

good men of all classes must combine to defeat them. When bribery and corruption do their worst to destroy the purity of the ballot, and the spoils system threatens the life of freedom, the ministers of God are religiously bound not only to denounce the crimes, but to use their best influences as good citizens and as preachers of righteousness to strengthen every genuine movement for the reform of these abuses. Not as fanatics nor as politicians, but as heralds of the kingdom of truth and right, as patriotic umpires of opinion, to whom their fellow-men properly look for wisdom, counsel, and "the courage of their convictions," they can help civil-service reform, as any other moral movement, by cooperating with their fellow-citizens in local associations, by the pen and the press, and by public speech on fit occasions. They can always do this on the broad ground of the common weal, and in the interest of good laws administered by capable, honest, and trustworthy officials. Of all men in this free country, the clergy cannot afford to be on the wrong side of a vital national reform which reaches from every home and hamlet to the capitals of the States and of the republic, and from the remotest ballot-box to the elect of the nation. There are times when moral indifference to living issues is disloyalty; and ultra-conservatism is cowardly toward liberty and religion. Revolutions in civil polity stamp their likenesses upon national character as deeply as do the scars of war. Are there not scores and hundreds of patriotic American clergymen who have the sagacity and the force, as well as the grace, to seize the opportunity, and to help the reformers, who are doing their best to give us a pure ballot and a clean administration of the offices of the nation and of all the States and cities, so "that government of the people by the people and for the people may not perish from the earth"?

*William J. R. Taylor.*


NEWARK, N. J.

#### The Rescue of Chinese Gordon.

At a time when the whole civilized world is anxiously looking for tidings of General Gordon, and hoping almost against hope that he may be extricated from his perilous position, it is not reassuring to reflect upon the ignorance and misstatements of the British authorities concerning the geography, topography, and peculiarities of a country which they have virtually occupied for eight years, and which was fully mapped out and described a generation ago. My knowledge of the Soudan, it is proper to state, was acquired by six thousand miles' travel on camel's back, over the theater of the Mahdi's war. As one of the American officers in the late Khedive's service, it fell to my lot to command two military and scientific expeditions of exploration in the Soudan—one to the east and the other to the west of the Nile. For two years I lived among the Bedouin tribes now in insurrection. The object of the expeditions led by me was to make accurate surveys of the country and to report to the Egyptian Government upon its water-supply and its resources of every kind. What I state, therefore, is the result of careful personal observation and study, and I wish briefly to discuss the means and routes by which it has been thought possible to reach General Gordon at Khartoum, to relieve him if still besieged; else rescue or avenge him,

if he has been overpowered, the latter probably being the fact.

The two routes which have been used from timeim-



MAP SHOWING THE USUAL ROUTES (DOTTED LINES) FROM CAIRO TO KHARTOUM AND EL OBEID.

memorial as the highways of trade between Cairo and Khartoum are (1) by way of Suakim, (2) up the Nile through Korosko. The quickest route is the former from Cairo to Suez, five hours by rail, one hundred and twenty miles; from Suez to Suakim, nine hundred miles, or four days by steamer; from Suakim to Berber, two hundred and forty miles by caravan; from Berber to Khartoum, two hundred and twenty-five miles by water, or by land, following the banks of the Nile; total, one thousand four hundred and eighty-five miles. To illustrate the difficulties of this line of advance, let us suppose a British force, with all its supplies and munitions, to have landed at Suakim. Remembering that ten thousand Bedouins, armed only with sword and spear, were so near destroying four thousand British soldiers, on the plain within ten miles of Suakim (breaking one of their squares and capturing its artillery), it is evident that five or six thousand soldiers is the smallest force that could venture to attack the Bedouins in their mountains and deserts.

Immediately after leaving the sea-coast or the Nile, one enters the "Waterless Land," where there is not a stream, a creek, a rivulet, or even a living spring,—nothing but deep and scanty wells at long intervals with here and there a few natural, rocky reservoirs in narrow ravines, away from the line of march and known only to the natives. In six thousand miles of travel, I saw not more than five living springs, and their waters disappeared in the sand within sixty yards

of the observable source. Therefore, in addition to all its supplies, ammunition, etc., an army would be compelled to carry water enough to last it on the journey from well to well, sometimes a distance of five days for a caravan moving without opposition. Droughts of long duration are common all over the Soudan. When I traveled over these desert routes it had not rained for three years. Many of the wells were dry, and multitudes of camels and cattle had perished. Water must be carried in goat-skins and ox-hides on camel's back. Hicks Pasha's army of ten thousand Egyptians had six thousand camels, a large proportion being water camels; yet I believe he had transportation only for one day's supply. The Suakim trail (for there are no roads between Suakim and Berber) is better supplied with water than most desert routes; yet the wells are seldom less than two or three days apart, and there is not a group of wells on the whole line sufficient to water more than six hundred men and their animals. Traveling with five hundred camels and two hundred men, I frequently found on arriving at the wells that another caravan had just exhausted them for the time; and I had to wait one or two days for the water to ooze in sufficiently to water my party and fill my water-skins. How, then, would it be possible to march an army of five or six thousand men and their immense train of animals where not over six hundred could get water at a time at any one place? The only way would be to march in detachments of five hundred, two days apart; but in time of war such a course would insure their easy destruction by the enemy.

In the "Waterless Land," water is the paramount question. If it be asked how a large body of Bedouins like the ten thousand who nearly destroyed the British squares at Tamaï manage to subsist, the reason is plain. In the first place, they do not need the enormous trains required for a European army. They are the most abstemious of men. Each man carries a skin of water and a small bag of grain, procured by purchase or barter from caravans. Their camels and goats move with them, supplying them with milk and meat, and subsisting upon the scanty herbage and the foliage of the thorny mimosa, growing in secluded wadies. These people could live upon the increase of their flocks alone, which they exchange readily for other commodities; but being the exclusive carriers and guides for all the travel and commerce that cross their deserts, they realize yearly large amounts of money. As to water, they know every nook and hollow in the mountains, away from the trails, where a few barrels of water collect in some shaded ravine, and they can scatter, every man for himself, to fill their water-skins. On my first expedition, near the close of the three years' drought, I reached some wells on which I was depending, and found them entirely dry. It was several days to the next wells. But my Bedouin guides knew some natural reservoirs in the hills about six miles off. So they took the water camels at night-fall, and came back before daylight with the water-skins filled. An invading army would find it hard to obtain guides, and even if they did, they must keep together, and could not leave the line of march to look for water. Besides, the Bedouins, accustomed from infancy to regard water as most precious and rare, use it with wonderful economy. Neither men nor animals drink more

than once in forty-eight hours. As to washing, they *never* indulge in such wasteful nonsense. When Bedouins came to my camp, water was always offered them. Their answer would frequently be: "No, thanks; I drank yesterday." They know too well the importance of keeping up the habit of abstemiousness. No wonder they can subsist where invaders would quickly perish.

Now, let us suppose a British army to have secured the six or eight thousand camels needed for transportation (a most improbable thing, for nearly all the camels in the Soudan belong to the rebellious tribes). Even the guns have to be dismounted, and with their carriages carried on camels' backs. I had very light howitzers of about five hundred pounds without the carriages. Each was fitted on a huge wooden pack-saddle made for the purpose, and the unfortunate camel which bore it never lasted over ten days, for four hundred pounds is a full load for the desert camel, whose capacity must be judged by what he can carry when worn down by travel and short rations.

All the forage and water for the cavalry and artillery horses must also be carried on camel's back, for horses would starve where the camel thrives. A march of fourteen miles from Suakim would bring the army to the foot of the great Arabian Chain, which begins at Suez and runs parallel to the Red Sea down to the equator, many of its peaks rising above eight thousand feet. It is eighty miles across, consisting of several parallel ridges separated by deep valleys. For six or seven days, at least, the army, with its immense train, would be struggling and floundering up one side of a ridge and down the other, through steep and narrow defiles where men and animals have to move in single file, and where many a baggage camel would drop his load and his bones.

Suppose that the fierce Bedouins, whose homes are in these mountains, have allowed the British, strung out in a long slender column vulnerable at every point, to cross the numerous defiles where a few hundred men could stop a whole army. Suppose the invaders to have emerged without serious losses from the mountain range out upon the plateau extending to the Nile, and which itself is very rugged and abounding in difficult passes and belts of deep, loose sand,—the toughest obstacles of all. The worst is yet to come. Water was comparatively plentiful in the mountains, and the heat was moderate. But now the only supply is from the scanty wells upon the line of march. The Bedouins retreat, destroying the wells behind them (which is a very easy thing to do), and swarms of them hang around the flanks and rear of the invaders to harass them and cut off their stragglers. The heat rises every day above one hundred degrees, even in November and December, and one hundred and fifty degrees and more in summer; in that cloudless land there is no shade. The plain quivers under the fierce sunlight, while the mirage deludes the eyes with the mockery of fictitious lakes. This is what I experienced day after day on the deserts. Suppose, now, the invaders to have consumed their supply of water. If the enemy can cut them off from the wells for three days, there is no need of firing another shot. Not a soul of them can survive. It is the story of the Roman legions perishing in the Parthian deserts, and of Hicks Pasha in Kordofan.

After much deliberation over a question that required so little, the British authorities came to the conclusion that the Suakim route is impracticable. But will it be believed that British officers at Suakim seriously proposed to build a narrow-gauge railroad, which, they said, could be laid *as rapidly as the troops could march?* And even as late as July 12 a Cairo dispatch says: "The operations for the relief of Khartoum, it has finally been decided, will begin early in September. General Wolseley continues to advise that the line of the chief attack be by way of Suakim and Berber. Additional material for the new railway is being sent to Suakim. The preparations for an expedition up the Nile have been suspended." Think of the grading, blasting, tunneling required to construct a railroad across that great chain eighty miles wide, and then one hundred and sixty miles beyond it—where everything, even to the wooden sleepers, must be brought from abroad! And would the Bedouins permit the work to proceed unmolested? And supposing the road built, how many regiments would be needed to guard it against being cut at a hundred points by the Bedouins?

Most of the objections to the Suakim route apply to all the desert routes. The next to be considered is the Korosko route, by the Nile, from Cairo in boats to Korosko, 610 miles; from Korosko, over the desert across the great bend of the Nile, 230 miles to Abou Hammed; thence along the banks of the Nile (here not navigable) to Berber, 100 miles; from Berber to Khartoum by water, or along the banks, 225 miles. In all 1125 miles. This is the great commercial caravan route. It traverses the most frightful desert in the Soudan, but it is 500 miles shorter than the course of the Nile, which, moreover, is not navigable at all for 700 miles from the second cataract to Berber.

The Arabs divide their deserts into two kinds. The first is called *el jebel* or *el berrryé*, meaning mountain or wilderness. In this kind of deserts there is more or less vegetation, always very scanty; but yet it is there that the Bedouins roam and raise their flocks and camels. Gazelles and other game are also found. The desert between Berber and Suakim is chiefly of this kind. The other sort is called the *atmoor*, and it is impossible to imagine anything more barren and desolate. It is literally nothing but sand and rocks. Not a bush, not a blade of grass ever grew there, and consequently no animal life at all, not even insects. They are like oceans which you cross on your "desert ships," but where it is death to tarry. The ostrich and the hyena cross them swiftly by night. These atmoors are generally from eight to ten days across, with one group of wells in the middle. Such is the Atmoor of Shigré, which I crossed in nine days, and that of Korosko in seven (two days less than the usual time). Only one group of wells is found half-way, which is called *mouva*—bitter. None but camels and Bedouins can drink its water. Travelers always carry enough Nile water to last them across. It is the only desert where no guides are needed, for the track is perfectly marked by the skeletons of camels and cattle, which, as I counted them, average sixty to the mile on the best parts of the trail, and four hundred on the worst. Thousands of camels and oxen perish there yearly. The latter are driven from the Upper Nile, scantily watered once in forty-eight hours on the march, and a large proportion of them die on

the way. The hyenas and vultures, which are the only denizens of the atmoor, pick their bones clean before the next morning, and the fierce sun heat dries the hides and bones, so that the stench of carrion never taints the desert air. The objections to this route, as regards water, are still greater than to the Suakim route, and it has been rejected also.

The third route is never followed because of its extreme length. It is as follows: From Cairo to the second cataract by water, 700 miles; thence to Berber by land, following the course of the river, 700 miles. The Nile is not navigable for this entire distance, being interrupted by numerous cataracts. Only small country boats are used in the reaches between one cataract and the next. This well-known fact illustrates the absurdity of the suggestion to employ a flotilla of gun-boats to accompany a British force on a march along the river. I once followed this route as far as Dongola and Dabbé, and then struck off to the south-east to El Obeid, the present capital of the Mahdi. From Berber to Khartoum, and nearly to the lakes, the Nile is navigable, but there are only half a dozen steamers of light draft, sixty or seventy feet long, which were transported in sections on camel's back, and put together at Berber; and small as they are they continually get fast on sand-banks, as I know to my sorrow. An army following this route would have abundance of water, but would require four or five months to reach Khartoum.

The fact is, that it is almost impossible for any European army to penetrate into the Soudan. From the beginning of the present troubles I have thought that the only hope of rescuing Gordon is by the aid of King John of Abyssinia. His people are just as indomitable warriors as the Bedouins. Though savages, they call themselves Christians, and hate the Mussulmans bitterly. Their most ardent desire is to obtain an outlet upon the Red Sea, from which they have been completely shut out by Egypt. By offering King John the port of Massowah with a strip of the coast, and paying him any amount he may ask, a force of 30,000 Abyssinians could be got to move from their own country down the Blue Nile, relieving the garrisons of Kassala and Sennaar, and reaching Khartoum without any difficulty. It is only a question of money, for those people are very avaricious, and England would better pay millions than let Gordon perish. Admiral Hewett went on a mission to King John, but so far as the results have been made public he seems to have accomplished little.

The last and perhaps the only hope for Gordon's safety, is that he may be captured and held for ransom. It is probable that Khartoum has already fallen. If not, it is only a question of days. The Mahdi is well aware of Gordon's pecuniary value. He obtained \$60,000 for the ransom of twelve members of the Austrian Catholic mission at El Obeid, and if he demands a million sterling for Gordon's ransom, England would pay it rather than let that brave soldier fall a victim to his own patriotic enterprise, and as the world is inclined to think, to the incapacity of his Government.

No wonder the situation in Egypt is galling to British pride. They seized that country by a doubtful exercise of power; they have forced Egypt to abandon the vast empire of the Soudan with a disre-

gard for the loss of life consequent upon a hasty and unprepared evacuation. And all their hopes are now limited to the rescue of General Gordon and to the defense of Egypt proper from the invasion of the Mahdi. The latter, flushed with success, is steadily advancing. The theological university of El Ahzar at Cairo, which is to the Mussulman world what the Pope and the College of Cardinals are to Roman Catholicism, has just recognized his mission as from God. No true Mussulman will oppose him now, and all the population of Egypt consider him as the deliverer from the yoke of Christians and foreigners, so that even the defense of lower Egypt may become a very difficult matter. And whether Gordon survive or perish, England, to save her prestige and vindicate her honor, must send an expedition to rescue or to avenge him.

R. E. Colston.

Late Bey on the General Staff of the Egyptian Army.  
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 18, 1884.

#### The Appeal of the Harvard Annex: A Claim on Educated Women.

IT is now five years since a circular was issued offering "private collegiate instruction to women" at Cambridge, Mass., the instruction to be given by members of the Faculty of Harvard University. A sum of \$15,000 had been raised by those interested in the experiment, which, with the fees of students, was estimated as sufficient to test "the scheme"—now well known as the "Harvard Annex"—for a period of four years.

During its third year the plan took definite legal shape; a charter was obtained from the State of Massachusetts, and the corporate name of "The Society for the Collegiate Instruction of Women" was adopted. This charter defines the object of the society to be "to promote the education of women with the assistance of the instructors of Harvard University," and authorizes it "to perform all acts appropriate to the main purpose of the Society," and also, whenever doing so would advance the objects of the association, to transfer "the whole or any part of its funds or property to the President and Fellows of Harvard College." It was in the exercise of the powers conferred by this special clause that, after four years of quiet, effective work, and when, in view of what had been accomplished, it seemed reasonable to ask an intelligent and generous public to assist in placing the association on a permanent financial basis, that in February, 1883, the ladies of the Executive Committee in due form asked for a permanent endowment fund of one hundred thousand dollars which would not only supply an assured income, but would gain for the "Annex" a recognized connection with the University, the goal of the highest hopes of its originators. The substance and ground of the appeal may be briefly summarized as follows: "The experiment (for so it was considered by those who projected it) has encountered no difficulties either from within or without; has excited neither opposition nor prejudice, but has worked so simply and easily that its success has hardly attracted attention. Few seem to know how closely the courses of study correspond in character with those of the University itself, instruction being given exclusively by officers of Harvard. . . . The annual

number of students has been from thirty-five to forty; of these, some have been themselves teachers, others young women fitting themselves to become such; a few have been brought by the simple love of study. . . . All have shown high average standard, some exceptional excellence. . . . A scheme which is of such evident value to women, and which has proven so practicable, should have an official claim on the University, a connection only to be secured by the endowment asked for." Thirty-six thousand dollars was already promised by some twenty persons concerned for the success of the work. The press throughout the country noticed the appeal, in many cases with a few words of editorial commendation; but only a little more than thirty thousand dollars additional has been subscribed.

Now, in a nation which numbers many thousands of women with both wealth and education, this should not be. How many—or rather how *few*—dresses, bonnets, wraps, etc., would the rich women of the cultured circles of the United States have to forego for one season, in order to respond to such appeals as that of the Harvard Annex?

There is no occasion in the discussion of this or of any kindred question—from the point of view of a *claim on women*—to look at it with the slightest degree of sentiment, or to commend it to the consideration of cultivated women with any theoretical rhetoric. Taking a thoroughly practical view of the matter, the peremptoriness of such claims can be frankly urged on wives and mothers of fortune, with almost the promise that if they thus cast their bread upon the waters it will return to them with interest, in the benefit to their children derived from thoroughly trained and cultivated teachers. The majority of the instructors of youth in America are women, and there can be but one opinion as to the desirability of all women who select the profession of teaching having every possible opportunity to prepare themselves for it; and it is to this class that the Annex and similar schemes will always be of special service. In its report for 1883, the students are spoken of as principally "young women fitting as teachers, or older women who are already teachers, but who allow themselves out of their small earnings the rare luxury of a little change from teaching to learning, that they may go back to their work refreshed and better. . . . We have had as yet no flighty students brought by the novelty of the thing. . . . The standard of our public and private schools can never be a matter of indifference to parents, and that standard can hardly fail to be raised by the closer relations of the schools to the universities."

If any woman is tempted to say in reply to this demand for a subscription, "Women do not control the purse-strings as a rule, and, to the extent of their ability to give, they respond to more urgent needs than those of Annexes, and distribute their pocket-money in less public channels than the endowment of universities," I bespeak her attention to some data which, collected for another purpose some few years ago, have special worth in this connection, and would seem to prove not only that women in America, even as far back as colonial times, have always given to educational institutions, but that less than a tithe of the amount they have given to colleges for men