

and a vow made before God is ten times a promise. So I always mean to keep mine to you, as I have kept it. I will do my best to make you happy, and you must do your part to make it possible.

After all, that is the way most people live. True love, lasting lifetimes and not changing, exists in the world, and it is the hope of it that makes youth lovely and marriage noble. Few people find it, and the many who do not must live as well as they can without it. That is what we must do. Perhaps, though the hope of love is gone, we may find peace together. Let us try.

But not with Archie. There are things which no woman can forgive nor forget. I could not forgive you this if I loved you with all my heart, and you must not expect it of me, for it is not in my power. The harm was not done to me, but to him, and he is more to me than you ever were, and far more to me than myself. I will only say that. There can be no need of ever speaking about it, but I want you to understand; and not only this, but everything. That is why I write such a long letter.

It must all be perfectly clear, and I hope I have made it so. It was I who suffered for the great mistake we made in marrying; but you are sorry for that, and I say, let us try the experiment, and

see whether we can live together in peace for the rest of our lives. You are changed since your illness, I have no doubt, and you will make it as easy as you can. At least, you will do your best, and so shall I.

Have I repeated myself in this letter? At least I have tried to be clear and direct. Besides, you know me, and you know what I mean by writing in this way: I am in earnest.

God bless you, Henry; I hope this may turn out well.

HELEN.

It was ten o'clock when she had finished. She laid her hand upon the bell, meaning to send her letter to the post-office by a servant; but just then the sound of laughing voices came up to her through the open window, and she did not ring. Looking out, she saw that there were still many people in the street, for it was a warm evening. It was only a step from her hotel to the post-office, and if she went herself she should have the satisfaction of knowing positively that the letter was safe. She put on a hat with a thick veil, and went out.

F. Marion Crawford.

(To be continued.)

THE ABSURDITY OF WAR.



WAR is the last remnant of man's mode of deciding disputes in the animal or savage state. As soon as he started on the road to civilization he set up judges or courts to settle controversies. Before that, when two men differed about anything, they tore or mutilated each other's bodies, and it was tacitly agreed that the man who was most mutilated, if not killed, should give way. But he abode by the decisions of courts very reluctantly. The hardest battle of the reformers of the race was to get him to submit to the judges. He always preferred in his heart some kind of mutilation of his adversary's body, and in order to give a certain dignity to this mode of settling quarrels he got up the theory that God presided over it, and always gave the victory to the man who was in the right. In England this notion lasted in the «trial by battle,» or «wager of battle,» almost down to our own time. It was held that the Deity was on the side of the man who gave most cuts and stabs.

When the wager of battle as a settlement of disputes of any kind became too absurd, the

turbulent classes were driven into starting the duel. They felt that there must be some mode reserved of getting at an adversary's body with some weapon. So they established the rule that all offences against what they called their «honor»—that is, their sense of personal dignity—must be avenged by cutting, stabbing, or shooting, and that each man must decide when his «honor» was injured, and when cutting, stabbing, or shooting was necessary. This was a very cunning arrangement; for if it were left to other people to say when your «honor» was injured, you might never, or very rarely, get a chance to cut or stab or shoot at all, because they might say your honor was not injured. But there was even a better device than this; for it was arranged that the man who you said had injured your honor could not deny it or apologize without disgrace. He was held bound, no matter how trifling the injury, to give you a chance to cut him or stab him, and to do his best to cut or stab you. In what manner this mended your honor was never explained. To all outward appearance, after the theory of the interest of the Deity in the matter had died out, your

honor remained after the fight exactly what it was before the fight. The cutting and stabbing had neither proved nor disproved anything; it had simply gratified an animal instinct of the primeval time. Dueling, however, has disappeared here and in England. It flourishes still, in the old barbarous, absurd form, on the Continent.

Disputes between nations, for obvious reasons, have not come as rapidly under human methods of decision as disputes between individuals. Nations have never agreed to have judges and arguments as individuals have. The result is that their mode of deciding differences of opinion has always remained the old animal one of doing as much material injury as possible to the other side; and there still lingers the belief that God is on the side of the one which does most injury; that he counts up the number of killed and wounded, and decides that the one which has most killed and wounded is in the wrong. During war he is prayed to see that the number of killed and wounded on the other side may be the larger, and after what is called a «victory»—that is, the killing and wounding of a larger number of your enemies than they have managed to kill and wound on your side—people hurry to church and sing hymns of thanks. This belief is very strong still in our day, and the enemy's dead are counted joyfully. The human plan of deciding differences of opinion by judges, proofs, and argumentative persuasion, as distinguished from the animal or feline plan of deciding by the tearing and rending of bodies, has, in fact, not made much progress, though it has begun to receive attention.

But the process of settling quarrels by mutilation and destruction of property in disputes between nations has some features of atrocity unknown in dueling, or single combat, or wager of battle. In all these cases the actual enemies, who know whatever is to be known about the cause of the dispute, meet face to face and do the cutting and stabbing on each other. They do not attack any one else, and when they have injured each other to the extent of their ability, they stop, if living. But in the case of nations vast bodies of men are employed to kill and maim one another in quarrels of the merits of which they know nothing, and which they have no power of their own to end; and they may go on fighting for years, as in the great wars of Napoleon, killing and being killed, without the power to come to terms. When this takes place it is called «war,» and really is no more human or rational than fights be-

tween animals. In fact, it is the one great trait of barbarism of the primeval world retained by modern nations. As far back as we can go we find men trying to kill each other about something, or to gratify mere hatred, on as large a scale as the tribe can afford. The Iroquois led two or three hundred men to the field because they hated the Mohicans, or because the Mohicans had something they wanted. The modern Germans led a million of men to the field because they hated the French, or because the French had something they wanted. The French do the same thing to the Germans. Nothing, or very little, is changed except the scale on which the thing is done, and the treatment of the wounded prisoners. Civilization has made its way so far that we treat them with tolerable kindness; the Iroquois used to kill and torture them.

But civilization has done another very curious thing. It has raised the business of killing enemies and destroying their property into a very honorable profession. Indeed, it has raised it in honor far above the other professions. The soldier who settles quarrels by stabbing, cutting, and rending stands higher in popular estimation than the judge and advocate who sit to decide quarrels peaceably, by reason, on the human method. The animal method has the ascendancy. With the general public this is due largely to leaving what the soldier *does* out of sight, and considering simply to what he exposes himself. He is not looked on at all as a man who kills and wounds enemies and destroys property; who makes widows and orphans by the thousand; who tramples down crops, and burns villages, and brings ruin into thousands of lives: but as a man who exposes his life for others. In the popular imagination he does not kill for his country: he is killed for his country. The active part of his business is seldom present to the mind; the passive or suffering part is what is mainly present. It is chiefly through this impression, also, that war is elevated into an improver of character, or moral elevator of the whole community. This view could hardly be maintained if war were constantly thought of as a collection of men cutting, stabbing, mutilating, and burning houses. Its success is due to the habit of fixing the imagination on soldiers as in some sense martyrs, as men who for the sake of the community sacrifice their own lives. The theory has no foundation on observed facts. Wars have raged since the dawn of civilization, but there is no record of their having improved any na-

tion's character, of having made men more sober, or religious, or humane, or law-abiding. All that we know of the effect of war represents it as demoralizing to the many, though probably in a few cases having chastened or purified a few surviving relatives.

But the most serious charge which can be made against war is that either it does not decide things, or that it is waged over things which might be decided without it, although it is enormously costly. Take as examples the wars of this century between civilized nations. I will admit that those between civilized and barbarous nations have been just and necessary. The wars of Napoleon lasted twenty years; cost, it is estimated, the lives of three millions of men; suspended the march of civilization all over Europe; and caused enormous destruction of property. Very few of those engaged in them had any idea what they were about. They ended in leaving France exactly as they found her—much impoverished in money and population, and with the same, or nearly the same, frontiers as when they began. The next war was the attempt of France to keep a certain family on the throne of Spain. It failed: the family lost the throne. The next was the Belgian revolution. It settled what ought to have been settled without it. The next was the Crimean war. Within twenty years everything it accomplished had disappeared, and the general opinion of Europe was that it should never have been undertaken. It cost two hundred thousand lives and about one billion dollars. The next was the war for the liberation of Italy. It succeeded, but ought not to have been necessary. The next was the war of the rebellion, costing about five billion dollars, and two hundred thousand lives, and enormous destruction of property. It was of no use to those who began it. The next were the Prusso-Austrian and the Franco-German war. Both accomplished their purpose, and were enormously destructive.

Now, what is noticeable in all these is that they were about matters capable of the submission of proofs, and arguments by counsel, and judicial decisions; and that in every case, excepting the seizure of Alsace and Lorraine, wise and impartial judges would have decided the matter exactly either as the war decided it, or as the war was meant to decide it, but did not. Nearly everything in the dispute was plain, except which of the disputants had most power of destruction;

in other words, the war was totally unnecessary. On human plans of expediency and persuasion, France would never have been invaded after the Revolution; Napoleon would never have fought; Holland would have let Belgium go; France would never have invaded Spain; England would never have fought Russia; Austria would have surrendered Italy, and would have concluded an arrangement with Prussia; the South would have yielded to the North for compensated emancipation; and the French would never have called the German king to account about the throne of Spain. What I mean is, that in every one of these cases an impartial tribunal would have decided the matter either in the way the war decided it, or in the way hindsight decided it. About five million men who were killed or maimed would have continued to labor and enrich their countries, and the nations of Europe would have been saved a debt which I do not put into figures because they would be so large that they would convey nothing to the reader's mind. In every case the difficulty was one which could have been settled by the human art of persuasion; by people simply saying before the war what they said after it; or, in other words, by acting like men, not like animals. If cats fought in armies, the only question they would settle which could not be settled in any other way would be, which set could do most biting and scratching. Any other question between them—such as, which was entitled to most food, which made most noise at night, which was the best climber of backyard fences, which had the best fur—could be settled judicially by testimony and argument.

The enormous growth of armies in Europe, and the recent unhealthy outburst of jingoism among us, may seem to contradict what I say as to the growth of a more peaceful spirit among the nations—that is, as to the growth of civilization. But it must be observed that in no case is the tremendous enlargement of the standing armies ascribed to love of war or aggression. On the contrary, every nation says it is arming in the interest of peace, and that it loathes war; that it is some other nation's evil designs which render the increase in armament necessary. This is of itself a distinct advance. In the last century the increase in the army would have been boldly ascribed to a desire to conquer or humiliate somebody.

E. L. Godkin.