

discouraging events, in the face of bad municipal administration and of erroneous views respecting national finance, and in spite of a superficial readiness to be offensive and threatening to other nations, the memory of battles fought and won gives strength to every patriot. Nobody is really despondent; not many think they are discouraged. Everybody knows that human nature is receptive of instruction, and that

it takes a great deal longer to educate seventy millions of people than it does to educate the few who are at leisure for study and reflection. Already we rest secure in freedom from caste and class, in the diffusion of knowledge, in the wide-spread enjoyment of physical comfort, and in abiding respect for law and order. On foundations like these the future development of democracy in this country most certainly depends.

## SPAIN AND HER AMERICAN COLONIES.

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THE year 1763 was one of mighty import to the North American continent. The treaty of Paris sealed what the gallantry of Wolfe had won, and at last the English-American colonies were free from the cloud of Indian incursion stirred up by France, which for so long had checked their growth. The continent, north and south, was now mainly shared by two countries instead of three—Great Britain and Spain. But how different the origin, how different the development, of their colonies had been!—those of Spain founded upon the romantic exploits of the Conquistadores, those of Britain seeking, in a simpler and humbler way, a new home, new industries, wider liberties. In one the priest followed the warrior, converted and enslaved the natives who escaped the sword, and put the infant settlements under the bondage of ecclesiasticism. In the other also there was sometimes ecclesiasticism, but it tried to grasp the consciences of the emigrants, not the bodies of the natives. There was monkery as against Puritanism; the thirst for gold as against the desire for civil and religious liberty; native labor under the foreign taskmaster as against English husbandmen painfully conquering a niggardly soil.

The Devon fishermen on the Newfoundland Banks were enriching and upbuilding an empire more surely than the Spanish adventurers with their slave-gangs, their mines of gold, and the kingdoms at their feet.

But while it yet lasted, what picture can compare with the Spanish conquest of a new

world in the restless sixteenth century? Valiant soldier, cruel inquisitor, helpless chief, and suffering native, in history as in romance, pass in ceaseless stream before our eyes, and now we see the end of it all. Even while we are watching, the last of Spain's mighty conquests are wrenched from her by a people undreamed of when she won them. A brilliant picture; a striking contrast. Is there meaning in it? Is it the result of great causes which we can trace, and in doing so say, That way lies disaster?

The colony which had sprung from this sixteenth-century seed was an ideal monopoly. It was administered, built up, defended, for the sake of the mother country. No foreign ships could trade with it, no foreign houses establish themselves in it. Manufacturing was discouraged, sometimes forbidden, as well as the purchase of supplies from or the sale of staples to a foreign market. This protected market for home manufactures, this exclusive trade, was the return which the mother country got for the protection and aid which she afforded. This was the "colonial system," an outgrowth of the mercantile system. It completely dominated both politics and commerce until the close of the last century. The "open door" is a modern idea; and it is not every nation, even now, that hangs the latch-string out. Besides its commercial value, the colonial system was advocated as building up a marine which, like a reservoir, could be drawn upon for ships and for seamen in naval war. This exclusiveness was a weakness as well as a

strength. For the stronger navy could cut its enemy off from communicating with her colonies. And if, to maintain intercourse, neutral ships were licensed to engage in the trade, the belligerent seized them too, as taking on a hostile character.

This theory of colonial monopoly was common to all states. It reflected the economic ideas of the time. And it certainly was better than the ancient plan of squeezing tribute in cash from a nation's dependencies.

There was another characteristic of the last-century colonies—their administration by viceroys or governors-general or deputy governors, sent out for the purpose, very often with neither knowledge nor capacity nor will to serve the interests of the colony. This official was not in fact sent to serve them, but rather to hamper them. For if they grew, it must be at the mother country's expense. This diversity instead of unity of interests meant friction and discontent.

Thus the evils of monopoly and of administration went hand in hand. We are sufficiently familiar with them in our own colonial history. But we may not realize that in Spain's possessions they were far greater. "No European nation carried its colonial monopoly so far as Spain, or enforced it with so much rigour," writes Lewis, in his "Essay on the Government of Dependencies." Her colonies were not permitted to trade with one another. At times their cultivation of staple products like the vine and the olive was forbidden, because the mother also grew them, and wanted the colonial market. The Council of the Indies, after 1542, was the highest judicial authority in colonial affairs. Its powers related to finance, police, church, the army, and trade as well. Under this council were the viceroys, keeping up great state, once very powerful, but with dwindling prerogatives as time went on. The *audiencias* were a court of second instance. In but few instances had a viceroy been colonial-born. The child born of pure Spanish stock, but in the colony, was not eligible to office, nor socially the equal of the Spanish-born. The colonies had not been founded upon agriculture, but upon mining. Moreover, the climate made field work hardly practicable for the whites, so that there was no such class as the early stock which cleared the land and tilled the soil in the English colonies north of the Potomac. Instead there was a great preponderance of natives, with a considerable mixed race and African importations. This complicated the questions of local self-government, and made the men of European

blood to claim it relatively few. The church held an excessive share of the soil, and exerted a baleful influence upon the colony life. The growing decadence of Spain was reflected in her colonies, although in the last quarter of the last century they were freed from some of their restrictions and saw better times. On the whole, however, the drawbacks of climate, misgovernment, clericalism, and class feeling, added to a radically false system, produced a result far less hopeful than that worked out in the northern colonies of Dutch and English blood.

We come now to the present century.

The lesson of the American Revolution, though not wasted upon the British government, was not thoroughly learned for more than fifty years. It required an insurrectionary movement in Canada, in 1837, to bring the British people to its senses. The movement was abortive, but its investigation led to reforms which have altered the whole scheme of English colonial government. Little is left to be desired now, because the colonies can have what they want.

The great self-governing colonies of the Empire, like Canada and New Zealand, subject to a rarely exercised veto power in the hands of the crown, make their own laws, lay their own duties and taxes, decide upon their own policy, under party government. The mother country stands ready to defend them—sacrifices herself for their interests. They, rather than she, benefit by the connection. And the smaller crown colonies scattered over the face of the waters, though in closer dependence in the matters of legislation and of duties, find that their interests are the ones to be considered and preferred. Both classes of colonies may trade with all the world. And the results have been, in the main, prosperity, contentment, loyalty, and readiness for a closer tie to England, if the destinies of the Empire demand. English colonial greatness is really a product of this century. It is based upon a reformed colonial administration, and freedom of commerce and of government. It was part of the Reform movement.

Contrast with this development that of the colonies of Spain. The colonial system gradually passed away, but its spirit remains. A discriminating duty in favor of the home product, as in the case of flour in Cuba, compels purchase in the dearer, not the natural, market. An arbitrary governor, with his swarm of Spanish officials, emphasizes the absence of the privilege of self-government. To be a native of the soil is a mark of in-

feriority. Corrupt office-holders, it is said, misuse the resources of the place. Religious houses, as in the Philippines, like locusts, eat up the land. Thus it is to-day. Thus it was in the early years of the century, when Napoleon's attack, invited by Spain's weakness, gave the Central and South American colonies their opportunity.

It was not the revolt of a united people, urged on by a sense of oppression, and resolved at all hazards to be free, which the decade 1810-20 witnessed. It was rather the working out of European hostilities, of political intrigues, of personal ambitions, of the revolutionary and liberalized spirit of the time, in a scattering volley of insurrections, illumined here and there by patriotism and self-sacrifice, and all eventually gravitating to the republican form.

In this movement the Colombian states occupy the first place, because of their closer connection with the Antilles and with Europe, and their greater commercial importance.

Venezuela, in 1810, renounced the Spanish authority, elected a junta, and entered into relations with other juntas which in 1811 published a declaration of independence. Twelve years of struggle were needed to make this declaration good. Four times the control of the provinces changed hands, and the figure of Bolivar appears as liberator and dictator, as patriotic soldier and tyrannical statesman.

Buenos Ayres, at the other extreme of progress, was twice occupied by English forces, 1806-07, but they were too few to hold what they had won. Nor did the agents of France fare better. After the abdication of their legitimate king, the colonists lost no time in asserting their independence, little resistance being offered. This was in 1810. Their excess of energy led them in arms into Peru and Uruguay, while their privateers carried their flag into the waters of the Pacific.

In the cellar of a stately house in New Haven, built by one of these privateersmen, there is a tablet let into the wall, and thus inscribed:

To the owner of this house ——— a native citizen of Huntingdon this State and at present Consul General of the United Provinces of South America of which Buenos-Ayres is the capital where he resided for many years and assisted in establishing its Independence, greeting. I have caused this beautiful building to be erected for your use as well as mine, and have taken much pains to accommodate you for which you will never pay; and being no relative of mine, I demand

that you assemble your friends together on every 25th day of May in honor of the Independence of South America it being on that day in the year 1810 that the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres established a free Government. New Haven 1820.

But the scattered and half-civilized plainsmen were but ill prepared for an independent political life, and their future hardly answered the expectations of the altruistic privateersman. Shrinking from the anarchy which confronted them, in 1814 they hawked their sovereignty about, to find that neither England nor any other European state, even Spain itself, would accept it. In 1816 a constitution after the United States pattern was adopted. It lasted four years only, then gave way to twenty years of civil war, despotism, and chaos, with the sinister figure of Rosas the dictator at the end of the period.

Chile had thrown off the yoke of Spanish authority in 1810, under the pretext of fidelity to its dethroned king. It could not, however, maintain its independent existence alone; and in 1814 Spain regained control, to lose it, three years later, at the hands of San Martin of the Argentine. Its climate and soil, the character of its people, its wealth and success in war, have raised Chile in our day to the first place among the South American republics.

Peru was the last stronghold of Spain on the American continent. The struggle for independence came late, and was won in 1832 only through the aid of Chile and Colombia. Bolivar was dictator until 1825, and the next year the republic of Bolivia was carved out of its northern provinces.

Mexico, between independence and the republican goal, tried a monarchical experiment. After ten years of incoherent internal warfare between royalists and revolutionaries, Iturbide set up an independent constitutional monarchy in 1821, which was recognized by the Spanish viceroy, but not by Spain itself. He could not maintain himself, resigned in 1823, returned to Mexico for another venture in 1824, and was shot. In 1824 a federal republic was set up, under a republican constitution.

And, lastly, the several intendancies which made up the captain-generalcy of Guatemala — that is, Central America — declared themselves independent. Neglected by Spain, after Mexico on the north and New Granada on the south had become free, they followed their neighbors' example. They met with no resistance. For once independence was won without the shedding of blood.

These are the bald facts of the loss of her

principal colonies by Spain. The reasons for her weak resistance are found in her domestic troubles, arising from the French intervention. The disaffection of the colonies and their grievances seem to have been recognized; and, to assure their fidelity, the junta constituted them an integral part of the nation, with representation in the Cortes, nine delegates from America and one from the Philippines, about a fifth of the whole body.

This was a gleam of better government in the midst of the darkness. But the colonies were not satisfied. Revolution was in the air, their legitimate king dethroned, the abuses of administration fresh in mind, and they saw so much more within their grasp. Moreover, this betterment was soon lost to them. For in 1814, after Ferdinand's restoration, that despotic and contemptible intriguer abolished the Cortes, reestablished the Inquisition, and overthrew the liberal constitution of 1812. The revolutionary movement, eight years later, forced the king to restore this constitution; but he was enabled to set up despotic government again by the intervention of France, carrying out the mandate of the Congress of Verona. The success of this step emboldened the Holy Alliance to undertake an extension of its system to this continent, to restore its revolted colonies to Spain. Canning's protest took the form of recognition of the independence of these colonies, which the United States had done the year before, while President Monroe warned the members of the Alliance that if they sought to extend their practice of intervention in favor of absolutism to this hemisphere, they would have this country to deal with. The mere threat was enough.

In this even balance between the forces of liberalism and of despotism in Spain the unlikelihood of colonial reform is evident. The beginnings of constitutional liberty under the regency were crushed out at the Restoration, and the king had the mass of his people to back him. When the government grew intolerable again, and the enlightened element revolted, the outside forces of absolutism combined against it. The colonies would have suffered the same fate but for the counter-influence of the English-speaking peoples. Napoleon's attack upon Spain gave her colonies their opportunity, but their independence dates from the later period of reaction—an independence for which, indeed, they were but scantily equipped by previous training in local self-government.

It was not oppression alone that drove these colonies to revolt from their king. It was not his abdication alone which released them. An opportunity which they had not made, a government which they could not endure, commercial and social inequalities, the impossibility of reform, the more liberal spirit abroad in the civilized world—all these combined to push them over the brink of revolution. But their eventual success was not gained unaided.

It has already been said that England learned the lesson of the American Revolution, while Spain has never heeded it nor the loss of her own colonies. Yet it really was not until fifty years ago that their methods sharply diverged. As early as 1778 Spain had begun to open her dependencies to foreign trade, and early in this century they were allowed to trade with one another. So, likewise, although great changes had been earlier made in the English colonies, the spirit of monopoly and of a restrictive policy was in force until about 1815. So far as relates to the evils of the colonial system, then, the two were not very unlike. But into the field of administrative reform and the grant of autonomous powers to her colonies, Spain never has entered. The abuses of the early part of the century characterize also its later years. Discrimination against the native-born, even of the purest Spanish stock; officials who regard the colony as a mine to be worked, not a trust to be administered; forced dependence upon the mother country for manufactures, even for produce, so far as duties can effect it; self-government stifled; representation in the Cortes denied or a nullity; a civil service unprogressive, ignorant, sometimes corrupt—compare these handicaps with the growth, the prosperity, the independence, above all, the decent and orderly administration, of the colonies of England. One of the wonderful things in this half-century is that army of British youth, with but little special training or genius, or even, perhaps, conscious sympathy for the work, learning to administer the great and growing Indian and colonial empire honestly and wisely and well, with courage and judgment equal to emergencies, animated by an every-day working sense of duty and honor, but not very often making any fuss or phrases about it. It is not that Spanish colonial government is worse than formerly, which is costing it now so dear, but that it is no better, while the world's standard has advanced and condemns it. Never yet has Spain looked at her colonies with

their own welfare uppermost in her mind. She has never outgrown the old mistaken theories. Her fault is medievalism, alias ignorance.

It is not a cause for wonder, therefore, quite apart from special sources of discontent, that Cuba, which, by position is thrown into contact with progressive peoples, should chafe at her leading-strings. Without reference to the corruption and cruelty, arrogance, injustice, and repression which are alleged against the mother country, without rhetoric and without animosity, we may fairly say that Spain is losing Cuba, perhaps all her colonies, simply because she has not conformed to the standard of the time in the matter of colonial government. If England had not altered her own methods, her colonies would long since have abandoned her as opportunity offered. The wonder really is that Spain has held hers so long; for Cuba, at least, owing to its exceptional fertility and posi-

tion, has relatively outstripped its declining mother.

There remains the moral of the story.

If we are not mistaken as to the fundamental causes of Spain's colonial weakness, other colonial powers must take warning also, and the United States in particular, if it yields to the temptations, or, as many say, assumes the divinely ordered responsibilities, of the situation. For its protective system is a derivative of the mercantile system, as the colonial system was. If it becomes a colonial power, but attempts by heavy duties to limit the foreign trade of its colonies, if it administers those colonies through officials of the spoils type, if it fails to enlarge the local liberties and privileges of its dependencies up to the limit of their receptive powers,—if, in short, it holds colonies for its own aggrandizement instead of their well-being,—it will be but repeating the blunders of Spain, and the end will be disaster.

## ORCHARDS BY THE SEA.

BY MEREDITH NICHOLSON.

ALONG the northern coast they stand,  
 These groups of rugged apple-trees,  
 Grim outposts of the fruitful land,  
 Defying winds and seas.

The waves that beat the rocks below  
 For long have shaken branch and root,  
 Yet the gnarled boughs again will show  
 Their meager yield of fruit.

And inland apples, softly kissed  
 On quiet boughs by dew and rain,  
 Unflavored by the salt-sea mist,  
 Untaught by the sea's pain,

But tamely live, and never share  
 Those secrets of the elder seas  
 Once held inviolate by the fair  
 Fruits of Hesperides.