Maurice. Don't try to say anything like that! Pray, don't. I could n't bear it."

"But I must. Your silence — I misconstrued it. I thought —"

"And you don't think so now? I 'm glad of that." He took her hand, and this time she let him keep it a moment.

"But — you don't know what I have thought of you."

Philip frowned, but he said with a smile, "I don't care; or I sha'n't if you 'll tell me what you think *now*." He bent over her, looking into her eyes. She dropped her gaze to the carpet.

"Look up!" he said. She obeyed him slowly. They let their eyes rest on each other, and melt and mix in a glance that taught them each other. Then he stooped shyly, and kissed her.

(To be continued.)

Wolcott Balestier.

A VOICE FOR THE PEOPLE OF RUSSIA.

A REPLY TO "A VOICE FOR RUSSIA."

THE article entitled "A Voice for Russia," signed by Pierre Botkine, Secretary of the Russian Legation in Washington, and published in THE CENTURY MAGAZINE for February, seems to me to be one of the most striking and noteworthy evidences that the world has recently had of the power of the press and the force of public opinion. When an independent and autocratic government like that of Russia finds it necessary or expedient to come out from behind its wall of silence and indifference, enter the arena of public discussion, and defend there the policy that it is pursuing toward its own people, there can be no doubt that it feels to some extent the world's disapprobation, that it recognizes dimly the controlling influence of ideas in the world's history, and that it admits, at least by implication, the power of the world's press.

Never before, I believe, has the Russian government taken official notice of foreign criticism relating to its own domestic affairs, and never before has it published in a foreign journal an authorized defense of its own internal administration. Mr. Botkine's article, therefore, is significant as an evidence of official sensibility, even if it be unimportant as a contribution to the literature of the subject; and regarded from that point of view, it seems to me to be full of inspiration and encouragement. If the Russian minister of the interior, who certainly approved and who perhaps inspired this article, will only pursue consistently the path upon which he has entered,—if he will discuss in THE CENTURY the questions of public policy that he dares not discuss or allow to be discussed in his own periodicals,—we, the friends of Russian freedom, will show him why the winds blow "foaming waves of the sea of public opinion over our bridge of sentiment" which is supposed to exist between his country and ours, and will show, moreover, to him and to the world, who it is that "misrepresents" facts, and who are the real "enemies of Russia."

It is my purpose in this paper to review Mr. Botkine's diplomatic apology for despotism, to subject some of its unsupported assertions to critical examination, and then to consider briefly the question whether there is, or ought to be, any "bridge of sentiment" between the United States and Russia, and, if so, whether the transatlantic end of that bridge should rest upon the throne of the Russian autocrat or upon the hearthstones of the Russian people. I shall be compelled, I fear, to deepen the "disagreeable impression" which was produced, Mr. Botkine says, by my earlier articles; but I hope not to be "disagreeable" to Mr. Botkine personally, and I do not mean to overstep the limits of fair and courteous discussion.

The article with which I have to deal is entitled "A Voice for Russia." This title naturally suggests the question, What is "Russia"?

Does it consist of the Czar, a few governor-generals, and an army of soldiers and police? Or is it the great nation of men and women who stand back of the Czar, who give him all his wealth and power, who support his army and his navy, and who earn, painfully and by the sweat of their brows, everything that he eats, wears, or possesses? The question is not a difficult one to answer. Even a cursory perusal of Mr. Botkine's article suffices to show that "Russia," in the sense in which he uses the word, means the Czar and the Czar's bureaucracy; or, in other words, the Government. It is the Government that maintains the prisons which Mr. Botkine defends; it is the Govern-

ment whose intolerant attitude toward religious dissenters he palliates and excuses; and finally, it is the Government that hopes, with the aid of extradition treaties and "bridges of sentiment," to establish closer "bonds of sympathy" with the United States. The article under consideration, therefore, should be entitled not "A Voice for Russia," but "A Voice for the Russian Government." My "Russia" is not Mr. Botkine's "Russia," and in order that there may be no uncertainty as to the point of view from which I regard Russian questions, I have entitled this paper "A Voice for the People of Russia."

The points that Mr. Botkine endeavors to make in his defense of the Russian government may be stated briefly as follows:

(1) That Russia and the United States "are natural and disinterested allies, who have never fallen out, and are drawn to each other by bonds of sympathy."

(2) That the present Government of Russia is an enlightened and beneficent system of paternal control, which "is as natural and satisfactory to Russia as is the republican form of government to the United States," and which results in general contentment and prosperity.

(3) That Mr. Julius M. Price, and certain unnamed members of the Fourth International Prison Congress, have come to conclusions with regard to the Russian penal system which are quite contrary to those at which Mr. Kennan arrived.

(4) That the persecution of the Jews is not really a persecution at all, but merely "an effort to relieve the Empire of the injurious struggle against those particular traits of Hebrew character that were obstructing the progress of our people along their own lines of natural development."

(5) That, in matters of religion, the orthodox Russian church allows "the amplest freedom of faith and of practice," and "has always deferred to the fullest extent to the saying in the Scriptures, 'Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.'"

In view of the surprising, not to say extraordinary, nature of some of these assertions, Mr. Botkine's readers may reasonably and properly inquire, "Where are the proofs?" Does the "Voice" that is raised for "Russia" give us any extracts from the reports of Russian governors, or the investigations of Russian *zemstvos*,[1] to show the contentment and prosperity of the Russian people? Not an extract. Does the champion of the holy orthodox church make any citations from the Russian penal code, the reports of the holy synod, or the "Laws concerning Stundists," to illustrate the "amplest freedom of faith and of practice" which that church allows? Not a citation. Does the apologist for medieval persecution offer any selections from the periodical literature of Russia, or any statistics from the annals of Russian trade and industry, to show the danger of allowing a Jew to earn a living, and the necessity of relieving the Empire from his obstructive traits of character? Not a selection, nor a line of statistics. The whole case for the defense rests upon Mr. Botkine's unproved and unsupported assertions. What are the reasons for this complete absence of proofs? Is Mr. Botkine ignorant of the facts set forth in the political and economic literature of his country? Has he omitted the facts because the facts are not in harmony with his statements? Or does he suppose that Americans have become tired of facts and are longing for a few good round assertions? I shall not undertake to answer these questions, pertinent although they may be, because I do not know to what extent Mr. Botkine is responsible for the article that bears his name. In the revision to which it was subjected at St. Petersburg it may have been materially changed or modified, in which case it would be unjust, of course, to attribute its deficiencies to its nominal author. All that I shall undertake to do is to show that the statements contained in this official apology for despotism are not only unproved, but incapable of proof, for the reason that the facts with regard to which the "Voice" is silent contradict the assertions to which the "Voice" gives utterance.

Waiving, for the present, a discussion of Mr. Botkine's first point, viz., the alleged sympathy of the United States with the Government of Russia, I shall examine his other assertions in the order in which they are made.

(1) Is it true that the present Government of Russia is an enlightened and beneficent system of paternal control, which "is as natural and satisfactory to Russia as is the republican form of government to the United States," and which results in general contentment and prosperity?

One of the surest signs of contentment and prosperity in any country is the absence of extraordinary and exceptional legislation, and particularly of legislation intended to silence criticism, to prevent discussion, and to repress all forms of political activity. If the people of a country are satisfied and prosperous, there is no necessity for severe repressive measures, because there is no popular discontent to repress. Is this absence of exceptional legislation characteristic of the present situation in Russia? It appears, from the semi-official journals of civil and criminal law in St. Petersburg and Moscow, that a large part of the Em-

[1] Provincial assemblies established by Alexander II.

pire, including its most thickly settled provinces and nearly all its large cities, has been in a state of siege (*usilenoi okhrana*), or, as we should say, under martial law, ever since the present Emperor came to the throne. It appears that, throughout a period of nearly twelve years, Russian governors, governor-generals, and chiefs of police have had authority to issue "imperative orders" (*obyazatelnikh postanovlenie*) with regard to all matters that concern the maintenance of public tranquillity, or the safety of the state; to prohibit all public, social, or even private meetings and assemblies; to direct the closing of all commercial and industrial establishments; to remove cases from the civil to the military courts whenever, in their opinion, such a course is necessary; to arrest and imprison without judicial warrant and upon mere suspicion; to make searches and seizures in all dwellings, factories, foundries, etc., without exception; and finally, to recommend the banishment to Siberia of any person whose character seems to them obnoxious, or whose presence is regarded by the police as "prejudicial to public order."[1]

Will Mr. Botkine be kind enough to explain the reasons for the existence of such extraordinary and exceptional legislation as this in a country whose government is "natural and satisfactory," and whose happy and prosperous people regard their "peaceful and beneficent sovereign" with "ever-increasing affection"? Martial law, in civilized countries, is not a permanent institution; it is a last resort in time of war, tumult, or disorder, when the comparatively slow and formal processes of the civil courts are not adequate to meet the dangerous and swiftly arising emergencies of the hour. But martial law has existed in Russia for twelve years in a time of profound peace, and seems likely to last for a quarter of a century. What are the reasons for it? Is Russian society in such a state of tumult or disorder that the civil courts can no longer control it? Mr. Botkine assures us that such is by no means the case. "The political agitation," he says, "which years ago disturbed the peace and prosperity of the country has ceased; and I believe I make no mistake in asserting that at present there are fewer anarchists in Russia than in any other area of equal population in the civilized world."[2] And yet the annual proclamations of martial law continue. What do they mean? Lest Mr. Botkine should find some difficulty in answering this question, I will suggest an answer myself; and an answer, moreover, which is not a mere assertion, but which rests upon a solid basis of incontrovertible facts. The annual proclamations of martial law in Russia mean that the Government of the Czar cannot control by ordinary methods the spirit of discontent which is abroad in the Empire, and that it resorts to martial law as the best, if not the only available, means of silencing criticism, crushing opposition, and maintaining a deceptive semblance of tranquillity and contentment.

The people of Russia are neither happy nor prosperous. On the contrary, tens of millions of them are desperately unhappy and wretchedly poor. In an article entitled "Some Truths about Russia," published in a recent number of an English review, the condition of a large part of the Russian people is described by "A Former Resident of Russia" as follows:

> The conditions of Russian peasant life may appear ideal and idyllic to an enthusiastic tourist from the window of a railway carriage; but to the careful observer they seem what they really are — intolerable and inhuman. The peasants are financially ruined; the worst of them are dying — literally dying — of hunger, while others have scarcely anything to eat or drink, or the wherewithal to protect their bodies from the cold; and yet their last cow — that fed their children, innocent of mother's milk — is distrained for taxes, and they themselves flogged in order to extract from them the money requisite to keep the administrative machine in motion. In very many places which I could name, the peasants, who have hitherto managed to keep body and soul together, are now reduced to living on bread made partly of rye, partly of the husks of rye, and often mixed with the worm-eaten bark of the oak, or

[1] "Journal of Civil and Criminal Law" (a monthly review and the official organ of the St. Petersburg Bar Association), St. Petersburg, November–December, 1881, pp. 154–161. The original proclamation of martial law was made by virtue of an ukase dated at Peterhoff, August 14, 1881. It included the provinces of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkoff, Pultava, Chernigoff, Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia, Kherson, and Bessarabia; the districts of Simferapol, Eupatoria, Yalta, Teeodosia, and Perekop, and the city of Berdiansk in the Taurida province; the city and district of Voronezh, the city of Rostoff-on-the-Don, and the city of Mariupol in the Ekaterinoslav province; and the cities of Odessa, Taganrog, and Kertch. This proclamation, with some changes from time to time in the boundaries of the proclaimed areas, has been renewed annually in August ever since the present Czar came to the throne — that is, throughout a period of nearly twelve years. A notice of the proclamation for last year (1892) may be found in the Russian magazine "Northern Messenger," No. 11, November, 1891, p. 123.

[2] As a matter of fact, there are no anarchists in Russia at all. The revolutionists have never been an anarchistic party; and in their famous letter to Alexander III., written immediately after the assassination of his father, they said: "We declare solemnly, before the people of our native land, and before the whole world, that our party will submit unconditionally to the decisions of a National Assembly elected in the manner above indicated, and that we will not allow ourselves, in future, to offer violent resistance to any government that the National Assembly may sanction." (See "Siberia and the Exile System," Vol. II, p. 503.)

the dry and powdered bark of the pine-tree, which stills, without satisfying, the cravings of hunger.[1]

That the statements above made are applicable to all, or even to a majority, of the peasants in the Russian empire, I should not venture to affirm; but that they describe accurately the life of many millions of the Czar's "affectionate" and "devoted" subjects there can be no doubt. Any one who has studied the reports of the Russian zemstvos, or has even followed the discussion of economic topics in Russian periodicals, knows that the condition of the peasants for a quarter of a century has been going steadily from bad to worse. In 1871 the well-known political economist Prince Vassilchikoff estimated that Russia had a proletariat that amounted to five per cent. of the whole peasant population. In 1881 — ten years later — the researches of Orloff and other statisticians from the zemstvos showed that this proletariat had increased to fifteen per cent.,[2] and in 1885 it was asserted by competent authority that there were thirty million people in European Russia who were living from hand to mouth; that is, who possessed no capital, and had not land enough to afford them support.[3]

The progressive impoverishment of the Russian peasantry was frankly admitted as long ago as 1882 even by the Government officials themselves. A prominent Russian senator, who made a "revision," or, as we should say, "an official tour of inspection," that year in the central provinces of European Russia, reported upon the condition of the people as follows:

Among the indisputable evidences of progressive impoverishment among the peasants are the decreasing stocks of grain in the village storehouses, the diminishing number of farm animals, the deterioration of buildings, the exhaustion of the soil, the destruction of forests, the arrears of taxes, and the struggle of the people to migrate. . . . In almost every village the penniless class is constantly growing, and at the same time there is a frightfully rapid increase in the number of peasant families that are passing from comparative prosperity to poverty, and from poverty to a condition in which they have no assured means of support.[4]

A striking proof of the impoverishment of the Russian peasantry is furnished by the official statistics with regard to the number of farm animals in the Empire, and particularly the number of horses. Every American farmer knows that he would find it extremely difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to work his land without the aid of a horse; and that the complete absence of horses on a farm is an unmistakable evidence of extreme poverty and destitution. What is the condition of the Russian peasant when tried by this test? In the year 1882 there were in the village communities of European Russia 9,079,924 peasant households. Of this number 2,437,555 households, representing a population of perhaps 14,000,000, and constituting twenty-seven per cent. of the whole agricultural class, did not own a single horse.[5] Of course these 14,000,000 people had not always been without horses. They had lost them, partly through contagious diseases, which they knew not how to combat, partly in forced settlement of debts to money-lenders, which they were unable to pay, and partly as the result of the ruthless and short-sighted policy of a Government that sells the last horse of a poor peasant farmer for taxes, and thus renders it almost impossible for him ever to pay taxes again.[6]

Mr. Botkine refers in his article to the recent famine in Russia as a calamity that gave the American people an opportunity to show their sympathy with the people of Russia. I wonder whether it ever occurred to him that the calamity to which he refers was permitted, if not caused, by the "beneficent sovereign" whom he defends; and that the distress which called forth our sympathy was the work, in large part, of the very Government that he describes as "natural and satisfactory." The famine of 1891–92 was not one of the sudden, unforeseen, and unforeseeable catastrophies that are described in bills of

[1] "Moscow Gazette," March 29 and April 10, 1888. This, it will be observed, was before the beginning of the recent famine.

[2] See the article entitled, "The Village Proletariat," in the St. Petersburg newspaper "New Time" (*Nóvoe Vrémya*) for June 13, 1886.

[3] See the article entitled, "Thirty Million Proletarians," in the Russian journal "The Week" (*Nedié-lia*), No. 32, August 11, 1885, p. 1113. "The Week" fills in Russia something like the place that is occupied in the United States by the New York "Nation."

[4] See the article entitled, "The Economic Condition of the Peasants," published in the St. Petersburg newspaper "The Voice" (*Gólos*), No. 283, October 18, 1882, p. 2.

[5] See the article entitled, "Statistics of Peasant Economy" (*Itogi Khrestyanskaho Khozaistvo*), in the legal review "Juridical Messenger" (*Yuridicheski Vestnik*), Moscow, November, 1892, p. 438. The "Juridical Messenger" is the official organ of the Moscow Bar Association. The figures are from the Government census.

[6] The Russian minister of the interior has issued two circular letters since 1881 directing the administrative authorities to "proceed with caution" in the collection of taxes by distraint; but the local officials, anxious to make a good showing, and to acquire a reputation for energy and efficiency, have paid little attention to the minister's instructions, and have continued to seize and sell the last horse or the last cow of a delinquent taxpayer, after the old fashion. (See "Gatsuk's Gazette" [*Gazéta Gátsuka*], Moscow, September 16, 1890, p. 628.)

lading and insurance policies as "acts of God"; neither was it due solely to the unfavorable meteorological conditions which brought about a failure of the harvest. It was the result, in large part, of the oppression and maladministration to which the people had been subjected, and was merely the culmination of a long-threatened crisis. The economic condition of the peasants in the famine-stricken provinces, and particularly in the provinces lying along the Volga River and its tributaries, was almost hopeless before the harvest failed. The distress and destitution which prevailed, for example, in the provinces of Saratoff, Samara, Viatka, and Kazan, were well known to the Russian government, and to the Russian public, long before the failure of the crops added the last straw to the burden of the struggling peasantry, and forced it to its knees.

In the volume entitled "Statistical Information Concerning the Province of Saratoff," published by the Saratoff zemstvo in 1882, it was shown that in the five *volosts*, or cantons, covered by that volume, the average amount of land owned by a peasant family was only nine tenths of a *decetine*, or two acres and seven tenths; and that twenty-one per cent. of the peasant farmers had neither horse, ox, nor cow.[1] In 1888, two years before the failure of the crops to which the famine is attributed, the distress of the people in this same province of Saratoff had become so alarming that the provincial governor, General Kosach, addressed a circular letter to all officials and public institutions within his jurisdiction, in which he said that he "observed everywhere proofs of the economic disorganization of the population," and that this disorganization had become "so serious as to demand the immediate adoption of measures to remedy it." Such measures, however, could not be taken, he said, until the reasons for the unfortunate state of affairs had been ascertained; and he therefore begged his subordinates to tell him frankly what, in their opinion, had brought the province into such an unsatisfactory economic condition, and what means were likely, in their judgment, to change it for the better. The governor's circular was apparently well meant, and his desire to do something for the relief of the distressed peasants of his province was probably sincere; but the evils the existence of which he recognized and deplored were too closely interwoven with the social and political framework of the Empire to be removed by any measures that he had power to adopt.[2]

A correspondent of the "Volga Messenger," writing from the province of Viatka in the autumn of 1886, said:

> In the course of the last few years the situation of our agricultural population has changed greatly for the worse. Some have become so poor that it is doubtful whether they can save themselves from ruin, unless the zemstvo and the educated class come to their rescue, and adopt more or less radical measures to improve the economic condition of the country. One meets now in our villages with not a few peasant farmers who have neither horse nor cow, and who are hopelessly in debt to local money-lenders. . . . Before spring the greater part of the population will have to get along as best it can with what God sends.[3]

An official report of the bureau of statistics in the province of Riazan, published in 1882, shows that in two districts of that province which, taken together, had a population of 230,000, thirty-five per cent. of the peasant proprietors had not a single horse, and twenty-five per cent. had neither horse nor cow.[4]

The state of affairs in the province of Samara was worse rather than better. In 1883 the permanent board (*uprava*) of the Samara zemstvo made a report to that body in which it was stated that the condition of the peasant farmers in many parts of that province was deplorable. More than half of the agricultural villages in the district (*uyezd*) of Buguruslan were in a state of economic disorganization; seventeen villages in the district of Buzuluk had become so impoverished that it was doubtful whether they could save themselves from ruin; and the arrears of taxes in these and other districts amounted to six or eight times the annual assessment. With all this economic distress there was an immense amount of suffering throughout the province from the bad sanitary conditions of life, and the preventable diseases resulting therefrom. Scarlet fever, typhoid fever, and measles were epidemic; 18 villages of the Nikolaievsk and Novouzensk districts were suffering from diphtheria, and 11 villages of the Buguruslansk district were infected with smallpox. In the peasant village of Mishutkina there were 102 cases of the last-named disease, and 63 deaths in a single day (December 1, 1883).[5]

In the province of Kazan, more than a year

[1] See "Saratoff Correspondence," in the St. Petersburg newspaper "The Voice" for December 18, 1882.

[2] The "Siberian Gazette" (*Sibírskaya Gazéta*), No. 22, Tomsk, March 20, 1888, p. 3. The text of the governor's letter is quoted by the "Siberian Gazette" from the St. Petersburg newspaper "Citizen" (*Grázhdanín*).

[3] The "Volga Messenger" (*Volzhski Vestnik*), No. 190, Kazan, September 4, 1886.

[4] "Statistical Reports for the Province of Riazan," Vol. II, part i, p. 255, and part ii, p. 189, Riazan, 1882.

[5] Samara correspondence of the St. Petersburg newspaper "The Voice," January 19, 1883.

before the failure of the harvest to which the famine is attributed, the uncollectable arrears of taxes amounted to nearly three times the annual assessment,[1] and Mr. P. K. Kuprianof reported to the Kazan Provincial Assembly, of which he was a member, the case of 200 families, numbering about 1000 persons, who were entirely without food, and who were living upon bread made out of the weed called "goosefoot," mixed with bark, husks, and bran.[2]

But it is impossible, within the limits of a magazine article, to refer, even in the briefest and most casual way, to the proofs of popular distress and destitution which are to be found in the periodical literature of Russia for the past twelve years.[3] The evidence is not only complete, it is overwhelming, and no one who has attentively studied it can fail, I think, to see that millions of the Czar's subjects are engaged, and have been engaged for years, in a desperate, heart-breaking, and almost hopeless struggle for a bare existence. What, meanwhile, has been the attitude toward them of the Russian government? Has it endeavored to lighten their heavy burdens by cutting down the army and navy estimates, and thus reducing their taxes? Has it treated them with merciful consideration when they could no longer pay taxes that amounted, in many cases, to more than the whole net product of their lands?[4] By no means! The taxes, instead of being reduced, have been increased; and have been collected with merciless rigor under the lash. "Everybody knows perfectly well," says the Russian publicist Priklónski, "that with us corporal punishment is employed by the police as one of the commonest means of collecting taxes; but it is a disgrace, nevertheless, to our native land. The torture of the human body by authority of law exists as a fact before our eyes; while we, conscious of our inability to prevent it, can only say with the permanent board of the Taurida zemstvo, 'It is hard to defend a punishment which kills a man's honor and destroys his self-respect.'"[5] I have not space in this article to illustrate Mr. Priklónski's statement by describing the barbarous practice known in Russia as "threshing out the arrears"; but I will cite a few cases, almost at random, to show how the officials of Mr. Botkine's "beneficent sovereign" collect the money by which his "natural and satisfactory" Government is maintained.

In the year 1878 there were flogged for non-payment of taxes in two peasant villages of the Slobodski district, in the province of Kazan, no fewer than 618 heads of households.[6] Between the years 1878 and 1881 there were flogged for the same reason in the single canton of Kaigorodsk, also in the province of Kazan, 797 heads of peasant households out of a total number of about 1200.[7] In the year 1884, 178 delinquent taxpayers, out of a total number of 414, were flogged in three villages of the Yampolski district in the province of Kiev.[8] Between May 16 and June 23, 1885,— that is, within a period of less than six weeks,— there were flogged for non-payment of taxes in ten villages of the Novo Ladoga district, in the province of St. Petersburg, 224 heads of households out of a total number of 517.[9]

If we picture to ourselves in imagination the poverty, misery, and despair represented by these statistics of corporal punishment, we have no reason to feel surprise when we read in "The Week" of St. Petersburg that a newly appointed tax-collector committed suicide rather than assume the duties of his office,[10] and that a poor peasant of the village of Pola, in that same unfortunate province of Kazan, sold his last cow in order to pay his taxes, and then, having neither money nor food, cut the throats of his three motherless children and hanged himself.[11]

If, in view of the facts and statistics above given, Mr. Botkine continues to maintain that the Russian government is an enlightened and beneficent system of paternal control, which results in general contentment and prosperity,

[1] See the report of the Government comptroller in the St. Petersburg newspaper "The Government Messenger" (*Pravitelstvenni Vestnik*) for December 13, 1892.

[2] "Gatsuk's Gazette" (*Gazéta Gátsuka*), Moscow, January 12, 1890, p. 13.

[3] Mr. Botkine will find a very recent and very careful discussion of the economic condition of the Russian peasantry in an article by P. Golubiof, entitled "The Reasons for the Decadence of the Rural Population," etc., published in the Moscow law review "Yuridicheski Vestnik" for October, 1892, pp. 194-247.

[4] Professor J. E. Yanson, of the University of St. Petersburg, one of the ablest statisticians in the Empire, showed in 1877 that in many provinces of European Russia the taxes of the peasant farmers amounted to from 100 per cent. to 176 per cent., and in some extreme cases reached 465 per cent., of the whole net income of their lands. The difference between this net income and the amount of their taxes they made good by going to the nearest cities in winter and working in factories, while their wives and children devoted themselves to various cottage industries at home. (See "An Attempt at a Statistical Investigation of the Peasants' Landed Property and Taxation," by Professor J. E. Yanson, pp. 35, 36, and 86.)

[5] "Sketches of Self-Government," by S. A. Priklónski (St. Petersburg, 1886), p. 173.

[6] "Sketches of Self-Government," p. 354.

[7] "Annals of the Fatherland" (*Atéchestvenia Zapiski*), a monthly review, St. Petersburg, May, 1882, p. 159.

[8] "Sketches of Self-Government," p. 356.

[9] "Sketches of Self-Government," p. 354, and also Novo Ladoga correspondence of "The Week" (*Nediélia*), St. Petersburg, August 28, 1885, p. 1081.

[10] "The Week," February 24, 1885.

[11] "The Week," January 20, 1885, p. 127.

I am ready to continue the argument, and shall be glad of an opportunity to use more of my proofs. For the present, however, I must leave this branch of the subject and take up the next point.

(2) Mr. Botkine says that "Mr. Kennan, to whom our Government hospitably opened the darkest corners where it must keep the evil and pernicious of its subjects, has been pleased to paint our penitentiaries in the blackest colors"; but that "other foreigners, to whom we have as readily opened our prisons for inspection,"—namely, Mr. Julius M. Price, and the members of the Fourth International Prison Congress,—"have come to conclusions quite contrary."

Mr. Botkine, apparently, has not yet learned from controversial experience how dangerous it is to quote an author without having read him. A mere newspaper notice of a book may be enough to base conversation upon in society, but a careful perusal of the work itself is absolutely indispensable if one intends to quote it as proof of a statement. Mr. Botkine would not have called attention, I think, to the interesting book of Mr. Julius M. Price [1] if he had taken the trouble to read the latter's account of the two Siberian prisons that both he and I visited. In his description of a *kamera* in the prison of Krasnoyarsk Mr. Price says:

> What astonished me most in the whole place was the married prisoners' quarters, for in the large dormitory there were at least 200 men, women, and children, of all ages, herded together indiscriminately. No words can fitly describe the scene. The evil faces, the babel of voices, the crying of children, and clanking of chains, and above all the indescribable stench which seems inseparable from the Siberian prisons, all combined to make as hideous an impression as could well be imagined. . . . The heat of the place, which appeared to be without ventilation, was, as usual, fearfully oppressive, and many of the men and women were in the very scantiest of attires, for decency did not appear to affect them much, and the sight of so many poor little innocent children in such surroundings struck me as being particularly horrible. [2]

I could hardly desire a more complete confirmation than this of the statements that I made with regard to similar kameras in the forwarding prison of Tomsk, which, by the way, Mr. Price did not see. [3]

Of the Irkutsk forwarding prison Mr. Price says:

> The halls and dormitories, on account of their overcrowded state, were in a filthy condition, and little better than human pigsties. Every spot was occupied, and the stench was awful.

The "secret" cells, where political prisoners are confined, he describes as follows:

> We then went back to the prison, as I expressed a wish to see the prisoners in the *sekretni* cells. This was the only part of the building which was really like a prison, and very gloomy and depressing was it. No less than three heavily barred iron doors had to be unlocked before we reached the corridor where these cells were situated. A warder is on duty here, I was told, night and day, for there are several political prisoners, and the rest were the most desperate characters. In each door was a little hole, about the size of a sixpence, through which could be seen the interior of the cell. I had a peep into all. It was almost like looking at some caged wild beasts, the clanking of the heavy chains on their hands and feet heightening the illusion. Some of the prisoners had, I was informed, been there for years, and were only allowed out for exercise for an hour a day. [4]

Mr. Price seems inclined to take a favorable view of the life of political exiles in the larger Siberian towns, and refers to several who were living in comparative freedom and comfort; but he admits, nevertheless, that

> in the case of a well-connected and educated man sent from, say, Moscow, St. Petersburg, or some other important city in Russia, for a long period, to some remote Siberian village, the punishment must be a severe one. From the little I have seen of these villages on our way up the river, I can imagine no fate more dreadful than to be shut up alone, among a lot of unsympathetic and ignorant peasants, with no books to read, and entirely out of touch and hearing of the civilized world. Better, almost, to be buried alive! [5]

If, after reading the above quotations from Mr. Price's book, Mr. Botkine is still of opinion that they controvert my statements, his ideas as to the nature of rebutting evidence require revision and adjustment. He might have found passages in my book that would have answered his purpose much better than anything contained in the work of Mr. Price. [6]

[1] "From the Arctic Ocean to the Yellow Sea," by Julius M. Price. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1892.

[2] See "From the Arctic Ocean," etc., pp. 147, 148.

[3] "Siberia and the Exile System," Vol. I, pp. 302–321. As Mr. Price came into Siberia by way of the Arctic Ocean and the Yensei River, and went out of it at Kiakhta, he had no opportunity to inspect the forwarding prisons of Tomsk and Tiumen, which were among the worst that I saw, and he did not visit any of the penal establishments in the East Siberian province of the Trans-Baikal. Out of the forty or fifty prisons that I examined he saw only two; viz., the forwarding prisons of Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk.

[4] "From the Arctic Ocean," etc., p. 205.

[5] "From the Arctic Ocean," etc., p. 114.

[6] See, for example, the favorable description of the Alexandrofski Central Prison, the favorable description of the Krasnoyarsk forwarding prison, and the complimentary references to prison officials on pp. 345 and 346 of Vol. I, and pp. 207, 331–334, 346–350, 366, and 405 of Vol. II, of "Siberia and the Exile System."

As for the unnamed members of the Fourth International Prison Congress, who have come, Mr. Botkine says, to conclusions quite different from mine, I can only say that they had neither experience enough nor knowledge enough to justify them in coming to any conclusions whatever. They were not acquainted with the Russian language, nor with the history of Russian penal institutions; they did not go, I believe, outside the limits of St. Petersburg and Moscow; and they certainly did not visit Siberia, which was the field of my researches. I do not know how many prisons they personally examined, but probably not more than half a dozen out of the whole number of 871 which the Empire at that time contained. If they supposed that a casual inspection of half a dozen show prisons in St. Petersburg and Moscow entitled them to express an opinion with regard to the Russian penal system as a whole, if they believed that the condition of the half-dozen prisons which they did see represented fairly the condition of the 865 which they did not see, they were ignorant of the very first principles of scientific investigation.

As a matter of fact, the members of the Fourth International Prison Congress had no opportunity — at least in an official capacity — to make any investigation whatever. They were indirectly warned, at the outset, by Mr. Gálkine Wrásskoy, chief of the Russian prison administration, that "if they attempted to broach the Siberian prison scandals in the International Congress they would make a great mistake."[1] In view of this warning, there was nothing for them to do but adhere, officially, to the program that had been drawn up for them, and seek, privately, for more trustworthy information than that for which the program provided. But they did not even do this. If the reports that reached me from St. Petersburg are to be believed, the congress devoted much more time to banquets, complimentary speeches, and excursions than to the investigation of Russian prisons. Professor N. D. Sergeiefski, a well-known writer upon Russian criminal law and penology, did not hesitate to say in his magazine, "Juridical Annals" (*Yuridicheskaya Letopis*), that "the congress indulged itself unnecessarily in feasting and enjoyment, when there were grievous questions to be decided, and when the remarkable book of George Kennan upon Siberia was still fresh in the minds of many of its members."[2] Perhaps if the delegates whom Mr. Botkine quotes had devoted less time to "feasting and enjoyment," and more time to the "grievous questions" of which Professor Sergeiefski speaks, they would have come to conclusions in harmony with mine, and would not have expressed "their astonishment at the extremely humane treatment of convicts on the part of the Russian authorities." Finally, if they had manifested any sincere desire to learn the real condition of Russian prisons, and had applied for information to Professor Sergeiefski, Professor Foinitski, Mr. Nikitin, or any Russian penologist of recognized reputation, they would have been furnished with a translation of two remarkable articles upon Russian prison methods which had just been written by a Russian expert, published in a legal journal of the highest character, and expressly dedicated to the members of the Fourth International Prison Congress.[3] The picture of Russian prison life presented by the author of these articles is painted in colors as black as any that I have ever used. Mr. Botkine will find it reproduced, in part, in the article entitled "The Truth about Russian Prisons," by E. B. Lanin, published in the "Fortnightly Review" for July, 1890, page 20. It was this black picture of Russian prisons — painted, be it observed, not by a foreign traveler, but by a Russian specialist — which inspired Swinburne's fiery poem in defense and justification of tyrannicide.

If Mr. Botkine will read attentively these two articles in the "Juridical Messenger," and an article entitled "Prisons of the Lena Region" (*Tiurmi Prilenskaho Kraiya*), by Vladimir Ptitsin, published in the St. Petersburg magazine "Northern Messenger" (*Sieverni Vestnik*) for December, 1889, he will be convinced, I think, that the artists who use the "blackest colors" in depicting the penal institutions of Russia are not travelers from the United States, but Russian prison experts.

(3) In the argument by which Mr. Botkine attempts to justify the persecution of the Jews in Russia there is the same fatal weakness which invalidates his defense of autocracy, and renders worthless his apology for Russian prisons; viz., complete absence of proof. His case against the Jews is not supported by a single fact, nor by reference to a single recognized authority, nor by a line of statistics, nor by a paragraph of history, nor by a section of law. It is a bare statement of personal belief, which would not have the slightest weight in a court of justice, and which ought not to exert the least influence upon public opinion. If Mr.

[1] St. Petersburg correspondence of the London "Times," March 14, 1890.

[2] "The Juridical Messenger" (*Yuridicheski Vestnik*), Moscow, January, 1891, p. 144.

[3] "Prison Methods (*Tiuremni Poriadki*): Notes and Observations dedicated to the Members of the Fourth International Prison Congress," by S. T. Kh., "Juridical Messenger," Moscow, February, 1890, p. 356, and April, 1890, p. 622.

Botkine wished to justify and defend the treatment of the Jews in Russia, he should have made an attempt, at least, to show, by a presentation of facts, that the means adopted by Russian Jews to earn a living are prejudicial to the interests of a civilized state. If he believed, for example, that Jewish lawyers are dishonorable tricksters and pettifoggers, he should have given us some information with regard to the number of Jewish lawyers disbarred for unprofessional conduct. If he wished to maintain that there are more Jewish usurers and money-lenders in proportion to the whole Jewish population than there are Russian usurers and money-lenders in proportion to the whole Russian population, he should have supported his assertion with figures. If he was of opinion that Russian Jews are parasitic non-producers, who devote themselves to trade and money-lending, and who will not work with their hands, he should have given us statistics as to the number of Russian Jews who are engaged in trade and money-lending, and then, on the other hand, the number who are working in factories, the number who are cultivating farms, and the number who are employed as teamsters, porters, dock-hands, etc., in arduous manual labor. Finally, he should have furnished us with trustworthy information, supported by proofs, as to the nature and trend of Russian legislation with regard to the Jews, in order to show us that the latter have as good a chance to become good citizens as the Russians have, and that their alleged bad behavior is a manifestation of innate depravity, and not a result of unjust legislative discrimination against them. Instead of doing this, he has offered us a series of unproved and unsupported assertions which, if I understand them rightly, may be summarized as follows. The Jews are obnoxious in Russia not on account of their religion, but on account of their character. They are not "homogeneous" with the Russians; they have no faculty for "adapting themselves to sympathy" with the latter; they do not desire "solidarity" with them; they are "not an integral part of the community"; they are "guests without affinity"; they are too numerous; and finally, they are "superior to the Russians in education," and therefore "obstruct the progress" of the latter "along their own lines of natural development."

Mr. Botkine's explanation of the hostility of the Russian government toward the Jews reminds me of the rhymed translation of Martial's thirty-third epigram, in which Tom Brown expressed his feeling for the dean of Christ Church:

> I do not love thee, Dr. Fell;
> The reason why I cannot tell;
> But this alone I know full well,
> I do not love thee, Dr. Fell.

Stripped of verbiage, and reduced to the simplest possible form of expression, the feeling of the governing classes in Russia toward the Jews would seem, from this explanation, to be a feeling of personal antipathy blended with race prejudice. If there is any other reason, Mr. Botkine does not state it; and upon this presentation of the facts any dispassionate judge would not hesitate to dismiss the case without even hearing argument from the other side. Granting the truth of all that Mr. Botkine asserts, the persecution of the Jews in Russia is still unjust and unjustifiable.

It is not my purpose, at present, to discuss the Russo-Jewish question. The literature of that subject, in the Russian language alone, makes a bibliography of nearly ten thousand titles; and it is obviously impossible, within the limits of a magazine article, to deal satisfactorily with a question of such magnitude and complexity. All that I aim to do is to show that Mr. Botkine has added nothing, except his own personal opinion, to our knowledge of the subject. Readers who wish to know how the Russian government "restricts the activity" of the Jews, and by what means it relieves "the Empire of the injurious struggle against those particular traits of Hebrew character that were obstructing the progress of our people along their own lines of natural development," will find full information in a recently published report of Colonel Weber and Dr. Kempster to the Secretary of the Treasury upon the personal investigation of the Russo-Jewish question which they made on the ground in the summer of 1891.[1]

(4) Mr. Botkine asserts, but does not attempt, of course, to prove, either by citation of law or by reference to facts, that the orthodox Russian church allows "the amplest freedom of faith and of practice," and "has always deferred to the fullest extent to the saying in the Scriptures, 'Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.'"

When I turn to the Russian penal code, and read, in "Title II," the sections that relate to "Crimes against the Faith," I am forced to the conclusion that Mr. Botkine is either forgetful of the laws of his country, or unconscious of the full significance of the English words that he uses. When we, in America, say that our Government allows "the amplest freedom of faith and of practice," we mean that every citizen of the United States is at liberty to worship God in accordance with the dictates of his own con-

[1] "Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury transmitting a Report of the Commissioners of Immigration upon the Causes which incite Immigration to the United States." Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1892.

science; and that if any man feel disposed to change his religious faith, to criticize the doctrines of the churches, or even to found and preach a religion of his own, he has a perfect right to do so. This is what we understand by "freedom of faith and of practice," and if Mr. Botkine uses the words in this sense he ignores or contradicts almost every section of the Russian penal code. To the great mass of the Russian people the orthodox church allows no freedom whatever. Section 188 of the code provides that if any person shall leave that church, even to join another Christian denomination, he shall be turned over to the ecclesiastical authorities for instruction and admonition; his minor children shall be taken into the custody of the Government; his real estate shall be put into the hands of an administrator; and until he abjures his errors, he shall have no further control over either. Section 196 declares that all persons who shall be guilty of aiding in the extension of existing sects, or who shall be instrumental in the creation of new sects hostile or injurious to the orthodox faith, shall be deprived of all civil rights and exiled for life either to Siberia or to the Trans-Caucasus. Section 184 says that if a Jew shall induce an orthodox Christian to renounce the true church, and become an adherent of the Jewish faith, he shall be deprived of all civil rights and exiled for life, with not less than eight nor more than ten years of penal servitude.

It would be easy to fill pages with illustrative examples of the unjust and oppressive character of Russian penal legislation in the field of religious crime. Every paragraph of "Title II" fairly bristles with threats of "imprisonment," "exile," and "penal servitude," and the whole title seems to breathe a spirit of medieval bigotry and intolerance. Everybody knows how these laws have recently been enforced against the Lutherans and the Stundists. For two years or more it has been almost impossible to take up a religious newspaper, in England or the United States, without finding in it an account of the suspension or exile of a Lutheran pastor for having trespassed upon the spiritual preserve of the orthodox church, or the banishment of a peasant family to the Trans-Caucasus for having abandoned the worship of "miracle-working" images, and returned to the simpler and purer faith of the first disciples.[1] The Russian Stundists, in their faith and in their practice, probably come nearer to living in accordance with the spirit and the precepts of Christ than do any other people in the Czar's dominions; and yet they can meet to read the New Testament and to pray only in secret, and if they are discovered gathered together in the name of their Master, they are arrested, imprisoned, and finally banished to the Caucasus or to Siberia.

Mr. Botkine asserts that the orthodox church "has always deferred to the fullest extent to the saying in the Scriptures, 'Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.'" It would be a truer statement, and therefore a less irreverent statement, if I should say that "Where two or three Russians are gathered together in the name of Christ, there is a police officer in the midst of them." If the Saviour himself should appear, poor and unknown, in a Russian peasant village, as he appeared in Galilee nineteen centuries ago, if he should speak to the people the same words that he spoke in Galilee and that are recorded in the four Gospels, he would not be at liberty twenty-four hours. He would first be handcuffed and sent to the pale of settlement by etape as a Jew, and then, if he continued to teach, he would be rearrested and thrown into prison. If he finally escaped crucifixion at the hands of the holy orthodox church which bears his name, it would be only because crucifixion has been superseded in Russia by exile, incarceration in the "heretic cells" of remote monasteries,[2] and deportation to the mines of the Trans-Baikal.

Mr. Botkine declares that "Russia and the United States are natural and disinterested allies, who have never fallen out, and are drawn to each other by bonds of sympathy."

If we investigate carefully the nature of the sympathy which draws the despotic Government of Russia toward the free popular Government of the United States, we shall find that it is not a sympathy based upon similarity of institutions, nor upon affectionate esteem and good will, but rather a sympathy based upon a feeling of hostility for the Government of Great Britain. It is a sympathy founded primarily upon hatred. The interests of Rus-

[1] See, for examples, "The Canada Presbyterian," Toronto, August 14, 1889; "The Independent," New York, August 15, 1889; "The Religious Intelligencer," Fredericton, N. B., August 14, 1889; "The Presbyterian Observer," Philadelphia, August 8, 1889; "The Christian," London, England, August 29, 1890, and also the "Times," London, November 15, 1889; The "New York Times," November 15, 1889; the "New York Tribune," March 31, 1891, and May 31, 1891; and the "New York Times," January 24, 1892.

[2] A correspondent of the St. Petersburg newspaper "The Voice," living at Suzdal, in the province of Vladimir, discovered, in the year 1880, that in the prison connected with the monastery at that place there were living two bishops and an archbishop of the dissenting sect known as the "Starovertsi," or Old Believers. One of the bishops had been in solitary confinement in this monasterial prison 17 years, the other 22 years, and the archbishop 26 years. For merely making this fact known to the public, "The Voice" was deprived for a month of the right to print advertisements.

sia and Great Britain have always conflicted both in Europe and in Asia; and, unfortunately, the interests of the United States and Great Britain have also conflicted on the Canadian border and in the North Pacific. As a natural result of this state of affairs, the two powers opposed to Great Britain have been drawn, at times, into a half-political, half-sentimental alliance against their common enemy; and each, in turn, has looked to the other for moral if not physical aid and support. That this was the view of Russo-American relations taken by the Emperor Nicholas in 1838 there can be no doubt. The United States and Great Britain seemed at that time to be on the brink of war. Sir Francis Head, in attempting to crush an insurrection in Canada, had attacked on the Niagara River the American steamer *Caroline*, said to be in the service of the insurgents, had killed her crew within our jurisdiction, set her on fire, and allowed her to drift over Niagara Falls. This incident and the frontier skirmishes that followed it caused great popular excitement in the United States, and a strong feeling of hostility was manifested there toward the Government of Great Britain. The Emperor Nicholas was well aware of this hostile feeling, and before it had had time to subside he took occasion, in a conversation with Mr. George Mifflin Dallas, United States minister in St. Petersburg, to discuss the relations between his Government and ours. Mr. Dallas reports the conversation as follows:

> He [the Emperor] then recurred to our political relations, was happy to know that between him and the United States there could exist no sentiments but those of the most friendly character, and hoped that I went away under the same impression. I told him that my attention to the subject had produced a conviction that our highest interests as a nation were identified with those of Russia. "Not only are our interests alike," said he, "but [with emphasis in his tone] our enemies are the same."[1]

The Emperor's last words furnish the key to what might seem the inexplicable mystery of friendship and sympathy between the most absolute of monarchies and the freest of republics—"our enemies are the same."

In the darkest period of our civil war, when the ruling classes in England were openly hostile to the Government of the United States, and when it seemed likely that Great Britain would intervene in behalf of the Confederacy, Russia saw another opportunity to strengthen her tacit alliance with the United States as against her European enemy England; and she therefore sent her fleet with sealed orders to the port of New York. This action, however, was not taken as a means of showing her sympathy with American institutions, nor as a proof of her desire that the crucial experiment of republican self-government should succeed. It was simply a movement on the great chess-board of diplomacy to threaten the adverse Queen. Great Britain seemed likely to acquire, by means of armed intervention, an amount of power and influence in the New World which the Russian government regarded as excessive and dangerous. If, by sending a fleet to New York, Russia could prevent this intervention and acquisition of power on the part of Great Britain, and, at the same time, gain the friendship and gratitude of the people of the North, who were likely to win in the struggle, she would score two points against her traditional enemy. Prince Gortchakoff, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, virtually admitted this in an interview which he had with Mr. Bayard Taylor, our diplomatic representative at St. Petersburg, in 1862. "What Russia fears," he said, "is the ultimate exhaustion of the two sections of the Union, which will leave them helpless to resist the encroachments of hostile powers. The political equilibrium which she sees in the maintenance of the Union in its original strength would thus be destroyed.[2]

It appears from this statement that Russia's action was controlled, not primarily by friendship for the people or the Government of the United States, but rather by considerations of enlightened self-interest. She desired, for reasons of her own, to maintain the existing "political equilibrium," and to prevent Great Britain from acquiring such a preponderance of power as would render her a more dangerous enemy than ever. That Great Britain was the power against which this move was made, and that the Government of the United States was well aware of the fact, appears clearly from the nature of the service that our Secretary of State proposed to render Russia in return for her aid and support. This service was the sending of a special mission to the court of Persia with a view to furthering the aggressive plans of Russia in Central Asia. "It was conceived," Mr. Bayard Taylor says, "that this friendship [between Russia and the United States] could be sealed more completely if the United States were to enter into diplomatic relations with Persia; since it was clear to statesmen that the movements of Russia, in the future, would be on that frontier; and any *moral support* which

[1] "Diary of George Mifflin Dallas, while United States Minister to Russia," etc., J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1892, p. 209.

[2] "Life and Letters of Bayard Taylor," Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1884. Letter of Mr. Taylor to Mr. Seward, dated St. Petersburg, November 12, 1862.

the United States, *as an English-speaking people*, might thus grant to Russia, *would be of peculiar value*."[1] The significant reference to the "peculiar value" which the "moral support" of an "English-speaking people" would have for Russia, when she should begin her "movements" along the Persian frontier, shows clearly that it was against Great Britain that such movements were to be directed. The Government of the United States virtually said to the Government of Russia, "You supported us against Great Britain at a critical moment in our history, and now we will support you against Great Britain when you begin your march toward India—'our enemies are the same.'"

From this brief recital of the facts of the case it will be seen, I think, that the attitude taken by Russia toward the United States in 1862–63 was dictated by self-interest rather than by friendship. But even if it were not so, even if Alexander II. and the group of men who constituted the Government of Russia at that time were actuated by the most generous and disinterested motives, the debt of gratitude which we should owe to them would not be payable to Alexander III. and the group of men who constitute the Russian government of to-day. The rulers of Russia thirty years ago were comparatively liberal and enlightened men, and they were engaged, at that very time, in a work of regeneration and reform which promised to bring happiness and prosperity to their people. The rulers of Russia to-day are oppressors, religious bigots, and reactionists, whose chief aim seems to be the complete destruction of all the liberal institutions that their predecessors founded. We might properly have felt sympathy with the reforming Russian government of 1862; but with the reactionary Government of to-day, which gags the provincial assemblies, limits the right of trial by jury, persecutes the Jews and the Stundists, flogs the people by thousands for non-payment of taxes, and maintains itself by the rigorous enforcement of martial law, we can have nothing in common. If there is to be any "disinterested alliance" between the United States and Russia, it should be based upon some nobler feeling than hostility to Great Britain. If there is to be any "bridge of sentiment" between the Republic of the West and the Empire of the North, it should stretch not from the State Department to the throne of the Czar, but from the hearts of the American people to the hearts of the men and women beyond the Vistula who share our love of freedom, but are unable to attain it, and who look to us for sympathy while they wait for the dawn of a brighter day. Russia will not always be a despotism. Sooner or later the authority of the autocrat will give way to the authority of the people; and when that time comes I hope we may be able to say to the free citizens of a free Russia that if, in their time of need, we did not give our moral support to them, we at least withheld it from their oppressors. As for me, my sympathies are with the Russia of the people, not the Russia of the Czars; with the Russia of the provincial assemblies, not the Russia of the secret police; with the Russia of the future, not the Russia of the past.

George Kennan.

[1] "Life and Letters of Bayard Taylor," Vol. I, pp. 411, 412. The italics are my own.

TOPICS OF THE TIME.

Origin and Growth of the Spoils System.

MR. CARL SCHURZ, in his interesting address at the annual meeting of the National Civil Service Reform League, in April last, gave some very instructive facts about the attitude of Presidents Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams toward appointments to and removals from office. He showed that Jefferson during his two terms made only thirty-nine removals, that Madison during his two terms made only five, that Monroe during his two terms made nine, and John Quincy Adams during his four years made only two. Because the number of Jefferson's removals was four times as great as that of any other President during the first forty years of the Government, he has been accused of introducing the "spoils" system into American politics. There is little or no foundation for this charge. The spoils system was in full operation when he became President, and although his election brought a new party into power, and although the offices were filled almost entirely with members of the defeated party, he made very few removals except for good cause, and resisted strong importunities to make what is known as a modern "clean sweep." His utterances, as Mr. Schurz showed in his address, were strongly in favor of what are now the recognized principles of civil-service reform, and in all but an insignificant portion of his removals and appointments he lived up to his utterances. Of Madison's five removals, three were of defaulters, and the other two were for good cause. Monroe, coming into office, like Madison, without party change, and coming in also under the mollifying influence of the so-called "era of good feeling," had no excuse for making many changes, and all his nine removals were for good cause.

With the second Adams the case was quite different. He had been subjected to bitter personal opposition, and had been elected under such peculiar political