson and the first

election of Grant. At the last Republican convention at Chicago Sheridan was present as a spectator; and when he received a single vote for President, he stepped to the front and begged to transfer it to his "best friend, General Grant."

His influence over his men was supreme. He knew just what his troops could do and would do, and when. He led them frequently in person, and they never failed to follow. Every one remembers the famous instance at Cedar Creek, where he changed the whole course of battle by his single presence. But he possessed the same power with individuals as with masses. At the battle of Five Forks a soldier, wounded under his eyes, stumbled and was falling to the rear, but Sheridan cried: "Never mind, my man, there's no harm done"; and the soldier went on with a bullet in his brain, till he dropped dead on the field.

His career since the war has always been conspicuous for courage, sagacity, and ability. His management of the Indians was singularly successful, and his course after the Chicago fire gained the applause of the country.

His accession to the position of general-in-chief is perhaps the last great military event proceeding from or connected with the war; for Sheridan is, in the direct line of succession, the youngest of the three great generals who came out foremost, not only in rank, but, beyond all question, in the estimation of their countrymen, their enemies, and the world.

Adam Badeau.

A SHADOW.

My Lady paces up the broad oak stair;
Men smile to see her face so soft and fair.
"Look up! She's worth a glance!" does one declare;
"My Lady there."

Tender and fine, from 'neath the cloud of lace
Crowning her hair, gleams forth her clear-cut face,
Its eyes alight, upon its lips the grace
Of smiles so rare

And gay, that those who pass her feel their light
Warm their own smiles until they grow more bright.
"She looks her best," they say — "her best — to-night,
My Lady there."

The music pulses in the rooms below;
Outside, the moon falls on the soft, deep snow;
Inside, the dancers' rhythm seems to flow
Through all the air.

My Lady paces up the broad oak stair,
The smile still on her lips so red, so rare.
"Look up!" she hears, "and smile then an you dare,
My Lady there!"

The music pulses in the room below,
The dancers to its pulsing come and go;
Out from her face is blanched all light and glow —
It fronts her there!

"I am thy Grief! I am thy Grief!" it cries,
"The Grief that darkens for thee all thy skies,
That blights thy bright life for thee as it flies!
And dost thou dare

"To smile and wear thy mask and play thy part
As though thy white breast held no broken heart,—
As though it bled not 'neath my stab's fierce smart?
When did *I* spare?

"I am thy passionate grief, thy bitter pain.
Turn on the world thy light, sweet, cold disdain,
But not on me! Here stand I — here again!
Thy fierce Despair!"

P. H. Sheridan