

humiliation and disaster before her strength could be organized for defense, and it would be impossible to estimate the loss that must be endured before the military strength of the country could be in a condition to act on the offensive.

To carry these views into effect, nothing more is required than a resolution of Congress to the effect that the army in time of peace shall be conducted as an educational establishment, for the purpose of preparing officers and instructors in military duties, and to disseminate a military knowledge throughout the entire Union, so that every section may have means of defense in any emergency. The enlistment laws should be amended so that the recruits would be obtained from the various sections in proportion to the population, and only young men under twenty-one years of age should be enlisted. Reenlistment should be authorized only in special cases where men had shown themselves exceptionally qualified as instructors, and should be an honorary privilege attended with increased pay and distinction, to serve as a stimulant to all.

Should this system be adopted, it would take five years with the present period of enlistment before the supply of material for officers would begin, but at the end of ten years every section of the Union would be supplied with a sufficient number of army graduates to officer and prepare for the field any number of volunteers that would be likely to be called for or required in any emergency.

Should war fail to come,—and the fact that we had such a means of preparing for it would be a very effective method of warding it off,—the young men from the army would still be a valuable element of the communities to which they would return. Besides being good patriotic citizens, they would be valuable as instructors for the National Guard organizations, and would keep alive in the country the military spirit so essential to our existence as a nation.

The measures herein suggested are so simple and easy of execution, and so important in their object, with little if any additional cost to the Government, that their adoption should follow in view of the fact that there is so little preparation for the national defense. The plan is both democratic and republican, for it would make our army a representative institution, drawn from the people, for the people, and would be as beneficial during peace as in war, and would give a strength to the republic it has never had. The social and political status of the army would rise to be the pride of the nation, and as long as our enemies are as remote as at present, no other means for marshaling the troops would be required for the national defense.

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A National Militia.

“Solon said to Cæsus, ‘If another come whose iron is better than yours, he will take away all this gold.’”

THE United States is to-day the Cæsus of nations, but there are in Europe at least six great powers whose iron of war is better than our gold. Any one of these, by merely arranging a convention to secure the neutrality of the others, could extract indemnities from us, limited only by its cupidity and our wealth.

For some years there has been more or less friction in our relations with the German empire. Our relations with Canada and hence with England have been for some time decidedly strained. The same causes which brought about the Mexican war, in 1846, exist to-day, but in vastly increased ratio, viz.: the presence of a numerous colony of our people on Mexican territory and the investment of many millions of our capital in Mexican enterprises. China has repeatedly entertained against us a *casus belli* more strong and just than any which has led to the numerous wars of this century. Should the Panama canal ever be completed, we can look forward to it as a fruitful source of diplomatic discussion, if not of serious international contention. Some of our leading statesmen have asserted on the floor of the Senate that the mere existence of that canal as a European property, under foreign control, would constitute an infraction of the Monroe doctrine, which is at present our sole foreign policy, and which we cannot now abandon without losing national prestige and incurring national disgrace.

All history shows that the suggestions of a nation are respected and heeded only in proportion to the amount of organized, equipped force with which she is ready to emphasize them. If we expect our just and reasonable demands to be respected and heeded by the powers, we must have a navy and we must organize and train a national militia. We are to-day building ships, but we are without soldiers, and these cannot be made of the standard pattern in a day, or a week, or a month. But war may come upon us with giant strides. With the vast accumulations of wealth in our defenseless lake and sea-bound cities, we offer to any well-armed, first-class power the safest, richest picking which the earth has furnished since Pizarro sacked Peru.

The Constitution fully recognizes the vital importance of the subject, and invests Congress with ample powers to enact the necessary laws. In 1792 Congress passed a Militia Act which is to-day the militia law of the United States. Under its provisions must be drilled and trained, if they are to be trained according to law, the seven millions of able-bodied citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five who are to form the reserve to our little regular army.

Through the neglect of Congress, the whole nation is left without a practicable militia law. Hence the individual States are left to their own devices in providing a reinforcement to their various municipal police forces. This police reserve is a measure of necessity merely as an additional insurance on life and property where a dense population exists in proximity to vast accumulations of wealth.

For all the purposes for which it was intended, it would be difficult, without a vast increase of expenditure, to devise a more reliable or perfect organization than the New York State Guard. But when we come to look at these organizations from a national standpoint, they present a very different appearance. In fact, they do not exist at all so far as the United States is concerned. Let us suppose, by way of illustration, that Congress, acting within its constitutional powers, declares war and calls out the militia, and that the President then makes requisition on the governor, say of New York, for a certain number of militiamen. Of course the only militia which he has a right to call

for are the national militia, those existing by reason of and in accordance with the Constitution and the Act of 1792. The governor might truthfully reply that there was not a single national militiaman in his State, that the men at his disposal were the State Guard, organized and maintained by acts of its legislature, and that, as they were not the product of any national legislation, he did not recognize the right of the President of the United States to make requisition for them. This would be a very temperate and civil response for a governor to make compared with some recorded in our history. The President's only recourse then would be to issue calls for volunteers. He might get them and he might not, depending on whether or not his war was popular in that State. Thus it is evident that even the small number of militia in our country who are drilled and disciplined are entirely beyond the control of the President in time of war. Of course the individuals composing the State armies are at liberty to assist the President in his war, provided the governors do not interfere to prevent them. But there have been several instances where governors have so interfered. In short, the citizens accept or decline the invitation to attend the war, as best pleases them. When everything in the nation is staked on the chances of battle, the President of sixty millions of people should not be an issuer of invitations, but of orders.

Of late years there has been a growing and manifest desire on the part of the Government to disseminate military instruction among the people. This important question resolves itself into two parts: first, how shall the requisite number of men be disciplined and drilled; second, how shall the Government be guaranteed that in time of need it can command the services of the identical men upon whom it has spent its time and money. The Government would not be justified in arming and drilling men and yet leaving the matter in such shape that, when it called for soldiers, the State governors could give it either raw recruits or none at all, at their pleasure, which would be the state of affairs should it spend money on the so-called National Guards as they now stand. In short, the Government, in proposing to arm and train A. and B. to be soldiers, should have the power of insuring itself that when it asks for soldiers in an emergency, it shall get A. and B., whom it has trained, and not C. and D., who are ignorant of a soldier's business.

To attain this end, there is no more simple and practical method than to pursue our great national precedent of a subsidy; but always having it clearly understood and fully admitted by all concerned that the Government reserves the right to command, at any time, the services of the identical men whom it has trained. Next, let us establish a standard militiaman, and fix the price to be paid for him. On looking the world over, we will find that there is no commodity in its markets whose price varies so much as that of the soldier. A soldier costs Germany, per year, \$202; France, \$208; England, \$405; the United States, \$990. These figures represent the cost of regular soldiers, whose entire time is devoted to armies. In our own country, New York, which has the largest and perhaps the best State Guard, pays annually, per man, about \$35.00. All things considered, the United States Government could well afford to pay annually, per man, \$50.00 for standard United States militiamen. In this way Congress could

fix the number of men for whose military instruction it saw fit to provide by inserting a corresponding sum in the yearly appropriation bill. It could train twenty thousand men for one million dollars, forty thousand for two millions, and so on, according to the varying needs of the country.

The dual allegiance which every citizen owes the general and State governments should be recognized. The militia would be entirely under the control of the State for local purposes, except at such times as Congress might call them forth for the national defense. The States would furnish the men and the nation would pay the cost. The general Government, being the major power, should claim the right of precedence in commanding their services. A more just and equal copartnership cannot be devised. It is constitutional, rational, and practicable, and were it adopted by the States generally, it would have the effect of rendering the State National Guards constitutional and legal, which at present they are not.

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George De Forest Brush.

THE "Moose Hunt," by George De Forest Brush, engraved in this number of *THE CENTURY*, is probably his strongest picture; and one can hardly regard it without high admiration for the mental and technical equipment of the painter. It is like opening a window and looking out into another age, upon another race, almost into another world. To achieve this result a high resolve and an unflinching steadfastness of purpose are needful, and these qualities, combined with great technical skill, have been observable in Mr. Brush's work since 1880, when, at the exhibition of the Society of American Artists, he made his first appearance before the American public with a picture inspired by Bret Harte's "Miggles." Up to that time Mr. Brush had pursued the uneventful career of an art student, first at the Academy of Design in this city, from 1871 to 1873, and after that, from 1874 to 1880, in the studio of Gérôme in Paris. Returning to this country in the latter year, Mr. Brush, with the courage of his conviction that as an American he must paint subjects suggested by American life, has passed much time in the West and in Canada gathering the material for a large number of pictures of Indian subjects which have greatly increased his reputation.¹ In 1890, at the age of thirty-five (having been born in Shelbyville, Tennessee, in 1855), Mr. Brush returned to Paris, where he still remains. Rumors of a change in his opinions, a realization that art, to be American, need not necessarily be local, have reached his friends here, and may be true or not, though the classical subject which he is reported to be painting would bear out such a supposition. But whether his views remain fixed or change with the seasons, Mr. Brush will always be an important factor in our art, where we have too few men who think, and, thinking, execute with sureness born of knowledge.

¹ For Mr. Brush's individual views on his art, see *THE CENTURY* for May, 1885. Mr. Brush was elected member of the Society of American Artists in 1882. In 1888 he received the first Hallgarten prize at the National Academy Exhibition, and was elected an associate of that body the same year. He has also had charge of classes at the Art Students' League and the Women's Art School, Cooper Union.