

States where population is not yet dense, Congress alone can properly develop a real National Guard. It can do what hardly any power could induce the State Legislature to do; it can appropriate an amount large enough to insure a thorough summer encampment by giving a reasonable payment to the men. Experience has shown that the encampment training is an essential to any effective system. It is carried on in many of those States having a uniformed National Guard, but almost always under great embarrassments and for too brief a period for want of funds. In some States, the men have served without pay and even paid their own expenses while in camp, and in almost all the States the member of the Legislature who should vote for the appropriation which is really necessary for that purpose would have an unhappy quarter of an hour on meeting his constituents to explain. And yet the men should be paid for the time spent in the work; and any parsimonious policy in this matter is not even tolerable. The National Guard is as much in the service of the State as the Fire or Police departments are in the service of the city; its possible service is much more unpleasant; and it has fully as much claim to adequate compensation. Some of the States, but by no means all, are able to afford this. If we wish a thoroughly trained National Guard in every State, we must look for it to Act of Congress.

The appropriation of a sum large enough to arm and equip the National Guard thoroughly, and to pay the men for the time spent in the annual training or for any other service rendered to the United States, would be a foundation for a larger oversight of the National Guard by Congress. The administration of "the discipline prescribed by Congress," and the appointment of the officers, must remain with the States; but Congress would have a fair right to insist that its War Department should be satisfied, through its inspecting officers, that the discipline was properly carried out. The mere presence of United States officers has a bracing effect upon the officers of the National Guard, and it is nowhere more necessary. The story of the militia officer who kept his men under a fire of bricks and stones for ten minutes, while he turned over the pages of his hand-book in search of the proper order, may be altogether apocryphal. But the deep cut at Reading, Pennsylvania, through which a militia genius marched his men, exposing them helplessly to the fire of the mob above, is still to be seen of all men who travel by rail from Philadelphia to or through Reading; and it testifies that it is sometimes better to have no men than to have some officers.

The reform which has been the first to be carried through by the States which have begun to develop their National Guard has been a comparatively simple one, but one of wide effects, and not easy to accomplish. Under the voluntary constitution of the National Guard, the uniforms were about as various as the companies. Under the new system, the service uniform and equipments of all the regiments of a State's force are to be identical throughout. How difficult it was to extirpate the reds and blues and yellows, the varieties in style and caliber of weapons, perhaps some of the self-sacrificing men who have given their time and attention to the work can tell us; but the results have been all for good. A riotous mob can no longer distinguish one regiment or company from another by its

uniform, or pick out off-hand the particular company from which it believes that there is comparatively little danger. Uniformity gives the sense of discipline to the men and a business-like air which creates respect. Similarity of uniform is a large factor in securing safety to militia, when employed in distant parts of its own State. When the time comes, if it shall come, that militia of one State must be employed in another as in 1794, nothing but a *national* uniformity of equipment will make the step even a reasonable experiment. Evidently, in the course of development into which circumstances have forced us, national action and national development are the only legitimate lines to choose.

The immediate answer to all the line of argument here relied upon, would be that the step proposed would have a strongly centralizing tendency, throwing more power into the hands of the Federal Government. So it may seem on the surface; but in reality the tendency is directly the reverse. Affairs have drifted in such a direction that, while all the States need home protection, only a few are able to provide it for themselves. When the emergency comes, the helpless State naturally looks to the Federal Government for protection, and relies progressively less upon herself. The plain drift of such a policy is to a necessarily strong central government, with a powerful standing army, and the disappearance or absorption of the militia, as we now have it. The development of our National Guard system, an entirely unobjectionable system of volunteer State forces, is simply the encouragement of individual States to rely on themselves. It is thus a National Guard in the complete sense of the adjective under our complex system, an effort by the Federal power to enable the States to carry on the normal operations of the social system. The bill which seems to come nearest to the measure of the national duty, the Sewell Bill, increasing the militia appropriation, passed the Senate at the last session without opposition. It did not reach consideration in the House of Representatives, but still hangs there, ready for consideration and passage in December. The duty of the House in the premises seems plain; and it is to be hoped that one of its first steps will be to take up, consider, and pass the Sewell Bill, as the lowest limit of the national obligation to the National Guard.

#### The Congressional Balance-sheet.

ECONOMY, says the proverb, is wealth; and though it ill becomes a great people to follow a cheese-paring policy with its government, to scrutinize its cost too closely, and thus compel it to study petty retrenchments instead of great national interests, there is still a certain proportion of results of government to cost of government which even the greatest of peoples is bound to insist upon. If results are great, the people can well afford a considerable expenditure; if results are *nil*, the cheapest of governments is dear at the price; if results are *nil* and expenditure generous, the government is worse than useless. The forty-ninth Congress, whose second session begins next month, closed its first session, August 5, 1886, having begun it December 7, 1885. In order to direct public attention to the results of the coming second session, it may

be well to compare the cost with the results of the first session of the same body. It should be borne in mind, however, that the first session had as near as may be eight months of "work," while the second session will have but a scant three months.

In arranging the debit side of such a balance-sheet, the appropriations for the fiscal year, ending June 30th, may stand as the cost of the session. If, on the one hand, they err in giving appropriations not fully expended, the error will be more than balanced by deficiencies due to the continuance of the session beyond the end of the fiscal year. The statement of the cost of Congress, as given below, errs, if at all, in being too small. The appropriation bills make it as follows:

SENATE: Pay of Senators.....	\$	380,000.00	
Mileage.....		33,000.00	
Pay of employees.....		344,113.10	
Contingent expenses, stationery, etc.....		109,970.00	
HOUSE: Pay of Representatives.....		1,695,000.00	
Mileage.....		110,624.00	
Pay of employees.....		390,849.10	
Contingent expenses, stationery, etc.....		114,462.00	
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY.....		1,200.00	
Police.....		36,700.00	
Public Printer.....		18,300.00	
Library.....		59,320.00	
Garden.....		16,700.00	
Cost of Session.....	\$	3,310,238.20	

Such being, roughly stated, the cost of the session, let us turn to the credit side of the sheet, the practical results accomplished by this body which costs the country nearly three and a half million dollars a year. They are as follows:

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED:			
In the House.....	10,228		
In the Senate.....	2,974	13,202	
BILLS PASSED:			
From the House.....	746		
From the Senate.....	241	987	
BILLS PASSED AND VETOED:			
Private pension bills.....	102		
Bills for public buildings.....	6		
Other bills.....	7	115	
Bills passed over the veto.....			1
"REPORTS" MADE BY COMMITTEES:			
In the House.....	3,455		
In the Senate.....	1,610	5,065	
Pages of "The Congressional Record" filled,			9,000

It would be unjust, as well as impossible, to state any grand total to this side of the Congressional balance-sheet. The reader must look upon the whole mass of "work," and estimate the grand total as seems to him good. It would be unjust, however, both to the reader and to the legislative body, to ignore certain comparative results, for which the first session of the forty-ninth Congress may fairly claim a preëminence over other sessions. Thus, it succeeded in filling about fifty per cent. more pages of that invaluable periodical, "The Congressional Record," than the corresponding sessions of either of the two preceding Congresses. It "introduced," in this one session, nearly twenty-five per cent. more bills and joint resolutions than the two preceding Congresses introduced in both sessions; and the two preceding Congresses were by no means prentice hands at the trade. Its busy and efficient committees made twenty-five per cent. more "reports" in this one session than the forty-eighth Congress made in both sessions, and

fifty per cent. more than the forty-seventh Congress made in both sessions. And it may be added that, for the number and variety of the vetoes placed upon its legislation, this session will rank as without a peer. Such considerations as these must surely reconcile the voter to a balance-sheet as to which he might otherwise complain of the intolerable deal of sack compared to the bread of actual legislation.

About six and a half per cent. of the bills introduced were passed and escaped the veto. It would, however, be quite misleading to leave the impression that even this small percentage constituted any important addition to the country's accumulated stock of legislation. Outside of the regular Appropriation Bills, the Presidential Succession Act, the tax on oleomargarine, the increase of the navy, the Congressional Library Act, a railroad forfeiture, and the Porter Act, the mass of "legislation," achieved by the first session of the forty-ninth Congress was as colorless as a jelly-fish, and of about equal importance. It consisted mainly of private legislation, interesting only to certain constituents of the more skillful members of Congress, and of such "public" legislation as Acts permitting the erection of bridges at specified points, and Acts for the erection of public buildings, interesting only to larger or smaller groups of other shrewd or fortunate Congressmen. So far as really national legislation, business worthy of the time and attention of the legislative branch of one of the most powerful governments of the world, is concerned, the results of the session are sadly inadequate.

The reader may perhaps desire an explanation of this failure of our national Legislature. Let him, then, go to Washington while the two Houses are in session. Let him sit in the gallery of the Senate, provided an "executive session" does not turn him out; let him scan the faces of the Senators, reflect upon their previous records, and consider how many of them came to occupy their present positions. Let him then go and sit for a time in the gallery of the House of Representatives, and watch that national bear-garden. Let him enjoy the usual scene — one purple-faced Representative sawing the air in the progress of what is technically called an "oration"; a dozen or more highly amused colleagues surrounding him; the rest of the members talking at the top of their voices, clapping their hands for pages, writing, reading, telling funny stories and laughing uproariously at them, making social calls from desk to desk, doing anything and everything except the business for which they are paid. Let him try to estimate the rapidity with which a plain business man, finding his clerks engaged in such a scene during business hours, would make a "clean sweep" of them. He will no longer ask an explanation of the Congressional balance-sheet. What better result could be expected from two Houses, each in its own way controlled by influences antagonistic to intelligent legislation? Congress is no longer a legislative body. Its degeneration is now admitted. It consists now of a plutocracy at one end, and a mobocracy at the other. The two chronic perils of a democracy have a firm grip on the Congress of the United States.

Here is no question of comparative guilt or responsibility. Each House is as bad in its way as the other. Nor is there any partisan question involved. The course of Congress has for years been down-hill. Able and sincere men are still to be found in both Houses,

yet each successive Congress is, on the whole, worse than its predecessors; not because Democrats or Republicans control it, but because it is two years further on the road. The rules of the Lower House have been developed with the apparent design of making a familiar acquaintance with them the great requisite for a party leader and of excluding all others from influence on legislation. Pitt or Gladstone would be an enforced cipher in our House of Representatives; and the mass of its members have grown out of the knowledge of or care for legislation. They have long since left all that work to committees; and the session just closed has developed a new feature—an unofficial “steering committee” selected by the majority to regulate the consideration of legislation; in other words, to save the incompetency of the House from exposure. So far as the real business of a legislative body is concerned, the Representatives might fully as well have met and organized in December, chosen their committees, and excused the rest of the members until the committees had done their work for them. By remaining in Washington, an incompetent House is reduced to the ignoble necessity of filling up the intervals with horse-play.

The Congress of the United States has become the most incapable legislative body of the constitutional world. So far as the Senate is concerned, its case is hopeless; the only remedy is outside of it, in the regeneration of the constituencies which elect the senators. The case of the House is somewhat different; its failure may be redeemed by reform within itself. The arguments for the present abominable condition of its committee system rest only on the amount and variety of the business which is introduced and laid before it. But most of this business is petty and utterly unworthy of the Congress of the United States. The great mass of it could easily be remitted to the courts or other permanent agencies, or regulated by general and automatic laws. The really national business could then, as in the earlier days of the republic, be discussed and settled by the House itself. The resistance to such a reform would probably come from the very members who are most injured by the present state of affairs. They have grown accustomed to the husks of legislation. The privilege of “introducing” private legislation, with an occasional sop in the shape of the passage of one of their bills, has become so dear to them that they can hardly give it up. They do not see that they are thus increasing the volume of “introduced” business to such an extent as to tighten the chains of the committee system around the House. It will require some intelligent self-denial and a determined suppression of a good many “leaders,” to bring the House back to its constitutional position as the popular branch of a really national legislative body; and the second session of the forty-ninth Congress could not spend its three months of existence to better purpose than in beginning the work.

#### The Uses and Dangers of “One Idea.”

MOST men of mature age have been tempted, at some time in their lives, to become “men of one idea” in order to gain that increase of power which devotion to one idea brings. Paul’s summary, “This one thing I do,” is believed in devoutly by many who have no similar reverence for any other of Paul’s summaries. The

prison reformers, from John Howard down, the Abolitionists, the framers and supporters of the Anti-Corn-Law League, the men, who, in England and the United States, have striven to take the civil service from the politicians and preserve it to the people, are familiar examples of the increase of power which man gains by giving himself up to one idea. It is no more than the conversion of all his force into one groove; and if the groove be well chosen, the result can only be to give the man more than his share of influence on the world’s progress.

It should not be forgotten, however, that the largest part of this increase of power is due to man’s retention of control over his dominant idea, to the fact that he utilizes it and does not surrender to it. The man who surrenders control of his thought or judgment to a predominant idea, whether his own or that of another, sees but a part of the case, and the judgment which he bases on it is either inapplicable to the whole or positively injurious. It cannot be preached too strongly, in these times of ours, that it is the characteristic of a well-balanced intellect to look for all the modifying circumstances of a case, as well as the one great circumstance which seems on the surface to control it, and to form a final judgment on the whole; just as universal charity, not the limited affection for one’s immediate dependents, is the characteristic of a well-balanced heart. To deal otherwise with facts is to warp the judgment, and to lose influence over one’s fellows. It need not go much farther to become positively noxious. Let the pursuit of wealth gain predominance as the one idea of a mind or soul, and only fortunate circumstances may be the reason why the result is not theft, swindling, or murder. Whatever be the increase of power which comes from a regulated devotion to one idea, it is easy to show how often fanaticism, lunacy, and crime have their common roots in the *surrender* to one idea, and that there is no quicker road to complete perversion of judgment. Dynamite properly used is power; but it would be folly to carry it in one’s pocket for daily use, and crime to use it for purposes of vengeance.

It is a familiar fact that masses of men often think, judge, and act on the presentation of one idea, and that a surface one. And yet there never has been a time when the fact was more dangerous, when it was more necessary to recall to men’s attention the fact that any wise and useful judgment and action is the resultant of a clear understanding of many correlative, perhaps apparently conflicting forces and circumstances. The citizen sees a policeman clubbing a man evidently in needy circumstances, hears that the offense arose in an effort to resist a reduction of wages by a street-car company, and jumps to the conclusion that it is his duty to side with oppressed labor against capital. He does not see the labor which has been oppressed simply because it has not been organized, which has been dubbed “scab” merely because it is individual labor; he does not see that in this case the real oppression has been that of labor by labor, not by capital. In modern times, when the life of each man is marked by an increasing absorption in a narrow line of work, and a consequently increasing unreadiness to appreciate off-hand the circumstances which are not on the surface, no better service can be done than the consistent preaching of a cautious reservation of individual judg-