

TOPICS OF THE TIME.

The Temperance Outlook.

THERE is no question, whether of morals or economics, now agitating the public mind, of more importance than the treatment of intemperance. The statistics of some of our prisons show that seven-eighths of their inmates reached their wretched condition through drunkenness. The withdrawal of such a multitude from active industry, the pauperism directly entailed upon thousands, the insecurity of property, and the heavy tax upon the community for their support and for the support of the machinery that seizes and disposes of them, give us the economic side of the giant evil; while the moral side, infinitely more sad and appalling, is represented in the rending asunder of families, the multiplication of criminals, and the disintegration and degradation of society. These facts are patent to all observers, and there is a very general demand for action against this formidable enemy. For many years philanthropists have met and sounded the alarm, and sporadic efforts have been made, mostly of a missionary and persuasive sort, to mitigate the evil. There had been in almost all the States laws regulating the sale of alcoholic liquors with a view to prevent excesses, but these laws had all proved to be dead letters, and nowhere was the evil checked except where small communities became virtually their own police and throttled it. The State of Maine was, we believe, the first State which attempted to sweep the curse from its entire area by an act of legislation, and hence "the Maine law" has become a significant term in general use. Maine not only enacted its law, but has firmly kept it on the statute-book, while elsewhere like action has been afterward annulled. After many years, two more States, Kansas and Iowa, have not only followed Maine's example, but have gone beyond the pattern—having inserted a clause in the State constitution forbidding the sale of alcoholic liquors as a beverage. And now this style of action against the enemy is prominently suggested as the panacea for the whole land. In many States parties are formed, or forming, for the insertion of such a constitutional amendment in the State fundamental law, and a large number of active minds are busy with the agitation for a like insertion in the national constitution. Will these efforts prove successful? We mean, will they, if successful in gaining the proximate end of constitutional prohibition, be successful in the ultimate object of destroying the rum monster? It is an invidious thing to find fault with a movement whose aim is the noblest and whose spirit is the purest. It is easy and natural to count such a fault-finder as an enemy to the truth, as an ally of the special foe, as seeking adroitly to weaken the progress of reform. And yet conscientious men must do that invidious thing, when they see that a reform, with however noble a purpose, is riding over the clearest principles of right and actually preparing the way for the utter failure of the noble purpose. Reformers should not,

in reforming on their line, open other lines of error that shall need reform. It is unwise treatment to cure a chill by producing a fever.

The prime objection to a constitutional amendment on the subject of temperance is that it is wholly unnecessary. Law, as enacted by a legislature, would be just as efficacious. A people will obey a statute just as soon as an article in the fundamental law. Again, a constitution is not the place for such specific applications of principle, but for the general principle itself. If the constitution says that the legislature shall have power to make all laws necessary to the peace and welfare of the community, and then lays down certain principles which limit this grant of power, it has done all a constitution should do. Anything further destroys its character as a constitution. If one detailed law is to be inserted, why not a thousand? If a law against the sale of ardent spirits, why not a law against an equal evil, the prostitution of women? Why not a law against gambling, which slays its thousands annually? Making the constitution a statute-book is to mar its character and influence and to confound things that differ. Such an action must have a reaction. The people will some time see what an error they have made, and when these laws are wiped off the constitution, their prestige will suffer. That which has influence must never be apparently degraded. If so, the influence is gone, or at least modified. To exalt, therefore, a law and put it into the constitution, when afterward it must be removed from its false position, is really to degrade that law. This degradation of the prohibitory law we shall inevitably see in those States which now so eagerly lift it into the constitution. Such a righteous restoration of the law to its own place will be claimed (falsely, and yet effectively) by the rum interest as a victory for them.

But there is another error in this movement, which so greatly involves principle that consciences must speak out. The movement makes no discrimination between things that differ. Fermented wine differs as widely from distilled rum or whisky as coffee differs from opium, and yet this prohibitory movement ties them up in the same bundle and puts the one label on the whole! Human reason revolts at such arbitrary dealing. There is a broad and deep common sense throughout the community, which, without conscious reasoning, rejects all this and will render all attempts of the kind futile in the end. It may be quiet for a time while a wild, panic-like fury impels the reformers, but it will assert itself as surely as water will seek and find its level. Men will not believe that a glass of wine at the dinner-table and a glass of whisky at the bar are the same thing, any more than they will believe that a cup of coffee at the dinner-table and a whiff of opium at Ah-Ching's are the same thing. Men will not believe that a glass of wine is the beginning of drunkenness, although they have heard it asserted *ad nauseam* all their lives. Men will not believe that the fermented

juice of the grape from Nature's own process is to be classed with the results of manufacture through man's alembics. Men will not believe that the universal praise of wine by every people in all ages, including the sacred writers of the Holy Scriptures, is an error and a sin. One of the chief reasons of the ill success of the temperance movements of past years is this failure to discriminate, and by carrying this plan into the present effort the temperance leaders are showing that they learn nothing from the past. The improvement among educated people in the drinking customs of society is due, not to any of these extreme total abstinence movements, but to the general growth of sensible temperance; and yet these fanatical people claim it all as *their* triumph, and so go on in their most mistaken policy. The total abstinence movement has always been a hindrance to true temperance reform, by setting sensible people against all proper effort to help reform on account of the absurd complexion the reform has assumed. The vast numbers in the United States who would have fought as splendid soldiers for temperance have remained comparatively idle all these years, through fear of being identified with the extremists who had usurped the title of Temperance men. All this loss is rightfully laid at the door of the Total Abstinence propaganda. That the temperance question should be made a political question is most desirable. No question more vitally concerns the whole country with respect to its highest welfare. We should have temperance men in office and temperance laws enacted. But temperance must be temperance. It must be a sensible and practical scheme that sensible and practical men will support which shall bring about the desired reformation. It must be a scheme which the great majority of moral men will recognize to be sound in its logic and even in its justice. Anything else than this may, under pressure of an excitement, achieve a temporary success, but only this will be a permanent cure of the rampant abomination. The liquor men are now more defiant and more numerous, in proportion to the population, than in any former period. They work their criminal mills openly in the face of all, and we see the streams of vice and crime pouring forth from these sources to lay waste the community and overwhelm the dikes which philanthropy has erected. The courts, the police, and the public officers generally, seeing the bold mien of these disturbers of the peace, find it easier for their weak natures to humor them and to connive at their wicked works than to oppose them. The great majority of the community are thus oppressed and tyrannized over by this minority, who laugh at law and hound the defenders of law. The only end of this enormity will be in the *union of the majority*, and this can never be effected by extreme measures or fanatical pronouncements. Discrimination between liquors that are hurtful and those that are (in moderate use) healthful; discrimination between modes of drinking, as treating and drinking at meals; discrimination between places for drinking only and places for lunch or dinner; discrimination between drinking on the premises where the liquor is sold and drinking it at home; discrimination between day and night in the sale,—these and other like discriminations are to be made in place of the sweeping demands of the ultra men if a union of temperance forces is to be consummated. Without this

union the evil must go on propagating itself daily, and on the so-called temperance leaders must rest the blame. They have constituted an unreasonable shibboleth. When they abandon that the enemy will be conquered, unless meanwhile the enemy shall have conquered all the ground and made our land a moral desert. Admirable laws, exactly suited to diminish the curse and destroy the political power of the rum interest, have been introduced into the New York Legislature, and would have been enacted but for the solid vote against them of the so-called temperance members, directed by their "Temperance" constituency at home. This class of reformers will have their zeal intensified by the action of Kansas and Iowa, and they may carry a few more of the States. Would to God their success were really success, that the rum interest were stricken to the heart by it! But not until the reaction takes place, and these men are convinced of their error and are ready to build on truth and not on impulse, can we expect that union of all good elements which will finally dig the grave of Rum and bury him beyond all resurrection.

The Reticence of American Politicians.

ONE of the most singular facts in American politics to-day is the reluctance of party leaders to discuss the public questions of the time. To whatever cause this reluctance is due, the fact itself is too well known to require proof, being constantly apparent in the conduct of our public men without distinction of party. In reading the speeches and debates in Congress, for instance, we rarely find in them a firm grasp of the subject in hand, or anything beyond an attempt to humor some interest, class, or section, or to advance the personal fortunes of the speakers. So also in addressing the people, it is seldom that a politician of either party handles a subject of living interest with the ability and ease of a master, while some of the most important questions are habitually passed over with as little notice as possible.

Take, for instance, the subject of administrative reform. This has been more widely discussed among the people than any other reformatory measure of the time; yet very few of our public officers, administrative or legislative, have contributed anything toward the reform, either by advocating it before the people or by devising methods for putting it into practice. On the subject of the tariff, again, many members of Congress seem to be all at sea, their treatment of it indicating either great ignorance of the subject or great timidity in acting out their convictions. On the question of inter-state commerce and the government of corporations, which bids fair to become the leading issue in American politics, our public men have nothing to say; and the same is true as to nearly every question that now interests the public mind.

Such conduct on the part of the people's representatives can hardly be paralleled in any other country where free government exists. It is the business of leaders to lead; and in all free countries the people look to the leaders of parties to formulate public opinion and prepare the issues of the time. In England, the discussion of all important questions, pending and prospective, is recognized as one of the most essential

TOPICS OF THE TIME.

Central Park in Danger.

WE have a comely city, we of New York,—a city of extraordinary natural advantages, some of which remain neglected, but many of which we have skillfully availed ourselves of for purposes of beauty and recreation. The trouble with us is that we do not fully know, appreciate, and cherish what we have. New Yorkers, as a class, seem to be more bent upon getting on in the world,—reaching out for something beyond,—than upon enjoying, providing for, and jealously guarding what they already possess. The city, collectively considered, is supposed to be proud, for instance, of its Central Park, and yet for years it has permitted the affairs of this same much-vaunted and really much-enjoyed pleasure-ground to be grossly mismanaged—until, to-day, notwithstanding the existence of a Board of Commissioners charged with the custody of its affairs, the only trustworthy and vigilant guardians of the Park are the newspapers of the city, which keep a sharp look-out, and now and again sound a note of alarm when some new act of vandalism is threatened.

At the moment of writing, the press is once again in full cry. The Board of Commissioners has succeeded in getting rid, one after another, of the two eminent experts, Messrs. Vaux and Parsons, whose engagement in the service of the Board was, not long ago, hailed as the beginning of a new *régime*; and, meantime, the Commissioners, it seems, propose to go to work and destroy, for the purposes of a menagerie, one of the prettiest and rarest spots in the whole Park. There being now no expert connected with the management of the Park, the proposed desecration is, of course, not recommended by any official whom the public are willing to accept as both competent and responsible; and it is known that the experts who have recently been forced to resign their positions would never have consented to the ruin of the meadow which the newspapers have been trying so hard to save.

We say that the newspapers are looking after the affairs of the Park with commendable zeal. But on the part of the general community there appears, at least, to be an apathy which we suspect would not exist, under the same circumstances, in any other large city of this continent. Park management by newspaper evidently works better in New York than park management by commissioners,—as said commissioners have been managing these many years. (Or shall we call it park butchery, tempered by newspaper criticism?) But if the people of this city had the proper feeling of citizenship, they would long ago have done something more effectual than grumbling by proxy. Yet, that the public are displeased with the present state of affairs there is not the slightest doubt. That the indignation is gathering force and intensity there is some reason to hope.

When the public does become thoroughly aroused, we believe that it will demand a more radical cure for the present evils of park management than has yet

been applied. One trouble with the Board, as at present constituted, is that the number of commissioners established—namely, four—makes it difficult to arrive at a majority vote for any measure. It has been found by experience that the Board is much more likely to be at a dead-lock of two to two than it is to reach a decision by a majority vote of three to one. This is in part the origin of the pitiable wrangling that, for the past half a dozen years (with rare intervals of apparent peace), has made the published proceedings of the Board of Commissioners of the Department of Public Parks a disgrace to the city. Of late, secret executive sessions have been instituted, and newspaper readers have been spared those grotesque accounts of meetings of the Board, which, at times in the past, have seemed more like reports of the inelegant altercations of pot-house politicians than the recorded debates of high public officials having in charge a costly and magnificent work of art.

When the public does act in good earnest—and, judging by analogy, it is sure to do so sooner or later—it will, we say, insist upon a radical cure. It will strike both at the membership and organization of the Board; and it will insist, moreover, upon the retention in the management of the Park of the very best and the very best known experts. Landscape gardening, architecture, and tree-planting are arts and occupations which ordinary business men, or politicians, or engineers, no matter how well trained and competent in their own lines, should not undertake without skilled and responsible advice. It happens that, just at present, one of the ruling four has more knowledge of a kind which should be valuable to a Commissioner than has often been the case with members of the Board. But this gentleman does not, we are sure, claim to be an expert on all the points covered by Messrs. Vaux and Parsons, nor has he the definite authority of an expert with his compeers of the Board, nor has his reputation as an “expert” been increased in the community by his having countenanced the installation of the menagerie in the South Meadow, and the consequent ruin of what we are inclined to believe the most beautiful glade of the whole Park.

In a word, the Department has forfeited the confidence of the public; every man in the Board pulls his own way; the experts are gone; the entire service is demoralized; and the Central Park is daily and hourly in danger.

The Spiritual Effects of Drunkenness.

THE curse of drunkenness, on the side of its physical devastations, has been abundantly depicted by the advocates of the temperance reform. The amount of grain consumed in the manufacture of intoxicating liquors; the number of men whose labor is worse than wasted in producing and in vending them; the number of lives destroyed by them; the number of paupers and insane persons whose woes are traceable to this source;

the effects upon the health of individuals of the habitual use of intoxicants,—all these things are frequently set forth with sufficient fullness in impressive rhetoric. Some allowances must be made for the over-statement of zealous advocates; but there are facts enough, of an appalling nature, in these representations, to call for the most serious thought.

But the worst side of drunkenness is not that which appears in these familiar figures. The most frightful effects of the drink-habit are not those which can be tabulated in statistics and reported in the census. It is not the waste of corn, nor the destruction of property, nor the increase of taxes, nor even the ruin of physical health, nor the loss of life, which most impresses the mind of the thoughtful observer of inebriety. It is the effect of this vice upon the characters of men, as it is exhibited to him, day by day, in his ordinary intercourse with them. It is in the spiritual realm that the ravages of strong drink are most terrible.

Body and mind are so closely related that when the one suffers the other must share the suffering; and the injury of the physical health resulting from intemperate drinking must, therefore, be accompanied by similar injury of the mental and moral powers. But the inclination of the popular thought is so strongly toward the investigation of physical phenomena, that the spiritual consequences of drunkenness are often overlooked. Degeneration of tissue is more palpable than degeneracy of spirit; a lesion of the brain more startling than a breach of faith; but the deeper fact, of which the senses take no note, is the more important fact; and it would be well if the attention of men could be fixed upon it.

The phenomena to which we have referred often report themselves to the quickened perceptions of those who stand nearest to the habitual drinker. Many a mother observes, with a heart that grows heavier day by day, the signs of moral decay in the character of her son. It is not the flushed face and the heavy eyes that trouble her most; it is the evidence that his mind is becoming duller and fouler, his sensibilities less acute, his sense of honor less commanding. She discovers that his loyalty to truth is somewhat impaired; that he deceives her frequently, without compunction. This effect is often observed in the character of the inebriate. Truthfulness is the fundamental virtue; when it is impaired the character is undermined; and strong drink makes a deadly assault upon it. Coupled with this loss of truthfulness is that weakening of the will which always accompanies chronic alcoholism. The man loses, little by little, the mastery over himself; the regal faculties are in chains. How many of his broken promises are due to a debilitated will, and how many to a decay of his veraciousness, it would be impossible for the victim himself to determine. Doubtless his intention to break off his evil habit is sometimes honest, and the failure is due to the paralysis of his will; doubtless he often asseverates that such is his purpose at the moment when he is

contriving how he shall obtain the next dram. It is pitiful to mark the gradual decay of these prime elements of manliness in the character of the man who is addicted to strong drink.

This loss of self-respect, the lowering of ambition, and the fading out of hope are signs of the progress of this disease in the character. It is a mournful spectacle—that of the brave, ingenuous, high-spirited man sinking steadily down into the degradation of inebriety; but how many such spectacles are visible all over the land! And it is not in the character of those alone who are notorious drunkards that such tendencies appear. They are often distinctly seen in the lives of men who are never drunk. Sir Henry Thompson's testimony is emphatic to the effect that "the habitual use of fermented liquors, to an extent far short of what is necessary to produce intoxication, injures the body and diminishes the mental power." If, as he testifies, a large proportion of the most painful and dangerous maladies of the body are due to "the use of fermented liquors, taken in the quantity which is conventionally deemed moderate," then it is certain that such use of them must result also in serious injuries to the mental and moral nature. Who does not know reputable gentlemen, physicians, artists, clergymen even, who were never drunk in their lives, and never will be, but who reveal, in conversation and in conduct, certain melancholy effects of the drinking habit? The brain is so often inflamed with alcohol that its functions are imperfectly performed; and there is a perceptible loss of mental power and of moral tone. The drinker is not conscious of this loss; but those who know him best are painfully aware that his perceptions are less keen, his judgments less sound, his temper less serene, his spiritual vision less clear, because he carries every day a little too long at the wine. Even those who refuse to entertain ascetic theories respecting these beverages may be able to see that there are uses of them that stop short of drunkenness, and that are still extremely hurtful to the mind and the heart as well as the body. That conventional idea of moderation, to which Sir Henry Thompson refers, is quite elastic; the term is stretched to cover habits that are steadily despoiling the life of its rarest fruits. The drinking habit is often defended by reputable gentlemen to whom the very thought of a debauch would be shocking, but to whom, if it were only lawful, in the tender and just solicitude of friendship, such words as these might be spoken: "It is true that you are not drunkards, and may never be; but if you could know, what is too evident to those who love you best, how your character is slowly losing the firmness of its texture and the fineness of its outline; how your art deteriorates in the delicacy of its touch; how the atmosphere of your life seems to grow murky and the sky lowers gloomily above you,—you would not think your daily indulgence harmless in its measure. It is in just such lives as yours that drink exhibits some of its most mournful tragedies."

in accordance with the strongest trait of their works this year, into (1) ideal, (2) romantic, (3) dramatic, (4) historical, (5) moral, (6) didactic, (7) realistic; then we get for (1) Miss Woolson, (2) Mr. Crawford and Mr. King, (3) Mr. Harte and Mr. Hawthorne, (4) Judge Tourgée, (5) Miss Woolson and Mr. Howells, (6) Mr. Howells and Mr. James, (7) Messrs. Howells, James, and King, and Miss Woolson. I may be wrong; but it seems to me that by classifying in this way one gets a clearer idea of the conscious and unconscious aim of these various writers, and brings into relief the really important elements in books which are necessarily complex mixtures in different proportions of all the above seven qualities. The field for the novelist is immense, the demand is great, the prizes are immediate and rich. Few novels reach the higher planes of literary art. Unfortunately there is every inducement for flashy and crude work. No wonder novelists feel that the sooner they rush into print the better, for the poorest and hastiest work often brings in most money; and if they have a good idea, ten to one it will occur to somebody else who wields the pen of the ready writer and appear before the month is up. Much trash is published, that we all know. Among the twelve novels considered above, much trash is distributed. Yet, perhaps, without the trash no general interest will awake; without the interest of the general, no keen competition will set in between publishers; and without keen competition no great novels of the future will be forthcoming. Meantime, with so many practiced and conscientious workmen and workwomen on hand, I for one do not despair of the republic of letters. Novels are not epics, but they are the books that are read to-day. The public has a right to demand that they shall contain the best the writer can afford; and people should feel individually bound to encourage those novelists who seem to aim for and reach the highest standard of literary art by the simplest, most obvious course—by purchasing their books.

Alfred Arden.

"The Temperance Outlook."

EDITOR OF THE CENTURY:

Sir: The article with the above title, under "Topics of the Time," in the September number of your magazine, calls for something to be said upon the other side; and presuming upon the spirit of fairness which has always characterized THE CENTURY and its predecessor, I shall ask to be heard in opposition to your views.

It is conceded that there is considerable force in your first objection to constitutional prohibition; yet that kind of legislation is justified by precedent. There is probably no State constitution which does not contain more or fewer of such "specific applications of principle"; and though it seems more appropriate to have laws enacted by the Legislature, composed of the representatives of the people, yet if the people, in their capacity as the primary source of all political power, see fit to indulge in legislation, they are perfectly competent to do so; and perhaps it is not unreasonable for them to do this where the object, as in this case, is to make the legislation more permanent, and not subject to repeal by a temporary change in

public sentiment or by the accidents arising from exciting partisan contests.

Your second objection rests upon assumptions which are unsound, or upon asserted facts which are not facts. You say, "This movement makes no distinction between things that differ. Fermented wine differs as widely from distilled rum or whisky as coffee differs from opium, and yet this prohibitory movement ties them up in the same bundle and puts one label on the whole! Human reason revolts at such arbitrary dealing." I think it will be found, on investigation, that the human reason which revolts at this dealing is the reason belonging to a class of persons who have been educated to use fermented wine, and to think the use of rum and whisky vulgar. Fermented wine does not differ from distilled rum and whisky as coffee differs from opium. The difference between fermented and distilled liquors is a difference in degree only, and not in character or quality. The active element in all of them is alcohol; and if that were eliminated from them, no one would drink either. The alcohol in the fermented wine is the same as that in the brandy distilled from it. The latter contains four or five times the amount of alcohol which the wine did before the distillation,—that process having merely removed a large portion of the water which the wine contained; and the difference between them is the same as the difference between the punch which the novice in tipping delights in and the "whisky straight" which the old toper swallows with equal satisfaction. Both are drinking diluted alcohol,—the one drink simply containing a larger amount of nature's own beverage than the other.

Perhaps some "men will not believe that a glass of wine at the dinner-table and a glass of whisky at the bar are the same thing"; but they nevertheless produce the same effect; and the only difference worth noting is that the latter is regarded in polite society as more vulgar. Both produce intoxication, and both are damaging to the drinker. It may be less disgraceful to eat one's opium at home than to take it in a pipe at Ah Ching's den; but the result to the individual who uses it will be no worse (physically, at least) in the latter than in the former. It will require a few more glasses of wine or beer at the dinner-table to intoxicate the drinker, but it will accomplish that result just as effectually as the whisky that is dispensed at the bucket-shop on the corner. And as for a glass of wine being the beginning of drunkenness, the experience of mankind for a thousand years and more has demonstrated the soundness of the theory; and although some men have heard this declaration with disgust, and have sneered at the fanatics who have urged it, yet a large portion of these same men, in their subsequent years, proved the correctness of the unsavory assertion. It is seldom, indeed, that men learn to be drunkards by drinking whisky, brandy, or any other distilled liquors, which usually contain fifty per cent. or more of pure alcohol, and never without diluting these liquors till the drink contains as small a percentage of alcohol as champagne. They commence with the lighter beverages or fermented liquors,—beer, cider, and wine; and in the use of these they can and do become as grossly intoxicated as they afterward do upon the stronger drinks. Alcohol creates and

strengthens a thirst for itself, and that thirst grows constantly, so that it is continually demanding a larger amount for its satisfaction. Thus, drunkenness grows from a glass of wine; and even so long ago as the days of the deluge, the drunken Noah would undoubtedly have resorted to whisky, had there been a distillery or licensed grog-shop convenient to Mount Ararat. If some people have heard, *ad nauseam*, the assertion that wine is often the beginning of drunkenness, they are like the members of the human family generally, who thus listen to unwelcome truths.

You speak of the impropriety of "classing the fermented juice of the grape from nature's own process with the results of the manufacture through man's alembics." Fermentation is, of course, nature's own process, and so is distillation. But left alone, without the aid of man, nature produces no alcohol; at least, none in any appreciable quantity. Wine and whisky are alike the products of man's skill and labor, using nature's own processes in their manufacture. But it does not follow that wine and beer are innocuous, even if they are produced by nature's own process, and without the aid of man; nor that rum and whisky are necessarily poisonous, because they "are the results of the manufacture through man's alembics." The deadly nightshade is "the result of nature's own process," but it is as destructive of animal life as are any of the products of man's manufacture. It is impossible to make a "discrimination between alcoholic liquors that are hurtful and those that are (in moderate use) healthful," because none are healthful. The alcohol which you abominate in whisky and gin is the same alcohol which the total-abstinence people abominate in wine and beer also.

The total abstainers occupy a position where they cannot be affected by the cry of fanaticism; for the total-abstinence principle or theory rests mainly upon the fact, now fully demonstrated by science and confirmed by experience, that *alcohol is a poison*. This being so, it cannot form an important element in a healthful beverage; and its use as a beverage must be injurious and destructive to health and life, at least when used in a quantity sufficient to produce an effect which may be either seen or felt. The experience of humanity for many generations proves that such is the effect of its use. But because we and our fathers, for hundreds of years, have been educated with the idea that this fiery liquid is not only not poisonous, but, used in a certain way, is healthful, nutritious, and a conservator of life,—an *aqua vite*,—we find it difficult to rid ourselves of this notion, and to learn how deadly and dangerous an agent it is. And many have not only had this error firmly rooted in their minds, but have also learned to love these fermented liquids so much that that love warps their judgment; and seeing the community laid waste by intemperance, and unwilling to admit that their favorite beverages have helped to produce the drunkenness that stirs us to action, they make their war against the distilled liquors, and thereby

"Compound for sins they are inclined to,
By damning those they have no mind to."

The total-abstinence people being in the right, fidelity to truth and to their convictions compels them to

pursue the course which you condemn. To do otherwise would be to stultify themselves and justly subject them to the charge of pandering to falsehood, while professing a desire to suppress it. Knowing that alcohol is a poison, they must of necessity denounce its use, whether it is mingled with twice or six times its weight of water. And they must be allowed to differ with you in opinion as to the character of the legislation which they have defeated. They have never opposed the enactment of any laws "exactly suited to diminish the curse and destroy the political power of the rum interest"; but they have opposed, and will continue to oppose, the enactment of laws which are claimed to be in the interest of temperance, but which in reality are well calculated to strengthen the interests of the rum power.

Walter Farrington.

Hurricane Reform.

THE nostrum of constitutional prohibition of the liquor traffic, which is now pressed in many quarters as the panacea for the evils of intemperance, is a dose that should be well shaken before taken. Prohibition is one thing, and it may, in certain states of society, be a very good thing. But constitutional prohibition is quite another thing; and there are those who might under certain circumstances favor prohibition, but who would never, under any circumstances, consent to introduce prohibitory legislation into the organic law of the State. Such an attempt to forestall public sentiment, and to prevent the free expression of the popular will in legislation, ought not to be made and is not likely to succeed.

There are quite a number of methods of dealing by law with the evils of intemperance. No one of these methods will be found practicable in every community; much depends on the sentiments and the habits of the community. The people ought to be free to adopt those measures which seem to be the best adapted to their condition, and there ought to be no obstruction in the way of their changing a method which has proved ineffectual for one that promises better results. If they come to the conclusion that prohibition is the best method, they ought to be free to try it, and there should be nothing in their constitution to forbid the experiment. If they think that a combination of high license or stringent taxation with local option would be more effectual, they should not be debarred from trying that. But this scheme of constitutional prohibition shuts the Legislature up to one method. It is prohibition or nothing. So long as the Legislature is continuously and heartily favorable to prohibition, we shall have prohibition; whenever a Legislature that does not favor prohibition shall assemble, the prohibitory law will be repealed, or amended so that it will have no force, and then we shall have free liquor. One runs no risk in saying that there are but few States in this Union in which the Legislature will be continuously and heartily in favor of prohibition. In States where the public sentiment tends so strongly in this direction that such a Legislature could be kept in power, there is no need of any constitutional provision. The only State in which prohibition has been successful is Maine, whose constitution has until the last winter been silent

on the subject. In those States where the public sentiment cannot be relied on to send back a prohibitory Legislature term after term, the evil would remain, much of the time, wholly free from legal restraint, in spite of the constitutional provision.

In Ohio, after a long era of free rum,—the natural fruit of a constitutional provision forbidding license,—we have at last succeeded in securing a tax law, with a local-option section by which municipalities are empowered to prohibit the sale of liquor within their limits. The law seems to be based on a sound principle,—that of laying a special burden upon a business which is confessedly detrimental to the public welfare,—and there is no difficulty in enforcing it. It is compelling the liquor-sellers to contribute nearly two millions of dollars a year as a special tax to the treasury of the State. Doubtless this law can be improved. The tax ought to be heavier than it is, and it can be made heavier year by year. The privilege of local option ought to be extended to counties as well as to municipal corporations—the township in this State being a somewhat incoherent political division. With some such modifications, this law would probably prove about as effectual in restraining the evils of drunkenness as any law that we are likely to secure at present. But a strenuous effort is now making to pass a prohibitory amendment to the constitution. Under this amendment, the present law would, of course, be null and void. Whether anything would be gained by this change may well be doubted. The present law does not suppress all the evils of intemperance, but it does lessen them somewhat; it has closed a large number of the worst grogeries in the State, it has imposed a heavy fine upon the liquor business, and it is certain that it can be enforced in all parts of the State.

Could a prohibitory law be thus enforced? I have frequently put this question to my prohibitory friends, and they all, with one accord, confess that it could not. In the smaller communities it could be executed, they say; but not in Cincinnati, nor in Cleveland, nor in Columbus, nor in Toledo, nor in any other of a dozen cities or large towns that could be named—of course, not at present. "But," they say, "we are going to work up a public sentiment that will enforce it by and by." I confess that this seems to me a curious proceeding. It is proposed to enact a law which is sure to be trampled under foot by a good half of the population, and then, after enacting it, and while it is being mocked at and dishonored, to proceed to create the public sentiment which shall make it effective! The child Alice, in Mr. Carroll's fairy tale, found something like this in Looking-glass Land, but I never heard before of applying such principles to problems of statesmanship.

What the success of this attempt to introduce prohibition into the constitution of Ohio may be, I will not try to predict; before these words are in print the result will be known. But inasmuch as the same effort is making in other States, it may be well to consider the consequences of such a provision. These amendments all forbid the manufacture and sale as a beverage of all alcoholic liquors. The execution of a law based on this amendment would be a difficult undertaking. So far as the retailing of liquor in saloons is concerned, the problem is simple; the phrase "as a beverage" is easily applied to this part of the business. But how could it be determined whether the

manufacturer was manufacturing it to be used "as a beverage" or for use in the arts? Beer, of course, is used almost exclusively as a beverage, and the brewer could not shield his business against the prohibition. If the law were enforced the breweries would be closed. But the distillers could claim that they were manufacturing liquor not to be used as a beverage, but for other purposes; that they were selling it to the wholesale dealers with the understanding that it should be used for other purposes; and I am unable to see how the law could be successfully enforced against them. In this case the distilleries would all be running, and the breweries all closed; we should have an abundant supply of the stronger intoxicants, and a small supply of the lighter beverages; it would be difficult to get lager-beer and easy to get whisky. Perhaps the history of Scotland would then be repeated in our country. The date I am not able to mention; but students of history will recall the legislation which forbade or sharply restricted the manufacture of ale in Scotland, with the purpose of giving a monopoly of the business to the English brewers. The Scotch in anger forsook their ale and drank whisky instead, and the result was a swift and terrible increase of drunkenness. The excise returns of Great Britain to-day show that the average Englishman consumes nearly three times as much malt every year as the average Scotchman, and only one-third as much spirits. Scotland, as its best men sorrowfully confess, is one of the most intemperate countries in the world, and this sad result is partly due to the selfish and mischievous legislation to which I have referred.

There are a good many among us to whom a sharp reduction in the supply of both the stronger and the milder kinds of intoxicants would cause no inconvenience or regret; but even to us there appears to be a choice between evils; and we should be sorry to see whisky taking the place of beer as the popular beverage. Legislation having that tendency would certainly be ill-advised.

I find another serious difficulty with this prohibitory amendment. If it should accomplish the purpose of its authors, it would, of course, destroy the larger part of the capital now invested in the manufacture of spirituous and fermented liquors. Now I confess that I never look with enthusiasm on a big distillery or a big brewery. It is not a kind of business in which I should engage. I would starve first. It is a wonder to me that kind-hearted and otherwise reputable men (for there are such) should be willing, in view of the evils that flow from it, to get their living by it. Nevertheless, these men have embarked all their capital in the business, and it seems to me a harsh and inequitable procedure to sweep their property out of existence by an act of the Legislature. Even these men have some rights, and the State cannot afford to ignore them.

I have been reading an admirable speech lately delivered by the Hon. John Bright, at the opening of a coffee-house in Birmingham. Mr. Bright has long been a total abstainer; he believes himself to be a thorough-going temperance man; but he protests with vigor against such sweeping measures. "I am against dealing," he says, "with a question of this nature, affecting the interests of so many people, by what you may call a hurricane. That is fit only for times of revolution. I should like to deal with it in a

more just, and what I call more statesmanlike manner, according to the legislation that becomes an intelligent people in a tranquil time." Mr. Bright contends that, "if a trade in the country is permitted by law, that trade has a right to be defended by law." The liquor trade has been permitted, and is now permitted, and "it has a right to demand that it should not be subjected to violent and hasty legislation." The simple justice of this sentiment ought to be apparent to all fair-minded men. If for a long period of time men have been allowed, without censure of the law, to invest their capital in any kind of property, that property should not be extinguished by law without giving them some compensation. At any rate, some time ought to be given them to dispose of it, or turn it to other uses. It is quite possible that the people may come to the conclusion that a trade long permitted and protected by law is contrary to public morals or public policy, and may resolve upon extinguishing it, but the interests of the men engaged in it ought to be fairly considered. Slavery was a great wrong, and ought to have been abolished; but it would not have been right to abolish slavery in a time of peace by an act of Congress, without providing compensation to the owners of the slaves. It might justly be enacted, as in New York, that all persons born after a certain day should be free. The liquor business should be dealt with in some such manner. It could be restricted more summarily, no doubt; but some regard should certainly be paid to the property rights of the men who are engaged in it.

I am perfectly well aware of the answer that will be made to these suggestions. It will be said that the writer is undoubtedly a wine-bibber, probably a "rummy," and possibly in the pay of a Liquor Dealers' League. What will be charged upon Mr. Bright, I forbear to predict. But it is easy to anticipate the reception which awaits all moderate counsels in the camp of the professional temperance reformers. I see that THE CENTURY has been suffering this sort of violence, and am reminded of the treatment Dr. Holland received in his day from the same hands. The following brief paragraph on the temperance question, quoted from one of his "Topics," is particularly timely at this moment:

"It would be impossible for any set of men to manifest greater bigotry and intolerance toward all who have seen fit to differ with them on moral and legal measures, than have characterized those zealous and thoroughly well-meaning reformers who, through various organizations, have assumed the custody and management of this question. Editors who have undertaken to discuss the question independently—as they are in the habit of discussing all public questions—have been snubbed and maligned until they have dropped it in disgust, and turned the whole matter over to those who have doubted or denounced them."

This extract will show that Dr. Holland, though dead, yet speaketh in a way that should cause a tingling in the ears of a large number of temperance reformers.

Washington Gladden.

More About "Law-and-Order Leagues."

I HAVE read with pleasure the editorial in the October number of THE CENTURY on "Law-and-Order Leagues," and also E. V. Smalley's letter on

the enforcement of law. Your article probably answered his questions, but permit me to add a word of information, through your columns, with reference to the work that is being done in this direction, especially in the State of Illinois and in the city of Chicago. At the present time Law-and-Order Leagues are being organized all over the country, and on the 22d of February last a delegate convention was held in Boston, which resulted in the organization of a National Citizens' Law-and-Order League. This League is now ready to assist any community in organizing an auxiliary association. I shall be happy to furnish any information upon this subject that may be desired. The practicability of the suggestions made by Mr. Smalley has been fully demonstrated. To illustrate: We have had in Illinois for ten years a law that any person who shall sell or give liquor to a minor (without orders from his parents, guardian, or physician) or to a drunkard shall be subject to a fine or imprisonment. No effort was made to enforce this law until 1877, when a Citizens' League was organized in Chicago with the specific purpose of enforcing the law in relation to minors. In two years the law was so well enforced that the police reports show a decrease of one-third in the arrests of minors as compared with the arrests in the two years previous to the organization of the League. In other words, the actual number of criminals among boys and girls was decreased one-third. The law with regard to both minors and drunkards is now enforced, and our three agents who devote all their time to the work report the arrest and prosecution of an average of eighty-five saloon-keepers every month, and the conviction of more than two-thirds this number.

We have about four thousand saloons in Chicago. Many of them are notoriously vicious places, and their proprietors do not scruple to further their own interests whether in accordance with law or not. But so strong has our Citizens' League grown in the esteem of the public, that the Saloon-keepers' Organization has incorporated a clause in the constitution of its society to the effect that no one who sells liquor to a minor or a drunkard, knowingly, shall be eligible to membership in this society. It is now not infrequent for saloon-keepers to inform the League of other saloon-keepers who are violating the law.

If such an organization can live and do good in this city, in which the government is almost entirely controlled by the liquor interest; it certainly ought to live and do much more good in cities less under the control of the saloon element.

Through the efforts of the Chicago League, a bill was passed at the last Legislature, increasing the saloon license from \$52 to \$500 (license to sell beer only, \$150). This law is now being vigorously enforced.

Yours truly,

J. C. Shaffer,

Sec. National Law-and-Order League.

126 WASHINGTON ST. CHICAGO.

A Word about Christmas.

WHEN what was designed to be a pleasure becomes a burden, it is time to stop and examine it carefully, and see if it is the thing itself which has grown to be such a weight, or whether it is simply an awkward manner of carrying it. Certainly there must be some-

effectual guarantees can be obtained without national supervision of the schools themselves. Moreover, if national aid is to be given, it would seem that it ought to be distributed among the States in some proportion to merit. It might be well to give some preference to those States in which illiteracy most abounds, since the removal of illiteracy is the object in view; but surely some preference should also be given to those that are most earnest in the work themselves, and prove their earnestness by the liberality of their appropriations and the efficiency of their schools. But, under the measure that has been proposed, the States that do the least for education, and have in consequence the largest illiterate population, would receive the largest share of the national bounty, and the longer they allowed their people to remain illiterate the more money they would receive. In short, the effect of the measure would be to put a premium on ignorance; and it is hard to see how the cause of popular education can be subserved by such means as that.

Meanwhile, if the nation at large wishes to do something for the removal of illiteracy, there are various legitimate ways in which it may do so. One of the best would be to amend the Constitution so as to prohibit any person from voting, either in national or in State affairs, unless he can read and write. Another and equally useful amendment would be one providing that members of the House of Representatives should be apportioned among the States, not, as at present, in proportion to their whole population, but in proportion to that part of their population that can read and write. A third measure, no less useful than either of these, and not requiring a change in the Constitution, would be a law prohibiting the naturalization of any person that cannot read and write. It may be well that our country should be a refuge for the oppressed of all lands; but there is no good reason why it should be the refuge of the ignorant and worthless of all lands, as it practically is to-day. By such measures as these the cause of popular education would be far more effectually promoted than by gifts of money from the national treasury; for they would compel both the States themselves and their illiterate population to do their best to remove the ignorance that now so widely prevails.

J. B. Peterson.

The Temperance Question.

SUGGESTIONS REGARDING TEMPERANCE WORK.

ONE of the greatest hinderances in the way of our temperance reform is the indifference of those whom we are pleased to call our "reputable citizens." This sin of indifference, for it may be characterized by such a grave term, cannot be placed at the door of saloon-keepers and politicians. They are ever watching their interests, and pushing them with all their powers. We sincerely hope that the discussion of the various phases of the temperance reform now going on throughout our country will awaken the sluggish and indifferent among our better classes to action, and create enough public sentiment to establish in all parts of the land associations with the specific object of enforcing the laws.

The liquor business, like a huge giant, comes out with his heavy coat of mail—political influence—and defies the arms of virtue and of right. Who shall dare to resist this modern Goliath? He sends out his challenge, and we must either find a David to oppose him or be overcome. Suppose we believe that we have at last found our David. The next point is, how shall David fight, and what shall constitute his armor? Some will say, "Let religion be his coat of mail"; others, "moral suasion"; and others, "prohibition." But David declines all this cumbrous armor for his first venture, strong and invincible as it may be under some circumstances. So, taking his sling, he selects five smooth stones from the brook Experience, and, thus armed, goes to meet the foe. But now for a moment he hesitates. Which stone shall he throw first? The first stroke must not fail; else the giant may cast his spear in contempt, and David and his cause be overthrown at the very outset. At length he resolves to throw first his smallest stone, *No sale of liquor to minors*. His practice with this insures his lodging it somewhere in his enemy. A fair blow with this stone will sink it so deep that the giant will lose most of his blood; and while he is falling, David will throw his second stone, *No sale of liquor to drunkards*. This will draw more life-blood. Then *No sale of adulterated liquors* will bring the haughty giant to his knees. Quickly following up these strokes with *No music in saloons* and *High license*, and Goliath is forsooth ready to die. Then will David advance, and with the sword of *Prohibition* cut off the dying monster's head.

Some will say the sword should be used first. But the reply comes: It has been tried; but the attempts only wounded instead of killing, and the giant hid away for a time in the dark, feigning to be dead, only to make his appearance again when his strength returned.

Prohibition, to be successful, must take away the demand for liquor. The Women's Christian Temperance Union, of Chicago, in a recent call, acknowledge that, after nine years of reform work, they are convinced that the only means of stopping intemperance is by educating the young; and to this end they urge the organization of Bands of Hope all over the country. Keep the growing youth out of the saloons, and the demand for liquor in a very few years must cease.

There is no community that will not support organizations that seek to enforce the law against the sale of liquor to minors and drunkards. When this is done, you have taken away from the liquor-dealers four-fifths of their customers. If you, then, enforce the law against selling adulterated liquors, you take away nearly all their profits, as well as all their liquors. Then enforce the law against music and stage performances in saloons, and you will drive away most of the remaining fifth of their patrons.

There will be a few saloon-keepers who may live off the moderate drinker's appetite; but the number will be so small that their influence in politics will count for naught, and your mayor will close them up quickly when requested by the reputable citizens, *whose favor and influence he will then court*.

One of the great mistakes of the temperance reform to-day is, that we try to accomplish too much at one time. The liquor business did not grow up in

a night. Neither can it be put down in a night. "Nothing wins like success." It does not pay to risk *all* in a first encounter with the enemy. Hence it is better to gain some little vantage-ground by light skirmishing before attempting the "grand assault." Our cause may be just, but the means to accomplish the end still remains a hard problem to solve.

The Citizens' Law-and-Order Leagues have done much toward the solution of this problem. We have reason to hope that the battles they are now fighting in the enforcement of the laws, together with the education of the young in temperance principles, may lead before long to the grand Prohibition assault upon the forces of Intemperance.

Permit a word as to the kind of men needed in the carrying on of a Law-and-Order League. If possible, you should find such a man for president as Mr. Franklin, in Dr. Gladden's "Christian League of Connecticut," a man of enthusiasm, but neither rash nor impracticable. Then you want, as his associates, the men described by Dr. Holland,—

"Men whom the spoils of office cannot buy;

Men who can stand before a demagogue,
And damn his treacherous flatteries without winking!
Tall men, sun-crowned, who live above the fog
In public duty and in private thinking:
For while the rabble, with their thumb-worm creeds,
Their large professions and their little deeds,
Mingle in selfish strife, lo! Freedom weeps,
Wrong rules the land, and waiting Justice sleeps!

J. C. Shaffer,

Sec. Nat. Law-and-Order League.

126 WASHINGTON STREET,
CHICAGO, ILL.

HIGH LICENSE.

NO SERVICE could be more valuable, or contribute more to the solution of the temperance question, than the discussions of its many phases now carried on in the "Open Letters" department of THE CENTURY MAGAZINE. But the article entitled "More about Law-and-Order Leagues" closes with a sentence which seems to me misleading, though unintentionally so, I doubt not, in that it conveys the impression of the vigorous efficiency of the high license law now operative in Illinois. The sentence reads as follows: "This law is now being vigorously enforced." That it is not being vigorously enforced in Chicago may be discovered any day at the City Hall, where the books will show that nearly four thousand saloons are paying into the city treasury one hundred and three dollars each for the year ending April 1, 1884. The City Council took pains before the law came into effect (July 1, 1883) to issue these licenses for the period named at double the old municipal rates, and the Attorney-General of the State has given an opinion favorable to this evasion of the intent and purposes of the act.

At least a dozen other towns and cities whose operations have come under my own observation have adopted the same device for making the law of none effect, and probably this number might be multiplied tenfold by persons equally cognizant of the facts in the case. All of which must be considered a large abatement in the vigorous enforcement of the law.

That it has been and is in many places enforced, as well as the laws it has superseded, will doubtless be conceded by all; but this is a weak recommendation surely, when Law-and-Order Leagues have been found necessary to secure this enforcement. In a few conspicuous instances it has considerably diminished the number of the saloons; but it is nowhere claimed, to my knowledge,—and I have been at much pains to arrive at the truth,—that it has lessened drunkenness or the sales of liquor.

The high license law is regarded by the Women's Christian Temperance Union, first, as *unjust*, because tending to create a monopoly in liquor-selling—to build up the powerful dealers who already do the most harm, and to crush out the weak ones who do the least; secondly, as *unwise financially*, because if the dealer pays \$500, instead of \$100, for his permit to engage in the business, he must certainly prosecute his trade more vigorously to win back the extra \$400 which has gone into the city's coffers, thus producing more misery, poverty, and crime; thirdly, as *unwise morally*, since it lends respectability and tone to the dealers who can afford the tax, and increases their ability to lure "the weak brother" and the sons of respectable homes and parentage; fourthly, as *un-Christian*, because it is, like all license laws, a recognition and permission of a traffic which is a crime against civil and a sin against divine government. It is also such a recognition and indorsement as tends to perpetuate rather than weaken or overthrow the system.

These are the views of nearly one hundred thousand mothers of our land. The palace saloon is our terror. Make the dens of sorrow, vice, and shame less respectable if you can, rather than raise their level to the pathway where our sons walk unsuspecting and guarded by every device which a mother's love can suggest.

Mary B. Willard.

PROHIBITION IN KANSAS.

I HAVE read with some interest the articles which have appeared in late numbers of THE CENTURY on the temperance question, and I have wondered if the editor, or Mr. Walter Farrington, or the Rev. Washington Gladden, had any direct knowledge of the workings of constitutional prohibition in Kansas.

It would not be an easy task to the thoughtful observer, denied personal contact with citizens of this State, to explain satisfactorily why a public sentiment which was strong enough in 1879 to force constitutional prohibition on the State of Kansas is so shamefully weak and impotent to-day. But, in mingling with the people, one readily finds a solution to the moral problem.

One citizen, seemingly and presumably intelligent as regards most questions of State or national interest, admits that he did not fully understand the magnitude of the question nor its vital relation to society; but he voted for constitutional prohibition because, in the abstract, it was desirable; and another citizen, representing another class, reckless of the great responsibility which would be thrown upon the State, voted for the amendment because he "wanted to see it tried." To these two classes, more criminally careless, it may

be, in the handling of their suffrage, than wanting in intelligence, Kansas owes its present constitutional amendment prohibiting the manufacture, sale, or barter of intoxicating liquors.

The amendment, then, does not owe its existence to a strong, healthy public sentiment, but to the carelessness of easy-going, experiment-loving citizens. As a consequence, when the extreme difficulty of its enforcement first began to be apparent, we found these two classes of citizens (the classes which gave the amendment its majority) the first to drop the measure and inveigh against its practicability.

And as a further consequence of this heavy desertion from Prohibition ranks, the law has never been seriously enforced in any part of the State, if we may except those communities where public sentiment is really opposed to liquor; and in those communities practical prohibition would be a fact under any law.

Here in Abilene, a town of some four thousand inhabitants and one of the most thriving, intelligent, and moral communities in the State, we have six saloons and one wholesale liquor house. They are run in open defiance of the law and in spite of the opposition of the radical Prohibitionists. Practically, there is no attempt on the part of authorities or citizens to close these saloons, and free beer and whisky are sold *ad libitum*. A similar condition of affairs exists in all parts of the State, and this utter disregard of law must of necessity bring shame and reproach upon the Commonwealth, and be an active source of danger to its integrity and authority. And instead of getting better, the condition of things is growing worse.

The most unfortunate thing which has happened to this question is the dragging of it into politics, and no one can fully understand the situation unless he is found in the heat and dust of the conflict. Political questions are subordinated to this Prohibition and anti-Prohibition craze, and men are elected or defeated according to their expressed views on this one subject. Even those prosecutions which we do have are started through party interests and exigencies, and it is frequently the case that saloon men who "stand in" with the dominant local party are protected, while others, who happen to be on the "wrong side of the fence," suffer from a discriminating and therefore unjust prosecution.

So far has this intolerant spirit been carried, that Prohibition in Kansas has become nothing more than a screaming farce, and it would seem that the quicker the amendment is resubmitted to the people and repealed, the better it will be for the morals and peace of mind of the State. Fancy a condition of things which impels the thirsty resident of Kansas City, suffering from the Downing law which closes Missouri saloons on Sundays, to cross the State line into Prohibition Kansas for the purpose of supplying himself with all the liquor he wants! In an article of this kind it is impossible to speak of the strife between neighbor and neighbor, the perjuries of the witness-box, and the disregard of official oaths, which are directly traceable to the Prohibition amendment.

It is the candid opinion of your correspondent, considering the present state of public morals and public appetite, that the liquor question is to be successfully handled only by high license and local option.

S. K. Strother.

"The Bread-Winners."

A LETTER FROM THE AUTHOR.

FOR several months I have listened in silence to a chorus of vituperation which seems to me unjust and unfounded, until my original purpose of replying to no form of misrepresentation has been so far shaken that I beg for a little space to correct some errors and to justify at least my intentions.

The charges of my critics may be divided into three heads:

1. "The Bread-Winners" is conceived from an aristocratic point of view.

2. It is not well written. The incidents are extravagant and untrue to nature.

3. It is a base and craven thing to publish a book anonymously.

The first charge seems to me too absurd to be considered seriously. I hardly know what is meant by an aristocratic point of view. I am myself a working man, with a lineage of decent working men; I have been accustomed to earning my own living all my life, with rare and brief holidays. I have always been in intimate personal relations with artisans and with men engaged in trade. I do not see how it is possible for an American to be an aristocrat; if such a thing exists, I have never met it. But because, in my little book, more attention is bestowed upon certain dangerous or vicious tendencies among the poor than upon the faults incident to wealth, I am called an aristocrat, or a snob,—a name equally vague and senseless, which, so far as I can discover, merely denotes that the man using it does not like the man to whom it is applied. The question may be asked, Why do I talk more about the failings of the poor than about those of the rich? Simply because I know more about them.

The germ of "The Bread-Winners" was a remark made to me by a friend of mine, a carpenter of Detroit. He said one day, when we were walking past the High School and talking of social matters, "There is hardly a carpenter's daughter in this town who will marry a carpenter." The image of Miss Maud Matchin then formed itself in my mind. A few days later I met Mr. Offitt in a railway train, and afterward, I came to know him well in a boarding-house we both frequented. Almost without my consciousness the story took shape as it was written. The hero of the tale is Offitt, not Farnham; the heroine is Maud, and not Alice. I care little about Farnham. It is true I gave him a fine house and a lot of money,—which cost me nothing,—but that was only because Miss Matchin would never have looked at him otherwise. He is a commonplace soldier, with a large property; he pretends to be nothing else. Some of my critics, to my amazement, have said, as if they were making a great discovery, that there is nothing remarkable about him. I never intended there should be. I probably could not have made him wise or learned or witty if I had tried,—but I certainly never tried. I wanted him to be a gentleman, and I think he is; but that I cannot discuss, for I have never known two people to agree upon a definition of a gentleman.

The only other rich people at all kindly treated in the book are Mrs. Belding and her daughter. And here another astonishing criticism has been made. This comes from the Boston "Transcript." The writer

would give a little more of their attention to the poor who would be glad to be their tenants, better results would certainly follow than where the management of the homes of the poor is left to landlords who are but little higher in position, and occasionally even more steeped in ignorance, than the tenants themselves. That tenement-houses are an evil, none will deny; that they are in most large cities a necessary evil, we are all obliged to admit. What I wish to urge is, that those who are willing to help the poor would do so by being to them kind and equitable landlords, thus establishing a relationship in which there should be a common interest and a mutual sympathy. To any one who wishes to undertake such work I would say:

Choose a central locality; let no one become your tenant whose previous history you have not investigated; make a few strict rules and adhere to them closely; and you are sure of success, if your heart is in your work.

Of course, experience is of service; but so far as our own individual work is concerned, we feel that the greatest value of the experiment is, that it may induce others to come forward to profit by its success, and in this hope we have presented the report of what has been done.

Alice N. Lincoln.

BOSTON, May, 1883.

	Receipts.	Repairs.	Care of house.	Sundries.
1879-80.....	\$1257.05	\$10.50	\$ 61.45	\$ 73.43
1880-81.....	1422.05	59.17	87.54	117.87
1881-82.....	1441.77	40.00	118.60	166.89

	Rent.	Total of expenses.	Balance on hand.
1879-80.....	\$1000.00	\$1145.38	\$111.67
1880-81.....	1000.00	1264.58	157.47
1881-82.....	1000.00	1325.49	116.28

	Loss by allowance on extra rooms.	Loss by prepayment.	Loss by rooms unlet.
1879-80.....	\$145.99	\$27.90	\$186.00
1880-81.....	159.20	29.70	70.75
1881-82.....	133.45	31.50	47.50

Since the above was written a second tenement-house has been taken in the same neighborhood, and has been managed substantially in the same way for nine months with gradually increasing prosperity and success.

Though hired by the Boston Co-operative Building Company, this building has been under the same control and subject to the same rules as the one to which the article refers; and it is gratifying to find that an experience of even three or four years has been of much service in undertaking a second enterprise of the same nature.

That "Hurricane Reform."

Among the "Open Letters" in the December CENTURY, I have read with great interest the article of my friend Dr. Washington Gladden entitled "Hurricane Reform." I happen to be one of the three hundred and twenty thousand in Ohio who do not agree with him on that subject; and, feeling that it is a matter of grave importance to this State, I beg the privilege of a friendly reply.

1. The first point of Dr. Gladden's argument against constitutional prohibition is that it would "forestall public sentiment and prevent the free expression of the popular will in legislation." Now, if this means that it would prevent free popular discussion on this subject, preparatory to legislation, I fail to see any force in the language. For example, we have had for thirty years a constitutional provision forbidding

license. Does Dr. Gladden intend to say that such provision has prevented the free expression of the popular will on that subject? If I mistake not, there has always been, and especially for the last ten months, the freest possible expression of the popular will in regard to license. Why should it not be so if the Constitution should forbid the existence of the liquor traffic itself? The truth is that the free expression of the popular will, preparatory to legislation, never has been and never can be prevented by anything in the Constitution.

If the above language means simply that the Legislature would be "shut up to one method," and not at liberty to try any other experiment, it is pertinent to ask, in the first place, how long, and to what extent? The Constitution is not the laws of the Medes and Persians. It can be changed whenever the popular will sees fit, and the Legislature chooses to submit a proposition for that purpose. In the second place, the Legislature would always have the utmost room for the play of ingenuity in perfecting legislation for the execution of the organic law. And it could hardly damage the Ohio Legislature to be shut up for a season to this one method, now that it has tried license for fifty years, and regulation without license for thirty more, and has ignominiously failed in both either to reduce or to mitigate the evils of the liquor traffic. Our fathers, in deciding to have a Constitution at all, seemed to think it important to have some things settled long enough to fairly test their efficiency. Indeed, the great advantage of constitutional over statutory prohibition is that it would, so far as law is concerned, lift this, the greatest moral question of the age, above the fluctuations incident to party scrambling for office and power. It may seem to the people of this State that, after three-quarters of a century of legislative trifling with this infinite evil, a few years of something else would be a blessing.

2. The second point of Dr. Gladden's argument is that prohibition would not work if secured. "It could not be enforced." This is a prophecy which has been repeated by many good men, together with the whole liquor fraternity, for many years in this State. On what is it based? What does it mean, to say that, among a certain class of citizens, constitutional law "cannot be enforced"? It means that the liquor fraternity are *law-breakers*, that they will not be governed by righteous laws. It means rebellion. Dr. Gladden knows that the average saloon-keeper in Ohio is a law-breaker, not simply as an individual, but by organized conspiracy against all law that tends to restrain his business. This admission is just as fatal against regulation as against prohibition.

Has it come to this, then, that the law-abiding majority of Ohio must succumb to the law-breaking minority? Is anarchy to be our rule for the future? I submit that, if law cannot be enforced among such men, that is a reason for striking at the existence of the traffic itself by constitutional enactment, rather than for playing at legislation any longer with professional criminals. To say that public sentiment will not sustain prohibition even if it were carried, means one of two things: either that it would be carried by a minority, which is impossible, or that it would not be sustained by the public sentiment of the law-breakers, which is not to be expected. It seems to be for-

gotten that whenever a majority of voters put prohibition in the Constitution, it will have the public sentiment at its back.

3. In the article under discussion, the remarkable assertion is made that, in Ohio, "the long era of free rum is the natural fruit of a constitutional provision forbidding license." I beg to call my friend's attention to the fact that he quite overlooks the history of the liquor traffic in this State. He seems to imagine that the no-license clause has been in the Constitution from the birth of the State, and that free rum has arisen from that circumstance. What are the facts? Ohio had the license system from 1802 to 1851. Did those forty-nine years of license abolish or diminish or even check the evils of intemperance? Did the liquor traffic dwindle and die under that treatment? The reverse is the fact. It grew to such enormous proportions that the people rose up in alarm and demanded the prohibition of license. The "popular will" has been expressed on that subject, and cannot be now turned back. It was during that long era that rum became free. For thirty-two years, now, we have had regulation without license. Has the evil been abated? No man will assert that it has. No; the fifty years of license gave the liquor traffic its legal standing, and the thirty years of regulation, not daring to touch the evil itself, has only attempted to mitigate its appalling results, and has failed even in that. And yet Dr. Gladden informs us that "free rum in Ohio is the natural result of a constitutional provision forbidding license." I venture the assertion that rum always will be "free" till a new thing happens in Ohio: till the whole weight of organic law is thrown, not against its consequences, but against the existence of the evil itself. When the heel of Government is put squarely down on the head of the viper, instead of the tail, we may begin to hope. When a sovereign State by its fundamental law prohibits and exhausts its power to enforce the prohibition of a great, organized, aggressive, defiant public evil, it has reached the ultimatum in both legislation and morals. If it fails then, it can at least die with a clear conscience.

4. Dr. Gladden's chief hope is in the tax-law. For one, I have no objection to taxing the liquor men of Ohio. I would as soon tax the business to death as prohibit it to death, if that were possible. But granting all that may be claimed for the Scott law, it is a poor, half-way measure, which does not appreciably reduce the evil against which it is aimed. While it recognizes and practically authorizes the traffic, its one redeeming feature—the local-option clause—is now well known to be an absolute failure. No man can truthfully assert that license and tax laws have ever really abolished the evil or even materially abated the evils of the liquor traffic in any State of this Union. On the other hand, prohibition has, until recently, been tried on a large scale only in one State; and there, on Dr. Gladden's own admission, it has been a success.

5. But a fifth point in this argument is that, under prohibition, "The distilleries would be all running and the breweries all closed." "Whisky would take the place of beer as the popular beverage." "Therefore, legislation having that tendency would certainly be ill-advised." This conclusion is certainly true, but what about the premise? Is it true? Does anybody, apart from Dr. Gladden, believe that a constitutional

law forbidding the manufacture and sale of all intoxicants as a beverage would keep all the distilleries running? Has anybody ever discovered such an anomaly? Are the distilleries all running in the State of Maine? How many are there, and where? Scotland is referred to. Was there ever in Scotland any "ill-advised" prohibitory law, such as we advocate here, which gave rise to the exclusive use of whisky? There were restrictions placed upon ale which may have had that tendency to some extent, but any parallelism between that case and ours is difficult to see.

6. The last objection that Dr. Gladden advances is one which seems to have a good show of fairness. "It would destroy the larger part of the capital now invested in the manufacture of spirituous and fermented liquors" (which looks a little as if Dr. Gladden did not really expect "all the distilleries to be running"). John Bright is quoted on this point to the effect that "if a trade is permitted by law, that trade has a right to be defended by law." A sentiment which no one will question; a sentiment, too, which suggests the madness of permitting by law what we do not wish to defend by law. I would commend this utterance to all the friends of license. But Dr. Gladden claims that, after allowing men for a long period of time to invest their capital in a certain kind of property without censure of law, it would be unjust to extinguish that property by law without some compensation. I agree with Dr. Gladden on this principle. It may be the duty of the State to compensate the brewers and distillers. The State could better afford to do that than to build asylums for inebriates, *provided* these men will absolutely abandon the business. There is one difficulty even with that. Nearly every man engaged in the liquor business, distiller, brewer, and saloonist, both in theory and in fact, is a conspirator against the laws of Ohio. When men stand in that relation to the laws of their country, a plea for indemnity does not come with very good grace. Dr. Gladden should remember that prohibition is sought, if at all, as a protection from a crime against society.

There is on foot just now in this State a benevolent movement for a State asylum for inebriates; each inmate is to be received after due conviction before a magistrate or a county court as a confirmed drunkard, and hence as a criminal; and to be put to penal service till cured. I should favor such an institution, provided the other class of criminals whom Governor Foster calls rebels against the laws, and who help to make the drunkards, could be received on similar terms. That might possibly help to solve the problem of State compensation for the loss of property.

On the whole, I recognize the argument of Dr. Gladden as able and adroit; but he does not seem to me adequately to grasp the moral aspects of the case. He seems to believe in license, but does not say whether it is morally right to legalize an essentially bad business. He advocates taxation, but does not tell whether taxing a saloon "disinfects it so that it will not produce pauperism and crime." He does not touch the question whether the payment of a tax lessens the vice of putting the bottle to our neighbor's lips, or whether it mitigates the doom of the drunkard and the woe of his family. He does not inform us whether, in the sight of God, law-makers, charged with the government of

moral beings and the welfare of the State, have done their whole duty when they have simply levied a tax upon law-breakers who are daily inflicting upon society an immeasurable wrong.

Dr. Gladden's suspicion that he would be called a "rummy" or a "wine-bibber" for uttering his sentiments on this subject, it is to be hoped, is not well founded. He is too well known as an earnest, active preacher of God's Word, to be liable to any such epithets. But many will regret that he, who is so forward in all good works in other directions, should take a position twenty-five years behind the wave of Christian progress in this.

James Brand.

OSBERLIN, OHIO.

Comment.

MR. BRAND has placed me under great obligation by the courtesy of his reply. It is, so far as I know, the first answer from a prohibitionist to the arguments which I have lately ventured to print, that has not contained more or less of personal abuse or mean insinuation. To meet a gentleman in this field of controversy is really a very great pleasure. Let me speak, as briefly as I can, to the points which my friend has raised.

1. By the expression of the popular will, of course, I meant legislation, and not discussion. Popular opinion or prejudice may be expressed in talk; the popular will is expressed by legislation. A prohibitory amendment to the Constitution is intended to prevent the people from passing any other kind of laws respecting the liquor traffic except prohibitory laws. So long as this amendment should remain a part of the Constitution, the Legislature would be shut up to the alternatives of prohibition or free rum. It is true, as Mr. Brand says, that the Constitution might be re-amended; but it is a difficult matter to secure an amendment to the Constitution of Ohio; it takes time, in any case; and the real reason for desiring a constitutional amendment is that it would, so long as it existed, forbid the Legislature to pass a tax-law, or a local-option law, or a high-license law. It is an attempt to control future action. Now, this is precisely one of those subjects about which laws that do not express the *present* opinion of the people are seen to be futile and mischievous. The people of Ohio might have had prohibition this year if they had elected a Legislature that would enact a prohibitory law. And if the law had been successful in controlling or lessening drunkenness, and had commended itself to the people of Ohio, they certainly might have elected a Legislature two years hence that would have refused to repeal the law. If at that time the law had proved a failure, then it ought to be repealed. Any law, on a subject like this, that cannot steadily and continuously justify its own existence, ought not to be continued in existence. The prohibitory amendment is an attempt to obstruct the removal from the statute-book of a law which may have lost its hold on the convictions of the community — to perpetuate a dead letter. The argument for such an amendment reduces to this: "We can crowd the people up to the enactment of prohibition this year, but we fear that those who will vote two years from this time could not be trusted to maintain prohibition, so we will do what we can to

put it beyond their power to repeal it." The whole movement springs either from distrust of the people or distrust of the efficacy of the law, or both. If the law will do what is claimed for it, the people will know it; and if they care about having drunkenness suppressed, they will see to it that a Legislature is chosen every two years that will sustain and strengthen the law by which it is suppressed. If they do not care enough about prohibition to choose continuously such a Legislature, then they do not care enough about it to enforce a prohibitory law; for it takes a much stronger moral sentiment to enforce a law like this than to enact it. It is simply because it is found that the people cannot be kept up to the sticking point on this question that this amendment is proposed. It is a device of feebleness and faithlessness. It is an attempt to entail a moral rule upon future voters whose convictions we are not able to trust; to preserve upon the statute-books a law respecting conduct, behind which there is no adequate moral sentiment.

It is not only a device of feebleness and faithlessness; it is a device of foolishness. The notion that constitutional prohibition is going to "settle" this question, or lift it out of politics, is chimerical and quixotic. Any Legislature may repeal a prohibitory law, no matter how stringent the Constitution may be, and may adjourn without passing any new law, leaving the traffic in liquor wholly free. No constitutional amendment can compel legislative action. The whole subject rests, so far as any positive action is concerned, with the Legislature, and there it will rest. It cannot be taken out of politics by a constitutional amendment, any more than the malaria can be taken out of the atmosphere by constitutional amendment. The attempt to settle it once for all, and have it out of the way, is like the scheme of "getting religion" once for all. This fight with intemperance is not a three months' campaign, nor even a thirty years' war; it will not be fought out for many generations, and any resort to shifty expedients or factitious advantages is folly. It ought to be kept steadily before the people, and made a vital issue in every political campaign.

2. I think that Mr. Brand does not get the point of the argument that a prohibitory law, in the present state of moral sentiment in Ohio, could not be enforced. To say this, he says, is to say that "the liquor fraternity are law-breakers." By the "liquor fraternity" he means the liquor-sellers. But if liquor-sellers are law-breakers, liquor-buyers are their accomplices. If it is a crime to sell liquor, the buyer is *particeps criminis*. It cannot be morally wrong to sell liquor unless it is morally wrong to buy it. Mr. Brand will pardon me for saying that he, and all those who stand with him, utterly "fail to grasp the moral aspects of this case," when they put the whole weight of their legal condemnation on the sellers of liquor, and none on the buyers. They always indignantly deny that they seek to make it a crime to buy liquor; they only wish to make it a crime to sell it! Now, I think that the sellers and the buyers stand together under the same condemnation. The traffic originates with the demand of the buyer, though it is doubtless increased considerably, as every business is, by the supply which the seller furnishes. How large, then, is that "certain class of citizens" which resists the

enforcement of prohibitory laws? Mr. Brand argues as though it consisted merely of the sellers and manufacturers of liquor. That is the amazing assumption on which prohibitionists always rest. The truth is that this class of citizens includes all the buyers and drinkers of liquor, as well as the sellers. That is to say, it includes nearly if not quite half of all the voters in this State. I have lived here long enough to be able to affirm with confidence that a moiety of the voters here drink intoxicating liquors more or less habitually, and think that they have a perfect right to do it. I do not believe that so many as half of the voters are consistent total abstainers. If this is so, then the attempt to enforce a law which makes the liquor traffic criminal, is an attempt of one-half of a community to make the other half criminals, or the accomplices of criminals; and this is a legislative absurdity. It never yet has been done anywhere, and it never will be done. So long as the practices and sentiments of the people of Ohio respecting the use of these articles remain what they now are, a prohibitory law in large portions of the State would be a dead letter; and this not merely because the liquor-sellers would resist it, but because the liquor-sellers would be solidly supported in their resistance by the great army of liquor-buyers.

3-4. I have no time here to go into the history of liquor legislation in Ohio; but I have heard it said by intelligent temperance men a hundred times since I came to this State, that the anti-license amendment, which was supposed to be a temperance measure, has resulted in making the traffic practically free; and that it has had the effect to prevent legislation by which the traffic might have been restricted. Two or three statements that follow seem to me conspicuously inaccurate. The Scott law has reduced the number of saloons by more than three thousand. I should call that an "appreciable" result. Its local-option clause is not known to me to be an absolute failure. I know several communities where it is in full force. To say that license or tax laws have not materially abated the evils of the liquor traffic in any State of the Union, is to fly in the face of facts. And it is equally hazardous to assert that prohibition has, until recently, been tried on a large scale only in one State; it was faithfully and thoroughly tried in Massachusetts.

5. How could a law against "the manufacture and sale of liquors as beverages" be enforced against distilleries? Suppose the distiller asserts that he is manufacturing this liquor for use in the arts; who can disprove his assertion? It is possible that laws might be framed which should make such a constitutional provision effective against manufacturers; but it has always seemed to me that such a qualified provision would be easily evaded. To prove that a distiller making high-wines was manufacturing them *to be used as a beverage*, would be somewhat difficult.

6. I am glad to see that Mr. Brand feels the force of the considerations urged against a sweeping confiscation of property. I am sure that he will feel it all the more strongly when he considers that the traffic which is a "crime against society," and which prohibition seeks to prevent, has sprung from the demand of a large portion of the community, and that the attempt to make the liquor-sellers responsible for the whole of it is a monstrous injustice. I am well aware,

however, that in the persons of these liquor-sellers we have an organized and powerful body of men, with whom we shall be called to wage a long and fierce battle; and I am for this reason all the more anxious that in our controversy with them we shall never put ourselves in the wrong, nor take a single step in which they may charge us with encroaching on their rights.

As to Mr. Brand's concluding queries, I can only answer that while, as a teacher of ethics, I hold up before individuals an ideal rule of morality, I never expect while I live to secure conformity to the ideal of morality in the legislation of Ohio. Any law, though framed by angels, that the people did not want and would not enforce, would not be a good law for the people. Legislation on moral questions must follow, and not try to force, public opinion. Divorce for slight causes is an "essentially bad business," but it was wisely "licensed" by divine authority. The intentional slaying of an innocent man is an "essentially bad business," but it was "licensed" under the same authority, with good reason and with good results. Questions as to whether this is morally right are respectfully referred to Moses, who wrote the decalogue as an ideal rule of morality, but who adjusted his laws to the moral condition of the people. I am not, however, in favor of license in Ohio, since I believe that taxation, combined with local option, is a more practicable method. Mr. Brand will pardon me for saying, in conclusion, that, while I recognize his purpose as the highest, he seems to me fatally to miss the moral aspects of this case. His notion appears to be that the chief agency for securing the great reform which he seeks to promote is law—that is, force; that the first thing to do is to get the law passed, if it be only by a bare majority, and then work up public opinion to its support. The whole prohibitory movement, as at present managed, puts physical force at the front, and sends the moral forces to the rear. This is fatal error. The whole community must be stirred, from the top to the bottom, by a genuine, profound, mighty moral enthusiasm on this subject before anything will be accomplished by means of sweeping legislation. This is not guess-work. About some things I am not at all confident, but I do know something about the moral order of this universe; and I know that it can be depended on, and that it has got to be observed. I know that the cause comes before the effect; the blossom before the fruit; the spring before the summer; the lightning before the thunder; and I know, just as well, that any attempt to control by means of stringent law the social life of a community, before a thorough preparation was made in the convictions and the personal habits of that community for the changes introduced, would be a reversal of the divine order, and that it would end in a miserable failure.

Washington Gladden.

COLUMBUS, OHIO.

"Prohibition in Kansas."—A Reply.

[The following is one of many letters of similar import received from responsible persons claiming acquaintance with the subject.—EDITOR.]

A CORRESPONDENT in Abilene undertakes to enlighten the readers of THE CENTURY in regard to the workings of prohibition in Kansas. His state-

ments are so wide of the truth as to awaken doubt whether he has ever been outside of that "town of some four thousand inhabitants." He assures us it is "one of the most thriving, intelligent, and moral communities in the State;" yet coolly adds, "We have six open saloons and one wholesale liquor house run in open defiance of the law, and there is no attempt on the part of the authorities or citizens to close them." Most people would raise the question, "What kind of morals have they in Abilene, anyhow?" It surely cannot boast of a *very high* standard of morality, that openly defies the laws of the State, and tramples the Constitution under foot! Let me give the proof.

But when he affirms that "a similar condition of affairs exists in all parts of the State," he maligns and defames our noble commonwealth. And when he adds, "Instead of getting better, the condition of things is growing worse," he states what is exactly the reverse of the truth!

Proof: Six months ago there were open saloons in Topeka, Lawrence, Emporia, Newton, Wichita, and many other cities, where you will not find one to-day. More saloons have been closed in the last three months than during any similar period since the law first went into effect. It is true there was a reaction after the election of Governor Glick. The liquor-sellers imagined it was a victory over prohibition, and grew bold and defiant. But they "reckoned without their host," just as your correspondent has done. He claims that "the amendment does not owe its existence to a strong, healthy public sentiment, but to the carelessness of easy-going, experiment-loving citizens." Perhaps he can tell us how it happened that the whole Republican ticket, nominated on a strong prohibition platform, was elected, with the single exception of its candidate for Governor, by twenty-five to thirty thousand majority; and why the Legislature—a majority of whom were chosen at the same time—*refused* by a large majority to *resubmit* that amendment to the people! The fact is, the great body of the people of Kansas are more strongly in favor of the amendment to-day than they have ever been. The Atchison "Champion," one of the most influential papers in the State, and *not* a champion of prohibition, said recently, "There are scores of prohibitionists now where there was one two years ago." It says there is a growing respect for law, and disgust and alarm at the utter disregard by liquor-dealers of any restriction of the traffic. A Law-and-Order League has been organized in that city, officered by some of its leading business men, who declare that they can no longer bear the disgrace which the lawlessness of these men is bringing upon their city. Prosecutions have been commenced, and forty-five saloon-keepers indicted. The Atchison "Globe," a strong anti-prohibition paper, said recently, "A sense of duty compels us to remark that, notwithstanding our earnest opposition, the cause of prohibition is *gaining ground every day.*"

No one who reads the reports of the success that has attended efforts to enforce the law, in all parts of the State save in a few cities, like Leavenworth, Atchison, and Abilene, can doubt the truth of the above statements. Prosecutions are more frequent, and convictions usually follow. In Douglas County thirteen offenders were tried in the District Court last year, and every one convicted. In the justices' courts there were

five convictions and two disagreements. At the last term of court sixteen saloon-keepers pleaded guilty on forty counts, and were fined \$4200 and costs, and closed out because it didn't pay! The Secretary of the State Temperance Union reports that of four hundred and sixty cases tried in district courts, there have been three hundred and fifty-one convictions—or seven-ninths of the cases; in justices' courts, five hundred and twelve cases and three hundred and seventy-eight convictions, or three-fourths of the whole. The aggregate fines imposed exceed \$100,000 beside the costs, while eighty-one liquor-sellers have been sentenced to imprisonment for periods aggregating eleven years, five months, and nineteen days. There are to-day *more than fifty counties* in which there is not an open saloon; and of the three hundred reported in the remainder, one hundred and sixty are in the city of Leavenworth. In fact, take out a half-dozen places, and saloons are few and far between. Even in these excepted localities, public sentiment is steadily growing and crystallizing in favor of obedience to law, and it will not be very long before men engaged in defying it will find that "it is hard to kick against the pricks." If "prohibition in Kansas is a screaming farce"—as your correspondent affirms—we say, "All right! *Let it scream!*" We are very well satisfied to listen to such music. The only screaming that comes to our ears is the mournful cry of the convicted saloon-keeper, as he puts up his shutters and hangs crape on his door, beside the label "To Rent!" Prohibition was never so strong, its friends were never so hopeful, nor was Kansas ever so prosperous, as to-day. If your correspondent wants "high license," and more liberty, he had better emigrate to Missouri or Illinois. We have done with such foolishness in Kansas.

LAWRENCE, KANSAS.

A. M. Richardson.

William M. Baker.

THERE has been a good deal of surprise among that inner circle of readers who appreciated William M. Baker's work at its real value that his death created so little public interest. It seems to me that there were several reasons for this popular neglect of a man of power so abnormal and peculiar.

From a singular combination of circumstances, Mr. Baker stood more alone, probably, than any American author since Hawthorne. He was outside of all literary cliques; he had no following of influential friends, of sect or party, and hence had none of that professional backing and advertising which counts for so much with the public. Hawthorne might have remained "the obscurest man of letters in America" if Mr. Fields had not found him out and advertised him. In Baker's case the herdsmen did not signal, and the herd did not follow. He was Southern by birth, temperament, and sympathy, but he sided with the North from principle. Neither section, therefore, adopted or pushed him into success as a favorite son. He grappled the dangerous problems of thought with a courage bolder than that of any agnostic, yet liberal thinkers did not count him one of themselves because he was a Presbyterian clergyman, while Presbyterians could not boast of him as a representative sectary. He was too profoundly Christian to be the exponent of any narrower creed.

resting, say, on section No. 1. The two wheels are now connected and a current will pass. Both wheels move forward together, and the trailing arms at the same instant reach No. 2, which is to earth, and the line is discharged. The two wheels advance together to No. 3, and the circuit is closed again. Now it is easy to imagine that every tenth section of each wheel is connected with a branch wire. Every fifth section is connected with another branch wire. Now, if the two wheels are moving rapidly and exactly together, say at a speed of sixty sections a second, one branch is connected with the line and thrown off again six times a second, while the other branch is connected five times and a half in one second, or at the same speed as the other, but alternating with it. Six times a second each operator on one branch has the line to himself, and, if he telegraphs slowly, he will hardly perceive that the line has been taken from him and returned again. Increase the proportion and connect the branch, say, ten or twenty times a second, and the operator cannot realize that he is sharing the line with any one else. This division of the sections may be even more minute. One branch may be connected with the line at the first, third, sixth, ninth, etc., section, and another with the second, fifth, eighth, etc. Each branch will have the line so many times in a second, but so rapid is the movement of the wheel that to the operators there is no break. Each operator at the end of his branch sends or receives, and to the ear no loss of continuity can be perceived. By using a printing telegraph at the end of each branch, the connections with the line need not exceed twice a second, and by means of wheels of the proper proportion of sections seventy-two messages can be sent slowly over one wire at apparently the same time. Actually the seventy-two messages are marching in procession one after the other in confused fragments. Tap the main line, and nothing can be learned of the messages, as each is traveling in detached parts of words and letters; yet at the end of the line the wheel distributes to each branch its proper fraction from the confused medley of signals, and each printing apparatus pieces together its own letters to spell out its message. It will be seen that this multiplex telegraphic system depends wholly on exact correspondence between the two wheels. If one is in Boston and the other in Providence, they must move together and the messages will be confused. There appears to be no mechanical device for accomplishing this, and it has been thought that it could not be accomplished. The chief value of the improvement of the system is found in an invention for moving the wheels, and for causing one wheel to control the other. The motive power is a local battery that by means of an electro-magnet sets in vibration a tuning-fork. The swing of the arms of such a vibrating-fork makes and breaks a second circuit, that by means of an electro-magnet causes the wheel to revolve. On the wheel are two sections somewhat wider than the others. When the two wheels, each moved by its tuning-fork electro-motor, are moving exactly together, they reach the wider sections at the same instant. If one for any reason reaches the section before the other, it operates, by means of a special branch and magnet, a switch that tends to throw more resistance into the motor circuit, and the tuning-fork vibrates more slowly,

and the wheel is retarded till the second wheel overtakes it, when they move together again. This correction takes place continually, many times in a minute, so that the variations will never be so great as to impair the continuity of any one of the seventy-two branches using the single main line. This, in brief, is the Delany synchronous multiplex telegraphy. At an examination of the system in operation over the equivalent of two hundred miles of line-wire, six Morse instruments were in use at once, and each had the line virtually to itself. The printing telegraph worked fast enough for all business purposes, and it certainly had the merit of being quite independent of any Morse instruments or other printers that might be used at the same time. The system is soon to be tried on a commercial scale, and its results will be watched with interest, as it is in its present experimental stage the most promising invention in this field of work.

Charles Barnard.

The Tax on Whisky.

THE national tax on spirits should not be repealed. Thirty-two quarts of corn make almost sixteen quarts of whisky. The corn is worth from fifty to sixty cents, and the wholesaler will receive for the whisky from ten to twelve, and the retailer from twenty to twenty-five dollars. Profits so great appeal with irresistible force to the cupidity of men, and the result is twelve hundred and fifty registered distilleries and two hundred thousand liquor-dealers in the United States. The average consumption of domestic spirits is about 75,000,000 gallons a year; but the greed of the distillers has, for the last four years, raised the production to an average of over 90,000,000 gallons; so that on June 30th, 1883, there was a stock on hand in the United States of 116,000,000 gallons, of which 80,000,000 were still in the bonded warehouses and the tax unpaid. By means of warehouse receipts this has passed largely into the hands of speculators, or capitalists who have advanced money on it. Seventy-two million dollars' tax on this whisky will soon be due the Government, much of it in the next few months.

If the tax could be repealed, this money would remain in the pockets of the whisky owners, who are the most active and energetic workers for the removal of the excise. A second class who favor repeal are the "moonshiners" of the South, who regard the right to convert the product of their own fields into "a necessary article of daily diet" as an "inalienable" right secured by the Constitution; their representatives therefore favor the repeal. But the chief strength of the movement for free whisky lies in another direction. The internal revenue, mostly from liquors and tobacco, amounts to more than \$100,000,000 a year. The import duties amount to \$200,000,000 more. These sums, with the other sources of income, furnish \$100,000,000 a year more than the Government needs, and shrewd men foresee that the people will not long continue to pay into the national treasury such a surplus to serve as a corruption fund to Congress. Hence the friends of the present tariff would willingly strike off the tax on spirits and tobacco, in order that the Government shall be compelled to retain the present high duties. One or the other must go, either the tax on

rum or the tax on necessities. Which? Cheap rum means, to them, high prices on woollens, steel, iron, crockery, and glass. Hence many respectable men, and even professed friends of temperance, will silently lend their influence to cheapen the one article which is the greatest curse of our land.

Let us consider the iniquity of the proposition in the light of political economy. The tax on spirits is larger in amount, more uniform, and more certain than that on any other article. The Secretary of the Treasury can compute more definitely the prospective revenue from this source than that from any other. It is almost the only tax that the people pay of which every cent goes into the coffers of the Government. It has taken twenty years to perfect the system of internal revenue so that it shall work smoothly and efficiently, and the past year it paid into the Treasury \$120,000,000, at a cost of collection of less than four per cent. The tax lays its hand on no useful labor. It bars the way of no healthy enterprise. It raises the price of no one of the comforts of the home. It is largely levied on dens of infamy, and is contributed by vice and crime. It is a check on luxury and debauchery and idleness. In short, every principle of political economy is in favor of the tax. There is not one sound argument against it. The tax on whisky should never be repealed so long as our Government needs a revenue. England has given this article the first place in her permanent system of revenue, and raises \$150,000,000 a year from spirits and wines.

And after we have labored twenty years to perfect the laws and machinery for collecting this, the only really beneficent tax that our Government has levied, here come the reformers and propose to sweep it from our statute books, on the plea that it is a "war tax," and we must "remove the burdens from the people." But who are the "people" in this case? Do the wife and children of the drunkard clamor for cheaper rum, or for cheaper stockings and blankets? Does the laborer ask for more whisky or more clothing for his money? Does the industrious artisan complain of dear liquors, or of dear books and tools? No; the only "people" who are clamoring for this repeal are the scores of paid lobbyists hammering at the doors of Congress, and the only "people" to be benefited by it are the whisky-owners and the monopolists. The appeal is for special legislation of the very corruptest kind. To serve the interest of a single class, they would cut off the best revenue branch of our Government and flood the land with cheap rum.

Let us look at the probable effect of the repeal on the temperance cause. While the production of spirits has, for the last four years, reached an average of only ninety million gallons, the registered capacity of the distilleries is over *two hundred million* gallons per annum. To prevent a ruinous competition, the distillers have pooled their interests in the "Western Export Association" and the "Kentucky League." These pools regulate the amount produced each month, pay bounties for exportation and non-production, and adopt other measures to keep down competition and maintain the monopoly price in the market. The price of bonded whisky is but a little above one dollar a gallon. The payment of the government tax raises the cost to two dollars. So that, by the removal of

the tax, the price of spirits would be at once reduced almost one-half; and with the removal of the tax would be swept away all governmental inspection, registration, and bonded warehouses, which are vexatious and efficient checks upon the competition of petty local distilleries. It would then be difficult for the pools to control the market, and we might confidently expect that, as in the case of matches, the removal of the excise would produce a fall in price far greater than the amount of the tax, and that we should see intoxicating drink plentier and cheaper in our village streets than it has been for thirty years. We may then reverse the Iowa motto and cry, "A distillery on every hill-top and *two* saloons in the valley." The repeal would indeed be a calamity to the treasury, but it would be a thousand times greater calamity to the cause of temperance and every noble reform. This tax is not prohibition; but free rum, at one-half or one-fourth its present price, will greatly multiply dealers and drunkards, and be a huge boulder in the way of every temperance movement.

A year ago last December Mr. Kelley, chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, called his committee together before Congress met, and secured a vote to report a bill for the repeal of the tax on spirits and tobacco. But there were so many conflicting schemes that, notwithstanding the support of the Democratic caucus, the bill dragged, and it was proposed to pave the way for ultimate repeal by a bill, called "the bonded extension bill," extending indefinitely the period allowed for the payment of the tax. The measure was rushed through the House under suspension of the rules, twenty-nine votes only opposing. It was urged by Senator Sherman in the Senate with a vigor worthy of a better cause, but it failed to pass on account of the shortness of the session. Both bills were revived early in the present Congress. The bonded bill was pushed to the front, and the repeal bill held in reserve.

Though the bonded bill has just been beaten in the House, it was killed by the votes of protectionists, who hope thus to force the passage of the repeal bill. They frankly stated this in their speeches in the caucus and in the House. The resolution of the House of April 7th means only temporary abandonment of the scheme. It had two purposes: first, to strengthen the market, and thus enable certain holders of whisky to unload their stock without loss; and secondly, to avoid in the coming election the odium that would attach to the repeal, or the embarrassing questions which might be asked of candidates in case of any general public discussion of the project. The repeal bill will next be pressed to the front, and if it fails the extension bill will be revived. If indefinite extension, or extension for two years, is awarded to the whisky owners, they will continue to pile up the stock until they can accumulate sufficient influence to pass the repeal, and then it will be futile to oppose the remittance of the unpaid tax on whisky in bond. In fact, the passage of the bonded bill would be virtually the beginning of the manufacture of free whisky.

Every rejection of either bill is a repulse and not a defeat. The interested parties have too much at stake to accept defeat. They are watchful and tireless, and the present cross-purposes of Congress afford frequent opportunities for log-rolling. They will not

retire from the contest till the people have placed their condemnation on a measure which is fraught with more injury to the country than any measure since the fugitive-slave bill.

James F. Clafin.

LOMBARD, ILL., April, 1884.

The School-House versus the Liquor Saloon.

THOUGH for years an interested reader of THE CENTURY, I have been especially interested of late in the Open Letters, and their discussion of the many phases of the temperance reformation.

The Compulsory Temperance Education bill which, through the efforts of the department I represent, has just passed the Senate and Assembly at Albany, is a new phase in our State, and we believe a most hopeful remedy for the evils of intemperance.

Dr. Chalmers, after listening to an eloquent address upon these evils, is said to have exclaimed, "Sir, we know enough of the evils; in God's name give us the remedy." For years we have been striving to answer this cry, which comes from thousands of hearts and homes. Of all the answers yet given, we believe none is as practical in operation, as permanent in effect, and as easy of accomplishment, as that which proposes to set the school-house over against the saloon. Whatever difference of opinion there is as to other remedies, we find all are in favor of instructing the young in the physical effects of strong drink.

The sad experiences in work among liquor-dealers and liquor-drinkers naturally led the members of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union to this idea of prevention through education. This education was first attempted in the Sabbath schools, but the opposition encountered was so great that little could be accomplished in that direction. Juvenile unions and Bands of Hope were next established, and the hundreds gathered into them were faithfully taught the effects of alcohol upon the body and mind. But as there was nothing compulsory about attendance upon this teaching, the children could only be held while the novelty lasted. Finally our hopes gathered about the public schools. There, more largely than anywhere else, are found the children of our nation. There are the children of the foreigners who cannot be reached in any other way. To teach these children, as thoroughly and systematically as they are now taught geography, spelling and history, "what alcohol is, what it will do to us if we drink it, and what it will make us do," became the aim of our temperance workers. Encouraged by the fact that in Vermont, New Hampshire, and Michigan a compulsory temperance education bill had passed the Legislature, the department of scientific temperance instruction in New York State undertook to secure a similar bill this winter.

Petitions were scattered broadcast over the State. Letters were written to five thousand clergymen, to each senator and representative, to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House, to the regents, commissioners, superintendent of public instruction, and many others, while hundreds of pages of literature accompanied these letters. Large audiences in our most conservative churches, and in halls, normal schools, and teachers' institutes, have been addressed by the national and state superintendents of scientific instruction.

The bill which has passed Senate and Assembly reads as follows:

"An act relating to the study of physiology and hygiene in the public schools.

"The people of the State of New York, represented in the Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

"§ 1. Provision shall be made by the proper local school authorities for instructing all pupils in all schools supported by public money or under State control in physiology and hygiene, with special reference to the effects of alcoholic drinks, stimulants, and narcotics upon the human system.

"§ 2. No certificate shall be granted any person to teach in the public schools of the State of New York, after the 1st day of January, 1885, who has not passed a satisfactory examination in physiology and hygiene, with special reference to the effects of alcoholic drinks, stimulants, and narcotics upon the human system."

New York State now takes its place with Vermont, New Hampshire, and Michigan; and if the law is but properly enforced, our million and a half of children will be forewarned and forearmed in reference to the temptations which await them.

Dr. J. G. Holland uttered, in this magazine, these prophetic words: "What we want in our schools is to do away with the force of a pernicious example and a long-cherished error, by making the children thoroughly intelligent on this subject of alcohol. The more thoroughly we can instruct the young concerning this dominating evil of our time, the better it will be for them and for the world."

This noble prophecy has its fulfillment to-day in the passage of this bill. Could we but add to this teaching in our public schools lessons upon virtue, reverence, honesty, and morality, juvenile crime might be lessened, and a more hopeful outlook greet the nation.

Elizabeth W. Greenwood,

Supt. Scientific Instruction Dept. N. Y. State W. C. T. U.
151 REMSEN STREET, BROOKLYN, March, 1884.

Miss Mary Anderson in London.

WHEN Miss Mary Anderson first appeared in London as *Parthenia* in "Ingomar," it appeared to me that she had considerable talent, that her faults were more her teacher's than her own, and that a much misused word, "charming," was, rightly taken, the best adjective with which to describe the general effect of her performance. Since then Miss Anderson has appeared in the "Lady of Lyons," in Mr. Gilbert's "Pygmalion and Galatea," and in the same author's play "Comedy and Tragedy." Except in the last-named piece, no demands have been made on Miss Anderson's powers greater than were made in "Ingomar," and it has been generally acknowledged, rightly, as I think, that she has talent, and that she has the distinction of "charm," which is peculiarly valuable to an actress who is conscious that such a possession gives her a start in the race, but is also conscious that with that possession alone she can never win a really big prize. Much in Miss Anderson's acting seems to me to show that she has no idea of relying upon merely personal qualifications; that she has a distinct conception of what she ought to do upon the stage, and tries with all the earnestness of a gentle and artistic nature to do it. But much seems to me to show also that, whether from want of good schooling or want of perception, she is in great danger of going so wrong a way to

now. During the past year the work of the American Copyright League, for three years ably carried on under the secretaryship of Mr. G. P. Lathrop, has made, under the efficient direction of his successor, George Walton Green, Esq., marked and practical progress, both in the general forwarding of the reform and in the forcible presentation to the attention of Congress of a simple and workable measure. The press of the country—which, from the establishment of the League, has borne a most honorable part in the movement—has responded with vigorous aid to the latest calls upon it. The merits of the reform have been made clear to President Cleveland, and he has added his exhortation to those of his predecessors for speedy attention to the subject. The committee of the League, representing the large body of American authors, has advanced the reform by the spirit of friendliness which it has exhibited toward other interests, while at the same time it has very properly declined to consider it a part of its duty to urge their case; nor has anything been done to impair the confidence of the writing fraternity that its interests and honor are in safe and prudent hands. For the first time in the history of the movement a full hearing has been accorded to authors as such by a committee of Congress. In the conference which was held before the Senate Committee on Patents in January last, the League was fortunate in having for its chief spokesman an advocate who—to the credit of the guild of authorship, be it said—was in nothing more entirely their representative than in demanding the reform on the highest ground of morality. By those whose political code never rises above the stop-gap theory, Mr. Lowell would perhaps be called derisively an idealist. It is not the provision for the present emergency which enlists his interest, but the final establishment of the principle involved. He is not one of those (to quote his own words)

“Whose love of right is for themselves
And not for all the world”;

and as ideality always excites emulation (and sometimes blushes), his resolute speech before the committee put the question on a higher plane in the minds of his hearers, and, along with the reinforcements of other friends of the reform, has advanced the cause to the point where it can no longer be ignored by Congress. Another practical result of the conference is that it has committed to the principle of International Copyright the chief body from which opposition to the principle was to be expected; so that, if we except a theorist or two of inherited economic squint, all parties concerned have now virtually declared themselves before Congress in favor of the reform. It is therefore difficult to see how—without unpatriotic, almost criminal indifference on the part of Congress—the requisite legislation can be postponed beyond the present session.

2. Another reason for prompt action lies in the fact that during the past year the rest of the civilized world has put the seal of shame upon us anew by uniting, at the Berne Copyright Conference, in an international arrangement which is at once the most definite recognition and complete protection of literary property in existence. From this honorable compact the United States Government alone has excluded itself, the State Department not having felt at liberty to commit itself

to a convention the subject of which was at the time prominent before Congress in the form of the copyright bill of Mr. Dorsheimer.¹ During the past summer England, in addition to her action with the other powers, adopted a comprehensive, and in the present condition of English affairs, a most statesmanlike, measure of intercolonial copyright, superseding all her previous legislation and making uniform for the mother country and her dependencies the provisions relating to the ownership of copyright property. In both compacts the way is left open for us to obtain their advantages at any time. That the present shameful condition of affairs is not likely to exist for many years longer is evident from the daily increasing injury it entails upon the legitimate book trade. When would be a better time to terminate it than now? The committee of the Senate has with most praiseworthy interest and patience heard all sides of the copyright question and is probably ready to report. *Why should it not report both bills to the Senate* and let us have a full, free, and final consideration of a subject which, with the most honorable support from the cultivated classes, has never yet reached in the Senate the point of discussion on its merits? This is all that the friends of the League bill have asked, and this, it seems to us, is not an unreasonable demand. It is to be hoped that no senator will be found who will not be willing to devote time and attention to the practical consummation of so good a cause, and that the measure will not be left till the last of the session, to be swept aside by the appropriation bills.

3. A cogent argument for immediate attention to the subject lies in the recent growth of the communistic movement in America. The laws of property which give stability to life and hope to the worker have never been so formidably attacked as within the past year. The chief argument against International Copyright—an argument which appeals not so much to the reason as to the indifference of legislators—is that the absence of copyright makes books cheap. But is not the League right in urging that this is in itself a communistic principle: that we may refuse protection to foreign property if the uncompensated appropriation of it be, as is alleged, for the public good? Reduce communism to its least common denominator, and it is simply wanting something for nothing—a sentiment at war with self-respect, and thus an element of weakness in any individual or nation. It is unbelievable that this sentiment should affect to any great extent the Congress of the United States, the curator of our national honor. And what obligation has Congress to give the people cheap books more than cheap beer? Let us hope that, in the coming political conflict with communism, when Senators and members of Congress shall rise from their seats to denounce it, this blot on the escutcheon will have been removed, so that there will be no occasion to say to them: “Let him that is without sin among you cast the first stone.”

How Prohibition Grows.

MOST Americans are as yet rather indifferent on the subject of the license or prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors. Either they see little of immediate importance in it, or they are waiting to see whether Prohibition can be enforced, if it is enacted into law;

or they are still content to adopt without much question whatever position their customary political party may see fit to take on the question. There is, however, an increasing number of persons whose minds are distinctly made up, who are pronounced Prohibitionists; and the fact that their numbers are increasing ought to make it interesting to consider the influences through which this increase is taking place. For these influences are quite different from those which affect the ordinary political fortunes of the country. Political parties usually find speeches and contagious enthusiasm good, but printed documents better; oratory and the printing-press are their legitimate weapons of warfare. How many men have been converted by a Prohibition speech or a Prohibition document? Very many, no doubt; but no extended investigation will be necessary to show that such conversions have been more commonly due to some organized effort of the manufacturers or vendors of intoxicating liquors to protect their own interests. When a National Brewers' Convention or a State Liquor Dealers' Protective Association, or any kindred body, interferes successfully in an election, or raises a fund for the legal or political protection of its interests, or passes a series of resolutions which seem calculated to act as a menace to doubtful voters, the telegraphic dispatches are not only carrying the news through the country, but are everywhere operating on the feelings of men hitherto uninterested, and preparing them to vote at the first opportunity against the "Liquor Interest." The results come in every variety of form. In most cases they probably produce only a feeling of anger against the party which has been the agent of the organization; in a smaller number there appears a somewhat vague willingness to appear as the public opponent of "the saloon in politics"; a still smaller number will account for the steady increase in the absolute Prohibition vote. But the process is the same in all, and almost any man can verify the statement of it within the sphere of his personal acquaintance.

The situation is a startling echo of some of the features of the anti-slavery contest. In that struggle, also, the attacked party was a body of men, not formally organized, but bound to common action by great common interests. Its consequent discipline gave it the ability to secure great initial advantages; but it never gained one of these without having its success reflected in a rise of the tide which opposed it. Its true policy was to seek sedulously the shelter of retirement from public view, and to sacrifice almost any advantage, however tempting, which would bring it into public collision with an opposition whose moral aspect could not but be respected, however troublesome it might be in practice. Such a policy was its only possible salvation or reprieve; and yet it was just the policy which was impossible of adoption as soon as the number of slave-holders ceased to be small. The larger it became, the more impossible was it to prevent organized or common action by a number of slave-holders so considerable as to force the bulk of their fellows, with or against their will, into reinforcing them; and so the struggle went on widening to its inevitable conclusion. Who can avoid seeing the parallel in the present case of the liquor-dealers? The larger their numbers become, the more difficult is it to check ambitious or heedless individuals in their efforts to precipitate pub-

lic conflicts which can operate only to add to the pronounced opposition. Organization means action; and every public action is but a step on the road to destruction. It does not follow that the parallel must necessarily be carried to the same conclusion. If the question is presented often and strongly enough, it may be taken as certain that the mass of voters at present uninterested will side against the liquor-dealers; an American people committed, after full deliberation, to the support of drunkenness, is hardly conceivable. But everything will depend on whether the stream of opposition is to remain a narrow torrent of absolute Prohibition, or is to spread out into the broad reservoir of high license and moral opposition to "the saloon."

The settlement of this final question will depend very much on the power, for it is a power, which is now engaged in the defense of the manufacture and sale of intoxicants in the United States. It may, if it will, make this a Prohibition country. Its best friends, if the expression be permissible, could not, to be sure, induce it to pursue the only policy which would insure it a peaceable, though unostentatious, existence; but its most eager enemies could not ask a more happy dispatch for it than will certainly come from a violent resistance. Buying legislatures is bad; buying voters by wholesale is worse; but to undertake to check the Prohibition movement by shooting its apostles or setting fire to their houses is simply suicidal. One such case in Iowa last summer probably made more Prohibition voters than all the Prohibition speeches up to date. Nothing but this policy is wanted to prevent Prohibition from ever thinning out into some modified remedy. It is not difficult at any time to prove "the saloon" to be an enemy of morality: let it now prove itself to be a public enemy, and the end will no longer be difficult to predict.

Much may be done by the Prohibitionists also to determine the final question. The common charge against them is that of unreasonableness. A very large measure of this criticism has certainly come from the anxiety of politicians that their party necessities or convenience shall rank as modifying circumstances, to be tenderly considered by the Prohibitionists, and from the refusal of the Prohibitionists to do anything of the sort. Quite apart from all this, however, is there not ground for the criticism in the frequent refusal of Prohibitionists to make allowance for the existence of universal suffrage, and for the absolute necessity of popular backing for laws? He who, having control of the destinies of a savage and drunken tribe, should first grant them universal suffrage, and then declare that he will accept from universal suffrage nothing but absolute Prohibition from the beginning, would be thought not reasonable, perhaps not sane. What is the difference when he merely finds universal suffrage in existence, instead of being himself its grantor? He must at least recognize its existence. If he cannot limit the right of suffrage for a time, he would do well, in either case, to accept from it the nearest approach to his final object which he can get from it, not making this an excuse for stopping his own work, but not balking his own work in advance by refusing to consider circumstances which will not cease to defy him simply because he ignores them. Why should not a sincere Prohibitionist accept from time to time the best he can get for the

state, without thereby giving up the special work in which he must always find success, that of forcing issues upon the "liquor interest"?

Still less rational is it to make up the issue against those who conscientiously hold that large communities may need different treatment from small ones; or against those who are possible converts even to extreme views—instead of against the "liquor interest"; or to attack opinion through the lowest methods of the boycotter, and to endeavor to gain a doubtful vote by denouncing its possessor in public

and private as a "friend of rum." And the lowest depth has been reached in those few cases in which the lawless methods of their worst opponents have been imitated, and violence has been resorted to as an agent in converting opinion. Opinion is not successfully controlled in that fashion. Neither pro-slavery nor anti-slavery men ever succeeded in so dealing with public opinion, least of all with American public opinion. It will yield to instinct, to persuasion, or to reason: it has never had anything but defiance for compulsion or menace.

OPEN LETTERS.

Greek and Latin—Shall they Stay or Go?

NOTHING stays settled. Everything flows. Here is the old question, ever new, of classical culture to be discussed again—and yet again.

I have been considering whether there is not a rational view of the matter in which, could we all get the true standing-place, we all might agree. Let us, point by point, see what are some of the things wherein, upon mere statement, without discussion, we shall generally concur.

First, we all know well enough that few, very few, college students learn their Latin and Greek so as to be able to read and understand text at sight. Nearly all graduates must puzzle out the meaning of their classic author with much recourse to lexicon; and at that it is not the majority that succeed swimmingly.

Secondly, for most of the practical purposes of life, it is not to be reckoned loss to a man than he cannot read Latin and Greek with vernacular facility. Except for a limited number of persons, Latin literature and Greek are far less profitable than the living literatures of to-day.

Thirdly, the best Greek and Latin works have all of them, or nearly all of them, been translated into English. Of the versions accessible, some at least are scarcely inferior, as literature, to their originals. I have just been reading "Thucydides" throughout in Mr. Jowett's translation; and I am ready to pronounce that there is therein little lost from the simplicity, the terseness, the point, of the Greek text; while assuredly even the best of our Greek scholars would feel that of clearness, smoothness, coherency, there was actually some gain—fallacious gain, perhaps, not a few might say. This praise is of Mr. Jowett's work considered as literature. That it represents faithfully the sense of the original is a merit which it shares with many translations from Greek that, considered as English literature, are far inferior. It is the indisputable fact that the substance of classic literature, whatever may be the value rightly placed upon that substance, is open to be secured by any English-reading person through the medium of his own tongue.

Do I seem thus to have been giving reasons why Greek and Latin should cease to be studied? Well, that has by no means been my purpose. Have I been pointing out imperfections that ought to be remedied in our ways of teaching and studying Greek and Latin? That also has been far from my aim. Perhaps

there are improved methods of classical education possible. Professor Shumway, with his admirable *Latine et Graece*, certainly thinks that there are. I hope we shall be willing to learn from him, if he can teach us.

I emphatically do not admit that Greek and Latin should be displaced, or replaced, in our schools. There is nothing suitable to replace them. Let them stand. But if they are removed, it cannot be for long. There will follow a revival of letters. But we cannot afford even an interregnum.

Why is the maintenance of the classics in their place as part of education desirable?

Answer, because the study of language is important, and to study language, *in* Latin and Greek, and *through* Latin and Greek, is the best method available. There is a strong set of tendency now toward studying things, as the phrase is, rather than words. The phrase itself is an argument—but it is an argument existing in words, and in words only. In short, the phrase is a capital instance of precisely what it ostensibly condemns; namely, barren practice in empty words. But not all dealing with words is such. For words are things, in a most true and most momentous sense. When we study words, if we study them right, we are studying things. And words are things eminently worth studying. They are the highest natural product of the highest animal in the circle of nature. To distinguish words, as it is often sought to distinguish them, from things, is unscientific.

But besides this, language is the great instrument of life. Nearly everything that men do in the world is done with the use of it, and I venture to say that there is no other single study whatever so immediately and so immensely practical, fruitful, as is the study of language. In this you undoubtedly could get along without Latin and Greek, and accomplish much that is desirable. But these tongues furnish us the best means existing to the study of language, and our own language is itself largely rooted in these ancient tongues. Once more, the process of translation is an unequalled exercise in two important activities of the human mind, namely, the obtaining and expressing of ideas through words.

The mind may be comparatively remiss in studying French and German. Of course, to acquire knowledge enough of them to use them freely for conversation is not easy, or rather, it takes time, and a condition not to be supplied in any scheme of general edu-

its only redeeming feature is its comparative initial cheapness, and in the long run repairs even this up. Country communities are apt to complain of the first cost of the macadam road, while annually spending millions of dollars and moving countless tons of earth, without having good permanent roads.

R. A. Learned.

The Iowa Experiment.

"How is prohibition working in your State?" is the question oftenest asked the Iowa man abroad. The inquirer as he listens to the story his question invites usually wears upon his face a peculiar expression which translated into words would read, "I acquit this man of intent to mislead, but my private opinion is, he's romancing." A rather skeptical acquaintance of mine in the East recently said to me, "Your story of empty jails, flourishing schools, and homes of thrift and comfort that were not there before, sounds like one of Washington Gladden's fascinating dreams of an ideal 'Christian League'; but don't you think you'd find it rather difficult to verify your statements with facts and figures drawn from official sources?"

Leaving to others the picturesque features of the subject, let me lay before the readers of THE CENTURY a few suggestive "facts and figures drawn from official sources"—some of the results of an investigation suggested by my practical friend's inquiry.

Permit me to say, in passing, that Iowa, far from being "a commonwealth of temperance cranks," as an Eastern journal has it, is a commonwealth of "plain people"—to borrow a phrase from Lincoln; people who do their own thinking, and have their own way of doing, and are daring enough to believe that some things can be done which the wisdom of the conservative East pronounces impossible. Taking advantage of the fact that we have no great centers of population to dictate our policies and load us down, we of Iowa have applied to the State as a whole the identical theory for handling the social evil known as the saloon which Georgia and Illinois apply to counties, and which New York applies to townships; namely, the theory that the majority shall determine whether the evil shall be tolerated and controlled, or prohibited. At a non-partisan election held in the summer of 1882, the question of prohibition *vs.* toleration was submitted to the people, and the voters of Iowa, by thirty thousand majority, declared they had no longer any use for the saloon. But the constitutional amendment which then carried had not been properly submitted, and was by our Supreme Court declared invalid. A disappointed majority then turned to the State legislature for relief, and in the spring of 1884 a prohibitory law was passed. The legislatures of 1886 and 1888 sustained the law and strengthened it by amendments. Thus steadfastly have the people sustained the prohibition, anti-toleration method of handling the saloon.

"But you will not deny the fact that there have been saloons in Iowa during all these years of prohibition? You cannot truthfully say there are no saloons in your State at the present time?"

The outlawed saloon does still linger on our borders; still maintains a precarious, characterless, hole-in-the-wall existence in many of our cities; but its social and

political prestige is gone, and in at least 70 of the 99 counties in the State there cannot be found an open saloon.

Seven years have elapsed since the voters of Iowa formally withdrew their sanction from the saloon. Five years have passed since the voters of Iowa, through their representatives, outlawed the saloon. Is there anything in the present situation to warrant a return to the toleration policy? Let us turn to the figures and see what they say on the subject.

I am indebted to Hon. Frank D. Jackson, Secretary of State, for advance sheets of the "Official Register of Iowa" for 1889. From this source, and by comparison with reports of other years, I discover that the total expense of the counties of Iowa, "on account of criminal prosecutions," was in 1882, the year in which the prohibitory amendment carried, \$401,431.18. In 1883 the total expense of criminal prosecutions was reduced to \$361,173.78. In 1884, presidential year, there was a slight increase in criminal expenses. In 1885 and 1886, years marked by the return of the outlawed saloon and a consequent reign of lawlessness, there was a large increase, the total in the year last named being \$421,024.31. In 1887, the year following the passage of the Clark (enforcement) law, the criminal expenses were reduced to \$282,877.66; and in 1888 they aggregated \$300,424.06 for ten months.

Compare the record of "leading crimes" in 1888 with the same in 1882. In 1888 there were 94 convictions for assault, 13 for breaking and entering, 47 for burglary, 13 for forgery, 13 for gambling, 42 for keeping a gambling-house, 148 for larceny, 9 for murder, 6 for manslaughter, 190 for keeping a nuisance, 59 for selling intoxicating liquors; total, 634. In 1882 there were 188 convictions for assault, 18 for breaking and entering, 78 for burglary, 30 for forgery, 14 for gambling, 41 for keeping a gambling-house, 215 for larceny, 14 for murder, 1 for manslaughter, 658 for keeping a nuisance, 25 for unlawfully selling intoxicants; total, 1282—more than double that of 1888.

A few weeks ago I met Warden Barr, of the Anamosa Penitentiary, on his way to Fort Madison with a carload of prisoners, under orders from Governor Larrabee to take these men from the State quarries to the State shops. I learned that the transfer was ordered in response to a loud call from Warden Crossley, of the Fort Madison Penitentiary, for more hands to enable him to comply with certain contracts for labor into which the State had entered with certain manufacturers. The circumstance led me to write Governor Larrabee for information as to the comparative number of prisoners in our penitentiaries this year and in previous years. From our chief executive I learn that the monthly average of prisoners in the two penitentiaries in 1886 was 696; in 1887 it was 667, and in 1888 it was 607. On the last day of September, 1888, the end of the fiscal year, there were but 535 prisoners in both penitentiaries. I am informed by those who have investigated the subject that no other State in the Union, unless it is Vermont, has as small a percentage of convicts as has Iowa at the present time.

But, going back to the counties, what say our judges? Here is a small pamphlet containing the answers of forty-one district and superior-court judges to a number of questions put to them by Governor Larrabee, one of the inquiries being as to the expediency of re-

pealing the prohibitory law. I find that of the forty-one, 4 favored repeal, 9 were non-committal, and 28 were of the opinion that the law should stay. Let me quote several specially significant passages from these letters.

Judge Traverse, Bloomfield: "My experience is that, wherever saloons are closed, crime is diminished."

Judge Harvey, Leon: "It has reduced crime at least one-half, and the criminal expenses in like ratio."

Judge Lewis, Sioux City: "The law is as well enforced as any other, and has decreased criminal expenses at least two-thirds."

Judge Deemer, Red Oak: "In many of the counties the jail is getting to be almost an unnecessary building, and in the last three counties I visited there was not an occupant."

Judge Carson, Council Bluffs: "When in the senate I favored local option, but I am now satisfied the statute should stand."

Judge Thornell, Sidney: "I should regard its repeal as a calamity."

Judge Bank, Keokuk: "This was the first and only term in my recollection that there was no criminal business transacted in court."

Judge Wilson, Creston: "I was not in favor of the law, thinking that high license would work better. I have carefully watched its workings and am convinced that I was wrong."

Judge Wakefield, Sioux City: "As the saloons were driven out, other business came in to occupy the vacant places."

Judge Wilkinson, Winterset: "Crime and criminal expenses have been lessened."

Judge Johnson, Oskaloosa: "The effect of the prohibitory law has been to reduce very materially crime and criminal expenses in this district."

Judge Kavanaugh, Des Moines: "It has decreased crime over 50 per cent. and added largely to individual happiness."

Judge Granger, Waukon (now of the Supreme Bench): "The closing of the front door of the saloon, whereby it is destroyed as a place of social resort, has canceled nine-tenths of the drunkenness. . . . Our grand juries have comparatively nothing to do. . . . Our criminal expenses since the closing of the saloons have been comparatively nominal."

But roving correspondents for journals in the large cities about us inform their readers that prohibition is killing, or has killed, Iowa. Let us see for ourselves.

The census of 1880 gave our State a population of 1,624,615. The State census of 1885 put the population at 1,753,980—an increase of 129,365. The fact that there has been a decided increase in population since the last census (in 1885) is shown by comparison of the vote of 1884 with that of 1888. The total vote of Iowa in 1884 was 377,153, while that of 1888 was 404,130; an increase of 26,977—an estimated increase of 134,885 in four years.

Iowa years ago won, and has never since lost, the honor of having less illiteracy in proportion to population than any other State in the Union. But note the educational progress she has made during these six years of prohibition. In 1883 there were 11,789 school-houses in Iowa; in 1884, 11,975; in 1885, 12,285; in 1886, 12,444. The value of these school-houses was, in 1883, \$10,473,147; in 1886, \$11,360,472. State Super-

intendent Sabin's report to the last Iowa legislature begins thus: "It is gratifying to be able to report a most satisfactory and prosperous condition of education throughout the State. The past two years have been years of increased interest, activity, and growth. . . . The number of school-houses has been increased by about 500, and their aggregate value by more than \$550,000. The number of teachers is increased by about 500, while our school population is 10,000 greater than the same as reported two years ago."

Another index of Iowa's increasing prosperity is the showing made by our savings-banks. The reports made to our Auditor of State show that the "total assets and liabilities" of Iowa's savings-banks were, in 1883, \$8,419,739.83; in 1885, \$9,618,866.97; in 1887, \$12,666,347.72. Auditor Lyons informs me that on June 30, 1888, the total assets, etc., of the savings-banks had increased to \$14,625,024.84. These figures show that since the adoption of prohibition the resources of these depositories of the poor man's surplus earnings have increased over six million dollars, or over 73 per cent.

Johnson Brigham.

A Tenor Farm.

WE are a conservative people in New England and there is plenty of idle money among us awaiting safe investment. Flaming prospectuses of riotously rich Western farm lands attract only after insistent iteration; even then, I fancy, they draw comparatively few of the hoarded dollars which have escaped the depression in "C. B. and Q." and "Atchison and Topeka." I have a plan for using these dollars on a Western farm. It is this. Let a company of capitalists buy the most fertile five hundred acres in Dakota, Kansas, or Southern California, anywhere thereabouts where land is good and the climate equable. Let them erect thereupon a set of dwellings and school-buildings, obeying in the process every sanitary law; also gymnasium, theater, and concert-hall. They should thoroughly fence their property with barbed wire. Now to people it. Let agents be sent throughout the United States in search of tenor voices, behind which are robust bodies and good average minds. Contract with the parents or guardians of these voices and bodies for their time and keep for a term of years, say six. After selecting competent agriculturists to run the farm, and a teacher of physical science,—for the farm and the gymnasium are to furnish the before-mentioned voices and bodies with healthy, normal, and discreet exercise,—get a good corps of teachers of the voice, who know their business (alas! alas! our scheme may fail at this point), another to teach music, and set them to the task of developing these voices and bodies into manly and beautiful singers. It can be done. It will pay a large dividend. Why? Because in this country there is a great cry for tenors. Twenty oratorio societies, ten societies giving high-class instrumental concerts, and scores of vocal clubs would keep the product of this tenor farm continually employed eight months out of every twelve, at from two hundred dollars to four hundred dollars per individual per engagement.

There is not one great American tenor singer. There is only one in England who is kindred to us on account of the language he speaks. Our concert audiences yearn to hear a good tenor. Look at a file of Boston Sym-

TOPICS OF THE TIME.

Prohibition by Law or by Constitution?

IT can hardly be denied that the cause of prohibition, as that word has hitherto been understood in morals and politics, has been set back materially during the past year. The expectations of its supporters in the Presidential election of 1888 were high, and their disappointment at the meagerness of the results must have been correspondingly intense. That this should be followed by an apparently contemptuous coolness among the politicians, who had so long been used to regard prohibition with profound outward deference, was perhaps disagreeable, but only to be expected; but there was hardly anything to mitigate the tremendous adverse majorities in the popular vote of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island last summer. Such a year in the experience of a war administration or of a mercantile house would lead to a general overhauling of affairs, in order, if possible, to find the root of misfortune.

Opinions as to the moving cause will vary even upon the facts as found. The prevailing belief will undoubtedly be that, after a fair and prolonged comparison between prohibition and high and restricted license, there is a more general and decided inclination to abandon prohibition in favor of its competitor. The belief of the Prohibitionists will be that their calamities are the work of the politicians; and there is probably no doubt that many of those who have been saying to prohibition deferentially and for years, "Is it well with thee, my brother?" have seized this opportunity to drive the dagger deep beneath the fifth rib. There is truth enough in the belief of both Prohibitionists and restrictionists: the unpardonably foolish belief, which can only bring its own punishment, is that the results are due to an increased popular indifference to the evils of drunkenness and of the system under which intoxicants have been sold freely in the past. The people "do care"; but perhaps they have come to see by instinct objections to the recently developed prohibition policy which Prohibitionists would do well to consider frankly.

We have in this country a written Constitution for the United States and similar written constitutions for each of the individual States. We are much in the habit of speaking of these instruments as "organic laws" and of thinking of them as if they were much the same in kind as ordinary laws, differing only in the intensity of their action and the difficulty of repeal. Such a conception entails many errors. The written constitution differs from a law in almost every point of nature and function. A law aims at both coercion and freedom; it helps to furnish tests for the decision of disputes; it makes or secures privileges. A constitution is all this, and more; it makes or unmakes laws and legislation; it is the voice of the underlying sovereignty, whatever it may be, imposing restrictions upon voters, upon non-voters, upon governmental agents, upon every manifestation of the political being called the State. But a constitution has even higher characteristics. It is the ultimate expression, not of some one's desires or hopes, not of what some warmly interested people think ought to be done for the people, but of the inmost political life, nature, and development of the people. It

cannot but be a mistake to use so peculiar an instrument as a constitution for purposes peculiarly appropriate to a law. There is no more real kindred between constitution and law than between the subtle, mysterious vital force and the flesh and bones which it builds up.

True as it is that a law must also express some substantial fact of a people's nature and progress, or else it will fail, this is very far from putting a constitution on a par with a law. There must be some field for experimentation and possible mistake; but this must be in a law, not in a constitution. In a country like Great Britain, which has no written constitution, the real offense of him who advises or commits an "unconstitutional" act is that he is throwing his own minute personality athwart the whole life and development of his people, and is attempting to impose his will as a limitation upon the national career. Where is the difference in the act of him who disobeys a written constitution, unless it be that his offense may usually be stated in more definite terms? Where, in reality, is the difference in the act of him who should assume to force upon a people such a constitution as he thinks they ought to have, but which they would never have made for themselves? Either they will invade or override it, or else he has permanently marred or crippled their whole political development. "An unconstitutional constitution," instead of being a contradiction in terms, may be a definite and true expression for an unnatural constitution.

Has there been the highest wisdom, then, in the new policy of the past few years, of "imbedding prohibition in the constitutions" of the States interested? There are, no doubt, cases in which such a policy is valid, when it indicates just the line and point of a State's own development. But there are cases which are not of this kind, but merely colorable imitations of it: it is possible, as every one knows, to coerce the real will of voters and reach the same result by a skillful use of temporary circumstances, by a strategic balancing of party against party, or by a spasmodic and exciting use of moral forces. Such a process could make at the best only an "unconstitutional constitution"; it would be the worst thing possible for popular government; and yet the temptations to seize upon such a success, and hope for good results, are peculiarly great for earnest men. Was it wise to multiply and intensify such temptations by the adoption of an indiscriminate policy of constitutional amendment?

"Everybody knows more than anybody"; and it may very well be that the disasters of the past year are due to an instinctive popular perception of the dangers of the new policy. It seems clear that, where popular condemnation is fairly to be inferred, it has thus far been provoked mainly along the lines of this policy. But it should not be forgotten that there is an entirely distinct field, that of law, applying either to a whole State, or to part of it by local option. None of the facts available seem to indicate that this is any the less debatable ground than it has always been. At any rate, those who believe that prohibition in this sense is dead would do well not to be too hasty in administering upon its estate.

tions of human society. Thus may be instituted a modern «Thousand and One Nights'» entertainment. The occupation of arranging and assorting is in itself very pleasant, having its social side, and bringing the family together into close communion; and it is instructive, as it renews acquaintance with subjects half forgotten, and forms acquaintances with others before ignored.

Then the work itself praises its master and friends, illustrating the process of winnowing the chaff from the grain, typifying the reunion of friends and brothers separated and estranged by differences of opinion and belief, and finally establishing a union of good, wise, noble natures in an ideal republic as enduring, as delightful, and as useful as good.

Herman Justi.

«One Man Who Was Content.»

A DEBT of gratitude is due to Mrs. Van Rensselaer from those who have been so fortunate as to read in the December CENTURY her sketch, «One Man Who Was Content.» This dispassionate recital of the tragedies of a life, and the triumph of personality over fate, is an inspiration to its readers. The tragedies rehearsed in the narrative are not wonderful or unprecedented. They are such as may come into any life, to be taken lightly by the irresponsible or seriously by the thoughtful and introspective soul. It is not to the light-brained, nor scarcely to the light-hearted, that the rehearsal appeals; but rather to him who knows that stinging blows can be dealt by the hand of fate, or to one who has suffered through his own mistakes or the mistakes of others. Personal tragedies are ordinary happenings to the world at large. The death of one man merely makes room for the ambition of another, and each man has his own content to seek, his own happiness to possess, and his own salvation to gain. Individual man, even amid a host of friendly souls, stands sublimely alone with his Creator. To fall by the wayside under adverse circumstances argues only a weakness which fate is justified in crushing out. Mrs. Van Rensselaer says: To dwell in resignation «is to acknowledge defeat at the hands of life, to accept it, and in passive endurance to give up the fight for happiness. . . . But the brave man, the wise man,» cannot do this; «he holds to his birthright of hope, and looks forward to a time when,» notwithstanding the enmity of fate, «in some sure way he will reconquer and reestablish contentment.» It is the cheerful tone which commends Mrs. Van Rensselaer's story. From her position nothing, no adversity, no mistake, is irremediable. No matter what the changing conditions of life may present, there is always a chance for readjustment to new denials and new demands. Unkind fate shall not dominate, for there is always something desirable left which can be secured. Pessimism is at present so rampant in literature that optimism is to be doubly appreciated. «The mood of disdain is upon us,» but it is neither a wholesome nor a desirable state. Only that is desirable which brings content, and «the greatest good to the greatest number.» There is no surer way to make a tired, tiresome, and pessimistic people than to make their literature on that pattern. Grant that life is a struggle; grant that there is more of the minor than of the major: but do not sell the

«birthright of hope» by eliminating or disabling man's power of modulating from the minor into the major.

From the most depressing situations may come the most glorious success; and the writer who inspires the world at large with this idea, who models his literature that it may build up hope, elevate character, stimulate thought, and urge to creditable and noble action—to such a one the world owes a debt. If the writer of «One Man Who Was Content» has inspired one depressed, despondent mind to vigorous action which results in accomplishment and content, then has she used her talents to great purpose.

But, some critic observes, the whole story of this one contented man is full of egotism. It puts a premium upon egotism. It is full of the all-important «I.» This criticism is granted; for in dealing with himself one always deals with an egotist. It is an egotist who says (quoting from the story under discussion): «I feel that I have indeed been successful, not because I have done all that with my chances a man might do, but because I have done absolutely all that with my abilities was possible to me.» But, egotistic as it is, it sums up all the possibilities of a life. It is a summary made by a man with sense sufficient to measure himself; and when such an example is found, be it in fiction or reality, it illustrates and accentuates the fact that when a man can measure himself, and know that he has turned all his talents to account, not burying one of them—to such belong rightfully the earnings of content.

Mrs. Van Rensselaer's story is a contribution to ethics. It defines man's duty to himself, and it tells him how to discharge that duty, in its teaching that hope and happiness are to be gained through earnest and honest development of talent, and again in the reminder of its concluding idea, that there is no «justification in a record of empty days.»

Estelle Thomas.

A Scientific Basis for Liquor Legislation.

EIGHT years ago a little company of distinguished students of social problems, who called themselves the Sociological Group, took up some of the larger subjects of social welfare, and their studies (for every subject taken up was made the special study of one member, and his conclusions were discussed by them all) were published in THE CENTURY MAGAZINE in 1889 and the years following. Four years ago they decided to enlarge the group and to concentrate their study on one great subject. Thus it came about that the Committee of Fifty for the Investigation of the Liquor Problem was organized. A fund was subscribed, and an original and comprehensive investigation was begun. No more significant or more public-spirited piece of work was ever undertaken, none that showed a more serious purpose. So entangled is the subject with social and even race prejudices, religious opinions, and political purposes, that it could be investigated satisfactorily in the United States only by a voluntary association of men of the highest character and the best equipment. One of the principal lines of inquiry was into the results of our legislative experience in regulating the liquor traffic; this was undertaken under the supervision of Presidents Eliot of Harvard University and Low of Columbia University, and James C. Carter, Esq., of New York. Another was into the economic and social effects of the

liquor traffic, which was intrusted to a committee of professional economists, of which the late President Francis A. Walker was chairman. In 1894 the committee on the legislative aspects of the problem sent into the field trained investigators, who, after nearly two years' work in eight States, each of which has different liquor laws, submitted their reports, which are now published («A Study of Liquor Laws») by Houghton, Mifflin & Co. These reports cover sufficient time and area and difference of conditions definitely to establish certain conclusions, which will govern all wise legislation in the future.

The most striking fact emphasized by the whole body of this work is the corruption that liquor laws bring into local politics. The corruption is not always in proportion to the severity of the law, but often in proportion to the complexity of the machinery for its enforcement, and always in proportion to the lagging of public sentiment behind the letter of the law. The worst effect in political corruption has been in Maine, in communities where public opinion has not supported the prohibition amendment to the Constitution. The investigators solemnly record as one result «a full-blown hypocrisy,» which is «nowhere so blatant as in the legislative halls.» Prohibition, which is already clearly waning as a proposed solution of the problem, can never recover from the damaging conclusions drawn by the committee from the study of its operations in Maine and Iowa. True, it has banished breweries and distilleries from Maine, but «there is no evidence that it has diminished the consumption of alcoholic drinks.» The motives of the original prohibitionists, and of many later ones, were good, and some benefits have resulted from prohibition; but «unlooked-for evils of the gravest character also are due to it,» such as «a whole generation of habitual law-breakers, schooled in evasion and shamelessness»; «courts ineffective through fluctuations in policy, delays, perjuries, negligences»; «officers of the law double-faced and mercenary»; «office-holders unfaithful to pledges»; «bribes, hush-money, and assessments for political purposes,» «used to corrupt the lower courts, the police administration, political organizations, and even the electorate itself.» The same phenomena were found also in Iowa under a prohibitory law, which, as in Maine, produced political, not to say social, immoralities out of proportion to its somewhat slight benefits.

Political evils of another kind followed the State-dispensary system in South Carolina. The army of store-keepers and State constables and commissioners that was organized under this interesting experiment produced an almost invincible political machine, with all a machine's evil qualities. The South Carolina experiment was like many other experiments in this—that the law had directly contrary results, in regard to discouraging consumption, from the results that were expected. It was expected that it would restrict drinking in the rural districts, though perhaps not in the towns; whereas in the towns it distinctly discouraged drinking and lessened crime, while in the country it encouraged intemperance. «There is,» concludes the committee, «no American legislation effective to remove the motive of private profit from the traffic.»

Measuring the success of liquor laws in proportion to their freedom from political corruption, of the eight kinds of laws the effects of which were examined in Maine, Iowa, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Ohio, Missouri, and South Carolina, the most successful of all has been the simple tax law of Ohio. Under this law the traffic is not licensed, but simply taxed. No false morals creep into such frank dealing with it, and there is less chance for political corruption.

Measuring the success of liquor laws by their promotion of temperate habits, the committee has not found that «any one kind of legislation has been more successful than another.» In one community one restrictive system has proved best, in another community another system, each in proportion to its support by local public sentiment and the sincerity of the execution of the law.

One clear and helpful conclusion deduced from this wide study is that in few towns and cities has the limit of license fees been reached. Within a period of five years the fees in Boston were doubled and again increased, without diminishing the number of applicants for licenses. The revenue-producing capacity of the licensed traffic is enormous before the point is reached where the illicit traffic is encouraged in any fairly well-policed community.

In general, this thorough and illuminating study of our experience with liquor legislation establishes on a scientific basis these facts, which are as important as they are fundamental: Attempts at prohibition have been vicious failures, except in small areas where public sentiment has been virtually, unanimous and in towns adjacent to large cities; no successful method has been found in the United States to remove the motive of private profit from the traffic; the greatest success has attended restrictive laws which impose severe taxes, and reduce the number of saloons, confining them to certain localities, and requiring a separation of the traffic in liquors from all other traffic, and imposing all enforceable conditions of publicity, such as the absence of screens, as in Massachusetts; in other words, we have successfully dealt with the problem only by elevating the saloon and then by heavily taxing it. And the investigation gives overwhelming proof that this great subject of social welfare, if no other, *can be dealt with best—indeed, can be dealt with only—in small areas; local laws are the only laws worth having in regulating it, and no local law is worth having except a law that local public sentiment will enforce.* When we find these truisms scientifically demonstrated out of our wasteful and corrupting experience, they cease to be mere truisms, for they become the foundation of a real social science. And they have a many-sided significance. They show the way to the true promotion of temperance; they give a clue to effective legislation; they point to the repression of the most corrupting influence in local politics; they indicate a yet imperfectly developed source of public revenue; and they make forever plain the distinction between the real laws of social progress and the dogmas of ignorance or philanthropy. The demonstration is as clear as a demonstration can be of far-reaching conclusions about so complex a subject of social well-being.

Walter H. Page.