

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

THE BORDER STATES.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

REBELLIOUS MARYLAND.



NO sooner had the secession ordinance been secretly passed by the convention of Virginia than Governor Letcher notified Jefferson Davis of the event, and (doubtless by preconcert) invited him to send a commissioner from Montgomery to Richmond to negotiate an alliance. The adhesion of Virginia was an affair of such magnitude and pressing need to the cotton-States, that Davis made the Vice-President of the new Confederacy, Alexander H. Stephens, his plenipotentiary, who accordingly arrived at Richmond on the 22d of April. Here he found everything as favorable to his mission as he could possibly wish. The convention was filled with a newborn zeal of insurrection; many lately stubborn Union members were willingly accepting offices in the extemporized army of the State; the governor had that day appointed Robert E. Lee commander-in-chief of the Virginia forces, which choice the convention immediately confirmed. Stephens was shrewd enough to perceive that his real negotiation lay neither with the governor nor the convention, but with this newly created military chieftain. That very evening he invited Lee to a conference, at which the late Federal colonel forgot the sentiment written by his own hand two days before, that he never again desired to draw his sword except in defense of his native State,† and now expressed great eagerness for the proposed alliance. Lee being willing, the remainder of the negotiation was easy; and two days afterward (April 24) Stephens and certain members of the convention signed a formal military league, making Virginia an immediate member of the "Confederate States," and placing her armies under the command of Jefferson Davis — thus treating with contempt the convention proviso that the secession ordinance should only take effect after ratification by the people, the vote on which had been set for the fourth Thursday of May. Lee and others endured this military usurpation, under which they became

beneficiaries, without protest. No excuse for it could be urged. Up to this time not the slightest sign of hostility to Virginia had been made by the Lincoln administration — no threats, no invasion, no blockade; the burning of Harper's Ferry and Gosport were induced by the hostile action of Virginia herself. On the contrary, even after these, Mr. Lincoln repeated in writing, in a letter to Reverdy Johnson which will be presently quoted, the declarations made to the Virginia commissioners on the 13th, that he intended no war, no invasion, no subjugation — nothing but defense of the Government.

At the time of the Baltimore riot the telegraph was still undisturbed; and by its help, as well as by personal information and private letters, that startling occurrence and the succeeding insurrectionary uprising were speedily made known throughout the entire South, where they excited the liveliest satisfaction and most sanguine hopes. All the Southern newspapers immediately became clamorous for an advance on Washington; some of the most pronounced Richmond conspirators had all along been favorable to such an enterprise; and extravagant estimates of possibilities were telegraphed to Montgomery. They set forth that Baltimore was in arms, Maryland rising, Lincoln in a trap, and not more than 1200 regulars and 3000 volunteers in Washington; that the rebels had 3000 men at Harper's Ferry; that Governor Letcher had seized three to five steamers on the James River; that the connecting Southern railroads could carry 5000 to 7000 men daily at the rate of 350 miles per day.

As a leader we want Davis. An hour now is worth years of common fighting. One dash, and Lincoln is taken, the country saved, and the leader who does it will be immortalized.‡

This, from a railroad superintendent supposed to have practical skill in transportation, looked plausible. The Montgomery cabinet caught the enthusiasm of the moment, and on April 22 Jefferson Davis telegraphed to Governor Letcher at Richmond:

In addition to the forces heretofore ordered, requisitions have been made for 13 regiments; 8 to rendezvous at Lynchburg, 4 at Richmond, and 1 at Harper's Ferry. Sustain Baltimore, if practicable. We reënforce you.

† Lee to General Scott, April 20, 1861.

‡ Bird to Walker, April 20, 1861. War Records.

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This dispatch shows us what a farce even the Virginia military league was, since two days before its conclusion "foreign" rebel troops were already ordered to the "sacred soil" of the Old Dominion. Governor Letcher was doubtless willing enough to respond to the suggestion of Davis, but apparently had neither the necessary troops nor preparation. He had as yet been able to muster but a shadowy force on the line of the Potomac, notwithstanding his adjutant-general's pretentious report of the previous December. Nevertheless, hoping that events might ripen the opportunity into better conditions for success, he lost no time in sending such encouragement and help as were at his control. The rebel commander at Harper's Ferry had already communicated with the Baltimore authorities and effected a cordial understanding with them, and they promised to notify him of hostile menace or approach.* Mason, late senator, appears thereupon to have been dispatched to Baltimore.† He seems to have agreed to supply the Maryland rebels with such arms as Virginia could spare; and some 2000 muskets actually found their way to Baltimore from this source during the following week,‡ though an arrangement to send twenty cannon (32-pounders) to the same city from the Gosport navy yard§ apparently failed.

But it would appear that the project of a dash at Washington found an unexpected obstacle in the counsels of Virginia's new military chief, Robert E. Lee, who assumed command of the State forces April 23.¶ He instructed the officers at Alexandria and along the Potomac to act on the defensive, to establish camps of instruction, and collect men and provisions.¶ This course was little to the liking of some of the more ardent rebels. They telegraphed (in substance) that Davis's immediate presence at Richmond was essential; that his non-arrival was causing dissatisfaction; that the troops had no confidence in Lee and were murmuring; that there were signs of temporizing, hopes of a settlement without collision, and consequent danger of demoralization; that Lee "dwelt on enthusiasm North and against aggression from us." Said another dispatch:

Have conversed with General Robert E. Lee. He wishes to repress enthusiasm of our people. His troops not ready, although pouring in every hour. They remain here. General Cocke has three hundred and no more. Corps of observation on Potomac near Alexandria. He considers Maryland helpless, needing encouragement and succor. Believes twenty thousand men in and near Washington.**

* Harper to Richardson, April 21, 1861. War Records.

† Blanchard to Howard, April 23, 1861. McPherson, "History of the Rebellion."

‡ Stuart to Police Board, May 2, 1861. *Ibid.*, p. 394.

In no State were the secession plottings more determined or continuous than in Maryland. From the first a small but able and unwearying knot of Baltimore conspirators sought to commit her people to rebellion by the empty form of a secession ordinance. They made speeches, held conventions, besieged the governor with committees; they joined the Washington conspirators in treasonable caucus; they sent recruits to Charleston; they incited the Baltimore riot; and there is no doubt that in these doings they reflected a strong minority sentiment in the State. With such a man as Pickens or Letcher in the executive chair they might have succeeded, but in Governor Hicks they found a constant stumbling-block and an irremovable obstacle. He gave Southern commissioners the cold shoulder. He refused at first to call the legislature. He declined to order a vote on holding a convention. He informed General Scott of the rebel plots of Maryland, and testified of the treasonable designs before the investigating committee of Congress. His enemies have accused him of treachery, and cite in proof a letter which they allege he wrote a few days after Lincoln's election in which he inquired whether a certain militia company would be "good men to send out to kill Lincoln and his men." If the letter be not a forgery, it was at most an ill-judged and awkward piece of badinage; for his repeated declarations and acts leave no doubt that from first to last his heart was true to the Union. He had the serious fault of timidity, and in several instances foolishly gave way to popular clamor; but in every case he soon recovered and resumed his hostility to secession.

The Baltimore riot, as we have seen, put a stop to the governor's arrangements to raise and arm four regiments of Maryland volunteers, of picked Union men, for United States service within the State or at Washington. Instead of this, he, in the flurry of the uprising, called out the existing militia companies, mainly disloyal in sentiment and officered by secessionists. The Baltimore authorities collected arms, bought munitions, and improvised companies to resist the passage of troops; they forbade the export of provisions, regulated the departure of vessels, controlled the telegraph. General Stewart, commanding the State militia, established posts and patrols, and in effect Maryland became hostile territory to the North and to the Government. The Union flag disappeared from her soil. For three or

§ Watts to Lee, April 27, 1861. MS.

¶ Lee, General Orders, April 23, 1861. War Records.

¶ Lee to Cocke, April 24, 1861. War Records.

** Duncan to Walker, April 26, 1861. MS.

four days treason was rampant; all Union men were intimidated; all Union expression or manifestation was suppressed by mob violence. The hitherto fearless Union newspapers, in order to save their offices and materials from destruction, were compelled to drift with the flood, and print editorials advising, in vague terms, that all must now unite in the defense of Maryland. It was in this storm and stress of insurrection that Governor Hicks protested against Butler's landing, and sent Lincoln his proposal of mediation;* and on the same day (April 22), and by the same influence, he was prevailed upon to notify the legislature to meet on the 26th. It so happened that the seats of the Baltimore members were vacant. A special election, dominated by the same passions, was held on the 24th. Only a "States Rights" ticket was voted for; and of the 30,000 electors in the city 9244, without opposition, elected the little knot of secession conspirators—the Union men not daring to nominate candidates or come to the polls.

For the moment the leading Unionists of Maryland deemed their true rôle one of patience and conciliation. In this spirit Reverdy Johnson, a lawyer and statesman of fame and influence both at home and abroad, came to Lincoln upon the stereotyped errand to obtain some assurance in writing that he meditated no invasion or subjugation of the South; to which the President confidentially replied:

I forebore to answer yours of the 22d because of my aversion (which I thought you understood) to getting on paper and furnishing new grounds for misunderstanding. I do say the sole purpose of bringing troops here is to defend this Capital. I do say I have no purpose to invade Virginia with them or any other troops, as I understand the word invasion. But suppose Virginia sends her troops, or admits others through her borders, to assail this Capital, am I not to repel them even to the crossing of the Potomac, if I can? Suppose Virginia erects, or permits to be erected, batteries on the opposite shore to bombard the city, are we to stand still and see it done? In a word, if Virginia strikes us, are we not to strike back, and as effectively as we can? Again, are we not to hold Fort Monroe (for instance), if we can? I have no objection to declare a thousand times that I have no purpose to invade Virginia or any other State, but I do not mean to let them invade us without striking back.†

Mr. Johnson replied, thanking the President for his frankness, and indorsing all his

* War Records.

† Lincoln to Johnson, April 24, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Johnson to Lincoln, April 24, 1861. Unpublished MS.

§ Campbell to Davis, April 28, 1861. Unpublished MS.

|| As the legislature, at its last session, had unseated

policy. "In a word," said he, "all that your note suggests would be my purpose were I intrusted with your high office." He also promised that the President's note should "be held perfectly confidential."‡ But it appears that Mr. Johnson chose his confidants with very poor judgment; for within four days its substance was written from Washington direct to Jefferson Davis.§

By no means the least of the difficult problems before Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet was the question how to deal with the Maryland legislature, so unexpectedly called to assemble. The special election in Baltimore,|| held under secession terrorism, had resulted in the unopposed choice of ten delegates from the city, all believed to be disloyal, and several of them known to be conspicuous secessionists. With this fresh element of treason suddenly added to a legislative body so small in numbers, it seemed morally certain that its first act would be to arm the State, and pass something equivalent to a secession ordinance. Should this be permitted? How could it best be prevented? Ought the legislature to be arrested? Should it be dispersed by force? General Butler was at Annapolis, where it was expected that the session would be held, and signified his more than willingness to act in the matter. The plans were discussed in Cabinet with great contrariety of opinion. Some of the least belligerent of the President's councilors were by this time in hot blood over the repeated disasters and indignities which the Government had suffered, and began to indulge in the unreasoning temper and impatience of the irritated public opinion of the North, where one of the largest and most influential journals had already declared that the country needed a dictator. Mr. Bates filed a written opinion—in spirit a protest—declaring that the treasonable acts in Virginia and Maryland were encouraged by the fact that "we frighten nobody, we hurt nobody"; though he failed to suggest any other than merely vindictive remedies that were immediately feasible. Mr. Chase also partook of this frame of mind, and wrote the President a curt little note of querulous complaint, eminently prophetic of his future feelings towards and relations to Mr. Lincoln:

Let me beg you to remember that the disunionists have anticipated us in everything, and that as yet we

the delegates from Baltimore, a special election was held in that city on April 24. But one ticket was presented, and 9244 ballots were cast for Messrs. John C. Brune, Ross Winans, Henry M. Warfield, J. Hanson Thomas, T. Parkin Scott, H. M. Morfitt, S. Teackle Wallis, Charles H. Pitts, Wm. G. Harrison, and Lawrence Sangston, the States Rights candidates. —Scharf, "History of Maryland," Vol. III., p. 424.

have accomplished nothing but the destruction of our own property. Let me beg you to remember also that it has been a darling object with the disunionists to secure the passage of a secession ordinance by Maryland. The passage of that ordinance will be the signal for the entry of disunion forces into Maryland. It will give a color of law and regularity to rebellion and thereby triple its strength. The custom-house in Baltimore will be seized and Fort McHenry attacked—perhaps taken. What next? Do not, I pray you, let this new success of treason be inaugurated in the presence of American troops. Save us from this new humiliation. A word to the brave old commanding general will do the work of prevention. You alone can give the word.*

The bad taste and injustice of such language consisted in its assumption that the President was somehow culpable for what had already occurred, whereas Mr. Chase had in the beginning been more conciliatory towards the rebels than had Mr. Lincoln.

With a higher conception of the functions of the presidential office, Mr. Lincoln treated public clamor and the fretfulness of Cabinet ministers with the same quiet toleration. Again, as before, and as ever afterward, he listened attentively to such advice as his Cabinet had to give, but reserved the decision to himself. He looked over the Attorney-General's legal notes, weighed the points of political expediency, canvassed carefully the probabilities of military advantage, and embodied his final directions in a letter to General Scott:

MY DEAR SIR: The Maryland legislature assembles to-morrow at Annapolis, and not improbably will take action to arm the people of that State against the United States. The question has been submitted to and considered by me, whether it would not be justifiable, upon the ground of necessary defense, for you, as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, to arrest or disperse the members of that body. I think it would not be justifiable, nor efficient for the desired object. *First*, they have a clearly legal right to assemble; and we cannot know in advance that their action will not be lawful and peaceful. And if we wait until they shall have acted, their arrest or dispersion will not lessen the effect of their action.

Secondly, we cannot permanently prevent their action. If we arrest them, we cannot long hold them as prisoners; and, when liberated, they will immediately reassemble and take their action. And precisely the same if we simply disperse them. They will immediately reassemble in some other place.

I therefore conclude that it is only left to the commanding general to watch and await their action, which, if it shall be to arm their people against the United States, he is to adopt the most prompt and efficient means to counteract, even if necessary to the bombardment of their cities; and, in the extremest necessity, the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*. †

* Chase to Lincoln, April 24, 1861. Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase."

† Lincoln to Scott, April 25, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Scott to Butler, April 26, 1861. War Records.

§ Hicks, Special Message, April 27, 1861. "Rebellion Record."

Thus directed, General Scott wrote to General Butler on the following day:

In the absence of the undersigned, the foregoing instructions are turned over to Brigadier-General B. F. Butler of the Massachusetts Volunteers, or other officer commanding at Annapolis, who will carry them out in a right spirit; that is, with moderation and firmness. In the case of arrested individuals notorious for their hostility to the United States, the prisoners will be safely kept and duly cared for, but not surrendered except on the order of the commander aforesaid. ‡

At the last moment, however, conscious of the offenses which some of their members were meditating against the Government, the Maryland legislature abandoned the idea of meeting at Annapolis, and induced the governor to convene their special session at the town of Frederick. Here Governor Hicks sent them his special message on the 27th, reciting the recent occurrences, transmitting his correspondence with the various Federal authorities, and expressing the conviction "that the only safety of Maryland lies in preserving a neutral position between our brethren of the North and of the South." At the same time he admitted the right of transit for Federal troops, and counseled "that we shall array ourselves for Union and peace." § The lack of coherence and consistency in the message was atoned for by its underlying spirit of loyalty.

Meanwhile the plentiful arrival of volunteers enabled the Government to strengthen its hold upon Annapolis and the railroad. || The military "Department of Annapolis" was created, and General Butler assigned to its command. This embraced twenty miles on each side of the railroad from Annapolis to Washington; ¶ and all of Maryland not included in these limits was left in General Patterson's "Department of Pennsylvania." Measures were taken to concentrate sufficient troops at Harrisburg and at Philadelphia to approach Baltimore in force from those quarters and permanently to occupy the city; and to give the military ample authority for every contingency, the President issued the following additional order to General Scott:

You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line which is now or which shall be used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* for the public safety, you personally, or through the officer in command at the point at which resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that writ.**

|| Butler to Scott, April 27, 1861. War Records.

¶ General Orders, No. 12, April 27, 1861. War Records.

** Lincoln to Scott, April 27, 1861. McPherson, "History of the Rebellion."

Having run its course about a week or ten days, the secession frenzy of Baltimore rapidly subsided. The railroad managers of that city once more tendered their services to the War Department; but Secretary Cameron, instead of giving them immediate encouragement, ordered that the Annapolis route be opened for public travel and traffic. Their isolation, first created by the bridge-burning, was thus continued and soon began to tell seriously upon their business interests, as well as upon the general industries and comfort of the city. On the 4th of May General Butler, under Scott's orders, moved forward and took post with two regiments at the Relay House, eight miles from Baltimore, where he could control the westward trains and cut off communication with Harper's Ferry. The significance of all these circumstances did not escape the popular observation and instinct. The Union newspapers took courage and once more printed bold leaders; the city government dismissed the rebel militia and permitted bridges and telegraphs to be repaired. Governor Hicks issued a proclamation for the election of members of Congress to attend the coming special session on the 4th of July; and also, by special message to the legislature and publication in the newspapers, repudiated the charge that he had consented to the bridge-burning. More than all, the Unionists of both city and State, gaining confidence with the strong evidences of reaction, began to hold meetings and conventions vigorously to denounce secession, and to demonstrate that they were in a decided majority.

Little by little loyalty and authority asserted themselves. About the 1st of May General Scott began preparing to reestablish the transit of troops through Baltimore, and on the 9th the first detachment since the riot of April 19 successfully made the journey. Some 1300 men in all, including Sherman's regular battery from Minnesota and 500 regulars from Texas, were brought in transports from Perryville and landed at Locust Point under the guns of the *Harriet Lane*, embarked in cars, and carried through South Baltimore. The city authorities, police, and a large concourse of people were present; and the precautions and arrangements were so thorough that not the slightest disturbance occurred. Four days after this (May 13) the railroad brought the first train from Philadelphia over its repaired track and restored bridges.


The Maryland legislature, finding its occupation gone, and yet nursing an obstinate secession sympathy, adjourned on May 14 to meet again on the 4th of June. About the same time the people of Baltimore underwent a surprise. Late on the evening of May 13,

under cover of an opportune thunder-storm, General Butler moved from the Relay House into the city with about a thousand men, the bulk of his force being the famous Massachusetts 6th, which had been mobbed there on the 19th of April. The movement was entirely unauthorized and called forth a severe rebuke from General Scott; but it met no opposition and was loudly applauded by the impatient public opinion of the North, which could ill comprehend the serious military risk it involved. The general carried his spirit of bravado still farther. He made his camp on Federal Hill, which he proceeded to fortify; and on the afternoon of the 14th sent a detachment of only thirty-five men to seize a lot of arms stored near the locality of the riot. The little squad of volunteers found the warehouse and were given possession of the arms,—2200 muskets sent from Virginia, and 4020 pikes of the John Brown pattern, made for the city by the Winans establishment during the riot week,—and loading them on thirty-five wagons and drays started for Fort McHenry over some of the identical streets where the Massachusetts men had been murdered by the mob. It was already late when this long procession got under way; large crowds collected, and riotous demonstrations of a threatening character were made at several points. Fortunately, the police gave efficient assistance, and what might easily have become an unnecessary sacrifice of life was by their vigilance averted.

Also coincident with this, the Union cause gained another signal advantage in Maryland. Governor Hicks's courage had risen with the ebb of disloyalty throughout the State; and as soon as the legislature was adjourned he issued his proclamation calling into the service of the United States the four regiments he originally promised under the President's call. These were rapidly formed, and became a part of the Union army under a new call. Amidst these fluctuations the more belligerent Maryland rebels also formed companies and went South—some to Richmond, some to the rebel camp at Harper's Ferry. But the fraction of military aid which Maryland finally gave to the rebellion rose to no special significance.

Out of these transactions, however, there arose a noteworthy judicial incident. A man named John Merryman, found recruiting as a lieutenant for one of these rebel companies, was arrested (May 25) and imprisoned in Fort McHenry. Chief-Justice Taney, then in Baltimore, being applied to, issued a writ of *habeas corpus* to bring the prisoner before him.* General Cadwalader, at this time in command, made a respectful reply to the writ, alleging

* Tyler, "Memoir R. B. Taney," pp. 640-642.



GOVERNOR T. H. HICKS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

Merryman's treason, and stating further that the President had authorized him to suspend the writ in such cases; and requested the Chief-Justice to postpone further action till the matter could be referred to the President.* This avowal aroused all the political ire of the Chief-Justice; he was struck with a judicial blindness which put disloyalty, conspiracy, treason, and rebellion utterly beyond his official contemplation. He saw not with the eye of a great judge the offended majesty of the law commanding the obedience of all citizens of the republic, but only, with a lawyer's microscopic acuteness, the disregard of certain technical forms and doubtful professional dicta. The personal restraint of one traitor in arms became of more concern to him than the endangered fate of representative government to the world.

The Chief-Justice immediately ordered an attachment to issue against General Cadwalader for contempt; upon which the marshal made return that he was unable to serve it, being denied entrance to Fort McHenry. Thereupon the Chief-Justice admitted the existence of a superior military force, but declared "that the President, under the Constitution of the United States, cannot suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, nor authorize a military officer to do it," and

that Merryman ought therefore to be immediately discharged; and went on to say "that he should cause his opinion when filed, and all the proceedings, to be laid before the President, in order that he might perform his constitutional duty to enforce the laws by securing obedience to the process of the United States."

To this general purport the Chief-Justice filed his written opinion on the 1st of June,† and caused a copy to be transmitted to the President.

Of that opinion it will not be irrelevant to quote the criticism of one of the profoundest and most impartial jurists of that day:

Chief-Justice Taney's opinion in Merryman's case is not an authority. This, of course, is said in the judicial sense. But it is not even an argument, in the full sense. He does not argue the question from the language of the clause, nor from the history of the clause, nor from the principles of the Constitution, except by an elaborate depreciation of the President's office, even to the extent of making him, as Commander-in-Chief of the army, called from the States into the service of the United States, no more than an assistant to the marshal's posse—the deepest plunge of judicial rhetoric. The opinion, moreover, has a tone, not to say a ring, of disaffection to the President, and to the Northern and Western side of his house, which is not comfortable to suppose in the person who fills the central seat of impersonal justice.‡

To this estimate of the spirit of Chief-Justice Taney's view we may properly, by way of anticipation, here add President Lincoln's own official answer to its substance. No attention was of course paid to the transmitted papers; but the President at the time of their receipt was already engaged in preparing his message to the coming special session of Congress, and in that document he presented the justification of his act. The original draft of the message, in Lincoln's autograph manuscript, thus defines the executive authority with that force of statement and strength of phraseology of which he was so consummate a master:


Soon after the first call for militia, I felt it my duty to authorize the commanding general, in proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*—or, in other words, to arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public safety. At my verbal request, as well as by the general's own inclination, this authority has been exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has been done under it are questioned; and I have been reminded from a high quarter that one who is sworn to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" should not himself be one to violate them. Of course I gave some consideration to the questions of power and

* Tyler, "Memoir R. B. Taney," pp. 643, 644.

† Ibid., pp. 644-659.

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‡ Horace Binney, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus," Part I., p. 36.



GOVERNOR CLAIBORNE F. JACKSON.

propriety before I acted in this matter. The whole of the laws which I have sworn to take care that they be faithfully executed were being resisted, and failing to be executed, in nearly one-third of the States. Must I have allowed them to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the means necessary to their execution some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty, that practically it relieves more of the guilty than the innocent, should, to a very limited extent, be violated? To state the question more directly, are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a case I should consider my official oath broken, if I should allow the Government to be overthrown, when I might think the disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it. But in this case I was not, in my own judgment, driven to this ground. In my opinion, I violated no law. The provision of the Constitution that "The privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it," is equivalent to a provision — is a provision — that such privilege may be suspended when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it. I decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, which I authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the executive, is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the power; and as the provision plainly was made for a dangerous emergency, I cannot bring myself to believe that the framers of that instrument intended that in every case the danger should run its course until Congress could be called together, the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case by the rebellion.*

The alterations and corrections from this first draft into the more impersonal form as finally sent to Congress and officially printed,

* Lincoln, Special Message, July 4, 1861. Autograph MS. of original draft.

but nowise changing its argument or substance, are also entirely in Lincoln's handwriting. That second and corrected form better befits the measured solemnity of a State paper. But in the language quoted above we seem brought into direct contact with the living workings of Lincoln's mind, and in this light the autograph original possesses a peculiar biographical interest and value.

MISSOURI.

THE governor of Missouri, Claiborne F. Jackson, was early engaged in the secession conspiracy, though, like other border-State executives, he successfully concealed his extreme designs from the public. There was an intolerant pro-slavery sentiment throughout the State; but, unlike other border States, it contained a positive and outspoken minority of equally strong antislavery citizens in a few localities, chiefly in the great commercial city of St. Louis, and made up mainly of its German residents and voters, numbering fully one-half the total population, which in 1860 was 160,000. This was the solitary exception to the general pro-slavery reaction in the whole South during the decade. Here, in 1856, a young, talented, courageous leader and skillful politician, Francis P. Blair, Jr., though himself a slaveholder, had dared to advocate the doctrine and policy of gradual emancipation, and on that issue secured an election to Congress. The same issue repeated in 1858 brought him sufficiently near an election to entitle him to contest his opponent's seat. In 1860 Blair and his followers, now fully acting with the Republican party, cast 17,028 votes for Lincoln, while the remaining votes in the State were divided as follows: Douglas, 58,801; Bell, 58,372; Breckinridge, 31,317. Blair was also again elected to Congress. The combined Lincoln, Douglas, and Bell vote showed an overwhelming Union majority; but the governor elected by the Douglas plurality almost immediately became a disunionist and secession conspirator.


With Blair as a leader, and such an organized minority at his call, the intrigues of Governor Jackson to force Missouri into secession met from the outset with many difficulties, notwithstanding the governor's official powers, influential following, and the prevalent pro-slavery opinion of the State. The legislature was sufficiently subservient; it contained a majority of radical secessionists, and only about fifteen unconditional Union members, who, however, were vigilant and active, and made the most of their minority influence. The same general expedients resorted to in other States by the conspirators were used in

Missouri—visits and speeches from Southern commissioners; messages and resolutions of "Southern" rights and sympathy and strong enunciation of the doctrine of non-coercion; military bills and measures to arm and control the State; finally, a "sovereign" State Convention. Here they overshot their mark. A strong majority of Union members was elected. The convention met at Jefferson City, the State capital, adjourned to the healthier atmosphere of St. Louis, and by an outspoken report and decided votes condemned secession and took a recess till December following.

The secession leaders, however, would not accept their popular defeat. In the interim Sumter fell, and Lincoln issued his call for troops. Governor Jackson, as we have seen, insultingly denounced the requisition as "illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, and diabolical," and again convened his rebel legislature in extra session to do the revolutionary work which the "sovereign" Missouri convention had so recently condemned.

It was an essential feature of Governor Jackson's programme to obtain possession of the St. Louis arsenal, and as early as January he had well-nigh completed his intrigue for its surrender to the State by a treacherous officer. But suspicion was aroused, the commandant changed, and the arsenal reënfined; by the middle of February the garrison had been increased to 488 regulars and recruits. In the mean time local intrigue was active. The secessionists organized bodies of "Minute men" to capture it, while the Union men with equal alertness formed a safety committee, and companies of Home Guards to join in its defense. These latter were largely drawn from the German part of the city, to which the arsenal lay contiguous, and their guardianship over it was therefore more direct and effective. Lincoln was inaugurated, and making Montgomery Blair his postmaster-general and Edward Bates his attorney-general, Missouri had virtually two representatives in the Cabinet. Francis P. Blair, Jr., brother of Montgomery, therefore found no great difficulty in having the command of the arsenal given to Captain Nathaniel Lyon, not only a devoted soldier, but a man of thorough anti-slavery convictions. Lyon was eager to forestall the secession conspiracy by extensive preparation and swift repression; but the depart-

ment commander, General Harney, and the ordnance officer, Major Hagner, whom Lyon had displaced, both of more slow and cautious temper, and reflecting the local political conservatism, thwarted and hampered Lyon and Blair, who from the beginning felt and acted in concert. No great difficulty grew out of this antagonism till the President's call for troops; then it created discussion, delay, want of coöperation. Blair could not get his volunteers mustered into service, and Governor Yates of Illinois could get no arms. The President finally grew impatient. Harney was relieved and called to Washington, and Lyon



MAJOR-GENERAL FRANCIS P. BLAIR, JR. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

directed to muster-in and arm the four Missouri regiments of volunteers with all expedition, and to send the extra arms to Springfield, Illinois, while three Illinois regiments were ordered to St. Louis to assist in guarding the arsenal.

These orders were issued in Washington on April 20. By this time St. Louis, like the whole Union, was seething with excitement, except that public opinion was more evenly divided than elsewhere. There were Union speeches and rebel speeches; cheers for Lin-

coln and cheers for Davis; Union flags and rebel flags; Union headquarters and rebel headquarters. With this also there was mingled a certain antipathy of nationality, all the Germans being determined Unionists. The antagonism quickly grew into armed organizations. The Unionists were mustered, armed, and drilled at the arsenal as United States volunteers. On the other hand Governor Jackson, having decided on revolution, formed at St. Louis a nominal camp of instruction under the State militia laws. The camp was established at Lindell's Grove, was christened "Camp Jackson," in honor of the governor, and was commanded by Brigadier-General D. M. Frost, a West Point graduate. Two regiments quickly assembled, and a third was in process of formation. The flag of the United States still floated over it and many Unionists were in the ranks of the old holiday parade militia companies, but the whole leadership and animating motive were in aid of rebellion: it was already literally one of Jefferson Davis's outposts. As soon as Governor Jackson had avowed his treason, he dispatched two confidential agents to Montgomery to solicit arms and aid, by whom Jefferson Davis wrote in reply:

After learning as well as I could from the gentlemen accredited to me what was most needful for the attack on the arsenal, I have directed that Captains Green and Duke should be furnished with two 12-pounder howitzers and two 32-pounder guns, with the proper ammunition for each. These from the commanding hills will be effective, both against the garrison and to breach the inclosing walls of the place. I concur with you as to the great importance of capturing the arsenal and securing its supplies, rendered doubly important by the means taken to obstruct your commerce and render you unarmed victims of a hostile invasion. We look anxiously and hopefully for the day when the star of Missouri shall be added to the constellation of the Confederate States of America.*

In reality he already regarded the "star" as in the "constellation." Three days later the rebel Secretary of War wrote to the governor:

Can you arm and equip one regiment of infantry for service in Virginia to rendezvous at Richmond? Transportation will be provided by this Government. The regiment to elect its own officers, and must enlist for not less than twelve months, unless sooner discharged.†

In face of the overwhelming Union sentiment of Missouri, so lately manifested by the

* Davis to Jackson, April 23, 1861. War Records.

† Walker to Jackson, April 26, 1861. War Records.

‡ Jackson to Walker, May 5, 1861. War Records.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL NATHANIEL LYON.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY BRADY.)

action of the State convention, Governor Jackson was not prepared for so bold a proceeding, and therefore wrote in reply:

Yours of the 26th ultimo, *via* Louisville, is received. I have no legal authority to furnish the men you desire. Missouri, you know, is yet under the tyranny of Lincoln's government — so far, at least, as forms go. We are woefully deficient here in arms and cannot furnish them at present; but so far as men are concerned we have plenty of them ready, willing, and anxious to march at any moment to the defense of the South. Our legislature has just met, and I doubt not will give me all necessary authority over the matter. If you can arm the men they will go whenever wanted, and to any point where they may be most needed. I send this to Memphis by private hand, being afraid to trust our mails or telegraphs. Let me hear from you by the same means. Missouri can and will put one hundred thousand men in the field if required. We are using every means to arm our people, and until we are better prepared must move cautiously. I write this in confidence. With my prayers for your success, etc.‡

First to capture the arsenal and then to reënforce the armies of Jefferson Davis was doubtless the immediate object of Camp Jackson. It would be a convenient nucleus which at the given signal would draw to itself similar elements from different parts of the State. Already the arsenal at Liberty—the same one from which arms were stolen to overawe Kansas in 1855—had been seized on April 20 and its contents appropriated by secessionists in western Missouri. Jeff M. Thompson had been for some weeks drilling a rebel camp at St. Joseph, and threatening the neighboring arsenal at Leavenworth. The legislature was maturing a comprehensive military bill which would give the governor power to concentrate and use these scattered fractions of regiments. Until this was passed, Camp Jackson had a lawful existence under the old militia laws.

But the Union Safety Committee, and especially Mr. Blair and Captain Lyon, followed the governor's intrigue at every step, and reporting the growing danger to Washington received from President Lincoln extraordinary powers to overcome it. An order to Captain Lyon read as follows:

The President of the United States directs that you enroll in the military service of the United States the loyal citizens of St. Louis and vicinity, not exceeding, with those heretofore enlisted, ten thousand in number, for the purpose of maintaining the authority of the United States for the protection of the peaceable inhabitants of Missouri; and you will, if deemed necessary for that purpose by yourself and by Messrs. Oliver T. Filley, John How, James O. Broadhead, Samuel T. Glover, J. Witzig, and Francis P. Blair, Jr., proclaim martial law in the city of St. Louis, etc.*

It was upon this order, with certain additional details, that General Scott made the indorsement, "It is revolutionary times, and therefore I do not object to the irregularity of this."

The Union Safety Committee soon had indisputable evidence of the insurrectionary purposes and preparations. On the night of May 8 cannon, ammunition, and several hundred muskets, sent by Jefferson Davis, were landed at the St. Louis levee from a New Orleans steamer, and at once transferred to Camp Jackson. They had been brought from the arsenal at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and were a part of the United States arms captured there in January by the governor of that State. The proceeding did not escape the vigilance of the Safety Committee, but the material of war was allowed to go unobstructed to the camp. The next day Captain Lyon visited Camp Jackson in disguise, and thus acquainting himself personally with its condition, strategical situation, and surroundings matured his plan for its immediate capture. All legal obstacles which had been urged

against such a summary proceeding were now removed by the actual presence in the camp of the hostile supplies brought from Baton Rouge.

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon of May 10 a strong battalion of regulars with six pieces of artillery, four regiments of Missouri Volunteers, and two regiments of Home Guards, all under command of Captain Lyon, were rapidly marching through different streets to Camp Jackson. Arrived there, it was but a moment's work to gain the appointed positions surrounding the camp, and to plant the batteries, ready for action, on commanding elevations. General Frost heard of their coming, and undertook to avert the blow by sending Lyon a letter denying that he or his command, or "any other part of the State forces," meant any hostility to the United States—though it was himself who had endeavored to corrupt the commandant of the arsenal in January,† and who, in a letter to the governor,‡ had outlined and recommended these very military proceedings in Missouri, convening the legislature, obtaining heavy guns from Baton Rouge, seizing the Liberty arsenal, and establishing this camp of instruction, expressly to oppose President Lincoln.

So far from being deterred from his purpose, Lyon refused to receive Frost's letter; and, as soon as his regiments were posted, sent a written demand for the immediate surrender of Camp Jackson, "with no other condition than that all persons surrendering under this demand shall be humanely and kindly treated." The case presented no alternative; and seeing that he was dealing with a resolute man, Frost surrendered with the usual protest. Camp and property were taken in possession; arms were stacked, and preparation made to march the prisoners to the arsenal, where on the following day they were paroled and disbanded.

Up to this time everything had proceeded without casualty, or even turbulent disorder; but an immense assemblage of the street populace followed the march and crowded about the camp. Most of them were peaceful spectators whose idle curiosity rendered them forgetful of danger; but among the number was the usual proportion of lawless city rowdies, of combative instincts, whose very nature impelled them to become the foremost elements of disorder and revolution. Many of them had rushed to the scene of expected conflict with such weapons as they could seize; and now as the homeward march began they pressed defiantly upon the troops, with cheers for Jeff Davis and

* Cameron to Lyon, April 30, 1861. War Records.

† Frost to Jackson, January 24, 1861. Peckham,

"General Nathaniel Lyon," p. 43.

‡ Frost to Jackson, April 15, 1861. *Ibid.*, p. 147.

insults and bitter imprecations upon the soldiers. It seems a fatality that when a city mob in anger and soldiers with loaded guns are by any circumstances thrown into close contact it produces the same incidents and results. There are insult and retort, a rush and a repulse; then comes a shower of missiles, finally a pistol-shot, and after it a return volley from the troops, followed by an irregular fusillade from both sides. Who began it, or how it was done, can never be ascertained. It so happened on this occasion, both at the head and rear of the marching column and during a momentary halt; and, as usual, the guilty escaped, and innocent men, women, and children fell in their blood, while the crowd fled pell-mell in mortal terror. Two or three soldiers and some fifteen citizens were killed and many wounded.

As at Baltimore, the event threw St. Louis into the excitement of a general riot. Gun stores were broken into and newspaper offices threatened; but the police checked the outbreak, though public tranquillity and safety were not entirely restored for several days.

Aside from its otherwise deplorable results, the riot produced, or rather magnified, a military and political complication. On the day after the capture of Camp Jackson, General Harney returned from Washington, and once more assumed command. His journey also was eventful. Arrested by the rebels at Harper's Ferry, he had been sent to Richmond; there the authorities, anxious to win him over to secession by kindness, set him at liberty. Proof against their blandishments, however, he merely thanked them for their courtesy, and, loyal soldier as he was, proceeded to his superiors and his duty at Washington. This circumstance greatly aided his explanations and excuses before General Scott, President Lincoln, and the Cabinet, and secured his restoration as Department Commander.

But his return to St. Louis proved ill timed. His arrival there in the midst of the excitement over the capture of Camp Jackson and the riot emphasized and augmented the antagonism between the radical Unionists, led by Blair and Lyon, and the pro-slavery and conservative Unionists, who now made the general their rallying point. Paying too much attention to the complaints and relying too blindly upon the false representations and promises of secession conspirators like Frost, and greatly underrating the active elements of rebellion in Missouri, Harney looked coldly upon the volunteers and talked of disbanding the Home Guards. This brought him into conflict with the Union Safety Committee and President Lincoln's orders. Delegations of equally influential citizens representing both sides went to

Washington, in a stubborn mistrust of each other's motives. In their appeal to Lincoln, Lyon's friends found a ready advocate in Mr. Blair, Postmaster-General, and Harney's friends in Mr. Bates, the Attorney-General; and the Missouri discord was thus in a certain degree, and at a very early date, transplanted into the Cabinet itself. This local embitterment in St. Louis beginning here ran on for several years, and in its varying and shifting phases gave the President no end of trouble in his endeavor from first to last to be just to each faction.

Harney was strongly intrenched in the personal friendship of General Scott; besides, he was greatly superior in army rank, being a brigadier-general, while Lyon was only a captain. On the other hand, Lyon's capture of Camp Jackson had shown his energy, courage, and usefulness, and had given him great popular éclat. Immediately to supersede him seemed like a public censure. It was one of the many cases where unforeseen circumstances created a dilemma, involving irritated personal susceptibilities and delicate questions of public expediency.

President Lincoln took action promptly and firmly, though tempered with that forbearance by which he was so constantly enabled to extract the greatest advantage out of the most perplexing complications. The delegations from Missouri with their letters arrived on May 16, a week after the Camp Jackson affair. Having heard both sides, Lincoln decided that in any event Lyon must be sustained. He therefore ordered that Harney should be relieved, and that Lyon be made a brigadier-general of volunteers. In order, however, that this change might not fall too harshly, Lincoln did not make his decision public, but wrote confidentially to Frank Blair, under date of May 18:

MY DEAR SIR: We have a good deal of anxiety here about St. Louis. I understand an order has gone from the War Department to you, to be delivered or withheld in your discretion, relieving General Harney from his command. I was not quite satisfied with the order when it was made, though on the whole I thought it best to make it; but since then I have become more doubtful of its propriety. I do not write now to countermand it, but to say I wish you would withhold it, unless in your judgment the necessity to the contrary is very urgent. There are several reasons for this. We had better have him a friend than an enemy. It will dissatisfy a good many who otherwise would be quiet. More than all, we first relieve him, then restore him, and now if we relieve him again the public will ask, "Why all this vacillation?" Still, if in your judgment it is indispensable, let it be so.

Upon receipt of this letter both Blair and Lyon, with commendable prudence, determined to carry out the President's suggestion. Since Harney's return from Washington his words and acts had been more in conformity

with their own policy. He had published a proclamation defending and justifying the capture of Camp Jackson, and declaring that "Missouri must share the destiny of the Union," and that the whole power of the United States would be exerted to maintain her in it. Especially was the proclamation unsparing in its denunciation of the recent military bill of the rebel legislature.

This bill cannot be regarded in any other light than an indirect secession ordinance, ignoring even the forms resorted to by other States. Manifestly its most material provisions are in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States. To this extent it is a nullity, and cannot, and ought not to, be upheld. . . . Within the field and scope of my command and authority the supreme law of the land must and shall be maintained, and no subterfuges, whether in the form of legislative acts or otherwise, can be permitted to harass or oppress the good and law-abiding people of Missouri. I shall exert my authority to protect their persons and property from violations of every kind, and I shall deem it my duty to suppress all unlawful combinations of men, whether formed under pretext of military organizations, or otherwise.*

He also suggested to the War Department the enlistment of Home Guards and the need of additional troops in Missouri. So far as mere theory and intention could go, all this was without fault. There can be no question of Harney's entire loyalty, and of his skill and courage as a soldier dealing with open enemies. Unfortunately, he did not possess the adroitness and daring necessary to circumvent the secret machinations of traitors.

Governor Jackson, on the contrary, seems to have belonged by nature and instinct to the race of conspirators. He and his rebel legislature, convened in special session at Jefferson City, were panic-stricken by the news of the capture of Camp Jackson. On that night of May 10 the governor, still claiming and wielding the executive power of the State, sent out a train to destroy the telegraph and to burn the railroad bridge over the Osage River, in order to keep the bayonets of Lyon and Blair at a safe distance. At night the legislature met for business, the secession members belted with pistols and bowie-knives, with guns lying across their desks or leaning against chairs and walls, while sentinels and soldiers filled the corridors and approaches. The city was in an uproar; the young ladies of the female seminary and many families were moved across the river for security.† All night long the secession governor and his secession majority hurried their treasonable legislation through the mere machinery of parliamentary forms. It was under these conditions that the

famous military bill and kindred acts were passed. It appropriated three millions; authorized the issue of bonds; diverted the school fund; anticipated two years' taxes; made the governor a military dictator, and ignored the Federal Government. It was, in truth, as Harney called it, "an indirect secession ordinance."

Armed with these revolutionary enactments, but still parading his State authority, Governor Jackson undertook cautiously to consolidate his military power. Ex-Governor Sterling Price was appointed Major-General commanding the Missouri State Guard; who, more conveniently to cloak the whole conspiracy, now sought an interview with Harney, and entered with him into a public agreement, vague and general in its terms, "of restoring peace and good order to the people of the State in subordination to the laws of the general and State governments."

General Price, having by commission full authority over the militia of the State of Missouri, undertakes, with the sanction of the governor of the State, already declared, to direct the whole power of the State officers to maintain order within the State among the people thereof, and General Harney publicly declares that, this object being thus assured, he can have no occasion, as he has no wish, to make military movements which might otherwise create excitements and jealousies, which he most earnestly desires to avoid.‡

Blinded and lulled by treacherous professions, Harney failed to see that this was evading the issue and committing the flock to the care of the wolf. Price's undertaking to "maintain order" was, in fact, nothing else than the organization of rebel companies at favorable points in the State, and immediately brought a shower of Union warnings and complaints to Harney. Within a week the information received caused him to notify Price of these complaints, and of his intention to organize Union Home Guards for protection.§ More serious still, reliable news came that an invasion was threatened from the Arkansas border. Price replied with his blandest assurances, denying everything. The aggressions, he said, were acts of irresponsible individuals. To organize Home Guards would produce neighborhood collision and civil war. He should carry out the agreement to the letter. Should troops enter Missouri from Arkansas or any other State he would "cause them to return instanter."||

Harney, taking such declarations at their surface value, and yielding himself to the suggestions and advice of the St. Louis conservatives who disliked Lyon and hated Blair, remained inactive, notwithstanding a sharp

* Harney, Proclamation, May 14, 1861. War Records.

† Peckham, "General Nathaniel Lyon," pp. 168-178.

‡ Price, Harney Agreement, May 21, 1861. War Records.

§ Harney to Price, May 27, 1861. War Records.

|| Price to Harney, May 28 and May 29. War Records.

admonition from Washington. The Adjutant-General wrote:

The President observes with concern that notwithstanding the pledge of the State authorities to cooperate in preserving peace in Missouri, loyal citizens in great numbers continue to be driven from their homes. . . . The professions of loyalty to the Union by the State authorities of Missouri are not to be relied upon. They have already falsified their professions too often, and are too far committed to secession, to be entitled to your confidence, and you can only be sure of their desisting from their wicked purposes when it is out of their power to prosecute them. You will therefore be unceasingly watchful of their movements, and not permit the clamors of their partisans and opponents of the wise measures already taken to prevent you from checking every movement against the Government, however disguised, under the pretended State authority. The authority of the United States is paramount, and whenever it is apparent that a movement, whether by color of State authority or not, is hostile, you will not hesitate to put it down.*

Harney had announced this identical policy in his proclamation of May 14. The difficulty was that he failed to apply and enforce his own doctrines, or rather that he lacked penetration to discern the treachery of the State authorities. He replied to the War Department:

My confidence in the honor and integrity of General Price, in the purity of his motives, and in his loyalty to the Government remains unimpaired. His course as President of the State Convention that voted by a large majority against submitting an ordinance of secession, and his efforts since that time to calm the elements of discord, have served to confirm the high opinion of him I have for many years entertained.†

Lyon and Blair were much better informed, and the latter wrote to Lincoln:

. . . I have to-day delivered to General Harney the order of the 16th of May above mentioned relieving him, feeling that the progress of events and condition of affairs in this State make it incumbent upon me to assume the grave responsibility of this act, the discretionary power in the premises having been given me by the President.‡

The President and the Secretary of War duly sustained the act.

This change of command soon brought matters in Missouri to a crisis. The State authorities were quickly convinced that Lyon would tolerate no evasion, temporizing, or misunderstanding. They therefore asked an interview; and Lyon sent Governor Jackson

and General Price a safeguard to visit St. Louis. They on the one part, and Lyon and Blair on the other, with one or two witnesses, held an interview of four hours on June 11. The governor proposed that the State should remain neutral; that he would not attempt to organize the militia under the military bill, on condition that the Union Home Guards should be disarmed and no further Federal troops should be stationed in Missouri. Lyon rejected this proposal, insisting that the governor's rebel "State Guards" should be disarmed and the military bill abandoned, and that the Federal Government should enjoy its unrestricted right to move and station its troops throughout the State, to repel invasion or protect its citizens. This the governor refused.

So the discussion terminated. Jackson and Price hurried by a special train back to Jefferson City, burning bridges as they went. Arrived at the capital, the governor at once published a proclamation of war. He recited the interview and its result, called fifty thousand militia into the active service of the State, and closed his proclamation by coupling together the preposterous and irreconcilable announcements of loyalty to the United States and declaration of war against them — a very marvel of impudence, even among the numerous kindred curiosities of secession literature.§

This sudden announcement of active hostility did not take Lyon by surprise. Thoroughly informed of the conspirators' plans, he had made his own preparations for equally energetic action. Though Jackson had crippled the railroad, the Missouri River was an open military highway, and numerous swift steamboats lay at the St. Louis wharf. On the afternoon of June 13 he embarked one of his regular batteries and several battalions of his Missouri Volunteers, and steamed with all possible speed up the river to Jefferson City, the capital of the State, leading the movement in person. He arrived on the 15th of June, and, landing, took possession of the town without resistance, and raised the Union flag over the State-house. The governor and his adherents hurriedly fled, his Secretary of State carrying off the great seal with which to certify future pretended official acts.

But it is equally my duty to advise you that your first allegiance is due to your own State, and that you are under no obligation whatever to obey the *unconstitutional* edicts of the military despotism which has enthroned itself at Washington, nor to submit to the infamous and degrading sway of its wicked minions in this State. No brave and true-hearted Missourian will obey one or submit to the other. Rise, then, and drive out ignominiously the invaders who have dared to desecrate the soil which your labors have made fruitful, and which is consecrated by your homes. [Jackson, Proclamation, June 12, 1861. Peckham, "General Nathaniel Lyon," p. 252.]

* Thomas to Harney, May 27, 1861. War Records.

† Harney to Thomas, June 5, 1861. War Records.

‡ F. P. Blair, Jr., to the President, May 30, 1861. Peckham, "General Nathaniel Lyon," p. 223.

§ In issuing this proclamation I hold it to be my solemn duty to remind you that Missouri is still one of the United States; that the Executive Department of the State government does not arrogate to itself the power to disturb that relation; that that power has been wisely vested in a convention which will at the proper time express your sovereign will; and that meanwhile it is your duty to obey all *constitutional* requirements of the Federal Government.

There had been no time for the rebellion to gather any head at the capital; but at the town of Boonville, fifty miles farther up the river, General Price was collecting some fragments of military companies. This nucleus of opposition Lyon determined also to destroy. Leaving but a slight guard at the capital, he reëmbarked his force next day, and reaching Boonville on the 17th landed without difficulty, and put the half-formed rebel militia to flight after a spirited but short skirmish. General Price prudently kept away from the encounter; and Governor Jackson, who had come hither, and who witnessed the disaster from a hill two miles distant, once more betook himself to flight. Two on the Union and fifteen on the rebel side were killed.

This affair at Boonville was the outbreak of open warfare in Missouri, though secret military aggression against the United States Government had been for nearly six months carried on by the treasonable State officials, aided as far as possible by the conspiracy in the cotton-States.

The local State government of Missouri, thus broken by the hostility of Governor Jackson and subordinate officials, was soon regularly restored. It happened that the Missouri State convention, chosen, as already related, with the design of carrying the State into rebellion, but which, unexpectedly to the conspirators, remained true to the Union, had, on adjourning its sessions from March to December, wisely created an emergency committee with power to call it together upon any necessary occasion. This committee now issued its call, under which the convention assembled in Jefferson City on the 22d of July. Many of its members had joined the rebellion, but a full constitutional quorum remained, and took up the task of reconstituting the disorganized machinery of civil administration. By a series of ordinances it declared the State offices vacant, abrogated the military bill and other treasonable legislation, provided for new elections, and finally, on the 31st of July, inaugurated a provisional government, which thereafter made the city of St. Louis its official headquarters. Hamilton R. Gamble, a conservative, was made governor. He announced his unconditional adherence to the Union, and his authority was immediately recognized by the greater portion of the State. Missouri thus remained through the entire war, both in form and in substance, a State in the Union.

Nevertheless a considerable minority of its population, scattered in many parts, was strongly tainted with sympathy for the rebellion. The conspiracy so long nursed by Governor Jackson and his adherents had taken

deep and pernicious root. An anomalous condition of affairs suddenly sprung up. Amidst a strongly dominant loyalty there smoldered the embers of rebellion, and during the whole civil war there blazed up fitfully, often where least expected, the flames of neighborhood strife and guerrilla warfare to an extent and with a fierceness not equaled in any other State. We shall have occasion to narrate how, under cover of this sentiment, the leaders of secession bands and armies made repeated and desolating incursions; and how, some months later, Governor Jackson with his perambulating State seal set up a pretended legislature and State government, and the Confederate authorities at Richmond enacted the farce of admitting Missouri to the Southern Confederacy. It was, however, from first to last, a palpable sham; the pretended Confederate officials in Missouri had no capital or archives, controlled no population, permanently held no territory, collected no taxes; and Governor Jackson was nothing more than a fugitive pretender, finding temporary refuge within Confederate camps.

KENTUCKY.

THE three States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, forming McClellan's department, were bounded south of the Ohio River by the single State of Kentucky, stretching from east to west, and occupying at least four-fifths of the entire Ohio line. Kentucky was a slave State. This domestic institution allied her naturally to the South, and created among her people a pervading sympathy with Southern complaints and demands. Her geographical position and her river commerce also connected her strongly with the South. On the other hand, the traditions of her local politics bound her indissolubly to the Union. The fame of her great statesman, Henry Clay, rested upon his lifelong efforts for its perpetuity. The compromise of 1850, which thwarted and for ten years postponed the Southern rebellion, was his crowning political triumph. But Henry Clay's teaching and example were being warped and perverted. A feebler generation of disciples, unable, as he would have done, to distinguish between honorable compromise and ruinous concession, undertook now to quell war by refusing to take up arms; desired an appeal from the battlefield to moral suasion; proposed to preserve the Government by leaving revolution unchecked.

The legislature, though appealing to the South to stay secession, and though firmly refusing to call a State convention, nevertheless protested against the use of force or

coercion by the General Government against the seceding States. John J. Crittenden took similar ground, counseling Kentucky to stand by the Union and correctly characterizing secession as simple revolution. Nevertheless he advised against the policy of coercion, and said of the seceded States, "Let them go on in peace with their experiment."* A public meeting of leading citizens at Louisville first denounced secession and then denounced the President for attempting to put down secession. They apostrophized the flag and vowed to maintain the Union, but were ready to fight Lincoln.† It makes one smile to read again the childish contradictions which eminent Kentucky statesmen uttered in all seriousness.

A people that have prospered beyond example in the records of time, free and self-governed, without oppression, without taxation to be felt, are now going to cut each other's throats; and why? Because Presidents Lincoln and Davis could not settle the etiquette upon which the troops were to be withdrawn from Fort Sumter.‡

This was the analysis of one. Another was equally infelicitous:

Why this war? . . . Because Mr. Lincoln has been elected President of the country and Mr. Davis could not be, and therefore a Southern Confederacy was to be formed by Southern demagogues, and now they are attempting to drag you on with them. . . . Let us not fight the North or South, but, firm in our position, tell our sister border States that with them we will stand to maintain the Union, to preserve the peace, and uphold our honor and our flag, which they would trail in the dust. . . . If we must fight, let us fight Lincoln and not our Government.§

The resolutions of the meeting were quite as illogical. They declared that

the present duty of Kentucky is to maintain her present independent position, taking sides not with the Administration, nor with the seceding States, but with the Union against them both; declaring her soil to be sacred from the hostile tread of either; and, if necessary, to make the declaration good with her strong right arm.||

The preposterous assumption was also greatly strengthened in the popular mind by the simultaneous publication of an address of the same tenor in Tennessee, from John Bell and others. He had been one of the four candidates for President in the election of 1860—the one for whom both Kentucky and Tennessee cast their electoral votes; and as the standard-bearer of the "Constitutional Union" party had in many ways reiterated his and their devotion to "the Union, the

Constitution, and the enforcement of the laws." The address distinctly disapproved secession; it condemned the policy of the Administration; it unequivocally avowed the duty of Tennessee to resist by force of arms the subjugation of the South.¶ What shall be said when men of reputed wisdom and experience proclaim such inconsistencies? All these incidents are the ever-recurring signs of that dangerous demoralization of public sentiment, of that utter confusion of political principles, of that helpless bewilderment of public thought, into which portions of the country had unconsciously lapsed.

Governor Magoffin of Kentucky and his personal adherents seem to have been ready to rush into overt rebellion. His official message declared that Kentucky would resist the principles and policy of the Republican party "to the death, if necessary"; that the Union had practically ceased to exist; and that she would not stand by with folded arms while the seceded States were being "subjugated to an anti-slavery Government." With open contumacy he replied to President Lincoln's official call, "Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States."** He applied to Jefferson Davis for arms, and to the Louisville banks for money, but neither effort succeeded. The existing legislature contained too many Union members to give him unchecked control of the public credit of the State. He was therefore perforce driven to adhere to the policy of "neutrality," as the best help he could give the rebellion. Nevertheless, he was not without power for mischief. The militia of Kentucky had recently been reorganized under the personal influence and direction of S. B. Buckner, who, as inspector-general, was the legal and actual general-in-chief. Buckner, like the governor, ex-Vice-President Breckinridge, and others, was an avowed "neutral" but a predetermined rebel, who in the following September entered the military service of Jefferson Davis. For the present his occupation was rather that of political intrigue to forward the secession of Kentucky, which he carried on under pretense of his formal and assumed instructions from the governor to employ the "State Guard," or rather its shadow of authority, to prevent the violation of "State neutrality" by either the Southern or the Northern armies.

The public declarations and manifestations in Kentucky were not reassuring to the people

* Crittenden, speech before Kentucky legislature, March 26, 1861. New York "Tribune," March 30.

† "Rebellion Record."

‡ James Guthrie, speech at Louisville, Ky., April 18, 1861. Ibid.

§ Archibald Dixon, speech at Louisville, April 18, 1861. Ibid.

¶ "Rebellion Record."

¶ Ibid.

** Magoffin to Cameron, April 15, 1861. War Records.

north of the Ohio line. Governor Morton of Indiana wrote:

The country along the Ohio River bordering on Kentucky is in a state of intense alarm. The people entertain no doubt but that Kentucky will speedily go out of the Union. They are in daily fear that marauding parties from the other side of the river will plunder and burn their towns.*

Even after the lapse of some weeks this fear was not dissipated. General McClellan wrote:

The frontier of Indiana and Illinois is in a very excited and almost dangerous condition. In Ohio there is more calmness. I have been in more full communication with the people. A few arms have been supplied, and all means have been taken to quiet them along the frontier. Special messengers have reached me from the governors of Indiana and Illinois, demanding heavy guns and expressing great alarm. I sent Lieutenant Williams to confer with Governor Morton, to tell him that I have no heavy guns, and to explain to him the impropriety of placing them in position along the frontier just at the present time. I have promised Governor Yates some heavy guns at Cairo as soon as I can get them.

McClellan himself was not free from apprehension:

I am very anxious to learn the views of the General [Scott] in regard to western Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri. At any moment it may become necessary to act in some one of these directions. From reliable information I am sure that the governor of Kentucky is a traitor. Buckner is under his influence, so it is necessary to watch them. I hear to-night that one thousand secessionists are concentrating at a point opposite Gallipolis. Cairo is threatened.†

He proposed, therefore, to reënforce and fortify Cairo, place several gunboats on the river, and in case of need to cross into Kentucky and occupy Covington Heights for the better defense of Cincinnati.

This condition of affairs brought another important question to final decision. The governor of Illinois had ordered the summary seizure of war material at Cairo, and President Lincoln formally approved it. Ordinary river commerce was more tenderly dealt with. Colonel Prentiss wrote:

No boats have been searched unless I had been previously and reliably informed that they had on board munitions of war destined to the enemies of the Government, and in all cases where we have searched we have found such munitions. My policy has been such that no act of my command could be construed as an insult, or cause to any State for secession.‡

But the threatening demonstrations from the South were beginning to show that this was a dangerous leniency. McClellan there-

fore asked explicitly whether provisions destined for the seceded States or for the Southern army should longer be permitted to be sent, § to which an official order came on May 8: "Since the order of the 2d, the Secretary of War decides that provisions must be stopped at Cairo."||

In reality matters in Kentucky were not quite so bad as they appeared to the public eye. With sober second thought, the underlying loyalty of her people began to assert itself. Breckinridge and his extreme Southern doctrines had received only a little more than one-third the votes of the State.¶ Mr. Lincoln was a Kentuckian by birth, and had been a consistent Whig; their strong clanship could not quite give him up as hopelessly lost in abolitionism. Earnest Unionists also quickly perceived that "armed neutrality" must soon become a practical farce; many of them from the first used it as an artful contrivance to kill secession. The legislature indeed declared for "strict neutrality," and approved the governor's refusal to furnish troops to the President.** Superficially, this was placing the State in a contumacious and revolutionary attitude. But this official action was not a true exponent of the public feeling. The undercurrent of political movement is explained by a letter of John J. Crittenden, at that time the most influential single voice in the State. On the 17th of May he wrote to General Scott:

The position of Kentucky, and the relation she occupies toward the government of the Union, is not, I fear, understood at Washington. It ought to be well understood. Very important consequences may depend upon it and upon her proper treatment. Unfortunately for us, our governor does not sympathize with Kentucky in respect to the secession. His opinions and feelings incline him strongly to the side of the South. His answer to the requisition for troops was in its terms hasty and unbecoming, and does not correspond with usual and gentlemanly courtesy. But while she regretted the language of his answer, Kentucky acquiesced in his declining to furnish the troops called for, and she did so, not because she loved the Union the less, but she feared that if she had parted with those troops, and sent them to serve in your ranks, she would have been overwhelmed by the secessionists at home and severed from the Union; and it was to preserve, substantially and ultimately, our connection with the Union that induced us to acquiesce in the partial infraction of it by our governor's refusal of the troops required. This was the most prevailing and general motive. To this may be added the strong indisposition of our people to a civil war with the South, and the apprehended consequences of a civil war within our State and among our own people. I could elaborate and strengthen all this, but I will leave the subject to your own reflection; with this only remark, that I think Kentucky's excuse

* Morton to Cameron, April 28, 1861. War Records.

† McClellan to Townsend, May 10, 1861. War Records.

‡ Prentiss to Headquarters.

§ McClellan to Scott, May 7, 1861. War Records.

|| Townsend to McClellan, May 8, 1861. *Ibid.*

¶ The vote of Kentucky in 1860 was: Lincoln, 13,64; Douglas, 25,651; Breckinridge, 53,143; Bell, 66,058. ["Tribune Almanac," 1861.]

** Resolutions, May 16, 1861. Van Horne, "History Army of the Cumberland," Vol. I., p. 7.

is a good one, and that, under all the circumstances of the complicated case, she is rendering better service in her present position than she could by becoming an active party in the contest.*

In truth, Kentucky was undergoing a severe political struggle. The governor was constantly stimulating the revolutionary sentiment. The legislature had once more met, on May 6, being a second time convened in special session by the governor's proclamation. The governor's special message now boldly accused the President of usurpation, and declared the Constitution violated, the Government subverted, the Union broken. He again urged that the State be armed and a convention be called. It was these more radical and dangerous measures which the Union members warded off with a legislative resolution of "neutrality." So also the military bill which was eventually passed was made to serve the Union instead of the secession cause. A Union Board of Commissioners was provided to control the governor's expenditures under it. A "Home Guard" was authorized, to check and offset Buckner's "State Guard" of rebellious proclivities. Privates and officers of both organizations were required to swear allegiance to both the State and the Union. Finally, it provided that the arms and munitions should be used neither against the United States nor against the Confederate States, unless to protect Kentucky against invasion. Such an attitude of qualified loyalty can only be defended by the plea of its compulsory adoption as a lesser evil. But it served to defeat the conspiracy to assemble a "sovereignty convention" to inaugurate secession; and the progress of the Kentucky legislature, from its "anti-coercion" protest in January to its merely defensive "neutrality" resolutions and laws in May, was an immense gain.

From the beginning of the rebellion, Lincoln felt that Kentucky would be a turning weight in the scale of war. He believed he knew the temper and fidelity of his native State, and gave her his special care and confidence. Though Governor Magoffin refused him troops, there came to him from private sources the unmistakable assurance that many Kentuckians were ready to fight for the Union. His early and most intimate personal friend, Joshua F. Speed, was now an honored and influential citizen of Louisville. At Washington also he had taken into a cordial acquaintanceship a characteristic Kentuckian, William Nelson, a young, brave, and energetic lieutenant of the United States Navy. Nelson saw his usefulness, and perhaps also his opportunity, in an effort to redeem his State, rather than in active service on the quarter-deck. He possessed the social gifts, the free manners, the

impulsive temperament peculiar to the South. Mr. Lincoln gave him leave of absence, and sent him to Kentucky without instructions. At the same time the President brought another personal influence to bear. Major Anderson was the hero of the hour, and being a Kentuckian, that State rang with the praise of his prudence and valor in defending Sumter. On the 7th of May, Lincoln gave him a special commission, "To receive into the army of the United States as many regiments of volunteer troops from the State of Kentucky, and from the western part of the State of Virginia, as shall be willing to engage in the service of the United States,"† etc., and sent him to Cincinnati, convenient to both fields of labor. These three persons, Speed and Nelson at Louisville, and Anderson within easy consulting distance, formed a reliable rallying-point and medium of communication with the President. The Unionists, thus encouraged, began the formation of Union Clubs and Home Guards, while the Government gave them assurance of protection in case of need. Wrote General McClellan:

The Union men of Kentucky express a firm determination to fight it out. Yesterday Garrett Davis told me: "We will remain in the Union by voting if we can, by fighting if we must, and if we cannot hold our own, we will call on the General Government to aid us." He asked me what I would do if they called on me for assistance, and convinced me that the majority were in danger of being overpowered by a better-armed minority. I replied that if there were time I would refer to General Scott for orders. If there were not time, that I would cross the Ohio with 20,000 men. If that were not enough, with 30,000; and if necessary, with 40,000; but that I would not stand by and see the loyal Union men of Kentucky crushed. I have strong hopes that Kentucky will remain in the Union, and the most favorable feature of the whole matter is that the Union men are now ready to abandon the position of "armed neutrality," and to enter heart and soul into the contest by our side.‡

In a short time Nelson quietly brought five thousand Government muskets to Louisville, under the auspices and control of a committee of leading citizens. Wrote Anderson to Lincoln:

I had the pleasure to receive yesterday your letter of the 14th [May] introducing Mr. Joshua F. Speed, and giving me instructions about issuing arms to our friends in Kentucky. I will carefully attend to the performance of that duty. Mr. Speed and other gentlemen for whom he will vouch, viz., Hon. James Guthrie, Garrett Davis, and Charles A. Marshall, advise that I should not, at present, have anything to do with the raising of troops in Kentucky. The committee charged with that matter will go on with the organization and arming of the Home Guard, which they will see is composed of reliable men.§

* Unpublished MS.

† War Records.

‡ McClellan to Townsend, May 17, 1861. War Records.

§ Anderson to Lincoln, May 19, 1861. Unpublished MS.

Under date of May 28 Lincoln received further report of these somewhat confidential measures to counteract the conspiracy in his native State :

The undersigned, a private committee to distribute the arms brought to the State of Kentucky by Lieutenant William Nelson, of the United States Navy, among true, reliable Union men, represent to the Executive Department of the United States Government that members of this Board have superintended the distribution of the whole quantity of five thousand muskets and bayonets. We have been reliably informed and believe that they have been put in the hands of true and devoted Union men, who are pledged to support the Constitution of the United States and the enforcement of the laws; and, if the occasion should arise, to use them to put down all attempts to take Kentucky, by violence or fraud, out of the Union.*

The committee added that this had greatly strengthened the cause, that twenty thousand more could be safely intrusted to the Union men, who were applying for them and eager to get them, and recommended that this system of arming Kentucky be resumed and widely extended.†

The struggle between treason and loyalty in the Kentucky legislature had consumed the month of May, ending, as we have seen, by decided advantages gained for the Union, and attended by the important understanding and combination between prominent Kentucky citizens and President Lincoln whereby the loyalists were furnished with arms and assured of decisive military support. The Kentucky legislature adjourned *sine die* on May 24, and the issue was thereupon transferred to the people of the State. The contest took a double form: first an appeal to the ballot in an election for members of Congress, which the President's call for a special session on the 4th of July made necessary. A political campaign ensued of universal and intense excitement. Whatever the Union sentiment of the State had hitherto lacked of decision and boldness was largely aroused or created by this contest. The Unionists achieved a brilliant and conclusive triumph. The election was held on the 20th of June, and nine out of the ten Congressmen chosen were outspoken loyalists.

The second phase of the contest was, that it evoked a partial show of military force on both sides of the question. The military bill passed on the last day of the May session provided for organizing "Home Guards" for local defense. Whether by accident or design, Buckner's old militia law to organize the "State Guards" had required an oath of allegiance from the officers only. The new law

required all the members to swear fidelity to both Kentucky and the United States, and a refusal terminated their membership.‡ This searching touchstone at once instituted a process of separating patriots from traitors. The organization of Home Guards and the reorganization of the State Guards went on simultaneously. It would perhaps be more correct to say disorganization of the State Guards; for many loyal members took advantage of the requirement to abandon the corps and to join the Home Guards, while disloyal ones seized the same chance to go to rebel camps in the South; and under the action of both public and private sentiment the State Guards languished and the Home Guards grew in numerical strength and moral influence.

Meanwhile, as a third military organization, Kentuckians were enlisting directly in the service of the United States. Even before the already mentioned commission to Anderson, Colonels Guthrie and Woodruff had established "Camp Clay," on the Ohio shore above Cincinnati, where a number of Kentuckians joined a yet larger proportion of Ohioans, and were mustered into the three-months' service as the 1st and 2d regiments Kentucky Volunteer Infantry.§ These regiments were afterward reorganized for the three-years' service; and this time, mainly filled with real Kentuckians, were on the 9th and 10th of June remustered under their old and now entirely appropriate designations. About this time also State Senator Rousseau, who had made a brilliant Union record in the legislature, obtained authority to raise a brigade. On consulting with the Union leaders, it was resolved still to humor the popular "neutrality" foible till after the congressional election; and to this end he established "Camp Joe Holt," on the Indiana shore, where he gathered his recruits.|| The same policy kept the headquarters of Anderson yet in Cincinnati.

With the favorable change of public sentiment, and the happy issue of the congressional election, the Union men grew bolder. Union had all this while been busy, and had secretly appointed the officers and enrolled the recruits for four regiments from central Kentucky. At the beginning of July he threw off further concealment, and suddenly assembled his men in "Camp Dick Robinson," which he established between Danville and Lexington. His regiments were only partly full and indifferently armed, and the transmission of proper arms to his camp was persist-

* The report was signed by C. A. Wickliffe, Garrett Davis, J. H. Garrard, J. Harlan, James Speed, and Thornton F. Marshall; and also indorsed by J. F. Robinson, W. B. Houston, J. K. Goodloe, J. B. Brunner, and J. F. Speed.

† Committee, Report, May 28, 1861. Unpublished MS.

‡ Act of May 24, 1861. "Session Laws," p. 6.

§ Van Horne, "Army of the Cumberland," Vol. I., p. 14.

|| Van Horne, "Army of the Cumberland," Vol. I., p. 16.

ently opposed by rebel intrigue, threats, and forcible demonstrations. Nevertheless the camp held firm, and by equal alertness and courage secured its guns, and so far sustained and strengthened the loyal party that at the general election of the 5th of August a new legislature was chosen giving the Union members a majority of three-fourths in each branch.

Thus in a long and persistent contest, extending from January to August, the secession conspirators of Kentucky, starting with the advantage of the governor's coöperation, military control, and general acceptance of the "neutrality" delusion, were, nevertheless, outgeneraled and completely baffled. Meanwhile the customary usurpations had carried Tennessee into active rebellion; and now, despairing of success by argument and intrigue, and inspired by the rebel success at Bull Run, the local conspiracy arranged to call in the assistance of military force. On the 17th of August the conspirators assembled in caucus in Scott county,* and, it is alleged, arranged a three-fold programme: first, the governor should officially demand the removal of Union camps and troops from the State; secondly, under pretense of a popular "peace" agitation, a revolutionary rising in aid of secession should take place in central Kentucky; thirdly, a simultaneous invasion of rebel armies from Tennessee should crown and secure the work.

Whether or not the allegation was literally true, events developed themselves in at least an apparent conformity to the plan. Governor Magoffin wrote a letter to the President, under date of August 19, urging "the removal from the limits of Kentucky of the military force now organized and in camp within the State." In reply to this, President Lincoln, on August 24, wrote the governor a temperate but emphatic refusal:

I believe it is true that there is a military force in camp within Kentucky, acting by authority of the United States, which force is not very large, and is not now being augmented. I also believe that some arms have been furnished to this force by the United States. I also believe this force consists exclusively of Kentuckians, having their camp in the immediate vicinity of their own homes, and not assailing or menacing any of the good people of Kentucky. In all I have done in the premises I have acted upon the urgent solicitation of many Kentuckians, and in accordance with what I believed, and still believe, to be the wish of a majority of all the Union-loving people of Kentucky. While I have conversed on this subject with many eminent men of Kentucky, including a large majority of her members of Congress, I do not remember that any one of them or any other person, except your Excellency and the bearer of your Excellency's letter, has urged me to remove the military force from Kentucky, or to disband it. One other very worthy citizen of Kentucky did solicit me to have the augmenting of the force suspended for a time. Taking all the means within my reach to form a judgment, I do not believe it is the popular wish of Kentucky that this

force shall be removed beyond her limits, and with this impression I must respectfully decline to so remove it. I most cordially sympathize with your Excellency in the wish to preserve the peace of my own native State, Kentucky. It is with regret I search and cannot find in your not very short letter any declaration or intimation that you entertain any desire for the preservation of the Federal Union.

The other features of the general plot succeeded no better than Magoffin's application to Lincoln. Three public demonstrations were announced, in evident preparation and prompting of a popular rebel uprising in central Kentucky. Under pretense of an ovation to Vallandigham, an Ohio congressman and Democratic politician, who had already made himself notorious by speeches of a rebel tendency, a meeting was held in Owen county on September 5. On September 10 a large "peace" mass meeting was called at Frankfort, the capital, to overawe the newly assembled loyal legislature. Still a third gathering, of "States Rights" and "peace" men, was called at Lexington on September 20, to hold a camp drill of several days, under supervision of leading secessionists.†

The speeches and proceedings of these treacherous "peace" meetings sufficiently revealed their revolutionary object. They were officered and managed by men whose prior words and acts left no doubt of their sympathies and desires, and the most conspicuous of whom were soon after in important stations of command in the rebel armies. The resolutions were skillfully devised: though the phraseology was ambiguous, the arrangement and inference led to one inevitable conclusion. The substance and process were: Firstly, that peace should be maintained; secondly, to maintain peace we must preserve neutrality; thirdly, that it is incompatible with neutrality to tax the State "for a cause so hopeless as the military subjugation of the Confederate States"; fourthly, that a truce be called and commissioners appointed to treat for a permanent peace.

At the larger gatherings, where the proceedings were more critically scanned, prudence dictated that they should refrain from definite committal; but at some of the smaller preliminary meetings the full purpose was announced "that the recall of the invading armies, and the recognition of the separate independence of the Confederate States, is the true policy to restore peace and preserve the relations of fraternal love and amity between the States."

While these peace meetings were in course of development, the second branch of the plot was not neglected. In the county of Owen an

* "Danville Quarterly Review," June, 1862.

† "Danville Quarterly Review," June and September, 1862, pp. 245, 381, 385, and 388.

insurrectionary force was being organized by Humphrey Marshall. There was no concealment of his purpose to march upon Frankfort, where the legislature of the State had lately met, and by force of arms to scatter it and break up the session. Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky related the attendant circumstances in a speech in the United States Senate:

I reached there to attend a session of the Court of Appeals on the very evening that it was said Humphrey Marshall was to make his incursion into Franklin county, and to storm the capital. Some members, especially secession members of the legislature, and some citizens of the town of Frankfort, and one or two judges of our Court of Appeals, left Frankfort hurriedly in the expectation that it was to be sacked that night by Humphrey Marshall's insurgent hosts. I myself, with other gentlemen, provided ourselves with arms to take part in the defense of the legislature and the capital of the State. We sent to Lexington, where there were encamped three to five hundred Union troops, who had been enlisted in the Union service for the defense of the legislature and the capital of our State, and had them brought down at 3 o'clock in the morning.*

As events progressed, both these branches of the plot signally failed. The peace meetings did not result in a popular uprising; they served only to show the relative weakness of the secession conspiracy. Such manifestations excited the Union majority to greater vigilance and effort, and their preparation and boldness overawed the contemplated insurrectionary outbreak. A decisive turn of affairs had indeed come, but armed conflict was avoided. Instead of the Union legislature being driven from the capital and dispersed, Vice-President Breckinridge, General Buckner, William Preston, and other leaders of the conspiracy soon after hurriedly left Kentucky with their rebellious followers and joined the Confederate army, just beyond the Tennessee border, to take part in the third branch of the plot,—a simultaneous invasion of Kentucky at three different points.

THE CONFEDERATE MILITARY LEAGUE.

It was constantly assumed that secession was a movement of the entire South. The fallacy of this assumption becomes apparent when we remember the time required for the full organization and development of the rebellion. From the 12th of October, when Governor Gist issued his proclamation convening the South Carolina legislature to inaugurate secession, to January 26, when Louisiana passed her secession ordinance, is a period of three and a half months. In this first period, as it may be called, only the six cotton-States reached a positive attitude of insurrection; and they,

as is believed, by less than a majority of their citizens. Texas, the seventh, did not finally join them till a week later. During all this time the eight remaining slave States, with certainly as good a claim to be considered the voice of the South, earnestly advised and protested against the precipitate and dangerous step. But secession had its active partisans in them. As in the cotton-States, their several capitals were the natural centers of disunion; and, with few exceptions, their State officials held radical opinions on the slavery question. With the gradual progress of insurrection therefore in the extreme South four of the interior slave States gravitated into secession. Their change was very gradual; perhaps principally because a majority of their people wished to remain in the Union, and it was necessary to wait until by slow degrees the public opinion could be overcome.

The anomalous condition and course of Virginia has already been described—its Union vote in January, the apparently overwhelming Union majority of its convention, its vacillating and contradictory votes during February and March, and its sudden plunge into a secession ordinance and a military league with Jefferson Davis immediately after the Sumter bombardment. The whole development of the change is explained when we remember that Richmond had been one of the chief centers of secession conspiracy since the Frémont and Buchanan campaign of 1856.

In the other interior slave States the secession movement underwent various forms, according to the greater obstacles which its advocates encountered. North Carolina, it will be remembered, gave a discouraging answer to the first proposal, and the earliest demonstrations of the conspiracy elicited no popular response. On the 9th and 10th of January an immature combination of State troops and citizens seized Forts Caswell and Johnston, but the governor immediately ordered their restoration to the Federal authorities. The governor excused the hostile act by alleging the popular apprehension that Federal garrisons were to be placed in them, and earnestly deprecated any show of coercion.† He received a conciliatory response from the War Department (January 15, 1861) that no occupation of them was intended unless they should be threatened.‡

Nevertheless conspiracy continued, and, as usual, under the guise of solicitude for peace; and in a constant clamor for additional guarantees, the revolutionary feeling was augmented little by little. There seems to have

* Garrett Davis, Senate speech, March 13, 1862. "Congressional Globe," p. 1214.

† Ellis to Buchanan, Jan. 12, 1861. War Records.

‡ Holt to Ellis, Jan. 15, 1861. *Ibid.*

been great fluctuation of public opinion. A convention was ordered by the legislature and subsequently voted down at the polls. Commissioners were sent to the peace convention at Washington, and also to the provisional rebel Congress at Montgomery, with instructions limiting their powers to an effort at mediation. At the same time the North Carolina House passed a unanimous resolution that if reconciliation failed, North Carolina must go with the slave States. Next a military bill was passed to reorganize the militia, and arm ten thousand volunteers.* In reality it seems to have been the same struggle which took place elsewhere; the State officials and radical politicians favoring secession, and the people clinging to the Union, but yielding finally to the arts and intrigues of their leaders. When Sumter was bombarded and President Lincoln called for troops, the governor threw his whole influence and authority into the insurrectionary movement. He sent an insulting refusal to Washington,† and the next day ordered his State troops to seize Forts Caswell and Johnston. A week later (April 22) he seized the Fayetteville arsenal, containing 37,000 stands of arms, 3000 kegs of powder, and an immense supply of shells and shot. We may also infer that he was in secret league with the Montgomery rebellion; for the rebel Secretary of War at once made a requisition upon him, and he placed his whole military preparation at the service of Jefferson Davis, sending troops and arms to Richmond and elsewhere. It was a bold usurpation of executive power. Neither legislature nor convention had ordered rebellion; but from that time on the State was arrayed in active hostility to the Union. It was not till the 1st of May that the legislature for the second time ordered a convention, which met and passed an ordinance of secession on the 20th of that month, also formally accepting the Confederate States Constitution.

In the State of Arkansas the approaches to secession were even slower and more difficult than in North Carolina. There seems to have been little disposition at first, among her own people or leaders, to embark in the disastrous undertaking. The movement appears to have been begun when, on December 20, 1860, a commissioner came from Alabama, and by an address to the legislature invited Arkansas to unite in the movement for separation. No direct success followed the request, and the deceitful expedient of a convention to ascertain the will of the people was resorted to. All parties joined in this measure; the fire-eaters to promote secession, the Unionists to thwart it. An election for or against a convention took place February 18, 1861, resulting in

27,412 votes for and 15,826 votes against it; though as compared with the presidential election it was estimated that at least 10,815 voters did not go to the polls. At a later election for delegates the returns indicated a Union vote of 23,626 against a secession vote of 17,927. When the convention was organized, March 4, 1861, the delegates are reported to have chosen Union officers by a majority of six;‡ many of the delegates must have already betrayed their constituents by a change of front. Revolutionary tricks had been employed, the United States arsenal at Little Rock had been seized (February 8), and the ordnance stores at Napoleon (February 12), while no doubt the insurrectionary influences from the neighboring cotton-States were indefinitely multiplied. With all this the progress of the conspirators was not rapid. A conditional secession ordinance was voted down by the convention, 39 to 35. This ought to have effectually killed the movement; but it shows the greater aggressiveness and persistence of the secession leaders, that, instead of yielding to their defeat, they kept alive their scheme, by the insidious proposal to take a new popular vote on the question in the following August. Meanwhile there were a continual loss of Union sentiment and growth of secession excitement; and, as in other States, when the Sumter catastrophe occurred, the governor and his satellites placed the State in an attitude of insurrection by the refusal to comply with Lincoln's call for troops, and by hostile military organization. Thereafter disunion had a free course. The convention was hastily called together April 20, and, meeting on the 6th of May, immediately passed the customary ordinance of secession.

In no other State did secession resort to such methods of usurpation as in Tennessee. The secession faction of the State was insignificant in numbers, but its audacity was perhaps not equaled in any other locality; and it may almost be said that Governor Harris carried the State into rebellion single handed. The whole range of his plottings cannot, of course, be known. He called a session of the legislature January 7, 1861, and sent them a highly inflammatory message. A convention bill was passed and approved January 19, 1861, which submitted the question of "convention" or "no convention," and which also provided that any ordinance of disunion should be ratified by popular vote before taking effect. At the election held on February 9 there appeared on the vote for delegates a Union majority of 64,114, and

* "Annual Cyclopaedia," 1861, p. 538.

† Ellis to Cameron, April 15, 1861. War Records.

‡ "Annual Cyclopaedia," 1861, p. 22.

against holding the convention a majority of 11,875. This overwhelming popular decision for a time silenced the conspirators. The fall of Fort Sumter and Lincoln's call for troops afforded the governor a new pretext to continue his efforts. He sent the President a defiant refusal, and responded to a requisition from Montgomery for troops, being no doubt in secret league with the rebellion. In the revolutionary excitement which immediately followed, the governor's official authority, and the industrious local conspiracy of which he was the head, carried all before them. Since it was evident that he could not obtain a convention to do his bidding, he resolved to employ the legislature, which he once more called together. In secret sessions he was able to manipulate it at his will. On the 1st of May the legislature passed a joint resolution directing the governor to appoint commissioners "to enter into a military league with the authorities of the Confederate States," placing the whole force of the State at the control of Jefferson Davis, and on the 7th of the month a formal military league or treaty to this effect was signed.* Even after this the governor had difficult work. Eastern Tennessee was pervaded by so strong a Union sentiment that it continued to labor and protest against being dragged into rebellion contrary to its will, but the opposition was of little direct avail. Military organization had its grasp on the whole State, and citizens not in arms had no choice but to submit to the orders issued from Montgomery and Nashville.

It will be seen from this recital that the secession movement divides itself into two distinct periods. The first group, the cotton States, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, and Texas, took action mainly between the 12th of October, 1860, and February 4, 1861, a period of a little more than three and a half months. The second group, the interior slave States, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, was occupied by the struggle about three months longer, or a total of six months after Lincoln's election. So also these two periods exhibited separate characteristics in their formative processes. The first group, being more thoroughly permeated by the spirit of revolt, and acting with greater vigor and promptness, shows us the semblance at least of voluntary confederation, through its Provisional Congress at Montgomery. On the other hand, the action of the four interior slave States

* "Rebellion Record."

was, in each case, with more or less distinctness at first, merely that of joining the original nucleus in a military league, in which the excitement of military preparation and allurements of military glory, not the consideration of political expediency, turned the scale.

There remained still the third group, consisting of the border slave States of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. The efforts of the conspirators to involve Maryland in secession have already been detailed, as well as the persistence they employed to gain control of Kentucky and Missouri. In these three States, however, the attempt failed because of the direct and indirect military support which the Government was able to give immediately to the Union sentiment and organizations. Had it been possible to extend the same encouragement and help to Arkansas and Tennessee, they also might have been saved. This becomes more apparent when we remember how quickly half of Virginia was reclaimed and held steadfastly loyal during the war. The remaining slave State, Delaware, was so slightly tainted with treason that her attitude can scarcely be said to have been in doubt; moreover, her geographical position threw her destiny inseparably with the free States.

The adhesion which we have described of the four interior slave States of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas to the Confederate States at once wholly changed the scope and resources of the rebellion. It extended its territorial area nearly one-third, and almost doubled its population and resources. It could now claim to be a compact nation of eleven States, with a territory more than double the size of any European nation except Russia, and with a population of five and a half millions of whites and three and a half millions of blacks. It had a long sea-coast, several fine harbors, and many navigable rivers. It contained a great variety of lands, important diversities of climate, and a wide range of agricultural products. Its country was as yet sparsely inhabited, and was known to include very considerable mineral wealth, while its manufacturing capabilities were almost wholly untouched. The exultation and enthusiastic prophecies of the rebel chiefs at the successful beginning of their daring project were perhaps not unnatural when we reflect that their mischievous design and reprehensible cause had secured the support of such fair and substantial elements of national greatness and power.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE ADVANCE.



SECESSION sophistry about oppression and subjugation was sufficiently answered by the practical logic of the Southern States in collecting armies and uniting in military leagues. Military necessity, not political expediency, was now the unavoidable rule of action. The Washington authorities had long foreseen that merely filling the National capital with Northern regiments would not by itself give security to the Government buildings and archives. The presidential mansion, the Capitol, and the various department offices all lay within easy reach of rebel batteries which might rise in a single night at commanding points on the southern bank of the Potomac, and from which hostile shot and shell could speedily reduce the whole city to ruins. As early, therefore, as the 3d of May, Scott instructed General Mansfield, the local commander, to seize and fortify Arlington Heights. Various causes produced a postponement of the design, urgent as was the necessity; but finally the needed reinforcements arrived. Under plans carefully matured, the Union forces commanded by Brigadier-General Irvin McDowell on the morning of May 24 made their advance across the Potomac River and entered Virginia. Here was begun that formidable system of earth-works, crowning every hill in an irregular line for perhaps ten miles, extending from the river-bend above Georgetown to the bay into which Hunting Creek flows, below Alexandria, which constituted such an immense military strength, and so important a moral support to the Army of the Potomac, and, indeed, to the Union sentiment of the whole country during the entire war.

Three other movements of troops were begun about the same time. General Butler was transferred from Baltimore to Fort Monroe to collect nine or ten regiments for aggressive purposes. General Robert Patterson, who was organizing the Pennsylvania militia, assembled the contingent of that State with a view to a movement against Harper's Ferry.

And General George B. McClellan, appointed to organize the contingent from the State of Ohio, had his earliest attention directed toward a movement into western Virginia.

Prompted by many different shades of feeling, there now arose throughout the North a demand for military action and military success. Assuming the undeniable preponderance of men and means in the free States, public opinion illogically also assumed that they could be made immediately victorious. Under bold head-lines a leading newspaper kept "The nation's war cry" standing in its columns: "Forward to Richmond! Forward to Richmond! The rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet there on the 20th of July. By that date the place must be held by the National army!"† Though this was but a single voice, it brought responsive echoes from all parts of the North.

Two months of the first three-months' enlistment of the militia called into service were already gone; it seemed desirable that the remaining third of their term should be utilized in an energetic movement. General Scott's original idea had been that this energetic movement should occur at Harper's Ferry; but Johnston's evacuation of that place, and Patterson's over-caution and defensive strategy, frustrated the design. Under the increasing political pressure, the most promising alternative was thought to be a direct advance from Washington against Manassas Junction, the strategical importance of which the Confederates had instinctively recognized, especially its relation to Harper's Ferry. Colonel Cocke had written to Lee, May 15:

These two columns, one at Manassas and one at Winchester, could readily coöperate and concentrate upon the one point or the other; either to make head against the enemy's columns advancing down the valley, should he force Harper's Ferry, or in case we repulse him at Harper's Ferry, the Winchester supporting column could throw itself on this side of the mountains to coöperate with the column at Manassas.

On the 29th of June President Lincoln called his Cabinet and principal military officers to a council of war at the Executive Mansion, to discuss a campaign against the rebels at Manassas. General Scott took occa-

† "New York Tribune," June 20, 1861.

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sion to say that he was not in favor of such a movement. "He did not believe in a little war by piecemeal. But he believed in a war of large bodies." He adhered to the "anacanda" policy, and a decisive campaign down the Mississippi River in the autumn and winter. "We were to go down, fight all the battles that were necessary, take all the positions we could find and garrison them, fight a battle at New Orleans and win it, and thus end the war."* But being overruled by the President and Cabinet in favor of an immediate movement, the old soldier gracefully yielded his preference, and gave his best counsel and co-operation to the new enterprise. He caused to be read the plan matured by General McDowell and approved by himself.

McDowell's plan stated that the secession forces then at Manassas Junction, under command of General Beauregard, and its dependencies, were estimated at twenty-five thousand. When threatened they would call up all reënforcements within reach.

If General J. E. Johnston's force is kept engaged by Major-General Patterson, and Major-General Butler occupies the force now in his vicinity, I think they will not be able to bring up more than ten thousand men. So we must calculate on having to do with about thirty-five thousand men. . . . Leaving small garrisons in the defensive works, I propose to move against Manassas with a force of 30,000 of all arms, organized into 3 columns, with a reserve of 10,000. . . . After uniting the columns this side of it, I propose to attack the main position by turning it, if possible, so as to cut off communications by rail with the South. †

Before, however, the preparation for this advance had even been completed, the first campaign of the war, though not an extensive one, was already finished with a decided success to the Union arms.

When the Richmond convention by the secret secession ordinance of the 17th of April, and a few days later by a military league with Jefferson Davis, literally kidnapped Virginia and transferred her, bound hand and foot, to the rebel government at Montgomery, the western half of the State rose with an almost unanimous protest against the rude violation of self-government, and resolved to secede from secession. A series of popular meetings was held, with such success that on the 13th of May delegates from twenty-five counties met for consultation at Wheeling, and agreed on such further action and co-operation as would enable them to counteract and escape the treason and alienation to which they had been committed without their consent. The leaders made their designs known to President Lincoln at Washington, and to General McClellan at Cincinnati, commanding the

* Committee on Conduct of the War.

Department of the Ohio, and were not only assured of earnest sympathy, but promised active help from the Ohio contingent of three-months' volunteers, whenever the decisive moment of need should arrive. In conformity with this understanding, an expedition under McClellan's orders moved against and dispersed a little nucleus of rebel troops at Philippi, in a secluded mountain valley about fifteen miles south of Grafton.

Under shelter and encouragement of this initial military success, the political scheme of forming a new State proceeded with accelerated ardor. As early as June 11 a delegate convention, representing about forty counties lying between the crest of the Alleghanies and the Ohio River, met and organized at Wheeling. On the 13th of June, after reciting the various treasonable usurpations of the Richmond convention and Governor Letcher, it adopted a formal declaration that all the acts of the convention and the executive were without authority and void, and declared vacated all executive, legislative, and judicial offices in the State held by those "who adhere to said convention and executive." On the 19th of June an ordinance was adopted creating a provisional State government, under which F. H. Peirpoint was appointed governor, to wield executive authority in conjunction with an executive council of five members. A legislature was constituted by calling together such members-elect as would take a prescribed oath of allegiance to the United States and to the restored government of Virginia, and providing for filling the vacancies of those who refused. A similar provision continued or substituted other State and county officers. After adding sundry other ordinances to this groundwork of restoration, the convention on the 25th took a recess till August. The newly constituted legislature soon met to enact laws for the provisional government; and on July 9 it elected two United States senators, who were admitted to seats four days later.

So far the work was simply a repudiation of secession and a restoration of the government of the whole State which had been usurped. But the main motive and purpose of the counter-revolution was not allowed to halt nor fail. In August the Wheeling convention reassembled, and on the 20th adopted an ordinance creating the new State of Kanawha (afterward West Virginia) and providing for a popular vote to be taken in the following October on the question of ratification.

The Richmond government had no thought of surrendering western Virginia to the Union without a struggle. Toward the end of June † McDowell to Townsend, June, 1861. War Records.

they sent General Garnett to oppose the Federal forces. He took position in a mountain-pass at Laurel Hill with 3 or 4 regiments, and stationed Colonel Pegram in another pass at Rich Mountain, 17 miles south, with a regiment and 6 guns. Early in July, General McClellan, learning the weakness of the rebels, resolved to drive them from their positions. He sent General Morris with 5 or 6 regiments against Garnett, and himself moved with some 7 regiments upon Pegram's intrenched camp. General Rosecrans, commanding McClellan's advance, was fortunate enough to obtain a Union mountaineer, thoroughly familiar with the locality, who led a detachment of 1900 men to the rear of the rebel position, where they easily dispersed an outpost of 300 men with 2 guns stationed near the summit. This victory made Pegram's position untenable; and, hastily abandoning his intrenched camp and guns, he sought to join Garnett at Laurel Hill by a northward march along the mountain-top. Garnett, however, was already retreating; and Pegram, unable to escape, surrendered his command of between 500 and 600 to McClellan on the morning of the 13th of July.

A difficult route of retreat to the northward still lay open to Garnett, and he made diligent efforts to impede the pursuit, which was pushed with vigor. About noon of July 13 Captain Benham with three Union regiments came up with the rebel wagon train at Carrick's Ford, one of the crossings of Cheat River, twenty-six miles north-west of Laurel Hill. Here Garnett deployed his rear-guard of a regiment with three guns to protect his train; but by a sharp attack the Union forces drove the enemy, capturing one of the guns. In a desultory skirmish a little farther on Garnett himself was killed by a sharpshooter, and that incident terminated the pursuit. The Unionists secured the wagon train, and the remnant of rebels successfully continued their farther retreat.

Large political and military results followed this series of comparatively slight encounters. They terminated the campaign for the possession of western Virginia, and the movement for the establishment of a separate State thereafter went on unchecked. The most important result was upon the personal fortunes of General McClellan. These were the first decided Union

victories of the war, and they were hailed by the North with a feeling of triumph altogether disproportionate to their real magnitude. When on the following day McClellan summed up in a single laconic dispatch* the scattered and disconnected incidents of three different days, happening forty miles apart, the impression, without design on his part, was most naturally produced upon the authorities and the country that so sweeping and effective a campaign could only be the work of a military genius of the first order. McClellan was the unquestioned hero of the hour. The *éclat* of this achievement soon called him to Washington, and in a train of events which followed had no insignificant influence in securing his promotion, on the 1st of November following, without further victories, to the command of all the armies of the United States.

BULL RUN. †

It had been arranged that McDowell's advance against the enemy at Manassas should begin on July 9: by dint of extraordinary exertions he was ready and issued his marching orders on July 16. ‡ But his organization was very imperfect and his preparations were far from complete. Many of his regiments reached him but two days before, and some only on the day he moved. He started with barely wagons enough for his ammunition and hospital supplies; tents, baggage, and rations were to follow.§ The utmost caution was enjoined to avoid another Vienna or Big Bethel disaster. Three things, his marching orders said, would be held unpardonable: *First*, to come upon a battery or a breastwork without knowledge of its position. *Second*, to be surprised. *Third*, to fall back. His army being a new, untried machine, his men unused to the fatigues and privations of a march, progress was slow. With a cumbersome movement it felt its way toward Fairfax Court House and Centreville, the outposts of the enemy having sufficient time to retire as it advanced. Tyler commanded his first division, of 4 brigades; Hunter the second division, of 2 brigades; Heintzelman the third division, of 3 brigades; and Miles the fifth division, of 2 brigades. The fourth division, under Runyon,

* HUNTSVILLE, VA., July 14, 1861.

COLONEL TOWNSEND: Garnett and forces routed; his baggage and one gun taken; his army demoralized; Garnett killed. We have annihilated the enemy in western Virginia, and have lost 13 killed and not more than 40 wounded. We have in all killed at least 200 of the enemy, and their prisoners will amount to at least 1000. Have taken seven guns in all. I still look for the capture of the remnant of Garnett's army by General Hill. The troops defeated are the crack regiments of eastern Virginia, aided by Georgians, Ten-

nesseans, and Carolinians. Our success is complete and secession is killed in this country.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General Commanding.

[War Records.]

† For a more detailed account of the battle of Bull Run, see Nicolay, "The Outbreak of Rebellion," pp. 169-197.

‡ War Records.

§ Committee on Conduct of the War.

was left behind to guard his communications. His total command embraced an aggregate of 34,320 men; his marching column proper consisted of a little less than 28,000 men, including artillery, a total of 49 guns, and a single battalion of cavalry.

When, on the morning of July 18, Tyler reached Centreville, he found that the enemy had everywhere retired behind the line of Bull Run, a winding, sluggish stream flowing south-easterly toward the Potomac, about thirty-two miles south-east of Washington. While it is fordable in many places, it generally has steep and sometimes precipitous and rocky banks with wooded heights on the west. Three miles beyond the stream lies Manassas Junction on a high, open plateau. Here the railroads, from Richmond on the south and the Shenandoah Valley on the west, come together. To protect this junction the rebels had some slight field-works, armed with 14 or 15 heavy guns, and garrisoned by about 2000 men. Beauregard, in command since the 1st of June, had gathered an army of nearly 22,000 men and 29 guns. The independent command of Holmes, called up from Aquia Creek, augmented his force to a little over 23,000 men and 35 guns. Instead of keeping this about the Manassas earth-works he had brought it close down to the banks of Bull Run and posted it along a line some eight miles in length, extending from the Manassas railroad to the stone bridge on the Warrenton turnpike, and guarding the five intermediate fords.

The enemy retired from Centreville as Tyler approached that place; and taking a light detachment to make a reconnaissance, he followed their main body toward the crossing of Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, near the center of Beauregard's extended line. Tyler was under express orders to observe well the roads, but not to bring on an engagement.* Apparently lured on, however, by the hitherto easy approach, his reconnaissance became a skirmish, and calling up support, the skirmish became a preliminary battle. Before he was well aware of it 60 men had fallen, 2 exposed field-pieces had been with difficulty extricated, 1 regiment had retreated in confusion, and 3 others were deployed in line of battle, to make a new charge. At this point Tyler remembered his instructions and called off his troops. This engagement at Blackburn's Ford, so apparently without necessity or advantage, greatly exasperated the men and officers engaged in it, and seriously chilled the fine spirit in which the army started on its march. The attacking detachment did not then know that the enemy had suffered equal loss and demoralization.†

McDowell began his campaign with the

purpose of turning the flank of the enemy on the south; but the examinations made on the 18th satisfied him that the narrow roads and rough country in that direction made such a movement impracticable. When, in addition, he heard Tyler's cannonade on the same day, he hurried forward his divisions to Centreville; and the report of that day's engagement also seemed to prove it inexpedient to make a direct attack.‡ That night McDowell assembled his division commanders at Centreville and confidentially informed them that he had changed his original plan, and resolved to march northward and turn Beauregard's left flank.† All of Friday, the 19th, and Saturday, the 20th, were spent in an effort of the engineers to find an unfortified ford over Bull Run in that direction; and thus the main battle was postponed till Sunday, July 21. During those two days, while McDowell's army was refreshed by rest and supplied with rations, the strength of the enemy in his front was greatly increased.

McDowell's movement was based upon the understanding and promise that Patterson should hold Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley, and General Scott made every exertion to redeem this promise. On the 13th he directed Patterson to detain Johnston "in the valley of Winchester"; and as the critical time approached, and hearing no official report from him for three whole days, he sent him a sharp admonition: "Do not let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small force in front, whilst he reënforces the [Manassas] Junction with his main body."‡ And still more emphatically on the 18th, while the engagement of Blackburn's Ford was being fought by McDowell's troops: "I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy. If not, to hear that you had felt him strongly, or at least had occupied him by threats and demonstrations. You have been at least his equal, and, I suppose, superior in numbers. Has he not stolen a march and sent reënforcements toward Manassas Junction? A week is enough to win victories."§ Patterson was touched by the implied censure, and answered restively: "The enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have kept him actively employed, and by threats and reconnaissances in force have caused him to be reënforced."|| But the facts did not bear out the assertion. He had been grossly outwitted, and the enemy was at that moment making the stolen march which Scott feared, and of which

* McDowell to Tyler, July 18, 1861. War Records.

† War Records.

‡ Scott to Patterson, July 17, 1861. War Records.

§ Scott to Patterson. War Records.

|| Patterson to Scott, July 18, 1861. War Records.

Patterson remained in profound ignorance till two days later.

Since the 9th of July his readiness to "offer battle," or to "strike" when the proper moment should arrive, had oozed away. He became clamorous for reinforcements, and profuse of complaints. Making no energetic reconnaissance to learn the truth, and crediting every exaggerated rumor, he became impressed that he was "in face of an enemy far superior in numbers." Understanding perfectly the nature and importance of his assigned task, and admitting in his dispatches that "this force is the key-stone of the combined movements"; ambitious to perform a brilliant act, and commanding abundant means to execute his plan, his courage failed in the trying moment. "To-morrow I advance to Bunker Hill," he reported on July 14, "preparatory to the other movement. If an opportunity offers, I shall attack."* Reaching Bunker Hill on the 15th, he was within nine miles of the enemy. His opportunity was at hand. Johnston had only 12,000 men all told; Patterson, from 18,000 to 22,000. All that and the following day he must have been torn by conflicting emotions. He was both seeking and avoiding a battle. He had his orders written out for an attack. But it would appear that his chief of staff, Fitz-John Porter, together with Colonels Abercrombie and Thomas, at the last moment persuaded him to change his mind. Making only a slight reconnaissance on the 16th, he late that night countermanded his orders, and on July 17 marched to Charlestown—nominally as a flank movement, but practically in retreat. Johnston, the Confederate commander, was at Winchester, in daily anticipation of Patterson's attack, when at midnight of July 17 he received orders to go at once to the help of Beauregard at Manassas. By 9 o'clock on the morning of the 18th his scouts brought him information that Patterson's army was at Charlestown. Relieved thus unexpectedly from a menace of danger which otherwise he could neither have resisted nor escaped, he lost no time. At noon of the same day he had his whole effective force of 9000 men on the march; by noon of Saturday, July 20, 6000 of them, with 20 guns, were in Beauregard's camp at Bull Run, ready to resist McDowell's attack.

The Union army lay encamped about Centreville; from there the Warrenton turnpike ran westward over a stone bridge, crossing Bull Run to Gainesville, several miles beyond. Unaware as yet that Johnston had joined Beauregard, McDowell desired to seize Gainesville, a station on the railroad, to pre-

vent such a junction. The stone bridge was thought to be defended in force, besides being mined, ready to be blown up. The engineers, however, late on Saturday, obtained information that Sudley Ford, two or three miles above, could be readily carried and crossed by an attacking column.

On Saturday night, therefore, McDowell called his officers together and announced his plan of battle for the following day. Tyler's division was ordered to advance on the Warrenton turnpike and threaten the stone bridge; while Hunter and Heintzelman, with their divisions, should make a circuitous and secret night march, seize and cross Sudley Ford, and descending on the enemy's side of Bull Run should carry the batteries at the stone bridge by a rear attack, whereby Tyler would be able to cross and join in the main battle.

Beauregard, on his part, also planned an aggressive movement for that same Sunday morning. No sooner had Johnston arrived than he proposed that the Confederates should sally from their intrenchments, cross the five fords of Bull Run they were guarding, march by the various converging roads to Centreville, and surprise and crush the Union army in its camps. The orders for such an advance and attack were duly written out, and Johnston, as ranking officer, signed his approval of them in the gray twilight of Sunday morning. But it proved wasted labor. At sunrise Tyler's signal guns announced the Union advance and attack. The original plan was thereupon abandoned, and Beauregard proposed a modification—to stand on the defensive with their left flank at the stone bridge, and attack with their right from the region of Blackburn's Ford. This suggestion again Johnston adopted and ordered to be carried out. There had been confusion and delay in the outset of McDowell's march, and the flanking route around by Sudley Ford proved unexpectedly long. Tyler's feigned attack at the stone bridge was so feeble and inefficient that it betrayed its object; the real attack by Hunter and Heintzelman, designed to begin at daylight, could not be made until near 11 o'clock. The first sharp encounter took place about a mile north of the Warrenton turnpike; some five regiments on each side being engaged. The rebels tenaciously held their line for an hour. But the Union column was constantly swelling with arriving batteries and regiments. Tyler's division found a ford, and crossing Bull Run a short distance above the stone bridge, three of its brigades joined Hunter and Heintzelman. About 12 o'clock the Confederate line, composed mainly of Johnston's troops, wavered and broke, and was swept back across and out of the valley of the Warrenton turnpike, and down the road

* Patterson to Townsend, July 14, 1861. War Records.

running southward from Sudley Ford to Manassas Junction.

The commanders and other officers on both sides were impressed with the conviction that this conflict of the forenoon had decided the fortunes of the day. Beauregard's plan to make a counter-attack from his right flank against Centreville had failed through a miscarriage of orders; and leaving Johnston at headquarters to watch the entire field, he hastened personally to endeavor to check the tide of defeat. Jackson, afterward known by the sobriquet of "Stonewall," had already formed his fresh brigade, also of Johnston's army, on the crest of a ridge half a mile south of the Warrenton turnpike. Other regiments and batteries were hurried up, until they constituted a semicircular line of 12 regiments, 22 guns, and 2 companies of cavalry, strongly posted and well hidden in the edge of a piece of woods behind the screen of a thick growth of young pines.

At half-past 2 o'clock in the afternoon, McDowell attacked this second position of the enemy with an immediately available force of about 14 regiments, 24 guns, and a single battalion of cavalry. Here the advantages of position were all strongly against him. The enemy was posted, concealed, and his artillery concentrated, while McDowell's brigades were at the foot of the hill; not only where the ascent must be made in open view, but where the nature of the ground rendered a united advance impossible. A series of successive and detached assaults followed. Two batteries were lost by mistaking a rebel for a Union regiment; and because of the lax organization and want of discipline in the raw volunteer regiments, the strength of McDowell's command melted away in a rapid demoralization and disintegration. The scales of victory, however, yet vibrated in uncertainty, when at 4 in the afternoon the remainder of Johnston's army arrived, and seven fresh rebel regiments were thrown against the extreme right and partly in rear of the Union line.

This heavy numerical overweight at a decisive time and place terminated the battle very suddenly. The abundant rumors that Johnston was coming to the help of Beauregard seemed verified; and the Union regiments, ignorant of the fact that they had been successfully fighting part of his force all day, were now seized with a panic, and began by a common impulse to move in retreat. The suddenness of their victory was as unexpected to the rebel as to the Union commanders. Jefferson Davis, who had come from Richmond, arriving at Manassas at 4 o'clock, was informed that the battle was lost, and was implored by his companions not to endanger his

personal safety by riding to the front. Nevertheless he persisted, and was overjoyed to find that the Union army had, by a sudden and unexplained impulse, half marched, half run from the field. The rebel detachments of cavalry hung about the line of retreat, and by sudden dashes picked up a large harvest of trophies in guns and supplies, but they dared not venture a serious attack; and so unconvinced were they as yet of the final result, that that night the rebel commanders set a strong and vigilant guard in all directions against the expected return, and offensive operations, by McDowell next morning. The precaution was needless, for the Union army was so much demoralized that the commanders deemed it unsafe to make a stand at Centreville, where the reserves were posted; and a rapid though orderly retreat was continued through the night, and until all organized regiments or fragments reached their old camps within the fortifications on the Potomac, and the scattered fugitives made their way across the river into the city of Washington.

McDowell's defeat was wholly due to Patterson's inefficiency. He was charged with the task of defeating or holding Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley; he had a double force with which to perform his task. Had he done so, McDowell, who in that case would have been superior in numbers to Beauregard, and whose plans were in the main judicious, could easily have conquered. It was Johnston's army, which Patterson had permitted to escape, that principally fought the battle of Bull Run and defeated McDowell.* Nor is there any good sense in that criticism which lays the blame upon General Scott and the Administration for not having first united the two Federal armies. The Administration furnished a superior force against Beauregard at Bull Run, and an overwhelming force against Johnston at Winchester, and assured victory in each locality by the only reliable condition—other things being equal—an excess of numbers. Had Patterson held his foe, as he might, and McDowell defeated Beauregard, as he would have done, the capture of Johnston's force between the two Federal armies was practically certain, as General Scott intended.†

* The following analysis of the forces engaged in the main and decisive phases of the actual fighting shows it conclusively:

	JOHNSTON'S ARMY.		BEAUREGARD'S ARMY.	
	Regs.	Guns.	Regs.	Guns.
Battle of the morning	4	4	1	2
Battle of the afternoon	9	16	3	6
Final flank attack which created the panic	3	4	4	..
	16	24	8	8

† Scott to McClellan, July 18, 1861. War Records.

Scott was aware of the danger which Paterson's negligence had created. "It is known that a strong reinforcement left Winchester on the afternoon of the 18th, which you will also have to beat," he telegraphed McDowell on the day of the battle, which it was then too late to countermand.* He also promised him immediate reinforcements. The confidence of the General-in-Chief remained unshaken, and he telegraphed McClellan: "McDowell is this forenoon forcing the passage of Bull Run. In two hours he will turn the Manassas Junction and storm it to-day with superior force."†

It may well be supposed that President Lincoln suffered great anxiety during that eventful Sunday; but General Scott talked confidently of success, and Lincoln bore his impatience without any visible sign, and quietly went to church at 11 o'clock. Soon after noon copies of telegrams began to come to him at the Executive Mansion from the War Department and from army headquarters. They brought, however, no certain information, as they came only from the nearest station to the battle-field, and simply gave what the operator saw and heard. Toward 3 o'clock they became more frequent, and reported considerable fluctuation in the apparent course and progress of the cannonade. The President went to the office of General Scott, where he found the general asleep, and woke him to talk over the news. Scott said such reports were worth nothing as indications either way — that the changes in the currents of wind and the variation of the echoes made it impossible for a distant listener to determine the course of a battle. He still expressed his confidence in a successful result, and composed himself for another nap when the President left.

Dispatches continued to come about every ten or fifteen minutes, still based on hearing and hearsay. But the rumors grew more cheering and definite. They reported that the battle had extended along nearly the whole line; that there had been considerable loss; but that the secession lines had been driven back two or three miles, some of the dispatches said, to the Junction. One of General Scott's aides now also came, bringing the telegram of an engineer, repeating that McDowell had driven the enemy before him, that he had ordered the reserves to cross Bull Run, and wanted reinforcements without delay.‡

The aide further stated substantially that the general was satisfied of the truth of this

report, and that McDowell would immediately attack and capture the Junction, perhaps to-night, but certainly by to-morrow noon. Deeming all doubt at an end, President Lincoln ordered his carriage, and went out to take his usual evening drive.

He had not yet returned when, at 6 o'clock, Secretary Seward came to the Executive Mansion, pale and haggard. "Where is the President?" he asked hoarsely of the private secretaries. "Gone to drive," they answered. "Have you any late news?" he continued. They read him the telegrams which announced victory. "Tell no one," said he. "That is not true. The battle is lost. The telegraph says that McDowell is in full retreat, and calls on General Scott to save the capital. Find the President and tell him to come immediately to General Scott's." Half an hour later the President returned from his drive, and his private secretaries gave him Seward's message — the first intimation he received of the trying news. He listened in silence, without the slightest change of feature or expression, and walked away to army headquarters. There he read the unwelcome report in a telegram from a captain of engineers: "General McDowell's army in full retreat through Centreville. The day is lost. Save Washington and the remnants of this army. . . . The routed troops will not re-form."§ This information was such an irreconcilable contradiction of the former telegram that General Scott utterly refused to believe it. That one officer should report the army beyond Bull Run, driving the enemy and ordering up reserves, and another immediately report it three miles this side of Bull Run, in hopeless retreat and demoralization, seemed an impossibility. Yet the impossible had indeed come to pass; and the apparent change of fortune had been nearly as sudden on the battle-field as in Washington.

The President and the Cabinet met at General Scott's office, and awaited further news in feverish suspense, until a telegram from McDowell confirmed the disaster.|| Discussion was now necessarily turned to preparation for the future. All available troops were hurried forward to McDowell's support; Baltimore was put on the alert; telegrams were sent to the recruiting stations of the nearest Northern States to lose no time in sending all their organized regiments to Washington; McClellan was ordered to "come down to the Shenandoah Valley with such troops as can be spared from western Virginia."¶ A great number of

* Scott, Testimony, Committee on Conduct of the War.

† Scott to McClellan, July 21, 1861. War Records.

‡ Wendell to Thomas, July 21, 1861, 4 P. M. War Records.

§ Alexander, July 21, 1861. War Records.

|| McDowell to Townsend, July 21, 1861. War Records.

¶ Scott to McClellan, July 21, 1861. War Records.

civilians, newspaper correspondents, and several senators and representatives had followed McDowell's army to Centreville; one of the latter, Mr. Ely of New York, went to the battle-field itself, and was captured and sent for a long sojourn to Libby Prison in Richmond. Such of these non-combatants as had been fortunate enough to keep their horses and vehicles were the first to reach Washington, arriving about midnight. President Lincoln had by this time returned to the Executive Mansion, and reclining on a lounge in the Cabinet room he heard from several of these eye-witnesses their excited and exaggerated narratives, in which the rush and terror and unseemly stampede of lookers-on and army teamsters were altogether disproportionate and almost exclusive features. The President did not go to his bed that night; morning found him still on his lounge in the Executive office, hearing a repetition of these recitals and making memoranda of his own comments and conclusions.

As the night elapsed, the news seemed to grow worse. McDowell's first dispatch stated that he would hold Centreville. His second, that "the larger part of the men are a confused mob, entirely demoralized"; but he said that he would attempt to make a stand at Fairfax Court House.* His third reported from that point that "many of the volunteers did not wait for authority to proceed to the Potomac, but left on their own decision. They are now pouring through this place in a state of utter disorganization. . . . I think now, as all of my commanders thought at Centreville, there is no alternative but to fall back to the Potomac."† Reports from other points generally confirmed the prevalence of confusion and disorganization. Monday morning the scattered fugitives reached the bridges over the Potomac, and began rushing across them into Washington. It was a gloomy and dismal day. A drizzling rain set in which lasted thirty-six hours. Many a panic-stricken volunteer remembered afterward with gratitude, that when he was wandering footsore, exhausted, and hungry through the streets of the capital, her loyal families opened their cheerful doors to give him food, rest, and encouragement.

One of the principal reasons which prevented McDowell's making a stand at Centreville or Fairfax Court House was the important fact that the term of service of the three-months' militia, organized under President Lincoln's first proclamation, was about to expire. "In

the next few days," says McDowell in his report, "day by day I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the army."‡ This vital consideration equally affected the armies at other points; and bearing it, as well as the local exigency, in mind, the President and the Cabinet determined on several changes of army leadership. McDowell was continued in command on the Virginia side of the Potomac, with fifteen regiments to defend and hold the forts. McClellan was called to Washington to take local command, and more especially to organize a new army out of the three-years' regiments which were just beginning to come in from the various States. Patterson was only a three-months' general, appointed by the governor of Pennsylvania; his time expired, and he was mustered out of service. Banks was sent to Harper's Ferry to succeed him. Dix was put in command at Baltimore, and Rosecrans in western Virginia.

By noon of Monday the worst aspects of the late defeat were known; and especially the reassuring fact that the enemy was making no pursuit; and so far as possible immediate dangers were provided against. The War Department was soon able to reply to anxious inquiries from New York:

Our loss is much less than was at first represented, and the troops have reached the forts in much better condition than we expected. We are making most vigorous efforts to concentrate a large and irresistible army at this point. Regiments are arriving. . . . Our works on the south bank of the Potomac are impregnable, being well manned with reinforcements. The capital is safe. §

On the following day Lincoln in person visited some of the forts and camps about Arlington Heights, and addressed the regiments with words of cheer and confidence.

Compared with the later battles of the civil war, the battle of Bull Run involved but a very moderate loss || in men and material. Its political and moral results, however, were widespread and enduring. The fact that the rebel army suffered about equal damage in numbers of killed and wounded, and that it was crippled so as to be unable for months to resume the offensive, could not be immediately known. The flushed hope of the South magnified the achievement as a demonstration of Southern invincibility. The event of a pitched battle won gave the rebellion and the Confederate government a standing and a sudden respect-

* McDowell to Townsend, July 21, 1861. War Records.

† McDowell to Townsend, July 22, 1861.

‡ McDowell, Report, August 4, 1861. War Records.

§ Cameron to Stetson, Grinnell, and others, July 22, 1861. War Records.

|| The official reports show a loss to the Union side in the battle of Bull Run of 25 guns (the Confederates claim 28), 481 men killed, 1011 men wounded, and 1460 (wounded and other Union soldiers) sent as prisoners to Richmond. On the Confederate side the loss was 387 killed, 1582 wounded, and a few prisoners taken.—War Records.

ability before foreign powers it had hardly dared hope for. With the then personal government of France, and with the commercial classes whose influence always rules the government of England, it gained at once a scarcely disguised active sympathy.

Upon the irritated susceptibilities, the wounded loyalty, the sanguine confidence of the North, the Bull Run defeat fell with a cruel bitterness. The eager hopes built on the victories of western Virginia were dashed to the ground. Here was a fresher and deeper humiliation than Sumter or Baltimore. But though her nerves winced, her will never faltered. She was both chastened and strengthened in the fiery trial. For the moment, however, irritation and disappointment found vent in loud complaint and blind recrimination. One or two curious incidents in this ordeal of criticism may perhaps be cited. A few days after the battle, in a conversation at the White House with several Illinois members of Congress, in the presence of the President and the Secretary of War, General Scott himself was so far nettled by the universal chagrin and fault-finding that he lost his temper and sought an entirely uncalled-for self-justification. "Sir, I am the greatest coward in America," said he. "I will prove it. I have fought this battle, sir, against my judgment; I think the President of the United States ought to remove me to-day for doing it. As God is my judge, after my superiors had determined to fight it I did all in my power to make the army efficient. I deserve removal because I did not stand up, when my army was not in a condition for fighting, and resist it to the last." The President said, "Your conversation seems to imply that I forced you to fight this battle." General Scott then said, "I have never served a President who has been kinder to me than you have been." Richardson, who in a complaining speech in Congress related the scene, then drew the inference that Scott intended to pay a personal compliment to Mr. Lincoln, but that he did not mean to exonerate the Cabinet; and when pressed by questions, further explained: "Let us have no misunderstanding about this matter. My colleagues understood that I gave the language as near as I could. Whether I have been correctly reported or not I do not know. If I did not then make the correct statement, let me do it now. I did not understand General Scott, nor did I mean so to be understood, as implying that the President had forced him to fight that battle."* The incident illustrates how easily history may be perverted by hot-blooded criticism. Scott's petulance drove him to an inaccurate statement

of events; Richardson's partisanship warped Scott's error to a still more unjustifiable deduction, and both reasoned from a changed condition of things. Two weeks before, Scott was confident of victory, and Richardson chafing at military inaction. The exact facts have already been stated. Scott advised against an offensive campaign into Virginia, but consented—was not forced—to prepare and direct it. He made success as certain as it ever can be made in war; but the inefficiency of Patterson foiled his plan and preparation. Even then victory was yet possible and probable but for the panic, against which there is no safeguard, and which has been fatal to armies in all times and in all countries.

Historical judgment of war is subject to an inflexible law, either very imperfectly understood or very constantly lost sight of. Military writers love to fight over the battles of history exclusively by the rules of the professional chess-board, always subordinating, often totally ignoring, the element of politics. This is a radical error. Every war is begun, dominated, and ended by political considerations; without a nation, without a government, without money or credit, without popular enthusiasm which furnishes volunteers, or public support which endures conscription, there could be no army and no war—neither beginning nor end of methodical hostilities. War and politics, campaigns and statecraft, are Siamese twins, inseparable and interdependent; and to talk of military operations without the direction and interference of an Administration is as absurd as to plan a campaign without recruits, pay, or rations. Applied to the Bull Run campaign, this law of historical criticism analyzes and fixes the relative responsibilities of government and commanders with easy precision. When Lincoln, on June 29, assembled his council of war, the commanders, as military experts, correctly decided that the existing armies could win a victory at Manassas and a victory at Winchester. General Scott correctly objected that these victories, if won, would not be decisive; and that in a military point of view it would be wiser to defer any offensive campaign until the following autumn. Here the President and the Cabinet, as political experts, intervened, and on their part decided, correctly, that the public temper would not admit of such a delay. Thus the Administration was responsible for the forward movement, Scott for the combined strategy of the two armies, McDowell for the conduct of the Bull Run battle, Patterson for the escape of Johnston, and Fate for the panic; for the opposing forces were equally raw, equally undisciplined, and as a whole fought the battle with equal courage and gallantry.

* "Globe," July 24 and Aug. 1, 1861, pp. 246 and 387.

But such an analysis of causes and such an apportionment of responsibilities could not be made by the public, or even by the best-informed individuals beyond Cabinet circles, in the first fortnight succeeding the Bull Run disaster. All was confused rumor, blind inference, seething passion. That the public at large and the touch-and-go newspaper writers should indulge in harsh and hasty language is scarcely to be wondered at; but the unseemly and precipitate judgments and criticisms of those holding the rank of leadership in public affairs are less to be excused. Men were not yet tempered to the fiery ordeal of revolution, and still thought and spoke under the strong impulse of personal prejudice, and with that untamed and visionary extravagance which made politics such a chaos in the preceding winter. That feeling, momentarily quelled and repressed by the rebel guns at Sumter, was now in danger of breaking out afresh. In illustration we need only to cite the words of prominent leaders in the three parties of the North, namely: Stanton, late Buchanan's attorney-general, and destined soon to become famous as Lincoln's War Secretary; Richardson, who had been the trusted lieutenant of Douglas, and now, since Douglas was dead, the ostensible spokesman of the faction which had followed that leader; and thirdly, Horace Greeley, exercising so prominent an influence upon the public opinion of the country through the columns of "The Tribune."

The Buchanan cabinet was still writhing under the odium which fell upon the late Administration, and much more severely upon the Breckinridge Democracy. Mr. Buchanan and his Cabinet were eager to seize upon every shadow of self-justification, and naturally not slow to emphasize any apparent shortcoming of their successors. Stanton, with his impulsive nature, was especially severe on the new President and Administration. In his eyes the only hope of the country lay in the members of Buchanan's reconstructed Cabinet. Thus he wrote to his colleague Dix, on June 11, in language that resembled a stump speech of the presidential campaign:

No one can imagine the deplorable condition of this city and the hazard of the Government, who did not witness the weakness and panic of the Administration, and the painful imbecility of Lincoln. We looked to New York in that dark hour as our only deliverance under Providence, and, thank God, it came. . . . But when we witness venality and corruption growing in power every day, and controlling the millions of money that should be a patriotic sacrifice for national deliverance, and treating the treasure of the nation as a booty to be divided among thieves, hope dies away: deliverance from this danger also must come from New York. . . . Of military affairs I can form no judgment. Every day affords fresh proof of the

design to give the war a party direction. The army appointments appear (with two or three exceptions only) to be bestowed on persons whose only claim is their Republicanism—broken-down politicians without experience, ability, or any other merit. Democrats are rudely repulsed, or scowled upon with jealous and ill-concealed aversion. The Western Democracy are already becoming disgusted, and between the corruption of some of the Republican leaders and the self-seeking ambition of others some great disaster may soon befall the nation. How long will the Democracy of New York tolerate these things? . . . We hoped to see you here, especially after you had accepted the appointment of major-general. But now that the Administration has got over its panic, you are not the kind of man that would be welcome.*

This letter plainly enough shows Mr. Stanton's attitude toward the new Administration. His letter of the following day to ex-President Buchanan reveals the state of feeling entertained by Dix:

The recent appointments in the army are generally spoken of with great disapprobation. General Dix is very much chagrined with the treatment he has received from the War Department, and on Saturday I had a letter declaring his intention to resign immediately.†

Again, July 16:

General Dix is still here. He has been shamefully treated by the Administration. We are expecting a general battle to be commenced at Fairfax to-day, and conflicting opinions of the result are entertained.†

And once more, on July 26:

The dreadful disaster of Sunday can scarcely be mentioned. The imbecility of this Administration culminated in that catastrophe: an irretrievable misfortune and national disgrace, never to be forgotten, are to be added to the ruin of all peaceful pursuits and national bankruptcy as the result of Lincoln's "running the machine" for five months. You perceive that Bennett is for a change of the Cabinet, and proposes for one of the new Cabinet Mr. Holt. . . . It is not unlikely that some change in the War and Navy Departments may take place, but none beyond these two departments until Jefferson Davis turns out the whole concern. The capture of Washington seems now to be inevitable: during the whole of Monday and Tuesday it might have been taken without any resistance. The rout, overthrow, and utter demoralization of the whole army is complete. Even now I doubt whether any serious opposition to the entrance of the Confederate forces could be offered. While Lincoln, Scott, and the Cabinet are disputing who is to blame, the city is unguarded and the enemy at hand. General McClellan reached here last evening. But if he had the ability of Cæsar, Alexander, or Napoleon, what can he accomplish? Will not Scott's jealousy, Cabinet intrigues, Republican interference, thwart him at every step? While hoping for the best, I cannot shut my eyes against the dangers that beset the Government, and especially this city. It is certain that Davis was in the field on Sunday, and the secessionists here assert that he headed in person the last victorious charge. General Dix is in Baltimore. After three weeks' neglect and insult he was sent there.†

While Stanton and Dix were thus nursing their secret griefs on behalf of one of the late

* Dix, "Memoirs of John A. Dix."

† "North American Review," November, 1879.

political factions, Richardson, as the spokesman of the Douglas wing of the Democracy, was indulging in loud complaints for the other. Charging that the division of the Democratic party at Charleston had brought the present calamity upon the Union, he continued:

This organization of the Breckinridge party was for the purpose of destroying the Government. That was its purpose and its object. What do we see? Without the aid and coöperation of the men of the North that party was powerless. The men from the Northern States who aided and encouraged this organization which is in rebellion are at the head to-day of our army. Butler of Massachusetts, Dix of New York and Patterson of Pennsylvania, and Cadwalader—all of them in this movement to break down and disorganize the Democratic party and the country. Why is it? This Douglas party furnished you one-half of your entire army. Where is your general, where is your man in command to-day who belongs to that party? Why is this? Have you Republicans sympathized with this Breckinridge party? Are you sympathizing with them, and lending your aid to the men who lead our armies into misfortune and disgrace?*

Richardson was easily answered. A member correctly replied that these and other three-months' generals had been selected by the governors of various States, and not by the President; moreover, that Patterson had been specially recommended by General Scott, whom Richardson was eulogizing, and that there would be plenty of opportunity before the war was over for the Douglas men to win honors in the field. But all this did not soothe Richardson's temper, which was roused mainly by his revived factional jealousy.

Unjust fault-finding was to be expected from party opponents; but it is not too much to say that it was a genuine surprise to the President to receive from a party friend, and the editor of the most influential newspaper in the Union, the following letter, conveying an indirect accusation of criminal indifference, and proposing an immediate surrender to rebellion and consent to permanent disunion:

NEW YORK, Monday, July 29, 1861.
Midnight.

DEAR SIR: This is my seventh sleepless night—yours, too, doubtless—yet I think I shall not die, because I have no right to die. I must struggle to live, however bitterly. But to business. You are not considered a great man, and I am a hopelessly broken one. You are now undergoing a terrible ordeal, and God has thrown the gravest responsibilities upon you. Do not fear to meet them. Can the rebels be beaten after all that has occurred, and in view of the actual state of feeling caused by our late, awful disaster? If they can,—and it is your business to ascertain and decide,—write me that such is your judgment, so that I may know and do my duty. And if they *cannot* be beaten,—if our recent disaster is fatal,—do not fear to sacrifice yourself to your country. If the rebels are not to be beaten,—if that is your judgment in view of all the light you can get,—then every drop of blood henceforth shed in this quarrel will be wantonly, wickedly

shed, and the guilt will rest heavily on the soul of every promoter of the crime. I pray you to decide quickly and let me know my duty.

If the Union is irrevocably gone, an armistice for 30, 60, 90, 120 days—better still for a year—ought at once to be proposed, with a view to a peaceful adjustment. Then Congress should call a national convention, to meet at the earliest possible day. And there should be an immediate and mutual exchange or release of prisoners and a disbandment of forces. I do not consider myself at present a judge of anything but the public sentiment. That seems to me everywhere gathering and deepening against a prosecution of the war. The gloom in this city is funereal,—for our dead at Bull Run were many, and they lie unburied yet. On every brow sits sullen, scorching, black despair. It would be easy to have Mr. Crittenden move any proposition that ought to be adopted, or to have it come from any proper quarter. The first point is to ascertain what is best that can be done—which is the measure of our duty, and do that very thing at the earliest moment.

This letter is written in the strictest confidence, and is for your eye alone. But you are at liberty to say to members of your Cabinet that you *know* I will second any move you may see fit to make. But do nothing timidly nor by halves. Send me word what to do. I will live till I can hear it at all events. If it is best for the country and for mankind that we make peace with the rebels at once and on their own terms, do not shrink even from that. But bear in mind the greatest truth: "Whoso would lose his life for my sake shall save it." Do the thing that is the highest right, and tell me how I am to second you.

Yours, in the depths of bitterness,
HORACE GREELEY.†

These few citations are noteworthy, because of the high quarters whence they emanated and the subsequent relations some of their authors bore to the war. They give us penetrating glimpses of how the Bull Run disaster was agitating the public opinion of the North. But it must not be hastily inferred that such was the preponderant feeling. The great tides of patriotism settled quickly back to their usual level. The army, Congress, and the people took up, a shade less buoyantly, but with a deeper energy, the determined prosecution of the war, and soon continued their cheerful confidence in the President, Cabinet, and military authorities. The war governors tendered more troops and hurried forward their equipped regiments; the Administration pushed the organization of the long-term volunteers; and out of the scattered débris of the Bull Run forces there sprang up that magnificent Army of the Potomac, which in a long and fluctuating career won such historic renown.

Meanwhile, in this first shadow of defeat, President Lincoln maintained his wonted equipoise of manner and speech. A calm and resolute patience was his most constant mood; to follow with watchfulness the details of the

* Richardson, Speech in House of Representatives, July 24, 1861.

† Unpublished Autograph MS.

accumulation of a new army was his most eager occupation. He smiled at frettings like those of Scott, Dix, and Richardson; but letters like that of Greeley made him sigh at the strange weakness of human character. Such things gave him pain, but they bred no resentment, and elicited no reply. Already at this period he began the display of that rare ability in administration which enabled him to smooth mountains of obstacles and bridge rivers of difficulty in his control of men. From this time onward to the end of the war his touch was daily and hourly amidst the vast machinery of command and coördination in Cabinet, Congress, army, navy, and the hosts of national politics. To still the quarrels of factions, to allay the jealousies of statesmen, to compose the rivalries of generals, to soothe the vanity of officials, to prompt the laggard, to curb the ardent, to sustain the faltering, was a substratum of daily routine underlying the great events of campaigns, battles, and high questions of state.

On the night following the battle of Bull Run, while Lincoln lay awake on a sofa in the Executive office, waiting to gather what personal information he could from the many officers and prominent civilians who were arriving at Washington after their flight from the battle-field, he already began sketching a pencil memorandum of the policy and military programme most expedient to be adopted in the new condition of affairs. This memorandum sketch or outline he added to from time to time during the succeeding days. On the 27th of July he seems to have matured his reflections on the late disaster, and with his own hand he carefully copied his memorandum in this completed form:

JULY 23, 1861.

1. Let the plan for making the blockade effective be pushed forward with all possible dispatch.
2. Let the volunteer forces at Fort Monroe and vicinity, under General Butler, be constantly drilled, disciplined, and instructed without more for the present.
3. Let Baltimore be held as now, with a gentle but firm and certain hand.
4. Let the force now under Patterson or Banks be strengthened and made secure in its position.
5. Let the forces in western Virginia act till further orders according to instructions or orders from General McClellan.
6. General Frémont push forward his organization and operations in the West as rapidly as possible, giving rather special attention to Missouri.
7. Let the forces late before Manassas, except the three-months' men, be reorganized as rapidly as possible in their camps here and about Arlington.
8. Let the three-months' forces who decline to enter the longer service be discharged as rapidly as circumstances will permit.
9. Let the new volunteer forces be brought forward as fast as possible; and especially into the camps on the two sides of the river here.

JULY 27, 1861.

When the foregoing shall have been substantially attended to,

1. Let Manassas Junction (or some point on one or other of the railroads nearest it) and Strasburg be seized, and permanently held, with an open line from Washington to Manassas, and an open line from Harper's Ferry to Strasburg—the military men to find the way of doing these.

2. This done, a joint movement from Cairo on Memphis; and from Cincinnati on east Tennessee.*

FRÉMONT.

MISSOURI had been saved from organized rebellion, but the smell and blackness of insurrectionary fire were strong upon her. While Governor Jackson and General Price, flying from the battle of Boonville as fugitives, were momentarily helpless, they nevertheless had reasonable hope of quick support. Whatever of latent rebellion and secret military preparation existed were set in motion by the governor's proclamation of June 12 and his order dividing the State into nine military districts and issuing commissions to a skeleton army under the provisions of the military bill passed by his rebel legislature before their expulsion from the capital by Lyon. Thus every one inclined to take up arms against the Union had the plausible excuse of authority and the guidance of a designated commander and rendezvous, and a simultaneous movement toward organization long preconceived immediately began. Missouri is a large State. She had over 68,000 square miles of territory, and a population of over a million souls; a trifling percentage would yield a formidable force. The spirit and impulse of revolution were at fever heat, and all the fire of the Border-Ruffian days smoldered along the frontier. The governor's brigadier-generals designated camps, and the hot-blooded country lads flocked to them, finding a charm of adventure in the very privations they were compelled to undergo. For half a year disloyalty had gone unpunished; the recent reports of march and battle served rather to sharpen their zeal.

Three railroads radiated from St. Louis—one toward the west, with its terminus at Sedalia; one toward the south-west, with terminus at Rolla; one toward the south, with terminus at Ironton. The first of these reached only about three-fourths, the last two scarcely half-way, across the State. Western Missouri, therefore, seemed beyond any quick reach of a military expedition from St. Louis. General Price, proceeding westward from Boonville, found one of these camps at Lexington; the governor, proceeding southward, was attended by a little remnant of fugitives from the bat-

* Lincoln, Autograph MS.

tle of Boonville. With such following as each could gather both directed their course toward the Arkansas line, collecting adherents as they went. Their pathway was not entirely clear. Before leaving St. Louis, Lyon had sent an expedition numbering about twenty-five hundred, commanded by Sweeny, a captain of regulars, by rail to Rolla and thence by a week's march to Springfield, from which point he had advanced a part of his force under Sigel to Carthage, near the extreme south-western corner of the State. Jackson and Price, having previously united their forces, thus found Sigel directly in their path. As they greatly outnumbered him, by the battle of Carthage, July 5,—a sharp but indecisive engagement,—they drove him back upon Springfield, and effected a junction with the rebel force gathered in the north-western corner of Arkansas, which had already assisted them by demonstrations and by capturing one of Sigel's companies.

Delayed by the need of transportation, Lyon could not start from Boonville on his south-western march until the 3d of July. The improvised forces of Jackson and Price, moving rapidly, because made up largely of cavalry, or, rather, unorganized horsemen, were far in advance of him, and had overwhelmed Sigel before Lyon was well on his way. Nevertheless he pushed ahead with energy, having called to him a detachment of regulars from Fort Leavenworth, and volunteers from Kansas numbering about 2200. These increased his column to about 4600 men. By July 13 he was at Springfield, and with the forces he found there was at the head of an aggregate of between 7000 and 8000 men.

The Confederate authorities had ambitious plans for the West. They already possessed Arkansas; the Indian Territory was virtually in their grasp; Missouri they looked upon with somewhat confident eyes; even the ultimate conquest of Kansas seemed more than a remote possibility. Nor were such plans confined to mere speculation. Major-General Polk was stationed at Memphis early in July to command the Mississippi region. The neutrality policy in Kentucky for the moment left the Tennessee contingent idle. Being appealed to by Governor Jackson, Polk made immediate preparations for a campaign in Missouri. On July 23 he reported to the Confederate government his purpose to send two strong columns into that State—one under McCulloch, of about 25,000 men, against Lyon at Springfield; another, under Pillow and Hardee, to march upon Ironton in south-east Missouri, where he estimated they would collect a force of 18,000. He wrote:

They are directed to pass in behind Lyon's force by land, or to proceed to St. Louis, seize it, and, taking

possession of the boats at that point, to proceed up the river Missouri, raising the Missourians as they go; and at such point as may appear most suitable to detach a force to cut off Lyon's return from the west. . . . If, as I think, I can drive the enemy from Missouri with the force indicated, I will then enter Illinois and take Cairo in the rear on my return.*

He was obliged a few days later to curtail this extravagant programme. Governor Jackson, he learned, to his chagrin, had exaggerated the available forces fully one-half.† Although he had already sent Pillow to New Madrid, he now "paused" in the execution of his plan; and the rivalry of the various rebel commanders seems soon to have completely paralyzed it. The "neutrality" attitude of the governors of both Missouri and Kentucky greatly delayed the progress of the war in the West. The middle of June came before Lyon chased the rebels from Jefferson City, and in Kentucky open and positive military action was deferred till the first weeks of September. Meanwhile, however, it was felt that the beginning of serious hostilities was only a question of time. The Mississippi River was blockaded, commerce suspended, Cairo garrisoned and fortified, gun-boats were being built, regiments were being organized and sent hither and thither, mainly as yet to keep the neighborhood peace. In the East the several Virginia campaigns were in progress, and General Scott's "anaconda" plan was well understood in confidential circles.

This condition of affairs made the whole Mississippi Valley sensitive and restless. The governors of the North-west met, and, by memorial and delegation, urged the Administration to make the Ohio line secure by moving forward and occupying advanced posts in Kentucky and Tennessee. Especially did they urge the appointment of a competent commander who could combine the immense resources of the West, and make them effective in a grand campaign southward to open the Mississippi.

Almost universal public sentiment turned to John C. Frémont as the desired leader for this duty. He was about forty-eight years of age. As student, as explorer, as a prominent actor in making California a State of the Union, he had shown talent, displayed energy, and conquered success in situations of difficulty and peril. As senator for a brief term, his votes proved that the North could rely on his convictions and principles. As the presidential candidate of the Republican party in 1856, his name had broadened into national representative value. The post of honor then had brought him defeat. He might well claim the post of duty for a chance to win a victory.

* Polk to Walker, July 23, 1861. War Records.

† War Records.

The dash of romance in his career easily rekindled popular enthusiasm; political sagacity indicated that he should be encouraged to change this popularity into armies, and lead them to military success in aid of the imperiled nation. The inclination of the Administration coincided with the sentiment of the people. Seward had proposed him for Secretary of War, and Lincoln mentioned him for the French mission; but in the recent distribution of offices no place at once suitable to his abilities and adequate to his claims had been found available. This new crisis seemed to have carved out the work for the man.

He had passed the previous winter in France, but upon the outbreak of rebellion at once returned to his country. On his arrival in the city of New York, about the 1st of July, President Lincoln appointed him a major-general in the regular army, and on the 3d created the Western department, consisting of the State of Illinois and all the States and Territories between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains, and placed it under his command, with headquarters at St. Louis.

For a man whose genius could have risen to the requirements of the occasion it was a magnificent opportunity, an imperial theater. Unfortunately, the country and the Administration had overrated Frémont's abilities. Instead of proceeding at once to his post of duty, he remained in New York, absorbed largely in his personal affairs. Two weeks passed before he sent his letter of acceptance and oath of office. "Please proceed to your command without coming here," telegraphed General Scott, two days later. Postmaster-General Blair testified:

As soon as he was appointed, I urged him to go to his department. . . . The President questioned me every day about his movements. I told him so often that Frémont was off, or was going next day, according to my information, that I felt mortified when allusion was made to it, and dreaded a reference to the subject. Finally, on the receipt of a dispatch from Lyon by my brother, describing the condition of his command, I felt justified in telegraphing General Frémont that he must go at once. But he remained till after Bull Run; and even then, when he should have known the inspiration that would give the rebels, he traveled leisurely to St. Louis.*

When, on July 25, he finally reached his headquarters, and formally assumed command, he did not find his new charge a bed of roses. The splendid military strength of the North-west was only beginning its development. Recruiting offices were full; but commanders of departments and governors of States quarreled over the dribblets of arms and equipments remaining in the arsenals, and which were needed in a dozen places at once.

* Committee on Conduct of the War.

The educated and experienced officers and subalterns of the old regular army, familiar with organization and routine, did not suffice to furnish the needed brigadier-generals and colonels, much less adjutants, commissaries, quartermasters, and drill-sergeants. Error, extravagance, delay, and waste ensued. Regiments were rushed off to the front without uniforms, arms, or rations; sometimes without being mustered into service. Yet the latent resources were abundant in quantity and excellent in quality, and especially in the qualities of mind, ambition, earnestness, and talent competent through practical service to rise to every requirement of duty and sacrifice—genius which could lead, and patriotic devotion ready to serve, suffer, and die. What magnificent capabilities in those early Western volunteers; what illustrious talent in those first regiments found by Frémont and coming at his call!—Lyon, Grant, Blair, McClelland, Pope, Logan, Schofield, Curtis, Sturgis, Palmer, Hurlbut, and a hundred others whose names shine on the records of the war, to say nothing of the thousands who, unheralded, went gloriously to manful duty and patriotic death.

The three weeks loitered away in New York already served to quadruple Frémont's immediate task. Lyon had taken the field, and Blair had gone to Washington to take his seat in the special session of Congress as representative. The whole service immediately felt the absence from headquarters of these two inspiring and guiding leaders. At three points in Frémont's new department matters wore a threatening aspect. The plentiful seeds of rebellion sown by Governor Jackson throughout Missouri were springing up in noxious rankness. Amidst dominant loyalty existed a reckless and daring secession minority, unwilling to submit to the control of superior sentiment and force. Following the battle of Boonville there broke out in many parts of the State a destructive guerrilla warfare, degenerating into neighborhood and family feuds, and bloody personal reprisal and revenge, which became known under the term of "bushwhacking." Houses and bridges were burned, farms were plundered, railroads were obstructed and broken, men were kidnapped and assassinated. During the whole period of the war few organized campaigns disturbed the large territory of the State; but disorder, lawlessness, crime, and almost anarchy were with difficulty repressed from beginning to end.

The local administration charged with the eradication of these evils was greatly embarrassed and often thwarted through the unfortunate jealousy and rivalry between the

factions of radicals and conservatives, both adherents of the Union. Equally loyal, equally sincere in their devotion to the Government, they paralyzed each other's efforts by a blind opposition and recrimination. As events progressed these factions increased in their animosity toward each other, and their antagonistic attitude was continued throughout the whole war period. This conflict of local sentiment—personal, political, and military—produced no end of complications requiring the repeated direct interference of President Lincoln, and taxed to the utmost his abounding forbearance. Neighborhood troubles were growing in northern Missouri before Frémont left New York; and Lyon's adjutant selected Brigadier-General Pope to take command there and restore order. Frémont gave the permission by telegraph; and when he reached St. Louis, General Pope had eight Illinois regiments employed in this duty.*

Frémont's second point of difficulty was the strong report of danger to Cairo. The rebel general Polk, at Memphis, was in the midst of his preparations for his Missouri campaign, already mentioned. About the time of Frémont's arrival Pillow had just moved six thousand Tennesseans to New Madrid, and reported his whole force "full of enthusiasm and eager for the 'Dutch hunt.'" News of this movement, and the brood of wild rumors which it engendered, made General Prentiss, the Union commander at Cairo, exceedingly uneasy, and he called urgently for assistance. Cairo, the strategic key of the whole Mississippi Valley, was too important to be for a moment neglected; and in a few days after his arrival Frémont gathered the nearest available reinforcements, about eight regiments in all, and, loading them on a fleet of steamboats, led them in person in a somewhat ostentatious expedition to Cairo; and the demonstration, greatly magnified by rumor, doubtless had much influence in checking the hopes of the rebel commanders for an early capture of Missouri and Illinois.

The reinforcement of Cairo was very proper as a measure of precaution. It turned out, however, that the need was much less urgent than Frémont's third point of trouble, namely,

* General Pope, under date of August 3, makes a graphic statement of the methods of the bushwhackers: "The only persons in arms, so far as I could learn, were a few reckless and violent men in parties of twenty or thirty, who were wandering about, committing depredations upon all whose sentiments were displeasing, and keeping this whole region in apprehension and uneasiness. . . . So soon as these marauders found that troops were approaching, which they easily did, from the very persons who ask for protection, they dispersed, each man going to his home, and, in many cases, that home in the very town occupied by the troops. . . . When troops were sent

the safety of Lyon at Springfield, in southwestern Missouri. When Lyon left St. Louis he had conceived this campaign to the southwest, not merely to control that part of the State and to protect it against invasion, but also with the ultimate hope of extending his march into Arkansas. For this he knew his force in hand was inadequate; but he believed that from the troops being rapidly organized in the contiguous free States he would receive the necessary help as soon as it was needed. We have seen that he reached Springfield with an aggregate of about 7000 or 8000 men. It was, for those early days, a substantial, compact little army, somewhat seasoned, well commanded, self-reliant, and enthusiastic. Unfortunately it also, like the armies at every other point, was under the strain and discouragement of partial dissolution. The term of enlistment of the three-months' militia regiments, raised under the President's first proclamation, was about to expire. In every detachment, army, and at every post, throughout the whole country, there occurred about the middle of July, 1861, the incident of quick succession of companies and regiments going out of the service. Many of these corps immediately reorganized under the three-years' call; many remained temporarily in the field to take part in some impending battle. But despite such instances of generous patriotism, there was at all points a shrinkage of numbers, an interval of disorganization, a paralysis of action and movement.

On the whole, therefore, Lyon found his new position at Springfield discouraging. He was 120 miles from a railroad; provisions and supplies had not arrived as expected; half his army would within a brief period be mustered out of service; McClellan† was in western Virginia, Frémont in New York, Blair in Washington. He scarcely knew who commanded, or where to turn. The rebels were in formidable force just beyond the Arkansas line. The dispatches at this juncture take on an almost despairing tone.

All idea of any farther advance movement, or of even maintaining our present position, must soon be abandoned, unless the Government furnish us promptly

out against these marauders, they found only men quietly working in the field or sitting in their offices, who, as soon as the backs of the Federal soldiers were turned, were again in arms and menacing the peace." [Pope to Sturgeon, August 3, 1861. War Records.]

† While McClellan was yet at Cincinnati, organizing the Ohio contingent of three-months' men, Missouri had been temporarily attached to his department. Beyond a few suggestions by telegraph, however, he did not give it any attention in detail, because his hands were already full of work. His Virginia campaign soon required his presence and entire time.

with large reënforcements and supplies. Our troops are badly clothed, poorly fed, and imperfectly supplied with tents. None of them have as yet been paid.*

Two days later Lyon wrote:

If it is the intention to give up the West, let it be so; it can only be the victim of imbecility or malice. Scott will cripple us if he can. Cannot you stir up this matter and secure us relief? See Frémont, if he has arrived. The want of supplies has crippled me so that I cannot move, and I do not know when I can. Everything seems to combine against me at this point. Stir up Blair. †

Lyon's innuendoes against the Administration and against General Scott were alike unjust. Both were eager to aid him, but there was here, as elsewhere, a limit to possibilities. It was Frémont who needed stirring up. Appointed by the President on July 1, he had not even sent his official acceptance till the 16th, the day before Lyon wrote this appeal; and, after final and emphatic urging by Postmaster-General Blair, it was the 25th before he entered on his duties at St. Louis. Three special messengers from Lyon awaited him on his arrival, and repeated the tale of need and of danger. But Fremont listened languidly and responded feebly. Urgent calls indeed came to him from other quarters. As already stated, Cairo was represented to be seriously threatened, and he had chosen first to insure its safety. He had the means, by a judicious rearrangement of his forces, to have aided effectually both these exposed points. Under the critical conditions fully pointed out to him, he could at least have recalled Lyon and assisted his safe withdrawal to his railroad base at Rolla. But he neither recalled him nor substantially reënforced him. Two regiments were set in motion toward him, but it proved the merest feint of help. No supplies and no troops reached Lyon in season to be of the slightest service. Lyon's danger lay in a junction of the various rebel leaders just beyond the Arkansas line. The Confederate government had sent Brigadier-General McCulloch to conciliate or conquer the Indian Territory as events might dictate, and had given him three regiments—one from Louisiana, one from Texas, and one from Arkansas—for the work. Finding it bad policy for the present to occupy the Indian Territory, he hovered about the border with permission to move into either Kansas or Missouri.

Even before Polk's ambitious programme was found to be impracticable, McCulloch made haste to organize a campaign on his own account. On July 30 he reported that he was on his way toward Springfield with his own

brigade of 3200 troops, the command of General Pearce, with 2500 Arkansas State troops, and the somewhat heterogeneous gathering of Missourians under Price, which he thought could furnish about 7000 effective men, generally well mounted, but badly commanded, and armed only with common rifles and shotguns. It was the approach of this large force which had given Lyon such uneasiness, and with good cause. Moving steadily upon him, they soon approached so near that his position became critical. His own command had dwindled to less than five thousand effective men; the combined enemy had nearly treble that number of effectives, and probably more than three to one, counting the whole mass. If he remained stationary, they would slowly envelop and capture him. If he attempted to retreat through the 120 miles of barren mountainous country which lay between him and Rolla, they would follow and harass him and turn his retreat into a rout. Counting to the last upon reënforcements which did not come, he had allowed events to place him in an untenable position.

As a final and desperate resource, and the only one to save his army, he resolved to attack and cripple the enemy. As at Bull Run, and as so often happens, both armies, on the evening of August 9, were under orders to advance that night and attack each other. Some showers of rain in the evening caused McCulloch temporarily to suspend his order; but Lyon's little army, moving at nightfall, marched ten miles south of Springfield to Wilson's Creek. At midnight they halted for a brief bivouac. Dividing into two columns they fell upon the enemy's camp at daylight, Sigel, with 1200 men and a battery, marching against their right flank, in an endeavor to get to the rear, while Lyon in person led the remaining 3700 men, with two batteries, to a front attack against their left center. The movement was a most daring one, and the conflict soon became desperate. Sigel's attack, successful at first, was checked, his detachment put to flight, and 5 of his 6 guns captured and turned against Lyon.

Lyon, on the contrary, by an impetuous advance, not only quickly drove the enemy out of their camp, but gained and occupied a strong natural position, which he held with brave determination. His mixed force of regulars and volunteers fought with admirable coöperation. McCulloch, confident in his overwhelming numbers, sent forward line after line of attack, which Lyon's well-posted regular batteries threw back. The forenoon was already well spent when a final unusually heavy assault from the enemy was thus repulsed, largely by help of the inspiring per-

* Schofield to Harding, July 15, 1861. War Records.

† Lyon to Harding, July 17, 1861. War Records.

sonal example of Lyon himself, who led some fragments of reserves in a bayonet charge. The charge ended the conflict; but it also caused the fall of the commander, who, pierced by a ball, almost immediately expired. It was his fourth wound received in the action. Though the battle was substantially won, Sturgis, upon whom the command devolved, deemed it too hazardous to attempt to hold the field, and a retreat to Springfield was agreed upon by a council of officers. An unmolested withdrawal was effected in the afternoon, and upon further consultation a definite retreat upon Rolla was begun the following day. As Lyon had anticipated, the enemy was too much crippled to follow. The Union forces had 223 killed, 721 wounded, and 291 missing. The Confederate loss was 265 killed, 800 wounded, and 30 missing.

The battle of Wilson's Creek, the death of Lyon, and the retreat of the army to Rolla turned public attention and criticism sharply upon Frémont's department and administration, and that commander was suddenly awakened to his work and responsibility. He now made haste to dispatch reinforcements to Rolla, and sent urgent telegrams for help to Washington and to the governors of the neighboring free States. His new energy partook a little too much of the character of a panic. He declared martial law in the city of St. Louis, and began an extensive system of fortifications; which, together with directions to fortify Rolla, Jefferson City, and several other places, pointed so much to inaction, and a defensive policy, as to increase rather than allay public murmur.

His personal manners and methods excited still further and even deeper dissatisfaction. A passion for display and an inordinate love of power appeared to be growing upon him. He had established his headquarters in an elegant mansion belonging to a wealthy secessionist; his personal staff consisted largely of foreigners, new to the country, and unfamiliar with its language and laws. Their fantastic titles and gay trappings seemed devised for show rather than substantial service. He organized a special body-guard. Sentinels and subordinates unpleasantly hedged the approach to his offices. Instead of bringing order into the chaotic condition of military business, he was prone to set method and routine at defiance, issuing commissions and directing the giving out of contracts in so irregular a way as to bring a protest from the proper accounting officers of the Government. Though specially requested by the President to coöperate with the provisional governor, he continued to ignore him. A storm of complaint soon arose from all except the little

knot of flatterers who abused his favor and the newspapers that were thriving on his patronage. The Unionists of Missouri became afraid that he was neglecting the present safety of the State for the future success of his intended Mississippi expedition, and wild rumors even floated in the air of a secret purpose to imitate the scheme of Aaron Burr and set up an independent dictatorship in the West.*

Reports came to President Lincoln from multiplied sources, bringing him a flood of embarrassment from the man to whom he had looked with such confidence for administrative aid and military success. It was his uniform habit, when he had once confided command and responsibility to an individual, to sustain him in the trust to the last possible degree. While he heard with pain the cumulating evidence of Frémont's unfitness, instead of immediately removing him from command, he sought rather to remedy the defect. In this spirit he wrote the following letter to General Hunter, which letter peculiarly illustrates his remarkable delicacy in managing the personal susceptibilities of men:

MY DEAR SIR: General Frémont needs assistance which it is difficult to give him. He is losing the confidence of men near him, whose support any man in his position must have to be successful. His cardinal mistake is that he isolates himself, and allows nobody to see him; and by which he does not know what is going on in the very matter he is dealing with. He needs to have by his side a man of large experience. Will you not, for me, take that place? Your rank is one grade too high to be ordered to it; but will you not serve the country and oblige me by taking it voluntarily? †

With this letter of the President, Postmaster-General Blair—hitherto Frémont's warm personal friend—and Meigs, the quartermaster-general of the army, went to St. Louis, to make a brief inspection and report of matters, and to give friendly advice and admonition to the commander of the Department of the West. While they were on their way, Mrs. Frémont was journeying toward Washington, bearing her husband's reply to a letter from the President sent him by special messenger about a week before.

Her mind was less occupied with the subject of the missive she bore than with the portent of a recent quarrel which the general had imprudently allowed to grow up between Colonel Frank Blair and himself. Blair had finally become convinced of Frémont's incapacity, and in public print sharply criticised his doings. Indeed, the quarrel soon progressed so far that Frémont placed him under arrest; then Blair preferred formal charges against the general for maladministration, and

* Meigs, Diary. MS.

† Lincoln to Hunter, Sept. 9, 1861. Unpublished MS.

the general in turn entered formal counter-charges against Blair.

Arrived at her destination Mrs. Frémont took the opportunity, in her interview with Mr. Lincoln, to justify General Frémont in all he had done, and to denounce his accusers with impetuous earnestness. She even asked for copies of confidential correspondence concerning her husband's personal embroilment. In these circumstances it was no light task for Mr. Lincoln to be at once patient, polite, and just; yet the following letter will testify that he accomplished even this difficult feat:

WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 12, 1861.

MRS. GENERAL FRÉMONT.

MY DEAR MADAM: Your two notes of to-day are before me. I answered the letter you bore me from General Frémont, on yesterday, and not hearing from you during the day, I sent the answer to him by mail. It is not exactly correct, as you say you were told by the elder Mr. Blair, to say that I sent Postmaster-General Blair to St. Louis to examine into that department and report. Postmaster-General Blair did go, with my approbation, to see and converse with General Frémont as a friend. I do not feel authorized to furnish you with copies of letters in my possession, without the consent of the writers. No impression has been made on my mind against the honor or integrity of General Frémont, and I now enter my protest against being understood as acting in any hostility towards him. Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.*

It will be interesting to read in addition a graphic, verbal recapitulation of these incidents, made by President Lincoln in a confidential evening conversation with a few friends in the Executive office a little more than two years afterward, and which one of his secretaries recorded:

The Blairs have to an unusual degree the spirit of clan. Their family is a close corporation. Frank is their hope and pride. They have a way of going with a rush for anything they undertake; especially have Montgomery and the old gentleman. When this war first began they could think of nothing but Frémont; they expected everything from him, and upon their earnest solicitation he was made a general and sent to Missouri. I thought well of Frémont. Even now I think well of his impulses. I only think he is the prey of wicked and designing men, and I think he has absolutely no military capacity. He went to Missouri the pet and protégé of the Blairs. At first they corresponded with him and with Frank, who was with him, fully and confidentially, thinking his plans and his efforts would accomplish great things for the country. At last the tone of Frank's letters changed. It was a change from confidence to doubt and uncertainty. They were pervaded with a tone of sincere sorrow and of fear that Frémont would fail. Montgomery showed them to me, and we were both grieved at the prospect. Soon came the news that Frémont had issued his emancipation order, and had set up a bureau of abolition, giving free papers, and occupying his time apparently with little else. At last, at my suggestion, Montgomery Blair went to Missouri to look at and talk over matters. He went as the friend of Frémont. He passed, on the way, Mrs. Frémont, coming to see me. She sought an audience with me at midnight, and tasked me so violently with many things, that I had to exercise all the awkward tact I have to avoid quarrel-

ing with her. She surprised me by asking why their enemy, Montgomery Blair, had been sent to Missouri. She more than once intimated that if General Frémont should decide to try conclusions with me, he could set up for himself.†

MILITARY EMANCIPATION.

Not only President Lincoln, but the country at large as well, was surprised to find, in the newspapers of August 30, a proclamation from the commander of the Department of the West of startling significance. The explanations of its necessity and purpose were altogether contradictory, and its mandatory orders so vaguely framed as to admit of dangerous variance in interpretation and enforcement. Reciting the disturbed condition of society, and defining the boundaries of army occupation, it contained the following important decrees:

Circumstances, in my judgment of sufficient urgency, render it necessary that the commanding general of this department should assume the administrative powers of the State. . . . In order, therefore, to suppress disorder, to maintain as far as now practicable the public peace, and to give security and protection to the persons and property of loyal citizens, I do hereby extend and declare established martial law throughout the State of Missouri. . . . All persons who shall be taken with arms in their hands within these lines shall be tried by court-martial, and, if found guilty, will be shot. The property, real and personal, of all persons in the State of Missouri directly proven to have taken an active part with their enemies in the field is declared to be confiscated to the public use, and their slaves, if any they have, are hereby declared freemen. . . . The object of this declaration is to place in the hands of the military authorities the power to give instantaneous effect to existing laws, and to supply such deficiencies as the conditions of war demand. But this is not intended to suspend the ordinary tribunals of the country, where the law will be administered by the civil officers in the usual manner, and with their customary authority, while the same can be peaceably exercised.‡

Despite its verbiage and confusion of subjects, it was apparent that this extraordinary document was not a measure of military protection, but a political manœuvre. Since the first movement of the armies the slavery question had become a subject of new and vital contention, and the antislavery drift of public opinion throughout the North was unmistakably manifest. There was no room for doubt that General Frémont, apprehensive about his loss of prestige through the disaster to Lyon and the public clamors growing out of his mistakes and follies in administration, had made this appeal to the latent feeling in the public mind as a means of regaining his waning popularity. Full confirmation was afforded by his immediately convening under his

* Unpublished MS.

† Unpublished MS.

‡ Frémont, Proclamation. War Records.

proclamation a military commission to hear evidence, and beginning to issue personal deeds of manumission to slaves.* The proceeding strongly illustrates his want of practical sense: the delay and uncertainty of enforcement under this clumsy method would have rendered the theoretical boon of freedom held out to slaves rare and precarious, if not absolutely impracticable. As soon as an authentic text of the proclamation reached President Lincoln, he wrote and dispatched the following letter:

WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 2, 1861.

MAJOR-GENERAL FRÉMONT.

MY DEAR SIR: Two points in your proclamation of August 30 give me some anxiety:

First. Should you shoot a man, according to the proclamation, the Confederates would very certainly shoot our best men in their hands in retaliation; and so, man for man, indefinitely. It is, therefore, my order that you allow no man to be shot under the proclamation without first having my approbation or consent.

Second. I think there is great danger that the closing paragraph, in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberating slaves of traitorous owners, will alarm our Southern Union friends and turn them against us; perhaps ruin our rather fair prospect for Kentucky. Allow me, therefore, to ask that you will, as of your own motion, modify that paragraph so as to conform to the first and fourth sections of the act of Congress entitled, "An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes," approved August 6, 1861, and a copy of which act I herewith send you.

This letter is written in a spirit of caution, and not of censure. I send it by special messenger, in order that it may certainly and speedily reach you.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.†

It was the reply to the above which the general sent to Washington by the hand of Mrs. Frémont, and which contained a very lame apology for the dictatorial and precipitate step he had taken. He wrote:

Trusting to have your confidence, I have been leaving it to events themselves to show you whether or not I was shaping affairs here according to your ideas. The shortest communication between Washington and St. Louis generally involves two days, and the employment of two days in time of war goes largely towards success or disaster. I therefore went along according to my own judgment, leaving the result of my movements to justify me with you. And so in regard to my proclamation of the 30th. Between the rebel armies, the Provisional Government, and home traitors, I felt the position bad and saw danger. In the night I decided upon the proclamation and the form of it. I wrote it the next morning and printed it the same day. I did it without consultation or advice with any one, acting solely with my best judgment to serve the country and yourself, and perfectly willing to receive the amount of censure which should be thought due if I had made a false movement. This is as much a movement in the war as a battle, and in going into these I shall have to act according to my judgment of the ground before me, as I did on this occasion. If, upon reflection, your better judgment still decides that I am wrong in the article respecting

the liberation of slaves, I have to ask that you will openly direct me to make the correction. The implied censure will be received as a soldier always should the reprimand of his chief. If I were to retract of my own accord, it would imply that I myself thought it wrong, and that I had acted without the reflection which the gravity of the point demanded. But I did not. I acted with full deliberation, and upon the certain conviction that it was a measure right and necessary, and I think so still. In regard to the other point of the proclamation to which you refer, I desire to say that I do not think the enemy can either misconstrue or urge anything against it, or undertake to make unusual retaliation. The shooting of men who shall rise in arms against an army in the military occupation of a country is merely a necessary measure of defense, and entirely according to the usages of civilized warfare. The article does not at all refer to prisoners of war, and certainly our enemies have no ground for requiring that we should waive in their benefit any of the ordinary advantages which the usages of war allow to us. ‡

Frémont thus chose deliberately to assume a position of political hostility to the President. Nevertheless Mr. Lincoln, acting still in his unflinching spirit of dispassionate fairness and courtesy, answered as follows:

WASHINGTON, Sept. 11, 1861.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. FRÉMONT.

SIR: Yours of the 8th in answer to mine of the 2d instant is just received. Assuming that you, upon the ground, could better judge of the necessities of your position than I could at this distance, on seeing your proclamation of August 30 I perceived no general objection to it. The particular clause, however, in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves appeared to me to be objectionable in its non-conformity to the act of Congress passed the 6th of last August upon the same subjects; and hence I wrote you, expressing my wish that that clause should be modified accordingly. Your answer, just received, expresses the preference on your part that I should make an open order for the modification, which I very cheerfully do. It is therefore ordered that the said clause of said proclamation be so modified, held, and construed as to conform to, and not to transcend, the provisions on the same subject contained in the act of Congress entitled, "An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes," approved August 6, 1861, and that said act be published at length, with this order.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.§

As might have been expected, Frémont's proclamation of military emancipation, and Lincoln's order revoking it, produced a fresh and acrimonious discussion of the slavery question. The incident made the name of Frémont a rallying cry for men holding extreme anti-slavery opinions, and to a certain extent raised him to the position of a new party leader. The vital relation of slavery to the rebellion was making itself felt to a degree which the great body of the people, so long trained to a legal tolerance of the evil, could not yet bring themselves to acknowledge. Men hitherto conservative and prudent were swept along by the relentless logic of the nation's calamity

* "Rebellion Record."

† War Records.

‡ Frémont to Lincoln, Sept. 8, 1861. War Records.

§ War Records.

to a point where they were ready at once to accept and defend measures of even the last necessity for the nation's preservation.

With admirable prudence Lincoln himself added nothing to the public discussion, but a confidential letter written to a conservative friend who approved and defended Frémont's action will be found of enduring interest.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, Sept. 22, 1861.

HON. O. H. BROWNING.

MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 17th is just received; and coming from you, I confess it astonishes me. That you should object to my adhering to a law, which you had assisted in making, and presenting to me, less than a month before, is odd enough. But this is a very small part. General Frémont's proclamation, as to confiscation of property, and the liberation of slaves, is *purely political*, and not within the range of *military law* or necessity. If a commanding general finds a necessity to seize the farm of a private owner, for a pasture, an encampment, or a fortification, he has the right to do so, and to so hold it, as long as the necessity lasts; and this is within military law, because within military necessity. But to say the farm shall no longer belong to the owner, or his heirs forever, and this, as well when the farm is *not* needed for military purposes as when it is, is purely political, without the savor of military law about it. And the same is true of slaves. If the general needs them he can seize them and use them, but when the need is past, it is not for him to fix their permanent future condition. That must be settled according to laws made by law-makers, and not by military proclamations. The proclamation in the point in question is simply "dictatorship." It assumes that the general may do *anything* he pleases — confiscate the lands and free the slaves of *loyal* people, as well as of disloyal ones. And going the whole figure, I have no doubt, would be more popular, with some thoughtless people, than that which has been done! But I cannot assume this reckless position, nor allow others to assume it on my responsibility.

You speak of it as being the only means of saving the Government. On the contrary, it is itself the surrender of the Government. Can it be pretended that it is any longer the Government of the United States — any government of constitution and laws — wherein a general or a president may make permanent rules of property by proclamation?

I do not say Congress might not, with propriety, pass a law on the point, just such as General Frémont proclaimed. I do not say I might not, as a member of Congress, vote for it. What I object to is, that I, as President, shall expressly or impliedly seize and exercise the permanent legislative functions of the Government.

So much as to principle. Now as to policy. No doubt the thing was popular in some quarters, and would have been more so if it had been a general declaration of emancipation. The Kentucky legislature would not budge till that proclamation was modified; and General Anderson telegraphed me that on the news of General Frémont having actually issued deeds of manumission, a whole company of our volunteers threw down their arms and disbanded. I was so assured as to think it probable that the very arms we had furnished Kentucky would be turned against us. I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game. Kentucky gone, we cannot hold Missouri, nor, as I think, Maryland. These all against us, and the job on our hands is too large for us. We would as well consent to separation at once, including the surrender of this capital. On the contrary, if you will give

up your restlessness for new positions, and back me manfully on the grounds upon which you and other kind friends gave me the election, and have approved in my public documents, we shall go through triumphantly.

You must not understand I took my course on the proclamation *because* of Kentucky. I took the same ground in a private letter to General Frémont before I heard from Kentucky.

You think I am inconsistent because I did not also forbid General Frémont to shoot men under the proclamation. I understand that part to be within military law, but I also think, and so privately wrote General Frémont, that it is impolitic in this, that our adversaries have the power, and will certainly exercise it, to shoot as many of our men as we shoot of theirs. I did not say this in the public letter, because it is a subject I prefer not to discuss in the hearing of our enemies.

There has been no thought of removing General Frémont on any ground connected with his proclamation, and if there has been any wish for his removal on any ground, our mutual friend Sam. Glover can probably tell you what it was. I hope no real necessity for it exists on any ground. . . .

Your friend, as ever,

A. LINCOLN.*

The reader will not fail to note that the argument of this letter seems diametrically opposed to the action of the President, when, exactly one year later, he issued his preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation, as well as to that of the final one, on the first day of January, 1863. Did Mr. Lincoln change his mind in the interim? The answer is two-fold. He did not change his mind as to the principle; he did change his mind as to the policy of the case.

Rightly to interpret Mr. Lincoln's language we must imagine ourselves in his position, and examine the question as it presented itself to his mind. Congress, by the act of August 6, 1861, had authorized him to cause property used or employed in aid of insurrection to be "seized, confiscated, and condemned"; providing, however, that such condemnation should be by judicial proceeding. He saw that Frémont by mere proclamation assumed to confiscate all property, both real and personal, of rebels in arms, whether such property had been put to insurrectionary use or not, and, going a step further, had annexed a rule of property, by decreeing that their slaves should become free. This assumption of authority Lincoln rightly defined as "simply dictatorship," and as being, if permitted, the end of constitutional government. The case is still stronger when we remember that Frémont's proclamation began by broadly assuming "the administrative powers of the State"; that its declared object was mere individual punishment, and the measure a local police regulation to suppress disorder and maintain the peace; also that it was to operate throughout Missouri, as well within as without the

*MS. Also printed in "Proceedings of Illinois Bar Association, 1882," pp. 40, 41.

portions of the State under his immediate military control. Military necessity, therefore, could not be urged in justification. The act was purely administrative and political.

The difference between these extra-military decrees of Frémont's proclamation and Lincoln's acts of emancipation is broad and essential. Frémont's act was one of civil administration, Lincoln's a step in an active military campaign; Frémont's was local and individual, Lincoln's national and general; Frémont's partly within military lines, Lincoln's altogether beyond military lines; Frémont's an act of punishment, Lincoln's a means of war; Frémont's acting upon property, Lincoln's acting upon persons. National law, civil and military, knew nothing of slavery, and did not protect it as an institution. It only tolerated State laws to that effect, and only dealt with fugitive slaves as "persons held to service." Lincoln did not, as dictator, decree the abrogation of these State laws; but in order to call persons from the military aid of the rebellion to the military aid of the Union, he, as Commander-in-Chief, armed by military necessity, proclaimed that persons held as slaves within rebel lines should on a certain day become free unless rebellion ceased.

Thus no real distinction of principle exists between his criticism of Frémont's proclamation and the issuing of his own. On the other hand, there is a marked and acknowledged change of policy between the date of the Browning letter and the date of his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. In September, 1861, he stood upon the position laid down in the Chicago platform; upon that expressed in the constitutional amendment and indorsed in his inaugural; upon that declared by Congress in July, in the Crittenden resolution, namely: that the General Government would not interfere directly or indirectly with the institution of slavery in the several States. This policy Lincoln undertook in good faith to carry out, and he adhered to it so long as it was consistent with the safety of the Government. His Browning letter is but a reaffirmation of that purpose. At the time he wrote it military necessity was clearly against military emancipation, either local or general. The revocation of Frémont's decree saved Kentucky to the Union, and placed forty thousand Kentucky soldiers in the Federal army. But one year after the date of the Browning letter, the situation was entirely reversed. The Richmond campaign had utterly failed; Washington was menaced; the country was despondent; and military necessity now justified the policy of general military emancipation.

Whatever temporary popularity Frémont

gained with antislavery people by his proclamation was quickly neutralized by the occurrence of a new military disaster in his department. The battle of Wilson's Creek and the retreat of the Union army to Rolla left the Confederate forces master of south-west Missouri. The junction of rebel leaders, however, which had served to gain that advantage was of short duration. Their loosely organized and badly supplied army was not only too much crippled to follow the Union retreat, but in no condition to remain together. Price, as major-general of Missouri State forces, had only temporarily waived his rank and consented to serve under McCulloch, holding but a brigadier-general's commission from Jefferson Davis. Both the disagreement of the leaders and the necessities of the troops almost immediately compelled a separation of the rebel army. General Pearce with his Arkansas State forces returned home, and General McCulloch with his three Confederate regiments also marched back into Arkansas, taking up again his primary task of watching the Indian Territory. General Price held his numerous but heterogeneous Missouri followers together, and, busying himself for a time in gathering supplies, started back in a leisurely march northward from Springfield toward the Missouri River. The strong secession feeling of south-western Missouri rapidly increased his force, liberally furnished him supplies, and kept him fully informed of the numbers and location of the various Union detachments. There were none in his line of march till he neared the town of Lexington, on the Missouri River. The rebel governor, Jackson, had recently convened the rebel members of his legislature here, but a small Union detachment sent from Jefferson City occupied the place, dispersing them and capturing their records, and the great seal of the State, brought by the governor in his flight from the capital. About the 1st of September the Union commander at Jefferson City heard of the advance of Price, and sent forward the Chicago Irish Brigade under Colonel Mulligan to reënforce Lexington, with directions to fortify and hold it. Mulligan reached Lexington by forced marches, where he was soon joined by the Union detachment from Warrensburg retreating before Price. The united Federal force now numbered 2800 men, with 8 guns. Price pushed forward his cavalry, and made a slight attack on the 12th, but was easily repulsed and retired to await the arrival of his main body, swelled by continual accessions to some 20,000 with 13 guns; and on the 18th he again approached and formally laid siege to Lexington.

Mulligan made good use of this interim,

gathering provisions and forage, casting shot, making ammunition for his guns, and inclosing the college building and the hill on which it stood, an area of some fifteen acres, with a strong line of breastworks. Price began his attack on the 18th, but for two days made little headway. Slowly, however, he gained favorable positions; his sharpshooters, skilled riflemen of the frontier, drove the Federals into their principal redan, cut off their water supply by gaining and occupying the river shore, and finally adopted the novel and effective expedient of using movable breastworks, by gradually rolling forward bales of wet hemp. On September 20, after fifty-two hours of gallant defense, Mulligan's position became untenable. The reinforcements he had a right to expect did not come, his water cisterns were exhausted, the stench from dead animals burdened the air about his fort. Some one at length, without authority, displayed a white flag, and Price sent a note which asked, "Colonel, what has caused the cessation of the fight?" Mulligan's Irish wit was equal to the occasion, and he wrote on the back of it, "General, I hardly know, unless you have surrendered." The pleasantry led to a formal parley; and Mulligan, with the advice of his officers, surrendered.*

The uncertainty which for several days hung over the fate of Lexington, and the dramatic incidents of the fight, excited the liveliest interest throughout the West. Newspaper discussion soon made it evident that this new Union loss might have been avoided by reasonable prudence and energy on the part of Frémont, as there were plenty of disposable troops at various points, which, during the slow approach and long-deferred attack of Price, could have been hurried to Mulligan's support. There were universal outcry and pressure that at least the disaster should be retrieved by a prompt movement to intercept and capture Price on his retreat. Frémont himself seems to have felt the sting of the disgrace, for, reporting the surrender, he added:

"I am taking the field myself, and hope to destroy the enemy, either before or after the junction of forces under McCulloch. Please notify the President immediately."

"Your dispatch of this day is received," responded General Scott. "The President is glad you are hastening to the scene of action; his words are, 'he expects you to repair the disaster at Lexington without loss of time.'"

This hope was not destined to reach a fulfillment. Price almost immediately retreated southward from Lexington with his captured booty, among which the pretentious great seal

* "Rebellion Record."

of the State figures as a conspicuous item in his report. On September 24 Frémont published his order, organizing his army of five divisions, under Pope at Boonville, McKinstry at Syracuse, Hunter at Versailles, Sigel at Georgetown, Asboth at Tipton. On paper it formed a respectable show of force, figuring as an aggregate of nearly 39,000; in reality it was at the moment well-nigh powerless, being scattered and totally unprepared for the field. Frémont's chronic inattention to details, and his entire lack of methodical administration, now fully revealed themselves. Even under the imperative orders of the general, nearly a month elapsed before the various divisions could be concentrated at Springfield; and they were generally in miserable plight as to transportation, supplies, and ammunition. Amidst a succession of sanguine newspaper reports setting forth the incidents and great expectations of Frémont's campaign, the convincing evidence could not be disguised that the whole movement would finally prove worthless and barren.

Meanwhile, acting on his growing solicitude, President Lincoln directed special inquiry, and about the 13th of October the Secretary of War, accompanied by the Adjutant-General of the Army, reached Frémont's camp at Tipton. His immediate report to the President confirmed his apprehension. Secretary Cameron wrote:

I returned to this place last night from the headquarters of General Frémont at Tipton. I found there and in the immediate neighborhood some 40,000 troops, with 1 brigade (General McKinstry's) in good condition for the field and well provided; others not exhibiting good care, and but poorly supplied with munitions, arms, and clothing. I had an interview with General Frémont, and in conversation with him showed him an order for his removal. He was very much mortified, pained, and, I thought, humiliated. He made an earnest appeal to me, saying that he had come to Missouri, at the request of the Government, to assume a very responsible command, and that when he reached this State he found himself without troops and without any preparation for an army; that he had exerted himself, as he believed, with great energy, and had now around him a fine army, with everything to make success certain; that he was now in pursuit of the enemy, whom he believed were now within his reach; and that to recall him at this moment would not only destroy him, but render his whole expenditure useless. In reply to this appeal, I told him that I would withhold the order until my return to Washington, giving him the interim to prove the reality of his hopes as to reaching and capturing the enemy, giving him to understand that, should he fail, he must give place to some other officer. He assured me that, should he fail, he would resign at once.

It is proper that I should state that after this conversation I met General Hunter, who, in very distinct terms, told me that his division of the army, although then under orders to march, and a part of his command actually on the road, could not be put in proper condition for marching for a number of days. To a question I put to him, "whether he believed General Frémont fit for the command," he replied that he did not think

that he was; and informed me that though second in command, he knew nothing whatever of the purposes or plans of his chief.*

The opinion of another division commander, General Pope, was freely expressed in a letter of the previous day, which Hunter also exhibited to the Secretary:

I received at 1 o'clock last night the extraordinary order of General Frémont for a forward movement of his whole force. The wonderful manner in which the actual facts and condition of things here are ignored stupefies me. One would suppose from this order that divisions and brigades are organized, and are under immediate command of their officers; that transportation is in possession of all; that every arrangement of supply trains to follow the army has been made; in fact, that we are in a perfect state of preparation for a move.

You know, as well as I do, that the exact reverse is the fact; that neither brigades nor divisions have been brought together, and that if they were there is not transportation enough to move this army one hundred yards; that, in truth, not one solitary preparation of any kind has been made to enable this advance movement to be executed. I have never seen my division, nor do I suppose you have seen yours. I have no cavalry even for a personal escort, and yet this order requires me to send forward companies of pioneers protected by cavalry. Is it intended that this order be obeyed, or rather, that we try to obey it, or is the order only designed for Washington and the papers? . . . I went to Jefferson City, the last time I saw you, for the express purpose of getting transportation for my division, and explained to General Frémont precisely what I have said above. How in the face of the fact that he knew no transportation was furnished, and that Kelton has none, he should coolly order such a movement, and expect it to be made, I cannot understand on any reasonable or common-sense hypothesis.

Another letter to the President from a more cautious and conservative officer, General Curtis, exercising a local command in St. Louis, gave an equally discouraging view of the situation:

Your Excellency's letter of the 7th inst., desiring me to express my views in regard to General Frémont frankly and confidentially to the Secretary of War, was presented by him yesterday, and I have complied with your Excellency's request. . . . Matters have gone from bad to worse, and I am greatly obliged to your Excellency's letter, which breaks the restraint of military law, and enables me to relieve myself of a painful silence. In my judgment General Frémont lacks the intelligence, the experience, and the sagacity necessary to his command. I have reluctantly and gradually been forced to this conclusion. His reserve evinces vanity or embarrassment, which I never could so far overcome as to fully penetrate his capacity. He would talk of plans, which, being explained, only related to some move of a general or some dash at a shadow, and I am now convinced he has no general plan. Forces are scattered and generally isolated without being in supporting distance or relation to each other, and when I have expressed apprehension as to some, I have seen no particular exertion to repel or relieve, till it was too late. I know the demand made on him for force everywhere is oppressive; but remote posts have improperly stood out, and some still stand, inviting assault, without power to retreat, fortify, or reën-

force. Our forces should be concentrated, with the rivers as a base of operation; and these rivers and railroads afford means for sudden and salutary assaults on the enemy. . . . The question you propound, "Ought General Frémont to be relieved from or retained in his present command?" seems easily answered. It is only a question of manner and time. Public opinion is an element of war which must not be neglected. . . . It is not necessary to be precipitate. A few days are not of vast moment, but the pendency of the question and discussion must not be prolonged. Controversies in an army are almost as pernicious as a defeat. †

Thus the opinions of three trained and experienced army officers, who had every means of judging from actual personal observation, coincided with the general drift of evidence which had come to the President from civilian officials and citizens, high and low. Frémont had frittered away his opportunity for usefulness and fame; such an opportunity, indeed, as rarely comes to men. He had taken his command three months before with the universal good-will of almost every individual, every subordinate, every official, every community in his immense department. In his brief incumbency he not only lost the general public confidence, but incurred the special displeasure or direct enmity of those most prominent in influence or command next to him, and without whose friendship and hearty coöperation success was practically impossible.

Waiting and hoping till the last moment, President Lincoln at length felt himself forced to intervene. On the 24th of October, just three months after Frémont had assumed command, he directed an order to be made that Frémont should be relieved and General Hunter be called temporarily to take his command. This order he dispatched by the hand of a personal friend to General Curtis at St. Louis, with the following letter:

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24, 1861.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL S. R. CURTIS.

DEAR SIR: On receipt of this, with the accompanying inclosures, you will take safe, certain, and suitable measures to have the inclosure addressed to Major-General Frémont delivered to him with all reasonable dispatch, subject to these conditions only, that if, when General Frémont shall be reached by the messenger,—yourself or any one sent by you,—he shall then have, in personal command, fought and won a battle, or shall then be actually in a battle, or shall then be in the immediate presence of the enemy in expectation of a battle, it is not to be delivered, but held for further orders. After, and not till after, the delivery to General Frémont, let the inclosure addressed to General Hunter be delivered to him.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN. ‡

It will be seen that the conditions attending the delivery of this order were somewhat peculiar. If General Frémont had just won a battle, or were on the eve of fighting one,

* Cameron to Lincoln, Oct. 14, 1861. Unpublished MS.

† Curtis to Lincoln, Oct. 12, 1861. MS.

‡ War Records.

then both justice to himself, and more especially the risk or gain to the Union cause, rendered it inexpedient to make a sudden change in command. But the question also had another and possibly serious aspect. Amid all his loss of prestige and public confidence, Frémont had retained the clamorous adhesion and noisy demonstrative support of three distinct elements. First, a large number of officers to whom he had given irregular commissions, issued by himself, "subject to the approval of the President." These commissions for the moment gave their holders rank, pay, and power; and to some of them he had assigned extraordinary duties and trusts under special instructions, regardless of proper military usage and method. The second class was the large and respectable German population of St. Louis, and other portions of Missouri, forming the nucleus of the radical faction whose cause he had especially espoused. The third class comprised the men of strong antislavery convictions throughout the Union who hailed his act of military emancipation with unbounded approval. The first class composed about his person a clique of active sycophants, wielding power and dispensing patronage in his name; the other two supplied a convenient public echo. Out of such surroundings and conditions there began to come a cry of persecution and a vague hum of insubordination, coupled with adulations of the general. Some of his favorites talked imprudently of defiance and resistance to authority; * occasional acts of Frémont himself gave a color of plausibility to these mutterings. He had neglected to discontinue the expensive fortifications and barracks when directed to do so by the Secretary of War. Even since the President ordered him to modify his proclamation, he had on one occasion personally directed the original document to be printed and distributed. Several of his special appointees were stationed about the city of St. Louis, "so they should control every fort, arsenal, and communication, without regard to commanding officers or quartermasters." † Suspicions naturally arose, and were publicly expressed, that he would not freely yield up his command; or, if not actually resisting superior authority, that he might at least, upon some pretext, temporarily prolong his power.

There was, of course, no danger that he could successfully defy the orders of the President. The bulk of his army, officers and sol-

* To remove Mr. Frémont will be a great wrong, as the necessary investigation following it will prove. It will make immense confusion, and require all his control over his friends and the army to get them to do as he will,—accept it as an act of authority, not of justice,—but in time of war it is treason to question authority. To leave him here without money, without

diaries, would have spurned such a proposition. But the example of delay or doubt, any shadow of insubordination, would have had an extremely pernicious effect upon public opinion. General Curtis therefore sent a trusted bearer of dispatches, who, by an easy stratagem, entered Frémont's camp, gained a personal audience, and delivered the official order of removal. Duplicates of the President's letters were at the same time, and with equal care, dispatched to the camp of General Hunter, at a considerable distance, and he traveled all night to assume his new duties. When he reached Frémont's camp, on the following day, he learned that ostensible preparations had been made and orders issued for a battle, on the assumption that the enemy was at Wilson's Creek advancing to an attack. Taking command, Hunter sent a reconnaissance to Wilson's Creek, and obtained reliable evidence that no enemy whatever was there or expected there. Frémont had been duped by his own scouts; for it is hardly possible to conceive that he deliberately arranged this final bit of theatrical effect.

The actual fact was that while Price, retreating southward, by "slow and easy marches," ‡ kept well beyond any successful pursuit, his army of twenty thousand which had captured Lexington dwindled away as rapidly as it had grown. His movement partook more of the nature of a frontier foray than an organized campaign: the squirrel-hunters of western Missouri, whose accurate sharp-shooting drove Mulligan into his intrenchments to starvation or surrender, returned to their farms or their forest haunts to await the occasion of some new and exciting expedition; the whole present effort of General Price, now at the head of only 10,000 or 12,000 men, being to reach an easy junction with McCulloch on the Arkansas border, so that their united force might make a successful stand, or at least insure a safe retreat from the Union army.

President Lincoln, however, did not intend that the campaign to the south-west should be continued. Other plans were being discussed and matured. With the order to supersede Frémont he also sent the following letters, explaining his well-considered views and conveying his express directions:

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24, 1861.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL S. R. CURTIS.

MY DEAR SIR: Herewith is a document—half letter, half order—which, wishing you to see, but not

the moral aid of the Government, is treason to the people. I cannot find smoother phrases, for it is the death struggle of our nationality, and no time for fair words. [Mrs. Frémont to Lamont, St. Louis, Oct. 20, 1861. Unpublished MS.]

† Curtis to Lincoln, Nov. 1, 1861. MS.

‡ Price, Official Report. War Records.

to make public, I send unsealed. Please read it, and then inclose it to the officer who may be in command of the Department of the West at the time it reaches him. I cannot now know whether Frémont or Hunter will then be in command.

Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.*

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24, 1861.

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE WEST.

SIR: The command of the Department of the West having devolved upon you, I propose to offer you a few suggestions. Knowing how hazardous it is to bind down a distant commander in the field to specific lines and operations, as so much always depends on a knowledge of localities and passing events, it is intended, therefore, to leave a considerable margin for the exercise of your judgment and discretion.

The main rebel army (Price's) west of the Mississippi is believed to have passed Dade County in full retreat upon north-western Arkansas, leaving Missouri almost freed from the enemy, excepting in the south-east of the State. Assuming this basis of fact, it seems desirable, as you are not likely to overtake Price, and are in danger of making too long a line from your own base of supplies and reinforcements, that you should give up the pursuit, halt your main army, divide it into two corps of observation, one occupying Sedalia and the other Rolla, the present termini of railroad; then recruit the condition of both corps by reestablishing and improving their discipline and instructions, perfecting their clothing and equipments, and providing less uncomfortable quarters. Of course both railroads must be guarded and kept open, judiciously employing just so much force as is necessary for this. From these two points, Sedalia and Rolla, and especially in judicious coöperation with Lane on the Kansas border, it would be so easy to concentrate and repel any army of the enemy returning on Missouri from the south-west that it is not probable any such attempt to return will be made before or during the approaching cold weather. Before spring the people of Missouri will probably be in no favorable mood to renew for next year the troubles which have so much afflicted

* War Records.

† Townsend to Curtis, Nov. 6, 1861. War Records.

‡ McCulloch to Cooper, Nov. 19, 1861. War Records.

and impoverished them during this. If you adopt this line of policy, and if, as I anticipate, you will see no enemy in great force approaching, you will have a surplus of force, which you can withdraw from these points and direct to others, as may be needed, the railroads furnishing ready means of reinforcing their main points, if occasion requires. Doubtless local uprisings will for a time continue to occur, but these can be met by detachments and local forces of our own, and will ere long tire out of themselves. While, as stated in the beginning of the letter, a large discretion must be and is left with yourself, I feel sure that an indefinite pursuit of Price, or an attempt by this long and circuitous route to reach Memphis, will be exhaustive beyond endurance, and will end in the loss of the whole force engaged in it.

Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.*

The change of command occasioned neither trouble nor danger. Frémont himself acted with perfect propriety. He took leave of his army in a brief and temperate address, and returned to St. Louis, where he was welcomed by his admirers with a public meeting and eulogistic speeches. The demonstration was harmless and unimportant, though care had been taken to send authority to General Curtis to repress disorder, and specially to look to the safety of the city and the arsenal. †

In accordance with the policy outlined by the President, General Hunter soon drew back the Federal army from Springfield to Rolla, and the greater part of it was transferred to another field of operations. Hearing of this retrograde movement, McCulloch rapidly advanced, and for a season occupied Springfield. One of the distressing effects of these successive movements of contending forces is described in a sentence of his report, "The Union men have nearly all fled with the Federal troops, leaving this place almost deserted." ‡

BY TELEPHONE.



It was a suggestion of Hawthorne's — was it not? — that in these more modern days Cupid has no doubt discarded his bow and arrow in favor of a revolver. There are ladies of a beauty so destructive that in their presence the little god would find a Gatling gun his most useful weapon. It is safe to say that the son of Venus does not disdain the latest inventions of Vulcan for the use of Mars, and that he slips off his bandage whenever he goes forth to replenish his armory. Lovers are quick

to follow his example, and the house of love has all the modern improvements. Nowadays the sighing swain may tryst by telegraph and the blushing bride must elope by the lightning-express; and if ever there were an Orlando in the streets of New York, he would have to carve his Rosalind's name on the telegraph poles.

If the appliances of modern science had been at the command of Cupid in the past as they are in the present, the story of many a pair of famous lovers would be other than it is. Leander surely would not have set out to swim to his mistress had international storm-warnings been sent across the Atlantic, which Hero could have conveyed to him by the

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.



ON the day after the battle of Bull Run, General McClellan was ordered to Washington. He arrived there on the 26th of July, and the next day assumed command of the division of the Potomac, comprising the troops in and around Washington on both banks of the river. In his report he says:

There were about 50,000 infantry, less than 1000 cavalry, and 650 artillerymen, with 9 imperfect field-batteries of 30 pieces. . . . There was nothing to prevent the enemy shelling the city from heights within easy range, which could be occupied by a hostile column almost without resistance. Many soldiers had deserted, and the streets of Washington were crowded with straggling officers and men, absent from their stations without authority, whose behavior indicated the general want of discipline and organization.†

This picture is naturally drawn in the darkest colors, but the outlines are substantially accurate. There was great need of everything which goes to the efficiency of an army. There was need of soldiers, of organization, of drill, of a young and vigorous commander to give impulse and direction to the course of affairs.

All these wants were speedily supplied. The energy of the Government and the patriotism of the North poured into the capital a constant stream of recruits. These were taken in hand by an energetic and intelligent staff, assigned to brigades and divisions, equipped and drilled, with the greatest order and celerity. The infantry levies, on their first arrival, were sent to the various camps in the suburbs, and being there formed into provisional brigades were thoroughly exercised and instructed before being transferred to the forces on the other side of the river. These provisional brigades were successively commanded by Generals Fitz John Porter, Ambrose E. Burnside, and Silas Casey. The cavalry and the artillery, as they arrived, reported respectively to Generals George Stoneman and William F. Barry, chiefs of those arms. Colonel Andrew Porter was made Provost-Marshal of Washington, and

soon reduced the place to perfect order, which was never again disturbed during the war. Deserters were arrested, stragglers sent back to their regiments, and the streets rendered more quiet and secure than those of most cities in profound peace.

A great army was speedily formed. The 50,000 that General McClellan found in Washington were reënforced by the stalwart men of the North as fast as steam could bring them by water or land. Nothing like it had ever before been seen on the continent. The grand total of officers and men of the regular army before the war consisted of 17,000 souls. On the 27th of October, exactly three months after General McClellan assumed command, he reported an aggregate of strength for the army under him of 168,318, of which there were, he said, present for duty 147,695;‡ and he reported several other bodies of troops *en route* to him. The Adjutant-General's report, three days later, shows present for duty with the Army of the Potomac, inclusive of troops in the Shenandoah, on the Potomac, and at Washington, 162,737, with an aggregate present and absent of 198,238. This vast army was of the best material the country could afford. The three-months' regiments—which were, as a rule, imperfectly organized and badly officered, their officers being, to a great extent, the product of politics and personal influence—had been succeeded by the volunteer army of three-years' men, which contained all the best elements of the militia, with very desirable additions. Only the most able of the militia generals, those whom the President had recognized as worthy of permanent employment, returned to the field after the expiration of their three-months' service. The militia organization of brigades and divisions had of course disappeared. The governors of the States organized the regiments, and appointed regimental and company officers only. The higher organization rested with the President, who also had the appointing of general and staff officers. A most valuable element of the new army was the old regular organization, largely increased and improved by the addition of eleven regiments, constituting two divisions of two brigades each. This

† McClellan, Report, p. 9.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

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created a great many additional vacancies, which were filled partly from the old army and partly from civil life, giving to the service a large number of valuable officers. Two classes of cadets were that year graduated from the military academy at West Point, many of whom became useful and distinguished in the regular and the volunteer service.

In brief, for three months the Government placed at the disposal of the young general more than a regiment a day of excellent troops. The best equipments, the best arms, the best artillery, the most distinguished of the old officers, the most promising of the young, were given him. The armies in every other part of the country were stinted to supply this most important of all the departments; and at first it was with universal popular assent that this bountiful provision was made for him. He had gained for the country the only victory it had yet to its credit. He enjoyed a high character for military learning and science, founded upon the report of his friends. He was capable of great and long-continued industry in executive affairs. He was surrounded by an able and brilliant staff, all heartily devoted to him, and inclined to give him the greater share of the credit for their own work. His alert and gallant bearing, as he rode from camp to camp about Washington, surrounded by a company of aides in uniforms as yet untarnished by campaign life, impressed the imagination of tourists and newspaper correspondents, who at once gave him, on this insufficient evidence, the sobriquet of "the young Napoleon." In addition to these advantages, he was a man of extraordinary personal attractiveness; strangers instinctively liked him, and those who were thrown much in his company grew very fond of him. In every one, from the President of the United States to the humblest orderly who waited at his door, he inspired a remarkable affection and regard, a part of which sprang, it is true, from the intense desire prevalent at the time for success to our arms, which naturally included an impulse of good-will to our foremost military leaders; but this impulse, in the case of General McClellan, was given

a peculiar warmth by his unusually winning personal characteristics. In consequence he was courted and caressed as few men in our history have been. His charm of manner, enhanced by his rising fame, made him the idol of the Washington drawing-rooms; and his high official position, his certainty of speedy promotion to supreme command, and the probability of great political influence to follow, made him the target of all the interests and ambitions that center in a capital in time of war.*

He can hardly be blamed if this sudden and dazzling elevation produced some effect upon his character and temper. Suddenly, as by a spell of enchantment, he had been put in command of one of the greatest armies of modern times; he had become one of the most conspicuous figures of the world; his portrait had grown as familiar as those of our great historic worthies; every word and act of his were taken up and spread broadcast by the thousand tongues of publicity. He saw himself treated with the utmost deference, his prejudices flattered, and his favor courted by statesmen and soldiers twice his age. We repeat that he can hardly be blamed if his temper and character suffered in the ordeal.

He has left in his memoirs and letters unquestionable evidence of a sudden and fatal degeneration of mind during the months he passed in Washington in the latter half of 1861.† At first everything was novel and delightful. On the 27th of July he wrote: "I find myself in a new and strange position here; President, Cabinet, General Scott, and all deferring to me. By some strange operation of magic I seem to have become the power of the land." Three days later he wrote: "They give me my way in everything, full swing and unbounded confidence. . . . Who would have thought when we were married that I should so soon be called upon to save my country?" A few days afterward: "I shall carry this thing on *en grand* and crush the rebels in one campaign." By the 9th of August his estimate of his own importance had taken such a morbid development that he was able to say: "I would cheerfully take

* General W. T. Sherman writes in his "Memoirs": "General McClellan arrived. . . . Instead of coming over the river, as we expected, he took a house in Washington, and only came over from time to time to have a review or inspection. . . . August was passing and troops were pouring in from all quarters; General McClellan told me he intended to organize an army of 100,000 men, with 100 field batteries, and I still hoped he would come on our side of the Potomac, pitch his tent, and prepare for real hard work, but his headquarters still remained in a house in Washington City." Vol. I, pp. 191, 192.

To show how differently another sort of general comprehended the duties before him at this time, we

give another sentence from Sherman's "Memoirs": "I organized a system of drills, embracing the evolutions of the line, all of which was new to me, and I had to learn the tactics from books; but I was convinced that we had a long, hard war before us, and made up my mind to begin at the very beginning to prepare for it."

† "McClellan's Own Story," p. 82. We should hesitate to print these pathetic evidences of McClellan's weakness of character, contained as they are in private letters to his family, if they had not been published by Mr. W. C. Prime, with a singular misconception of their true bearing, as a basis for attacking the administration of Mr. Lincoln.

the dictatorship and agree to lay down my life when the country is saved"; yet he added in the same letter,* "I am not spoiled by my unexpected new position." This pleasing delirium lasted only a few weeks, and was succeeded by a strange and permanent hallucination upon two points: one was that the enemy, whose numbers were about one-third his own, vastly exceeded his army in strength; and the other, that the Government—which was doing everything in its power to support him—was hostile to him and desired his destruction. On the 16th of August he wrote: "I am here in a terrible place; the enemy have from three to four times my force; the President, the old general, can not or will not see the true state of affairs." He was in terror for fear he should be attacked, in doubt whether his army would stand. "If my men will only fight I think I can thrash him, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers. . . . I am weary of all this." Later on the same day he wrote with exultation that "a heavy rain is swelling the Potomac; if it can be made impassable for a week, we are saved." All through the month he expected battle "in a week." By the end of August his panic passed away; he said he was "ready for Beauregard," and a week later began to talk of attacking him.

By this time he had become, to use his own language, "disgusted with the Administration—perfectly sick of it."† His intimate friends and associates were among the political opponents of the men at the head of affairs, and their daily flatteries had easily convinced him that in him was the only hope of saving the country, in spite of its incapable rulers. He says in one place, with singular *naïveté*, that Mr. Stanton gained his confidence by professing friendship for himself while loading the President with abuse and ridicule.‡ He professed especial contempt for the President; partly because Mr. Lincoln showed him "too much deference."§ In October he wrote: "There are some of the greatest geese in the Cabinet I have ever seen—enough to tax the patience of Job." In November his disgust at the Government had become almost intolerable: "It is sickening in the extreme, and makes me feel heavy at heart, when I see the weakness and unfitness of the poor beings who control the destinies of this great country." The affair of Mason and Slidell, with which he had no concern, and upon which his advice was not asked, agitated him at this time. He feels that his wisdom alone must save the country in this crisis; he writes that he must

spend the day in trying to get the Government to do its duty. He does not quite know what its duty is—but must first "go to Stanton's to ascertain what the law of nations" has to say on the matter, Stanton being at this time his friend, and, as he thinks, Lincoln's opponent. He had begun already to rank the President as among his enemies. He was in the habit of hiding at Stanton's when he had serious work to do, "to dodge," as he said, "all enemies in the shape of 'browsing' Presidents," etc. "I am thwarted and deceived by these incapables at every turn."||

He soon began to call and to consider the Army of the Potomac as his own. He assumed the habit, which he never relinquished, of asking that all desirable troops and stores be sent to him. Indeed, it may be observed that even before he came to Washington this tendency was discernible. While he remained in the West he was continually asking for men and money. But when he came to the Potomac he recognized no such need on the part of his successor, and telegraphed to Governor Dennison to "pay no attention to Rosecrans's demand" for reënforcements.¶ In the plan of campaign which he laid before the President on the 4th of August, 1861, which was, in general objects and intentions, very much the same plan already adopted by General Scott and the Government, he assigned the scantiest detachments to the great work of conquering the Mississippi Valley; 20,000, he thought, would be enough, with what could be raised in Kentucky and Tennessee, "to secure the latter region and its railroads, as well as ultimately to occupy Nashville"—while he demanded for himself the enormous aggregate of 273,000 men.** He wanted especially all the regular troops; the success of operations elsewhere, he said, was relatively unimportant compared with those in Virginia. These views of his were naturally adopted by his immediate associates, who carried them to an extent probably not contemplated by the general. They seemed to regard him as a kind of tribunal, armed by the people with powers independent of and superior to the civil authorities. On the 20th of August his father-in-law, Colonel R. B. Marcy, being in New York, and not satisfied with what he saw in the way of recruitment, sent General McClellan a telegram urging him "to make a positive and unconditional demand for an immediate draft of the additional troops you require." "The people," he says, "will applaud such a course, rely upon it." The general, seeing

* "McClellan's Own Story," p. 85.

† *Ibid.*, p. 168.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 177.

¶ McClellan to Dennison, Aug. 12, 1861. War Records.

** McClellan to Lincoln. War Records.

nothing out of the way in this explosive communication of his staff-officer, sent it to the Secretary of War with this indorsement: "Colonel Marcy knows what he says, and is of the coolest judgment"; and recommended that his suggestion be carried into effect. All this time every avenue of transportation was filled with soldiers on their way to Washington.

In connection with his delusion as to the number of the enemy in front of him, it grew a fixed idea in his mind that all the best troops and all the officers of ability in the army should be placed under his orders. On the 8th of September he wrote a remarkable letter to the Secretary of War embodying these demands. He begins, in the manner which at an early day became habitual with him and continued to the end of his military career, by enormously exaggerating the strength of the enemy opposed to him. He reports his own force, in the immediate vicinity of Washington, at 85,000, and that of the enemy at 130,000, which he says is a low estimate, and draws the inevitable conclusion that "this army should be reënforced at once by all the disposable troops that the East and West and North can furnish. . . . I urgently recommend," he says, "that the whole of the regular army, old and new, be at once ordered to report here," with some trifling exceptions. He also demands that the choicest officers be assigned to him, especially that none of those recommended by him be sent anywhere else.* Most of these requests were granted, and General McClellan seems to have assumed a sort of proprietary right over every regiment that had once come under his command. When General T. W. Sherman's expedition was about sailing for the South, he made an earnest request to the Government for the 79th New York Highlanders. The matter being referred to General McClellan, he wrote in the most peremptory tone to the War Department, forbidding the detachment of those troops. "I will not consent," he says roundly, "to one other man being detached from this army for that expedition. I need far more than I now have, to save this country. . . . It is the task of the Army of the Potomac to decide the question at issue."† The President accepted this rebuke, and telegraphed to General Sherman that he had promised General McClellan "not to break his army here without his consent."‡

Such an attitude towards the military and civil authorities is rarely assumed by a gen-

eral so young and so inexperienced, and to sustain it requires a degree of popular strength and confidence which is only gained by rapid and brilliant successes. In the case of General McClellan the faith of his friends and of the Government had no nourishment for a long time except his own promises, and several incidents during the late summer and autumn made heavy drafts upon the general confidence which was accorded him.

From the beginning of hostilities the blockade of the Potomac River below Washington was recognized on both sides as a great advantage to be gained by the Confederates, and a great danger to be guarded against by the national Government. For a while the navy had been able to keep the waters of the river clear by the employment of a few powerful light-draft steamers; but it soon became evident that this would not permanently be a sufficient protection, and even before the battle of Bull Run the Navy Department suggested a combined occupation, by the army and the navy, of Mathias Point, a bold and commanding promontory on the Virginia side, where the Potomac, after a horse-shoe bend to the east, flows southward again with its width greatly increased. On the 20th of August the Navy Department renewed its importunities to the War Department to coöperate in the seizure of this most important point, which was "absolutely essential to the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac."§ Eleven days later these suggestions were still more pressingly presented, without effect. In October, however, when rebel batteries were already appearing at different points on the river, and when it was in contemplation to send to Port Royal the steamers which had been policing the Potomac, an arrangement was entered into between the army and the navy to occupy Mathias Point. Orders were sent to Captain Craven to collect at that place the necessary boats for landing a force of 4000 men. He waited all night and no troops appeared. Captain Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who had taken a great deal of interest in the expedition, went in deep chagrin to the President, who at once accompanied him to General McClellan's quarters to ask some explanation of this failure. The general informed him that he had become convinced it would not be practicable to land the troops, and that he had therefore not sent them. Captain Fox assured him that the navy would be responsible for that; and, after some discussion, it was concluded that the troops should go the next

* McClellan to Cameron. War Records.

† McClellan to Thomas A. Scott, Oct. 17, 1861. War Records.

‡ Lincoln to Sherman, October 18, 1861. War Records.

§ Welles to Cameron. War Records.

night. Captain Craven was again ordered to be in readiness; the troops did not go. Craven came to Washington in great agitation, threw up his command, and applied for sea-service, on the ground that his reputation as an officer would be ruined by the closing of the river while he was in command of the flotilla.* The vessels went out one by one; the rebels put up their batteries at their leisure, and the blockade of the river was complete. When General McClellan was examined as to this occurrence by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he did not remember the specific incidents as recited by Captain Fox, and as reported above, but said he never regarded the obstruction of the Potomac as of vital importance; its importance was more moral than physical.†

General McClellan was perhaps inclined to underrate moral effects. The affair at Ball's Bluff, which occurred on the 21st of October, produced an impression on the public mind and affected his relations with the leading spirits in Congress to an extent entirely out of proportion to its intrinsic importance. He had hitherto enjoyed unbounded popularity. The country saw the army rapidly growing in numbers and improving in equipment and discipline, and was content to allow the authorities their own time for accomplishing their purposes. The general looked forward to no such delays as afterward seemed to him necessary. He even assumed that the differences between himself and Scott arose from Scott's preference "for inaction and the defensive."‡ On the 10th of October he said to the President: "I think we shall have our arrangements made for a strong reconnaissance about Monday to feel the strength of the enemy. I intend to be careful and do as well as possible. Don't let them hurry me, is all I ask." The President, pleased with the prospect of action, replied: "You shall have your own way in the matter, I assure you."§ On the 12th he sent a dispatch to Mr. Lincoln from the front, saying that the enemy was before him in force, and would probably attack in the morning. "If they attack," he added, "I shall beat them."|| Nothing came of this. On the 16th the President was, as usual, at headquarters for a moment's conversation with General McClellan, who informed him that the enemy was massing at Manassas, and said that he was "not such a fool as to buck against that place in the spot designated by the rebels." But he seemed continually to be waiting merely for some slight additional

increment of his force, and never intending any long postponement of the offensive; while he was apparently always ready, and even desirous, for the enemy to leave their works and attack him, being confident of defeating them.

In this condition of affairs, with all his force well in hand, he ordered, on the 19th of October, that General McCall should march from his camp at Langley to Dranesville, to cover a somewhat extensive series of reconnaissances for the purpose of learning the position of the enemy, and of protecting the operations of the topographical engineers in making maps of that region. The next day he received a dispatch from General Banks's adjutant-general, indicating that the enemy had moved away from Leesburg. This information turned out to be erroneous; but upon receiving it General McClellan sent a telegram to General Stone at Poolesville informing him that General McCall had occupied Dranesville the day before and was still there, that heavy reconnaissances would be sent out the same day in all directions from that point, and directing General Stone to keep a good lookout upon Leesburg, to see if that movement had the effect to drive them away. "Perhaps," he adds, "a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them."¶ General McClellan insists that this order contemplated nothing more than that General Stone should make some display of an intention to cross, and should watch the enemy more closely than usual. But General Stone gave it a much wider range, and at once reported to General McClellan that he had made a feint of crossing at Poolesville, and at the same time started a reconnoitering party towards Leesburg from Harrison's Island, and that the enemy's pickets had retired to their intrenchments. Although General McClellan virtually holds that this was in effect a disobedience of his orders, he did not direct General Stone to retire his troops—on the contrary, he congratulated him upon the movement; but thinking that McCall would not be needed to coöperate with him, he ordered the former to fall back from Dranesville to his camp near Prospect Hill, which order, though contradicted by later instructions which did not reach him until his return to Langley, was executed during the morning of the 21st. But while McCall, having completed his reconnaissance, was marching at his leisure back to his camp, the little detachment which General Stone had sent across the river had blundered into battle.

A careful reading of all the accounts in the

* Report Committee on Conduct of the War. G. V. Fox, Testimony.

† Report Committee on Conduct of the War. McClellan, Testimony.

‡ "McClellan's Own Story," p. 170.

§ J. H., Diary.

|| Ibid.

¶ McClellan, Report, p. 32.

archives of the War Department relating to this affair affords the best possible illustration of the lack of discipline and intelligent organization prevailing at that time in both armies. The reports of the different commanders seem hardly to refer to the same engagement; each side enormously exaggerates the strength of the enemy, and the descriptions of the carnage at critical moments of the fight read absurdly enough when compared with the meager official lists of killed and wounded. We will briefly state what really took place.

On the evening of the 20th General Gorman made a demonstration of crossing at Edwards Ferry, and a scouting party of the 20th Massachusetts crossed from Harrison's Island and went to within about a mile of Leesburg, returning with the report that they had found a small camp of the enemy in the woods. General Stone then ordered Colonel Charles Devens, commanding the 20th Massachusetts, to take four companies of his regiment over in the night to destroy this camp at daybreak. Colonel Devens proceeding to execute this order found that the report of the scouting party was erroneous, and reporting this fact waited in the woods for further orders. General Stone sent over a small additional detachment which he afterward reinforced by a larger body, the whole being in command of Colonel E. D. Baker of the California regiment—a Senator from Oregon, an officer of the highest personal and political distinction, and, as we have already related, not without experience in the Mexican war. General Stone had now evidently resolved upon a reconnaissance in force, and in case an engagement should result he confidently expected Colonel Baker to drive the enemy from his front, at which juncture General Stone expected to come in upon their right with Gorman's troops, which he was pushing over at Edwards Ferry, and capture or rout the entire command. He gave Colonel Baker discretionary authority to advance or to retire after crossing the river, as circumstances might seem to dictate.

Colonel Baker entered upon the work assigned to him with the greatest enthusiasm and intrepidity. The means of transportation were lamentably inadequate; but working energetically, though without system, the greater part of the troops assigned for the service were at last got over, and Baker took command on the field a little after 2 o'clock. The battle was already lost, though the brave and high-spirited orator did not suspect it, any more than did General Stone, who, at Edwards Ferry, was waiting for the moment to arrive when he should attack the enemy's right and convert his defeat into rout. Colonel Devens,

who had been skirmishing briskly with continually increasing numbers of the Confederates all the morning, had by this time fallen back in line with Baker's, Lee's, and Cogswell's regiments, and a new disposition was made of all the troops on the ground to resist the advancing enemy. The disposition was as bad as it could well be made; both flanks were exposed, and the reserves were placed in an unprotected position immediately in rear of the center, where they were shot down without resistance, and were only dangerous to their comrades in front of them. Colonel Baker, whose bravery marked him for destruction, was killed about 4 o'clock, being struck at the same moment by several bullets while striving to encourage his men, and after a brief and ineffectual effort by Colonel Cogswell to move to the left, the National troops retreated to the river bank. They were closely followed by the Confederates; the wretched boats into which many of them rushed were swamped; some strong swimmers reached the Maryland shore, some were shot in the water, a large number threw their arms into the stream and, dispersing in the bushes, escaped in the twilight; but a great proportion of the entire command was captured. The losses on the Union side were 10 officers and 39 enlisted men killed, 15 officers and 143 enlisted men wounded, 26 officers and 688 enlisted men missing.* The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was almost as great—36 killed and 117 wounded.*

As soon as the news of the disaster began to reach General Stone, he hurried to the right, where the fugitives from the fight were arriving, did what he could to reestablish order there, and sent instructions to Gorman to intrench himself at Edwards Ferry and act on the defensive. General Banks arrived with reinforcements at 3 o'clock in the morning of the 22d and assumed command. The Confederates made an attack upon Gorman the same day and were easily repulsed; but General McClellan, thinking "that the enemy were strengthening themselves at Leesburg, and that our means of crossing and recrossing were very insufficient," withdrew all the troops to the Maryland side.† It seems from the Confederate reports that he was mistaken in concluding that the enemy were strengthening themselves; they were also getting out of harm's way as rapidly as possible. General Evans, their commander, says:

Finding my brigade very much exhausted, I left Colonel Barksdale with his regiment, with 2 pieces

* War Records.

† McClellan to Secretary of War. War Records.

of artillery and a cavalry force, as a grand guard, and I ordered the other 3 regiments to fall back towards Carter's Mills to rest and to be collected in order.*

The utter inadequacy of means for crossing was of course a sufficient reason to justify the cessation of active operations at that time and place.

Insignificant as was this engagement in itself, it was of very considerable importance in immediate effect and ultimate results. It was the occasion of enormous encouragement to the South. The reports of the Confederate officers engaged exaggerated their own prowess, and the numbers and losses of the National troops tenfold. General Beauregard, in his congratulatory order of the day, claimed that the result of this action proved that no disparity of numbers could avail anything as against Southern valor assisted by the "manifest aid of the God of battles."† It will probably never be possible to convince Confederate soldiers that here, as at Bull Run, the numbers engaged and the aggregate killed and wounded were about equal on both sides — a fact clearly shown by the respective official records. At the North the gloom and affliction occasioned by the defeat were equally out of proportion to the event. Among the killed and wounded were several young men of brilliant promise and distinguished social connections in New England, and the useless sacrifice of their lives made a deep impression upon wide circles of friends and kindred. The death of Colonel Baker greatly affected the public mind. He had been little known in the East when he came as Senator from Oregon, but from the moment that he began to appear in public his fluent and impassioned oratory, his graceful and dignified bearing, a certain youthful energy and fire which contrasted pleasantly with his silver hair, had made him extremely popular with all classes. He was one of Mr. Lincoln's dearest friends; he was especially liked in the Senate; he was one of the most desirable and effective speakers at all great mass-meetings. A cry of passionate anger went up from every part of the country over this precious blood wasted, this dishonor inflicted upon the National flag.

The first and most evident scape-goat was, naturally enough, General Stone. He cannot be acquitted of all blame, even in the calmest review of the facts; there was a lack of preparation for the fight, a lack of thorough supervision after it had begun. But these were the least of the charges made against him. The suspicions which civil war always breeds, and the calumnies resulting from them, were let loose upon

him. They grew to such proportions by constant repetition, during the autumn and winter following, that many people actually thought he was one of a band of conspirators in the Union army working in the interest of rebellion. This impression seized upon the minds of some of the most active and energetic men in Congress, friends and associates of Colonel Baker. They succeeded in convincing the Secretary of War that General Stone was dangerous to the public welfare, and on the 28th of January an order was issued from the War Department to General McClellan directing him to arrest General Stone. He kept it for several days without executing it; but at last, being apparently impressed by the evidence of a refugee from Leesburg that there was some foundation for the charges made by the committee of Congress, he ordered the arrest of General Stone, saying at the same time to the Secretary of War that the case was too indefinite to warrant the framing of charges.‡ The arrest was made without consulting the President. When Mr. Stanton announced it to him the President said: "I suppose you have good reasons for it; and having good reasons, I am glad I knew nothing of it until it was done." General Stone was taken to Fort Lafayette, where he remained in confinement six months; he was then released and afterward restored to duty, but never received any satisfaction to his repeated demands for reparation or trial.

For the moment, at least, there seemed no disposition to censure General McClellan for this misfortune. Indeed, it was only a few days after the battle of Ball's Bluff that he gained his final promotion to the chief command of the armies of the United States. A brief review of his relations to his predecessor may be necessary to a proper understanding of the circumstances under which he succeeded to the supreme command.

Their intercourse, at first marked by great friendship, had soon become clouded by misunderstandings. The veteran had always had a high regard for his junior, had sent him his hearty congratulations upon his appointment to command the Ohio volunteers, and although he had felt compelled on one occasion to rebuke him for interference with matters beyond his jurisdiction,§ their relations remained perfectly friendly, and the old general warmly welcomed the young one to Washington. But once there, General McClellan began to treat the General-in-Chief with a neglect which, though probably unintentional, was none the less galling. On the 8th of August, General McClellan sent to

* Evans to Jordan, Oct. 3, 1861. War Records.
† Beauregard, Orders, Oct. 23, 1861. War Records.

‡ McClellan to Stone, Dec. 5, 1862. War Records.
§ War Records.

General Scott a letter* to the effect that he believed the capital "not only insecure," but "in imminent danger." As General McClellan had never personally communicated these views to his chief, but had, as Scott says, "propagated them in high quarters," so that they had come indirectly to the old general's ears, his temper, which was never one of the meekest, quite gave way, and declining to answer General McClellan's letter, he addressed an angry note to the Secretary of War, scouting the idea of Washington being in danger, calling attention to "the stream of new regiments pouring in upon us," complaining bitterly of the reticence and neglect with which his junior treated him, and begging the President, as soon as possible, to retire him from the active command of the army, for which his age, his wounds, and his infirmities had unfitted him.

Mr. Lincoln was greatly distressed by this altercation between the two officers. He prevailed upon General McClellan to write him a conciliatory note, withdrawing the letter of the 8th; and armed with this, he endeavored to soothe the irritation of Scott, and to induce him to withdraw his angry rejoinder of the 9th. But youth, sure of itself and the future, forgives more easily than age; and Scott refused, respectfully but firmly, to comply with the President's request. He waited two days and wrote again to the Secretary of War, giving his reasons for this refusal. He believed General McClellan had deliberately, and with the advice of certain members of the Cabinet, offended him by the letter in question, and

that for the last week, though many regiments had arrived and several more or less important movements of troops had taken place, General McClellan had reported nothing to him, but had been frequently in conversation with various high officers of the Government. "That freedom of access and consultation," he continued, "has, very naturally, deluded the junior general into a feeling of indifference towards his senior." He argues that it would be "against the dignity of his years to be filing daily complaints against an ambitious junior," and closes by reiterating his unfitness for command.†

The two generals never became reconciled. The bickerings between them continued for two months, marked with a painful and growing bitterness on the part of Scott, and on the part of McClellan by a neglect akin to contempt. The elder officer, galled by his subordinate's persistent disrespect, published a general order on the 16th of September, which he says was intended "to suppress an irregularity more conspicuous in Major-General McClellan than in any other officer," forbidding junior officers on duty from corresponding with their superiors except through intermediate commanders; the same rule applying to correspondence with the President and the Secretary of War, unless by the President's request. General McClellan showed how little he cared for such an order by writing two important letters to the Secretary of War within three days after it was issued. On the same day a special order was given General

* This letter deserves a careful reading. It is extremely characteristic, as showing, in the first place, how early McClellan began to exaggerate the number of the enemy in front of him, and how large were his ideas as to the force necessary for the protection of Washington so long as the duty of protecting the capital devolved upon him.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE POTOMAC,
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8, 1861.

LIEUT.-GEN. WINFIELD SCOTT,
Commanding U. S. Army.

GENERAL: Information from various sources reaching me to-day, through spies, letters, and telegrams, confirms my impressions, derived from previous advices, that the enemy intend attacking our positions on the other side of the river, as well as to cross the Potomac north of us. I have also received a telegram from a reliable agent just from Knoxville, Tenn., that large reinforcements are still passing through there to Richmond. I am induced to believe that the enemy has at least 100,000 men in front of us. Were I in Beauregard's place with that force at my disposal, I would attack the positions on the other side of the Potomac, and at the same time cross the river above this city in force. I feel confident that our present army in this vicinity is entirely insufficient for the emergency, and it is deficient in all the arms of the service — infantry, artillery, and cavalry. I therefore respectfully and most earnestly urge that the garrisons of all places in our rear be reduced at once to the minimum absolutely necessary to hold them, and that all the

troops thus made available be forthwith forwarded to this city; that every company of regular artillery within reach be immediately ordered here to be mounted; that every possible means be used to expedite the forwarding of new regiments of volunteers to this capital without one hour's delay. I urge that nothing be left undone to bring up our force for the defense of this city to 100,000 men, before attending to any other point. I advise that at least eight or ten good Ohio and Indiana regiments may be telegraphed for from western Virginia, their places to be filled at once by the new troops from the same States, who will be at least reliable to fight behind the intrenchments which have been constructed there. The vital importance of rendering Washington at once perfectly secure, and its imminent danger, impel me to urge these requests with the utmost earnestness, and that not an hour be lost in carrying them into execution. A sense of duty which I cannot resist compels me to state that in my opinion military necessity demands that the departments of North-eastern Virginia, Washington, the Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, including Baltimore, and the one including Fort Monroe, should be merged into one department, under the immediate control of the commander of the main army of operations, and which should be known and designated as such.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

[War Records.]

† Scott to the President, Aug. 12, 1861.

McClellan to report to army headquarters the number and position of troops under his command, to which order he paid no attention whatever. General Scott felt himself helpless in the face of this mute and persistent disobedience, but he was not able to bear it in silence. On the 4th of October he addressed another passionate remonstrance to the Secretary of War, setting forth these facts, asking whether there were no remedy for such offenses, advising once more to his physical infirmities, and at last divulging the true reason why he had borne so long the contumely of his junior—that he was only awaiting the arrival of General Halleck, whose presence would give him increased confidence in the preservation of the Union, and thus permit him to retire.* On the 31st of October he took his final resolution, and addressed the following letter to the Secretary of War:

For more than three years I have been unable, from a hurt, to mount a horse or to walk more than a few paces at a time, and that with much pain. Other and new infirmities—dropsy and vertigo—admonish me that repose of mind and body, with the appliances of surgery and medicine, are necessary to add a little more to a life already protracted much beyond the usual span of man. It is under such circumstances, made doubly painful by the unnatural and unjust rebellion now raging in the Southern States of our so late prosperous and happy Union, that I am compelled to request that my name be placed on the list of army officers retired from active service.* As this request is founded on an absolute right granted by a recent act of Congress, I am entirely at liberty to say it is with deep regret that I withdraw myself, in these momentous times, from the orders of a President who has treated me with distinguished kindness and courtesy, whom I know among much personal intercourse to be patriotic, without sectional partialities or prejudices, to be highly conscientious in the performance of every duty, and of unrivaled activity and perseverance. And to you, Mr. Secretary, whom I now officially address for the last time, I beg to acknowledge my many obligations for the uniform high consideration I have received at your hands.*

His request was granted, with the usual compliments and ceremonies, the President and Cabinet waiting upon him in person at his residence. General McClellan succeeded him in command of the armies of the United States, and in his order of the 1st of November he praised in swelling periods the war-worn veteran † whose latest days of service he had so annoyed and embittered. When we consider the relative positions of the two officers—the years, the infirmities, the well-earned glory of Scott, his former friendship and kindness towards his junior; and, on the other hand, the youth, the strength, the marvelous good fortune of McClellan, his great promotion, his certainty of almost immediate succession to supreme command—it cannot be said that his demeanor towards his chief was magnanimous. Although General Scott's unfitness for com-

mand had become obvious, although his disposition, which in his youth had been arrogant and haughty, had been modified but not improved by age into irascibility, it would certainly not have been out of place for his heir presumptive to dissemble an impatience which was not unnatural, and preserve some appearance at least of a respect he did not feel. Standing in the full sunshine, there was something due from him to an old and illustrious soldier stepping reluctant into hopeless shadow.

The change was well received in all parts of the country. At Washington there was an immediate feeling of relief. The President called at General McClellan's headquarters on the night of the 1st of November and gave him warm congratulations. "I should feel perfectly satisfied," he said, "if I thought that this vast increase of responsibility would not embarrass you." "It is a great relief, sir," McClellan answered. "I feel as if several tons were taken from my shoulders to-day. I am now in contact with you and the Secretary. I am not embarrassed by intervention." "Very well," said the President; "draw on me for all the sense and information I have. In addition to your present command the supreme command of the army will entail an enormous labor upon you." "I can do it all," McClellan quickly answered. ‡ Ten days later Blenker's brigade organized a torchlight procession, a sort of Fackel-tanz, in honor of the event. The President, after the show was over, went as usual to General McClellan's, and referring to the Port Royal expedition thought this "a good time to feel the enemy." "I have not been unmindful of that," McClellan answered; "we shall feel them tomorrow." § Up to this time there was no importunity on the part of the President for an advance of the army, although for several weeks some of the leading men in Congress had been urging it. As early as the 26th of October, Senators Trumbull, Chandler, and Wade called upon the President and earnestly represented to him the importance of immediate action. Two days later they had another conference with the President and Mr. Seward, at the house of the latter. They spoke with some vehemence of the absolute necessity for energetic measures to drive the enemy from in front of Washington. The President and the Secretary of State both defended the general in his deliberate purpose not to move until he was ready. The zealous senators did not confine their visits to the civil authorities. They called upon General McClellan also,

* Scott to Cameron. War Records.

† McClellan, Order, Nov. 1, 1861. War Records.

‡ J. H., Diary, Nov. 1, 1861.

§ Ibid., Nov. 11, 1861.

and in the course of an animated conversation Mr. Wade said an unsuccessful battle was preferable to delay; a defeat would be easily repaired by the swarming recruits—a thrust which McClellan neatly parried by saying he would rather have a few recruits before a victory than a good many after a defeat.* There was as yet no apparent hostility to McClellan, even among “these wretched politicians,” as he calls them. On the contrary, this conference of the 26th was not inharmonious; McClellan represented General Scott as the obstacle to immediate action, and skillfully diverted the zeal of the senators against the General-in-Chief. He wrote that night:

For the last three hours I have been at Montgomery Blair's, talking with Senators Wade, Trumbull, and Chandler about war matters. They will make a desperate effort to-morrow to have General Scott retired at once; until this is accomplished, I can effect but little good. He is ever in my way, and I am sure does not desire effective action.†

The President, while defending the generals from the strictures of the senators, did not conceal from McClellan the fact of their urgency. He told him it was a reality not to be left out of the account; at the same time he was not to fight till he was ready. “I have everything at stake,” the general replied. “If I fail, I will never see you again.” At this period there was no question of more than a few days' delay.

The friendly visits of the President to army headquarters were continued almost every night until the 13th of November, when an incident occurred which virtually put an end to them.‡ On that evening Mr. Lincoln walked across the street as usual, accompanied by one of his household, to the residence of the Secretary of State, and after a short visit there both of them went to General McClellan's house, in H street. They were there told that the general had gone to the wedding of an officer and would soon return. They waited nearly an hour in the drawing-room, when the general returned, and, without paying any special attention to the orderly who told him the President was waiting to see him, went upstairs. The President, thinking his name had not been announced to the general, again sent a servant to his room and received the answer that he had gone to bed. Mr. Lincoln attached no special importance to this incident, and, so far as we know, never asked nor received any explanation of it. But it was not unnatural that he should conclude his frequent visits had become irksome to the general, and that he should discontinue them. There was no cessation of their friendly relations, though

after this most of their conferences were held at the Executive Mansion.

On the 20th of November a grand review of the Army of the Potomac took place at Upton's Hill. There were about 50,000 men in line, drawn up on a wide, undulating plain, which displayed them to the best advantage, and a finer army has rarely been seen. The President, accompanied by Generals McClellan and McDowell, and followed by a brilliant cavalcade of a hundred general and staff officers, rode up and down the entire extent of the embattled host. Mr. Lincoln was a good horseman, and was received with hearty cheers by the troops, thousands of whom saw him that day for the first and last time. The reviewing officers then took their stand upon a gentle acclivity in the center of the plain, and the troops filed past in review through the autumnal afternoon until twilight. It had certainly all the appearance of a great army ready for battle, and there was little doubt that they would speedily be led into action. But after the review drilling was resumed; recruits continued to pour in, to be assigned and equipped and instructed. The general continued his organizing work; many hours of every day he passed in the saddle, riding from camp to camp with tireless industry, until at last he fell seriously ill, and for several weeks the army rested almost with folded hands awaiting his recovery.

EUROPEAN NEUTRALITY.

ONE of the gravest problems which beset the Lincoln administration on its advent to power was how foreign nations would deal with the fact of secession and rebellion in the United States; and the people of the North endured a grievous disappointment when they found that England and France were by active sympathy favorable to the South. This result does not seem strange when we consider by what insensible steps the news from America had shaped their opinion.

Europeans were at first prepared to accept the disunion threats of Southern leaders as mere transient party bravado. The non-coercion message of President Buchanan, however, was in their eyes an indication of serious import. Old World statesmanship had no faith in unsupported public sentiment as a lasting bond of nationality. The experience of a thousand years teaches them that, under their monarchical system, governments and laws by “divine right” are of accepted and permanent force only when competent physical power stands behind them to compel obedience. Mr. Buchanan's dogma that the Federal Government had no authority to keep a State in the Union was to them, in

* J. H., Diary, Oct. 26, 27, 1861. † J. H., Diary.

† “McClellan's Own Story,” p. 171.

theory at least, the end of the Government of the United States. When, further, they saw that this theory was being translated into practice by acquiescence in South Carolina's revolt; by the failure to reënforce Sumter; by the President's quasi-diplomacy with the South Carolina commissioners as foreign agents; and finally by his practical abdication of executive functions, in the message of January 8,* "referring the whole subject to Congress," and throwing upon it all "the responsibility,"—they naturally concluded that the only remaining question for them was one of new relations with the divided States. From the election of Lincoln until three days preceding his inauguration, a period of nearly four months, embracing the whole drama of public secession and the organization of the Montgomery confederacy, not a word of information, explanation, or protest on these momentous proceedings was sent by the Buchanan cabinet to foreign powers. They were left to draw their inferences exclusively from newspapers, the debates of Congress, and the President's messages till the last day of February, 1861, when Secretary Black, in a diplomatic circular, instructed our ministers at foreign courts "that this Government has not relinquished its constitutional jurisdiction within the territory of those seceded States and does not desire to do so," and that a recognition of their independence must be opposed. France and England replied courteously that they would not act in haste, but quite emphatically that they could give no further binding promise.

Mr. Seward, on assuming the duties of Secretary of State, immediately transmitted a circular, repeating the injunction of his predecessor and stating the confidence of the President in the speedy restoration of the harmony and unity of the Government. Considerable delay occurred in settling upon the various foreign appointments. The new minister to France, Mr. Dayton, and the new minister to Great Britain, Mr. Adams, did not sail for Europe till about the 1st of May. Before either of them arrived at his post, both governments had violated in spirit their promise to act in no haste. On the day Mr. Adams sailed from Boston, his predecessor, Mr. Dallas, yet in London, was sent for by Lord John Russell, her Britannic Majesty's Minister of Foreign Affairs. "He told me," wrote Mr. Dallas, "that the three representatives of the Southern Confederacy were here; that he had not seen them, but was not unwilling to do so, *unofficially*; that there existed an understanding between this Government and that of France which would

lead both to take the same course as to recognition, whatever that course might be." The step here foreshadowed was soon taken. Three days later Lord Russell did receive the three representatives of the Southern Confederacy; and while he told them he could not communicate with them "officially," his language indicated that when the South could maintain its position England would not be unwilling to hear what terms they had to propose. When Mr. Adams landed in England he found, evidently to forestall his arrival, that the Ministry had published the Queen's proclamation of neutrality, raising the Confederate States at once to the position and privilege of a belligerent power; and France soon followed the example.

In taking this precipitate action, both powers probably thought it merely a preliminary step: the British ministers believed disunion to be complete and irrevocable, and were eager to take advantage of it to secure free trade and cheap cotton; while Napoleon III., Emperor of the French, already harboring far-reaching colonial designs, expected not only to recognize the South, but to assist her at no distant day by an armed intervention. For the present, of course, all such meditations were veiled under the bland phraseology of diplomatic regret at our misfortune. The object of these pages is, however, not so much to discuss international relations as to show what part President Lincoln personally took in framing the dispatch which announced the answering policy of the United States.

When the communication which Lord Russell made to Mr. Dallas was received at the State Department, the unfriendly act of the English Government, and more especially the half-insulting manner of its promulgation, filled Mr. Seward with indignation. In this mood he wrote a dispatch to Mr. Adams, which, if transmitted and delivered in its original form, could hardly have failed to endanger the peaceful relations of the two countries. The general tone and spirit of the paper were admirable; but portions of it were phrased with an exasperating bluntness, and certain directions were lacking in diplomatic prudence. This can be accounted for only by the irritation under which he wrote. It was Mr. Seward's ordinary habit personally to read his dispatches to the President before sending them. Mr. Lincoln, detecting the defects of the paper, retained it, and after careful scrutiny made such material corrections and alterations with his own hand as took from it all offensive crudeness without in the least lowering its tone, but, on the contrary, greatly increasing its dignity.

* "Globe," Jan. 9, 1861, p. 294.

SEWARD'S ORIGINAL DISPATCH, SHOWING MR. LINCOLN'S CORRECTIONS.

[All words by Lincoln in margin or in text are in italics. All matter between brackets was marked out.]

No. 10.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, May 21st, 1861.

SIR:

Mr. Dallas in a brief dispatch of May 2d (No. 333) tells us that Lord John Russell recently requested an interview with him on account of the solicitude which His Lordship felt concerning the effect of certain measures represented as likely to be adopted by the President. In that conversation the British Secretary told Mr. Dallas that the three Representatives of the Southern Confederacy were then in London, that Lord John Russell had not yet seen them, but that he was not unwilling to see them unofficially. He farther informed Mr. Dallas that an understanding exists between the British and French Governments which would lead both to take one and the same course as to recognition. His Lordship then referred to the rumor of a meditated blockade by us of Southern ports, and a discontinuance of them as ports of entry. Mr. Dallas answered that he knew nothing on those topics and therefore could say nothing. He added that you were expected to arrive in two weeks. Upon this statement Lord John Russell acquiesced in the expediency of waiting for the full knowledge you were expected to bring.

Mr. Dallas transmitted to us some newspaper reports of Ministerial explanations made in Parliament.

You will base no proceedings on parliamentary debates farther than to seek explanations when necessary and communicate them to this Department. [We intend to have a clear and simple record of whatever issue may arise between us and Great Britain.]

Leave out.

Leave out, because it does not appear that such explanations were demanded.

Leave out.

The President [is surprised and grieved] *regrets* that Mr. Dallas did not protest against the proposed unofficial intercourse between the British Government and the missionaries of the insurgents, [as well as against the demand for explanations made by the British Government]. It is due however to Mr. Dallas to say that our instructions had been given only to you and not to him, and that his loyalty and fidelity, too rare in these times [among our late representatives abroad are confessed and] *are* appreciated.

Intercourse of any kind with the so-called Commissioners is liable to be construed as a recognition of the authority which appointed them. Such intercourse would be none the less [wrongful] *hurtful* to us, for being called unofficial, and it might be even more injurious, because we should have no means of knowing what points might be resolved by it. Moreover, unofficial intercourse is useless and meaningless, if it is not expected to ripen into official intercourse and direct recognition. It is left doubtful here whether the proposed unofficial intercourse has yet actually begun. Your own [present] antecedent instructions are deemed explicit enough, and it is hoped that you have not misunderstood them. You will in any event desist from all intercourse whatever, unofficial as well as official with the British Government, so long as it shall continue intercourse of either kind with the domestic enemies of this country, [confining yourself simply to a delivery of a copy of this paper to the Secretary of State. After doing this]* you will communicate with this Department and receive farther directions.

Leave out.

** When intercourse shall have been arrested for this cause,*

Lord John Russell has informed us of an understanding between the British and French Governments that they will act together in regard to our affairs. This communication however loses something of its value from the circumstance that the communication was withheld until after knowledge of the fact had been acquired by us from other sources. We know also another fact that has not yet been officially communicated to us, namely that other European States are apprized by France and England of their agreement and are expected to concur with or follow them in whatever measures they adopt on the subject of recognition. The United States have been impartial and just in all their conduct towards the several

nations of Europe. They will not complain however of the combination now announced by the two leading powers, although they think they had a right to expect a more independent if not a more friendly course from each of them. You will take no notice of that or any other alliance. Whenever the European governments shall see fit to communicate directly with us we shall be as heretofore frank and explicit in our reply.

As to the blockade, you will say that by [the] *our own* laws [of nature] and *the laws* of nature and the laws of nations this government has a clear right to suppress insurrection. An exclusion of commerce from national ports which have been seized by the insurgents, in the equitable form of blockade, is a proper means to that end. You will [admit] not insist that our blockade is [not] to be respected if it be not maintained by a competent force—but passing by that question as not now a practical or at least an urgent one you will add that [it] the blockade is now and it will continue to be so maintained, and therefore we expect it to be respected by Great Britain. You will add that we have already revoked the exequatur of a Russian Consul who had enlisted in the Military service of the insurgents, and we shall dismiss or demand the recall of every foreign agent, Consular or Diplomatic, who shall either disobey the Federal laws or disown the Federal authority.

As to the recognition of the so-called Southern Confederacy it is not to be made a subject of technical definition. It is of course [*quasi*] direct recognition to publish an acknowledgment of the sovereignty and independence of a new power. It is [*quasi*] direct recognition to receive its ambassadors, Ministers, agents, or commissioners officially. A concession of belligerent rights is liable to be construed as a recognition of them. No one of these proceedings will [be borne] *pass* [*unnoticed*] unquestioned by the United States in this case.

Hitherto recognition has been moved only on the assumption that the so-called Confederate States are de facto a self-sustaining power. Now after long forbearance, designed to soothe discontent and avert the need of civil war, the land and naval forces of the United States have been put in motion to repress the insurrection. The true character of the pretended new State is at once revealed. It is seen to be a Power existing in pronunciamiento only. It has never won a field. It has obtained no forts that were not virtually betrayed into its hands or seized in breach of trust. It commands not a single port on the coast nor any highway out from its pretended Capital by land. Under these circumstances Great Britain is called upon to intervene and give it body and independence by resisting our measures of suppression. British recognition would be British intervention to create within our own territory a hostile state by overthrowing this Republic itself. [When this act of intervention is distinctly performed, we from that hour shall cease to be friends and become once more, as we have twice before been forced to be enemies of Great Britain.]

[Leave out.]

As to the treatment of privateers in the insurgent service, you will say that this is a question exclusively our own. We treat them as pirates. They are our own citizens, or persons employed by our citizens, preying on the commerce of our country. If Great Britain shall choose to recognize them as lawful belligerents, and give them shelter from our pursuit and punishment, the laws of nations afford an adequate and proper remedy, [and we shall avail ourselves of it. *And while you need not to say this in advance, be sure that you say nothing inconsistent with it.*]

Happily, however, Her Britannic Majesty's Government can avoid all these difficulties. It invited us in 1856 to accede to the declaration of the Congress of Paris, of which body Great Britain was herself a member, abolishing privateering everywhere in all cases and for ever. You *already* have our authority to propose to her our accession to that declaration. If she refuse to receive it, it can only be because she is willing to become the patron of privateering when aimed at our devastation.

These positions are not elaborately defended now, because to vindicate them would imply a possibility of our waiving them.

[Drop all from this line to the end, and in lieu of it write

"This paper is for your own guidance only, and not [sic] to be read or shown to anyone.]

We are not insensible of the grave importance of this occasion. We see how, upon the result of the debate in which we are engaged, a war may ensue between the United States, and one, two, or even more European nations. War in any case is as exceptionable from the habits as it is revolting from the sentiments of the American people. But if it come it will be fully seen that it results from the action of Great Britain, not our own, that Great Britain will have decided to fraternize with our domestic enemy, either without waiting to hear from you our remonstrances, and our warnings, or after having heard them. War in defense of national life is not immoral, and war in defense of independence is an inevitable part of the discipline of nations.

The dispute will be between the European and the American branches of the British race. All who belong to that race will especially deprecate it, as they ought. It may well be believed that men of every race and kindred will deplore it. A war not unlike it between the same parties occurred at the close of the last century. Europe atoned by forty years of suffering for the error that Great Britain committed in provoking that contest. If that nation shall now repeat the same great error the social convulsions which will follow may not be so long but they will be more general. When they shall have ceased, it will, we think, be seen, whatever may have been the fortunes of other nations, that it is not the United States that will have come out of them with its precious Constitution altered or its honestly obtained dominion in any degree abridged. Great Britain has but to wait a few months and all her present inconveniences will cease with all our own troubles. If she take a different course she will calculate for herself the ultimate as well as the immediate consequences, and will consider what position she will hold when she shall have forever lost the sympathies and the affections of the only nation on whose sympathies and affections she has a natural claim. In making that calculation she will do well to remember that in the controversy she proposes to open we shall be actuated by neither pride, nor passion, nor cupidity, nor ambition; but we shall stand simply on the principle of self-preservation, and that our cause will involve the independence of nations, and the rights of human nature.

I am Sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, ESQ., etc., etc., etc.

W. H. S.

[It is quite impossible to reproduce in type the exact form of the manuscript of the dispatch with all its interlineations and corrections; but the foregoing shows those made by Mr. Lincoln with sufficient accuracy. Such additional verbal alterations of Mr. Seward's as merely corrected ordinary slips of the pen or errors of the copyist are not noted. When the President returned the manuscript to his hands, Mr. Seward somewhat changed the form of the dispatch by prefixing to it two short introductory paragraphs in which he embodied, in his own phraseology, the President's direction that the paper was to be merely a confidential instruction not to be read or shown to any one, and that he should not in advance say anything inconsistent with its spirit. This also rendered unnecessary the President's direction to omit the last two paragraphs, and accordingly they remained in the dispatch as finally sent.]

THE mere perusal of this document shows how ill-advised was Mr. Seward's original di-

rection to deliver a copy of it to the British foreign office without further explanation, or without requesting a reply in a limited time. Such a course would have left the American minister in a position of uncertainty whether he was still in diplomatic relations or not, and whether the point had been reached which would justify him in breaking off intercourse; nor would he have had any further pretext upon which to ascertain the disposition or intention of the British Government. It would have been wiser to close the legation at once and return to America. Happily, Mr. Lincoln saw the weak point of the instruction, and by his changes not only kept it within the range of personal and diplomatic courtesy, but left Mr. Adams free to choose for himself the best way of managing the delicate situation.

The main point in question, namely, that the United States would not suffer Great Britain to carry on a double diplomacy with Washington and with Montgomery at the same time — that if she became the active friend of the re-

billion she must become the enemy of the United States, was partly disposed of before the arrival of the amended dispatch at London. Several days before it was written Mr. Adams had his first official interview (May 18) with Lord John Russell, and in the usual formal phraseology, but with emphatic distinctness, told him that if there existed on the part of Great Britain "an intention more or less marked to extend the struggle" by encouragement in any form to the rebels, "I was bound to acknowledge in all frankness that in that contingency I had nothing further left to do in Great Britain." The British minister denied any intention to aid the rebellion, and explained that the Queen's proclamation was issued merely to define their own attitude of strict neutrality, so that British naval officers and other officials might understand how to regulate their conduct.*

When the dispatch finally reached Mr. Adams, he obtained another interview with Lord John Russell, to ascertain definitely the status of the rebel commissioners in London. He told him that a continuance of their apparent relation with the British Government "could scarcely fail to be viewed by us as hostile in spirit, and to require some corresponding action accordingly." Lord John Russell replied that he had only seen the rebel commissioners twice, and "had no expectation of seeing them any more."†

So early as the year 1854, when the shadow of the Crimean war was darkening over Europe, the Government of the United States submitted to the principal maritime nations the propositions, first, that free ships should make free goods, and second, that neutral property on board an enemy's vessel should not be subject to confiscation unless contraband of war. These propositions were not immediately accepted, but when the powers assembled in congress at Paris in 1856, for the purpose of making peace, Great Britain and the other nations which took part in the congress gave them their assent, adding to them, as principles of international law, the abolition of privateering and the obligation that blockades, to be respected, must be effective. The adhesion of the United States having been invited to these four propositions, the Government of that day answered that they would accede to them if the other powers would accept a fifth principle—that the goods of private persons, non-combatants, should be exempt from confiscation in maritime war. This proposition was rejected by the British Government, and the negotiations were then suspended until after Mr. Lincoln became President. A few weeks after his inauguration

the suspended negotiations were taken up by Mr. Seward, who directed Mr. Adams to signify to the British Government that the United States were now ready to accept without reserve the four propositions adopted at the Congress of Paris.‡ After some delay, Lord John Russell remarked to Mr. Adams that in case of the adhesion of the United States to the Declaration of Paris, the engagement on the part of Great Britain would be prospective and would not invalidate anything done. This singular reserve Mr. Adams reported to his Government, and was directed by Mr. Seward to ask some further elucidation of its meaning. But before this dispatch was received, the strange attitude of the British Government was explained by Lord Russell's§ submitting to Mr. Adams a draft of a supplementary declaration on the part of England that her Majesty did not intend, by the projected convention for the accession of the United States to the articles of the Congress of Paris, "to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States." The President, having been informed of this proposed declaration, at once instructed Mr. Adams|| that it was inadmissible, as the Government of the United States could not accede to this great international act except upon the same equal footing upon which all the other parties stood. It afterward transpired that the British Government had, at the same time that these important negotiations were going on with the Government of the United States, approached the new Confederate Government upon the same subject, sending communications in a clandestine manner through the British Legation in Washington to Mr. Bunch, the English consul at Charleston, through whom they were in the same furtive and unofficial manner laid before the authorities at Richmond. The French Government joined in this proceeding, at the invitation of England. Mr. Davis at once recognized the great importance of such quasi-recognition of his Government, and he himself drafted resolutions declaring the purpose of the Confederates to observe the principles towards neutrals embodied in the second and third rules of the Declaration of Paris—that blockades to be binding must be effectual, but

* Adams to Seward, May 21, 1861.

† Adams to Seward, June 14, 1861.

‡ See Mr. Seward's dispatch to Mr. Adams, April 24, 1861; Seward to Adams, May 17, 1861; and papers relating to Treaty of Washington, Vol. I., p. 33, et seq.

§ Lord John Russell was raised to the peerage, under the title of Earl Russell, July 30, 1861.

|| Seward to Adams, Sept. 7, 1861.

that they "maintained the right of privateering."* These resolutions were passed in the Confederate Congress, and Mr. Bunch, conveying the news of this result to Lord Lyons, said:

The wishes of her Majesty's Government would seem to have been fully complied with, for as no proposal was made that the Confederate Government should abolish privateering, it could not be expected that they should do so of their own accord, particularly as it is the arm upon which they most rely for the injury of the extended commerce of their enemy.

The American Government held itself justly aggrieved, therefore, that its accession to the Declaration of Paris was impeded by conditions which it could not, consistently with its dignity, accept; that the British Government was secretly negotiating at the same time with the insurgents upon the same subject; that while the United States were invited to accede to all four of the articles of Paris the Confederate Government was given its choice by the British Cabinet to accept only three. The Government of the United States said afterward in its case at Geneva that

The practical effect of this diplomacy, had it been successful, would have been the destruction of the commerce of the United States or its transfer to the British flag, and the loss of the principal resource of the United States upon the ocean should a continuation of this course of insincere neutrality unhappily force the United States into a war. Great Britain was thus to gain the benefit to its neutral commerce of the recognition of the second and third articles, the rebel privateers and cruisers were to be protected and their devastation legalized, while the United States were to be deprived of a dangerous weapon of assault upon Great Britain.

The action of Mr. Bunch in this matter was properly regarded by the President as a violation of the laws of the United States to which he was accredited, and his exequatur was revoked. A long discussion followed, in which neither side succeeded in convincing the other of its wrong; and the next year, pending an attack upon Charleston, a British man-of-war entered that port and took Mr. Bunch away.

THE "TRENT" AFFAIR.


THE public mind would probably have dwelt with more impatience and dissatisfaction upon the present and prospective inaction of the armies but for an event which turned all thoughts with deep solicitude into an entirely different channel. This was what is known as the *Trent* affair, which seriously threatened to embroil the nation in a war with Great Britain. The Confederate Gov-

* Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington, Vol. I., p. 36.

ernment had appointed two new envoys to proceed to Europe and renew its application for recognition, which its former diplomatic agents had so far failed to obtain. For this duty ex-Senator Mason of Virginia and ex-Senator Slidell of Louisiana were selected, on account of their political prominence, as well as their recognized abilities. On the blockade runner *Theodora*, they, with their secretaries and families, succeeded in eluding the Union cruisers around Charleston, and in reaching Havana, Cuba. Deeming themselves beyond danger of capture, they made no concealment of their presence or mission, but endeavored rather to "magnify their office." The British consul showed them marked attention, and they sought to be presented officially to the Captain-General of Cuba; but that wary functionary explained that he received them only as "distinguished gentlemen." They took passage on board the British mail steamer *Trent* for St. Thomas, intending there to take the regular packet to England.

Captain Wilkes, commanding the United States war steamer *San Jacinto*, just returned from an African cruise, heard of the circumstance, and, going to Havana, fully informed himself of the details of their intended route. The *Trent*, he learned, was to leave Havana on November 7. That day found him stationed in the old Bahama channel, near the northern coast of Cuba, where he had reason to believe she would pass. At about noon of the 8th the lookout announced the approach of the *Trent*, and when she was sufficiently near, the *San Jacinto* fired a round-shot across her course, and displayed the American colors. The British steamer did not seem disposed to accept the warning and failed to slacken her speed, whereupon Captain Wilkes ordered a shell to be fired across her bows, which at once brought her to. Lieutenant Fairfax, with two officers and a guard of marines, left the *San Jacinto* and rowed to the mail steamer; the lieutenant mounted to the deck alone, leaving his officers and men in the boat. He was shown to the quarter-deck, where he met Captain Moir of the *Trent*, and, informing him who he was, asked to see his passenger-list. Captain Moir declined to show it. Lieutenant Fairfax then told him of his information that the rebel commissioners were on board and that he must satisfy himself on that point before allowing the steamer to proceed. The envoys and their secretaries came up, and, hearing their names mentioned, asked if they were wanted. Lieutenant Fairfax now made known in full the purport of his orders and the object of his visit.

The altercation and commotion called a



CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY MAYALL, LENT BY THEODORE F. DWIGHT, ESQ.)

considerable number of passengers around the group. All of them manifested open secession sympathy, and some indulged in abusive language so loud and demonstrative that the lieutenant's two officers, and six or eight armed men from the boat, without being called, mounted to the lieutenant's assistance. In these unfriendly demonstrations the mail agent of the *Trent*, one Captain Williams, a retired British naval officer, made himself especially conspicuous with the declaration that he was the "Queen's representative," and with various threats of the consequences of the affair. The captain of the *Trent* firmly but quietly opposed all compliance or search, and the envoys and their secretaries protested

against arrest, whereupon Lieutenant Fairfax sent one of his officers back to the *San Jacinto* for additional force. In perhaps half an hour the second boat returned from the *San Jacinto* with some twenty-four additional men. Lieutenant Fairfax now proceeded to execute his orders without actual violence, and with all the politeness possible under the circumstances. Mason and Slidell, and their secretaries, foreseeing the inevitable, had retired to their state-rooms to pack their luggage; thither it was necessary to follow them, and there the presence of the families of Slidell and Eustis created some slight confusion, and a few armed marines entered the cabin, but were sent back. The final act of capture and

removal was then carried out with formal stage solemnity.*

Captain Wilkes's first instruction to Lieutenant Fairfax was to seize the *Trent* as a prize, but, as he afterward explained:

I forbore to seize her, however, in consequence of my being so reduced in officers and crew, and the derangement it would cause innocent persons, there being a large number of passengers, who would have been put to great loss and inconvenience as well as disappointment from the interruption it would have caused them in not being able to join the steamer from St. Thomas for Europe.†

The *Trent* was allowed to proceed on her voyage, while the *San Jacinto* steamed away for Boston, where she arrived on the 24th of



REAR-ADMIRAL CHARLES WILKES, U. S. N.
(FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY ANTHONY.)

November, and transferred her prisoners to Fort Warren.

The whole country rang with exultation

* "When the marines and some armed men had been formed," reports Lieutenant Fairfax, "just outside of the main deck cabin, where these four gentlemen had gone to pack up their baggage, I renewed my efforts to induce them to accompany me on board, they still refusing to accompany me unless force was applied. I called in to my assistance four or five officers, and first taking hold of Mr. Mason's shoulder, with another officer on the opposite side, I went as far as the gang-way of the steamer, and delivered him over to Lieutenant Greer, to be placed in the boat. I then returned for Mr. Slidell, who insisted that I must apply considerable force to get him to go with me. Calling in at last three officers, he also was taken in charge and handed over to Mr. Greer. Mr. McFarland and Mr. Eustis, after protesting, went quietly into the boat." "There was a great deal of excitement on board at this time," says another report, "and the officers and passengers

over the exploit. The feeling was greatly heightened by the general public indignation at the unfriendliness England had so far manifested to the Union cause; but perhaps more especially because the two persons seized had been among the most bitter and active of the secession conspirators. The public press lauded Captain Wilkes, Boston gave him a banquet, and the Secretary of the Navy wrote him a letter of emphatic approval. He congratulated him "on the great public service" he had rendered in the capture, and expressed only the reservation that his conduct in omitting to capture the vessel must not be allowed to constitute a precedent.‡ When Congress met on the 2d of December following, the House of Representatives immediately passed a resolution, without a dissenting voice, thanking Captain Wilkes for his "brave, adroit, and patriotic conduct"; while by other resolutions the President was requested to order the prisoners into close confinement, in retaliation for similar treatment by the rebels of certain prisoners of war. The whole strong current of public feeling approved the act without qualification, and manifested an instant and united readiness to defend it.

President Lincoln's usual cool judgment at once recognized the dangers and complications that might grow out of the occurrence. A well-known writer has recorded what he said in a confidential interview on the day the news was received:

I fear the traitors will prove to be white elephants. We must stick to American principles concerning the rights of neutrals. We fought Great Britain for insisting, by theory and practice, on the right to do precisely what Captain Wilkes has done. If Great Britain shall now protest against the act, and demand their release, we must give them up, apologize for the act as a violation of our doctrines, and thus forever bind her over to keep the peace in relation to neutrals, and so acknowledge that she has been wrong for sixty years.§

The Cabinet generally coincided in expressing gratification and approval. The international questions involved came upon them so suddenly that they were not ready with de-

of the steamer were addressing us by numerous opprobrious epithets, such as calling us pirates, villains, traitors, etc." (Report Secretary of the Navy, Dec. 2, 1861.) The families of Slidell and Eustis had meanwhile been tendered the use of the cabin of the *San Jacinto*, if they preferred to accompany the prisoners; but they declined, and proceeded in the *Trent*.

† Report Secretary of the Navy, Dec. 2, 1861.

‡ Welles, in "The Galaxy," May, 1873, pp. 647-649.

§ Lossing, "Civil War in the United States," Vol. II., p. 156.

¶ Secretary of the Navy Welles corroborated the statement in "The Galaxy" for May, 1873, p. 647: "The President, with whom I had an interview immediately on receiving information that the emissaries were captured and on board the *San Jacinto*, before consultation with any other member of the Cabinet discussed with me some of the difficult points presented. His chief

cided opinions concerning the law and policy of the case; besides, the true course obviously was to await the action of Great Britain.


The passengers on board the *Trent*, as well as the reports of her officers, carried the news of the capture directly to England, where the incident raised a storm of public opinion even more violent than that in the United States, and very naturally on the opposite side. The Government of England relied for its information mainly upon the official report of the mail agent, Captain Williams, who had made himself so officious as the "Queen's representative," and who, true to the secession sympathies manifested by him on shipboard, gave his report a strong coloring of the same character. English public feeling, popular and official, smarted under the idea that the United States had perpetrated a gross outrage, and the clamor for instant redress left no room for any calm consideration of the far-reaching questions of international law involved. There seemed little possibility that a war could be avoided, and England began immediate preparations for such an emergency. Some eight thousand troops were dispatched to Canada, ships were ordered to join the English squadrons in American waters, and the usual proclamation issued prohibiting the export of arms and certain war supplies.

Two days after the receipt of the news Lord Palmerston, in a note to the Queen, formulated the substance of a demand to be sent to the United States. He wrote:

The general outline and tenor which appeared to meet the opinions of the Cabinet would be, that the Washington Government should be told that what has been done is a violation of international law and of the rights of Great Britain, and that your Majesty's Government trusts that the act will be disavowed, and the prisoners set free and restored to British protection; and that Lord Lyons should be instructed that, if this demand is refused, he should retire from the United States.*

On the following day the formal draft of the proposed dispatch to Lord Lyons was laid before the Queen, who, together with Prince Albert, examined it with unusual care. The critical character of the communication, and the imminent danger—the almost certainty

anxiety—for his attention had never been turned to admiralty law and naval captures—was as to the disposition of the prisoners, who, to use his own expression, would be elephants on our hands, that we could not easily dispose of. Public indignation was so over-




JOHN SLIDELL.

—of a rupture and war with America which it revealed, made a profound impression upon both. Prince Albert was already suffering from the illness which terminated his life two weeks afterward. This new and grave political question gave him a sleepless night. "He could eat no breakfast," is the entry in her Majesty's diary, "and looked very wretched. But still he was well enough on getting up to make a draft for me to write to Lord Russell, in correction of his draft to Lord Lyons, sent me yesterday, which Albert did not approve."

The Queen returns these important drafts, which upon the whole she approves; but she cannot help feeling that the main draft—that for communication to the American Government—is somewhat meager. She should have liked to have seen the expression of a hope that the American captain did not act under instructions, or, if he did, that he misapprehended them—that the United States Government must be fully aware that the British Government could not allow its flag to be insulted, and the security of her mail communications to be placed in jeopardy; and her Majesty's Government are unwilling to believe that the United States Government intended wantonly to put an insult upon this country, and to add to their many distressing

welming against the chief conspirators that he feared it would be difficult to prevent severe and exemplary punishment, which he always deprecated."

* Martin, "Life of the Prince Consort," Vol. V., p. 420.



J. M. MASON.

complications by forcing a question of dispute upon us; and that we are therefore glad to believe that upon a full consideration of the circumstances of the undoubted breach of international law committed, they would spontaneously offer such redress as alone could satisfy this country, viz., the restoration of the unfortunate passengers and a suitable apology.*

It proved to be the last political memorandum he ever wrote. The exact language of his correction, had it been sent, would not have been well calculated to soothe the irritated susceptibilities of Americans. To the charge of "violating international law," to which Palmerston's cold note confined itself, he added the accusation of "wanton insult," though disclaiming a belief that it was intended. But a kind and pacific spirit shines through his memorandum as a whole, and it is evident that both the Queen and himself, gratefully remembering the welcome America had lately accorded the Prince of Wales, shrank from the prospect of an angry war. In this the Queen unconsciously responded to the impulse of amity and goodwill which had induced the President to modify so materially his foreign secretary's dispatch of the 21st of May, the unpremeditated thought of the ruler, in each case, being at once wiser and more humane than the first intention of the diplomatists. It was from the intention rather than the words of the Prince that the

Queen's ministers took their cue and modified the phraseology into more temperate shape. Earl Russell wrote:

Her Majesty's Government, bearing in mind the friendly relations which have long subsisted between Great Britain and the United States, are willing to believe that the United States' naval officer who committed this aggression was not acting in compliance with any authority from his Government, or that if he conceived himself to be so authorized, he greatly misunderstood the instructions he had received. For the Government of the United States must be fully aware that the British Government could not allow such an affront to the national honor to pass without full reparation, and her Majesty's Government are unwilling to believe that it could be the deliberate intention of the Government of the United States unnecessarily to force into discussion between the two Governments a question of so grave a character, and with regard to which the whole British nation would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feeling. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, trust that when this matter shall have been brought under the consideration of the Government of the United States, that Government will of its own accord offer to the British Government such redress as alone would satisfy the British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen and their delivery to your Lordship, in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed. Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose them to him.†

In the private note accompanying this formal dispatch further instruction was given, that if the demand were not substantially complied with in seven days, Lord Lyons should break off diplomatic relations and return with his whole legation to London. Yet at the last moment Lord Russell himself seems to have become impressed with the brow-beating precipitancy of the whole proceeding, for he added another private note, better calculated than even the Queen's modification to soften the disagreeable announcement to the American Government. He wrote to Lord Lyons:

My wish would be, that at your first interview with Mr. Seward you should not take my dispatch with you, but should prepare him for it and ask him to settle it with the President and the Cabinet what course they will propose. The next time you should bring my dispatch and read it to him fully. If he asks what will be the consequence of his refusing compliance, I think you should say that you wish to leave him and the President quite free to take their own course, and that you desire to abstain from anything like menace.‡

* Martin, "Life of the Prince Consort," Vol. V., p. 422.

† Earl Russell to Lord Lyons, Nov. 30, 1861. British "Blue Book."

‡ Inclosure in No. 49. British "Blue Book."

This last diplomatic touch reveals that the Ministry, like the Queen, shrank from war, but that it desired to reap all the advantages of a public menace, even while privately disclaiming one.

The British demand reached Washington on the 19th of December. It happened, fortunately, that Lord Lyons and Mr. Seward were on excellent terms of personal friendship, and the British envoy was therefore able to present the affair with all the delicacy which had been suggested by Lord Russell. The Government at Washington had carefully abstained from any action other than that already mentioned. Lord Lyons wrote:

Mr. Seward received my communication seriously and with dignity, but without any manifestation of dissatisfaction. Some further conversation ensued in consequence of questions put by him with a view to ascertain the exact character of the dispatch. At the conclusion he asked me to give him to-morrow to consider the question, and to communicate with the President.*

Another dispatch from Lord Lyons shows that Mr. Seward asked a further delay, and that Lord Russell's communication was not formally read to him till Monday, the 23d of December.†

If we may credit the statement of Secretary Welles, Mr. Seward had not expected so serious a view of the affair by the British Government; and his own language implies as much when, in a private letter some months afterward, he mentions Lord Lyons's communication as "our first knowledge that the British Government proposed to make it a question of offense or insult, and so of war," adding: "If I had been as tame as you think would have been wise in my treatment of affairs with that country, I should have no standing in my own."‡ But while Mr. Seward, like most other Americans, was doubtless elated by the first news that the rebel envoys were captured, he readily discerned that the incident was one of great diplomatic gravity and likely to be fruitful of prolonged diplomatic contention. Evidently in this spirit, and for the purpose of reserving to the United States every advantage in the serious discussion which was unavoidable, he prudently wrote in a confidential dispatch to Mr. Adams, on November 27:

I forbear from speaking of the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell. The act was done by Commodore Wilkes without instructions, and even without the knowledge of the Government. Lord Lyons has judiciously refrained from all communication with me on

* Lyons to Russell, Dec. 19, 1861.

† Lyons to Russell, Dec. 23, 1861. British "Blue Book."

‡ Seward to Weed, March 2, 1862. "The Galaxy," August, 1870.

the subject, and I thought it equally wise to reserve ourselves until we hear what the British Government may have to say on the subject.

Of the confidential first interviews between the Secretary of State and the President on this important topic there is no record. From what remains we may easily infer that the President clearly saw the inevitable necessities surrounding the question, and was anxiously searching some method of preserving to the United States whatever of indirect advantage might accrue from compliance with the British demand, and of making that compliance as palatable as might be to American public opinion. In this spirit we may presume he wrote the following experimental draft of a dispatch, preserved in his autograph manuscript. Its chief proposal is to arbitrate the difficulty, or in the alternative seriously to examine the question in all its aspects, and out of them to formulate a binding rule for both nations to govern similar cases. It was an honest and practical suggestion to turn an accidental quarrel into a great and durable transaction for the betterment of international law.

The dispatch of her Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, dated the 30th of November, 1861, and of which your Lordship kindly furnished me a copy, has been carefully considered by the President; and he directs me to say that if there existed no fact or facts pertinent to the case, beyond those stated in said dispatch, the reparation sought by Great Britain from the United States would be justly due, and should be promptly made. The President is unwilling to believe that her Majesty's Government will press for a categorical answer upon what appears to him to be only a partial record, in the making up of which he has been allowed no part. He is reluctant to volunteer his view of the case, with no assurance that her Majesty's Government will consent to hear him; yet this much he directs me to say, that this Government has intended no affront to the British flag, or to the British nation; nor has it intended to force into discussion an embarrassing question, all which is evident by the fact hereby asserted, that the act complained of was done by the officer without orders from, or expectation of, the Government. But being done, it was no longer left to us to consider whether we might not, to avoid a controversy, waive an unimportant though a strict right; because we too, as well as Great Britain, have a people justly jealous of their rights, and in whose presence our Government could undo the act complained of only upon a fair showing that it was wrong, or at least very questionable. The United States Government and people are still willing to make reparation upon such showing.

Accordingly I am instructed by the President to inquire whether her Majesty's Government will hear the United States upon the matter in question. The President desires, among other things, to bring into view, and have considered, the existing rebellion in the United States; the position Great Britain has assumed, including her Majesty's proclamation in relation thereto; the relation the persons whose seizure is the subject of complaint bore to the United States, and the object of their voyage at the time they were seized; the knowledge which the master of the *Trent* had of their relation to the United States, and of the object of their voyage, at the time he received them on board for the

voyage; the place of the seizure; and the precedents and respective positions assumed, in analogous cases, between Great Britain and the United States.

Upon a submission, containing the foregoing facts, with those set forth in the before-mentioned dispatch to your Lordship, together with all other facts which either party may deem material, I am instructed to say, the Government of the United States will, if agreed to by her Majesty's Government, go to such friendly arbitration as is usual among nations, and will abide the award.

Or, in the alternative, her Majesty's Government may, upon the same record, determine whether any, and if any, what, reparation is due from the United States; provided no such reparation shall be different in character from, nor transcend, that proposed by your Lordship, as instructed in and by the dispatch aforesaid; and provided further, that the determination thus made shall be the law for all future analogous cases between Great Britain and the United States.*

We may suppose that upon consultation with Mr. Seward, Mr. Lincoln decided that, desirable as this proceeding might be, it was precluded by the impatient, inflexible terms of the British demand. Only three days of the seven-days' grace remained; if they should not by the coming Thursday agree to deliver Mason and Slidell, the British legation would close its doors, and the consternation of a double war would fill the air. It is probable, therefore, that even while writing this draft, Lincoln had intimated to his Secretary of State the need of finding good diplomatic reasons for surrendering the prisoners.

A note of Mr. Seward shows us that the Cabinet meeting to consider finally the *Trent* question was appointed for Tuesday morning, December 24; but the Secretary says that, availing himself of the President's permission, he had postponed it to Wednesday morning at 10 A. M., adding, "I shall then be ready." It is probably true, as he afterward wrote,† that the whole framing of his dispatch was left to his own ingenuity and judgment, and that neither the President nor any member of the Cabinet had arrived at any final determination. The private diary of Attorney-General Bates supplies us some additional details:

Cabinet council at 10 A. M., December 25, to consider the relations with England on Lord Lyons's demand of the surrender of Mason and Slidell; a long and interesting session, lasting till 2 P. M. The instructions of the British Minister to Lord Lyons were read. . . . There was read a draft of answer by the Secretary of State.

The President's experimental draft quoted above was not read; there is no mention of

* Lincoln, unpublished MS.

† The consideration of the *Trent* case was crowded out by pressing domestic affairs until Christmas Day. It was considered on my presentation of it on the 25th and 26th of December. The Government, when it took the subject up, had no idea of the grounds upon which it would explain its action, nor did it believe it would

either the reading or the points it raised. The whole discussion appears to have been confined to Seward's paper. There was some desultory talk, a general comparing of rumors and outside information, a reading of the few letters which had been received from Europe. Mr. Sumner, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was invited in, and read letters he had received from John Bright and Richard Cobden, liberal members of the British Parliament and devoted friends of the Union. During the session also there was handed in and read the dispatch just received from his Government by M. Mercier, the French minister, and which, in substance, took the English view of the matter. The diary continues:

Mr. Seward's draft of letter to Lord Lyons was submitted by him, and examined and criticised by us with apparently perfect candor and frankness. All of us were impressed with the magnitude of the subject, and believed that upon our decision depended the dearest interest, probably the existence, of the nation. I, waiving the question of legal right,—upon which all Europe is against us, and also many of our own best jurists,—urged the necessity of the case; that to go to war with England now is to abandon all hope of suppressing the rebellion, as we have not the possession of the land, nor any support of the people of the South. The maritime superiority of Britain would sweep us from all the Southern waters. Our trade would be utterly ruined, and our treasury bankrupt; in short, that we must not have war with England.

There was great reluctance on the part of some of the members of the Cabinet—and even the President himself—to acknowledge these obvious truths; but all yielded to, and unanimously concurred in, Mr. Seward's letter to Lord Lyons, after some verbal and formal amendments. The main fear, I believe, was the displeasure of our own people—lest they should accuse us of timidly truckling to the power of England.‡

The published extracts from the diary of Secretary Chase give somewhat fully his opinion on the occasion:

Mr. Chase thought it certainly was not too much to expect of a friendly nation, and especially of a nation of the same blood, religion, and characteristic civilization as our own, that in consideration of the great rights she would overlook the little wrong; nor could he then persuade himself that, were all the circumstances known to the English Government as to ours, the surrender of the rebel commissioners would be insisted upon. The Secretary asserted that the technical right was undoubtedly with England. . . . Were the circumstances reversed, our Government would, Mr. Chase thought, accept the explanation, and let England keep her rebels; and he could not divest himself of the belief that, were the case fairly understood, the British Government would do likewise. "But," continued Secretary Chase, "we cannot afford delays. While

concede the case. Yet it was heartily unanimous in the actual result after two days' examination, and in favor of the release. Remember that in a council like ours there are some strong wills to be reconciled. [Seward to Weed, Jan. 22, 1862. Weed, "Autobiography," Vol. II., p. 409.]

‡ Bates, Diary. Unpublished MS.

the matter hangs in uncertainty the public mind will remain disquieted, our commerce will suffer serious harm, our action against the rebels must be greatly hindered, and the restoration of our prosperity—largely identified with that of all nations—must be delayed. Better, then, to make now the sacrifice of feeling involved in the surrender of these rebels, than even avoid it by the delays which explanations must occasion. I give my adhesion, therefore, to the conclusion at which the Secretary of State has arrived. It is gall and wormwood to me. Rather than consent to the liberation of these men, I would sacrifice everything I possess. But I am consoled by the reflection that while nothing but severest retribution is due to them, the surrender under existing circumstances is but simply doing right—simply proving faithful to our own ideas and traditions under strong temptations to violate them; simply giving to England and the world the most signal proof that the American nation will not under any circumstances, for the sake of inflicting just punishment on rebels, commit even a technical wrong against neutrals.”*

In these two recorded opinions are reflected the substantial tone and temper of the Cabinet discussion, which ended, as both Mr. Bates and Mr. Seward have stated, in a unanimous concurrence in the letter of reply as drawn up by the Secretary of State. That long and remarkably able document must be read in full, both to understand the wide range of the subject which he treated and the clearness and force of his language and argument. It constitutes one of his chief literary triumphs. There is room here only to indicate the conclusions arrived at in his examination. First, he held that the four persons seized and their dispatches were contraband of war; secondly, that Captain Wilkes had a right by the law of nations to detain and search the *Trent*; thirdly, that he exercised the right in a lawful and proper manner; fourthly, that he had a right to capture the contraband found. The real issue of the case centered in the fifth question: “Did Captain Wilkes exercise the right of capturing the contraband in conformity with the law of nations?” Reciting the deficiency of recognized rules on this point, Mr. Seward held that only by taking the vessel before a prize court could the existence of contraband be lawfully established; and that Captain Wilkes having released the vessel from capture, the necessary judicial examination was prevented, and the capture left unfinished or abandoned.

Mr. Seward’s dispatch continued:

I trust that I have shown to the satisfaction of the British Government, by a very simple and natural statement of the facts and analysis of the law applicable to them, that this Government has neither meditated, nor practiced, nor approved any deliberate wrong

in the transaction to which they have called its attention, and, on the contrary, that what has happened has been simply an inadvertency, consisting in a departure by the naval officer, free from any wrongful motive, from a rule uncertainly established, and probably by the several parties concerned either imperfectly understood or entirely unknown. For this error the British Government has a right to expect the same reparation that we, as an independent State, should expect from Great Britain or from any other friendly nation in a similar case. . . . If I decide this case in favor of my own Government, I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those principles and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the case itself. . . . The four persons in question are now held in military custody at Fort Warren, in the State of Massachusetts. They will be cheerfully liberated.†

With the formal delivery of Mason and Slidell and their secretaries to the custody of the British minister, the diplomatic incident was completed on the part of the United States. Lord Russell, on his part, while announcing that her Majesty’s Government differed from Mr. Seward in some of the conclusions‡ at which he had arrived, nevertheless acknowledged that the action of the American Government constituted “the reparation which her Majesty and the British nation had a right to expect.”§ It is not too much to say that not merely the rulers and Cabinets of both nations, but also those of all the great European powers, were relieved from an oppressive apprehension by this termination of the affair.

If from one point of view the United States suffered a certain diplomatic defeat and humiliation, it became, in another light, a real international victory. The turn of affairs placed not only England, but France and other nations as well, distinctly on their good behavior. In the face of this American example of moderation they could no longer so openly brave the liberal sentiment of their own people by the countenance they had hitherto given the rebellion. So far from improving or enhancing the hostile mission of Mason and Slidell, the adventure they had undergone served to diminish their importance and circumscribe their influence. The very act of their liberation compelled the British authorities sharply to define the hollow pretense under which they were sent. In his instructions to the British Government vessel which received them at Provincetown and conveyed them to England, Lord Lyons wrote:

It is hardly necessary that I should remind you that these gentlemen have no official character. It will be

seizure, were not contraband; secondly, that the bringing of the *Trent* before a prize court, though it would alter the character would not diminish the offense against the law of nations.

§ Russell to Lyons, Jan. 10, 1862.

* Warden, “Life of Chase,” pp. 393, 394.

† Seward to Lyons, Dec. 26, 1861.

‡ In a dispatch to Lord Lyons of Jan. 23, 1862, in which he discusses the questions at some length, Lord Russell held: first, that Mason and Slidell and their supposed dispatches, under the circumstances of their

right for you to receive them with all courtesy and respect as private gentlemen of distinction; but it would be very improper to pay to them any of those honors which are paid to official persons.*

The same result in a larger degree awaited their advent in Europe. Under the intense publicity of which they had been the subject, officials of all degrees were in a measure com-

pelled to avoid them as political "suspects." Mason was received in England with cold and studied neglect; while Slidell in France, though privately encouraged by the Emperor Napoleon III., finally found himself a victim instead of a beneficiary of his selfishness.

* Lyons to Commander Hewett, Dec. 30, 1861. British "Blue Book."

BIRD MUSIC: SPARROWS.

THE SONG SPARROW.

THE sparrow family is a large one. There may be twenty species, half of which, at least, spend their summer in New England. The song sparrows are the most numerous, sing the most, and exhibit the greatest variety of melody. Standing near a small pond recently, I heard a song sparrow sing four distinct songs within twenty minutes, repeating each several times.



I have more than twenty songs of this sparrow, and have heard him in many other forms. He generally gives a fine trill at the beginning or end of his song. Sometimes, however, it is introduced in the middle, and occasionally is omitted, especially in the latter part of the season. There is a marked difference in the quality and volume of the voices of different individuals. During the season of 1885 I listened almost daily to the strongest and best sparrow voice that I have ever heard. There was a fullness and richness, particularly in the trills, that reminded one of the bewitching tones of the wood-thrush. These are some of his songs:



That the singers of any species sing exactly alike, with the same voice and style, and in the same key always, is a great mistake.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

TENNESSEE AND KENTUCKY.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

HALLECK.



IN sending General Hunter to relieve Frémont, the President did not intend that he should remain in charge of the Department of the West. Out of its vast extent the Department of Kansas was created a few days afterward, embracing the State of Kansas, the Indian Territory, and the Territories of Nebraska, Colorado, and Dakota, with headquarters at Fort Leavenworth, and Hunter was transferred to its command. General Halleck was assigned to the Department of the Missouri, embracing the States of Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Arkansas, and that portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River.

Henry Wager Halleck was born in Oneida County, New York, January 15, 1815. Educated at Union College, he entered the military academy at West Point, where he graduated third in a class of thirty-one, and was made second lieutenant of engineers July 1, 1839. While yet a cadet he was employed at the academy as assistant professor of engineering. From the first he devoted himself with constant industry to the more serious studies of his profession. He had attained a first lieutenantcy when the Mexican war broke out, and was sent to the Pacific coast. Valuable services in the military and naval operations prosecuted there secured him the brevet of captain from May 1, 1847. On the conquest of California by the United States forces, he took part in the political organization of the new State, first as Secretary of State under the military governors, and afterward as leading member of the convention which framed the constitution under which California was admitted to the Union.

He remained in the army and in charge of various engineering duties on the Pacific coast until August 1, 1854, having been meanwhile promoted captain of engineers. At that date he resigned his commission to engage in civil pursuits. He became a member of a law firm, and was also interested in mines and railroads,

when the outbreak of the rebellion called him again into the military service of the Government. He was not only practically accomplished in his profession as a soldier, but also distinguished as a writer on military art and science. Halleck's high qualifications were well understood and appreciated by General Scott, at whose suggestion he was appointed a major-general in the regular army to date from August 19, 1861, with orders to report himself at army headquarters in Washington. A phrase in one of Scott's letters, setting forth McClellan's disregard for his authority, creates the inference that the old general intended that Halleck should succeed him in chief command. But when the latter reached Washington, the confusion and disasters in the Department of the West were at their culmination, and urgent necessity required him to be sent thither to succeed Frémont.

General Halleck arrived at St. Louis on November 18, 1861, and assumed command on the 19th. His written instructions stated forcibly the reforms he was expected to bring about, and his earlier reports indicate that his difficulties had not been overstated—irregularities in contracts, great confusion in organization, everywhere a want of arms and supplies, absence of routine and discipline. Added to this was reported danger from the enemy. He telegraphs under date of November 29:

I am satisfied that the enemy is operating in and against this State with a much larger force than was supposed when I left Washington, and also that a general insurrection is organizing in the counties near the Missouri River, between Boonville and Saint Joseph. A desperate effort will be made to supply and winter their troops in this State, so as to spare their own resources for a summer campaign.

An invasion was indeed in contemplation, but rumor had magnified its available strength. General Price had, since the battle of Lexington, lingered in south-western Missouri, and was once more preparing for a northward march. His method of campaigning was peculiar, and needed only the minimum of organization and preparation. His troops were made up mainly of young, reckless, hardy Missourians, to whom a campaign was

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an adventure of pastime and excitement, and who brought, each man, his own horse, gun, and indispensable equipments and clothing. The usual burdens of an army commissariat and transportation were of little moment to these partisans, who started up as if by magic from every farm and thicket, and gathered their supplies wherever they went. To quote the language of one of the Missouri rebel leaders: "Our forces, to combat or cut them off, would require only a haversack to where the enemy would require a wagon." The evil of the system was, that such forces vanished quite as rapidly as they appeared. The enthusiastic squads with which Price had won his victory at Lexington were scattered among their homes and haunts. The first step of a campaign, therefore, involved the gathering of a new army, and this proved not so easy in the opening storms of winter as it had in the fine midsummer weather. On the 26th of November, 1861, Price issued a call for 50,000 men. The language of his proclamation, however, breathed more of despair than of confidence. He reminded his adherents that only one in forty had answered to the former call, and that "Boys and small property-holders have in main fought the battles for the protection of your property." He repeated many times, with emphasis, "I must have 50,000 men."* His prospects were far from encouraging. McCulloch, in a mood of stubborn disagreement, was withdrawing his army to Arkansas, where he went into winter quarters. Later on, when Price formally requested his cooperation, McCulloch as formally refused. For the moment the Confederate cause in south-western Missouri was languishing. Governor Jackson made a show of keeping it alive by calling the fugitive remnant of his rebel legislature together at Neosho, and with the help of his sole official relic — the purloined State seal — enacting the well-worn farce of passing a secession ordinance, and making a military league with the Confederate States.

The Confederate Congress at Richmond responded to the sham with an act to admit Missouri to the Confederacy. An act of more promise at least, appropriating a million dollars to aid the Confederate cause in that State, had been passed in the preceding August. Such small installment of this fund, however, as was transmitted failed even to pay the soldiers, who for their long service had not as yet received a penny. In return the Richmond authorities asked the transfer of Missouri troops to the Confederate service; but with this request the rebel Missouri leaders

were unable immediately to comply. When, under date of December 30, 1861, Governor Jackson complained of neglect and once more urged that Price be made commander in Missouri, Jefferson Davis responded sarcastically that not a regiment had been tendered, and that he could not appoint a general before he had troops for him.† From all these causes Price's projected winter campaign failed, and he attributed the failure to McCulloch's refusal to help him.‡

The second part of the rebel programme in Missouri, that of raising an insurrection north of the Missouri River, proved more effective. Halleck was scarcely in command when the stir and agitation of depredations and the burning of bridges, by small squads of secessionists in disguise, were reported from various counties of northern Missouri. Federal detachments went promptly in pursuit, and the perpetrators as usual disappeared, only however to break out with fresh outrages when quiet and safety had apparently been restored. It was soon evident that this was not merely a manifestation of neighborhood disloyalty, but that it was part of a deliberate system instigated by the principal rebel leaders. "Do you intend to regard men," wrote Price to Halleck, January 12, 1862, "whom I have specially dispatched to destroy roads, burn bridges, tear up culverts, etc., as amenable to an enemy's court-martial, or will you have them to be tried as usual, by the proper authorities, according to the statutes of the State?" § Halleck, who had placed the State under martial law, to enable him to deal more effectually with this class of offenders, stated his authority and his determination, with distinct emphasis, in his reply of January 22, 1862:

You must be aware, general, that no orders of yours can save from punishment spies, marauders, robbers, incendiaries, guerrilla bands, etc., who violate the laws of war. You cannot give immunity to crime. But let us fully understand each other on this point. If you send armed forces, wearing the garb of soldiers and duly organized and enrolled as legitimate belligerents, to destroy railroads, bridges, etc., as a military act, we shall kill them, if possible, in open warfare; or, if we capture them, we shall treat them as prisoners of war. But it is well understood that you have sent numbers of your adherents, in the garb of peaceful citizens and under false pretenses, through our lines into northern Missouri, to rob and destroy the property of Union men and to burn and destroy railroad bridges, thus endangering the lives of thousands, and this, too, without any military necessity or possible military advantage. Moreover, peaceful citizens of Missouri, quietly working on their farms, have been instigated by your emissaries to take up arms as insurgents, and to rob and plunder, and to commit arson and murder. They do not even act under the garb of soldiers, but under false pretenses and in the

* War Records.

† Davis to Jackson, Jan. 8, 1862. *Ibid.*

‡ Price to Polk, Dec. 23, 1861. *Ibid.*

§ Price to Halleck. *Ibid.*

guise of peaceful citizens. You certainly will not pretend that men guilty of such crimes, although "specially appointed and instructed by you," are entitled to the rights and immunities of ordinary prisoners of war.

One important effect which Price hoped to produce by the guerrilla rising he was instigating was to fill his army with recruits. "The most populous and truest counties of the State," he wrote, "lie upon or north of the Missouri River. . . . I sent a detachment of 1100 men to Lexington, which after remaining only a part of one day gathered together about 2500 recruits, and escorted them in safety to me at Osceola." His statement was partly correct, but other causes contributed both to this partial success and the partial defeat that immediately followed. Just at the time this expedition went to Lexington, the various Federal detachments north of the Missouri River were engaged in driving a number of secession guerrilla bands southward across that stream. Halleck was directing the joint movements of the Union troops, and had stationed detachments of Pope's forces south of the Missouri River, with the design of intercepting and capturing the fugitive bands. A slight failure of some of the reports to reach him disconcerted and partly frustrated his design. The earliest guerrilla parties which crossed at and near Lexington escaped and made their way to Price, but the later ones were intercepted and captured as Halleck had planned. Pope reports, September 19:

Colonel Davis came upon the enemy near Milford late this afternoon, and having driven in his pickets assaulted him in force. A brisk skirmish ensued, when the enemy, finding himself surrounded and cut off, surrendered at discretion. One thousand three hundred prisoners, including 3 colonels and 17 captains, 1000 stand of arms, 1000 horses, 65 wagons, tents, baggage, and supplies have fallen into our hands. Our loss is 2 killed and 8 wounded.*

On the next day he found his capture was still larger, as he telegraphs: "Just arrived here. Troopers much embarrassed with nearly 2000 prisoners and great quantity of captured property."

In anticipation of the capture or dispersion of these north-western detachments of rebels, Halleck had directed the collection of an army at and about Rolla, with the view to move in force against Price. General Samuel R. Curtis was, on December 25, assigned to the command of the Union troops to operate in the south-western district of Missouri. Some 10,000 men were gathered to form his column; and had he known Price's actual condition, the possibility of a short and successful campaign was before him. But the situation

was also one of difficulty. The railroad ended at Rolla; Springfield, the supposed location of Price's camp, was a hundred and twenty miles to the south-west, with bad roads, through a mountainous country. Rebel sentiment and sympathy were strong throughout the whole region, and the favoring surroundings enabled Price to conceal his designs and magnify his numbers. Rumors came that he intended to fight at Springfield, and the estimates of his strength varied from 20,000 to 40,000. The greatest obstacle to a pursuit was the severity of the winter weather; nevertheless the Union soldiers bore their privations with admirable patience and fortitude, and Halleck urged a continuance of the movement through every hindrance and discouragement. He writes to McClellan, January 14, 1862:

I have ordered General Curtis to move forward, with all his infantry and artillery. His force will not be less than 12,000. The enemy is reported to have between 35 and 40 guns. General Curtis has only 24; but I send him 6 pieces to-morrow, and will send 6 more in a few days. I also propose placing a strong reserve at Rolla, which can be sent forward if necessary. The weather is intensely cold, and the troops, supplied as they are with very inferior clothing, blankets, and tents, must suffer greatly in a winter campaign, and yet I see no way of avoiding it. Unless Price is driven from the State, insurrections will continually occur in all the central and northern counties, so as to prevent the withdrawal of our troops.

A few days later (January 18) Halleck wrote to Curtis that he was about to reënforce him with an entire division from Pope's army, increasing his strength to fifteen thousand; that he would send him mittens for his soldiers:

Get as many hand-mills as you can for grinding corn. . . . Take the bull by the horns. I will back you in such forced requisitions when they become necessary for supplying the forces. We must have no failure in this movement against Price. It must be the last.

And once more, on January 27, he repeated his urgent admonition:

There is a strong pressure on us for troops, and all that are not absolutely necessary here must go elsewhere. Pope's command is entirely broken up; 4000 in Davis's reserve and 6000 ordered to Cairo. Push on as rapidly as possible and end the matter with Price.

This trying winter campaign led by General Curtis, though successful in the end, did not terminate so quickly as General Halleck had hoped. Leaving the heroic Western soldiers camping and scouting in the snows and cutting winds of the bleak Missouri hills and prairies, attention must be called to other incidents in the Department of the Missouri. While Halleck was gratifying the Government and the Northern public with the ability and

* Pope to Halleck. War Records.

vigor of his measures, one point of his administration had excited a wide-spread dissatisfaction and vehement criticism. His military instincts and methods were so thorough that they caused him to treat too lightly the political aspects of the great conflict in which he was directing so large a share. Frémont's treatment of the slavery question had been too radical; Halleck's now became too conservative. It is not probable that this grew out of his mere wish to avoid the error of his predecessor, but out of his own personal conviction that the issue must be entirely eliminated from the military problem. He had noted the difficulties and discussions growing out of the dealings of the army with fugitive slaves, and hoping to rid himself of a perpetual dilemma, one of his first acts after assuming command was to issue his famous General Order No. 3 (November 20, 1861), the first paragraph of which ran as follows:

It has been represented that important information respecting the numbers and condition of our forces is conveyed to the enemy by means of fugitive slaves who are admitted within our lines. In order to remedy this evil, it is directed that no such persons be hereafter permitted to enter the lines of any camp or of any forces on the march, and that any now within such lines be immediately excluded therefrom.*

This language brought upon him the indignant protest of the combined antislavery sentiment of the North. He was berated in newspapers and denounced in Congress, and the violence of public condemnation threatened seriously to impair his military usefulness. He had indeed gone too far. The country felt, and the army knew, that so far from being generally true that negroes carried valuable information to the enemy, the very reverse was the rule, and that the "contrabands" in reality constituted one of the most important and reliable sources of knowledge to the Union commanders in the various fields, which later in the war came to be jocosely designated as the "grape-vine telegraph." Halleck soon found himself put on the defensive, and wrote an explanatory letter to the newspapers. A little later he took occasion officially to define his intention:

The object of these orders is to prevent any person in the army from acting in the capacity of negro-catcher or negro-stealer. The relation between the slave and his master, or pretended master, is not a matter to be determined by military officers, except in the single case provided for by Congress. This matter in all other cases must be decided by the civil authorities. One object in keeping fugitive slaves out of our camp is to keep clear of all such questions. . . . Orders No. 3 do not apply to the authorized private servants of officers nor the negroes employed by proper author-

ity in the camps. It applies only to fugitive slaves. The prohibition to admit them within our lines does not prevent the exercise of all proper offices of humanity in giving them food and clothing outside where such offices are necessary to prevent suffering.†

It will be remembered that the Missouri State Convention in the month of July appointed and inaugurated a provisional State government. This action was merely designed to supply a temporary executive authority until the people could elect new loyal State officers, which election was ordered to be held on the first Monday in November. The convention also, when it finished the work of its summer session, adjourned to meet on the third Monday in December, 1861, but political and military affairs remained in so unsettled a condition during the whole autumn that anything like effective popular action was impracticable. The convention was therefore called together in a third session at an earlier date (October 11, 1861), when it wisely adopted an ordinance postponing the State election for the period of one year, and for continuing the provisional government in office until their successors should be duly appointed.

With his tenure of power thus prolonged, Governor Gamble, also by direction of the convention, proposed to the President to raise a special force of Missouri State militia for service within the State during the war there, but to act with the United States troops in military operations within the State or when necessary to its defense. President Lincoln accepted the plan upon the condition that whatever United States officer might be in command of the Department of the West should also be commissioned by the governor to command the Missouri State militia; and that if the President changed the former, the governor should make the corresponding change, in order that any conflict of authority or of military plans might be avoided. This agreement was entered into between President Lincoln and Governor Gamble on November 6, and on November 27 General Schofield received orders from Halleck to raise, organize, and command this special militia corps. The plan was attended with reasonable success, and by the 15th of April, 1862, General Schofield reports, "an active efficient force of 13,800 men was placed in the field," nearly all of cavalry.


The raising and organizing of this force, during the winter and spring of 1861-62, produced a certain degree of local military activity just at the season when the partisan and guerrilla operations of rebel sympathizers were necessarily impeded or wholly suspended by severe weather; and this, joined with the vigorous administration of General Hal-

* War Records.

† Halleck to Asboth, Dec. 26, 1861. *Ibid.*

leck, and the fact that Curtis was chasing the army of Price out of south-western Missouri, gave a delusive appearance of quiet and order throughout the State. We shall see how this security was rudely disturbed during the summer of 1862 by local efforts and uprisings, though the rebels were not able to bring about any formidable campaign of invasion, and Mis-

sion became, in the public estimation, rather a sign of suspicion than an assurance of honesty and good faith. It grew into one of the standing jests of the camps that when a Union soldier found a rattlesnake, his comrades would instantly propose with mock gravity, "Administer the oath to him, boys, and let him go."



souri as a whole remained immovable in her military and political adherence to the Union.

With the view still further to facilitate the restoration of public peace, the State convention at the same October (1861) session, extended amnesty to repentant rebels in an ordinance which provided that any person who would make and file a written oath to support the Federal and State governments, declaring that he would not take up arms against the United States, or the provisional government of Missouri, nor give aid and comfort to their enemies during the present civil war, should be exempt from arrest and punishment for previous rebellion.

Many persons doubtless took this oath and kept it with sincere faith. But it seems no less certain that many others who also took it so persistently violated both its spirit and letter as to render it practically of no service as an external test of allegiance to the Union. In the years of local hatred and strife which ensued, oaths were so recklessly taken and so willfully violated that the ceremony of adjura-

THE TENNESSEE LINE.

In the State of Kentucky the long game of political intrigue came to an end as the autumn of 1861 approached. By a change almost as sudden as a stage transformation-scene, the beginning of September brought a general military activity and a state of qualified civil war. This change grew naturally out of the military condition, which was no longer compatible with the uncertain and expectant attitude the State had hitherto maintained. The notes of preparation for Frémont's campaign down the Mississippi could not be ignored. Cairo had become a great military post, giving the Federal forces who held it a strategical advantage both for defense and offense against which the Confederates had no corresponding foothold on the great river. The first defensive work was Fort Pillow, 215 miles below, armed with only twelve 32-pounders. To oppose a more formidable resistance to Frémont's descent was of vital importance, which General

Polk's West Point education enabled him to realize.

But the Mississippi, with its generally level banks, afforded relatively few points capable of effective defense. The one most favorable to the Confederate needs was at Columbus, in the State of Kentucky, eighteen miles below Cairo, on a high bluff commanding the river for about five miles. Both the Union and Confederate commanders coveted this situation, for its natural advantages were such that when fully fortified it became familiarly known as the "Gibraltar of the West." So far, through the neutrality policy of Kentucky, it had remained unappropriated by either side. On the first day of September, the rebel General Polk, commanding at Memphis, sent a messenger to Governor Magoffin to obtain confidential information about the "future plans and policy of the Southern party in Kentucky," explaining his desire to "be ahead of the enemy in occupying Columbus and Paducah." Buckner at the same time was in Richmond, proposing to the Confederate authorities certain military movements in Kentucky, "in advance of the action of her governor." On September 3 they promised him, as definitely as they could, countenance and assistance in his scheme; and a week after, he accepted a brigadier-general's commission from Jefferson Davis. While Buckner was negotiating, General Polk initiated the rebel invasion of Kentucky. Whether upon information from Governor Magoffin or elsewhere, he ordered Pillow with his detachment of six thousand men to cross the river from New Madrid and occupy the town of Columbus.

The Confederate movement created a general flurry in neutrality circles. Numerous protests went to both Polk and the Richmond authorities, and Governor Harris hastened to assure Governor Magoffin that he was in entire ignorance of it, and had appealed to Jefferson Davis to order the troops withdrawn. Even the rebel Secretary of War was mystified by the report, and directed Polk to order the troops withdrawn from Kentucky. Jefferson Davis however, either with prior knowledge or with truer instinct, telegraphed to Polk: "The necessity justifies the action."* In his letter to Davis, the general strongly argued the propriety of his course: "I believe, if we could have found a respectable pretext, it would have been better to have seized this place some months ago, as I am convinced we had more friends than in Kentucky than we have had since, and every hour's delay made against us. Kentucky was fast

melting away under the influence of the Lincoln Government." He had little need to urge this view. Jefferson Davis had already written him, "We cannot permit the indeterminate quantities, the political elements, to control our action in cases of military necessity";† and to Governor Harris, "Security to Tennessee and other parts of the Confederacy is the primary object. To this all else must give way."‡

To strengthen further and consolidate the important military enterprises thus begun, Jefferson Davis now adopted a recommendation of Polk that

They should be combined from west to east across the Mississippi Valley, and placed under the direction of one head, and that head should have large discretionary powers. Such a position is one of very great responsibility, involving and requiring large experience and extensive military knowledge, and I know of no one so well equal to that task as our friend General Albert S. Johnston.

Johnston, with the rank of general, was duly assigned, on September 10, to the command of Department No. 2, covering in general the States of Tennessee, Arkansas, part of Mississippi, Kentucky, Missouri, Kansas, and the Indian Territory. Proceeding at once to Nashville and conferring with the local authorities, he wrote back to Richmond, under date of September 16:

So far from yielding to the demand for the withdrawal of our troops, I have determined to occupy Bowling Green at once. . . . I design to-morrow (which is the earliest practicable moment) to take possession of Bowling Green with five thousand troops, and prepare to support the movement with such force as circumstances may indicate and the means at my command may allow.

The movement was promptly carried out. Buckner was put in command of the expedition; and seizing several railroad trains, he moved forward to Bowling Green on the morning of the 18th, having sent ahead five hundred men to occupy Munfordville, and issuing the usual proclamation, that his invasion was a measure of defense. Meanwhile the third column of invaders entered eastern Kentucky through Cumberland Gap. Brigadier-General Zollicoffer had eight or ten thousand men under his command in eastern Tennessee, but, as elsewhere, much scattered, and badly armed and supplied. Under his active supervision, during the month of August he somewhat improved the organization of his forces and acquainted himself with the intricate topography of the mountain region he was in. Prompted probably from Kentucky, he was ready early in September to join in the combined movement into that State. About the 10th he advanced with six regiments through

* Davis to Polk, Sept. 4, 1861. War Records.

† Davis to Polk, Sept. 15, 1861. Ibid.

‡ Davis to Harris, Sept. 13, 1861. Ibid.

Cumberland Gap to Cumberland Ford, and began planning further aggressive movements against the small Union force, principally Home Guards, which had been collected and organized at Camp Dick Robinson.

The strong Union legislature which Kentucky elected in August met in Frankfort, the capital, on the 2d of September. Polk, having securely established himself at Columbus, notified the governor of his presence, and offered as his only excuse the alleged intention of the Federal troops to occupy it. The legislature, not deeming the excuse sufficient, passed a joint resolution instructing the governor "to inform those concerned that Kentucky expects the Confederate or Tennessee troops to be withdrawn from her soil unconditionally."* The governor vetoed the resolution, on the ground that it did not also embrace the Union troops; the legislature passed it over his veto. Governor Magoffin now issued his proclamation, as directed. Polk and Jefferson Davis replied that the Confederate army would withdraw if the Union army would do the same. To this the legislature responded with another joint resolution, that the conditions prescribed were an insult to the dignity of the State, "to which Kentucky cannot listen without dishonor," and "that the invaders must be expelled." The resolution further required General Robert Anderson to take instant command, with authority to call out a volunteer force, in all of which the governor was required to lend his aid. Kentucky was thus officially taken out of her false attitude of neutrality, and placed in active coöperation with the Federal Government to maintain the Union. Every day increased the strength and zeal of her assistance. A little later in the session a law was enacted declaring enlistments under the Confederate flag a misdemeanor and the invasion of Kentucky by Confederate soldiers a felony, and prescribing heavy penalties for both. Finally, the legislature authorized the enlistment of forty thousand volunteers to "repel invasion," providing also that they should be mustered into the service of the United States and coöperate with the armies of the Union. This was a complete revolution from the anti-coercion resolutions that the previous legislature had passed in January.

Hitherto there were no Federal forces in Kentucky except the brigade which Lieutenant Nelson had organized at Camp Dick Robinson; the Home Guards in various counties, though supplied with arms by the Federal Government, were acting under State militia laws. General Robert Anderson, commanding the military department which embraced Kentucky, still kept his headquarters

* War Records.

at Cincinnati, and Rousseau, a prominent Kentuckian, engaged in organizing a brigade of Kentuckians, had purposely made his camp on the Indiana side of the Ohio River. Nevertheless President Lincoln, the governors of Ohio and Indiana, and the various military commanders had for months been ready to go to the assistance of the Kentucky Unionists whenever the emergency should arise. Even if the neutral attitude of Kentucky had not been brought to an end by the advance of the Confederate forces, it would have been by that of the Federals. A point had been reached where further inaction was impossible. Three days before General Pillow occupied Hickman, Frémont sent General Grant to south-eastern Missouri, to concentrate the several Federal detachments, drive out the enemy, and destroy a rumored rebel battery at Belmont. His order says finally, "It is intended, in connection with all these movements, to occupy Columbus, Kentucky, as soon as possible." It was in executing a part of this order that the gun-boats sent to Belmont extended their reconnaissance down the river, and discovered the advance of the Confederates on the Kentucky shore. An unexpected delay in the movement of one of Grant's detachments occurred at the same time; and that commander, with the military intuition which afterward rendered him famous, postponed the continuance of the local operations in Missouri, and instead immediately prepared an expedition into Kentucky, which became the initial step of his brilliant and fruitful campaign in that direction a few months later. He saw that Columbus, his primary objective point, was lost for the present; but he also perceived that another, of perhaps equal strategical value, yet lay within his grasp, though clearly there was no time to be wasted in seizing it. The gun-boat reconnaissance on the Mississippi River, which revealed the rebel occupation of Kentucky, was begun on September 4. On the following day General Grant, having telegraphed the information to Frémont and to the Kentucky legislature, hurriedly organized an expedition of 2 gun-boats, 1800 men, 16 cannon for batteries, and a supply of provisions and ammunition on transports. Taking personal command, he started with the expedition from Cairo at midnight of the 5th, and proceeded up the Ohio River to the town of Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee, where he arrived on the morning of the 6th. A contraband trade with the rebels, by means of small steamboats plying on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, had called special attention to the easy communication between this point and central Tennessee. Helanded without opposition and took possession, making

arrangements to fortify and permanently hold the place; having done which, he himself returned to Cairo the same afternoon, to report his advance and forward reinforcements. The importance of the seizure was appreciated by the rebels, for, on the 13th of September, Buckner wrote to Richmond, "Our possession of Columbus is already neutralized by that of Paducah."

The culmination of affairs in Kentucky had been carefully watched by the authorities in Washington. From a conference with President Lincoln, Anderson returned to Cincinnati on September 1, taking with him two subordinates of exceptional ability, Brigadier-Generals Sherman and Thomas. A delegation of prominent Kentuckians met him, to set forth the critical condition of their State. He dispatched Sherman to solicit help from Frémont and the governors of Indiana and Illinois, and a week later moved his headquarters to Louisville, also sending Thomas to Camp Dick Robinson, to take direction of affairs in that quarter. By the time that Sherman returned from his mission the crisis had already developed itself. The appearance of Polk's forces at Columbus, the action of the legislature, the occupation of Paducah by Grant, and the threatening rumors from Buckner's camp, created a high degree of excitement and apprehension. On September 16 Anderson reported Zollicoffer's invasion through Cumberland Gap, upon which the President telegraphed him to assume active command in Kentucky at once. Added to this, there came to Louisville on the 18th the positive news of Buckner's advance to Bowling Green. This information set all central Kentucky in a military ferment; for the widely published announcement that the State Guards, Buckner's secession militia, would meet at Lexington on September 20, to have a camp drill under supervision of Breckinridge, Humphrey Marshall, and other leaders, seemed too plainly coincident with the triple invasion to be designed for a mere holiday. A rising at Lexington and a junction with Zollicoffer might end in a march upon Frankfort, the capital, to disperse the legislature; a simultaneous advance by Buckner in force and capture of Louisville would, in a brief campaign, complete the subjugation of Kentucky to the rebellion. There remains no record to show whether or not such a plan was among the movements, "in advance of the governor's action," which Buckner discussed with Jefferson Davis on September 3 at Richmond. The bare possibility roused the Unionists of Kentucky to vigorous action. With an evident distrust of Governor Magoffin, a caucus of the Union members of the legislature as-

sumed quasi-executive authority, and through the speakers of the two Houses requested General Thomas, at Camp Dick Robinson, to send a regiment, "fully prepared for fight," to Lexington in advance of the advertised "camp drill" of the State Guards; also promising that the Home Guards should rally in force to support him. Thomas ordered the movement, and, in spite of numerous obstacles, Colonel Bramlette brought his regiment to the Lexington fair ground on the night of the 19th of September. His advent was so sudden that he came near making important arrests. Breckinridge, Humphrey Marshall, Morgan, and other leaders were present, but, being warned, fled in different directions, and the "camp drill," shorn of its guiding spirits, proved powerless for the mischievous ends which had evidently been intended.

At Louisville, General Anderson lost no time in the effort to meet Buckner's advance. There were no organized troops in the city, but the brigade Rousseau had been collecting on the Indiana shore was hastily called across the river and joined to the Louisville Home Guards, making in all some 2500 men, who were sent out by the railroad towards Nashville, under the personal command of Sherman. An expedition of the enemy had already burned the important railroad bridges, apparently, however, with the simple object of creating delay. Nevertheless, Sherman went on and occupied Muldraugh's Hill, where he was soon reinforced; for the utmost efforts had been used by the governors of Ohio and Indiana to send to the help of Kentucky every available regiment. If Buckner meditated the capture of Louisville, this show of force caused him to pause; but he remained firm at Bowling Green, also increasing his army, and ready to take part in whatever movement events might render feasible.

No serious or decisive conflicts immediately followed these various moves on the military chess-board. For the present they served merely to define the hostile frontier. With Polk at Columbus, Buckner at Bowling Green, and Zollicoffer in front of Cumberland Gap, the Confederate frontier was practically along the northern Tennessee line. The Union line ran irregularly through the center of Kentucky. One direct result was rapidly to eliminate the armed secessionists. Humphrey Marshall, Breckinridge, and others who had set up rebel camps hastened with their followers within the protection of the Confederate line. Before further operations occurred, a change of Union commanders took place. The excitement, labors, and responsibilities proved too great for the physical strength of General Anderson. Relieved at his own re-

quest, on October 8, he relinquished the command to General Sherman, who was designated by General Scott to succeed him. The new and heavy duties which fell upon him were by no means to Sherman's liking. "I am forced into the command of this Department against my will," he wrote. Looking at his field with a purely professional eye, the disproportion between the magnitude of his task and the immediate means for its accomplishment oppressed him like a nightmare. There were no troops in Kentucky when he came. The recruits sent from other States were gradually growing into an army, but as yet without drill, equipments, or organization. Kentucky herself was in a curious transition. By vote of her people and her legislature, she had decided to adhere to the Union; but as a practical incident of war, many of her energetic and adventurous young men drifted to Southern camps, while the Union property-holders and heads of families were unfit or unwilling immediately to enlist in active service to sustain the cause they had espoused. The Home Guards, called into service for ten days, generally refused to extend their term. The arms furnished them became easily scattered, and, even if not seized or stolen by young secession recruits and carried to the enemy, were with difficulty recovered for use. Now that the General Government had assumed command and the State had ordered an army, many neighborhoods felt privileged to call for protection rather than furnish a quota for offense. Even where they were ready to serve, the enlistment of the State volunteers, recently authorized by the legislature, had yet scarcely begun.

About the middle of October, Mr. Cameron, Secretary of War, returning from a visit to Frémont, passed through Louisville and held a military consultation with Sherman. General Sherman writes:

I remember taking a large map of the United States, and assuming the people of the whole South to be in rebellion, that our task was to subdue them; showed that McClellan was on the left, having a frontage of less than 100 miles, and Frémont the right, about the same; whereas I, the center, had from the Big Sandy to Paducah, over 300 miles of frontier; that McClellan had 100,000 men, Frémont 60,000, whereas to me had only been allotted about 18,000. I argued that for the purpose of defense we should have 60,000 men at once, and for offense would need 200,000 before we were done. Mr. Cameron, who still lay on the bed, threw up his hands and exclaimed, "Great God! where are they to come from?" I asserted that there were plenty of men at the North, ready and willing to come if he would only accept their services; for it was notorious that regiments had been formed in all the North-western States whose services had been refused by the War Department, on the ground that they would not be needed. We discussed all these matters fully,

in the most friendly spirit, and I thought I had aroused Mr. Cameron to a realization of the great war that was before us, and was in fact upon us.*

While recognizing many of the needs which Sherman pointed out, the Secretary could not immediately promise him any great augmentation of his force.

Complaints and requests of this character were constantly coming to the Administration from all the commanders and governors, and a letter of President Lincoln, written in reply to a similar strain of fault-finding from Indiana, plainly indicates why such requirements in all quarters could not be immediately supplied:

WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 29, 1861.

HIS EXCELLENCY GOV. O. P. MORTON: Your letter by the hand of Mr. Prunk was received yesterday. I write this letter because I wish you to believe of us (as we certainly believe of you) that we are doing the very best we can. You do not receive arms from us as fast as you need them; but it is because we have not near enough to meet all the pressing demands, and we are obliged to share around what we have, sending the larger share to the points which appear to need them most. We have great hope that our own supply will be ample before long, so that you and all others can have as many as you need. I see an article in an Indianapolis newspaper denouncing me for not answering your letter sent by special messenger two or three weeks ago. I did make what I thought the best answer I could to that letter. As I remember, it asked for ten heavy guns to be distributed with some troops at Lawrenceburgh, Madison, New Albany, and Evansville; and I ordered the guns and directed you to send the troops if you had them. As to Kentucky, you do not estimate that State as more important than I do; but I am compelled to watch all points. While I write this I am if not in *range* at least in *hearing* of cannon shot, from an army of enemies more than a hundred thousand strong. I do not expect them to capture this city; but I know they would if I were to send the men and arms from here to defend Louisville, of which there is not a single hostile armed soldier within forty miles, nor any force known to be moving upon it from any distance. It is true the army in our front may make a half-circle around southward and move on Louisville; but when they do, we will make a half-circle around northward and meet them; and in the mean time we will get up what forces we can from other sources to also meet them.

I hope Zollicoffer has left Cumberland Gap (though I fear he has not), because, if he has, I rather infer he did it because of his dread of Camp Dick Robinson, reënforced from Cincinnati, moving on him, than because of his intention to move on Louisville. But if he does go round and reënforce Buckner, let Dick Robinson come round and reënforce Sherman, and the thing is substantially as it was when Zollicoffer left Cumberland Gap. I state this as an illustration; for in fact I think if the Gap is left open to us Dick Robinson should take it and hold it; while Indiana, and the vicinity of Louisville in Kentucky, can reënforce Sherman faster than Zollicoffer can Buckner. . . .

Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN.†

The conjectures of the President proved substantially correct. Great as was the need of arms for Union regiments, the scarcity among the rebels was much greater. Of the 30,000

* Sherman, "Memoirs," Vol. I., p. 203.

† Unpublished MS.

stands which Johnston asked for when he assumed command, the rebel War Department could only send him 1000. Ammunition and supplies were equally wanting. He called out 50,000 volunteers from Tennessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas, but reinforcements from this and other sources were slow. His greatest immediate help came by transferring Hardee with his division from Missouri to Bowling Green. If, as Sherman surmised, a concentration of his detachments would have enabled him to make a successful march on Louisville, he was unwilling to take the risk. The contingency upon which the rebel invasion was probably based, the expected rising in Kentucky, had completely failed. Johnston wrote to Richmond:

We have received but little accession to our ranks since the Confederate forces crossed the line; in fact, no such enthusiastic demonstration as to justify any movements not warranted by our ability to maintain our own communications.*

One of his recruiting brigadiers wrote:

The Kentuckians still come in small squads; I have induced the most of them to go in for the war. This requires about three speeches a day. When thus stirred up they go, almost to a man. Since I have found that I can't be a general, I have turned recruiting agent and sensation speaker for the brief period that I shall remain.†

For the present Johnston's policy was purely defensive; he directed Cumberland Gap to be fortified, and completed the works at Columbus, "to meet the probable flotilla from the North, supposed to carry two hundred heavy guns," while Buckner was vigorously admonished to "Hold on to Bowling Green." He made this order when Buckner had six thousand men; but even when that number was doubled, after the arrival of Hardee, Johnston was occupied with calculations for defense and asking for further reinforcements.‡

LINCOLN DIRECTS COÖPERATION.

At the beginning of December, 1861, the President was forced to turn his serious personal attention to army matters. Except to organize, drill, and review the Army of the Potomac, to make an unfruitful reconnaissance and to suffer the lamentable Ball's Bluff disaster, McClellan had nothing to show for his six months of local and two months of chief command. The splendid autumn weather, the wholesome air and dry roads, had come and gone. Rain, snow, and mud, crippling clogs to military movements in all lands and

epochs, were to be expected for a quarter if not for half of the coming year. Worse than all, McClellan had fallen seriously ill. With most urgent need of early action, every prospect of securing it seemed to be thus cut off. In this dilemma Lincoln turned to the Western commanders. "General McClellan is sick," he telegraphed to Halleck on the last day of the year. "Are General Buell and yourself in concert?" The following day, being New Year's, he repeated his inquiry, or rather his prompting suggestion, that, McClellan being incapable of work, Buell and Halleck should at once establish a vigorous and hearty co-operation. Their replies were not specially promising. "There is no arrangement between General Halleck and myself," responded Buell, adding that he depended on McClellan for instructions to this end; while Halleck said, "I have never received a word from General Buell. I am not ready to coöperate with him"; adding, in his turn, that he had written to McClellan, and that too much haste would ruin everything. Plainly, therefore, the military machine, both East and West, was not only at a complete standstill, but was without a programme.

Of what avail, then, were McClellan's office and function of General-in-Chief, if such a contingency revealed either his incapacity or his neglect? The force of this question is immensely increased when we see how in the same episode McClellan's acts followed Lincoln's suggestions. However silent and confiding in the skill and energy of his generals, the President had studied the military situation with unremitting diligence. In his telegram of December 31 to Halleck, he started a pregnant inquiry. "When he [Buell] moves on Bowling Green, what hinders it being reinforced from Columbus?" And he asked the same question at the same time of Buell. Halleck seems to have had no answer to make; Buell sent the only reply that was possible: "There is nothing to prevent Bowling Green being reinforced from Columbus if a military force is not brought to bear on the latter place."

Lincoln was not content to permit this know-nothing and do-nothing policy to continue. "I have just been with General McClellan, and he is much better," he wrote the day after New Year's; and in this interview the necessity for action and the telegrams from the Western commanders were fully discussed, as becomes evident from the fact that the following day McClellan wrote a letter to Halleck containing an earnest suggestion to remedy the neglect and need pointed out by Lincoln's dispatch of December 31. In this letter McClellan advised an expedition up the Cumberland River, a dem-

* War Records.

† Alcorn to Buckner, Oct. 21, 1861. Ibid.

‡ Johnston to Cooper, Oct. 17, 1861. Ibid.

onstration on Columbus, and a feint on the Tennessee River, all for the purpose of preventing reënforcements from joining Buckner and Johnston at Bowling Green, whom Buell was preparing to attack.

Meanwhile Lincoln's dispatch of inquiry had renewed the attention, and perhaps aroused the ambition, of Buell. He and Halleck had, after Lincoln's prompting, interchanged dispatches about concerted action. Halleck reported a withdrawal of troops from Missouri "almost impossible"; to which Buell replied that "the great power of the rebellion in the West is arrayed" on a line from Columbus to Bowling Green, and that two gun-boat expeditions with a support of 20,000 men should attack its center by way of the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, and that "whatever is done should be done speedily, within a few days." Halleck, however, did not favorably entertain the proposition. His reply discussed an altogether different question. He said it would be madness for him with his forces to attempt any serious operation against Camp Beauregard or Columbus; and that if Buell's Bowling Green movement required his help it ought to be delayed a few weeks, when he could probably furnish some troops. Leaving altogether unanswered Buell's suggestion for the movement up the Cumberland and the Tennessee, Halleck stated his strong disapproval of the Bowling Green movement, and on the same day he repeated these views a little more fully in a letter to the President. Premising that he could not at the present time withdraw any troops from Missouri, "without risking the loss of this State," he said:

I know nothing of General Buell's intended operations, never having received any information in regard to the general plan of campaign. If it be intended that his column shall move on Bowling Green while another moves from Cairo or Paducah on Columbus or Camp Beauregard, it will be a repetition of the same strategic error which produced the disaster of Bull Run. To operate on exterior lines against an enemy occupying a central position will fail, as it always has failed, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. It is condemned by every military authority I have ever read. General Buell's army and the forces at Paducah occupy precisely the same position in relation to each other and to the enemy as did the armies of McDowell and Patterson before the battle of Bull Run.

Lincoln, finding in these replies but a continuation of not only the system of delay, but also the want of plans, and especially of energetic joint action, which had thus far in a majority of cases marked the operations of the various commanders, was not disposed further to allow matters to remain in such unfruitful conditions. Under his prompting McClellan, on this same 6th of January, wrote to

Buell, "Halleck, from his own account, will not soon be in a condition to support properly a movement up the Cumberland. Why not make the movement independently of and without waiting for that?" And on the next day Lincoln followed this inquiry with a still more energetic monition: "Please name as early a day as you safely can, on or before which you can be ready to move southward in concert with Major-General Halleck. Delay is ruining us, and it is indispensable for me to have something definite. I send a like dispatch to Major-General Halleck." This somewhat peremptory order seems to have brought nothing except a reply from Halleck: "I have asked General Buell to designate a day for a demonstration to assist him. It is all I can do till I get arms." Three days later, Halleck's already quoted letter of the 6th reached Washington by mail, and after its perusal the President indorsed upon it, with a heart-sickness easily discernible in the words, "The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck. It is exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can be done."

Nevertheless, something was being done: very little at the moment, it is true, but enough to form the beginning of momentous results. On the same day on which Halleck had written the discouraging letter commented upon above by the President, he had also transmitted to Grant at Cairo the direction, "I wish you to make a demonstration in force on Mayfield and in the direction of Murray." The object was, as he further explained, to prevent reënforcements being sent to Buckner at Bowling Green. He was to threaten Camp Beauregard and Murray, to create the impression that not only was Dover (Fort Donelson) to be attacked, but that a great army to be gathered in the West was to sweep down towards Nashville, his own column being merely an advance guard. Commodore Foote was to assist by a gun-boat demonstration. "Be very careful, however," added Halleck, "to avoid a battle; we are not ready for that; but cut off detached parties and give your men a little experience in skirmishing."

If Halleck's order for a demonstration against Mayfield and Murray, creating an indirect menace to Columbus and Dover, had gone to an unwilling or negligent officer, he could have found in his surrounding conditions abundant excuses for evasion or non-compliance. There existed at Cairo, as at every other army post, large or small, lack of officers, of organization, of arms, of equipments, of transportation, of that multitude of things considered necessary to the efficiency of moving troops. But in the West the sudden increase of armies brought to command,

and to direction and management, a large proportion of civilians, lacking methodical instruction and experience, which was without question a serious defect, but which left them free to invent and to adopt whatever expedients circumstances might suggest, or which rendered them satisfied, and willing to enter upon undertakings amidst a want of preparation and means that better information might have deemed indispensable.

The detailed reports and orders of the expedition we are describing clearly indicate these latter characteristics. We learn from them that the weather was bad, the roads heavy, the quartermaster's department and transportation deficient, and the gun-boats without adequate crews. Yet nowhere does it appear that these things were treated as impediments. Halleck's instructions dated January 6 were received by Grant on the morning of the 8th, and his answer was that immediate preparations were being made for carrying them out, and that Commodore Foote would cooperate with three gun-boats. "The continuous rains for the last week or more," says Grant, "have rendered the roads extremely bad, and will necessarily make our movement slow. This however will operate worse upon the enemy, if he should come out to meet us, than upon us." The movement began on the evening of January 9, and its main delay occurred through Halleck's orders. It was fully resumed on the 12th. Brigadier-General McClellan, with five thousand men, marched southward, generally parallel to the Mississippi River, to Mayfield, midway between Fort Henry and Columbus, and pushed a reconnaissance closely up to the latter place. Brigadier-General Smith, starting from Paducah, marched a strong column southward, generally parallel to the Tennessee River, to Calloway, near Fort Henry. Foote and Grant, with three gun-boats, two of them new iron-clads, ascended the Tennessee to Fort Henry, drew the fire of the fort, and threw several shells into the works. It is needless to describe the routes, the precautions, the marching and counter-marching to mystify the enemy. While the rebels were yet expecting a further advance, the several detachments were already well on their return. "The expedition," says Grant, "if it had no other effect, served as a fine reconnaissance." But it had more positive results. Fort Henry and Columbus were thoroughly alarmed and drew in their outposts, while the Union forces learned from inspection that the route offered a feasible line of march to attack and invest Columbus, and demonstrated the inherent weakness and vulnerability of Fort Henry. This, be it remembered, was done with raw forces and

without preparation, but with officers and men responding alike promptly to every order and executing their task more than cheerfully, even eagerly, with such means as were at hand when the order came. "The reconnaissance thus made," reports McClellan, "completed a march of 140 miles by the cavalry, and 75 miles by the infantry, over icy or miry roads, during a most inclement season." He further reports that the circumstances of the case "prevented me from taking, on leaving Cairo, the five-days' supply of rations and forage directed by the commanding officer of this district; hence the necessity of an early resort to other sources of supply. None other presented but to quarter upon the enemy or to purchase from loyal citizens. I accordingly resorted to both expedients as I had opportunity."

Lincoln's prompting did not end with merely having produced this reconnaissance. The President's patience was well-nigh exhausted; and while his uneasiness drove him to no act of rashness, it caused him to repeat his admonitions and suggestions. In addition to his telegrams and letters to the Western commanders between December 31 and January 6, he once more wrote to both, on January 13, to point out how advantage might be taken of the military condition as it then existed. Halleck had emphasized the danger of moving on "exterior lines," and insisted that it was merely repeating the error committed at Bull Run and would as inevitably produce disaster. Lincoln in his letter shows that the defeat at Bull Run did not result from movement on exterior lines, but from failure to use exterior lines with judgment and concert; and he further illustrated how the Western armies might now, by judicious cooperation, secure important military results.

MY DEAR SIR: * Your dispatch of yesterday is received, in which you say, "I have received your letter and General McClellan's, and will at once devote all my efforts to your views and his." In the midst of my many cares I have not seen nor asked to see General McClellan's letter to you. For my own views, I have not offered, and do not now offer, them as orders; and while I am glad to have them respectfully considered, I would blame you to follow them contrary to your own clear judgment, unless I should put them in the form of orders. As to General McClellan's views, you understand your duty in regard to them better than I do. With this preliminary, I state my general idea of this war to be, that we have the greater numbers, and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he makes no

* This letter was addressed to Buell, but a copy of it was also sent to Halleck. [War Records.]

change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much. To illustrate: Suppose last summer, when Winchester ran away to reinforce Manassas, we had forborne to attack Manassas, but had seized and held Winchester. I mention this to illustrate, not to criticise. I did not lose confidence in McDowell, and I think less harshly of Patterson than some others seem to. In application of the general rule I am suggesting, every particular case will have its modifying circumstances, among which the most constantly present and most difficult to meet will be the want of perfect knowledge of the enemy's movements. This had its part in the Bull Run case; but worse in that case was the expiration of the terms of the three-months' men. Applying the principle to your case, my idea is that Halleck shall menace Columbus and "down river" generally, while you menace Bowling Green and east Tennessee. If the enemy shall concentrate at Bowling Green do not retire from his front, yet do not fight him there either; but seize Columbus and east Tennessee, one or both, left exposed by the concentration at Bowling Green. It is a matter of no small anxiety to me, and one which I am sure you will not overlook, that the east Tennessee line is so long and over so bad a road.

Buell made no reply to this letter of Lincoln's; but Halleck sent an indirect answer a week later, in a long letter to General McClellan, under date of January 20. The communication is by no means a model of correspondence when we remember that it emanates from a trained writer upon military science. It is long and somewhat rambling; it finds fault with politics and politicians in war, in evident ignorance of both politics and politicians. It charges that past want of success "is attributable to the politicians rather than to the generals," in plain contradiction of the actual facts. It condemns "pepper-box strategy," and recommends detached operations in the same breath. The more noticeable point of the letter is that, while reiterating that the General-in-Chief had furnished no general plan, and while the principal commanders had neither unity of views nor concert of action, it ventures, though somewhat feebly, to recommend a combined system of operations for the West. Says Halleck, in this letter:

The idea of moving down the Mississippi by steam is, in my opinion, impracticable, or at least premature. It is not a proper line of operations, at least now. A much more feasible plan is to move up the Cumberland and Tennessee, making Nashville the first objective point. This would turn Columbus and force the abandonment of Bowling Green. . . . This line of the Cumberland or Tennessee is the great central line of the western theater of war, with the Ohio below the mouth of Green River as the base, and two good navigable rivers extending far into the interior of the theater of operations. But the plan should not be attempted without a large force—not less than 60,000 effective men.

The idea was by no means new. Buell had tentatively suggested it to McClellan as early as November 27; McClellan had asked further details about it December 5; Buell had

again specifically elaborated it, "as the most important strategical point in the whole field of operations," to McClellan on December 29, and as the "center" of the rebellion front in the West, to Halleck on January 3. Yet, recognizing this line as the enemy's chief weakness, McClellan at Washington, Buell at Louisville, and Halleck at St. Louis, holding the President's unlimited trust and authority, had allowed nearly two months to elapse, directing the Government power to other objects, to the neglect, not alone of military success, but of plans of coöperation, of counsel, of intention to use this great and recognized military advantage, until the country was fast losing confidence and even hope. Even now Halleck did not propose immediately to put his theory into practice. Like Buell, he was calling for more troops for the "politicians" to supply. It is impossible to guess when he might have been ready to move on his great strategic line, if subordinate officers, more watchful and enterprising, had not in a measure forced the necessity upon his attention.

GRANT AND THOMAS IN KENTUCKY.

In the early stage of military organization in the West, when so many volunteer colonels were called to immediate active duty in the field, the West Point education of Grant and his practical campaign training in the Mexican war made themselves immediately felt and appreciated at the department headquarters. His usefulness and superiority were at once evident by the clearness and brevity of his correspondence, the correctness of routine reports and promptness of their transmission, the pertinence and practical quality of his suggestions, the readiness and fertility of expedient with which he executed orders. Any one reading over his letters of this first period of his military service is struck by the fact that through him something was always accomplished. There was absence of excuse, complaint, or delay; always the report of a task performed. If his means or supplies were imperfect, he found or improvised the best available substitute; if he could not execute the full requirement, he performed so much of it as was possible. He always had an opinion, and that opinion was positive, intelligible, practical. We find therefore that his allotted tasks from the very first rose continually in importance. He gained in authority and usefulness, not by solicitation or intrigue, but by services rendered. He was sent to more and more difficult duties, to larger supervision, to heavier responsibilities. From guarding a station at Mexico on the North

Missouri railroad, to protecting a railroad terminus at Ironton in south-east Missouri; from there to brief inspection duty at Jefferson City, then to the command of the military district of south-east Missouri; finally to the command of the great military depot and rendezvous at Cairo, Illinois, with its several outlying posts and districts, and the supervision of its complicated details about troops, arms, and supplies to be collected and forwarded in all directions,—clearly it was not chance which brought him to such duties, but his fitness to perform them. It was from the vantage ground of this enlarged command that he had checkmated the rebel occupation of Columbus, by immediately seizing Paducah and Smithland. And from Cairo also he organized and led his first experiment in field fighting, at what is known as the battle of Belmont.

Just before Frémont was relieved, and while he was in the field in nominal pursuit of Price, he had ordered Grant to clear south-eastern Missouri of guerrillas, with the double view of restoring local authority and preventing reinforcements to Price. Movements were in progress to this end when it became apparent that the rebel stronghold at Columbus was preparing to send out a column.

Grant organized an expedition to counteract this design, and on the evening of November 6 left Cairo with about 3000 men on transports, under convoy of 2 gun-boats, and steamed down the river. Upon information gained while on his route, he determined to break up a rebel camp at Belmont Landing, on the Missouri shore opposite Columbus, as the best means of making his expedition effective. On the morning of the 7th he had landed his troops at Hunter's Point, three miles above Belmont, and marched to a favorable place for attack back of the rebel encampment, which was situated in a large open field and was protected on the land side by a line of abatis. By the time Grant reached his position the rebel camp, originally consisting of a single regiment, had been reinforced by four regiments under General Pillow, from Columbus. A deliberate battle, with about equal forces, ensued. Though the Confederate line courageously contested the ground, the Union line, steadily advancing, swept the rebels back, penetrating the abatis and gaining the camp of the enemy, who took shelter in disorder under the steep river-bank. Grant's troops had gained a complete and substantial victory, but they now frittered it away by a disorderly exultation, and a greedy plunder of the camp they had stormed. The record does not show who was responsible for the unmilitary conduct, but it quickly brought its

retribution. Before the Unionists were aware of it, General Polk had brought an additional reinforcement of several regiments across the river and hurriedly marched them to cut off the Federal retreat, which, instead of an orderly march from the battle-field, became a hasty scramble to get out of danger. Grant himself, unaware that the few companies left as a guard near the landing had already embarked, remained on shore to find them, and encountered instead the advancing rebel line. Discovering his mistake, he rode back to the landing, where "his horse slid down the river-bank on its haunches and trotted on board a transport over a plank thrust out for him."* Belmont was a drawn battle; or, rather, it was first a victory for the Federals and then a victory for the Confederates. The courage and the loss were nearly equal: 79 killed and 289 wounded on the Union side; 105 killed and 419 wounded on the Confederate side.

Brigadier-General McClelland, second in command in the battle of Belmont, was a fellow-townsmen of the President, and to him Lincoln wrote the following letter of thanks and encouragement to the troops engaged:

This is not an official but a social letter. You have had a battle, and without being able to judge as to the precise measure of its value, I think it is safe to say that you, and all with you, have done honor to yourselves and the flag, and service to the country. Most gratefully do I thank you and them. In my present position, I must care for the whole nation; but I hope it will be no injustice to any other State for me to indulge a little home pride, that Illinois does not disappoint us. I have just closed a long interview with Mr. Washburne, in which he has detailed the many difficulties you and those with you labor under. Be assured, we do not forget or neglect you. Much, very much, goes undone; but it is because we have not the power to do it faster than we do. Some of your forces are without arms; but the same is true here, and at every other place where we have considerable bodies of troops. The plain matter-of-fact is, our good people have rushed to the rescue of the Government faster than the Government can find arms to put into their hands. It would be agreeable to each division of the army to know its own precise destination; but the Government cannot immediately, nor inflexibly at any time, determine as to all; nor, if determined, can it tell its friends without at the same time telling its enemies. We know you do all as wisely and well as you can; and you will not be deceived if you conclude the same is true of us. Please give my respects and thanks to all.

Belmont having been a mere episode, it drew after it no further movement in that direction. Grant and his command resumed their routine work of neighborhood police and observation. Buell and Halleck, both coming to their departments as new commanders shortly afterward, were absorbed with difficulties at other points. Secession was not yet

* Force, "From Fort Henry to Corinth," p. 23.

† Lincoln to McClelland, Nov. 10, 1861. Unpublished MS.

quieted in Kentucky. The Union troops at Cairo, Paducah, Smithland, and other river towns yet stood on the defensive, fearing rebel attack rather than preparing to attack rebels. Columbus and Bowling Green were the principal Confederate camps, and attracted and received the main attention from the Union commanders.

The first noteworthy occurrence following Belmont, as well as the beginning of the succession of brilliant Union victories which distinguished the early months of the year 1862, was the battle of Mill Springs, in eastern Kentucky. It had been the earnest desire of President Lincoln that a Union column should be sent to seize and hold east Tennessee, and General McClellan had urged such movement upon General Buell in several dispatches almost peremptory in their tone. At first Buell seemed to entertain the idea and promised compliance; but as his army increased in strength and discipline his plans and hopes centered themselves in an advance against Bowling Green, with the design to capture Nashville. General Thomas remained posted in eastern Kentucky, hoping that he might be called upon to form his column and lead it through the Cumberland Gap to Knoxville; but the weeks passed by, and the orders which he received only tended to scatter his few regiments for local defense and observation. With the hesitation of the Union army at this point, the Confederates became bolder. Zollicoffer established himself in a fortified camp on the north bank of the Cumberland River, where he could at the same time defend Cumberland Gap and incite eastern Kentucky to rebellion. Here he became so troublesome that Buell found it necessary to dislodge him, and late in December sent General Thomas orders to that effect. Thomas was weak in numbers, but strong in vigilance and courage. He made a difficult march during the early weeks of January, 1862, and halted at Logan's Cross Roads, within ten miles of the rebel camp, to await the junction of his few regiments. The enemy, under Zollicoffer and his district commander, Crittenden, resolved to advance and crush him before he could bring his force together. Thomas prepared for and accepted battle. The enemy had made a fatiguing night march of nine miles, through a cold rain and over muddy roads. On the morning of January 19 the battle, begun with spirit, soon had a dramatic incident. The rebel commander, Zollicoffer, mistaking a Union regiment, rode forward and told its commanding officer, Colonel Speed S. Fry, that he was firing upon friends. Fry, not aware that Zollicoffer was an enemy, turned away to order his men to stop firing. At this moment one of

Zollicoffer's aides rode up, and seeing the true state of affairs drew his revolver and began firing at Fry, wounding his horse. Fry, wheeling in turn, drew his revolver and returned the fire, shooting Zollicoffer through the heart.* The fall of the rebel commander served to hasten and complete the defeat of the Confederates. They retreated in disorder to their fortified camp at Mill Springs. Thomas ordered immediate pursuit, and the same night invested their camp and made preparations to storm their intrenchments the following morning. When day came, however, it was found that the rebels had precipitately crossed the Cumberland River during the night, abandoning their wounded, twelve pieces of artillery, many small-arms, and extensive supplies, and had fled in utter dispersion to the mountains. It was one of the most remarkable Union victories of the war. General Thomas's forces consisted of a little over six regiments, those of Crittenden and Zollicoffer something over ten regiments.† It was more than a defeat for the Confederates. Their army was annihilated, and Cumberland Gap once more stood exposed, so that Buell might have sent a Union column and taken possession of eastern Tennessee with but feeble opposition. It is possible that the brilliant opportunity would at last have tempted him to comply with the urgent wishes of the President and the express orders of the General-in-Chief, had not unexpected events in another quarter diverted his attention and interest.

There was everywhere, about the months of December, 1861, and January, 1862, a perceptible increase of the Union armies by fresh regiments from the Northern States, a better supply of arms through recent importations, an increase of funds from new loans, and the delivery for use of various war material, the product of the summer's manufacture. Of prime importance to the military operations which centered at Cairo was the completion and equipment of the new gun-boats. A word of retrospect concerning this arm of the military service is here necessary. Commander John Rodgers was sent West in the month of May, 1861, to begin the construction of war vessels for Western rivers. Without definite plans he had purchased, and hastily converted, and armed as best he might, three river steamers. These were put into service in September. They were provided with cannon, but had no iron plating. They were the *Tyler*,‡ of 7 guns; the *Lexington*, of 6 guns; and the *Con-*

* Cist, "Army of the Cumberland," pp. 17, 18.

† Van Horne, "History of the Army of the Cumberland," Vol. I., p. 57.

‡ This vessel seems to have been named the *Tyler* at one time and the *Taylor* at another.

estoga, of 3 guns. Making Cairo their central station, they served admirably in the lighter duties of river police, in guarding transports, and in making hasty trips of reconnaissance. For the great expedition down the Mississippi, projected during the summer and fall of 1861, a more powerful class of vessels was provided.* The distinguished civil engineer James B. Eads designed and was authorized to build 7 new gun-boats, to carry 13 guns each, and to be protected about the bows with iron plating capable of resisting the fire of heavy artillery. They were named the *Cairo*, *Carondelet*, *Cincinnati*, *Louisville*, *Mound City*, *Pittsburg*, and *St. Louis*. Two additional gun-boats of the same type of construction, but of larger size,— the *Benton*, of 16 guns, and the *Essex*, of 5 guns,— were converted from other vessels about the same time. At the time Flag-Officer Foote finally accepted the first seven (January 15, 1862), it had been found impossible to supply them with crews of Eastern seamen. Resort was had to Western steamboatmen, and also to volunteers from infantry recruits. The joint reconnaissance of Grant and Foote to Fort Henry on the Tennessee River, January 14, has been related. A second examination was made by General Smith, who on January 22 reports that he had been within two miles and a half of the fort; that the river had risen fourteen feet since the last visit, giving a better opportunity to reconnoiter; more important, that the high water had drowned out a troublesome advance battery, and that, in his opinion, two iron-clad gun-boats could make short work of it. It is evident that, possessed of this additional information, Grant and Foote immediately resolved upon vigorous measures. Grant had already asked permission to visit Halleck at St. Louis. This was given; but Halleck refused to entertain his project. So firmly convinced was Grant, however, that his plan was good, that, though unsuccessful at first, he quickly renewed the request.† “Commanding-General Grant and myself,” telegraphed Foote to Halleck (January 28, 1862), “are of opinion that Fort Henry on the Tennessee River can be carried with four iron-clad gun-boats and troops to permanently occupy. Have we your authority to move for that purpose when ready?” To this Grant on the same day added the direct proposal, “With permission, I will take Fort Henry on the Ten-

nessee, and establish and hold a large camp there.” It would appear that no immediate answer was returned, for on the following day Grant renews his proposition with more emphasis.‡

It is easy to perceive what produced the sudden change in Halleck's mind. Grant's persistent urging was evidently the main influence, but two other events contributed essentially to the result. The first was the important victory gained by Thomas at Mill Springs in eastern Kentucky on January 19, the certain news of which was probably just reaching him; the second was a telegram from Washington, informing him that General Beauregard, with fifteen regiments from the Confederate army in Virginia, was being sent to Kentucky to be added to Johnston's army.§ “I was not ready to move,” explains Halleck afterward, “but deemed best to anticipate the arrival of Beauregard's forces.” It is well also to remember in this connection that two days before, President Lincoln's War Order No. 1 had been published, ordering a general movement of all the armies of the Union on the coming 22d of February. Whatever induced it, the permission now given was full and hearty. “Make your preparations to take and hold Fort Henry,” Halleck telegraphed to Grant on the 30th of January. “I will send you written instructions by mail.”

Grant and Foote had probably already begun their preparation. Receiving Halleck's instructions on February 1, Grant on the following day started his expedition of 15,000 men on transports, and Foote accompanied him with 7 gun-boats for convoy and attack. Their plan contemplated a bombardment by the fleet from the river, and assault on the land side by the troops. For this purpose General McClelland, with a division, was landed four miles below the fort on February 4. They made a reconnaissance on the 5th, and being joined by another division, under General Smith, were ordered forward to invest the fort on the 6th. This required a circuitous march of eight miles, during which the gun-boats of Flag-Officer Foote, having less than half the distance to go by the river, moved on and began the bombardment. The capture proved easier than was anticipated. General Tilghman, the Confederate commander of the

* To show the unremitting interest of the President in these preparations, and how his encouragement and prompting followed even their minor details, we quote from his autograph manuscript a note to the Secretary of War:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, Jan. 24, 1862.

HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.

MY DEAR SIR: On reflection I think you better make a peremptory order on the ordnance officer at

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Pittsburg to ship the ten mortars and two beds to Cairo instantly, and all others as fast as finished, till ordered to stop, reporting each shipment to the Department here.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

† Grant, “Memoirs,” Vol. I., p. 287.

‡ Ibid.

§ McClellan to Halleck and Buell, January 29, 1862. War Records.

fort, had, early that morning, sent away his 3000 infantry to Fort Donelson, being convinced that he was beset by an overpowering force. He kept only one company of artillery to work the eleven river guns of the fort; with these he defended the work about two hours, but without avail. Foote's 4 iron-plated gun-boats steamed boldly within 600 yards. The bombardment, though short, was well sustained on both sides, and not without its fluctuating chances. Two of the heaviest guns in the fort were soon silenced, one by bursting, the other being rendered useless by an accident with the priming wire. At this point a rebel shot passed through the casemate and the boiler of the gun-boat *Essex*, and she drifted helplessly out of the fight. But the remaining gun-boats continued their close and fierce attack, and five more of the rebel guns being speedily disabled, General Tilghman hauled down his flag and came on board to surrender the fort. McClelland's troops, from the land side, soon after entered the work and took formal possession. On the same day Grant telegraphed to Halleck, "Fort Henry is ours"; and his dispatch bore yet another significant announcement eminently characteristic of the man, "I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th."

FORT DONELSON.

THE news of the capture of Fort Henry created a sudden consternation among the Confederate commanders in Tennessee. It seemed as if the key-stone had unexpectedly fallen out of their arch of well-planned defenses. Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Hardee immediately met in a council of war at Bowling Green, and after full discussion united in a memorandum acknowledging the disaster and resolving on the measures which in their judgment it rendered necessary. They foresaw that Fort Donelson would probably also fall; that Johnston's army must retreat to Nashville to avoid capture; that since Columbus was now separated from Bowling Green, the main army at Columbus must retreat to Humboldt, or possibly to Grand Junction, leaving only a sufficient garrison to make a desperate defense of the works and the river;* and immediate orders were issued to prepare for these movements. Nevertheless, Johnston, to use his own language, resolved "to fight for Nashville at Donelson." For this purpose he divided the army at Bowling Green, starting 8000 of his men under Generals Buckner and Floyd, together with 4000 more under

Pillow from other points, on a rapid march to reinforce the threatened fort,† while General Hardee led his remaining 14,000 men on their retreat to Nashville.‡ This retreat was not alone a choice of evils. Even if Fort Henry had not fallen and Donelson been so seriously menaced, the overwhelming force of Buell would have compelled a retrograde movement. Had Buell been a commander of enterprise he would have seized this chance of inflicting great damage upon the diminished enemy in retreat. His advance guard, indeed, followed; but Johnston's remnant, marching night and day, succeeded in reaching the Cumberland River opposite Nashville, where, after preparations to cross in haste, the rebel commander awaited with intense eagerness to hear the fate of Donelson.

Of the two commanders in the West, the idea of the movement up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers was more favorably thought of by Halleck than by Buell. Buell pointed out its value, but began no movement that looked to its execution. Halleck, on the contrary, not only realized its importance, but immediately entertained the design of ultimately availing himself of it; thus he wrote at the time he ordered the reconnaissance which demonstrated its practicability: "The demonstration which General Grant is now making I have no doubt will keep them [the enemy] in check till preparations can be made for operations on the Tennessee or Cumberland."§ His conception of the necessary preparations was, however, almost equivalent to the rejection of the plan. He thought that it would require a force of 60,000 men; and to delay it till that number and their requisite material of war could be gathered or detached under prevailing ideas would amount to indefinite postponement.

When at last, through Grant's importunity, the movement was actually begun by the advance to capture Fort Henry, a curious interest in the expedition and its capabilities developed itself among the commanders. Grant's original proposition was simply to capture Fort Henry and establish a large camp. Nothing further was proposed, and Halleck's instructions went only to the same extent, with one addition. As the reported arrival of Beauregard with reinforcements had been the turning influence in Halleck's consent, so he proposed that the capture of Fort Henry should be immediately followed by a dash at the railroad bridges across the Tennessee and their destruction, to prevent those reinforcements from reaching Johnston. But

* Beauregard, Memorandum, Feb. 7, 1862. War Records.

† Johnston to ———, March 17, 1862. War Records.

‡ Johnston to Benjamin, Feb. 8, 1862. War Records.

§ Halleck to McClellan, Jan. 14, 1862. War Records.

with the progress of Grant's movement the chances of success brightened, and the plan began correspondingly to expand. On the 2d of February, when Grant's troops were preparing to invest Fort Henry, Halleck's estimate of coming possibilities had risen a little. He wrote to Buell:

At present it is only proposed to take and occupy Fort Henry and Dover [Donelson], and, if possible, cut the railroad from Columbus to Bowling Green.

Here we have Donelson added to Henry in the intention of the department commander. That the same intention existed in Grant's mind is evident, for, as already related, on the fall of Henry on the 6th, he immediately telegraphed to Halleck: "Fort Henry is ours. . . . I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th and return to Fort Henry." It is to be noted, however, that in proposing to destroy Fort Donelson, he still limits himself to his original proposition of an intrenched camp at Fort Henry.

At the critical moment Halleck's confidence in success at Fort Henry wavered, and he called upon Buell with impotency for sufficient help to make sure work of it. Buell's confidence also seems to have been very weak; for, commanding 72,502 men,—46,150 of them "in the field,"—he could only bring himself to send a single brigade* to aid in a work which he had described as of such momentous consequence. Afterward, indeed, he sent eight regiments more; but these were not from his 70,000 in the field. They were raw troops from Ohio and Indiana, which McClellan, with curious misconception of their usefulness, had ordered to Buell, who did not need them, instead of to Halleck, who was trying to make every man do double duty.

Out of this uncertainty about the final result at Fort Henry, the indecision of Buell's character becomes deplorably manifest. McClellan, satisfied that Buell could not advance against Johnston's force at Bowling Green over the difficult winter roads, and having not yet heard of the surrender of Fort Henry, suggested to both Buell and Halleck the temporary suspension of operations on other lines in order to make a quick combined movement up the Tennessee and the Cumberland. This was on February 6. Buell's fancy at first caught at the proposal, for he replied that evening:

This whole move, right in its strategical bearing, but commenced by General Halleck without appreciation, preparative or concert, has now become of vast magnitude. I was myself thinking of a change of the line to support it when I received your dispatch. It will have to be made in the face of 50,000, if not 60,000 men, and is hazardous. I will answer definitely in the morning.†

Halleck was more positive in his convictions. He telegraphed to McClellan on the same day:

If you can give me, in addition to what I have in this department, 10,000 men, I will take Fort Henry, cut the enemy's line, and paralyze Columbus. Give me 25,000, and I will threaten Nashville and cut off railroad communication, so as to force the enemy to abandon Bowling Green without a battle.

News of the fall of Fort Henry having been received at Washington, McClellan twenty-four hours later telegraphed to Halleck: "Either Buell or yourself should soon go to the scene of operations. Why not have Buell take the line of [the] Tennessee and operate on Nashville, while your troops turn Columbus? These two points gained, a combined movement on Memphis will be next in order." The dispatch was in substance repeated to Buell, who by this time thought he had made up his mind, for two hours later he answered: "I cannot, on reflection, think a change of my line would be advisable. . . . I hope General Grant will not require further reinforcements. I will go if necessary." Thus on the night of the 7th, with the single drilled brigade from Green River and the eight raw regiments from Ohio and Indiana, he proposed to leave the important central line on which Grant had started to its chances.

A night's reflection made him doubt the correctness of his decision, for he telegraphed on the morning of the 8th, "I am concentrating and preparing, but will not decide definitely yet." Halleck's views were less changeable: at noon on the 8th, he again urged that Buell should transfer the bulk of his forces to the Cumberland River, to move by water on Nashville. To secure this cooperation, he further proposed a modification of department lines to give Buell command on the Cumberland and Hitchcock or Sherman on the Tennessee, with superior command for himself over both.

No immediate response came from Washington, and three days elapsed when Halleck asked Buell specifically: "Can't you come with all your available forces and command the column up the Cumberland? I shall go to the Tennessee this week."‡ Buell's desire, vibrating like a pendulum between the two brilliant opportunities before him, now swings towards Halleck's proposal, but with provoking indefiniteness and fatal slowness. He answers that he will go either to the Cumberland or to the Tennessee, but that it will require ten days to transfer his troops.§ In this emergency,

* Buell to McClellan, Feb. 5, 1862. War Records.

† Buell to McClellan, Feb. 6, 1862. War Records.

‡ Halleck to Buell, Feb. 11, 1862. War Records.

§ Buell to Halleck, Feb. 12, 1862. War Records.

when hours counted as weeks, Buell showed himself almost as helpless and useless as a dimasted ship, rolling uneasily and idly in the trough of the sea. With, by this time, nearly 100,000 men* in the field, and with certainly a larger proportion of drilled and instructed regiments than could be found either in the camp of Grant or in the camps of the enemy, he could not make himself felt in any direction; he would neither attack the enemy in front nor send decisive help to Grant. He gives forth the everlasting cry of preparation, of delay, of danger.

During his painful hesitation, events forced him to a new conclusion. News came that the rebels had evacuated Bowling Green, and he telegraphed:

The evacuation of Bowling Green, leaving the way open to Nashville, makes it proper to resume my original plan. I shall advance on Nashville with all the speed I can.

From this last determination, Halleck appealed beseechingly to the General-in-Chief. He announced that Grant had formally invested Fort Donelson and that the bombardment was progressing favorably, but he further explained that since the evacuation of Bowling Green, the enemy were concentrating against Grant. He claimed that it was bad strategy for Buell to advance on Nashville over broken bridges and bad roads, and this point he reiterated with emphasis. He telegraphed on February 16:

I am still decidedly of the opinion that Buell should not advance on Nashville, but come to the Cumberland with his available forces. United to Grant we can take and hold Fort Donelson and Clarksville, and by another central movement cut off both Columbus and Nashville. . . . Unless we can take Fort Donelson very soon we shall have the whole force of the enemy on us. Fort Donelson is the turning-point of the war, and we must take it, at whatever sacrifice.

But his appeal was unavailing. McClellan took sides with Buell, insisting that to occupy Nashville would be most decisive. Buell had, indeed, ordered Nelson's division to go to the help of Grant; but in the conflict of his own doubts and intentions the orders had been so tardy that Nelson's embarkation was only beginning on the day when Donelson surrendered. McClellan's further conditional order to Buell, to help Grant if it were necessary, of-

ferred a yet more distant prospect of succor. If the siege of Donelson had been prolonged, assistance from these directions would of course have been found useful. In the actual state of facts, however, they show both Buell and McClellan incapable, even under continued pressure, of seizing and utilizing the fleeting chances of war which so often turn the scale of success, and which so distinctly call out the higher quality of military leadership.

Amidst the sluggish counsels of commanders of departments, the energy of Grant and the courage and intrepidity of his raw Western soldiers had already decided one of the great crises of the war. Grant had announced to Halleck that he would storm Fort Donelson on the 8th of February, but he failed to count one of the chances of delay. "I contemplated taking Fort Donelson to-day with infantry and cavalry alone," reported he, "but all my troops may be kept busily engaged in saving what we now have from the rapidly rising waters."† This detention served to change the whole character of the undertaking. If he could have marched and attacked on the 8th, he would have found but 6000 men in the fort, which his own troops largely outnumbered; as it turned out, the half of Johnston's army sent from Bowling Green and other points, conducted by Generals Pillow, Floyd, and Buckner, arrived before the fort was invested, increasing the garrison to an aggregate of 17,000 and greatly extending the lines of rifle-pits and other defenses.‡ This presented an altogether different and more serious problem. The enemy before Grant was now, if not superior, at least equal in numbers, and had besides the protection of a large and well-constructed earth-work, armed with seventeen heavy and forty-eight field-guns. It is probable that this changed aspect of affairs was not immediately known to him; if it was, he depended on the reinforcements which Halleck had promised, and which soon began to arrive. Early on the morning of the 12th he started on his march, with the divisions of McClernand and Smith, numbering 15,000. At noon they were within two miles of Donelson. That afternoon and all the following day, February 13, were occupied in driving in the rebel pickets, finding the approaches, and drawing the lines of investment around the

* The following is the force in the whole of the late Department of the Ohio, as nearly as can be ascertained at present: 92 regiments infantry, 60,882 for duty; 79,334 aggregate, present and absent. 11 regiments, 1 battalion, and 7 detached companies cavalry, 9222 for duty; 11,496 aggregate, present and absent. 28 field and 2 siege batteries, 3368 for duty; 3953 aggregate, present and absent. [Buell to Thomas, February 14, 1862. War Records.]

† Grant to Cullum, February 8, 1862. War Records.

‡ General Grant's estimate of the Confederate forces is 21,000. He says he marched against the fort with but 15,000, but that he received reinforcements before the attack, and their continued arrival had, at the time of the surrender, increased his army to about 27,000. Grant, "Personal Memoirs," Vol. I., pp. 299 and 315.

fort. A gallant storming assault by four Illinois regiments upon one of the rebel batteries was an exciting incident of the afternoon's advance, but was unsuccessful.

To understand the full merit of the final achievement, the conditions under which the siege of Donelson was thus begun must be briefly mentioned. The principal fort, or earth-work which bore the military name, lay on the west bank of the Cumberland River, half a mile north of the little town of Dover. The fort occupied the terminal knoll of a high ridge ending in the angle between the river and the mouth of Hickman Creek. This main work consisted of two batteries of heavy guns, primarily designed to control the river navigation. But when General Johnston resolved to defend Nashville at Donelson and gathered an army of 17,000 men for the purpose, the original fort and the town of Dover, and all the intervening space, were inclosed by a long, irregular line of rifle-pits connecting more substantial breastworks and embankments on the favorable elevations, in which field-batteries were planted; the whole chain of intrenchments, extending from Hickman Creek on the north till it inclosed the town of Dover on the south, having a total length of about two and a half miles. Outside the rifle-pits were the usual obstructions of felled trees and abatis, forming an interlacing barrier difficult to penetrate.

The Union troops had had no fighting at Fort Henry; at that place the gun-boats had done the whole work. The debarkation on the Tennessee, the reconnaissance, the march towards Donelson, the picket skirmishing during the 12th and 13th, had only been such as to give them zest and exhilaration. When, on the morning of the 12th, the march began, the weather was mild and agreeable; but on the afternoon of the 13th, while the army was stretching itself cautiously around the rebel intrenchments, the thermometer suddenly went down, a winter storm set in with rain, snow, sleet, ice, and a piercing north-west wind, that made the men lament the imprudence they had committed in leaving overcoats and blankets behind. Grant's army was composed entirely of Western regiments; fifteen from the single State of Illinois, and a further aggregate of seventeen from the States of Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Missouri, and Iowa. Some of these regiments had seen guerrilla fighting in Missouri, some had been through the battle of Belmont, but many were new to the privations and dangers of an active campaign. Nearly all the officers came from civil life; but a common thought, energy, and will animated the whole mass. It was neither discipline nor mere military ambition; it was

patriot work in its noblest and purest form. They had left their homes and varied peaceful occupations to defend the Government and put down rebellion. They were in the flush and exaltation of a common heroic impulse: in such a mood, the rawest recruit was as brave as the oldest veteran; and in this spirit they endured hunger and cold, faced snow and ice, held tenaciously the lines of the siege, climbed without flinching through the tangled abatis, and advanced into the deadly fire from the rifle-pits with a purpose and a devotion never excelled by soldiers of any nation or epoch.

Flag-Officer Foote, with six gun-boats, arrived the evening of the 13th; also six regiments sent by water. Fort Henry had been reduced by the gun-boats alone, and it was resolved first to try the effect of these new and powerful fighting machines upon the works of Donelson. Accordingly on Friday, February 14, the assault was begun by an attack from the six gun-boats. As before, the situation of the fort enabled the four iron-clads to advance up-stream towards the batteries, the engines holding them steadily against the swift current, presenting their heavily plated bows as a target for the enemy. The attack had lasted an hour and a half. The iron-clads were within 400 yards of the rebel embankments, the heavy armor was successfully resisting the shot and shell from the fort, the fire of the enemy was slackening, indicating that the water-batteries were becoming untenable, when two of the gun-boats were suddenly disabled and drifted out of the fight, one having her wheel carried away, and the other her tiller-ropes damaged.

These accidents, due to the weakness and exposure of the pilot-houses, compelled a cessation of the river attack and a withdrawal of the gun-boats for repairs, and gave the beleaguered garrison corresponding exultation and confidence. Flag-Officer Foote had been wounded in the attack, and deeming it necessary to take his disabled vessels temporarily back to Cairo, he requested Grant to visit him for consultation. Grant therefore went on board one of the gun-boats before dawn on the morning of the 15th, and it was arranged between the commanders that he should perfect his lines and hold the fort in siege until Foote could return from Cairo to assist in renewing the attack.

During all this time there had been a fluctuation of fear and hope in the garrison — from the repulse of McClelland's assault on the 13th, the prompt investment of the fort, the gun-boat attack and its repulse. There was want of harmony between Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, the three commanders within the fort.

Prior to the gun-boat attack a bold sortie was resolved upon, which project was, however, abandoned through the orders or non-compliance of Pillow. That night the second council of war determined to make a serious effort to extricate the garrison. At 6 o'clock on the morning of the 15th the divisions of Pillow and Buckner moved out to attack McClermand's division, and if possible open an avenue of retreat by the road running southward from Dover to Charlotte. The Confederates made their attack not only with spirit but with superior numbers. Driving back McClermand's right, they were by 11 o'clock in the forenoon in complete possession of the coveted Charlotte road. Buckner, who simultaneously attacked McClermand's left, did not fare so well. He was repulsed, and compelled to retire to the intrenchments from which he had issued. At this critical point Grant returned from his visit to Foote. What he found and what he did is stated with brevity in the message he hastily sent back:

If all the gun-boats that can will immediately make their appearance to the enemy it may secure us a victory. Otherwise all may be defeated. A terrible conflict ensued in my absence, which has demoralized a portion of my command, and I think the enemy is much more so. If the gun-boats do not show themselves, it will reassure the enemy and still further demoralize our troops. I must order a charge, to save appearances. I do not expect the gun-boats to go into action, but to make appearance and throw a few shells at long range.*

In execution of the design here announced, Grant sent an order to General C. F. Smith, commanding the second division, who held the extreme left of the investing line, to storm the intrenchments in front of him. His men had as yet had no severe fighting, and now went forward enthusiastically to their allotted task, carrying an important outwork with impetuous gallantry. Learning of his success, Grant in turn ordered forward the entire remainder of his force under Wallace and McClermand. This order was also executed during the afternoon, and by nightfall the whole of the ground lost by the enemy's morning attack was fully regained. There is a conflict of testimony about the object of the attack of the enemy. Buckner says it was to effect the immediate escape of the garrison; Pillow says he had no such understanding, and that neither he nor any one else made preparation for departure. The opportunity, therefore, which his division had during the forenoon to retire by the open road to Charlotte was not improved. By evening the chance was gone, for the Federals had once more closed that avenue of escape.

* Grant to Foote, Feb. 15, 1862. War Records.

During the night of the 15th, the Confederate commanders met in council to decide what they should do. Buckner, the junior, very emphatically gave the others to understand that the situation of the garrison was desperate, and that it would require but an hour or two of assault on the next morning to capture his portion of the defenses. Such a contingency left them no practical alternative. Floyd and Pillow, however, had exaggerated ideas of the personal danger they would be in from the Government if they permitted themselves to become prisoners, and made known their great solicitude to get away. An agreement was therefore reached through which Floyd, the senior general, first turned over his command to Pillow; then Pillow, the second in command, in the same way relinquished his authority to Buckner, the junior general. This formality completed, Floyd and Pillow made hasty preparations, and taking advantage of the arrival of a rebel steamer boarded it, with their personal followers, during the night, and abandoned the fort and its garrison.

As usual, the active correspondents of Western newspapers were with the expedition, and through their telegrams something of the varying fortunes of the Kentucky campaign and the Donelson siege had become known to the country, while President Lincoln at Washington gleaned still further details from the scattering official reports which came to the War Department through army channels. His urgent admonitions to Buell and Halleck in the previous month to bring about efficient coöperation have already been related. The new and exciting events again aroused his most intense solicitude, and prompted him to send the following suggestion by telegraph to Halleck:

You have Fort Donelson safe, unless Grant shall be overwhelmed from outside, to prevent which latter will, I think, require all the vigilance, energy, and skill of yourself and Buell, acting in full coöperation. Columbus will not get at Grant, but the force from Bowling Green will. They hold the railroad from Bowling Green to within a few miles of Fort Donelson, with the bridge at Clarksville undisturbed. It is unsafe to rely that they will not dare to expose Nashville to Buell. A small part of their force can retire slowly towards Nashville, breaking up the railroad as they go, and keep Buell out of that city twenty days. Meantime Nashville will be abundantly defended by forces from all South and perhaps from here at Manassas. Could not a cavalry force from General Thomas on the Upper Cumberland dash across, almost unresisted, and cut the railroad at or near Knoxville, Tennessee? In the midst of a bombardment at Fort Donelson, why could not a gun-boat run up and destroy the bridge at Clarksville? Our success or failure at Fort Donelson is vastly important, and I beg you to put your soul in the effort. I send a copy of this to Buell.

Before this telegram reached its destination, the siege of Donelson was terminated.

On Sunday morning, the 16th of February, when the troops composing the Federal line of investment were preparing for a final assault, a note came from Buckner to Grant, proposing an armistice to arrange terms of capitulation. The language of Grant's reply served to crown the fame of his achievement :

Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.

His resolute phrase gained him a prouder title than was ever bestowed by knightly accolade. Thereafter, the army and the country, with a fanciful play upon the initials of his name, spoke of him as "Unconditional Surrender Grant." Buckner had no other balm for the sting of his defeat than to say that Grant's terms were ungenerous and unchivalric, but the necessity compelled him to accept them. That day Grant was enabled to telegraph to Halleck :

We have taken Fort Donelson and from 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners, including Generals Buckner and Bushrod R. Johnson; also about 20,000 stand of

arms, 48 pieces of artillery, 17 heavy guns, from 2000 to 4000 horses, and large quantities of commissary stores.

By this brilliant and important victory Grant's fame sprang suddenly into full and universal recognition. Congress was in session at Washington; his personal friend and representative, Hon. Elihu B. Washburne, member from the Galena district of Illinois, lost no time in proposing a resolution of thanks to Grant and his army, which was voted without delay and with generous gratitude. With even more heartiness, President Lincoln nominated him major-general of volunteers, and the Senate at once confirmed the appointment. The whole military service felt the inspiring event. Many of the colonels in Grant's army were made brigadier-generals; and promotion ran, like a quickening leaven, through the whole organization. Halleck also reminded the Government of his desire for larger power. "Make Buell, Grant, and Pope major-generals of volunteers," he telegraphed the day after the surrender, "and give me command in the West. I ask this in return for Forts Henry and Donelson."



LINCOLN CATHEDRAL.



SEAL OF THE SEE OF LINCOLN.

NO man by taking thought can add a cubit to his stature, but dignity of carriage and a masterful air may accomplish many inches; — the yard-stick bears false witness to a Louis Quatorze, a Napoleon, or a Nelson. And as it is with men, so it is with cities. Canterbury counts

twenty thousand souls and looks small, weak, and rural. Lincoln counts only a few thousand more, but, domineering on its hill-top, makes so brave a show of municipal pride, has so truculent an air and attitude, that no tourist thinks to patronize it as a mere provincial town. It is a city to his eye; and the greatness of its church simply accentuates the fact. Canterbury's cathedral almost crushes Canterbury, asleep in its broad vale. Durham's rock-borne minster projects so boldly from the town behind it that it still seems what it really was in early years —

at once the master of Durham and its bulwark against aggression. But Lincoln's church, though quite as big and as imperial as the others, seems but the crown and finish of the city which bears it aloft in a close, sturdy grasp. Like Durham cathedral, it stands on a promontory beneath which runs a river. But the hill is very much higher, and the town, instead of spreading away behind the church, tumbles steeply down the hill and far out beyond the stream. Here for the first time in England we feel as we almost always do in continental countries — not that the cathedral church has gathered a city about it, but that the city has built a cathedral church for its own glory and profit.

I.

IN truth, the importance of Lincoln as a town long antedates its importance as an ecclesiastical center. We cannot read far enough back in its history to find a record of its birth. When the Romans came — calling it *Lindum*

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

THE MISSISSIPPI AND SHILOH.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.

THE MISSISSIPPI.



AS a powerful supplement to the Union victories in Tennessee, the military operations west of the Mississippi River next demand our attention. Under the vigorous promptings of Halleck we left the army of General Curtis engaged in his trying midwinter campaign in south-western Missouri. He made ready with all haste to comply with the order to "push on as rapidly as possible and end the matter with Price." His army obeyed every order with cheerful endurance. "They contend with mud, water, and snow and ice manfully," wrote Curtis under date of February 1, 1862, "and I trust they will not falter in the face of a more active foe." In the same spirit he encouraged his officers:

The roads are indeed very bad, but they are worse for the enemy than for us if he attempts to retreat. . . . The men should help the teams out of difficulty when necessary, and all must understand that the elements are to be considered serious obstacles, which we have to encounter and overcome in this campaign. . . . Constant bad roads will be the rule, and a change for the better a rare exception.

As already remarked, Price had kept his situation and numbers well concealed. He was known to be at Springfield; but rumor exaggerated his force to 30,000, and it was uncertain whether he intended to retreat or advance. Reports also came that Van Dorn was marching to his support with 10,000 men. Curtis kept the offensive, however, pushing forward his outposts. By the 13th of February Price found his position untenable and ordered a retreat from Springfield. Since McCulloch would not come to Missouri to furnish Price assistance, Price was perforce compelled to go to Arkansas, where McCulloch might furnish him protection. Curtis pursued with vigor. "We continually take cattle, prisoners, wagons, and arms, which they leave in their flight," he wrote. Near the Arkansas line Price endeavored to make a stand with his rear-guard, but without success. On February 18, in a special order announcing the recent Union victories elsewhere, Curtis was able to congratulate his own troops as follows:

You have moved in the most inclement weather, over the worst of roads, making extraordinary long marches, subsisting mainly on meat without salt, and for the past six days you have been under the fire of the fleeing enemy. You have driven him out of Missouri, restored the Union flag to the virgin soil of Arkansas, and triumphed in two contests.

The rebels were in no condition to withstand him, and he moved forward to Cross Hollow, where the enemy had hastily abandoned a large cantonment with extensive buildings, only a portion of which they stopped to burn. It was time for Curtis to pause. He was 240 miles from his railroad base at Rolla, where he had begun his laborious march. Orders soon came from Halleck not to penetrate farther into Arkansas, but to hold his position and keep the enemy south of the Boston Mountains. "Hold your position," wrote Halleck, March 7, "till I can turn the enemy." At that date Halleck expected to make a land march along what he had decided to be the central strategic line southward from Fort Donelson, turn the enemy at Memphis, and compel the Confederate forces to evacuate the whole Mississippi Valley down to that point.

There was, however, serious work yet in store for Curtis. To obviate the jealousies and bickerings among Trans-Mississippi Confederate commanders the Richmond authorities had combined the Indian Territory with portions of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri in the Trans-Mississippi District of Department No. II., and had sent Major-General Earl Van Dorn to command the whole. His letters show that he went full of enthusiasm and brilliant anticipations. He did not dream of being kept on the defensive. He called for troops from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas, and ordered the armies of McCulloch and McIntosh, and Pike with his Indian regiments, to join him. From these various sources he hoped to collect a force of from 30,000 to 40,000 men at Pocahontas, Arkansas. Unaware that Price was then retreating from Springfield, he wrote to that commander, under date of February 14, proposing a quick and secret march against St. Louis, which he hoped to capture by assault. Holding that city would soon secure Missouri and relieve Johnston, seriously pressed in Tennessee. He

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would not wait to prepare, but would adopt the style of frontier equipment and supply:

Flour, salt, and a little bacon in our wagons, and beef cattle driven with us, should be our commissariat. Grain-bags to contain two days' rations of corn, to be carried on our troopers' saddles, and money our paymaster's department, and sufficient ammunition our ordnance department.

But he did not have time enough to extemporize even this haversack campaign: he found his base of supplies menaced from the north-east, and information soon followed that Price was flying in confusion from the north-west. Ten days later we find him writing to Johnston:

Price and McCulloch are concentrated at Cross Hollow. . . . Whole force of enemy [Union] from 35,000 to 40,000; ours about 20,000. Should Pike be able to join, our forces will be about 26,000. I leave this evening to go to the army, and will give battle, of course, if it does not take place before I arrive. I have no doubt of the result. If I succeed, I shall push on.

Van Dorn found the Confederate forces united in the Boston Mountains, fifty-five miles south of Sugar Creek, to which point Curtis had retired for better security. He immediately advanced with his whole force, attacking the Union position on the 6th of March. On the 7th was fought the principal contest, known as the battle of Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn Tavern. As usual, rumor exaggerated the forces on both sides. By the official reports it appears that Van Dorn's available command numbered 16,000. The Union troops under Curtis numbered only about 10,500; but they had the advantage of a defensive attitude and gained a complete victory, to which the vigilance and able strategy of the Union commander effectively contributed. Generals McCulloch, McIntosh, and other prominent rebel officers were killed early in the action, and Van Dorn's right wing was shattered.

The diminished and scattered forces of Van Dorn, retreating by different routes from the battle of Pea Ridge, were not again wholly united. Pike was ordered to conduct his Indian regiments back to the Indian Territory for local duty. The main remnant of the Confederate army followed Van Dorn to the eastward in the direction of Pochontas, where he proposed to reorganize it, to resume the offensive. Halleck, cautioning Curtis to hold his position and keep well on his guard, speaks of Van Dorn as a "vigilant and energetic officer"; and Van Dorn's language certainly indicates activity, whatever may be thought of the discretion it betrays. He had hardly shaken from his feet the dust of his rout at Pea Ridge when he again began writing that he contemplated relieving the stress of

Confederate disaster in Tennessee by attempting to capture the city of St. Louis, a will-o'-the-wisp project that had by turns dazzled the eyes of all the Confederate commanders in the Mississippi Valley; or, as another scheme, perhaps a mere prelude to this, he would march eastward against Pope and raise the siege of New Madrid, on the Mississippi River. This brings us to a narrative of events at that point.

WITH the fall of Fort Donelson the rebel stronghold at Columbus had become useless. Its evacuation soon followed (March 2, 1862), and the Confederates immediately turned their attention to holding the next barrier on the Mississippi River. This was at a point less than one hundred miles below Cairo, where the Father of Waters makes two large bends, which, joined together, lie like a reversed letter S placed horizontally. At the foot of this first bend lay Island No. 10;* from there the river flows northward to the town of New Madrid, Missouri, passing which it resumes its southward flow. The country is not only flat, as the bend indicates, but it is encompassed in almost all directions by nearly impassable swamps and bayous. Island No. 10, therefore, and its immediate neighborhood, seemed to offer unusual advantages to bar the Mississippi with warlike obstructions. As soon as the evacuation of Columbus was determined upon, all available rebel resources and skill were concentrated here. The island, the Tennessee shore of the river, and the town of New Madrid were all strongly fortified and occupied with considerable garrisons—about 3000 men at the former and some 5000 at the latter place.

General Halleck, studying the strategical conditions of the whole Mississippi Valley with tenfold interest since the victories of Grant, also had his eye on this position, and was now as eager to capture it as the rebels were to defend it. One of the quickest movements of the whole war ensued. General Pope was selected to lead the expedition, and the choice was not misplaced. On the 22d of February, six days after the surrender of Fort Donelson, Pope landed at the town of Commerce, Missouri, on the Mississippi River, with 140 men. On the 28th he was on the march at the head of 10,000, who had been sent him in the interim from St. Louis and Cairo. On the 3d of March, at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, he appeared before the town of New Madrid with his whole force, to which further reinforcements were soon added, raising his army to about 20,000. It would have required but a few hours to cap-

* See communication from John Banvard in "Open Letters" of this number of THE CENTURY.—EDITOR.

ture the place by assault; but the loss of life would have been great and the sacrifice virtually useless. It was the season of the early spring floods; the whole country was submerged, and the great river was at a very high stage between its levees. In addition to its earth-works and its garrison, New Madrid was guarded by a fleet of eight rebel gun-boats under command of Commodore George N. Hollins. The high water floated these vessels at such an elevation that their guns commanded every part of the town, and made its occupation by hostile troops impossible. Had Pope entered with his army, Hollins would have destroyed both town and troops at his leisure.

Pope therefore surrounded the place by siege-works in which he could protect his men; and sending a detachment to Point Pleasant on the river, nine miles below, secured a lodgment for batteries that closed the river to rebel transports and cut off the enemy's reënforcements and supplies. The movement proved effectual. Ten days later (March 13, 1862) the rebels evacuated New Madrid, leaving everything behind.

The Confederates now held Island No. 10 and the Tennessee shore; but their retreat was cut off by the swamps beyond and Pope's batteries below. The rebel gun-boat flotilla had retired down the river. Pope's forces held New Madrid and the Missouri shore, but they had neither transports nor gun-boats, and without these could not cross to the attack. In this dilemma Pope once more called upon Flag-Officer Foote to bring the Union fleet of gun-boats down the river, attack and silence the batteries of Island No. 10, and assist in capturing the rebel army, which his strategy had shut in a trap.

Foote, although commanding a fleet of nine Union gun-boats, objected that the difficulty and risk were too great. With all their formidable strength the gun-boats had two serious defects. Only their bows were protected by the heavier iron plating so as to be shot-proof; and their engines were not strong enough to back easily against the powerful current of the Mississippi. In their attacks on Forts Henry and Donelson they had fought up-stream; when disabled, the mere current carried them out of the enemy's reach. On the Mississippi this was reversed. Compelled to fight down-stream, they would, if disabled, be carried irresistibly directly to the enemy. A bombardment at long range from both gun and mortar boats had proved inef-

fectual to silence the rebel batteries. Pope's expedition seemed destined to prove fruitless, when a new expedient was the occasion of success.

The project of a canal to turn Island No. 10 was again revived. The floods of the Mississippi, pouring through breaks in the levees, inundated the surrounding country. Colonel Bissell of the engineer regiment, returning in a canoe with a guide from his unsuccessful visit to secure Foote's coöperation, learned that a bayou, from two and a half to three miles west of the Mississippi, ran irregularly to the south-west from the neighborhood of Island No. 8, the station of the Union gun-boat flotilla, to its junction with the river at New Madrid, a distance of twelve miles. An open corn-field and an opening in the woods, which marked the course of an old road, suggested to him the possibility of connecting the river with the bayou; but between the end of the road and the bayou lay a belt of heavy timber two miles in width.* How could he get a fleet of vessels over the ground thickly covered by trees of every size, from a sapling to a forest veteran three feet in diameter, whose roots stood six or seven feet under water? Modern mechanical appliances are not easily baffled by natural obstacles. Six hundred skillful mechanics working with the aid of steam and machinery, and directed by American inventive ingenuity, brought the wonder to pass. In a few days Colonel Bissell had a line of four light-draught steamboats and six coal-barges† crossing the corn-field and entering the open road. Great saws, bent in the form of an arc and fastened to frames swinging on pivots, severed the tree-trunks four and a half feet under water; ropes, pulleys, and capstans hauled the encumbering débris out of the path. In eight days the amphibious fleet was in the bayou. Here were new difficulties—to clean away the dams of accumulated and entangled drift-wood. In a few days more Bissell's boats and barges were ready to emerge into the Mississippi at New Madrid, but yet kept prudently concealed. Two gun-boats were needed to protect the transports in crossing troops. The sagacious judgment of Foote and the heroism of his subordinates supplied these at the opportune moment. Captain Walke of the *Carondelet* volunteered to run the batteries at Island No. 10; and now that the risk was justified, the flag-officer consented. On the night of the 4th of April, after the moon had gone down, the gun-boat *Carondelet*, moving with as little noise as

* See the article "Sawing Out the Channel Above Island No. 10" by J. W. Bissell in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War" (N. Y.: The Century Co.), Vol. I., p. 460.

† The barges used were coal-barges, about eighty feet long and twenty wide, scow-shaped, with both ends alike. The sides were six inches thick, and of solid timber. [J. W. Bissell. *Ibid.*]

possible, swung into the stream from her moorings and started on her perilous voyage. It must have seemed an omen of success that a sudden thunder-storm with its additional gloom and noise came up to aid the attempt. The movement was unsuspected by the enemy till, by one of frequent flashes of lightning, the rebel sentries on the earth-works of Island No. 10 and the shore batteries opposite saw the huge turtle-shaped river craft stand out in vivid outline, to be in a second hidden again by the dense obscurity. Alarm cries rang out, musketry rattled, great guns resounded; the ship almost touched the shore in the drift of the crooked channel. But the Confederate guns could not be aimed amidst the swift succession of brilliant flash and total darkness. The rebel missiles flew wild, and a little after midnight the *Carondelet* lay unharmed at the New Madrid landing. Captain Walke had made the first successful experiment in a feat of daring and skill that was many times repeated after he had demonstrated its possibility.

The gun-boat *Pittsburgh*, also running past the rebel batteries at night, joined the *Carondelet* at New Madrid on the morning of April 7, and the problem of Pope's difficulties was solved. When he crossed his troops over the river by help of his gun-boats and transports, formidable attack was no longer necessary. Island No. 10 had surrendered to Flag-Officer Foote that morning, and the several rebel garrisons were using their utmost endeavors to effect a retreat southward. Pope easily intercepted their movement: on that and the following day he received the surrender of three general officers and six or seven thousand Confederate troops.

As General Pope's victory had been gained without loss or demoralization, he prepared immediately to push his operations farther south. "If transportation arrives to-morrow or next day," telegraphed Assistant-Secretary Scott, who was with him at New Madrid, "we shall have Memphis within ten days." Halleck responded with the promise of ten large steamers to carry troops, and other suggestions indicating his approval of the movement "down the river." In the same dispatch Halleck gave news of the Union victory at Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River, and announced his intention to proceed thither, and asked Assistant-Secretary Scott to meet him at Cairo for consultation. The meeting took place on the 10th of April, by which time Halleck had become more impressed with the severity and the perils of the late battle on the Tennessee; for Scott asks the Washington authorities whether a reënforcement of 20,000 or 30,000 men cannot be sent from the East to make good the loss. This conference proba-

bly originated the idea that soon interrupted the successful river operations, by withdrawing the army under Pope. Reënforcements could not be spared from the East, and Pope's army became the next resource. For the present, however, there was a continuation of the first plan. Pope's preliminary orders for embarkation were issued on the 10th, and on the 14th the combined land and naval forces which had reduced Island No. 10 reached Fort Pillow. Its works were found to be strong and extensive. The overflow of the whole country rendered land operations difficult; it was estimated that it would require two weeks to turn the position and reduce the works. Meanwhile information was obtained that Van Dorn's rebel army from Arkansas was about to reënforce Beauregard at Corinth. In view of all this, Assistant-Secretary Scott asked the question: "If General Pope finds, after careful examination, that he cannot capture Fort Pillow within ten days, had he not better reënforce General Halleck immediately, and let Commodore Foote continue to blockade below until forces can be returned and the position be turned by General Halleck beating Beauregard and marching upon Memphis from Corinth?" Before an answer came from the War Department at Washington, Halleck, who had for several days been with the army on the Tennessee River, decided the question for himself and telegraphed to Pope (April 15), "Move with your army to this place, leaving troops enough with Commodore Foote to land and hold Fort Pillow, should the enemy's forces withdraw." At the same time he sent the following suggestion to Flag-Officer Foote:

I have ordered General Pope's army to this place, but I think you had best continue the bombardment of Fort Pillow; and if the enemy should abandon it, take possession or go down the river, as you may deem best. General Pope will leave forces enough to occupy any fortifications that may be taken.

The plan was forthwith carried into effect. The transports, instead of disembarking Pope's troops to invest Fort Pillow, were turned northward, and steaming up the Mississippi to Cairo, thence to Paducah, and from Paducah up the Tennessee River, landed the whole of Pope's army, except two regiments, at Pittsburg Landing on the 22d of April.

The flotilla under Foote and the two regiments left behind continued in front of Fort Pillow, keeping up a show of attack, by a bombardment from one of the mortar-boats and such reconnaissances as the little handful of troops could venture, to discover, if possible, some weak point in the enemy's defenses. On the other hand, the Confederates, watching what they thought a favorable opportunity,

brought up eight of their gun-boats and made a spirited attack on the Union vessels on the morning of May 10. In a short combat two of the Union gun-boats, which bore the brunt of the onset, were seriously disabled, though not until they had inflicted such damage on three Confederate vessels that they drifted helplessly out of the fight; after which the remainder of the rebel flotilla retired from the encounter. For nearly a month after this preliminary gun-boat battle the river operations, though full of exciting daily incident, were marked by no important historical event. Mention, however, needs to be here made of a change in the control of the Union fleet. Commodore Foote had been wounded in the ankle during his attack on Fort Donelson, and his injury now caused him so much suffering and exhaustion of strength that he was compelled to relinquish his command. He took leave of his flotilla on the 9th of May, and was succeeded by Commodore Charles H. Davis, who from that time onward had charge of the gun-boat operations on the upper Mississippi.

THE SHILOH CAMPAIGN.

THE fall of Fort Donelson hastened, almost to a panic, the retreat of the Confederates from other points. By that surrender about one-third of their fighting force in Tennessee vanished from the campaign, while their whole web of strategy was instantly dissolved. The full possession of the Tennessee River by the Union gun-boats for the moment hopelessly divided the Confederate commands, and like a flushed covey of birds the rebel generals started on their several lines of retreat without concert or rallying point. Albert Sidney Johnston, the department commander, moved south-east towards Chattanooga, abandoning Nashville to its fate; while Beauregard, left to his own discretion and resources, took measures to effect the evacuation of Columbus so as to save its armament and supplies, and then proceeded to the railroad crossings of northern Mississippi to collect and organize a new army.

It is now evident that if the Union forces could have been promptly moved forward in harmonious combination, with the facility which the opening of the Tennessee River afforded them, such an advance might have been made, and such strategic points gained and held, as would have saved at least an entire year of campaign and battle in the West. Unfortunately this great advantage was not seized, and in the condition of affairs could not be; and a delay of a fortnight or more enabled the insurgents to renew the confidence and gather the forces to establish another line

farther to the south, and again to interpose a formidable resistance. One cause of this inefficiency and delay of the Union commanders may be easily gleaned from the dispatches interchanged by them within a few days succeeding the fall of Fort Donelson, and which, aside from their military bearings, form an interesting study of human nature.

General Buell, from his comfortable headquarters at Louisville, writes (February 17, 1862) that since the reinforcements (Nelson's division) started by him to assist at Fort Donelson are no longer needed, he has ordered them back. "The object of both our forces," he continues, "is, directly or indirectly, to strike at the power of the rebellion in its most vital point within our field. Nashville appears clearly, I think, to be that point." He thought further that heavy reinforcements would soon be thrown into it by the rebels. The leisurely manner in which he expected to strike at this heart of the rebellion appears from these words, in the same letter:

To depend on wagons at this season for a large force seems out of the question, and I fear it may be two weeks before I can get a bridge over the Barren River, so as to use the railroad beyond. I shall endeavor, however, to make an advance in less or much force before that time. . . . Let me hear your views.

Halleck, at St. Louis, was agitated by more rapid emotions. Watching the distant and dangerous campaign under Curtis in south-western Missouri, beginning another of mingled hazard and brilliant promise under Pope on the Mississippi, beset by perplexities of local administration, flushed to fever heat by the unexpected success of Grant, his mind ran forward eagerly to new prospects. "I am not satisfied with present success," he telegraphed Sherman. "We must now prepare for a still more important movement. You will not be forgotten in this." But this preparation seems, in his mind, to have involved something more than orders from himself.

Before he received the news of the surrender of Fort Donelson he became seriously alarmed lest the rebels, using their river transportation, might rapidly concentrate, attack Grant in the rear, crush him before succor could reach him, and, returning quickly, be as ready as before to confront and oppose Buell. Even after the surrender Halleck manifests a continuing fear that some indefinite concentration will take place, and a quick reprisal be executed by a formidable expedition against Paducah or Cairo. His overstrained appeals to Buell for help do not seem justified in the full light of history. An undertone of suggestion and demand indicates that this urgency, ostensibly based on his patriotic eagerness for success, was not wholly free from personal ambition.

We have seen how when he heard of Grant's victory he generously asked that Buell, Grant, and Pope be made major-generals of volunteers, and with equal generosity to himself broadly added, "and give me command in the West." He could not agree with Buell that Nashville was the most vital point of the rebellion in the West, and that heavy rebel reinforcements would be thrown into it from all quarters east and south. Halleck develops his idea with great earnestness in replying to that suggestion from Buell. He says:

To remove all questions as to rank, I have asked the President to make you a major-general. Come down to the Cumberland and take command. The battle of the West is to be fought in that vicinity. You should be in it as the ranking general in immediate command. Don't hesitate. Come to Clarksville as rapidly as possible. Say that you will come, and I will have everything there for you. Beauregard threatens to attack either Cairo or Paducah; I must be ready for him. Don't stop any troops ordered down the Ohio. We want them all. You shall have them back in a few days. Assistant-Secretary of War Scott left here this afternoon to confer with you. He knows my plans and necessities. I am terribly hard pushed. Help me, and I will help you. Hunter has acted nobly, generously, bravely. Without his aid I should have failed before Fort Donelson. Honor to him. We came within an ace of being defeated. If the fragments which I sent down had not reached there on Saturday we should have gone in. A retreat at one time seemed almost inevitable. All right now. Help me to carry it out. Talk freely with Scott. It is evident to me that you and McClellan did not at last accounts appreciate the strait I have been in. I am certain you will when you understand it all. Help me, I beg of you. Throw all your troops in the direction of the Cumberland. Don't stop any one ordered here. You will not regret it. There will be no battle at Nashville.

In answer to an inquiry from Assistant-Secretary Scott, he explains further:

I mean that Buell should move on Clarksville with his present column: there unite his Kentucky army and move up the Cumberland, while I act on the Tennessee. We should then be able to cooperate.

This proposal was entirely judicious; but in Halleck's mind it was subordinated to another consideration, namely: that he should exercise superior command in the West. Again he telegraphed to McClellan (February 19), "Give it [the Western division] to me, and I will split secession in twain in one month." The same confidence is also expressed to Buell, in a simultaneous dispatch to Assistant-Secretary Scott, who was with Buell. "If General Buell will come down and help me with all possible haste we can end the war in the West in less than a month." A day later Halleck becomes almost peremptory in a dispatch to McClellan: "I must have command of the armies in the West. Hesitation and delay are losing us the golden opportunity. Lay this before the President and Secretary of War. May I assume the command? Answer quickly."

To this direct interrogatory McClellan replied in the negative. The request, to say the least of it, was somewhat presumptuous, and hardly of proper tone to find ready acquiescence from a military superior. In this case, however, it was also calculated to rouse a twofold instinct of jealousy. Buell was a warm personal friend of McClellan, and the latter could not be expected to diminish the opportunities or endanger the chances of his favorite. But more important yet was the question how this sudden success in Halleck's department, and the extension of command and power so boldly demanded, might affect McClellan's own standing and authority. He was yet General-in-Chief, but the Administration was dissatisfied at his inaction, and the President had already indicated, in the general war order requiring all the armies of the United States to move on the 22d of February, that his patience had a limit. McClellan did not believe that the army under his own immediate care and command would be ready to fulfill the President's order. Should he permit a rival to arise in the West and grasp a great victory before he could move?

An hour after midnight McClellan answered Halleck as follows:

Buell at Bowling Green knows more of the state of affairs than you at St. Louis. Until I hear from him I cannot see necessity of giving you entire command. I expect to hear from Buell in a few minutes. I do not yet see that Buell cannot control his own line. I shall not lay your request before the Secretary until I hear definitely from Buell.

Halleck did not feel wholly baffled by the unfavorable response. That day he received a dispatch from Stanton, who said:

Your plan of organization has been transmitted to me by Mr. Scott and strikes me very favorably, but on account of the domestic affliction of the President I have not yet been able to submit it to him. The brilliant result of the energetic action in the West fills the nation with joy.

Encouraged by this friendly tone from the Secretary of War, Halleck ventured a final appeal:

One whole week has been lost already by hesitation and delay. There was, and I think there still is, a golden opportunity to strike a fatal blow, but I can't do it unless I can control Buell's army. I am perfectly willing to act as General McClellan dictates or to take any amount of responsibility. To succeed we must be prompt. I have explained everything to General McClellan and Assistant-Secretary Scott. There is not a moment to be lost. Give me authority and I will be responsible for results.

Doubtless Halleck felt that the fates were against him, for the reply chilled his lingering hopes:

Your telegram of yesterday, together with Mr. Scott's reports, have this morning been submitted to the Pres-

ident, who, after full consideration of the subject, does not think any change in the organization of the army or the military departments at present advisable. He desires and expects you and General Buell to cooperate fully and zealously with each other, and would be glad to know whether there has been any failure of cooperation in any particular.

Mr. Lincoln had been watching by the bedside of his dying son, and in his overwhelming grief probably felt disinclined to touch this new vexation of military selfishness—a class of questions from which he always shrank with the utmost distaste; besides, we shall see in due time how the President's momentary decision turned upon much more comprehensive changes already in contemplation.

Before McClellan's refusal to enlarge Halleck's command, he had indicated that his judgment and feelings were both with Buell. Thus he telegraphed the latter on February 20:

Halleck says Columbus reinforced from New Orleans, and steam up on their boats ready for move—probably on Cairo. Wishes to withdraw some troops from Donelson. I tell him improbable that rebels are reinforced from New Orleans or attack Cairo. Think [they] will abandon Columbus. . . . How soon can you be in front of Nashville, and in what force? What news of the rebels? If the force in West can take Nashville, or even hold its own for the present, I hope to have Richmond and Norfolk in from three to four weeks.

He sent a similar dispatch to Halleck, in which he pointed out Nashville as the pressing objective:

Buell has gone to Bowling Green. I will be in communication with him in a few minutes, and we will then arrange. The fall of Clarksville confirms my views. I think Cairo is not in danger, and we must now direct our efforts on Nashville. The rebels hold firm at Manassas. In less than two weeks I shall move the army of the Potomac, and hope to be in Richmond soon after you are in Nashville. I think Columbus will be abandoned within a week. We will have a desperate battle on this line.

While the three generals were discussing high strategy and grand campaigns by telegraph, and probably deliberating with more anxiety the possibilities of personal fame, the simple soldiering of Grant and Foote was solving some of the problems that confused scientific hypothesis. They quietly occupied Clarksville, which the enemy abandoned; and even while preparing to do so, Grant suggested in his dispatch of February 19, "If it is the desire of the general commanding department, I can have Nashville on Saturday week." Foote repeated the suggestion in a dispatch of February 21, but the coveted permission did not come in time.

Meanwhile Buell, having gone to Bowling Green to push forward his railroad bridge, and hearing of the fall of Clarksville and the prob-

able abandonment of Nashville, moved on by forced marches with a single division, reaching the Cumberland opposite the city on the 25th. The enemy had burned the bridge and he could not cross; but almost simultaneously he witnessed the arrival of steamboats bringing General Nelson's division, which immediately landed and occupied the place. This officer and his troops, after several varying orders, were finally sent up the Cumberland to Grant, and ordered forward by him to occupy Nashville and join Buell. It was a curious illustration of dramatic justice that the struggle of the generals over the capture of the place should end in the possession of Nashville by the troops of Buell under the orders of Grant, whose name had not once been mentioned by the contending commanders.

For a few days succeeding the occupation of Nashville news and rumors of what the rebels were doing were very conflicting, and none of the Union commanders suggested any definite campaign. On February 26 Halleck ordered preparations for a movement up either the Tennessee or the Cumberland, as events might require; but for two days he could not determine which. Finally, on the 1st of March, he sent distinct orders to Grant to command an expedition up the Tennessee River, to destroy the railroad and cut the telegraph at Eastport, Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. This was to be, not a permanent army advance, but a temporary raid by gun-boats and troops on transports; all of which, after effecting what local destruction they could, were to return—the whole movement being merely auxiliary to the operations then in progress against New Madrid and Island No. 10, designed to hasten the fall of Columbus. It turned out that the preparations could not be made as quickly as Halleck had hoped; the delay arising, not from the fault or neglect of any officer, but mainly from the prevailing and constantly increasing floods in the Western waters, and especially from damage to telegraph lines that seriously hindered the prompt transmission of communications and orders. Out of this latter condition there also grew the episode of a serious misunderstanding between Halleck and Grant, which threatened to obscure the new and brilliant fame which the latter was earning.

Only a moment of vexation and ill temper can account for the harsh accusation Halleck sent to Washington, that Grant had left his post without leave, that he had failed to make reports, that he and his army were demoralized by the Donelson victory. Reply came back that generals must observe discipline as well as privates. "Do not hesitate to arrest him [Grant] at once," added McClellan, "if

the good of the service requires it, and place C. F. Smith in command." Halleck immediately acted on the suggestion, ordered Grant to remain at Fort Henry, and gave the proposed Tennessee expedition to Smith. Grant obeyed, and at first explained, with an admirable control of temper, that he had not been in fault. Later on, however, feeling himself wronged, he several times asked to be relieved from duty. By this time Halleck was convinced that he had unjustly accused Grant and as peremptorily declined to relieve him, and ordered him to resume his former general command. "Instead of relieving you," he added, "I wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume the immediate command and lead it on to new victories." In truth, while neither general had been unjust by intention, both had been blamable in conduct. Grant violated technical discipline in leaving his command without permission; Halleck, with undue haste, preferred an accusation which further information proved to be groundless. It is to the credit of both that they dismissed the incipient quarrel and with new zeal and generous confidence immediately joined in hearty public service.

While the Grant-Halleck controversy and preparations for the Tennessee River expedition were both still in progress, the military situation was day by day slowly defining itself, though as yet without very specific action or conclusion. Buell, becoming satisfied that the enemy had no immediate intention to return and attack him at Nashville, inquired on March 3 of Halleck: "What can I do to aid your operations against Columbus?" To this Halleck replied on the 4th with the information that Columbus had been evacuated, and asked, "Why not come to the Tennessee and operate with me to cut Johnston's line with Memphis, Randolph, and New Madrid?" Without committing himself definitely, Buell answered on the 6th, merely proposing that they should meet at Louisville to discuss details. Halleck, however, unable to spare the time, held tenaciously to his proposition, informing Assistant-Secretary Scott, at Cairo, of the situation in these words:

I telegraphed to General Buell to reënforce me as strongly as possible at or near Savannah [Tennessee]. Their line of defense is now an oblique one, extending from Island No. 10 to Decatur or Chattanooga. Having destroyed the railroad and bridges in his rear, Johnston cannot return to Nashville. We must again pierce his center at Savannah or Florence. Buell should move immediately, and not come in too late, as he did at Donelson.

Feeling instinctively that he could get no effective voluntary help from Buell, Halleck turned again to McClellan, informing him of

his intended expedition up the Tennessee River, that he had directed a landing to be made at Savannah, that he had sent intrenching tools, and would push forward reënforcements as rapidly as possible. On the following day, however, reporting the strength of Grant's forces, he said: "You will perceive from this that without Buell's aid I am too weak for operations on the Tennessee." The information received by him during the next twenty-four hours that Curtis had won a splendid victory at the battle of Pea Ridge in Arkansas made a favorable change in his resources, and he explains his views and intentions to McClellan with more confidence:

Reserves intended to support General Curtis will now be drawn in as rapidly as possible and sent to the Tennessee. I propose going there in a few days. That is now the great strategic line of the Western campaign, and I am surprised that General Buell should hesitate to reënforce me. He was too late at Fort Donelson, as Hunter has been in Arkansas. I am obliged to make my calculations independent of both. Believe me, general, you make a serious mistake in having three independent commands in the West. There never will and never can be any coöperation at the critical moment; all military history proves it. You will regret your decision against me on this point. Your friendship for individuals has influenced your judgment. Be it so. I shall soon fight a great battle on the Tennessee unsupported, as it seems; but if successful, it will settle the campaign in the West.

We may also conclude that another element of the confidence that prompted his language was the intimation lately received from the Secretary of War, who three days before had asked him to state "the limits of a military department that would place all the Western operations you deem expedient under your command." In fact, events in the East as well as in the West were culminating that rather suddenly ended existing military conditions. The naval battle between the *Merrimac* and the *Monitor*, and the almost simultaneous evacuation of Manassas Junction by the rebel forces in Virginia, broke the long inactivity of the Army of the Potomac.

We cannot better illustrate how intently Mr. Lincoln was watching army operations, both in the East and the West, than by quoting his dispatch of March 10 to Buell:

The evidence is very strong that the enemy in front of us here is breaking up and moving off. General McClellan is after him. Some part of the force may be destined to meet you. Look out, and be prepared. I telegraphed Halleck, asking him to assist you if needed.

McClellan's aimless march to capture a few scarecrow sentinels and quaker guns in the deserted rebel field-works, which had been his nightmare for half a year, afforded the opportunity for a redistribution of military leader-

ships, which the winter's experience plainly dictated. Slow and cautious in maturing his decisions, President Lincoln was prompt to announce them when they were once reached. On the 11th of March he issued his War Order No. 3, one of his most far-reaching acts of military authority. It relieved McClellan from the duties of General-in-Chief of all the armies, and sent him to the field charged with the single object of conducting the campaign against Richmond. This made possible a new combination for the West, and the same order united the three Western departments (as far east as Knoxville, Tennessee) under the command of Halleck. Under this arrangement was fought the great battle on the Tennessee that Halleck predicted, giving the Union arms a victory the decisive influence of which was felt throughout the remainder of the war; a success, however, due mainly to the gallantry of the troops, and not to any genius or brilliant generalship of Halleck or his subordinate commanders.

The Tennessee River expedition under Smith, which started on March 10, made good its landing at Savannah, and on the 14th Smith sent Sherman with a division on nineteen steamboats, preceded by gun-boats, to ascend the river towards Eastport and begin the work of destroying railroad communications, which had been the original object of the whole movement. Sherman made a landing to carry out his orders; but this was the season of spring freshets. A storm of rain and snow changed every ravine and rivulet to a torrent; the Tennessee River rose fifteen feet in twenty-four hours, covering most steamboat landings with deep water; and the intended raid by land and water was reduced to a mere river reconnaissance, which proved the enemy to be in considerable force about Iuka and Corinth, covering and guarding the important railroad crossings and communications. Sherman felt himself compelled to return to Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank of the Tennessee, nine miles above Savannah, which was on the east bank. The place was already well known to both armies, for a skirmish had occurred there on the 1st of March between Union gun-boats and a rebel regiment.

It would seem that General Smith had fixed upon Pittsburg Landing as an available point from which to operate more at leisure upon the enemy's railroad communications, and hence had already sent Hurlbut's division thither, which Sherman found there on his return. The place was not selected as a battle-field, nor as a base of operations for a campaign, but merely to afford a temporary lodgment for raids upon the railroads. By a silent and gradual change of conditions, however,

the intention and essential features of the whole Tennessee River movement underwent a complete transformation. What was begun as a provisional expedition became a strategic central campaign; and what was chosen for an outpost of detachments was almost imperceptibly turned into a principal point of concentration, and became, by the unexpected assault of the enemy, one of the hardest-fought battle-fields of the whole war.

Halleck assumed command of his combined departments by general orders dated March 13, and after explaining once more to Buell that all his available force not required to defend Nashville should be sent up the Tennessee, he telegraphed him on the 16th of March:

Move your forces by land to the Tennessee as rapidly as possible. . . . Grant's army is concentrating at Savannah. You must direct your march on that point so that the enemy cannot get between us.

The combined campaign thus set in motion was wise in conception, but its preliminary execution proved lamentably weak; and the blame is justly attributable, in about equal measure, to Halleck, Buell, and Grant. For a few days Halleck's orders were decided and firm; then there followed a slackening of opinion and a variance of direction that came near making a disastrous wreck of the whole enterprise. His positive orders to Buell to move as rapidly as possible and to concentrate at Savannah were twice repeated on the 17th; but on the 26th he directed him to concentrate at Savannah or Eastport, and on the 29th to concentrate at Savannah or Pittsburg, while on April 5 he pointedly consented to a concentration at Waynesborough. This was inexcusable uncertainty in the combinations of a great strategist, who complained that "hesitation and delay are losing us the golden opportunity." These were the timid steps of a blind man feeling his way, and not the firm strides of a leader who promised to "split secession in twain in one month."

It can hardly be claimed that Buell's march fulfilled the injunction to move "as rapidly as possible." When his advanced division reached Duck River at Columbia on the 18th it found that stream swollen and the bridge destroyed, and set itself to the task of building a new frame bridge with a deliberateness better befitting the leisure of peace than the pressing hurry of war. Buell arrived in person at Columbia on the 26th.* He manifested his own dissatisfaction with the delay by ordering the construction of another bridge, this time of pontoons, which was completed simultaneously with the first on March 30.

* Buell in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. I., p. 491.

Still further delay was projected by a proposition to halt for concentration at Waynesborough. It must be said in justice to Buell, that Halleck did not complain of the slow bridge-building at Columbia, and that he consented to the concentration at Waynesborough. Had it taken place, Buell's army would again have been "too late" for a great battle. The excuse offered, that Buell supposed the Union army to be safe on the east bank of the Tennessee at Savannah, can scarcely be admitted; for on the 23d Buell received a letter from Grant which said:

I am massing troops at Pittsburg, Tennessee. There is every reason to suppose that the rebels have a large force at Corinth, Mississippi, and many at other points on the road towards Decatur.

This information, which Buell considered of no importance, appears to have excited the serious attention of General William Nelson, one of Buell's division commanders, who, already impatient at the tardy bridge-building, read the signs of danger in the conditions about him with a truer military instinct. Nelson finally obtained permission to ford the now falling waters of Duck River, crossed his division on the 29th and 30th, and began the march over the ninety miles remaining to be traversed with an enthusiasm and impetuosity that swept the whole army past the proposed halting-place at Waynesborough, bringing his own division to Savannah on the 5th, and others on the 6th, of April.

It reflects no credit on General Halleck or General Grant that during the interim of Buell's march the advanced post of Pittsburg Landing had been left in serious peril. Halleck was busy at St. Louis collecting reinforcements to send to Grant, with the announced intention to proceed to the field and take personal command on the Tennessee River. This implied a delay demanding either the concentration of the whole army at Savannah, as originally ordered by him, behind the safe barrier of the Tennessee, or strong fortifications for the exposed position of Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank. On the other hand, Grant, resuming his general command in person on March 17, and finding his five divisions separated, three at Savannah and two at Pittsburg Landing,—nine miles apart, with a river between them,—properly took alarm and immediately united them; but in doing this he committed the evident fault of defying danger by choosing the advanced position and of neglecting to raise the slightest intrenchments to protect his troops—which were without means of rapid retreat—against a possible assault from an enemy only twenty miles distant, and according to his own reports at all times his equal if not his superior in numbers. But

one cause can be assigned for this palpable imprudence. Well instructed in the duties of an officer under orders, he was just beginning his higher education as a leader of armies, and he was about to receive the most impressive lesson of his very strange career.

It has been already stated that after the fall of Fort Donelson the rebel commanders fled southward in confusion and dismay. We have the high authority and calm judgment of General Grant, in the mature experience and reflection of after years, that "if one general who would have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the Alleghanies, he could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis, and Vicksburg with the troops we then had";* but the Secessionists of the South-west were still in the fervor of their early enthusiasm, and recovered rapidly from the stupefaction of unexpected disaster. In the delay of four or five weeks that the divided ambition and over-cautious hesitation of the Union generals afforded them, they had renewed their courage, and united and reinforced their scattered armies. The separation of the armies of Johnston from those of Beauregard, which seemed irreparable when the Tennessee River was opened, had not been maintained by the prompt advance that everybody pointed out but which nobody executed. By the 23d of March the two Confederate generals had once more, without opposition, effected a junction of their forces at and about Corinth, and thus reversed the pending military problem. In the last weeks of February it could have been the united Unionists pursuing the divided Confederates. In the last weeks of March it was the united Confederates preparing to attack the divided armies of Halleck and Buell. The whole situation and plan is summed up in the dispatch of General Albert Sidney Johnston to Jefferson Davis, dated April 3, 1862:

General Buell is in motion, 30,000 strong, rapidly from Columbia by Clifton to Savannah; Mitchell behind him with 10,000. Confederate forces, 40,000, ordered forward to offer battle near Pittsburg. Division from Bethel, main body from Corinth, reserve from Burnsville converge to-morrow near Monterey on Pittsburg. Beauregard second in command; Polk, left; Hardee, center; Bragg, right wing; Breckinridge, reserve. Hope engagement before Buell can form junction.

The Confederate march took place as projected, and on the evening of April 5 their joint forces went into bivouac two miles from the Union camps. That evening also the Confederate commanders held an informal conference. Beauregard became impressed with impending defeat; their march had been slow, the rations they carried were exhausted, and

* Grant, "Personal Memoirs," Vol. I., p. 317.

their extra rations and ammunition were not yet at hand. They could no longer hope to effect the complete surprise that was an essential feature of their plan. Beauregard advised a change of programme—to abandon the projected attack and convert the movement into a "reconnaissance in force." General Johnston listened, but refused his assent, and orders were given to begin the battle next morning. No suspicion of such a march or attack entered the mind of any Union officer; and that same day Grant reported to Halleck, "The main force of the enemy is at Corinth."

The natural position occupied by the Union forces is admitted to have been unusually strong. The Tennessee River here runs nearly north. North of the camps, Snake Creek with an affluent, Owl Creek, formed a barrier stretching from the river bank in general direction towards the south-west. South of the camps, Lick Creek and river sloughs also formed an impassable obstruction for a considerable distance next to the Tennessee. The river on the east, and Snake and Owl creeks on the west, thus inclosed a high triangular plateau with sides three or four miles in length, crossed and intersected to some extent by smaller streams and ravines, though generally open towards the south. The roads from Pittsburg Landing towards Corinth followed the main ridge, also towards the south-west. A network of other roads, very irregular in direction, ran from the Corinth roads to various points in the neighborhood. Alternate patches of timber, thick undergrowth, and open fields covered the locality. Two miles from Pittsburg Landing, on one of the Corinth roads, stood a log meeting-house, called Shiloh Church, which was destined to become the center of the battle-field and to give its name to the conflict.

Three of Grant's divisions were camped in an irregular line from Lick Creek to Owl Creek, closing the open side of the triangular plateau—Sherman's division in the center, near Shiloh Church; Prentiss to his left, towards the Tennessee River and somewhat in advance; McClernand to the right, towards Owl Creek and somewhat in rear. Half-way back from Shiloh Church to Pittsburg Landing were camped the divisions of Hurlbut and of Smith, the latter now commanded—owing to Smith's illness—by W. H. L. Wallace. Another division, under General Lew. Wallace, had been left at Crump's Landing, six miles to the north, as a guard against rebel raids, which threatened to gain possession of the banks of the Tennessee at that point to destroy the river communications. Grant had apprehensions of a raid of this character and cautioned his officers against it, an admoni-

tion that was the basis of such alertness and vigilance as had existed for several days.

Most of the particulars of the battle that followed will probably always form a subject of dispute. There were no combined or dramatic movements of masses that can be analyzed and located. The Union army had no prepared line of defense; three lines in which the rebel army had been arranged for the attack became quickly broken and mingled with one another. On the Union side the irregular alignment of the camps and the precipitancy of the attack compelled the formation of whatever line of battle could be most hurriedly improvised. General Force says:

A combat made up of numberless separate encounters of detached portions of broken lines, continually shifting position and changing direction in the forest and across ravines, filling an entire day, is almost incapable of a connected narrative.

At 5 o'clock on the morning of Sunday, April 6, 1862, the rebel lines moved forward to the attack. The time required to pass the intervening two miles, and the preliminary skirmishes with Union pickets and a reconnoitering Union regiment that began the fight, gradually put the whole Union front on the alert; and when the main lines closed with each other, the divisions of Prentiss, Sherman, and McClernand were sufficiently in position to offer a stubborn resistance. The Confederates found themselves foiled in the easy surprise and confusion that they had counted upon. It would be a tedious waste of time to attempt to follow the details of the fight, which, thus begun before sunrise, continued till near sunset.

Along the labyrinth of the local roads, over the mixed patchwork of woods, open fields, and almost impenetrable thickets, across stretches of level, broken by miry hollows and abrupt ravines, the swinging lines of conflict moved intermittently throughout the entire day. There was onset and repulse, yell of assault and cheer of defiance, screeching of shells and sputtering of volleys, advance and retreat. But steadily through the fluctuating changes the general progress was northward, the rebels gaining and pushing their advance, the Unionists stubbornly resisting, but little by little losing their ground. It was like the flux and reflux of ocean breakers, dashing themselves with tireless repetition against a yielding, crumbling shore. Beauregard, to whom the Confederate commander had committed the general direction of the battle, several times during the day advanced his headquarters from point to point, following the steady progress of his lines. The time consumed and the lists of dead and wounded are sufficient evidence of the brave conduct of officers and

the gallant courage of men on both sides. On the Union side the divisions of Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace had early been brought forward to sustain those of Prentiss, Sherman, and McClernand. It was, to a degree seldom witnessed in a battle, the slow and sustained struggle, through an entire day, of one whole army against another whole army. The five Union divisions engaged in the battle of Sunday numbered 33,000.* The total force of the Confederates attacking them was 40,000.

It was in the latter half of the afternoon that the more noteworthy incidents of the contest took place. The first of these was the death of the Confederate commander, General Albert Sidney Johnston, who fell personally leading the charge of a brigade.† The knowledge of the loss was carefully kept from the Confederate army, and the management on their side of the conflict was not thereby impaired, because Beauregard had been mainly intrusted with it from the beginning. About 5 o'clock in the afternoon a serious loss fell upon the Unionists. General Prentiss, commanding the Sixth Division, and General W. H. L. Wallace, commanding the Third Division, whose united lines had held one of the key-points of the Federal left since 9 o'clock in the forenoon against numerous and well-concentrated assaults of the enemy, found that the withdrawal of troops both on the right and the left produced gaps that offered an opening to the enemy. Prentiss had been instructed by General Grant to hold his position at all hazards, and consulting with Wallace they determined to obey the order notwithstanding the now dangerous exposure. But the enemy seized the advantage; they quickly found themselves enveloped and surrounded; only portions of their command succeeded in cutting their way out; Wallace was mortally wounded, and Prentiss and fragments of the two divisions, numbering 2200 men, were taken prisoners.

This wholesale capture left a wide opening in the left of the Federal lines, and probably would have given the victory to the rebels but for another circumstance which somewhat compensated for so abrupt a diminution of the Union forces. The Union lines had now been swept back more than a mile and a half, and the rebel attack was approaching the main

Corinth road, running from Pittsburg Landing along the principal ridge, which here lay nearly at a right angle to the river. Colonel Webster of General Grant's staff, noting the steady retreat of the Union lines and foreseeing that the advancing attack of the enemy would eventually reach this ridge, busied himself to post a line of artillery—from thirty-five to fifty guns—along the crest, gathering whatever was available, among which were several heavy pieces. To man and support this extemporized battery he organized and posted, in conjunction with Hurlbut's division, such fragments of troops as had become useless at the front. To reach the crest of this ridge and this line of hastily planted cannon the enemy was obliged to cross a deep, broad hollow, extending to the river and partly filled with back-water. The topography of the place was such that the gun-boats *Tyler* and *Lexington* were also stationed in the Tennessee, abreast the valley and sheet of back-water, and their guns were thus enabled to assist the line of cannon on the ridge by a cross-fire of shells.

General Grant had passed the previous night at Savannah, where he had become aware of the arrival of the advance brigades of Nelson's division of Buell's army on the same day (April 5). He started by boat to Pittsburg Landing early Sunday morning, having heard the firing but not regarding it as an attack in force. Arrived there he became a witness of the serious nature of the attack, and remained on the battle-field, visiting the various division commanders and giving such orders as the broken and fluctuating course of the conflict suggested. But the defense, begun in uncertainty and haste before his arrival, could not thereafter be reduced to any order or system; it necessarily, all day long, merely followed the changes and the violence of the rebel attack. The blind and intricate battle-field offered little chance for careful planning; the haste and tumult of combat left no time for tactics. On neither side was the guidance of general command of much service; it was the division, brigade, and regimental commanders who fought the battle. About noon of Sunday General Grant began to have misgivings of the result, and dispatched a letter for help to Buell's forces at Savannah, saying, "If you will get upon the field, leaving all your baggage on the east bank of the

* Throughout the history of the War of the Rebellion there is a marked disagreement in the estimate of numbers engaged in battles, as stated by the Unionists on one side and the Confederates on the other. This variance comes from a different manner of reporting those "present for duty" in the two armies, out of which arises a systematic diminution of Confederates and increase of Federals in the statements of Confederate writers. General Force, in his admirable little book "From Fort Henry to Corinth," analyzes these

methods of computation as applied to the battle of Shiloh, and arrives at the conclusion that the actual number of "combatants engaged in the battle" of Sunday was fully 40,000 Confederates and between 32,000 and 33,000 Unionists.

The reinforcements of Monday numbered, of Buell's army, about 20,000; Lew. Wallace's, 6500; and other regiments, about 1400.

† W. P. Johnston in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. I., p. 504.

river, it will be more to our advantage, and possibly save the day to us." He also sent an order to General Lew. Wallace, at Crump's Landing, to hasten his division to the right of the army.

So far as the Confederates had any distinct plan of battle, it was merely the simple one of forcing the Federals away from the river to gain possession of Pittsburg Landing, cut off their means of retreat by seizing or destroying the transports, and compel Grant to capitulate. But the execution of this leading design was completely frustrated by the difficult nature of the ground and by the gallant resistance made by Prentiss and Wallace, who held their line on the Union left, unshaken and unmoved, from 9 o'clock in the forenoon until 5 o'clock in the evening. The principal advance made by the rebels was not next to the river, where they desired it, but on the Union right next to Owl Creek, where it was of least value. Even after they had captured the whole residue of Prentiss's and Wallace's divisions, and had cleared out that terrible center of the Union fire which they had ineffectually assaulted a dozen times, and which by bitter experience they themselves learned to know and designate as the "Hornets' Nest," and near which their Commander-in-Chief had fallen in death, they were not yet within reach of the coveted banks of Pittsburg Landing. Before them still yawned the broad valley, the back-water, the mire, the steep hills across which screeched the shells from the gunboats and from the long death-threatening line of Webster's reserve artillery, and behind which the bayonets of Hurlbut's division, yet solid in organization and strong in numbers, glistened in the evening sun. From Hurlbut's right the shattered but courageous remnants of the divisions of McClernand and Sherman stretched away in an unbroken line towards Owl Creek. Ground had been lost and ground had been won; the line of fire had moved a mile and a half to the north; the lines of combatants had been shortened from three miles in the morning to one mile in the evening; but now, after the day's conflict, when the sun approached his setting, the relations and the prospects of the bloody fight were but little changed. The Confederates held the field of battle, but the Unionists held their central position, their supplies, and their communications. The front of attack had become as weak as the front of defense. On each side from eight to ten thousand men had been lost, by death, wounds, and capture. From ten to fifteen thousand panic-stricken Union stragglers covered under the shelter of the high river bank at Pittsburg Landing. From ten to fifteen thousand Confederate stragglers, some

equally panic-stricken, others demoralized by the irresistible temptations of camp-pillage, encumbered the rear of Beauregard's army. The day was nearly gone and the battle was undecided.

A controversy has recently arisen as to the personal impressions and intentions of General Grant at this crisis. His "Memoirs" declare in substance that he was still so confident of victory that he gave orders that evening for a renewal of the fight on the following morning by a general attack. General Buell, on the other hand, makes a strong argument that the evidence is against this assumption.* It is possible, as in so many other cases, that the truth lies midway between the two statements. A famous newspaper correspondent who was on the battle-field made the following record of the affair long before this controversy arose:

The tremendous roar to the left, momentarily nearer and nearer, told of an effort to cut him off from the river and from retreat. Grant sat his horse, quiet, thoughtful, almost stolid. Said one to him, "Does not the prospect begin to look gloomy?" "Not at all," was the quiet reply. "They can't force our lines around these batteries to-night—it is too late. Delay counts everything with us. To-morrow we shall attack them with fresh troops and drive them, of course."

The correspondent adds, in a note: "I was myself a listener to this conversation, and from it I date, in my own case at least, the beginning of any belief in Grant's greatness."†

As this writer was one of Grant's most candid critics, his testimony on this point is all the more valuable.

The turning-point was at length reached. Whatever may have been the much-disputed intentions and hopes of commanders at that critical juncture that were not expressed and recorded, or what might have been the possibilities and consequence of acts that were not attempted, it is worse than useless to discuss upon hypothesis. Each reader for himself must interpret the significance of the three closing incidents of that momentous Sunday, which occurred almost simultaneously.

Some of the rebel division commanders, believing that victory would be insured by one more desperate assault against the Union left to gain possession of Pittsburg Landing, made arrangements and gave orders for that object. It seems uncertain, however, whether the force could have been gathered and the movement made in any event. Only a single brigade made the attempt, and it was driven back in confusion. The officer of another

* Buell in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. I., p. 523, *et seq.*

† Whitelaw Reid, "Ohio in the Civil War."

detachment refused the desperate service. Still others were overtaken in their preparation by orders from General Beauregard to withdraw the whole Confederate army from the fight, and to go into bivouac until the following day. Eager as was that commander for victory, the conclusion had been forced on his mind, that, for that day at least, it was not within the power of his army to complete their undertaking; and accordingly he directed that the fight should cease. He reached this determination not knowing that Buell had arrived, and still hoping that he would not arrive, even on the morrow.

In this hope Beauregard was disappointed. While yet his orders to retire from the combat were being executed, and before the last desperate charge of the rebels towards Webster's reserve artillery was beaten back, the vanguard of Nelson's division, which had marched from Savannah and had been ferried across the river by transports, was mounting the bank at Pittsburg Landing and deploying in line of battle under the enemy's fire, Ammen's fresh brigade first coming to the support of the line of Union guns. A few men out of the brigade fell by the rebel bullets, and then came twilight, and soon after the darkness of night. The tide of victory was effectually turned. Whatever the single army of Grant might or might not have accomplished on the following day against the army of Beauregard is only speculation. Beauregard's attack had been ordered discontinued before the actual presence of Buell's troops on the battle-field. Had the attack been continued, however, that opportune arrival would have rendered its success impossible.

After sunset of Sunday all chances of a rebel victory vanished. The remainder of Nelson's division immediately crossed the river and followed Ammen's brigade to the field. Crittenden's division was next placed in position during the night. Finally McCook's division reached Pittsburg Landing early Monday morning and promptly advanced to the front. General Buell, who had come before the vanguard on Sunday evening, in person directed the placing and preparation of these three superb divisions of his army — a total of about twenty thousand fresh, well-equipped, and well-drilled troops — to renew an offensive conflict along the left of the Federal line. On the Federal right was stationed the fresh division of General Lew. Wallace, numbering 6500, which had arrived from Crump's Landing a little after nightfall, and which took position soon after midnight of Sunday. Along the Federal right center, Grant's reduced divisions which had fought the battle of Sunday were gathered and reorganized, McClernand and

Sherman in front, Hurlbut and the escaped remnants of W. H. L. Wallace's division, with some new detachments, in reserve. Grant and Buell met on Sunday evening and agreed to take the offensive jointly on Monday morning; Buell to command his three divisions on the left, Grant to direct his own forces on the right. No special plan was adopted other than simultaneously to drive the enemy from the field. The plan was carried out in harmony and with entire success. With only temporary checks, brought about by the too great impetuosity of the newly arrived reinforcements, the two wings of the Union army advanced steadily, and by 3 o'clock in the afternoon were in possession of all the ground from which they had been driven on the previous day; while the rebel army was in full retreat upon Corinth — foiled of its victory, dejected in spirit, and in a broken and almost hopeless state of disorganization. A little more genius and daring on the part of the Union commanders would have enabled them by vigorous pursuit to demolish or capture it; but they chose the more prudent alternative, and remained satisfied with only sufficient advance to assure themselves that the enemy had disappeared.

HALLECK'S CORINTH CAMPAIGN.

ON Wednesday, April 9, two days after the battle of Shiloh, General Grant gave evidence that he had fully learned the severe lesson of that terrible encounter. Reporting to Halleck his information that the enemy was again concentrating all his forces at Corinth, he added:

I do not like to suggest, but it appears to me that it would be demoralizing upon our troops here to be forced to retire upon the opposite bank of the river, and unsafe to remain on this many weeks without large reinforcements.

If his mind had reached a conviction of this character two or three weeks earlier, the results of the battle of Shiloh would have given better testimony to his military efficiency.

Halleck's opinion probably coincided with that of Grant, and the fortunes of war enabled him immediately to fulfill his promise to come to his relief. The day which saw the conclusion of the fight at Shiloh (April 7, 1862) witnessed the surrender of the rebel works at Island No. 10, on the Mississippi River, and the quick capture of nearly their entire garrison of six or seven thousand men. This finished the task which General Pope had been sent to do and enabled Halleck to transfer him and his army, by water, from the Mississippi River to the Tennessee. Halleck's order was made on April 15, and on the 22d Pope landed at

Hamburg, four miles above the battle-field of Shiloh, with his compact force of twenty thousand men fully organized and equipped, and flushed with a signal victory.

Halleck had arrived before him. Reaching Pittsburg Landing on the 11th of April, he began with industry to cure the disorders produced by the recent battle. Critics who still accuse the Lincoln administration of ignorant meddling with military affairs are invited to remember the language of the Secretary of War to Halleck on this occasion: "I have no instructions to give you. Go ahead, and success attend you."

The arrival of Pope was utilized by Halleck to give his united command an easy and immediate organization into army corps. His special field orders of April 28 named the Army of the Tennessee the First Army Corps, commanded by Grant, and constituting his right wing; the Army of the Ohio the Second Army Corps, commanded by Buell, and constituting the center; and the newly arrived Army of the Mississippi the Third Army Corps, commanded by Pope, and forming the left wing. Two days later (April 30) another order gave command of the right wing to General Thomas, whose division of the Army of the Ohio was added to it; it also organized a reserve corps under General McClernand, and had this provision:

Major-General Grant will retain the general command of the district of West Tennessee, including the Army Corps of the Tennessee, and reports will be made to him as heretofore; but in the present movements he will act as second in command under the major-general commanding the department.

The exact intent of this assignment remains to this day a matter of doubt. Nominally, it advanced Grant in rank and authority; practically, it deprived him of active and important duty. Halleck being on the field in person issued his orders directly to the corps commanders and received reports from them, and for about two months Grant found himself without serious occupation. The position became so irksome that he several times asked to be relieved, but Halleck refused; though he finally allowed him to go for a season into a species of honorable retirement, by removing his headquarters from the camp of the main army.

Coming to the front so soon after the great battle, Halleck seems to have been impressed with the seriousness of that conflict, for all his preparations to assume the offensive were made with the most deliberate caution. It was manifest that the enemy intended to defend Corinth, and necessarily that place became his first objective. With all the efforts that the Confederate Government could make, however, Beauregard succeeded in bringing

together only about fifty thousand effective troops. Halleck's combined armies contained more than double that number; but such was his fear of another disaster, that his advance upon Corinth was not like an invading march, but like the investment of a fortress. An army carrying a hundred thousand bayonets, in the picturesque language of General Sherman, moved upon Corinth "with pick and shovel." Intrenching, bridge-building, road-making, were the order of the day. Former carelessness and temerity were succeeded by a fettering over-caution.

The Administration expected more energetic campaigning from a commander of Halleck's reputed skill and the brilliant results realized since his advent. The country seemed at the culmination of great events. Since the beginning of the year success had smiled almost continuously upon the Union cause. As the crowning inspiration, in the midst of his march there had come the joyful news of Farragut's triumph and the capture of New Orleans. "Troops cannot be detached from here on the eve of a great battle," telegraphed Halleck to Stanton. "We are now at the enemy's throat." To such encouraging assurances the Administration responded with every possible exertion of reinforcement and supply. But days succeeded days, and the President's hope remained deferred. Nearly a month later, when reports came that Halleck was awaiting the arrival of a fourth Union army,—that of Curtis from Arkansas,—and these reports were supplemented by intimations that he would like to be joined by a fifth army from somewhere else, Mr. Lincoln sent him a letter of so kindly an explanation, that, in the actual condition of things, every word was a stinging rebuke:

Several dispatches from Assistant-Secretary Scott and one from Governor Morton, asking reinforcements for you, have been received. I beg you to be assured we do the best we can. I mean to cast no blame when I tell you each of our commanders along our line from Richmond to Corinth supposes himself to be confronted by numbers superior to his own. Under this pressure we thinned the line on the Upper Potomac, until yesterday it was broken at heavy loss to us and General Banks put in great peril, out of which he is not yet extricated and may be actually captured. We need men to repair this breach, and have them not at hand. My dear general, I feel justified to rely very much on you. I believe you and the brave officers and men with you can and will get the victory at Corinth.

In reply Halleck resorted to the usual expedient of reading the Secretary of War a military lecture. May 26 he wrote:

Permit me to remark that we are operating upon too many points. Richmond and Corinth are now the great strategic points of war, and our success at these points should be insured at all hazards.

His herculean effort expended itself without corresponding result, when, a week later, he marched into the empty intrenchments of Corinth, only to find that the fifty thousand men composing Beauregard's army — the vital strength of rebellion in the West — were retreating at leisure to Baldwin and Okalona, railroad towns some fifty miles to the south. It had required but two days for the rebel army to go from Corinth to the Shiloh battle-field. Halleck consumed thirty-seven days to pass over the same distance and the same ground, with an army twice as strong as that of his adversary. Pope had reached him April 22, and it was the 29th of May when the Union army was within assaulting distance of the rebel intrenchments. The campaign had advanced with scientific precision, and attained one object for which it was conducted: it gained the fortifications of Corinth. In the end, however, it proved to be but the shell of the expected victory. Beauregard had not only skillfully disputed the advance and deceived his antagonist, but at the critical moment had successfully withdrawn the rebel forces to wage more equal conflict on other fields. The enemy evacuated Corinth on the night of the 29th, and beyond the usual demoralization which attends such a retrograde movement suffered little, for Halleck ordered only pursuit enough to drive him to a convenient distance. The achievement was the triumph of a strategist, not the success of a general. Instead of seizing his opportunity to win a great battle or to capture an army by siege, he had simply manœuvred the enemy out of position.

In reporting his success to Washington, Halleck of course magnified its value to the utmost,* and for the moment the Administration, not having that full information which afterward so seriously diminished the estimate, accepted the report in good faith as a grand Union triumph. It was indeed a considerable measure of success. Besides its valuable moral effect in strengthening the patriotism and the confidence of the North, and the secondary military advantage that the combined Western armies gained in the two months' strict camp discipline and active practical in-

struction in the art of field fortification, there was the positive possession of an important railroad center, and the apparent security of western and central Tennessee from rebel occupation.

In addition to these it had one yet more immediate and valuable military result. The remaining rebel strongholds on the upper Mississippi were now so completely turned that they were no longer tenable. Forts Pillow and Randolph were hastily evacuated by the enemy, and the Union flotilla took possession of their deserted works on June 5. Halleck had been looking somewhat anxiously for help on the river, and had complained of the unwillingness of the gun-boats to run past the Fort Pillow batteries and destroy the river fleet of the rebels. Flag-Officer Davis had considered the risk too great and had remained above Fort Pillow, occupying his time in harassing the works by a continuous bombardment. Now that the way was opened he immediately advanced in force, and at night of June 5 came to anchor two miles above the city of Memphis. His flotilla had lately received a notable reënforcement. One of the many energetic impulses which Stanton gave to military operations in the first few months after he became Secretary of War was his employment of an engineer of genius and daring, Charles Ellet, Jr., to extemporize a fleet of steam rams for service on the Western rivers.

The single blow by which the iron prow of the *Merrimac* sunk the frigate *Congress* in Hampton Roads, during the famous sea-fight between the *Merrimac* and the *Monitor*, had demonstrated the effectiveness of this novelty in marine warfare. Ellet's proposal to the Secretary of the Navy, to try it on the Western rivers, was not favorably entertained; probably because the Navy Department already had its officers and its appropriations engaged in other more methodical and permanent naval constructions. But the eager and impatient Secretary of War listened to Ellet's plans with interest, and commissioned him to collect such suitable river craft as he could find on the Ohio, and to convert them post-haste into steam rams, "the honorable Secretary," reports Ellet, "expressing the hope that not

* Pope, condensing into one dispatches from Rosecrans, Hamilton, and Granger, telegraphed to Halleck: "The two divisions in the advance under Rosecrans are slowly and cautiously advancing on Baldwin this morning, with the cavalry on both flanks. Hamilton with two divisions is at Rienzi and between there and Boonville, ready to move forward should they be needed. One brigade from the reserve occupies Danville. Rosecrans reports this morning that the enemy has retreated from Baldwin, but he is advancing cautiously. The woods, for miles, are full of stragglers from the enemy, who are coming in in squads. Not less than ten thousand men

are thus scattered about, who will come in within a day or two." General Halleck dispatched to the War Department: "General Pope, with 40,000 men, is 30 miles south of Corinth, pushing the enemy hard. He already reports 10,000 prisoners and deserters from the enemy, and 15,000 stand of arms captured." This dispatch of General Halleck's made a great sensation. The expectation that the stragglers would come into the national camp was disappointed; the prisoners taken were few, and Pope was censured for making a statement of fact which he neither made nor authorized. [Force, "From Fort Henry to Corinth."]

more than twenty days would be consumed in getting them ready for service." Ellet received his orders March 27.* On May 26 he joined the flotilla of Davis with a fleet of six vessels, formerly swift and strong river tugs and steamers, but now strengthened and converted for their new and peculiar service, and these accompanied the gun-boats in the advance against Memphis. On the morning of June 6 the rebel flotilla of eight gun-boats was discovered in front of the city preparing for fight, and there occurred another of the many dramatic naval combats of the war.

The eight rebel gun-boats ranged themselves in two lines abreast the city. The hills of Memphis were covered with thousands of spectators. With the dawn five of the Union gun-boats began backing down the Mississippi, holding their heads against the strong current to insure easier control and management of the vessel. The steam rams were yet tied up to the river bank. Soon the rebel flotilla opened fire on the Union gun-boats, to which the latter replied with spirit. Four of Ellet's rams, hearing the guns, cast loose to take part in the conflict. One of them disabled her rudder, and another, mistaking her orders, remained out of fighting distance. But the *Queen of the West* and the *Monarch*, passing swiftly between the gun-boats, dashed into the rebel line. The gun-boats, now turning their heads down the stream, hastily followed. There was a short and quick mêlée of these uncouth-looking river monsters, ram crashing into ram and gun-boat firing into gun-boat in a confusion of attack and destruction. In twenty minutes four rebel vessels and one Union ram were sunk or disabled. At this the other four rebel vessels turned and fled down-stream, and in a running pursuit of an hour, extending some ten miles, three additional vessels of the enemy were captured or destroyed. The Confederate fleet was almost annihilated; only one of their gun-boats escaped. The two disabled Union ships were soon raised and repaired, but the ram fleet had suffered an irreparable loss. Its commander, Ellet, was wounded by a pistol-shot, from the effect of which he died two weeks later. The combat was witnessed by Jeff. Thompson, commanding the city with a small detachment of rebel troops. In his report of the affair he mentions that "we were hurried in our retirement from Memphis," and that afternoon the Union flag floated over the city.

The naval victory of Memphis supplemented and completed the great Tennessee campaigns begun by Grant's reconnaissance of January 9. A division of Buell's army under General Mitchell had in the meanwhile occupied and held the line of the Tennessee River between Tusculum and Stevenson; and thus the frontier of rebellion had been pushed down from middle Kentucky below the southern boundary of the State of Tennessee.

But the invading movement following the line of the Tennessee River had expended its advantage; the initial point of a new campaign had been reached. We are left in doubt under what conviction Halleck formed his next plans, for he determined to dissolve and scatter the magnificent army of more than one hundred thousand men under his hand and eye; apparently in violation of the very military theory he had formulated two weeks before, when he said, "We are operating on too many points." In a dispatch to the Secretary of War on the 9th of June he announced his purpose to do three distinct things: First, to hold the Memphis and Charleston railroad; secondly, to send relief to Curtis in Arkansas; thirdly, to send troops to east Tennessee. To these three he added a fourth purpose in a dispatch of June 12:

If the combined fleet of Farragut and Davis fail to take Vicksburg, I will send an expedition for that purpose as soon as I can reënforce General Curtis.

Up to this point the country's estimate of General Halleck's military ability had steadily risen, but several serious errors of judgment now arrested his success. The greatest of these errors, perhaps, was the minor importance he seems to have attached to a continuation of the operations on the Mississippi River.

We have mentioned the victory of Farragut, and we need now to follow the upward course of his fleet. After receiving the surrender of New Orleans in the last days of April, he promptly pushed on an advance section of his ships up the Mississippi, which successively, and without serious opposition, received the surrender of all the important cities below Vicksburg, where Farragut himself arrived on the 20th of May. Vicksburg proved to be the most defensible position on the Mississippi, by reason of the high bluffs at and about the city. The Confederates had placed such faith in their defenses of the upper river, at Columbus, Island No. 10, and Fort Pillow, that no

* In response to that order I selected three of the strongest and swiftest stern-wheel coal tow-boats at Pittsburg, of which the average dimensions are about 170 feet length, 30 feet beam, and over 5 feet hold. At Cincinnati I selected two side-wheel boats, of which the largest is 180 feet long, 37½ feet beam in the wid-

est part, and 8 feet hold. At New Albany I secured a boat of about the same length but rather less beam, and subsequently I selected another at Cincinnati, of about the same class as the last, and sent her to Madison to be fitted out. [Ellet to McGunnigle, April 27, 1862. War Records.]

early steps were taken to fortify Vicksburg; but when Farragut passed and captured the lower forts and the upper defenses fell, the rebels made what haste they could to create a formidable barrier to navigation at Vicksburg. Beauregard sent plans for fortifications while he was yet disputing Halleck's advance from Shiloh to Corinth; and Lovell at New Orleans, retreating before Farragut's invasion, shipped the heavy guns he could no longer keep, and sent five regiments of Confederate troops, which he could no longer use, to erect the works. These reached their destination on May 12, and continuing the labors and preparations already begun, he had six batteries ready for service on Farragut's arrival. Remembering these dates and numbers, we can realize the unfortunate results of Halleck's dilatory Corinth campaign. He had then been in command, for a whole month, of forces double those of his antagonist. If, instead of digging his way from Shiloh to Corinth "with pick and shovel," he had forced such a prompt march and battle as his overwhelming numbers gave him power to do, the inevitable defeat or retreat of his enemy would have enabled him to meet the advance of Farragut with an army detachment sufficient to effect the reduction of Vicksburg with only slight resistance and delay. Such a movement ought to have followed by all the rules of military and political logic. The opening of the Mississippi outranked every other Western military enterprise in importance and urgency. It would effectually sever four great States from the rebel Confederacy; it would silence doubt at home and extinguish smoldering intervention abroad; it would starve the rebel armies and feed the cotton operatives of Europe. There would have been ample time; for he was advised as early as the 27th of April that New Orleans had been captured and that Farragut had "orders to push up to Memphis immediately," and he ought to have prepared to meet him.

No such coöperation, however, greeted Farragut. Reaching Vicksburg, his demand for the surrender of the place was refused. The batteries were at such a height that his guns could have no effect against them. Only two regiments of land forces accompanied the fleet. There was nothing to be done but to return to New Orleans, which he reached about the 1st of June. Here he met orders from Washington communicating the great desire of the Administration to have the river opened, and directing further efforts on his part to that end. Farragut took immediate measures to comply with this requirement. His task had already become more difficult. The enemy quickly comprehended the advantage which

the few high bluffs of the Mississippi afforded them, if not to obstruct, at least to harass and damage the operations of a fleet unsupported by land forces. The places which had been surrendered were, on the retirement of the ships, again occupied, and batteries were soon raised, which, though unable to cope with larger vessels, became troublesome and dangerous to transports, and were intermittently used or abandoned as the advantage or necessity of the enemy dictated.

Farragut again reached Vicksburg about June 25, accompanied this time by Porter with sixteen of his mortar-boats, and by General Williams at the head of three thousand Union troops. The mortar-sloops were placed in position and bombarded the rebel works on the 27th. On the morning of June 28, before daylight, Farragut's ships, with the aid of the continued bombardment, made an attack on the Vicksburg batteries, and most of them succeeded in passing up the river with comparatively small loss. Here he found Ellet—brother of him who was wounded at Memphis—with some vessels of the ram fleet, who carried the news to the gun-boat flotilla under Davis yet at Memphis. This flotilla now also descended the river and joined Farragut on the 1st of July.

We have seen, by the dispatch heretofore quoted, that Halleck expected the combined naval and gun-boat forces to reduce the Vicksburg defenses, but also that, in the event of their failure, he would send an army to help them. The lapse of two weeks served to modify this intention. The Secretary of War, who had probably received news of Farragut's first failure to pass the Vicksburg batteries, telegraphed him (on June 23) to examine the project of a canal to cut off Vicksburg, suggested by General Butler and others. Halleck replied (on June 28), "It is impossible to send forces to Vicksburg at present, but I will give the matter very full attention as soon as circumstances will permit." That same day Farragut passed above the batteries, and of this result Halleck was informed by Grant, who was at Memphis. Grant's dispatch added an erroneous item of news concerning the number of troops with Farragut, but more trustworthy information soon reached Halleck in the form of a direct application from Farragut for help. To this appeal Halleck again felt himself obliged to reply in the negative, July 3, 1862:

The scattered and weakened condition of my forces renders it impossible for me, at the present, to detach any troops to coöperate with you on Vicksburg. Probably I shall be able to do so as soon as I can get my troops more concentrated. This may delay the clearing of the river, but its accomplishment will be certain in a few weeks.

The hopeful promise with which the telegram closed dwindled away during the eleven days that followed. On the 14th of July Stanton asked him the direct question:

The Secretary of the Navy desires to know whether you have, or intend to have, any land force to coöperate in the operations at Vicksburg. Please inform me immediately, inasmuch as orders he intends to give will depend on your answer.

The answer this time was short and conclusive. "I cannot at present give Commodore Farragut any aid against Vicksburg."

A coöperative land force of from 12,000 to 15,000 men, Farragut estimated in his report of June 28, would have been sufficient to take the works. If we compare the great end to be attained with the smallness of the detachment thought necessary, there remains no reasonable explanation why Halleck should not have promptly sent it. But the chance had been lost. The waters of the Mississippi were falling so rapidly that Farragut dared not tarry in the river; and in accordance with orders received from the Department on July 20, he again ran past the Vicksburg batteries and returned to New Orleans.

If Halleck's refusal to help Farragut take Vicksburg seems inexplicable, it is yet more difficult to understand the apparently sudden cessation of all his former military activity, and his proposal, just at the point when his army had gathered its greatest strength and efficiency, abruptly to terminate his main campaign, and, in effect, go into summer quarters. He no longer talked of splitting secession in twain in one month, or of being at the enemy's throat. He no longer pointed out the waste of precious time, and uttered no further complaint about his inability to control Buell's army. His desires had been gratified. He commanded half of the military area within the Union; he had three armies under his own eye; the enemy was in flight before him; he could throw double numbers of men at any given point. At least two campaigns of overshadowing importance invited his resistless march. But in the midst of his success, in the plenitude of his power, with fortune thrusting opportunity upon him, he came to a sudden halt, folded his contented arms, and imitated the conduct that he wrongfully imputed to Grant after Donelson—"Satisfied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys it without regard to the future." In a long letter to the Secretary of War, dated June 25, after reviewing the sanitary condition of the army and

pronouncing it very good, he asks, apparently as the main question, "Can we carry on any summer campaign without having a large portion of our men on the sick-list?" This idea seems to dominate his thought and to decide his action. Buell had been ordered eastward on a leisurely march towards Chattanooga. Halleck proposed to plant the armies of Grant and of Pope on the healthy uplands of northern Mississippi and Alabama as mere corps of observation. Having personally wrested Corinth from the enemy, he exaggerated its strategical value. As a terminal point in the southward campaign, along the line of the Tennessee River, its chief use was to aid in opening the Mississippi River by turning the Confederate fortifications from Columbus to Memphis. Those strongholds once in Federal possession, Corinth inevitably fell into a secondary rôle, especially since the summer droughts rendered the Tennessee River useless as a military highway.

Carrying out this policy of Halleck, a large portion of the Western armies of the Union wasted time and strength guarding a great area of rebel territory unimportant for military uses, and which could have been better protected by an active forward movement. The security and the supply of Corinth appears to have been the central purpose. Buell was delayed in his march thoroughly to repair the railroad from Corinth eastward towards Chattanooga. Other detachments of the army were employed to repair the railroads westward from Corinth to Memphis, and northward from Corinth to Columbus. For several months all the energies of the combined armies were diverted from their more legitimate duty of offensive war to tedious labor on these local railroads;* much of the repairs being destroyed, almost as rapidly as performed, by daring guerrilla hostilities, engendered and screened amidst the surrounding sentiment of disloyalty.

It is impossible to guess what Halleck's personal supervision in these tasks might have produced, for at this juncture came a culmination of events that transferred him to another field of duty; but the legacy of policy, plans, and orders that he left behind contributed to render the whole Western campaign sterile throughout the second half of 1862.

The infatuation of Halleck in thus tying up the Western forces in mere defensive inaction comes out in still stronger light in the incident that follows, but it especially serves to show once more how, in the West as well as in the

* I inclose herewith a copy of a report of Brigadier-General McPherson, superintendent of railroads, from which it will be seen that we have opened 367 miles of road in less than one month, besides repairing a number of locomotives and cars which were captured

from the enemy greatly injured. Indeed, the wood-work of most of the cars has been entirely rebuilt, and all this work has been done by details from the army. [Halleck to Stanton, July 7, 1862. War Records.]

East, President Lincoln treated his military commanders, not with ignorant interference, as has been so often alleged, but with the most fatherly indulgence. Future chapters will describe the complete failure in the East of the campaign undertaken by McClellan against Richmond, and which, on the 30th of June, brought to Halleck an order from the Secretary of War, dated the 28th, immediately to detach and send 25,000 men to assist that imperiled enterprise. The necessity was declared "imperative." "But in detaching your force," explained the order, "the President directs that it be done in such a way as to enable you to hold your ground and not interfere with the movement against Chattanooga and east Tennessee." Halleck took instant measures to obey the order, but said in reply that it would jeopardize the ground gained in Tennessee and involve the necessity of abandoning Buell's east Tennessee expedition. This result the President had in advance declared inadmissible. He now telegraphed emphatically on June 30:

Would be very glad of 25,000 infantry — no artillery or cavalry; but please do not send a man if it endangers any place you deem important to hold, or if it forces you to give up or weaken or delay the expedition against Chattanooga. To take and hold the railroad at or east of Cleveland, in east Tennessee, I think fully as important as the taking and holding of Richmond.*

This request, but accompanied by the same caution and condition, was repeated by the President on July 2; and again, under the prompting of extreme need, Lincoln on July 4 sent a diminished request, still, however, insisting that no risk be incurred in the West:

You do not know how much you would oblige us if, without abandoning any of your positions or plans, you could promptly send us even ten thousand infantry. Can you not? Some part of the Corinth army is certainly fighting McClellan in front of Richmond. Prisoners are in our hands from the late Corinth army.

In Halleck's response on the following day it is important to notice the difference in the opinions entertained by the two men upon this point. Lincoln wished to gain east Tennessee, Halleck desired to hold west Tennessee. The distinction is essential, for we shall see that while Halleck's policy prevailed, it tended largely, if not principally, to thwart the realization of Lincoln's earnest wish. Halleck telegraphed:

For the last week there has been great uneasiness among Union men in Tennessee on account of the secret organizations of insurgents to cooperate in any attack of the enemy on our lines. Every commanding officer from Nashville to Memphis has asked for reinforcements. Under these circumstances I submitted the question of sending troops to Richmond to the principal officers of my command. They are unanimous in opinion that

* War Records.

if this army is seriously diminished the Chattanooga expedition must be revoked or the hope of holding south-west Tennessee abandoned. I must earnestly protest against surrendering what has cost so much blood and treasure, and which in a military point of view is worth more than Richmond.

He had already, in a previous telegram (July 1), acknowledged and exercised the discretion which Lincoln gave him, replying, "Your telegram, just received, saves western Tennessee."

It was found by the Washington authorities that the early reports of McClellan's reverses had been unduly exaggerated, and that by straining resources in the East, the Western armies might be left undiminished. But with this conviction President Lincoln also reached the decision that the failure of the Richmond campaign must be remedied by radical measures. To devise new plans, to elaborate and initiate new movements, he needed the help of the highest attainable professional skill. None seemed at the moment so available as that of Halleck. Under his administration order had come out of chaos in Missouri, and under his guiding control, however feeble in the particular cases that we have pointed out, the Western armies had won the victories of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Pea Ridge, Shiloh, Island No. 10, and Corinth. It was a record of steady success, which justified the belief that a general had been found who might be intrusted with the direction of the war in its larger combinations. The weakness of his present plans had not yet been developed. Accordingly on the 11th of July this order was made by the President:

That Major-General Henry W. Halleck be assigned to command the whole land forces of the United States as General-in-Chief, and that he repair to this capital so soon as he can with safety to the positions and operations within the department under his charge.

It seemed at the moment the best that could be done. In his short Corinth campaign Halleck had substantially demonstrated his unfitness for the leadership of an army in the field. He had made a grievous mistake in coming away from his department headquarters at St. Louis. He was a thinker and not a worker; his proper place was in the military study and not in the camp. No other soldier in active service equaled him in the technical and theoretical acquirements of his profession. The act of the President in bringing him to Washington restored him to his more natural duty.

In following the future career of Halleck, one of the incidents attending this transfer needs to be borne in mind. The first intimation of the change came in the President's dispatch of the 2d of July which asked: "Please tell me could you not make me a flying visit

for consultation without endangering the service in your department?" A few days later one of the President's friends went from Washington to Corinth bearing a letter of introduction to Halleck, explaining among other things:

I know the object of his visit to you. He has my cheerful consent to go, but not my direction. He wishes to get you and part of your force, one or both, to come here. You already know I should be exceedingly glad of this if in your judgment it could be done without endangering positions and operations in the Southwest.

To this Halleck replied on July 10:

Governor Sprague is here. If I were to go to Washington I could advise but one thing — to place all the forces in North Carolina, Virginia, and Washington under one head and hold that head responsible for the result.

It is doubtful if Halleck measured fully the import of his language; or whether he realized the danger and burden of the responsibility which, if he did not invite, he at least thus voluntarily assumed. Nominally he became General-in-Chief, but in actual practice his genius fell short of the high requirements of that great station. While he rendered memorable service to the Union, his judgment and courage sometimes quailed before the momentous requirements of his office, and thrust back upon the President the critical acts which overawed him. In reality, therefore, he was from the first only what he afterward became by technical orders — the President's chief-of-staff.

Before Halleck's transfer to Washington he had ordered Buell to move into east Tennessee, but that commander never seemed to appreciate the great military and political importance of such a movement. He considered the defense of west Tennessee a more essential object; and while his mind was engaged in that direction, Bragg planned and carried into effect a campaign into Kentucky that threatened at one time the most disastrous consequences to the Union cause in that region. He moved northward early in September, 1862, Kirby Smith preceding him with a strong detachment by way of Cumberland Gap, which marched without successful opposition almost to the Ohio River. Buell, believing that Bragg's real object was Nashville, made such dispositions that Bragg got a long start before him in the race to Louisville. He would, in fact, have had that city at his mercy if he had not left the direct road and turned to the right to join Kirby Smith at Frankfort to assist in the melancholy farce of inaugurating a Confederate governor for

Kentucky. Buell thus reached Louisville and immediately marched south in pursuit of Bragg. He overtook his army at Perryville and fought, on the 8th of October, a severe but indecisive battle; Buell kept the field and Bragg retired in the night, and hurried out of Kentucky at a pace that soon distanced his antagonist. The President renewed his earnest solicitations to Buell to occupy east Tennessee; Buell thought this impracticable, and was relieved of command on the 24th of October, and General Rosecrans was appointed to succeed him.

Rosecrans paid as little attention as Buell had done to the orders of the President for the occupation of east Tennessee. He established his headquarters at Nashville, completed and strengthened his communications, and in the latter part of December moved upon General Bragg, who had gone into winter quarters at Murfreesboro'. The two armies came within sight of each other on the night of the 30th of December, 1862, and the next morning at daybreak each general moved to the fight, in pursuance of plans that were the exact counterpart of each other — Rosecrans having ordered his left wing to strike Bragg's right, double it up and take the position at Murfreesboro' in reverse, while Bragg proposed to crush the right wing of Rosecrans, and swinging the Confederate army around pivoting on its right to cut the Union force off from Nashville. Bragg struck the first blow with so much vigor that Rosecrans was obliged to give up his position on the Confederate right and devote all his energies to the defense of his own position; and in spite of his utmost efforts, and the distinguished bravery with which he was supported by Thomas, Sheridan, and others, he lost ground all day, and at night the lines of the two armies were almost perpendicular to those that they had occupied in the morning. But Bragg had lost so severely in this day's fighting that he was unable to pursue his advantage on the 1st of January, 1863; and on the 2d Rosecrans resumed the offensive on his left with such success that Bragg found himself forced to abandon the field in the night. The losses on both sides were appalling, and the result of the fight was so damaging to Bragg that he was unable to resume active operations during the winter or spring, and was, in fact, so weakened, that when, in the summer of 1863, Rosecrans at last marched against him, he gave up his positions one after another, until the Union army occupied, in September, without striking a blow, the coveted and important mountain fortress of Chattanooga.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY.*

PLANS OF CAMPAIGN.

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO THE PRESIDENT.



ABOUT the 1st of December, 1861, Mr. Lincoln, who saw more clearly than McClellan, then General-in-Chief, the urgent necessity for some movement of the army, suggested to him a plan of campaign which, afterward much debated and discussed and finally rejected, is now seen to have been eminently wise and sagacious. He made a brief autograph memorandum of his plan, which he handed to McClellan, who kept it for ten days and returned it to Mr. Lincoln, with a hurried memorandum in pencil, showing that it made little impression on his mind. The memorandum and answer are so illustrative of the two men that we give them here in full, copied from the original manuscript:

If it were determined to make a forward movement of the Army of the Potomac, without waiting further increase of numbers, or better drill and discipline, how long would it require to actually get in motion? [Answer, in pencil: If bridge-trains ready by December 15th — probably 25th.]

After leaving all that would be necessary, how many troops could join the movement from south-west of the river? [In pencil, 71,000.]

How many from north-east of it? [In pencil, 33,000.]

Suppose then that of those south-west of the river [in pencil, 50,000] move forward and menace the enemy at Centreville? The remainder of the movable force on that side move rapidly to the crossing of the Occoquan by the road from Alexandria towards Richmond; there to be joined by the whole movable force from north-east of the river, having landed from the Potomac just below the mouth of the Occoquan, move by land up the south side of that stream, to the crossing-point named; then the whole move together, by the road thence to Brentville, and beyond, to the railroad just south of its crossing of Broad Run, a strong detachment of cavalry having gone rapidly ahead to destroy the railroad bridges south and north of the point.

If the crossing of the Occoquan by those from above be resisted, those landing from the Potomac below to take the resisting force of the enemy in rear; or, if the landing from the Potomac be resisted, those crossing the Occoquan from above to take that resisting force in rear. Both points will probably not be successfully resisted at the same time. The force in front of Centreville, if pressed too hardly, should fight back slowly into the intrenchments behind them. Armed vessels and transports should remain at the Potomac landing to cover a possible retreat.†

General McClellan returned the memorandum with this reply:

I inclose the paper you left with me, filled as you requested. In arriving at the numbers given, I have left the minimum number in garrison and observation.

Information received recently leads me to believe that the enemy could meet us in front with equal forces nearly, and I have now my mind actively turned towards another plan of campaign that I do not think at all anticipated by the enemy, nor by many of our own people.‡

The general's information was, as usual, erroneous. Johnston reports his "effective total" at this time as about 47,000 men — less than one-third what McClellan imagined it. Lincoln, however, did not insist upon knowing what the general's "other plan" was; nor did he press further upon his attention the suggestion that had been so scantily considered and so curtly dismissed. But as the weeks went by in inaction, his thoughts naturally dwelt upon the opportunities afforded by an attack on the enemy's right, and the project took more and more definite shape in his mind.

Congress convened on the 2d of December, and one of its earliest subjects of discussion was the battle of Ball's Bluff. Roscoe Conkling in the House of Representatives, and Zachariah Chandler in the Senate, brought forward resolutions for the appointment of committees to investigate and determine the responsibility for that disaster; but on motion of Grimes the Senate chose to order a permanent joint committee of three senators and four representatives to inquire into the conduct of the war. This action was unanimously agreed to by the House, and the committee was appointed, consisting of senators Wade, Chandler, and Johnson, and of representatives Gooch, Covode, Julian, and Odell. This committee, known as the Committee on the Conduct of the War, was for four years one of the most important agencies in the country. It assumed, and was sustained by Congress in assuming, a great range of prerogative. It became a stern and zealous censor of both the army and the government; it called soldiers and

† Lincoln to McClellan, autograph MS.

‡ McClellan to Lincoln, Dec. 10, 1861. Autograph MS.

statesmen before it and questioned them like refractory school-boys. It claimed to speak for the loyal people of the United States, and this claim generally met with the sympathy and support of a majority of the people's representatives in Congress assembled. It was often hasty and unjust in its judgment, but always earnest, patriotic, and honest; it was assailed with furious denunciation and defended with headlong and indiscriminating eulogy; and on the whole it must be said to have merited more praise than blame.

Even before this committee was appointed, as we have seen, senators Chandler and Wade, representing the more ardent and eager spirits in Congress, had repeatedly pressed upon the Government the necessity of employing the Army of the Potomac in active operations; and now that they felt themselves formally intrusted with a mandate from the people to that effect, were still more urgent and persistent. General McClellan and his immediate following treated the committee with something like contempt. But the President, with his larger comprehension of popular forces, knew that he must take into account an agency of such importance; and though he steadily defended General McClellan, and his deliberateness of preparation, before the committee, he constantly assured him in private that not a moment ought to be lost in getting himself in readiness for a forward movement. A free people, accustomed to considering public affairs as their own, can stand reverses and disappointments; they are capable of making great exertions and great sacrifices: the one thing that they cannot endure is inaction on the part of their rulers; the one thing that they insist upon is to see some result of their exertions and sacrifices. December was the fifth month that General McClellan had been in command of the greatest army ever brought together on this continent. It was impossible to convince the country that a longer period of preparation was necessary before this army could be led against one inferior in numbers, and not superior in discipline or equipment. As a matter of fact, the country did not believe the rebel army to be equal to the army of the Union in any of these particulars. It did not share the strange delusion of General McClellan and his staff in regard to the numbers of his adversary, and the common sense of the people was nearer right in its judgment than the computations of the general and his inefficient secret service. McClellan reported to the Secretary of War that Johnston's army, at the end of October, numbered 150,000, and that he would therefore require, to make an advance movement with the Army of the Potomac, a force of

240,000. Johnston's report of that date shows an effective total of 41,000 men! It was useless to try to convince General McClellan of the impossibility of such a concentration of troops in front of him; he simply added together the aggregates furnished by the guesses of his spies and implicitly believed the monstrous sum. It is worthy of notice that the Confederate general rarely fell into the corresponding error. At the time that McClellan was quadrupling, in his imagination, the rebel force, Johnston was estimating the army under McClellan at exactly its real strength.

Aware that his army was less than one-third as strong as the Union forces, Johnston contented himself with neutralizing the army at Washington, passing the time in drilling and disciplining his troops, which, according to his own account, were seriously in need of it. He could not account for the inactivity of the Union army. Military operations, he says, were practicable until the end of December; but he was never molested.

Our military exercises had never been interrupted. No demonstrations were made by the troops of that army, except the occasional driving in of a Confederate cavalry picket by a large mixed force. The Federal cavalry rarely ventured beyond the protection of infantry, and the ground between the two armies had been less free to it than to that of the Confederate army.

There was at no time any serious thought of attacking the Union forces in front of Washington. In the latter part of September, General Johnston had thought it possible for the Richmond government to give him such additional troops as to enable him to take the offensive, and Jefferson Davis had come to headquarters at Fairfax Court House to confer with the principals on that subject. At this conference, held on the 1st of October, it was taken for granted that no attack could be made, with any chances of success, upon the Union army in its position before Washington; but it was thought that, if enough force could be concentrated for the purpose, the Potomac might be crossed at the nearer ford, Maryland brought into rebellion, and a battle delivered in rear of Washington, where McClellan would fight at a disadvantage. Mr. Davis asked the three generals present, Johnston, Beauregard, and G. W. Smith, beginning with the last, how many troops would be required for such a movement. Smith answered "fifty thousand"; Johnston and Beauregard both said "sixty thousand"; and all agreed that they would require a large increase of ammunition and means of transportation. Mr. Davis said it was impossible to reënforce them to that extent, and the plan was dropped. It is hard to believe that during this same month of October, General McClellan, in a careful letter to

the War Department, with an army, according to his own account, of "147,695 present for duty," should have bewailed his numerical inferiority to the enemy, and begged that all other departments should be stripped of their troops and stores to enable him to make a forward movement, which he professed himself anxious to make "not later than the 25th of November," if the Government would give him men enough to meet the enemy on equal terms. This singular infatuation, difficult to understand in a man of high intelligence and physically brave, as McClellan undoubtedly was, must not be lost sight of. It furnishes the sole explanation of many things otherwise inexplicable. He rarely estimated the force immediately opposed to him at less than double its actual strength, and in his correspondence with the Government he persistently minimized his own force. This rule he applied only to the enemy in his immediate vicinity. He had no sympathy with commanders at a distance who asked for reinforcements. When Rosecrans succeeded him in western Virginia, and wanted additional troops, General McClellan was shocked at the unreasonable request. When William Tecumseh Sherman telegraphed that 75,000 men were needed to defend the Ohio line, and to make a forward movement into Kentucky, he handed the dispatch to Mr. Lincoln, who was sitting in his headquarters at the moment, with the remark, "The man is crazy." Every man sent to any other department he regarded as a sort of robbery of the Army of the Potomac.

All his demands were complied with to the full extent of the power of the Government. Not only in a material, but in a moral sense as well, the President gave him everything that he could. In addition to that mighty army, he gave him his fullest confidence and support. All through the autumn he stood by him, urging him in private to lose no time, but defending him in public against the popular impatience; and when winter came on, and the voice of Congress, nearly unanimous in demanding active operations, added its authoritative tones to the clamor of the country, the President endangered his own popularity by insisting that the general should be allowed to take his own time for an advance. In the latter part of December, McClellan, as already stated, fell seriously ill, and the enforced paralysis of the army that resulted from this illness and lasted several weeks added a keener edge to the public anxiety. The President painfully appreciated how much of justice there was in the general criticism, which he was doing all that he could to allay. He gave himself, night and day, to the study of the military situation. He read a large num-

ber of strategical works. He pored over the reports from the various departments and districts of the field of war. He held long conferences with eminent generals and admirals, and astonished them by the extent of his special knowledge and the keen intelligence of his questions. He at last convinced himself that there was no necessity for any further delay; that the army of the Potomac was as nearly ready as it ever would be to take the field against the enemy; and, feeling that he could not wait any longer, on the 10th of January, after calling at General McClellan's house and learning that the general was unable to see him, he sent for Generals McDowell and Franklin, wishing to take counsel with them in regard to the possibility of beginning active operations with the army before Washington. General McDowell has preserved an accurate report of this conference. The President said that he was in great distress; to use his own expression:

If something were not soon done, the bottom would be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan did not want to use the army he would like to borrow it, provided he could see how it might be made to do something.

In answer to a direct question, put by the President to General McDowell, that accomplished soldier gave a frank and straightforward expression of his conviction that by an energetic movement upon both flanks of the enemy — a movement rendered entirely practicable by the superior numbers of the Union army — he could be forced from his works and compelled to accept battle on terms favorable to us. General Franklin rather favored an attack upon Richmond, by way of York River. A question arising as to the possibility of obtaining the necessary transportation, the President directed both generals to return the next evening, and in the mean time to inform themselves thoroughly as to the matter in question. They spent the following day in this duty and went the next evening to the Executive Mansion with what information they had been able to procure, and submitted a paper in which they both agreed that, in view of the time and means required to take the army to a distant base, operations could now best be undertaken from the present base substantially as proposed by McDowell. The Secretaries of State and of the Treasury, who were present, coincided in this view, and the Postmaster-General, Mr. Blair, alone opposed it. They separated to meet the next day at 3 o'clock. General Meigs, having been called into conference, concurred in the opinion that a movement from the present base was preferable; but no definite resolution was taken, as General McClellan was reported as fully

recovered from his illness, and another meeting was arranged for Monday, the 13th, at the White House, where the three members of the Cabinet already mentioned, with McDowell, Franklin, Meigs, and General McClellan himself, were present. At the request of the President, McDowell made a statement of what he and Franklin had done under Mr. Lincoln's orders, and gave his reasons for advising a movement to the front. He spoke with great courtesy and deference towards his superior officer, and made an apology for the position in which he stood. McClellan was not inclined to relieve the situation of any awkwardness there might be in it. He merely said, "coldly, if not curtly," to McDowell, "You are entitled to have any opinion you please," and made no further remark or comment. The President spoke somewhat at length on the matter, and General McClellan said very briefly "that the case was so clear a blind man could see it" and went off instinctively upon the inadequacy of his forces. The Secretary of the Treasury, whose sympathies were with that section of his party which had already lost all confidence in General McClellan, asked him point blank what he intended to do with the army, and when he intended doing it. A long silence ensued. Even if the question had been a proper one, it is doubtful whether General McClellan would have answered it; as it was, it must have required some self-control for him to have contented himself with merely evading it. He said that Buell in Kentucky must move first; and then refused to answer the question unless ordered to do so. The President asked him if he counted upon any particular time, not asking what the time was—but had he in his own mind any particular time fixed when a movement could be begun? This question was evidently put as affording a means of closing a conference which was becoming disagreeable if not dangerous. McClellan promptly answered in the affirmative, and the President rejoined, "Then I will adjourn this meeting."

It is a remarkable fact that although the plan recommended by these generals was exactly the plan suggested six weeks before by the President to McClellan, neither of them made the slightest reference to that incident. That Mr. Lincoln did not refer to a matter so close to his heart is a striking instance of his reticence and his magnanimity; that General McClellan never mentioned it would seem to show that he thought so little of the matter as to have forgotten it. He seemed also to have thought little of this conference; he makes no reference to it in his report. He says, referring to this period:

About the middle of January, upon recovering from a severe illness, I found that excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the Army of the Potomac had taken possession of the minds of the Administration.

The last words of the phrase refer not only to the President, but to Mr. Stanton, the new Secretary of War, who began as soon as he took charge of his department to ply the commander of the army with continual incitements to activity. All suggestions of this sort, whether coming from the Government, Congress, or the press, General McClellan received with surprise and displeasure, and the resentment and vexation of his immediate friends and associates found vent in expressions of contempt for unmilitary critics, which, being reported, only increased the evil that provoked them. He at last laid before the President his plan for attacking Richmond by the lower Chesapeake, which the President disapproved, having previously convinced himself of the superior merit of the plan for a direct movement agreed upon by Generals McDowell, Franklin, and Meigs, who were ignorant of the fact that it was his. Further delay ensued, the President not being willing to accept a plan condemned by his own judgment and by the best professional opinions that he could obtain, and General McClellan being equally reluctant to adopt a plan that was not his own. The President at last, at the end of his patience, convinced that nothing would be done unless he intervened by a positive command, issued on the 27th of January his "General War Order, No. 1." He wrote it without consultation with any one, and read it to the Cabinet, not for their sanction, but for their information. The order directed

that the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces; that especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of western Virginia, the army near Munfordville, Kentucky, the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day; that all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given; that the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.

Four days later, as a necessary result of this general summons to action, a special instruction, called "President's Special War Order, No. 1," was issued to General McClellan, commanding

that all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the im-

mediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad south-westward of what is known as Manassas Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the General-in-Chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next.

This is the President's suggestion of December 1, put at last in the form of a command.

It would not have been characteristic of General McClellan to accept such an order as final, nor of Mr. Lincoln to refuse to listen to his objections and to a full statement of his own views. The President even went so far as to give him, in the following note, dated February 3, a schedule of points on which he might base his objections and develop his views.

MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac — yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock, to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroads south-west of Manassas.

If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:

First. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

Second. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?

Third. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?

Fourth. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?

Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?

Yours truly,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

This elicited from General McClellan a long letter, dated the same day, in which he dwelt with great emphasis on all the possible objections that could lie against a direct movement from Washington, and insisted with equal energy upon the advantages of a campaign by the lower Chesapeake. He rejects without argument the suggestion of an attack on both flanks of the enemy, on the ground of insufficient force, a ground that we have seen to be visionary. He says that an attack on the left flank of the enemy is impracticable on account of the length of the line, and confines his statement to a detail of the dangers and difficulties of an attack on the Confederate right by the line of the Occoquan. He insists that he will be met at every point by a determined resistance. To use his own words, he

brings out, in bold relief, the great advantage possessed by the enemy in the strong central position he occupies, with roads diverging in every direction, and a strong line of defense enabling him to remain on the defensive, with a small force on one flank, while he concentrates everything on the other for a decisive action.

Even if he succeeded in such a movement, he thought little of its results; they would be merely "the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Poto-

mac by the enemy, and the moral effect of the victory."

They would not end the war, the result he seemed to propose to himself in the one decisive battle he expected to fight somewhere. Turning to his own plan, he hopes by moving from his new base on the lower Chesapeake to accomplish this enormous and final success — to force the enemy either "to beat us in a position selected by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath the Caudine forks." The point which he thought promised the most brilliant results was Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock; "but one march from West Point,— on the York River, at the junction of the Pamunkey and the Mattaponi,— the key of that region, and thence but two marches to Richmond." He enjoys the prospect of brilliant and rapid movements by which the rebel armies shall be cut off in detail, Richmond taken, and the rebellion brought to a close. He says finally:

My judgment as a general is clearly in favor of this project. . . . So much am I in favor of the southern line of operations, that I would prefer the move from Fortress Monroe as a base — as a certain though less brilliant movement than that from Urbana, to an attack upon Manassas.

Most of the assumptions upon which this letter was based have since proved erroneous. The enormous force which McClellan ascribed to Johnston existed only in his imagination and in the wild stories of his spies. His force was about three times that of Johnston, and was therefore not insufficient for an attack upon one flank of the enemy while the other was held in check. It is now clearly known that the determined resistance that he counted upon, if he should attack by the line of the Occoquan, would not have been made. General Johnston says that about the middle of February he was sent for in great haste to Richmond, and on arriving there was told by Jefferson Davis that the Government thought of withdrawing the army to "a less exposed position." Johnston replied that the withdrawal of the army from Centreville would be necessary before McClellan's invasion,— which was to be looked for as soon as the roads were practicable,— but thought that it might be postponed for the present. He left Richmond, however, with the understanding on his part that the army was to fall back as soon as practicable, and the moment he returned to his camp he began his preparations to retire at once from a position which both he and the Richmond government considered absolutely untenable. On the 22d of February he says: "Orders were given to the chiefs of the quartermaster's and subsistence departments to remove the military property in the

depots at Manassas Junction and its dependencies to Gordonsville as quickly as possible." The railroads were urged to work to their utmost capacity. The line of the Occoquan, against which McClellan was arguing so strenuously to the President, was substantially the route by which Johnston expected him, believing, like the thorough soldier that he was, that it would be taken, because "invasion by that route would be the most difficult to meet"; and knowing that he could not cope with the Federal army north of the Rappahannock, he was ready to retire behind that stream at the first news of McClellan's advance. Everything now indicates that if McClellan had chosen to obey the President's order and to move upon the enemy in his front in the latter part of February* or the first days of March, one of the cheapest victories ever gained by a fortunate general awaited him. He would have struck an enemy greatly inferior in strength, equipment, and discipline, in the midst of a difficult retreat already begun, encumbered by a vast accumulation of provisions and stores,† which would have become the prize of the victor. He would not have won the battle that was to end the war. That sole battle was a dream of youth and ambition; the war was not of a size to be finished by one fight. But he would have gained, at slight cost, what would have been in reality a substantial success, and would have appeared, in its effect upon public opinion and the morale of the army, an achievement of great importance. The enemy, instead of quietly retiring at his own time, would have seemed to be driven beyond the Rapidan. The clearing the Potomac of hostile camps and batteries above and below Washington, and the capture of millions of pounds of stores, would have afforded a relief to the anxious public mind that the National cause sorely needed at that time, and which General McClellan needed most of all. ‡

These facts, that are now so clear to every one, were not so evident then; and although the President and the leading men in the Gov-

ernment and in Congress were strongly of the opinion that the plan favored by Mr. Lincoln and approved by McDowell, Meigs, and Franklin was the right one, it was a question of the utmost gravity whether he should force the General-in-Chief to adopt it against his obstinate protest. It would be too much to ask that any government should assume such a responsibility and risk. On the other hand, the removal of the general from the command of the Army of the Potomac would have been a measure not less serious. There was no successor ready at all his equal in accomplishments, in executive efficiency, or in popularity among the soldiers. Besides this, and in spite of his exasperating slowness, the President still entertained for him a strong feeling of personal regard. He therefore, after much deliberation and deep distress of mind, yielded his convictions, gave up his plan and adopted that of General McClellan for a movement by the lower Chesapeake. He never took a resolution which cost him more in his own feelings, and in the estimation of his supporters in Congress and in the country at large. He made no explanation of the reasons that induced this resolution; he thought it better to suffer any misrepresentation rather than to communicate his own grave misgivings to the country. The Committee on the Conduct of the War, who were profoundly grieved and displeased by this decision, made only this grim reference to it:

Your committee have no evidence, either oral or documentary, of the discussions that ensued, or of the arguments that were submitted to the consideration of the President, that led him to relinquish his own line of operations and consent to the one proposed by General McClellan, except the result of a council of war, held in February, 1862.

This council, which, the committee say, was the first ever called by McClellan, and then only at the direction of the President, was composed of twelve general officers — McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, Barnard, Keyes, Fitz-John Porter, Franklin, W. F. Smith, McCall, Blenker, Andrew Porter, and Naglee

† The subsistence department had collected at Manassas Junction more than three million pounds of provisions. They had also two million pounds of meat at Thoroughfare Gap, besides large herds of cattle and hogs. This accumulation was against the wish and to the great embarrassment of General Johnston. ["Johnston's Narrative," pp. 98 and 99.]

‡ Mr. William Swinton, who habitually takes sides with McClellan against the President where it is possible, says on this point: "Had Johnston stood, a battle with good prospect of success might have been delivered. But had he, as there was great likelihood he would do, and as it is now certain he would have done, fallen back from Manassas to the line of the Rapidan, his compulsory retirement would have been esteemed a positive victory to the Union arms." [Swinton, "Army of the Potomac," p. 73.]

* The following extract shows that General McClellan himself had some vague thought of moving at that time: "February came and on the 13th General McClellan said to me, 'In ten days I shall be in Richmond.' A little surprised at the near approach of a consummation so devoutly to be wished, I asked, 'What is your plan, General?' 'Oh,' said he, 'I mean to cross the river, attack and carry their batteries, and push on after the enemy.' 'Have you any gun-boats to aid in the attack on the batteries?' 'No, they are not needed; all I want is transportation and canal-boats, of which I have plenty that will answer.' I did not think it worth while to reply; but made a note of the date and waited. The ten days passed away; no movement, and no preparation for a movement, had been made." [From a memorandum written by Hon. S. P. Chase. Schucker's "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 446.]

(from Hooker's division). The first four voted against the Urbana plan; Keyes only favored it on condition that the Potomac batteries should first be reduced. The rest voted for it without conditions. This was the council afterward referred to by Stanton when he said, "We saw ten generals afraid to fight."*

This plan of campaign having been definitely adopted, Mr. Lincoln urged it forward as eagerly as if it had been his own. John Tucker, one of the Assistant Secretaries of War, was charged by the President and Mr. Stanton with the entire task of transporting the Army of the Potomac to its new base, and the utmost diligence was enjoined upon him. Quartermasters Ingalls and Hodges were assigned to assist him. We shall see that he performed the prodigious task intrusted to him in a manner not excelled by any similar feat in the annals of the world.

But in the mean while there were two things that the President was anxious to have done, and General McClellan undertook them with apparent good-will. One was to reopen the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the other to clear out the rebel batteries that still obstructed the navigation of the Potomac. For the first, extensive preparations were made: a large body of troops was collected at Harper's Ferry; canal-boats were brought there in sufficient quantity to make a permanent bridge. General McClellan went to the place and, finding everything satisfactory for the operation, telegraphed for a large additional force of cavalry, artillery, and a division of infantry to rendezvous at once at Harper's Ferry, to cross as soon as the bridge was completed, which would be only the work of a day, and then to push on to Winchester and Strasburg. It was only on the morning of the next day, when the attempt was made to pass the canal-boats through the lift-lock, that it was discovered they were some six inches too wide to go through. The general thus discovered that his permanent bridge, so long planned, and from which so much had been expected, was impossible.† He countermanded his order for the troops; contented himself with a reconnaissance to Charleston and Martinsburg; and returned to Washington, as he says, "well satisfied with what had been accomplished." He was much surprised at finding that his satisfaction was not shared by the President. Mr. Lincoln's slow anger was thoroughly roused at this ridiculous outcome of an important enterprise, and he received the general on his return in a manner that somewhat disturbed his complacency.

McClellan went on in his leisurely way,

* J. H., Diary.

† Chase in his Diary said the expedition died of lockjaw.

preparing for a movement upon the batteries near the Occoquan, undisturbed by the increasing signs of electric perturbation at the Executive Mansion and the Capitol, which answered but faintly to the growing excitement in the North. The accumulating hostility and distrust of General McClellan,—totally unjust as it affected his loyalty and honor and his ardent desire to serve his country in the way that he thought best,—though almost entirely unknown to him, was poured upon the President, the Government, and the leading members of Congress in letters, and conversations, and newspaper leaders. Mr. Lincoln felt the injustice of much of this criticism, but he also felt powerless to meet it, unless some measures were adopted to force the general into an activity which was as necessary to his own reputation as to the national cause. The 22d of February came and passed, and the President's order to move on that day was not obeyed. McClellan's inertia prevailed over the President's anxious eagerness. On the 8th of March, Mr. Lincoln issued two more important General Orders. The first directed General McClellan to divide the Army of the Potomac into four army corps, to be commanded respectively by Generals Irvin McDowell, E. V. Sumner, S. P. Heintzelman, and E. D. Keyes; the forces to be left in front of Washington were to be placed in command of General Wadsworth. The Fifth Corps was to be formed, to be commanded by General N. P. Banks. For months this measure had been pressed upon General McClellan by the Government. An army of 150,000 men, it was admitted, could not be adequately commanded by the machinery of divisions and brigades alone. But though McClellan accepted this view in principle, he could not be brought to put it into practice. He said that he would prefer to command the army personally on its first campaign, and then select the corps commanders for their behavior in the field. The Government thought better to make the organization at once, giving the command of corps to the ranking division commanders. The fact that of the four generals chosen three had been in favor of an immediate movement against the enemy in front of Washington will of course be considered as possessing a certain significance. It is usually regarded as a grievance by the partisans of General McClellan.

The other order is of such importance that we give it entire:

PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER, No. 3.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, March 8, 1862.

Ordered, That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without

leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the General-in-Chief and the commanders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure.

That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new base of operations until the navigation of the Potomac from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay shall be freed from enemy's batteries and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission. That any movement as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March instant, and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it moves as early as that day.

Ordered, That the Army and Navy cooperate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and Chesapeake Bay.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

L. THOMAS, *Adjutant-General.*

This order has always been subject to the severest criticism from General McClellan's partisans; but if we admit that it was proper for the President to issue any order at all, there can be no valid objection made to the substance of this one. It was indispensable that Washington should be left secure; it would have been madness to allow General McClellan to take *all* the troops to the Peninsula, leaving the Potomac obstructed by the enemy's batteries, so near the capital; and the fixing of a date beyond which the beginning of the movement should not be postponed had been shown to be necessary by the exasperating experience of the past eight months. The criticism so often made, that a general who required to have such orders as these given him should have been dismissed the service, is the most difficult of all to meet. Nobody felt so deeply as Mr. Lincoln the terrible embarrassment of having a general in command of that magnificent army who was absolutely without initiative, who answered every suggestion of advance with demands for reënforcements, who met entreaties and reproaches with unending arguments to show the superiority of the enemy and the insufficiency of his own resources, and who yet possessed in an eminent degree the enthusiastic devotion of his friends and the general confidence of the rank and file. There was so much of executive efficiency and ability about him that the President kept on, hoping to the last that if he could once "get him started" he would then handle the army well and do great things with it.

MANASSAS EVACUATED.

SUNDAY, the 9th of March, was a day of swiftly succeeding emotions at the Executive Mansion. The news of the havoc wrought by

the *Merrimac* in Hampton Roads the day before arrived in the morning, and was received with profound chagrin by the calmest spirits and with something like consternation by the more excitable. But in the afternoon astonishing tidings came to reverse the morning's depression. The first was of the timely arrival of the *Monitor*, followed shortly, on the completion of the telegraph to Fort Monroe, by the news of her battle and victory. The exultation of the Government over this providential success was changed to amazement by the receipt of intelligence that the rebel batteries on the Potomac were already abandoned, and the tale of surprises was completed by the news which came in the evening that the Confederate army had abandoned their works at Manassas, retreating southward. General McClellan was with the President and the Secretary of War when this message arrived, and he received it, as might have been expected, with incredulity, which at last gave way to stupefaction. He started at once across the river, ostensibly to verify the intelligence, and in his bewilderment and confusion issued an order that night for an immediate advance of the army upon Centreville and Manassas. In the elaborate report by which he strove, a year after the fact, to shift from himself to others the responsibility of all his errors, occurs this remarkable sentence:

The retirement of the enemy towards Richmond had been expected as the natural consequence of the movement to the Peninsula, but their adoption of this course immediately on ascertaining that such a movement was intended, while it relieved me from the results of the undue anxiety of my superiors and attested the character of the design, was unfortunate in that the then almost impassable roads between our positions and theirs deprived us of the opportunity for inflicting damage usually afforded by the withdrawal of a large army in the face of a powerful adversary.

This was the theory immediately adopted by himself, propagated among his staff, communicated to the Prince de Joinville, who published it in France on his return there, and to the Comte de Paris, who after twenty years incorporated it in his history — that the enemy, having heard of his scheme for going to the Peninsula, through the indiscretion of the Government, had suddenly taken flight from Manassas. General McClellan asserts this in his report a dozen times; he reiterates it as if he felt that his reputation depended upon it. If it is not true, then in the long contest with the President in regard to a direct attack from Washington the President was right and McClellan was wrong.

The straightforward narrative of General Johnston, and the official orders and correspondence of the Confederate officers, show

that there is not the slightest foundation for this theory of General McClellan's. They show, on the contrary, that the rebel government, nearly a month before this, had concluded that Johnston's position was untenable; that Johnston had shared in the belief, and had begun his preparations to retire on the 22d of February; that instead of "ascertaining McClellan's intention to move to the lower Chesapeake," he had been of the opinion that McClellan would advance upon the line designated by Mr. Lincoln, because it was the best line for attack and the most difficult for the rebels to defend; that he knew McClellan's enormous superiority in numbers and did not purpose to risk everything in resisting him there; that on the 5th of March, having received information of unusual activity in our army in the direction of Dumfries, he gave his final orders, and on the 7th began to move. He proceeded with the greatest deliberation, writing to one of his generals on the 15th, "McClellan seems not to value time especially." His subordinates were equally convinced that the Confederate right was the object of the Union advance; Holmes wrote in that sense to Lee on the 14th of March. Lee, who was then directing military operations in Richmond, answered him on the 16th, concurring in this view, recognizing the "advantages" of such a plan, and saying, "That he will advance upon our line as soon as he can, I have no doubt." Until the 18th of March Johnston did not suspect that McClellan was not advancing to strike his right flank; he then fell back behind the Rapidan, to guard against other contingencies. Even while our vast army was passing down the Potomac he could not make out where it was going. So late as the early days of April, Jefferson Davis was in doubt as to McClellan's destination, and Johnston only heard of the advance upon Yorktown about the 5th of that month.

By the very test, therefore, to which General McClellan appeals in the paragraph quoted above, his conduct during the autumn and winter stands finally condemned. By their contemporaneous letters and orders, by their military movements in an important crisis, by their well-considered historical narratives, the Confederate government and generals have established these facts beyond all possibility of future refutation: that the plan for a direct attack suggested by Lincoln, and contemptu-

ously rejected by McClellan, was a sound and practicable one; it was the plan they expected and dreaded to see adopted, because it was the one easiest to accomplish and hardest to resist. When they fancied that they saw the Army of the Potomac preparing to move, it was this plan alone of which they thought; and they immediately gave up their position, which McClellan thought impregnable, as they had been for weeks preparing to do at the first intimation of a forward movement. The long delay of five months, during three of which the roads were in unusually fine condition,* during all of which the Union forces were as three to one of the enemy, remains absolutely without excuse. It can only be explained by that strange idiosyncrasy of General McClellan which led him always to double or treble the number of an enemy and the obstacles in his immediate vicinity.

It is little blame to Confederate generals that they could not divine what General McClellan was doing with the grand army of the Union during the week that followed the evacuation of Manassas. No soldier could have been expected to guess the meaning of that mysterious promenade of a vast army to Centreville and Manassas, and back to Alexandria. In spite of the "impassable roads," they made the journey with ease and celerity. The question why the whole army was taken has never been satisfactorily answered. General McClellan started away in too much confusion of mind to know precisely what he intended; his explanation afterward was that he wanted the troops to have a little experience of marching and to "get rid of their *impedimenta*." He claims in his report to have found on this excursion a full justification of his extravagant estimate of the enemy's force, and speaks with indignation of the calumnious stories of "quaker guns" which were rife in the press at the time. Every one now knows how fatally false the estimate was; and as to the "quaker guns," this is what General Johnston says about them:

As we had not artillery enough for their works and for the army fighting elsewhere at the same time, rough wooden imitations of guns were made, and kept near the embrasures, in readiness for exhibition in them. To conceal the absence of carriages, the embrasures were covered with sheds made of bushes. These were the quaker guns afterwards noticed in Northern papers.

Without further discussing where the fault

* Pollard's History, Vol. I., p. 184, says: "A long, lingering Indian summer, with roads more hard and skies more beautiful than Virginia had seen for many a year, invited the enemy to advance." "Johnston's Narrative" says that the roads were practicable until the last of December.

From the admirable monograph of Major-General A. S. Webb, Chief-of-Staff of the Army of the Poto-

mac, entitled "The Peninsula," we quote a sentence on this subject: "During all the time Johnston's army lay at Centreville insolently menacing Washington . . . it never presented an effective strength of over 50,000 men. With more than twice that number, McClellan remained inactive for many precious weeks, under the delusion that he was confronted by a force nearly equal his own."

lay, the fact is beyond dispute that when the evacuation of Manassas was known throughout the country, the military reputation of General McClellan received serious damage. No explanation made at the time, and, we may add, none made since then, could account satisfactorily for such a mistake as to the condition of the enemy, such utter ignorance as to his movements. The first result of it was the removal of General McClellan from the command of the armies of the United States. This resolution was taken by the President himself, on the 11th of March. On that day he prepared the order known as "President's War Order, No. 3," and in the evening called together Mr. Seward, Mr. Chase, and Mr. Stanton, and read it to them. It was in these words:

PRESIDENT'S WAR ORDER, NO. 3.
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, March 11, 1862.

Major-General McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered he is relieved from the command of the other military departments, he retaining command of the Department of the Potomac.

Ordered further, That the departments now under the respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under General Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, Tenn., be consolidated and designated the Department of the Mississippi, and that, until otherwise ordered, Major-General Halleck have command of said department.

Ordered also, That the country west of the Department of the Potomac and east of the Department of the Mississippi be a military department, to be called the Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded by Major-General Frémont. That all the commanders of departments, after the receipt of this order by them respectively, report severally and directly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, and frequent reports will be expected of all and each of them.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

All the members of the Cabinet present heartily approved the order. The President gave his reason for issuing it while General McClellan was absent from Washington — a reason indeed apparent in the opening words, which were intended to take from the act any appearance of disfavor. The general's intimate biographers have agreed that it was because the President was afraid to do it while the general was in Washington! The manner of the order, which was meant as a kindness, was taken as a grievance. Mr. Seward advised that the order be issued in the name of the Secretary of War, but this proposition met with a decided protest from Mr. Stanton. He said there was some friction already between himself and the general's friends, and he feared that the act, if signed by him, would be attributed to personal feeling. The President decided to take the responsibility.* In a manly

* J. H., Diary.

and courteous letter the next day, McClellan accepted the disposition thus made of him.

On the 13th of March, at Fairfax Court House, General McClellan called together the four corps commanders who were with him and submitted to them for discussion the President's order of the 8th. The results of the council cannot be more briefly stated than in the following memorandum, drawn up by the generals who took part in it:

A council of the generals commanding army corps at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were of the opinion:

I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James rivers, provided —

First. That the enemy's vessel *Merrimac* can be neutralized;

Second. That the means of transportation, sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base, can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac; and

Third. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries on the York River.

Fourth. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.)

II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with materials sufficient for supplying the army should at once be collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and Aquia and Richmond railroads. (Unanimous.)

N. B. — That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice. (Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell.) A total of 40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice. (Sumner.)

These conclusions of the council were conveyed to Washington, and the President on the same day sent back to General McClellan his approval, and his peremptory orders for the instant execution of the plan proposed, in these words, signed by the Secretary of War:

The President, having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution: First, leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication. Second, leave Washington entirely secure. Third, move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there, or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route.

No commander could ask an order more unrestricted, more unhampered, than this. Choose your own route, your own course, only go; seek the enemy and fight him.

Under the orders of Mr. John Tucker, of

the War Department, a fleet of transports had been preparing since the 27th of February. It is one of the many grievances mentioned by General McClellan in his report, that this work was taken entirely out of his hands and committed to those of Mr. Tucker; he thus estops himself from claiming any credit for one of the most brilliant feats of logistics ever recorded. On the 27th of February, Mr. Tucker received his orders; on the 17th of March, the troops began their embarkation; on the 5th of April, Mr. Tucker made his final report, announcing that he had transported to Fort Monroe, from Washington, Perryville, and Alexandria, "121,500 men, 14,592 animals, 1150 wagons, 44 batteries, 74 ambulances, besides pontoon bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, etc., required for an army of such magnitude. The only loss," he adds, "of which I have heard is eight mules and nine barges, which latter went ashore in a gale within a few miles of Fort Monroe, the cargoes being saved." He is certainly justified in closing his story with these words: "I respectfully but confidently submit that, for economy and celerity of movement, this expedition is without a parallel on record."*

The first corps to embark was Heintzelman's; he took with him from General McClellan the most stringent orders to do nothing more than to select camping-grounds, send out reconnaissances, engage guides and spies, "but to make no important move in advance." The other forces embarked in turn, McDowell's corps being left to the last; and before it was ready to sail, General McClellan himself started on the 1st of April, with the headquarters on the steamer *Commodore*, leaving behind him a state of things that made it necessary to delay the departure of McDowell's troops still further.

In all the orders of the President it had been clearly stated that, as an absolute condition precedent to the army being taken away to a new base, enough troops should be left at Washington to make that city absolutely safe, not only from capture, but from serious menace. The partisans of General McClellan then, and ever since then, have contended that, as Washington could not be seriously attacked without exposing Richmond to capture, undue importance was attached to it in these orders. It would be a waste of words to argue with people who place the political and strategic value of these two cities on a level. The

* The means by which this work was done were as follows:

113 steamers at an average price per day	\$215.10
188 schooners at an average price per day	24.45
88 barges at an average price per day	14.27

capture of Richmond, without the previous virtual destruction of the rebel armies, would have been, it is true, an important achievement, but the seizure of Washington by the rebels would have been a fatal blow to the Union cause. General McClellan was in the habit of saying that if the rebel army should take Washington while he was at Richmond they could never get back; but it might be said that the general who would permit Washington to be taken could not be relied on to prevent the enemy from doing what they liked afterward. Mr. Lincoln was unquestionably right in insisting that Washington must not only be rendered safe from capture, but must also be without the possibility of serious danger. This view was adopted by the council of corps commanders, who met on the 13th of March at Fairfax Court House. They agreed unanimously upon this principle, and then, so as to leave no doubt as to details, three of the four gave the opinion that after the forts on the Virginia side were fully garrisoned, and those on the Maryland side occupied, a covering force of 25,000 men would be required.

The morning after General McClellan had sailed for Fort Monroe, the Secretary of War was astonished to hear from General Wadsworth, the military Governor of the District of Washington, that he had left him present for duty only 19,000 men, and that from that force he had orders to detach four good regiments to join General McClellan on the Peninsula, and four more to relieve Sumner at Manassas and Warrenton. He further reported that his command was entirely "inadequate to the important duty to which it was assigned." As General Wadsworth was a man of the highest intelligence, courage, and calm judgment, the President was greatly concerned by this emphatic statement. Orders were at once given to General E. A. Hitchcock, an accomplished veteran officer on duty at the War Department, and to Adjutant-General Thomas, to investigate the statement made by General Wadsworth. They reported the same night that it would require 30,000 men to man and occupy the forts, which, with the covering force of 25,000, would make 55,000 necessary for the proper defense of the city, according to the judgment of the council of corps commanders. They confirmed the report of Wadsworth that his efficient force consisted of 19,000, from which General McClellan had ordered eight regiments away. They therefore concluded "that the requirement of the President that the city should be left entirely secure had not been fully complied with." In accordance with this report the President directed that General McDowell's corps should

not be sent to the Peninsula until further orders.*

YORKTOWN.

GENERAL McCLELLAN arrived at Fort Monroe on the morning of the 2d of April. According to his own report he had ready the next day to move 58,000 men and 100 guns, besides the division artillery. They were of the flower of the volunteer army, and included also Sykes's brigade of regulars, Hunt's artillery reserve, and several regiments of cavalry. These were all on the spot, prepared to march, and an almost equal number were on their way to join him. He seemed at first to appreciate the necessity for prompt and decisive action, and with only one day's delay issued his orders for the march up the Peninsula between the York and James rivers. The first obstacle that he expected to meet was the force of General J. B. Magruder at Yorktown, which McClellan estimated at from 15,000 to 20,000. Magruder says his force consisted of 11,000, of which 6000 were required for the fortifications of Yorktown and only 5000 were left to hold the line across the Peninsula, 13 miles in length. His only object was to delay as long as possible the advance of the National troops upon Richmond, and his dispositions were made to that end. If he had had troops enough, he says that he would have made his line of defense between Ship Point, on the York, and the mouth of the Warwick, on the James. But his force being insufficient for that purpose, he took up as a second line the Warwick River, which heads only a mile or so from Yorktown and empties into the James some thirteen miles to the south. Yorktown and its redoubts, united by long curtains and flanked by rifle-pits, formed the left of his line, which was continued by the Warwick River, a sluggish and boggy stream running through a dense wood fringed with swamps. The stream was dammed in two places, at Wynn's Mill and at Lee's Mill; and Magruder constructed three more dams to back up the river and make the fords impassable. Each of these dams was protected by artillery and earthworks.

General McClellan was absolutely ignorant not only of these preparations made to receive him, but also of the course of the river and the nature of the ground through which it ran. He knew something of the disposition of Magruder's outposts on his first line, and rightly con-

jectured that they would retire as he advanced. His orders for the 4th of April were therefore punctually carried out, and he seemed to have expected no greater difficulty in his plan for the next day.† He divided his force into two columns — Heintzelman to take the right and march directly to Yorktown; and Keyes, taking the road to the left, to push on to the Half-way House in the rear of Yorktown, on the Williamsburg road. He expected Keyes to be there the same day, to occupy the narrow ridge in that neighborhood, "to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown by land, and to prevent reinforcements from being thrown in." Heintzelman went forward to the place assigned him in front of Yorktown, meeting with little opposition. Keyes marched by the road assigned him until he came to the enemy's fortified position at Lee's Mill, which, to use General McClellan's words, "he found altogether stronger than was expected, unapproachable by reason of the Warwick River, and incapable of being carried by assault." The discovery of this "unexpected" obstacle exercised a paralyzing influence upon the General-in-Chief. The energetic and active campaign that day begun was at once given up. Two days of reconnaissances convinced him that he could not break through the line which Magruder's little army of 11,000 men had stretched across the Peninsula, and he resolved upon a regular siege of the place. He began at the same time that campaign of complaint and recrimination against the Government which he kept up as long as he remained in the service.

He always ascribed the failure of his campaign at this point to two causes; first, to the want of assistance by the navy in reducing Yorktown, and second, to the retention of McDowell's corps in front of Washington. If the navy had silenced the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, he contended, he could have gone up the Peninsula unchecked. This is unquestionably true; it would be equally true to say in general terms that if somebody else would do our work we would have no work to do. He brings no proof to show that he had any right to expect that the navy would do this for him. It is true that he asked before he left Washington that the navy might cooperate with him in this plan, and received in reply the assurance that the navy would render him all the assistance in its power. The sworn testimony of Mr. Fox, the Assistant-

* General McClellan made in his report an elaborate effort to explain away these facts. He claims to have left a force of 73,000 for the defense of Washington, including in the number all the troops under Dix in Maryland, under Banks in the Shenandoah, all those at Warrenton, at Manassas, and on the lower Potomac.

But he does not deny the facts stated by Wadsworth and confirmed by Hitchcock and Thomas.

† In a letter on the 3d he wrote: "I hope to get possession of Yorktown day after to-morrow." ["McClellan's Own Story," p. 397.]

Secretary of the Navy, and of Admiral Goldsborough, shows that nothing was promised that was not performed, and that the navy stood ready to give, and did give, all the assistance to the army which was possible. Mr. Fox said:

Wooden vessels could not have attacked the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester with any degree of success. The forts at Yorktown were situated too high, were beyond the reach of naval guns; and I understood that General McClellan never expected any attack to be made upon them by the navy.

Admiral Goldsborough's evidence is to the same effect: he promised that the *Merrimac* should never go up the York River, and she did not; he never heard that he was expected to cooperate with the army in attacking Yorktown; he did everything that General McClellan requested of him. His orders from the department were clear and urgent, though general; he was "to extend to the army, at all times, any and all aid that he could render"; and he never refused to honor any draft that was made upon him. General McClellan pursued in this matter his invariable system. He asked for impossibilities, and when they were not accomplished for him he cherished it ever after as a precious grievance—like a certain species of lawyer, who in a case that he expects to lose always takes care to provide himself with a long bill of exceptions on which to base his appeal.

The greatest of his grievances was the retention of McDowell's corps, and his clamor in regard to this was so loud and long as to blind many careless readers and writers to the facts in the case. We have stated them already, but they may be briefly recapitulated here. A council of war of General McClellan's corps commanders, called by himself, had decided that Washington could not be safely left without a covering force of 55,000, including the garrisons of the forts. When he had gone, General Wadsworth reported that he had left only 19,000, and had ordered away nearly half of these. Two eminent generals in the War Department investigated this statement and found it true, whereupon the President ordered that McDowell's corps should for the present remain within reach of Washington. McClellan took with him to the Peninsula an aggregate force of over 100,000 men, afterwards largely increased. His own morning

report of the 13th of April, signed by himself and his adjutant-general, shows that he had with him actually present for duty 100,970. With this overwhelming superiority of numbers he could have detached 30,000 men at any moment to do the work that he had intended McDowell to do. But all the energy he might have employed in this work he diverted in attacking the Administration at Washington, which was doing all that it could do to support and provide for his army.

The attitude of the President towards him at this time may be seen from the following letter of the 9th of April, in which Mr. Lincoln answers his complaints with as much consideration and kindness as a father would use towards a querulous and petulant child:

Your dispatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it—certainly not without reluctance. After you left, I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented, or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My official order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself. And now allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th saying you had over 100,000 with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for?*

As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your

*The discrepancy cannot be accounted for. General McClellan's official morning report of the 13th of April, four days after the date of the President's letter, gives the following: "Number of troops composing the Army of the Potomac after its disembarkation on the Peninsula: Aggregate present for duty, 100,970; on special duty, sick, and in arrest, 4265; aggregate absent, 12,486, — total aggregate, 117,721." Yet with

statements like these on file in the War Department, over his own signature, he did not hesitate to inform the President that his force amounted to only 85,000; and even this sum dwindled so considerably, as years rolled by, that in his article in *THE CENTURY*, in May, 1885, on the Peninsula Campaign, he gives his available fighting force as "67,000 or 68,000."

own would have to do if that command was away. I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time, and if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone. And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act.

These considerations produced no impression upon General McClellan. From the beginning to the end of the siege of Yorktown, his dispatches were one incessant cry for men and guns. These the Government furnished to the utmost extent possible, but nothing contented him. His hallucination of overwhelming forces opposed to him began again, as violent as it was during the winter. On the 8th of April he wrote to Admiral Goldsborough, "I am probably weaker than they are, or soon will be." His distress is sometimes comic in its expression. He writes on the 7th of April, "The Warwick River grows worse the more you look at it." While demanding McDowell's corps *en bloc* he asked on the 5th for Franklin's division, and on the 10th repeated this request, saying that although he wanted more, he would be responsible for the results if Franklin's division were sent him. The Government, overborne by his importunity, gave orders the same day that Franklin's division should go to him, and the arrangements for transporting them were made with the greatest diligence. He was delighted with this news; and although the weather was good and the roads improving, he did nothing but throw up earth-works until they came. They arrived on the 20th, and no use whatever was made of them! He kept them in the transports in which they had come down the bay more than two weeks—in fact, until the day before the siege ended. It is hard to speak with proper moderation of so ridiculous a disposition of this most valuable force, so clamorously demanded by General McClellan, and so generously sent him by the President. General Webb, the intimate friend and staff-officer of McClellan, thus speaks of it:

Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander of the Corps of Engineers was instructed to devise the proper arrangements and superintend the landing of the troops; but,

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extraordinary as it may seem, more than two weeks were consumed in the preliminaries, and when everything was nearly ready for the disembarkation the enemy had vanished from the scene. . . . How long it would have taken the whole of McDowell's corps to disembark at this rate . . . the reader may judge; and yet for days it had been McClellan's pet project, in connection with his plan of campaign, to utilize McDowell in just this manner as a flanking column.

The simple truth is, there was never an hour during General McClellan's command of the army that he had not more troops than he knew what to do with; yet he was always instinctively calling for more. Mr. Stanton one day said of him, with natural hyperbole:

If he had a million men, he would swear the enemy had two millions, and then he would sit down in the mud and yell for three.

As usual with him, he entirely mistook the position, the strength, and the intentions of the enemy. He repeatedly telegraphed to Washington that he expected to fight an equal or greater force—in fact, "all the available force of the rebels" in the neighborhood of Yorktown. We have the concurrent testimony of all the Confederate authorities that no such plan was ever thought of. Magruder's intentions, as well as his orders from Richmond, were merely to delay McClellan's advance as long as practicable. His success in this purpose surpassed his most sanguine expectations. In the early days of April he was hourly expecting an attack at some point on his thinly defended line of 13 miles, guarded, as he says, by only 5000 men, exclusive of the 6000 who garrisoned Yorktown. "But to my utter surprise," he continues, "he permitted day after day to elapse without an assault." At last, no less to his astonishment than to his delight, Magruder discovered that McClellan was beginning a regular siege, which meant a gain of several weeks for the rebel defense of Richmond, and absolute safety for the concentration of rebel troops in the mean time.

It is now perfectly clear to all military critics not blinded by partisanship or personal partiality that McClellan could have carried the line of Magruder by assault at any time during the early days of April. From the mass of testimony to this effect before us we will take only two or three expressions, of the highest authority. General A. S. Webb says:

That the Warwick line could have been readily broken within a week after the army's arrival before it, we now know.

General Heintzelman says, in his evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

I think if I had been permitted, when I first landed on the Peninsula, to advance, I could have isolated the

troops in Yorktown, and the place would have fallen in a few days; but my orders were very stringent not to make any demonstration.

General Barnard, McClellan's Chief of Engineers, says in his final report of the campaign that the lines of Yorktown should have been assaulted:

There is reason to believe that they were not held by strong force when our army appeared before them, and we know that they were far from complete. . . . Our troops toiled a month in the trenches, or lay in the swamps of the Warwick. We lost few men by the siege, but disease took a fearful hold of the army, and toil and hardship, unrelieved by the excitement of combat, impaired the morale. We did not carry with us from Yorktown so good an army as we took there.

The testimony of the enemy is the same. Johnston, so soon as he came to examine it, regarded the position of Magruder as clearly untenable: saw that McClellan could not be defeated there; that the line was too long to be successfully defended; that the back-water was as much a protection to one side as the other; that there was a considerable unfortified space between Yorktown and the head of the stream, open to attack; and that the position could at any time be turned by way of York River. Every one seemed to see it except General McClellan. He went on sending dispatches every day to Washington for heavier guns and more men, digging a colossal system of earth-works for gradual approach upon one side of an entrenched camp of no strategic value whatever, the rear of which was entirely open; preparing with infinite labor and loss the capture of a place without a prisoner, the effect of which at the best would be merely to push an army back upon its reserves.

Even so late as the 16th of April, an opportunity to break Magruder's line was clearly presented to McClellan and rejected. He had ordered General W. F. Smith to reconnoiter a position known as Dam No. 1, between Lee's and Wynn's Mills, where there was a crossing covered by a one-gun battery of the enemy. For this purpose Smith pushed Brooks's Vermont brigade with Mott's battery somewhat close to the dam, carrying on a sharp fire. From this point he examined at his leisure, and in fact controlled, the position opposite, finding it feebly defended. A young officer of Brooks's staff, Lieutenant Noyes, crossed the river below the dam, where the water was only waist deep, and approached within fifty yards of the enemy's works. Returning after this daring feat, he repeated his observations to General Smith and to General McClellan, who had arrived on the ground and had ordered Smith to bring up his entire division to hold the advanced position occupied by Brooks's brigade. Smith, who per-

ceived the importance of Noyes's intelligence, obtained permission to send a party across the stream to see if the enemy's works had been sufficiently denuded to enable a column to effect a lodgment. Four companies of the 3d Vermont, numbering 200 men, under Captain Harrington, were ordered to cross the river, to ascertain "the true state of affairs." They dashed through the stream, and in a few moments gained the enemy's rifle-pits, where they maintained themselves with the utmost gallantry for half an hour. The enemy was thrown into great confusion by this bold and utterly unexpected movement. There were still several hours of daylight left, and another attempt was made to cross at the same point with a force no larger than Harrington's, assisted by a diversion of an equal force at the dam above. But the enemy being now thoroughly aroused and concentrated, the crossing was not made. It appears from General Smith's report that "no attempt to mass the troops of the division for an assault was made"; the only intention seemed to be "to secure the enemy's works if we found them abandoned!" He adds:

The moment I found resistance serious, and the numbers opposed great, I acted in obedience to the warning instructions of the General-in-Chief, and withdrew the small number of troops exposed from under fire.

"Thus," says General Webb, "a fair opportunity to break the Warwick line was missed."

The importance of this incident may be best appreciated by reading General Magruder's account of it. He calls it a serious attempt to break his line at the weakest part. If, instead of two hundred men, Smith had felt authorized to push over his entire division, the Peninsula campaign would have had a very different termination.

The little that was done greatly pleased General McClellan. He announced the movement of General Smith in a somewhat excited dispatch to the War Department, which Mr. Stanton answered with still more enthusiastic congratulation. "Good for the first lick!" he shouts; "Hurrah for Smith and the one-gun battery"—showing the intense eagerness of the Government to find motives for satisfaction and congratulation in McClellan's conduct. But there was no sequel to the movement; indeed, General McClellan's dispatches indicate considerable complacency that Smith was able to hold the position gained. General Webb says, "Reconnaissances were made, . . . but no assaulting columns were ever organized to take advantage of any opportunity offered."

No congratulations or encouragements from the Government now availed anything with

McClellan. Struggling with a command and a responsibility too heavy for him, he had fallen into a morbid state of mind in which prompt and energetic action was impossible. His double illusion of an overpowering force of the enemy in his front, and of a government at Washington that desired the destruction of his army, was always present with him, exerting its paralyzing influence on all his plans and actions. In his private letters he speaks of Washington as that "sink of iniquity"; of the people in authority as "those treacherous hounds"; of the predicament he is in, "the rebels on one side and the Abolitionists and other scoundrels on the other." "I feel," he says, "that the fate of a nation depends upon me, and I feel that I have not one single friend at the seat of government"—this at a moment when the Government was straining every nerve to support him.

The Confederates, as Mr. Lincoln had said, were daily strengthening their position by fortification and reënforcement. On the 17th of April, General Joseph E. Johnston took command of the army of the Peninsula. He says that his force after the arrival of Smith's and Longstreet's divisions amounted to about 53,000 men, including 3000 sick; he places the force of McClellan at 133,000, including Franklin's division of 13,000 floating idly on their transports.* He did nothing more than to observe the Union army closely, to complete the fortifications between Yorktown and the inundations of the Warwick, and to hold his own forces in readiness for a movement to the rear. He kept himself informed of the progress of McClellan's engineering work against Yorktown, as it was not his intention to remain long enough to spend an hour under fire. He did not expect to be hurried; he had long before that given his opinion that McClellan did not especially value time. Every day of delay was of course an advantage, but "an additional day or two gained by enduring a cannonade would have been dearly bought in blood," and he therefore determined to go before McClellan's powerful artillery should open upon him. Seeing, as we now can, what was occurring upon both sides of the Warwick River, there is something humiliating and not without a touch of the pathetic in the contrast between the clear vision of Johnston and the absolute blindness of McClellan, in relation to each other's attitude and purpose. While the former was simply watching for the flash of the first guns to take his departure,

glad of every day that the firing was postponed, but entirely indifferent to the enormous development of the siege-works going on in his sight, the latter was toiling with prodigious industry and ability over his vast earth-works and his formidable batteries, only pausing to send importunate dispatches to Washington for more guns and more soldiers, forbidding the advance of a picket beyond specified limits, carefully concealing every battery until all should be finished, not allowing a gun to be fired until the whole thunderous chorus should open at once, firmly convinced that when he was entirely ready he would fight and destroy the whole rebel army.

Nearly one hundred heavy Parrott guns, mortars, and howitzers were placed in battery against the town and camp of Yorktown and its outlying works, only fifteen hundred or two thousand yards away. Against the opinion of his ablest staff-officers, McClellan kept this immense armament silent for weeks while he was continually adding to it. Barnard, Chief of Engineers, says, "We should have opened our batteries on the place as fast as they were completed." Barry, Chief of Artillery, says:

The ease with which the 100 and 200 pounders of this battery [Battery No. 1] were worked, the extraordinary accuracy of their fire, and the since ascertained effects produced upon the enemy by it, force upon me the conviction that the fire of guns of similar caliber and power in the other batteries at much shorter ranges, combined with the cross-vertical fire of the thirteen and ten inch sea-coast mortars, would have compelled the enemy to surrender or abandon his works in less than twelve hours.

General McClellan's only reason for refusing to allow the batteries to open fire as they were successively finished was the fear that they would be silenced by the converging fire of the enemy as soon as they betrayed their position. That this was a gross error is shown by the Confederate reports. They were perfectly cognizant of the progress and disposition of his batteries; the very good reason why they did not annoy him in their construction was that the Union lines were, to use Johnston's words, "beyond the range of our old-fashioned ship guns." A few experimental shots were fired from the shore batteries on the 1st of May; the effect of them convinced the Confederate general of the enormous surplus strength of the Federal artillery. The shots from their first volley fell on the camp of his reserve, a mile and a half beyond the village.†

* His own force is correctly given. He only slightly exaggerates that of McClellan.

† On the 23d of April, McClellan wrote to the President: "Do not misunderstand the apparent inaction here—not a day, not an hour, has been lost. Works

have been constructed that may almost be called gigantic, roads built through swamps and difficult ravines, material brought up, batteries built. I have to-night in battery and ready for motion 5 100-pounder Parrott guns, 10 4½-inch ordnance guns, 18 20-pounder Par-

How long General McClellan would have continued this futile labor if he had been left alone, it is impossible to conjecture. If there was at first a limit in his own mind of the work to be done and the time to be given to it, it must have been continually moved forward until it passed out of sight. Up to the last moment he was still making demands which it would have taken weeks to fill. The completion of one work was simply an incentive to the beginning of another. Thus on the 28th of April,—a week after Franklin's arrival,—at a time when Johnston was already preparing to start for Richmond, he telegraphs to Washington as a pleasant bit of news that he "had commenced a new battery from right of first parallel," and adds: "Would be glad to have the 30-pounder Parrotts in the works around Washington at once. Am very short of that excellent gun." It is not difficult to imagine how such a dispatch at such a time smote upon the intense anxiety of the President. He answered in wonder and displeasure: "Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?" But the general, busy with his trenches and his epaulements, paid no regard to this searching question. Two days later, May 1, he continued his cheery report of new batteries and rifle-pits, and adds, "Enemy still in force and working hard"; and these stereotyped phrases last with no premonition of any immediate change until on the 4th he telegraphed, "Yorktown is in our possession," and later in the day began to magnify his victory, telling what spoils he had captured, and ending with the sounding phrases, "No time shall be lost. I shall push the enemy to the wall."

Johnston had begun his preparations to move on the 27th of April, and on the 3d of May, finding that McClellan's batteries were now ready to open,—a fact apparently not yet known to McClellan,—he gave orders for the evacuation, which began at midnight. He marched away from Yorktown with about 50,000 men. General McClellan, by his own morning report of the 30th of April, had in his camps and trenches, and scrambling in haste on board the transports that they had quitted the day before, the magnificent aggregate of 112,392 present for duty, and a total aggregate of 130,378.

rotts, 6 Napoleon guns, and 6 10-pounder Parrotts; this not counting the batteries in front of Smith and on his left — 45 guns. I will add to it to-morrow night 5 30-pounder Parrotts, 6 20-pounder Parrotts, from 5 to 10 13-inch mortars, and—if they arrive in time—one 200-pounder Parrott. Before sundown to-morrow I will

FROM WILLIAMSBURG TO FAIR OAKS.

THE evacuation of Yorktown took General McClellan so completely by surprise that a good deal of valuable time was lost in hurried preparation to pursue the retiring enemy. Franklin's division, after their fortnight of delay on the transports, had been disembarked. They were hastily returned to their boats. Says Webb:

Several hours were consumed in having the commands properly provisioned for the march. The evacuation was discovered at dawn, and it was noon before the first column started in pursuit. Johnston by this time had taken his entire command to Williamsburg. Knowing that McClellan's advance would soon reach him, he made his dispositions at his leisure. He posted a strong rear-guard there under Longstreet to protect the movement of his trains. The Union cavalry under Sherman came into collision with this force about dark and was repulsed, losing one gun. The main body of the pursuing army came up during the night, under the command of Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes. It is strongly illustrative of General McClellan's relations with his corps commanders, that neither of these generals had any orders from him as to the conduct of the battle which was inevitable as soon as they overtook the enemy, and there was even serious doubt as to which among them was in command of the forces. Sumner had been ordered by the General-in-Chief to take command in his absence, but these orders had not been communicated to Heintzelman, who thought that he was to take control of the movement.

There was some confusion of orders as to the roads to be taken by the different commands, in consequence of which Hooker came into position on the left of the line and Smith on the right. The contrary disposition had been intended.

The morning of the 5th came with no definite plan of battle arranged. General Hooker, following his own martial instincts, moved forward and attacked the enemy at half-past 7 and was soon hotly engaged. He fought almost the entire rear-guard of Johnston during the whole forenoon. Heavy reinforcements thrown against him checked his advance and caused him to lose the ground he had gained. Hooker speaks in his report with much bitterness, not wholly unjustified, of the manner in which his division was left to fight an overwhelming force, "unaided in the presence of more than 30,000 of their comrades with arms in their hands," and we search the reports of General McClellan and the corps commanders in vain for any adequate explanation of this state of things.

The whole day was bloody and expensive

essentially complete the redoubt necessary to strengthen the first parallel as far as Wormley's Creek on the left, and probably all the way to York River to-morrow night. *I will then be secure against sorties.*" [McClellan to Lincoln, April 23, MS.] With a force of three to one he was wasting weeks in defensive works.

and without adequate result. The heroism of Hooker and Hancock, and their brave troops, was well-nigh wasted. There was no head, no intelligent director, no understood plan. McClellan arrived late in the day and was unable to contribute anything to the result, although the cheers with which he was welcomed showed how fully he possessed the confidence and affection of his troops. He had not anticipated so early an engagement, and was spending the day at Yorktown to dispatch Franklin's division up the river.

Actual contact with the enemy, however, made, as it always did, an exaggerated impression upon him. The affair, which when he heard of it at Yorktown seemed to him a mere skirmish with a rear-guard, suddenly acquired a portentous importance when surveyed in the light of the bivouac at Williamsburg, amidst the actual and visible signs of a sanguinary conflict. His dispatch to the War Department, written at 10 o'clock the night of the battle, betrays great agitation, and his idiosyncrasy of multiplying the number of his enemy, as a matter of course, asserts itself. "I find General Joe Johnston in front of me in strong force, probably greater a good deal than my own." After a compliment to Hancock he continues, "I learn from the prisoners taken that the rebels intend to dispute every step to Richmond." One can only wonder what he expected them to say. "I shall run the risk of at least holding them in check here, while I resume the original plan. My entire force is undoubtedly inferior to that of the rebels, who will fight well."* Thus while Johnston was profiting by the darkness to prepare to continue his retrograde march at daybreak, McClellan was nerving himself to stand the risk of holding his ground at Williamsburg, while he "resumed the original plan" of a movement by water.

The next day, when he discovered that the enemy had moved away, leaving their wounded on the field of battle, his apprehension of attack subsided, but other difficulties rose before him. He telegraphed on the 7th to the Secretary of War that "until the roads improved both in front and rear no large body of troops could be moved." Johnston had apparently no difficulty in moving his troops, which McClellan thought a larger body than his own.

Reaching a place called Baltimore Cross-Roads, Johnston halted for five days, and, after receiving intelligence of the evacuation of

Norfolk and the destruction of the *Merrimac*, apprehending an attack upon Richmond by way of the James River, he ordered his forces to cross the Chickahominy on the 15th. Two days after this the rebel army encamped about three miles from Richmond, in front of the line of redoubts that had been constructed the previous year. It was a time of great apprehension, almost of dismay, at Richmond. The Confederate President, and most of his cabinet, hastily sent their families to places of safety. Mr. Davis, whose religious feelings always took on a peculiar intensity in critical times, had himself baptized at home, and privately confirmed at St. Paul's Church. There was great doubt whether the city could be successfully defended; the most important archives of the Government were sent, some to Lynchburg and some to Columbia.†

But General Johnston had reason to confirm his opinion that McClellan cared little for time. He remained several days at Williamsburg after he had ascertained that the enemy had disappeared from in front of him. His visions of overwhelming forces of rebels were now transferred to Franklin's front. On the 8th he telegraphed the War Department a story of 80,000 to 120,000 opposed to Franklin, but in full retreat to the Chickahominy. On the 10th he sends an urgent appeal to Washington for more troops, claiming that the enemy "are collecting troops from all quarters, especially well-disciplined troops from the South." His own army will inevitably be reduced by sickness, casualties, garrisons, and guards—as if that of the enemy would not. He therefore implores large and immediate reinforcements in a tone which implies that the President could make armies by executive decree. "If I am not reinforced," he says, "it is probable that I will be obliged to fight nearly double my numbers, strongly entrenched." In face of a morning report of over 100,000 men present for duty he says: "I do not think it will be at all possible for me to bring more than 70,000 men upon the field of battle." This last statement was in one sense true; he never did, and it is to be presumed he never could, handle that many men at once. All his battles were fought piecemeal with a part of his force at a time.

He still protested stoutly against the original organization of his army corps, and asked that he might be permitted to break it up or at least to suspend it. He disliked his corps

* On the 6th of May the veteran General Wool sent this dispatch to the War Department, showing how his elders regarded at the time these jeremiads of the young general: "The desponding tone of Major-General McClellan's dispatch of last evening more than surprises me. He says his entire force is undoubt-

edly considerably inferior to that of the rebels. If such is the fact, I am still more surprised that they should have abandoned Yorktown." [War Records.]

† J. B. Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," entries of May 8, May 10, and May 19.

commanders, and naturally wished his friends to exercise those important commands. He blamed the corps organization for all the trouble at Williamsburg, and said, if he had come on the field half an hour later, all would have been lost. The President was greatly wounded by this persistent manifestation of bad temper, but bore it after his fashion with untiring patience and kindness. He sent an official order, authorizing McClellan to suspend temporarily the corps organization in the Army of the Potomac, and to adopt any that he might see fit, until further orders. At the same time he wrote a private letter to the general, full of wise and kindly warning. He said:

I ordered the army corps organization not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals whom you had selected and assigned as generals of division, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from, and every modern military book, yourself alone excepted. Of course I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we cannot entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes. The commanders of these corps are of course the three highest officers with you, but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them; that you consult and communicate with nobody but General Fitz-John Porter and perhaps General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just, but at all events it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in anything? When you relieved General Hamilton of his command the other day, you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that senators and representatives speak of me in their places as they please without question, and that officers of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no great liberty with them. But to return. Are you strong enough — are you strong enough even with my help — to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes all at once? This is a practical and very serious question for you. The success of your army and the cause of the country are the same, and of course I only desire the good of the cause.

General McClellan accepted the authorization with alacrity and the sermon with indifference. He at once formed two provisional army corps, giving Fitz-John Porter the command of one and Franklin the other.

After leaving Williamsburg and joining his army at Cumberland, he reiterated his complaints and entreated for reinforcements that it was not in the power of the Government to send him. His morbid apprehension had grown to such an extent that on the 14th of May he telegraphed his conviction that he would be compelled, with 80,000 men, to fight 160,000 rebels in front of Richmond; and begged that the Government would send

him "by water" — he did not want them to come overland — "all the disposable troops," "every man" that could be mustered. The President, anxious to leave nothing undone to help and encourage him, replied to these important demands first by a friendly private note, in which he said:

I have done and shall do all I could and can to sustain you. I hoped that the opening of the James River and putting Wool and Burnside in communication, with an open road to Richmond, or to you, had effected something in that direction. I am still unwilling to take all our forces off the direct line between Richmond and here.

He afterwards sent a dispatch through the War Department, of which the essential points are as follows:

The President is not willing to uncover the Capital entirely, and it is believed that even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock by way of the Potomac and York rivers than by a land march. In order therefore to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered — keeping himself always in position to save the Capital from all possible attack — so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to cooperate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond, . . . but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington; and you will give no order, either before or after your junction, which can put him out of position to cover this city. . . . The President desires that General McDowell retain the command of the Department of the Rappahannock, and of the forces with which he moved forward.

Events as little foreseen by General McClellan as by the Government, and which had by him been declared impossible, — the defeat of our forces in the Shenandoah and the movement of a large rebel force to the upper Potomac, — prevented the execution of this plan. But it is worthy of notice that immediately on the receipt of the President's instructions, while he was waiting for McDowell to join him, General McClellan evinced no gratification at this compliance with his wishes. On the contrary, he lost no time in making a grievance of it; he wrote a long and elaborate dispatch protesting against it, and asking that "McDowell should be placed explicitly under his orders in the ordinary way." In his report, and in all his subsequent apologies for his campaign, he makes this positive assertion:

This order rendered it impossible for me to use the James River as a line of operations, and forced me to establish our depots on the Pamunkey and to approach Richmond from the north.

This charge is an evident after-thought, and is no less lacking in adroitness than in candor. We will permit it to be answered by General

Webb, the ablest military writer on the Peninsula campaign, who is always the friend of McClellan, and his partisan wherever the writer's intelligence and conscience allow it. He says:

It is but repeating the proper criticisms made by other writers that General McClellan had frequently mentioned the Pamunkey as his prospective base; that he made no representation to the Government, at the time, that he wished to be free to move by the James; and that it was within his power during the first three weeks of June, when he found that McDowell was again withheld from him, to follow the latter route. On one point there can be no question—that the position of his army, as already given, along the left bank of the Chickahominy from Bottom's towards New Bridge, on May 20, with the White House, on the Pamunkey, as the base of supplies, was one of McClellan's own choice, uninfluenced by McDowell's movements.

It required ten days after the fight at Williamsburg for McClellan's headquarters to reach Cumberland, on the south bank of the Pamunkey, and on the next day he established his permanent depot at the White House, near by. On the 21st the army was brought together and established in line on the Chickahominy, the right wing being about seven and the left about twelve miles from Richmond, from which they were separated by two formidable barriers—the rebel army, and the river with its environment of woods and swamps, its fever-breathing airs and its sudden floods. The latter was first attacked. General McClellan began at once with great energy the building of several bridges over the stream, a work of special difficulty on account of the boggy banks, which made long approaches necessary. In this work, and in a voluminous correspondence with the President in regard to reinforcements, which we shall notice when we come to treat of those movements of Jackson's in the valley that caused the division of McDowell's force, he passed ten days; he pushed the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman across the river, and retained those of Sumner, Franklin, and Porter on the north side.

The monotony of camp life was broken up on the 27th of May by a brilliant feat of arms performed by Fitz-John Porter and his corps at Hanover Court House, where he attacked and defeated a rebel force under General Branch. The chief value of this battle was its demonstration of the splendid marching and fighting qualities of the troops engaged. General McClellan was greatly annoyed that the President did not seem to attach sufficient importance to this action; but General Johnston in his "Narrative," while not diminishing the gallantry of Porter and his troops, or denying the complete defeat of Branch, treats it merely as an incident of Branch's march under orders to join Anderson, which was accomplished

the same day at the point designated for this junction. There was no sequel to the fight. Porter and his victorious troops marched back to camp.

On the 26th of May, General McClellan informed the President that he was "quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last struggle," and that he would be "free to strike" on the return of Porter. But several days elapsed without the blow being struck, until the enemy, as usual, accelerated matters by himself striking. It had been for some time the intention of General Johnston to attack the Union army before McDowell should join it; and learning, on the day of the battle of Hanover Court House, that McDowell was leaving Fredericksburg, he resolved at once to strike McClellan's force on both sides of the river. When we consider that the consolidated returns of the Army of the Potomac for the 31st of May showed an aggregate of 127,166 officers and men, of whom there were 98,000 present for duty, with 280 pieces of field artillery, and that General Johnston's force amounted to about 60,000 effectives, we cannot but think it was a fortunate circumstance for him that he did not attempt to carry this heroic plan into effect. At night, when he had called his general officers together for their instruction, Johnston was informed that McDowell's force, which had been marching southward, had returned to Fredericksburg. He then abandoned his idea of attacking McClellan on both sides of the river, and reverted to his former plan of assailing with his whole force the two corps on the south bank as soon as they had sufficiently increased the distance between themselves and the three corps on the north.

In this plan, as in the other one,—and we shall see, farther on, that the same was the case with General Lee,—General Johnston does not seem to have taken into the account the possible initiative of General McClellan. He makes his plans entirely without reference to it, choosing his time for attack absolutely at his own convenience. He takes it for granted that he will be met with a courageous and able defense—but nothing more. The worst he has to fear in any case is a repulse; there seems no thought of an offensive return in his mind. The Northern general, on the contrary, judged his adversary with more courtesy than justice. He evidently had no suspicion of Johnston's intentions. At the moment that the latter was calling his generals together to give orders for the assault, McClellan was telegraphing to Washington: "Richmond papers urge Johnston to attack, now that he has us away from gun-boats. I think he is too able for that."

Johnston's purpose was finally adopted and put in action with great decision and promptitude. On the 30th D. H. Hill informed him that the Federals were in force at Seven Pines, and that the indications were that all of Keyes's corps was south of the river; to which Johnston immediately responded by telling him he would attack the next morning. Within an hour or two his whole plan of battle was arranged. Orders were given to throw twenty-three of the twenty-seven brigades of which the Confederate army consisted against the two corps of Heintzelman and Keyes.* The rest were to observe the river by the Meadow and New bridges. After the plan of battle was arranged, a violent storm of rain came on and continued most of the night. This was a welcome incident to Johnston, as it inspired the hope that the river might overflow its banks and sever the communication between the two wings of the Federal army. He did not permit the rain to delay him.

The forces commanded by Longstreet and Hill attacked Casey's division of Keyes's corps with great impetuosity, and in overwhelming numbers, about 1 o'clock in the afternoon. Keyes's corps, supported by those of Heintzelman, defended their ground with gallantry and pertinacity; but the numbers opposed to them were too great, and they gradually and sullenly gave way, retiring inch by inch, until, as night came on, they had been forced more than a mile and a half east of the position that they had occupied in the morning.

The forces under G. W. Smith, accompanied by Johnston in person, whose duty it had been to strike the right flank of the Union army as soon as the assault of Longstreet and Hill became fully developed on the left, were delayed for some time on account of a peculiar condition of the atmosphere, which prevented the sound of the musketry from reaching from Seven Pines to the headquarters of Smith on the Nine-mile road. But about 4 o'clock, Johnston, having been informed of the progress of affairs in Longstreet's front, determined to put Smith in upon the Union right flank, being by this time relieved of all fear of a reinforcement from the other side of the river. Fortunately for the Union cause, the forces immediately opposite this position were commanded by General Sumner, an officer whose strongest traits were soldierly ardor and generosity. He had been ordered, as soon as the firing began, to hold himself in readiness to move to the assistance of his comrades at Fair Oaks; but he gave these orders a liberal interpretation, and instead of merely preparing to

move he at once marched with two divisions to the two bridges he had built and halted them, with his leading companies at the bridges. In this manner an hour of inestimable advantage was saved. The swollen river soon carried away one of the bridges, and the other was almost submerged when the order came to Sumner to cross.

Without delaying a moment on the west bank, Sumner marched through the thick mud in the direction of the heaviest firing and repulsed the attacks of Smith. This Union success was the result of Sumner's straightforward and unhesitating march. His appointment to the command of an army corps had been bitterly opposed and never forgiven by General McClellan; he had been treated by his commander with studied neglect and disrespect; and this magnificent service was his only revenge. About 7 o'clock the Confederates met their severest mischance of the day; General Johnston received at an interval of a few moments two severe and disabling wounds.

The firing ceased, "terminated by darkness only," Johnston is careful to say, before he had been borne a mile from the field. The command had devolved by seniority of rank upon General G. W. Smith.

There was great confusion and discouragement in the rebel councils. Jefferson Davis found hope in the suggestion that "the enemy might withdraw during the night, which would give the Confederates the moral effect of a victory." Early on June 1 the battle was renewed, and the Union troops reoccupied the ground lost on the day before. At 2 o'clock General Lee took command, and the battle died away by the gradual retirement of the Confederates.

A great battle had been fought absolutely without result. The Confederates had failed in their attempt to destroy McClellan's two outlying corps, but their failure entailed no other consequences. The losses were frightful upon both sides: the Union army lost 5000, and the Confederate loss was reported at something over 4000, which is generally considered an under-statement. But there was this enormous difference between the condition of the two armies: the Union troops south of the Chickahominy, though wearied by the conflict, with ranks thinned by death and wounds, had yet suffered no loss of *morale*; on the contrary, their spirits had been heightened by the stubborn fight of Saturday and the easy victory of Sunday. North of the river lay the larger portion of the army, which had not fired a gun nor lost a man in the action. It is hardly denied, at this day, by the most passionate of McClellan's partisans, that the way to Rich-

* In an article in *THE CENTURY* for May, 1885, General Johnston changes this statement to "twenty-two out of twenty-eight brigades."

mond was open before him on Saturday afternoon. It was his greatest opportunity.

Jackson was in the Valley of the Shenandoah detaching from Lee an army of 16,000 men. The enemy had thrown almost his whole force against McClellan's left wing, and had received more injury than he inflicted. Our right wing was intact; the material for bridging the upper Chickahominy had been ready for three days; the Confederate army was streaming back to Richmond in discouragement and disorder. Even so ardent a friend of McClellan as the Prince de Joinville writes :

The Federals had had the defensive battle they desired; had repulsed the enemy; but arrested by natural obstacles which perhaps were not insurmountable, they had gained nothing by their success. They had missed an unique opportunity of striking a blow.

If General McClellan had crossed his army, instead of one division, at the time that Johnston's entire force was engaged at Seven Pines,

* The repulse of the rebels at Fair Oaks should have been taken advantage of. It was one of those "occasions" which, if not seized, do not repeat themselves. We now know the state of disorganization and dismay in which the rebel army retreated. We now know that it could have been followed into Richmond. Had it been so, there would have been no resistance to overcome to bring over our right wing. [General Barnard]

Mr. William Henry Hurlbert, the translator of the Prince de Joinville's work, who was in Richmond during the battle, gives the following account of the condition of the Confederates on the morning of June 1 :

They were in a perfect chaos of brigades and regiments. The roads into Richmond were literally cov-

ered with stragglers, some throwing away their guns, some breaking them on the trees, all with the same story that their regiments had been "cut to pieces"—that the "Yankees were swarming on the Chickahominy like bees," and "fighting like devils." In two days of the succeeding week the provost-marshal's guard collected between 4000 and 5000 stragglers and sent them into camp. Had I been aware on that day of the actual state of things upon the field, I might easily have driven in a carriage through the Confederate lines directly into our own camps. It was not indeed until several days after the battle that anything like military order was restored throughout the Confederate positions. Appendix, p. 113.

"AS A BELL IN A CHIME."

AS a bell in a chime
 Sets its twin-note a-ringing,
 As one poet's rhyme
 Wakes another to singing,
 So, once she has smiled,
 All your thoughts are beguiled
 And flowers and song from your childhood are bringing.

 Though moving through sorrow
 As the star through the night,
 She needs not to borrow,
 She lavishes, light.
 The path of yon star
 Seemeth dark but afar :
 Like hers it is sure, and like hers it is bright.

 Each grace is a jewel
 Would ransom the town,
 Her speech has no cruel,
 Her praise is renown ;
 'T is in her as though Beauty,
 Resigning to Duty
 The scepter, had still kept the purple and crown.