

CRETE, THE ISLAND OF DISCORD.

THE famous island of Minos and Epimenides, where Zeus himself was born on Mount Ida, was nurtured, and even, according to the legend, was buried,—the «pearl of the Mediterranean,» whose «hundred cities» sent their contingents to the Grecian camp before the walls of Troy,—has once more attracted the attention of all who can sympathize with a gallant struggle for liberty.

The peculiarly favorable position of the island, situated at the junction of three continents, as it were, and commanding the coasts of all three, has invested it from the earliest times with an importance such as neither Sicily, Sardinia, nor Cyprus, although much larger in area, ever attained. While forming in prehistoric times a stepping-stone for Egyptian and Asiatic civilization in its progress toward the shores of Greece, Crete remained throughout antiquity singularly free from any close political connection with Egypt, Asia, or Greece. This insularity is to this day one of the marked characteristics of the Cretan people; and without accepting the view that they are the purest descendants extant of the Hellenes of the eighth century B. C., we must regard them nevertheless as one of the most interesting branches of the Greek race. Unfortunately, the gravest defects of the ancient Greek character were nowhere so pronounced as in Crete; and we are told that its history throughout antiquity was one continuous chain of civil strife, carried on with a savageness and bitterness of animosity exceeding all that was known in the rest of Greece. This political depravity was attended by such a degeneracy of morals as to render the name of «Cretan» a synonym for nearly every vice.

Finally the internal feuds of the Cretan cities became so violent that they all decided to invite Philip V of Macedonia to assume a protectorate over Crete. But Philip was soon entangled in his mighty struggle with Rome, and the Cretans were again left to their own devices. We next hear of them as formidable brigands and pirates, in the latter aspect second only to the Cilicians, and allied with the great Mithridates against Rome. Crete was the last section of Greece to bow to the Roman supremacy, just as, seventeen centuries later, it was the last Greek province to succumb to the Moslem conqueror.

It was not till 823 A. D. that the island fell into the hands of the infidels. A band of Andalusian Saracens, discontented with the climate or the government of Spain, appeared in the Levant, and after infesting Lower Egypt for eight whole years, sailed across to Crete with forty galleys, and after a short struggle became complete masters of the island. These Saracens of Crete, now called Candia, became as licentious corsairs as ever the natives had been in the past; and repeated expeditions sent by the emperors of Constantinople failed to dislodge them until the tenth century. Had Crete remained under Arab rule until the beginning of the thirteenth century, it is doubtful whether there would have been anything left of the Hellenic element in the island. By the reestablishment of Greek supremacy, the Greek population was once more strengthened and revived throughout a period of two hundred and fifty years, to a degree that carried it safely over six centuries of Venetian and Turkish rule, until the general uprising of the Hellenic race in 1821.

The Venetian supremacy in the island was maintained only by means of immense sacrifices and gigantic efforts. The revolts of 1212, 1213, 1217, 1219, 1228–34, 1251, 1271–77, 1283–99, 1319, 1333, 1341, and 1365, aided at first by the envious Genoese, later by the rehabilitated emperors of Constantinople, were in each case repressed with unsparing severity, Venice justly regarding Crete as the key to her dominion in the Levant and the bulwark of her trade with the far East.

It was in 1645 that the twenty-four years' struggle in Crete began between Turk and Venetian, which ended in the triumph of the crescent. The Cretans themselves, worn out with the cruelties of their Christian masters, looked with indifference at the approaching collision, feeling that even the Turkish yoke could not be worse than the Venetian. Nevertheless, at the last moment a large number of Cretan chieftains threw in their lot with the latter, and took an active and heroic part in the defense of the three large towns. Canea fell into the hands of the Turks in 1645, Retimo in the following year, and in 1648 Candia was completely invested by land, the defense lasting for nearly twenty-one years under the famous Francesco Morosini. The artillery of the defenders was handled

by the most experienced engineers of Venice and of France, while the Cretan archers, as redoubtable as in ancient times, poured their deadly showers upon the assailants. But skill and valor were at length forced to yield before the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Moslems, and on September 18, 1669, the capitulation was signed. The Venetians are said to have lost during the entire siege 30,000 killed and wounded, the Turks 120,000; the Turks made 56 assaults, and the Venetians 86 sorties; the Turks exploded 462 mines, the Venetians 1163. Three fortified places—Spinalonga, near the northeastern end of the island; Grabusa, perched on a precipitous cliff at the northwestern end; and the small islet at the entrance to Suda Bay—were occupied by Venetian garrisons for many years. But these, too, were evacuated in the course of time, Spinalonga being the last, in 1717.

Crete was the last of the Turkish conquests in Europe; yet the island, which was imperfectly conquered at the beginning, has since been retained in subjection only by an enormous expenditure of blood and treasure. Until 1869 the Turkish troops never succeeded in penetrating into the elevated regions of the interior, and the fierce mountaineers of Sphakia and Apokorona, secure in their rocky strongholds, have ever been ready to fly to arms on the slightest provocation. Through motives of fear or of self-interest, about one third of the Greek population embraced the creed of the Turkish conquerors, and, as usually happens in such cases, became worse Turks than the Turks themselves.

The ill-starred Greek rising of 1770—a premature movement instigated by Russia—was joined in by the Sphakiot Cretans, but no general uprising took place in the island. It was therefore natural that in the great war for Greek independence (1821-9) Crete took an active part. Matters were precipitated by the massacre of several thousand Christians by the Mussulmans, in the three principal towns, in June, 1821. The Cretans flew to arms, led by the indomitable Sphakiots, and in a few months had cleared the country-side of Mussulmans, established a local government, and elected deputies to the National Assembly of Greece. But internal dissensions, and the arrival of a powerful Egyptian army and fleet to reinforce the demoralized janizaries, destroyed the advantages thus gained, and led to a speedy failure of the movement. Thousands of Cretans went over to the Greek mainland to fight more effectively for the national cause. These Cretan volunteers, with



THE LABYRINTH OF GORTYNA: ENTRANCE AND GROUND PLAN.

There are to this day several intricate subterranean excavations in various parts of Crete, which approach one's conception of the mythical labyrinth of the Minotaur, Theseus, and Ariadne. One of these is that at Gortyna, probably a quarry, whose tortuous windings are depicted above. Here, in every Cretan revolution, hundreds of women and children found a safe refuge for months together. A similar labyrinth is that at Cnossus; a third, the Cave of Mehdoni, where several hundred Cretan fugitives took refuge in 1822, and were suffocated by the smoke of the fire which the Turks kindled at the entrance.

the warlike Maniotes and the fierce Roumeliotes, formed the flower of the patriot armies of the eight years' struggle; and a strong body of Cretans was utterly cut to pieces rather than give way in the bloody battle of Phaleron, May 6, 1827. After the battle of Navarino, however, Crete made a fresh effort for liberty under Kallergis. Once more the Moslems were driven back into the three walled towns, and were on the point of abandoning the island when Europe decided to hand it over to Mehemet Ali, viceroy of Egypt, who promptly invested it with a large army. The Egyptian régime was at first a relief to the suffering Cretans, for order was restored, political organization was introduced, and the privileged position of the Mussulman minority was abolished. But Mehemet's barbaric instincts for oppression and extortion soon got the better of his dread of Christian Europe, and the result was the revolts of 1833 and 1840, which he suppressed with an iron hand; yet he was forced to restore the island to his suzerain the Sultan. Another insurrection followed in 1858, which was ended only by the promise

of reforms—this marking the beginning of that outrageous Turkish game of reform-promising which has caused untold misery in Crete, as in Armenia, and will continue to do so as long as Turkish duplicity is tolerated by six great Christian powers.

The promises made in 1858 were never fulfilled. This brought on the insurrection of 1866-9, which cost the tyrants \$27,000,000, and was perhaps the bloodiest Cretan revolt in this century. One of the most noteworthy, though not strategically important, events of this struggle was the tragic catastrophe at the monastery of Arkadi, where about 200 insurgents, with 800 women and children, were besieged by a Turkish army of 23,000 men; and after the walls had been battered down by the Turkish artillery, and the place carried by assault, the besieged blew up themselves and their victors by igniting their powder-magazine. Of the Christians only 100 remained alive, while the Turks lost over 2000 men. They lost another 10,000 on two expeditions into the interior against Theriso and Sphakia; and Omar Pasha, who succeeded Mustapha as generalissimo, lost another 25,000 men in a couple of months' campaigning in the Sphakia district. The elastic system of warfare adopted by the Cretans—namely, drawing the Turks into mountain passes and then smiting them hip and thigh—worked so admirably that at the close of 1867 the Turks were practically confined to the three walled towns. By sea a squadron of thirty Turkish war-ships maintained a blockade, which three fast Greek steamers found no difficulty whatever in running, making regular weekly trips back and forth between Greece and the island, and landing arms, supplies, and volunteers within sight of the Turkish ships.

Finally, however, Hobart Pasha, an Englishman in the Turkish service, tightened the blockade so effectually that little support from outside could reach the insurgents. The latter became exhausted; and through the intrigues of Russia, who wished to avert any success of the Hellenic element in the East, and, singularly enough, then, as in 1896, found an easy dupe in the Greek government itself, the insurrection bubbled slowly away. The Grand Vizier himself came over to Crete, and the Cretans were persuaded to barter away the strong prospect of union with Greece for a measure of local self-government, known as the Organic Statute of 1869, which has proved a veritable Nessus gift to the unfortunate Cretans.

The year 1878 witnessed another insurrec-

tion, in which the usual barbarities were committed on both sides. Eventually the Cretan chiefs applied for the mediation of England; and under the auspices of the consul, the convention known as the Pact of Halépa was drawn up in the suburb of Canea which bears that name, and was sanctioned by the Porte. It was based upon the Organic Statute of 1869, which had meanwhile been confirmed by Article 23 of the treaty of Berlin. Among its more important provisions was the requirement that the governor-general of the island should henceforth be a Christian, appointed by the Porte for a term of five years.

The privileges obtained by the Halépa Pact relieved the Cretans from a large part of that grinding tyranny that is exercised by the «unspeakable» Turk in all other parts of his dominions, except Samos, but only to introduce the evils of a parliamentary régime among a people utterly unprepared for it. Political parties now sprang up in the Cretan Assembly,—«Liberals» and «Conservatives,» so called,—for no other visible reason than that there *must* be two opposing factions, each struggling for the upper hand in the administration. Political life thus became a scramble for the sweets of office, and the party which was beaten in the Assembly habitually conspired against the governor-general with his enemies at Constantinople, and in many cases with the Mohammedan military governor, who invariably aspired to supersede his Christian chief.

In this warfare of factions the Mussulman Cretans took part almost as eagerly as their Christian kinsmen, not, however, as a distinct party, but divided pretty equally between the two camps mentioned above. In fact, this political grouping might have had a most salutary effect in tending to obliterate the old religious hatred, had the Cretans as a race possessed the self-restraint essential to the working of parliamentary institutions. As it was, party strife absorbed the attention of the Cretans, to the exclusion of all thought on the material improvement of the island or the development of its abundant resources.

The next crisis occurred in 1889, under Sartinski Pasha, a governor of Polish extraction. The Conservatives, who had long been in power, having lost their majority, the governor conceived it to be his duty, according to constitutional principles, to bestow a number of appointments on the Liberals. The Conservatives replied by taking up arms and withdrawing to the mountains. Many of the native Mussulman beys, or landed aristocrats, clung to the Conservative party even

after this departure from Canea; but once the insurrection was lighted, the old half-dormant religious fanaticism became inflamed on both sides. In the space of a few months 8896 dwelling-houses, 152 schools, 57 mosques, and 14 churches were burned, and much valuable property was destroyed.

What the Christians had won in the way of political privileges through the two preceding insurrections the movement of 1889 destroyed for the greater part. The Porte acted for once with promptitude, and, as ever, with true Turkish duplicity. Aware that the Cretans invariably take the watchword from Athens, the Ottoman government besought M. Tricoupis, who was then at the head of Greek affairs, to persuade the insurgents not to resist the occupation of the important strategical posts in the island by the Turkish troops. Tricoupis, strangely unsuspecting of Asiatic perfidy, complied with the request without exacting any guaranty for the Porte's good faith; and the latter, once master of the situation, repaid him with the imperial firman of November, 1889, whereby the Pact of Halépa was well-nigh completely abrogated. Martial law was proclaimed throughout the island; Shakir Pasha, a Mussulman and a soldier, was appointed both civil and military governor; the number of deputies in the Assembly was reduced in a way which strengthened the Mussulman wing out of all proportion to the population; elections were henceforth to be on the indirect (elector) system; and the whole of the island's customs revenue, which since 1887 had been divided equally between the imperial and the Cretan treasuries, was now appropriated by the Porte. The protests of Greece and of the Cretans against this reactionary arrangement were unavailing. Turkish troops and Albanian gendarmes, quartered in every village, held the island in utter subjection; and for the next five years Crete was ruled autocratically, and without any assembly, by a succession of Mohammedan governors. Elections under the new system were, indeed, ordered; but the Christians refused to go to the polls, and it was not till 1895 that this attitude of uncompromising protest was relaxed, when the powers persuaded the Porte to nominate a Christian governor in the person of Alexander Karatheodory, hitherto Prince of Samos. An assembly was finally elected and brought together, and both Christians and Mussulmans showed a laudable desire to coöperate in concerting measures for the public good. But their efforts were defeated by the senseless high-handed-

ness of the Porte, which rescinded several proposals, well suited to the requirements of the situation, that had been passed unanimately by the Cretan Assembly and ratified by the governor-general. The financial difficulty was the worst feature of the situation. Owing to the arbitrary appropriation by the Porte of the customs and other revenues, the salaries of public officials were long overdue, and the gendarmerie were on the verge of mutiny because of twelve months' arrears of pay. One may readily imagine what the state of public security was when such was the attitude of the police force in a land where murders of the vendetta type are frequent even in seasons of the most profound peace; and if one may believe an estimate derived from a non-Cretan source, some six hundred murders took place all over the island between September, 1895, and May, 1896. But the Porte shut its eyes obstinately to all the dangers of the situation, and Karatheodory's repeated remonstrances were not listened to.

It was about this time that the «Reform Committee» of Apokorona made its appearance—a band of disappointed office-seekers who had nothing to lose and much to gain by unfurling the standard of rebellion. Their demands centered in the restoration of the Halépa charter, but their efforts were not treated at first very seriously by the majority of the Christian population. But the infatuated conduct of the Porte in provoking collisions between the armed followers of the committee and the imperial troops—collisions which resulted repeatedly in the repulse of the latter—soon enhanced the committee's prestige, and ultimately inaugurated the revolution of 1896. The alarming increase of murders of Christians by Mussulmans, and *vice versa*, during the first months of 1896, and the immigration of the Mussulman rural population into the fortified towns, foreshadowed the coming storm. In March, Karatheodory, who had certainly done his best to remedy the situation, was recalled at his own request, and Turkhan Pasha, who had been governor of Crete at a previous period, was nominated as his successor. This appointment dissatisfied both Christians and Mussulmans; but it was felt, by the Christians at least, that the fault lay less with the person of the governor than in the short-sighted policy of the Porte, and this feeling was fully borne out by the events which followed. Although it was evident even to superficial observers that Crete was on the eve of revolution, and that the nucleus of armed

revolt gathered about the Reform Committee was growing rapidly, the Porte suddenly issued a decree postponing the opening of the Cretan Assembly, which had been fixed for April 29. This abrogation of the last remnant of the old privileges, of the only means by which a peaceful solution of the Cretan difficulty could have been worked out, served at once to drive even the moderate Cretans into the arms of the revolutionists. New importance was thus lent to the Reform Committee in its self-assumed character as the representative of the Christian population; and when, furthermore, a military force sent against the committee's camp was worsted at Selia, the committee assumed the offensive. The Turkish garrison of 1200 men at Vamos, the capital of the mountainous Apokorona district, was shut up in the fort there, and besieged for seventeen days, by a force of nearly 5000 Cretans, and would have been starved out had not Turkhan's successor, Abdallah Pasha, succeeded on May 29 in relieving them in the nick of time.

Meanwhile, on May 24, 25, and 26 serious bloodshed had taken place at Canea, where the Mussulmans attempted a general massacre of the Christians, and were thwarted in this undertaking only by the prompt arrival of British, French, and Russian war-ships. The revolution had begun, and the hurried revocation of the decree postponing the Assembly, which was telegraphed from Constantinople, was now insufficient to arrest it.

It is unnecessary to recount here the devastation of the whole coast district west of Canea by Abdallah's troops and the native Mussulman ruffians; the destruction of some fifty villages under the eyes of the European war-ships anchored outside Canea harbor; Abdallah's disastrous campaign into the Apokorona district; the Mussulman atrocities at Candia and vicinity; the formation of a provisional revolutionary government, and finally the intervention of the six signatory powers of the Berlin treaty, compelling the Sultan to restore to the Cretans their suppressed privileges, with several important improvements. As in previous insurrections, the Cretans received almost all their aid from free Greece; and in spite of the ostentatious cruising of three weazy Turkish torpedo steamers between Crete and the nearest Greek islands, and the bustling show of neutrality on the part of the Greek government, arms, ammunition, and volunteers continued all summer to arrive in Crete, landing sometimes within twenty miles of Canea.

Even a body of ten young Greek officers, tired of clanking their useless sabers about the marble pavements of Athens, took «French leave,» and sailed away one fine night to Crete to help the insurgents. Public feeling in Greece ran so high that the government dared not place any real obstacle in the way of the support lent to the insurgents, although many measures were ostentatiously taken, to save appearances.

In the recent stormy debates in the Greek chamber on the government's policy in this last Cretan insurrection, the government was severely criticized by the speakers of the opposition for not having seized the opportunity, offered by the massacres of May 24, to send the Greek fleet, with a few regiments on board, to Crete, and drive out the few thousand Turkish troops before foreign powers could intervene or Turkish reinforcements arrive. No doubt a golden opportunity was thereby lost; for of the 8000 Turkish soldiers then in the island, over 1200 were shut up in Vamos, and the remainder concentrated at Canea. No further Turkish forces could have landed on the island without Greece's consent; for the old Turkish navy of 1868 has long since disappeared, and Greece can easily command the Ægean Sea with her small but efficient fleet. The Porte would not have ventured to declare war upon Greece, with Armenia, Macedonia, and the Lebanon on the verge of open rebellion; for the whole Eastern Question would have been reopened, calling for a readjustment, in which the Porte would have been the only loser. The powers were anything but agreed on Eastern matters, and in such disagreement lies a mine of strength for the smaller Eastern states. In a word, everything was propitious for the intervention of Greece in Crete. But it requires a hand of iron and a heart of oak to strike the blow at such a critical moment, and the only Greek statesman—Tricoupis—who was possessed of both had passed away at Cannes five weeks before.

This rare opportunity lost, the Greek government's only alternative was to advocate by diplomatic means the concession of some measure of autonomy to the Cretans. Yet here, too, the cabinet's courage failed them; and, as it appears, at the instigation of France and Russia (to whose counsels, unfortunately, M. Delyannis personally is apt to lend too willing an ear), the Greek government came to a private understanding with the Porte that the Halépa Convention, *pur et simple*, with all its proven unworkability, should be the price of the Cretans' submis-

sion. The Sultan offered the latter this magnificent boon by means of a proclamation, and the Greek consul at Canea struggled with the insurgent chiefs in behalf of its acceptance. But too much blood had been spilled and too many Christian villages destroyed to admit of a solution that would have been accepted willingly six months earlier; and it was not till the six great powers forced the Sultan to grant numerous and substantial improvements in the Halépa Charter that the Cretans consented to lay down their arms. The Greek insurgent movement in Macedonia, set on foot expressly as a diversion in favor of Crete, and the Armenian troubles at Constantinople, coincided to make the Sultan only too glad to compromise with the Cretans, and grant them a much more endurable measure of self-government than the Greek rulers, in their faint-heartedness, had thought it possible to demand.

The new charter was received by neither party in Crete with much enthusiasm, although both were secretly glad of a respite coming just in time to enable them to gather the olive-crop, which was unusually abundant. The exasperation of the Christians over the Mussulman atrocities, and the success of the insurgents' arms, had aroused among the Christians the hope of finally attaining the long-cherished goal of union with Greece, for which the new settlement seemed but a sorry substitute.

No one who visited the island during the autumn of 1896 can forget the sad picture of misery and ruin which unfolded itself before his eyes. As our cavalcade, escorted by a *peloton* of Turkish cavalry as far as the outposts, emerged from the main gate of Canea, nothing but devastated fields and burned cottages met our gaze. The Christians doubtless had some share in the destruction effected during the recent insurrection; for Cretans are no lambs, especially after centuries of the most maddening sufferings, and a Cretan insurrection always assumes the character of a war of reprisals. But the ravages of the Christians in 1896 were for the most part confined to the burning of several villages in the vicinity of Candia, after the revolting massacre of August 9 at Anopolis, where the Turks, among other atrocities, roasted a monk alive over a fire of sacred pictures, after cutting off his ears and nose.

Our journey led us through scenery the natural beauty of which can only be meagerly outlined. Crete approaches more nearly to one's conception of an earthly paradise than

any other part of Europe, notwithstanding the terrible waves of war and conquest that have swept over it in quick succession for five-and-twenty centuries. No other country offers to the eye such vivid and imposing contrasts of scenery. It is as if a block of Alpine landscape had been cast bodily into the Mediterranean, there to mirror its snow-clad crests, its dark, waving forests, and its green meadows upon the bosom of the blue waters.

Our party included three Christian deputies, who were the bearers of the text of the new charter to the insurgents' headquarters at Vamos. On the way, however, we were informed that they were not at Vamos, but at Campos, and were therefore obliged to alter our course in a more southerly direction. The news of the Sultan's accession to the Cretan demands had already been signaled to all parts of the island by beacon-fires from peak to peak several days before, just as of yore the tidings of the fall of Troy were flashed along the mountain-tops to Agamemnon's distant Argive home.

In half an hour after leaving the Turkish lines we arrived at the insurgents' outposts at Kontopoulo, and the whole garrison was soon grouped in a large semicircle under a wide-spreading plane-tree, while the new charter was read aloud and discussed with avidity. It was a striking group—from youths of fifteen to grandsires of sixty, most of them clad in the picturesque costume of the island (baggy dark-blue trousers, high boots, and a black kerchief twisted about the head), and each carrying his rifle and cartridge-belt. The Cretan's dearest possession is his rifle; all the men bear arms, and in times of disturbance such of them as have not gone to join the insurgent forces attend to their usual work with rifles in their hands.

When we arrived toward evening at Campos we found that the news of our approach had preceded us in the person of a fleet messenger lad from Kontopoulo; and as we entered the main street of the village the whole population greeted us, in true Cretan fashion, with salvos of musketry fired into the air.

The new charter was then read, and several speeches were made by some of the inevitable lawyer insurgents, each leaning upon his rifle; thereupon the gratification of the camp found vent in a furious discharge of rapid-fire musketry, which must have made an enormous hole in the camp ammunition. A gala open-air banquet followed, consisting of sheep (roasted whole, in Homeric fashion), fresh cheese, and a few raw vege-

tables, washed down with copious draughts of resinated wine in enthusiastic toasts to the welfare of Crete and to the dearest hope of the Cretans—union with Greece.

For it is no secret that the latter consumption alone can give the island that peace for which it has been struggling and bleeding for the past six hundred years. This must not be understood as implying that Greek rule is even approximately a model one. The present plight of the Greek kingdom, politically and financially, is indeed sorry. The Greeks took unto themselves parliamentary institutions fully a century too soon, and these have engendered among them a state of things not pleasant to look upon. Their reckless financial management has landed them in the slough of bankruptcy. Crete is in much the same predicament as free Greece, although not so much so through her own fault.

Crete, like Epirus, Cyprus, and the Archipelago, is indisputably destined to be united to the Greek kingdom; Macedonia, Thrace, and the coasts of Asia Minor are Greek territories whose possession is coveted by other, stronger powers, and only the providence of God can secure to them that union with the mother-country which they desire. The past year or two has witnessed a radical change in the international aspect of the Eastern Question. Bulgaria, so long the pet of England and the Triple Alliance, has at last stood out in her true colors and gone over to Russia;

and England and Austria are awakening to the fact that the Hellenic, not the Slavonic, element in the East is the more serviceable bulwark against the Russian advance to the Mediterranean. There can be no doubt as to the sincerity and cordiality with which the entire Greek nation dreads the great Slav power of the North, which threatens to engulf the Hellenic race and efface it more effectually than the Roman or the Ottoman conquest succeeded in doing.

Roumania and Greece, for a long time hostile to each other, have recently become reconciled, as was natural and fitting for the two non-Slavonic states of the Balkan peninsula. A third vigorous and serviceable anti-Russian element is the Albanian; and it should become the object of England's and Austria's diplomatic efforts to strengthen these three races in every possible way at the expense of their Slavonic neighbors, and at the same time bring them into relations of perfect amity and coöperation with one another against the common foe, Panslavism. In this defensive complex, which should ultimately be substituted for the rotten empire of the Turk, the Greeks would necessarily become the central or connecting link, as occupying extensive territories in Asia Minor as well as in Europe. Yet for Greece the first step to this great future lies unmistakably in the reform of the present Greek kingdom politically and financially.

ATHENS, February, 1897.

Demetrius Kalopothakes.

«UBI SUNT QUI ANTE NOS?»¹

HOW now are the Others faring? Where sit They all in state?
And is there a token that somewhere, beyond the muffled gate,
The vanished and unreturning, whose names our memory fill,
Are holding their upper conclave and are of the Century still?

Is it all a fancy that somewhere, that somehow, the mindful Dead,
From the first that made his exit to the latest kinsman sped,—
Their vision ourselves unnoting, their shapes by ourselves unseen,—
Have gathered, like us, together this night in that strange demesne?

That the astral world's telepathy along their aisles of light
Has summoned our brave immortals, this selfsame mortal night,
All in that rare existence where thoughts a substance are,
To their native planet's aura, from journeyings near and far;

¹ Written for the Semi-Centennial Meeting of «The Century Association,» under which title the Century Club of New York holds its charter. January 13, 1897, marked the fiftieth anniversary of this famous club's existence. Seven or eight hundred members gathered and feasted together that night in commemoration of the event. The President, Bishop Potter, and ex-President Daniel Huntington (one of the two surviving founders), made addresses. An oration was delivered by Parke Godwin, and poems were read by Richard H. Stoddard, William Allen Butler, and Edmund C. Stedman. The club anthems—Mr. Macdonough's «Carmen Centuriale» and Mr. Stedman's «Centuria»—were sung by the gathering.