

MONEY IN PRACTICAL POLITICS.



PERHAPS no field offers a better opportunity for the study of human nature than that of practical politics. No man better understands the motives that guide men in daily life than the politician; and no man uses this knowledge to accomplish his own purposes with greater skill than he.

By the ordinary citizen of the educated class, the practical politician is thought to be a man who, though sometimes perhaps having good intentions, is nevertheless led by selfish motives, in the main, to do selfish, corrupt, and dishonest deeds. In his own eyes, the practical politician of the higher grade is a patriotic citizen working for the good of a party upon the success of which depends the welfare of the country. He feels in many cases that he is driven to acts which to him are unpleasant; which are, perhaps, on the whole unfortunate for the country, but which, under the circumstances, are still a stern necessity. To be sure, among the "workers" will be found many who care neither for country nor party, nor even for leader, though that is rare; but in the higher ranks the proportion of the consciously dishonest, although possibly larger than that of the same class among merchants or lawyers, is still small. Most of our office-holders in the higher legislative and executive positions are at bottom as honest, hard-working, and self-sacrificing as men of other classes. The "submerged tenth" have dragged the reputations of their fellow-politicians lower than truth would permit us to declare their characters to be. These differences of opinion with reference to the character of the practical politician come largely from lack of knowledge on the part of the public as to the circumstances in which the politician is placed, and as to the pressure that is brought to bear upon him, as well as from ignorance of the amount of excellent self-sacrificing work that he really does.

Our Government is said to be one founded upon public influence guided by public opinion. There can be little question that all reforms must come from demands of the public; but unless the people are well informed as to the exact condition of affairs, they cannot act with intelligence. At the present time there is a great outcry against corruption in elections, and the selfish acts of the practical politicians as shown therein, and a demand that these

abuses be done away with. The demand is most certainly a worthy one; but it comes in good part from men who, though honest and well intentioned, do not begin to appreciate the real state of affairs, and who, consequently, too often suggest remedies for the abuses that are utterly impracticable, and which in many cases would do more harm than good. When the people really see things as they are, know what ought to be done, and demand that action be taken, the politician will be ready and prompt to act. The politician cannot act until he feels that public opinion is with him; his business, in fact, and in justice too in the main, is not to guide public opinion, but to follow it. He may help to create and guide public opinion, but that duty is equally incumbent upon lawyers, preachers, teachers, and all good and intelligent citizens. We need to distinguish in this regard the reformer, and even the statesman, from the politician. It is the business of the politician, and the business is a worthy one, to care for the interests of his party, and thereby, as it appears to him, for the interests of the state; and his party interests cannot be cared for unless he follows public opinion. To the politician also "the public" means, not merely the educated or the good citizens, but all citizens who have votes. If, then, we expect the politician to change his methods of action, we must in some way bring it about that by the change more votes will be gained to the party in power than will be lost.

A politician knows very well that he does many things that are condemned by the most enlightened consciences; he does many things that to himself are disagreeable, and that trouble even his well-trained conscience; but, as has been said, to him these acts are necessary, and he does them as other good people do necessary but unpleasant tasks. When he can be made to see that it will be better, not for himself personally, but for the success of the party,—which, let me repeat, to him means the good of the country,—to change the methods of conducting elections, nobody will be more ready to change than he. Indeed, as vote-buying is in reality a very unpleasant business for many of our most influential politicians,—so much so that many of them, while directing it, will never themselves take any part in it,—no one will work more actively to make this practice unnecessary than will they, if it can be clearly shown that a change to a better system of carrying elections is practicable.

Now nothing can be done that will have more influence in bringing together the opinions of the practical politicians, and of the citizens who are not in politics, than a candid statement of the real conditions under which elections are carried. The objectors to the present methods of work will then see the circumstances under which the politician acts, will be better able to see some remedy that can be suggested for the present state of things, and thus will be enabled to help the politician into better methods of political work.

PARTY ORGANIZATION.

PERHAPS the most important duty of the politician, under our present system, is to make nominations; but passing that by, and assuming that the nominations have already been made, let us see how the politician goes to work to carry an election. The first essential condition to success in a campaign is thorough party organization. We often use the word organization without fully realizing what thorough organization means. The "blocks-of-five" letter that was so much denounced in the campaign of 1888, while bad enough in intent from the standpoint of an honest citizen, was, nevertheless, in many respects, a very sensible, wise letter from the standpoint of practical working methods. From the standpoint of a "worker," the main objection to it was that it was entirely unnecessary to take so much risk as the writing of the letter involved. Probably in the whole State of Indiana there were few places where the organization was not as complete as that recommended in the famous letter.

As I write, I have before me some pages from the poll-books and check-books of one of the county committees in the State of New York. Before registration day a thorough canvass is made of each election district. The names of all of the voters are arranged in these poll-books alphabetically. After the column of names comes a series of columns headed, respectively, Republican, Democrat, Prohibition, Doubtful, Post-office Address, Occupation, and Remarks. Each voter's address is taken, and opposite his name is placed a mark in the proper column showing whether he is a regular Republican, a Democrat, or a Prohibition voter, or whether he is to be considered a "doubtful." After registration day, each man who registers has his name checked in the poll-book, so that the committees of both parties have a complete list of all those entitled to vote in each district. From this book, then, a check-book is prepared. In this second book, if I take as an example the check-book of the Republican party, on each page will be arranged in the first place, alphabetically, the names of

all the Republicans in the district; then in a column below, or on another page, all those that are considered doubtful; that is, those whose politics are not known, and those whose votes it is thought possible to bring to the Republican party either by persuasion or by purchase. The Democratic committees have books similarly arranged, with the names of all the sound Democrats and of the "doubtfuls."

In some places the prices that are paid from year to year are entered, usually, perhaps, as in the case of an acquaintance of mine in Michigan, by a private mark. Such entries depend upon the care and skill of the individual "worker." They are not very common, and really seem unnecessary. The memories of the "workers" will serve as long as it is necessary; and they do not care to keep historical records, interesting and valuable as such records would be.

On election day, then, it is an easy matter for the poll-book holder, standing by the polls, to check the name of every reliable party man as he comes to vote, and near the end of the day to find out how many men of his own party have not yet voted. He can then readily send a messenger to bring in any late or careless voters, the character of whose votes is not doubtful. The workers of each party, having thus a complete list of all doubtful or purchasable voters, will know how to handle them.

These doubtful voters will not be divided carelessly into "blocks-of-five and each block put into the hands of a trusty man," but each doubtful voter, being known, with his habits, his work, his associates, is considered individually. If he is one whose vote can be affected by honest persuasion, the man in the party who would be likely to have the most influence with him is selected to work with him, and to influence his vote by fair means, if possible. If he is a man whose vote must be purchased, he will be assigned to the worker who can purchase him to the best advantage. If the number of "floaters," or "commercials," as they are variously called, is relatively large to the number of workers, it may well be that they will have to be purchased in blocks of fives or blocks of tens; or, again, owing to social reasons, they at times can best be bought in groups, or clubs, or traded; but in all cases where the best work is done, each individual "floater," whether bought singly or as one of a group, is looked after personally by the man best competent to handle him.

Sometimes, especially where vote-buying has not been very common, it requires much skill and tact to handle these "commercials" to the best advantage. Your "float" is at times a sensitive, proud creature, patriotic to a degree. He votes, forsooth, with his party, as an

honest man should. But if, perchance, he can be made to believe that his own party "workers" distrust him,—that his name, for example, has appeared on their check-books in the doubtful column,—his wrath is enkindled, and his political enemy gets his vote on easy terms. And, again, he often feels it right to desert his party's candidate, unless he is paid as much money as the opposition will give. On equal terms he will vote with his party; but surely his vote is worth as much to his candidate as to the other, and why should he not get some money as long as there seems to be plenty to spare? He needs it more than do the candidates who furnished it. As a rule, however, a "floaters" gets less for voting with his own party than with the enemy; and the regular "floaters" is not sensitive, but may be approached directly and bargained with.

CAMPAIGN FUNDS.

A NECESSARY preliminary to the work on election day is the securing of election funds. Of course, there are many legitimate expenses in an election; the printing of tickets in ordinary cases, the hiring of campaign speakers and the payment of their expenses, the rent of halls, the printing of campaign literature, the purchase of torches and uniforms for processions, if such be considered necessary, etc. But after all, in close campaigns in doubtful districts, by far the largest part of the funds goes for the direct or indirect purchase of voters. How are these funds raised? The facts that follow are not mere guesses. The information in all cases is thoroughly trustworthy, though I am not at liberty to give names, and in many places it would be unwise to mention localities exactly. But in all instances cited the statements are trustworthy.

Of course the first, and in most cases the chief, source of revenue is the assessment of candidates. The amount of these assessments varies in different localities and under different circumstances. A common assessment in Illinois, for example, in districts that are not considered especially doubtful in ordinary elections, is five per cent. of the annual salary; and it is expected that all candidates, unless there is some special reason for exception, will pay this assessment. However, it not infrequently happens that the most valuable candidate for the party is a poor man who is unable to pay the regular assessment. In that case, the committee, taking all the circumstances into account, ask him to pay what seems reasonable, or he may be even entirely exempted from assessment, as in the case of a crippled candidate for county recorder in Indiana in 1890. A wealthy candidate, who can well afford to pay more, is sometimes assessed a lump sum with-

out any especial reference to the salary that he is to receive if elected.

In national elections local county committees expect to receive money also from the national committee, usually through the hands of the state committee. In the campaign of 1888 the Republican committee in one county of Indiana received \$800 from the state committee, which they supposed, as a matter of course, came from the national committee.

In the campaign of 1880, in that same State, the two leading county managers of one of the parties went to Indianapolis and met there a representative from the national committee. They went to his room in the hotel to talk with him regarding funds. When he asked their needs, it was replied that they did not come to beg money from the national committee, but that their county stood ready to match dollar for dollar whatever sum he was willing to give them. "You're the kind of men I have been wanting to see," replied the gratified representative from New York. "You can have as much money as you want; help yourselves." He took down two valises, and threw them open, showing them packed full of bills. One of the most astute of New York political managers is of the opinion that while they doubtless took what they needed, they failed to keep their promise to match the sum "dollar for dollar" from their own county; but they did keep their word.

Another source of revenue, and one that is much larger than we should expect, if we did not consider the great enthusiasm that a close campaign arouses, is voluntary contributions. I am not speaking here of the large sums that are raised by national committees from wealthy men, especially from those who feel that they have much at stake in national legislation, but the amount that is contributed to county and city committees in local campaigns. In the campaign of 1888, in the same county that received \$800 from the national committee, one little city of 4000 inhabitants raised \$1200 a day or two before the election, after the assessments had been collected. The money was given voluntarily by enthusiastic men. In that campaign, in that county, some \$7000 was spent by one party alone, the greater part of it in the purchase of votes.

Not infrequently, however, some extra pressure is necessary to secure the proper amount from those assessed, or to increase the size of the voluntary contributions. In this same campaign of 1888, in the most important city of a doubtful congressional district in a Western State, the management of the city campaign was put into the hands of a young men's club. The candidate for congressman, of course, had to pay assessments to each one of the county

committees in his district, besides paying to the local committee in charge of the election in this city. He was a man who had himself been an active campaigner for many years, a man who was known to be unscrupulous in his methods, and one who was commonly believed, even by enthusiastic members of his own party, to have purchased his nomination at an expense of \$1500, mostly spent in packing caucuses, though some delegates were probably bought outright. The chairman of this young men's club was without much experience in politics, but, nevertheless had a good knowledge of political methods. He was a young man of strong will, a shrewd judge of human nature, and he knew his man. The executive committee of the club was called together at the proper time, and in allotting to the leading candidates the sums that seemed proper for them to pay, this candidate for Congress was put down for \$200. A messenger was sent to ask him to come to meet the executive committee. It was known that he was a hard man to collect money from, and the committee expected trouble. When he came in, the chairman said, "Well, Mr. —, I suppose you know why we have sent for you." The candidate replied, that he presumed they needed money, and added he expected, of course, to pay his share. "We have been considering the matter," said the chairman, "and we have decided that your share is \$400." The candidate, evidently surprised, inquired if the sum was not rather large, but was solemnly assured that, as the campaign was to be a severe one, they were unanimously of the opinion that he should pay \$400. After some hesitation, he said that he would do so, put his name to a subscription paper, and left the room. The committee were jubilant (as one member expressed it, "I thought I should tumble when he said \$400"), and thought the chairman's doubling of the amount agreed upon a stroke of genius; but he explained that he had thought it necessary to ask twice what was expected in order to get what they really needed. Inasmuch, however, as the candidate had promised the \$400, he intended to collect it. So, when the proper time came for asking for the first instalment, he sent a messenger for \$200. After some hesitation, and a somewhat more earnest demand, a check for \$200 came. When shortly before the election a messenger was sent for the second instalment of \$200, and the money was not promptly forthcoming, an emphatic demand was sent to the candidate, with the assurance that if the messenger did not bring back a check for \$200, the young men's club would drop the work of the campaign then and there; it was not their intention to carry on a losing campaign, and the money must be paid at once

or they would cease their work. The messenger brought back the second check for \$200.

In a county in Indiana the chairman of the Republican committee found, on the day before election, that he had at his disposal, raised by the usual means, some two or three thousand dollars. The Democrats had probably about the same amount. The county was a close one, and the Republican chairman felt that he needed more money; so he quietly sent word to the leading Republicans that he had learned, straight from the Democratic camp (with the intimation that he had bribed some of the Democratic committee to tell), that the Democrats had \$6000 ready, and that unless the Republicans could raise more money, the election would be lost. These wealthy leading Republicans were summoned to a meeting that evening. The case was laid before them; they were assured that the campaign was lost unless more money were raised, and there, on the spot, at least \$3000 were collected. The next day the Republicans were in a position to offer \$40 a vote at the opening of the polls. By ten o'clock the Democratic money was gone, and after that the Republicans could buy votes at their own price. About three o'clock, an eye-witness tells me that he saw the Republicans buy "a whole raft of voters" at the lowest rates; the Democratic money had been exhausted hours before.

This plan of offering high prices for votes early in the day by the party that has most money, and thus exhausting early the enemy's treasury, is common. A local leader in New York State told me that he once made the opposition in one town exhaust their funds in the purchase of their first ten votes, and that then he bought all day for one fifth the first sum offered.

Money comes to aid the candidates also in many other ways than in those mentioned. In the State election of 1891, one of the candidates for membership in the lower house of the Ohio legislature, a resident of one of the central counties, within a week of his nomination, was approached by the postmaster of his city and told that if he would agree to vote for Mr. — for United States Senator he might have all the money that he needed to bear his campaign expenses of all kinds, and that he might name the sum himself. Any candidate who is willing to sell himself can easily find money to help secure his election.

CAMPAIGN METHODS.

ALTHOUGH in many districts, especially where the proportion of the "commercial" voters is large, bribery is most relied upon to secure votes, other means are not neglected.

Anything that can carry demoralization into the enemy's camp is likely to be resorted to; though, in such cases, everything depends upon the personal character and shrewdness of the managers.

One of the most astute, as well as one of the most unscrupulous, of political managers is Dr. C—. He is a man whose character in private business is entirely above reproach, a man of unusual intelligence, of good credit, and good morals. He has been the chairman of the Republican committee of his county for a number of years. Into his county there came some few years ago a lightning-rod agent, a southern man, and an ex-confederate. He was a violent Democrat, a shrewd talker, and soon won the confidence of the Democratic managers, and became prominent in their councils. But the lightning-rod business was not very profitable, and the man seemed to Dr. C— one whom he could use. So meeting him one day, he inquired about his business, found that it was not very good, and offered him an opportunity to make more money, and a good regular income if he wished. The man asked what he was to do.

"In the first place," said C—, "you are to obey orders; do exactly as I tell you; ask no questions, and make truthful reports. I want you now to go down to the town of J— and make the acquaintance of Mr. G—; hunt him up, and talk with him. I do not care what you say,—talk lightning-rod business,—but go and see him to-day and report to me, and then make it your business for the next few weeks to see him as often as once or twice a week, and talk with him, so that the neighbors will know that you two are acquainted."

A campaign was coming on, and Mr. G— was the most trusted Democratic "worker" in his town, and the man who had regularly handled the funds for his party there. The lightning-rod agent had himself appointed on the Democratic committee, and gave reliable information to the Republican chairman as to the amount of funds the Democrats had, what their plans were, and all other information that could benefit the Republicans.

Shortly before election day, acting under the instructions of Dr. C—, he began to hint to the Democratic managers that all was not right with Mr. G—. He doubted his loyalty to the Democratic party. He suspected that he was betraying the interests of the party to the Republicans, and that he would turn over the money given him to buy Republican votes. At first he was not believed at all. G— was an honest man, and had been a reliable Democrat for years; it was impossible that he should be treacherous. At length, one or two

evenings before the election, in a meeting of the Democratic committee, this agent declared that he knew Mr. G— was playing false; that he had overheard Dr. C— and others talking, and had learned that they had purchased Mr. G—. When this was still not believed, he told the committee to name any man from their number to go with him; he had heard that a meeting of the Republican committee was to be held that evening; he knew where he could listen at their door without fear of detection, and he could get absolute proof.

A man, one of his own kind, was selected to go with him. They went to the building where the Republican headquarters were, and secreted themselves so that they could overhear what was going on within. Soon Dr. C—, Judge A—, Messrs. H—, and D—, and other members of the Republican executive committee, began talking over campaign matters in the town of J—. Dr. C— brought up this case of Mr. G— (of course, this had been arranged by him with the spy beforehand), and told the other members of the committee, in detail, how he had purchased G—, how much it had cost him, how much money he was to get from him, the exact sum that the Democrats had put into his hands, etc. The agent and his ally then crept back to the Democratic headquarters and told their story.

The Democrats sent a messenger post haste to summon G— to come at once, that night. He appeared before the committee, and was denounced for his treachery. He denied the charge vehemently, called to witness his long service to the party, his character, his habits, everything—but to no avail. There were two witnesses present who had heard the whole details of the story from Dr. C—. He was read out of his position of trust in the party; but it was too late to get another man to fill his place in that town. His friends and neighbors trusted him, and disbelieved all the charges made by the Democratic committee, so far as they were known. The consequence was that the Democratic management in that town was utterly demoralized, and the Republicans easily carried the day.

Dr. C— kept his lightning-rod agent in his employ for two or three years, using him at his will as a spy upon the Democratic camp. He had suspected one year that one of his local managers was playing false to him, but he had no proof. Shortly before the next election, his agent spy was instructed to make the acquaintance of the man, and to attempt to buy him for the Democrats. This was done, the bargain made in detail. Then Dr. C— sent his agent to the Democratic manager, who, he suspected, had made the bargain the year before. In confidential tones the agent told his brother Demo-

crat that he had found a traitor among the Republicans, his influence, his price, etc., and at length his name. "Sh—," said the manager, lifting his finger. "Keep away from him; he's my man. I got him last year." A little questioning brought out all the facts, which were duly reported to Dr. C—. He, in turn, called on his Republican co-laborer of the year before, and, by his knowledge of facts, forced from him a humiliating, in fact, tearful confession, and a restitution of the money. Finally, when it was evident that the lightning-rod agent could be used no longer, the doctor told him that he thought he had better leave the county; that he should go to the Democratic manager and get a suit of clothes for the services that he could render the Democrats in that campaign. He went, and received a suit. On election day he appeared in his new suit of clothes; and taking the Republican ticket in his hand, made a speech to the Democrats, announced his conversion to Republican principles, voted the Republican ticket, and left the polls and the county, never to return. Some time after, the Democratic manager, Mr. A—, a thoroughly upright, trustworthy, honorable man in all matters not connected with political campaigns, meeting Dr. C—, remarked, after referring to the lightning-rod agent, "Dr. C—, I believe you are the — villain that ever lived"; a remark which Dr. C— took, quietly smiling, without comment. Of course the news of the agent's treachery gave rise to the belief that in some way Mr. G— had been betrayed; but the details of the plot were known only to the agent and Dr. C—, and Dr. C— has, presumably, never told the story to any except reliable, intimate Republican friends.

I know of an instance in Michigan where a very skilful Republican ward "worker" has kept a Democrat in his pay for years. Through him he is kept informed of the enemy's plans; helps pack the Democratic caucuses to Republican advantage—an excellent trick, he thinks; buys votes to better effect, etc. Doubtless such instances are not very common.

To demoralize the Democrats, in one congressional district in a Western State, in 1888, the Republican candidate paid a man \$600 and expenses, some \$1500 in all, to run as a Labor candidate, and thus draw part of the Democratic vote. After getting the money, the Labor candidate is said by the Republican managers to have sold out to the Democrats, though my information on that point is not entirely trustworthy.

HOW VOTES ARE BOUGHT.

AND NOW, how are the voters bought? I have shown how thoroughly each district is organ-

ized, how carefully each vote is watched, and some few of the many plans adopted to weaken the enemy. In many cases voters who can be bought beforehand are kept in custody for a day or two before election, then taken to the polls, and voted. In one case, in Indiana, a man kept a half-idiot who was working for him shut up in his cellar for some days before an election, to prevent the opposing party from capturing and treating him in the same way. Then, on election morning, with a man on each side to guard him, he was marched to the polls with a prepared ticket in his hands, and voted.

In 1888, in another county of the same State, six "floaters" were kept under guard in an upstairs office over night, the next morning taken down, marched to the polls under guard, voted, brought back to the office, and \$96 paid to their leader—\$16 apiece. How the money was divided among them only the leader knew. The owner of the office is an intelligent, honest, patriotic, Christian citizen, who detests the whole system, but who says that he cannot sit still and see the enemy win by such methods. He favors any law that will stop the custom in both parties, even though it should be to the disadvantage of his own.

In a small city in Michigan a friend of mine saw two "floaters" go back and forth across the street several times between a Republican and a Democratic worker. The first bid was a dollar, and the bids were increased a dollar at a time. The men finally voted at \$7. In one of the eastern counties of New York, some years ago, a good church deacon and his son received \$40 each for their votes from a manager of their own party to keep them from deserting to the enemy. That year, in that district, a strongly Republican one for many years, the Democrats nominated a very wealthy man for Congress with the hope of winning. The management of the election was put into the hands of a man who, up to that date, had been an active Republican; but his services had not been rewarded. The Democratic candidate is said to have spent \$190,000. This seems beyond belief; but it is certain that the Democrats won, that the campaign is still remembered for its unheard-of extravagance in vote-buying, and that the corrupting influence of that campaign of some years ago is still felt in the district.

In another Western State, the night before election, the Democrats had several "floaters" corraled in a small hotel and plentifully supplied with whisky. During the night the building was set on fire; and as the "floaters" escaped from the flames, most of them were captured by Republican "workers," run in for the night, and voted as Republicans the next day. Two theories as to the origin of the fire

have been offered: one that the stove was upset by the drunken "floaters"; the other, that the building was set on fire by the Republican workers.

In one of the eastern counties of New York State, Mr. L—, a local Democratic politician, had a bull for sale. The day before the election of 1888 a farmer came to buy the bull. The price asked was \$20, the amount offered was \$15; no sale was made. The next day L— was at the polls looking out for votes. The farmer, with his two sons, all of whom commonly voted the Democratic ticket, inquired how much he was paying for votes. He told him \$5 apiece. The man went away to see the Republican "workers," and soon returned, saying that he had been offered \$6 each, making \$18 in all. L— considered a moment, and then said: "Well, you take these three ballots and go and vote them, and tomorrow come and get the bull." "So," as my informant tells me, "the honest farmer and his two sons took the ballots, and went, and voted for the bull." L— transferred \$20 from the election pocket to his private pocket, and the double transaction was complete.

In Albany County, New York, a number of years ago, one of the Republican candidates prepared some tickets to be given to the "floaters" who were purchased for him. On the presentation of these tickets, they were to receive the sum stipulated. Some of the Democratic committee learned of the plan, secured one of the tickets, and then forged enough for their own use. During the day they bought voters freely for their own party, and paid them in tickets which were sent to the Republican candidate to cash. He redeemed tickets all day, and toward the close of the polls, counting up his tickets, and believing himself elected by a large majority, offered to bet a round sum as to the size of his majority. When the polls were closed, however, and the votes were counted, he was found to be defeated, his tickets having been used to too good advantage by the Democrats. In many localities little money goes directly to the voters. It is paid to men of influence to use in treating, etc., or simply to get them to coerce laborers or to influence friends.

These instances that I have given are typical, although in certain respects they may be considered extreme, and in these forms are, perhaps, not very common.

HOW PREVALENT IS VOTE-BUYING?

AFTER all, the vital question is, How prevalent is this custom of cheating and of purchasing votes, and what possibility is there of reform? The prevalence of the custom of vote-

buying depends, of course, very largely upon the locality, and upon the circumstances in each case. Where a district is strongly Republican or Democratic, and there is little likelihood of defeat for the more prominent party, there is little necessity for vote-buying, and little is done. In a city of some 15,000 inhabitants in the State of Illinois in the campaign of 1888, money for the direct purchase of votes was furnished to only two wards, and \$125 only was put into the worst ward—*i. e.*, the one having the most purchasable votes—by the party having the most money. In most of the wards three or four "workers" were paid for their day's labor at the polls, at \$2 apiece; and a few, mostly colored men, were hired to drive carriages to bring voters to the polls. In this way eight or ten votes, possibly, at each polling-place were made secure. But in one or two of the wards not even "workers" at the polls were paid for their time; all was voluntary. This paying of "workers" is almost universally found.

I have spoken of one county in another State in which, in that same campaign, \$7000 was spent by one party, mostly in vote-buying. In that county is one township, the most corrupt that my attention has ever been called to. I have been assured by thoroughly trustworthy informants from both parties, members of the county committees, that in that township of some two hundred voters there is not one thoroughly incorruptible vote. The Democratic managers have not one vote of which they are entirely sure; and while there are some Republicans who cannot be bribed by the Democrats, there is not a single Republican voter in the township who does not demand pay for his time on voting day. Under the new ballot law of Indiana, each county campaign committee has to select for each precinct an election judge and an election clerk, residents of the precinct. In 1890 the Democratic committee had no men in that township whom they could thoroughly trust to fill these offices. They feared that any whom they could appoint would be bought by the Republicans. However, they made the best selections that they could; but on election day, in the afternoon, the feeling of distrust was so great that the candidate for district judge drove some miles in order to be on the ground, and by his presence bring what pressure he could to bear upon the Democratic election judge and election clerk.

A man who knows assures me that there is one township in eastern New York, containing about four hundred voters, in which not more than thirty voters are entirely beyond reach of the money influence. Of course these are extreme cases; but it is nevertheless true that the proportion of voters who are subject to

money influence is very great. I have had estimates given me many times by men whose knowledge is based upon experience, and I find that the localities are not very uncommon where from ten to thirty-five per cent. of the voters are purchasable. In one county in New York, in which, perhaps, the Mugwump vote is larger in proportion to the total vote than in any other county in the State, and in which the largest city has only some 12,000 inhabitants, about twenty per cent. of the voters were purchased in 1888. Perhaps I need not add that the voters purchased included none of those counted as Mugwumps.

In Michigan, in one of the best and wealthiest wards of a city of some 15,000 inhabitants, the ward manager tells me that he pays about five per cent. of the voters. His price has never gone above five dollars, and he usually pays only one or two dollars. Though he has to pay some voters of his own party, he never gives them more than two or three dollars, and usually only one dollar.

The evil is not confined to the cities, nor to any one State. The probability is, that, all things considered, in such a State as that of New York, the farmers are as corrupt as the residents of the cities. It is said to be not an uncommon thing in New York State for a farmer to drive in to the polls with his sons and hired help, and virtually auction off the lot to the highest bidder. In California, an eye-witness tells me that he has seen fifty votes offered in a lump by one leader, though, in the special case mentioned, little was at stake in the election; no bidders were found, and the men (Greasers) finally withdrew late in the afternoon without voting at all.

THE EFFECT OF VOTE-BUYING ON THE VOTERS.

PERHAPS the chief danger to the State from this corruption is that where vote-buying has become common, the habit has so permeated the lower class of voters that the thought of corruption or of wrong-doing does not enter the minds of many. They feel that they have something to sell which is valuable to the candidate; and they sell their vote to the candidate with almost as little sense of guilt as they sell their potatoes to the grocer or their labor to their employer.

In a small city in Michigan, in a single election for alderman, caused by the resignation of the former holder of the office, in the wealthiest and most respectable ward in the city, a friend of mine was a candidate. On the day of election an acquaintance came to him, said that he wanted to vote for him, and asked him for a dollar or two. The candidate referred him to a committeeman who, he said, was managing the

campaign. The day after election even, a man came to him and asked him for two dollars, saying that he had bought two votes for him the day before for a dollar each without instructions, and he would like to have the money refunded. He, too, was referred to the committeeman, though he was doubtless lying with reference to the purchase of votes. In these cases, the men evidently had little feeling of guilt for vote-selling, and this seems to be the general testimony regarding the lower class of "floaters."

CAUSES OF CORRUPTION.

BEFORE we can find remedies for the corruption of the ballot it will be necessary to look somewhat carefully into the causes of the corruption. It is not sufficient to say that the corruption is due to the party spirit of the time, or to our form of ballot, or to any other one or more of such external causes; the causes lie deeper than that. In the first place, so long as we have, practically, universal suffrage, we shall always find many voters who are ready to cast their votes not from principle, but for their own pecuniary interest, though this number is smaller than many think. A large part of the "commercials" are paid to vote as they would vote without bribery. Not till the millennium comes can we expect these most selfish voters to refuse to sell their votes, if the opportunity offers. We must in some way make it for the interests of the party managers not to attempt to buy. But, on the other hand, whenever an election is close, and "floaters" stand about, waiting for bids, the temptation is so great for party managers to buy, in order to secure the election of their candidates, that we need not expect the practice to stop, unless in some way, as said above, we can make the advantage to be gained from honesty greater than that to be gained from dishonesty. At the present time, under our present laws, the prize is so great and the risk so slight, that corruption is sure to be found in almost every close district.

At the present time, many a man who will not sell his vote to the opposite party will nevertheless ask pay for his time on election day. From this receipt of his expenses in bringing himself and his workmen to the polls, bribery is made easy. The man feels that he is not selling his vote; he was expecting to vote his party ticket at any rate. But after he has gone thus far a number of times he loses sight of the real purpose for which he is voting, and the ballot seems to be cast for the good, not of the country, but of the candidate. If the candidate is to be benefited, why should he not pay for the benefit? He can afford it. Not a few men, seeing money going freely into the pockets of "floaters," say to the managers: "If

money is so plentiful, why should the scoundrels get it all? Let us honest partymen have our share. Our votes are worth just as much to the candidates."

In classes of university students, containing from ten to twenty voters, more than once I have found several,—from five to ten,—who had received from campaign managers their expenses home from college to cast their votes. These students were by no means common "floaters"; their votes could not be directly purchased at all. But still, on first consideration, many of them defend the payment of expenses of voters by their own party, when they are unable to pay them themselves, not realizing that this is but a covert form of bribery, and that, after receiving expenses, one would not feel at liberty to vote independently. If people as intelligent and honest as are college students of voting age will thus thoughtlessly encourage corrupt methods of voting, what may we expect from the "floater"?

Another cause that has conduced to the corruption of voters is the lack of distinct issues between the parties. When party feeling is very strong, as in our country at the time of the Civil War, when most of the masses feel that upon the success of their party depends the existence of their country, votes will not be so readily sold; relatively speaking, only here and there will be found a man whose vote is purchasable. But when the issues between the parties are not sharply drawn, when a man feels that either party's success is of slight consequence, it is much easier to secure his vote by purchase without any consciousness on his part of corruption.

Without going deeply enough to see the principle that underlies the practice, party managers not infrequently declare that the independent voter in good part is responsible for bribery. It is said that when party lines are sharply drawn the voter will not betray his party, but that when, through the action of independent voters, independent voting has become not merely respectable, but on the whole a mark of the educated, intelligent class, why should not the ignorant voter feel free and proud to cut loose from his party and vote as he will? It is a mark of spirit and intelligence. The intelligent voter, the Mugwump, votes from principle; the ignorant "float" votes for his own advantage, being often too ignorant to distinguish the difference. The argument is used to discourage independent voting. There is some force, doubtless, in the ingenious plea for party fealty, but the real causes of independent voting are of course overlooked in such an argument, and the remedy is to be found rather in making distinct issues than in voting with one party always. The party managers that cover

up and dodge the issues of a campaign are to blame rather than the Mugwump.

REMEDIES.

A LARGE proportion of our States have introduced ballot-reform laws to secure the secrecy of the ballot, and thus, as it is thought, to do away with vote-buying; but it will be found that the remedy, while helpful, is not sufficient. In the State of New York, in the last election, under the new ballot law, which, while not perfect, still secures the secrecy of the ballot, vote-buying was open and unrebuked in some places, though it was far less common, on the whole, than before the law was passed. In one precinct of one of the cities of the State, in the election of 1891, vote-buying was so common that, counting the expenses of both parties, an amount equal to six dollars for every registered voter was paid. The managers, too, had a surplus on hand after the election.

The ballot law did part of its work well. The voter who wished to cast an independent ballot, but who, under the former law would have been intimidated, under the present law entered the booth, prepared his ballot in secret, and voted as he wished. So, too, the man who wished to be known as a party man, but who still wished to split his ticket, being compelled to prepare his ballot in secret, voted more independently.

But the "commercial" voter and the ward "boss" will still at times evade the law. Many a man who will sell his vote, not fully appreciating the enormity of the offense, is still honest enough to vote as he has agreed to vote, especially when he is paid by the party that he calls his own. Party managers know their men, and in many cases can, with a reasonable assurance of success, buy a vote and trust that it will be cast as agreed upon; but when party managers on both sides stand ready to buy, the law will not always be enforced. In some places in New York, in the State election of 1891, men pleaded physical disability on account of headache or other trifling imaginary ailments, and in that way obtained permission to take with them into the booth to prepare their ballots their "friend"—the vote-buyer of the ward. As soon as the managers on one side saw that the others were evading the law, it was much easier and more natural for them to evade the law also, than to attempt to get their rights after the election was lost, by long and doubtful appeal to the courts. So it came about, in some places, that at times two and three men entered the booth together, little attempt being made to enforce the law where any one wished to evade it; and vote-buying was almost as common as of old. It was not the

form of the ballot or the paster ballot that brought about these results; with the blanket ballot the same thing might have happened. It is the corruption system as a whole that has not only stultified the consciences of the buyers and the bought, but has hoodwinked and discouraged citizens who for love of country ought to have seen that the law was enforced. The patriotism of men who stand idly by and see such fraudulent practices may well be questioned. The man who shields a thief or a burglar is a criminal, and may be prosecuted for compounding felony. How is he different morally from the man who winks at corruption of the ballot? Is not that a dangerous crime against the state?

I was discussing lately the merits of the new ballot law of Michigan, before the first election in that State under the law, with a ward "worker," a good, shrewd business man, who is in politics, not for money or office, but for the excitement and love of the game. He is a sporting man by nature. He has managed his ward for years with great success. The thought of honestly obeying the new law did not seem to enter his mind. His only talk was of methods of evading it. When at length I suggested that it might pay to obey it, and to insist upon the opposite party doing the same, he declared that they could not be trusted; that under an honest election they would have the advantage, for he could outwit them in vote-buying; and then, he feared, pathetically, that these new laws were going to take half the fun and excitement out of politics anyway, and he would prevent their action as long as he could.

A registration law that prevents the importation of voters is good. A ballot law that gives the timid party man an opportunity to vote in secret as he will, and that prevents intimidation, is also good, but we need still something more.

The politicians are sometimes averse to vote-buying, and at times will themselves stop it. In one township in Indiana, in 1886, the leaders of both parties, who had fought one another for years, who knew one another's methods, and how best to check them, agreed to do no vote-buying. Unable to trust one another, they met the night before election, and were paired off for work at the polls on election day; no man in either party who had been accustomed to vote-buying was permitted to speak to a "floater" during the day; no man was left a moment alone, unaccompanied by a watcher from the other party. Vote-buying in that town for that day was suppressed, only one vote on either side having been secured by unfair means. But instances of this kind are exceedingly rare, and in the present condition of public opinion cannot be counted upon. And yet, could not five prominent men

in each party practically compel such action in any rural county or in any small city, if they had the will and courage to make a stand? Each of them would need to be as ready to prosecute men in his own party as in that of his opponents. But of course such men are rarely found.

How difficult it is, though, for the average politician to forego a possible advantage for the sake of honest principles was shown not long ago in a city election in the State of New York. The committees had agreed to use no money on either side, and had instructed the ward "workers" to that effect. When, however, later in the day, the "commercials," who were hanging around waiting for a possible purchase, became plentiful, the temptation became too great for one "worker." He had agreed to use no money, but whisky had not been specified; so he supplied himself with a number of bottles of that, and began to run the voters in. Of course the opposite party soon discovered the trick, complaint was made, and the illicit traffic stopped; but the breaking of faith that day has since prevented so honorable an agreement.

This seems allied to another case in Michigan, where the candidate, knowing that he could not directly buy some of his opponent's voters, supplied an ally with money to treat them so freely that they became dead drunk and unable to vote at all; thus, as he said to me, "killing them off for the day." One of them might well have been killed for a longer period; for, as the candidate went home, he saw one of his victims lying in the snow and slush beside the gutter, on a cold, raw day, when such an experience could hardly result in less than a severe illness.

The New York law providing for a sworn return of the amount of money expended by the candidate, though good, as it stands alone, is of course of little influence; for the candidates pay large sums to campaign committees that are irresponsible. Even this law has been evaded in many instances, and party managers say that a majority of candidates in some places have perjured themselves in making their returns. It has doubtless, however, had some good influence, and more legislation along this line would be productive of still greater benefit. It seems very desirable that a law of this kind should be comprehensive, and so explicit in its provisions that a violation could be readily detected. There can be no doubt that before the passage of the Corrupt Practices Acts in England bribery was as great an evil there as it has ever been here, and that the methods of evading the first laws were as ingenious and technical as any used here to steal a senate or to capture a presidency. All the halls in a town

were hired to prevent meetings; to avoid bribery, rooms were rented for a week or two for guests that were never to come; men were hired by the dozen at enormous wages to erect campaign polls, and other squads of "floaters" were hired at equally munificent rates to guard them; that is, to remain in the nearest public house, and to look toward them a few times a day. Wives of needed voters were hired to make banners and uniforms, and their children to carry torches. Probably no imaginable method of corruption was overlooked. And yet their law is said to have practically ended the corruption, only here and there a vote being purchased now.

The English parliamentary elections are much simpler than ours, as only the one office is to be filled, so that their law would need much modification for adoption here. It may be, too, that some of its features would not be well adapted to our country, either because poorly suited to our people, or because we could not hope to secure their enactment. A law might be passed, however, were there a strong desire for reform, that might do much good. The following provisions are suggested:

Let the amount that can be expended for each candidate on the ticket be strictly limited; a certain small sum for a ward or town office, a larger sum for a county office, and a still larger for a congressional or State office, etc. The amounts should be liberal for all legitimate needs, and might be graded more or less by the number of voters, the size of the district, etc. Each candidate should be permitted to pay only his own personal expenses, for traveling, postage, etc. These sums should be limited, and he should be compelled to account under oath for every cent so expended. The rest of his contribution should go to his committee or manager. Every candidate representing a party should be compelled to have his campaign managed by his party committee. All the regular expenditures, except the personal ones mentioned above, should be made by the treasurer of the committee, and he should make a sworn, itemized return of every penny that comes into his hands. An independent candidate should select a manager who, under like conditions of accountability, should manage his canvass. The number of workers under pay at the polls on election day should be strictly limited, and the amount of their compensation prescribed. The English law does not permit the agents at the polls to vote. If their number is limited, however, I do not see the necessity for disfranchisement. Of course all bribery, promises of offices, etc., treating, and all such practices, should be forbidden, as well as expenditures for certain purposes that, though innocent, are really unnecessary, and which are

readily used to avoid bribery laws. Opinions might differ as to the nature of the expenditures to be forbidden; but whenever a practice, innocent in itself, becomes a cover for crime, expenditure of campaign money for it should be forbidden. Under this head in England come expenditures for torch-light processions and parades, bands of music, payment for carriages or horses to bring voters to the polls, payment of railway fares, expenditures for flags, cockades, ribbons, or other marks of distinction, etc. Some of these methods of conducting a campaign may arouse enthusiasm; but they can hardly be said to be educative, and politicians say that processions, music, even campaign speeches, affect few votes. If one party has them, the other must; but excepting the speeches, all might be forbidden with no harm to the voter, though I question if we have in the country a legislature bold enough to pass such a bill.

Many people defend the practice of bringing voters to the polls in carriages at the expense of the party, paying railway fares of those temporarily absent from home, etc. It is said that many a cripple, or poor man living at a distance, would otherwise be deprived of his vote; that the students in colleges, traveling salesmen, and others could often not afford to come home at election time, and that they would thus be disfranchised. So far as the matter concerns the crippled and infirm, while hired carriages do bring them to the polls, the carriages are not hired especially on their account, but rather for the sake of the owners and drivers, and that of the lazy and careless voters, whose votes are worse than useless to the country. The infirm, were no carriages hired by the committees, would hire carriages for themselves or be brought by public-spirited friends. As for the other classes, the trouble of bringing themselves to the polls would make their ballot of more value than it now is, and would make the right more highly appreciated. If they are to be aided at all,—a practice that seems to me undesirable,—it should be at the public expense, not at that of the candidate. No thoughtful, honest voter casts his vote as a favor to any man or party; he votes for his country's good.

This practice of paying for such expenditures has led very many of our farmers to feel that they should receive pay for their time, and that of their men, on election day, and has led college students to feel that they may honorably receive their expenses home. Why? They feel that they are voting for the good of the candidate. Why should he not pay them their necessary expenses? But no man can take such expenses, and thereafter cast an independent ballot. We ought not to blind

voters to the real significance of the ballot. I think it very doubtful if a law could be enacted here at present forbidding such expenditures; I have no doubt that, in connection with other laws, it would be desirable.

But to the provisions mentioned should be added the measure that has proved in England perhaps the most advantageous of all, the one recommended by Governor Hill in his annual message of 1890. By this law any successful candidate against whom can be proved a charge of bribery or of a corrupt practice, either on his own part or on that of his party managers, may be deprived of his seat by a writ of *quo warranto*, and his competitor, who brings the suit, may take the seat in his stead, unless the defendant shows that the petitioner also has been guilty of bribery, either through himself or his committee. This act, as a rule, makes it more advantageous, especially for the weaker candidate, to be honest than to be guilty of bribery; and, as experience in England and Canada has shown, self-interest in this way works better results than honest intentions merely. With this act it seems to me that we might be able to go further in accordance with the spirit of our institutions, and, in fact,—not merely in the statutes, as we sometimes do now,—disfranchise for a longer or shorter period any man found guilty of bribery or corrupt practice, either as giver or receiver. The fundamental principle upon which all democratic government is founded is that of personal responsibility. The true basis of suffrage is not property, or education, but personality. When one has lost this by failing to exercise his independent right to a vote, through yielding his principles to the will of another, he might well be deprived of his right to vote. Certainly a candidate for office, unseated because of bribery, should be disfranchised, as by the English law.

A system of proportional representatives, or a law providing that all nominations, whether first made in convention or not, must be made by petitions, and all candidates be given an equal chance of prominence on the ballots, would tend to weaken the influence of the "machine." Any law that tends to make the prizes for corruption less will be likely to have a good influence. But back of all these laws must be a favorable public opinion. At the present time in New York State, according to all appearances, no law would be more beneficial to the Democratic party than one that in reality established purity of elections. The Democratic managers concede that the Republicans have the advantage in vote-buying, because, as they say, "We have to buy not merely Republican votes, but our own as well." By far the larger portion of the purchasable vote is

probably normally Democratic. The Republicans, too, for several years, in the general opinion, have been able to raise money more easily than the Democrats. Men standing high in the councils of the Republican party have said to me that the greatest blow that the Republican party in New York had received for many years was the present ballot-reform law. And yet, with the legislature Democratic in both branches, and with a Democratic governor, no attempt has been made to extend the election laws in this direction, although Governor Hill recommended repeatedly—sincerely, his friends say; insincerely, say his enemies—such extension, along the lines of the best experience of Europe. What is the explanation of this neglect? The Democratic leaders say that public opinion is not with them. By public opinion, of course, they include the opinion of the "floaters" as well as of all of their own party managers. The leading Democrats, those high in the councils of the party, the leading machine politicians, would doubtless be glad to see the practice stopped, but the ward "heelers," those who have the money to handle, and who make good profits by handling the money, would be opposed to the stopping of the practice.

So, again, most of the "floaters" would be unwilling to see the practice stopped. The party managers cannot carry out the act unless public opinion is so strong in its favor that they can afford to alienate more than merely a large portion of the "floaters." They cannot afford to do it until the pressure of public opinion is strong enough to gain them by their act as many votes as they would lose by alienating the lower class of their party workers. County managers say that the men who handle their money regularly keep out good pay for themselves, twenty or thirty dollars at least, on election day, when much money is paid. It is the opinion of more than one that two thirds of these "buyers" could readily be bought for no great sum, being in party fealty little above the "floater" proper. I know of one in the West, who, in 1890, offered for \$200 to use his influence in his own party for the candidate for county clerk of the opposite party, the money to be paid on condition of the success of the candidate. It was feared that he was seeking to get evidence against the candidate, and no bargain was made.

In 1890, in Ohio, an expert workman in one of the rolling-mills in the interior of the State was hired by the candidate for Congress, a man since given a high executive office, to aid him in his campaign. He was first given \$400; then, for election day, \$1000 more. After election he had \$800 of it retained, on which capital he, within a few weeks, started a saloon. The head roller in the same establishment, a man earning from fifteen to twenty dollars a day, was

offered twice his wages for two weeks' work in electioneering for the same candidate, but he declined. These men, of course, were expected to influence the labor vote in the trades-unions, but the first one kept a large part of the money given him, and doubtless could have been bought by the opposition.

The opinion of many of our most intelligent classes is in favor of reform, though the measures of reform that they advocate may be sometimes unpractical, as the politicians charge; but there is as yet no popular demand on the part of the great mass of voters for this reform. Public opinion must be created, and here is the work for the reformers. We need the old Cobden cry, "Agitate, agitate, agitate!" Public interest, perhaps, can best be achieved by letting the people know through papers, periodicals, and books what is really done. This is by no means generally comprehended. And then, too, must be shown the evils that come from these practices.

So, again, as public opinion is slow to move, it may well be worth while to have the principles of rational, honest politics taught in our schools and colleges to a greater extent than is at present done. We hear much talk in school conventions of "teaching patriotism." But how is it to be taught? The practice of cheering the flag, of learning the biographies of some of our leading statesmen, or of learning to believe, without knowing why, that our country is the strongest and best on earth, will have little effect toward remedying our present political evils. Civil government is something

more than the written constitution, the names of the officers, the dates of election, and other such facts as are taught in our text-books on civil government. The civil government that will help our children to get ideas which later will be of practical use in politics is that which shows the principles of party government, the methods of making nominations, of carrying elections, of making appointments to offices, and all the other details of our political life as it in fact is managed, together with the facts of history and political science which show that, however valuable in carrying single elections, and advancing local interests, dishonest political scheming may be, in the long run the interests of states, as of individuals, are furthered by honest principles; that great public questions are not settled till they are settled right, because "the power in men that makes for righteousness" is, after all, when men's eyes are opened, the dominant one.

Lombroso, in his great work on criminals, has well said that each state has the criminals that it deserves. So, too, in a much truer sense, may it be said that each state has the laws, the institutions, the benefits, the evils that it deserves. Many of our best citizens, considered by themselves, are unjustly treated in our corrupt election practices; but taking our people as a whole, they have what they wish, though the wishing may be ignorant. When we, by the means suggested, have so enlightened our public that they demand improvements in these methods, the improvements will come, and that in a way to be effective.

Jeremiah W. Jenks.

TOPICS OF THE TIME.

Money in Elections.

THE preceding article by Professor J. W. Jenks, of Cornell University, on the corrupt uses of money in elections, is in many ways one of the most notable contributions yet made to the discussion of this important subject. It does not deal in generalities, but gives in specific form an amount of detailed information as to the ways in which money is used improperly which will startle persons who are not familiar with the mechanism of what is called "practical politics." Yet every one who is familiar with that mechanism must admit that all that Professor Jenks sets forth is true in every particular. The poll-books, which he describes as being used by the campaign committees throughout the rural districts of New York State for the purpose of keeping track of the purchasable voters, are very well known to all persons who interest themselves in politics at all. Indeed, the use of them has so hardened the consciences of the practical politicians that they make little or no concealment of their

contents. In some sections of the State the number of purchasable voters enrolled on these books is said to exceed the number of those belonging to either party.

What is true of New York is, in a greater or less degree, true of nearly every other State of the Union in which the strength of the two great parties is evenly balanced. In Rhode Island, for example, where money has been used corruptly in every election since the war, and in some before and during the war, there are known to be about 5000 purchasable voters in a total of 54,000, or nearly ten per cent. of the whole number. These are distributed over the State, ranging from ten in the smaller towns to 1000 in the cities; but in every case their names and individual prices are matters of record. In one town, according to a careful analysis of the record by the "Providence Journal," whose figures we are quoting, all but ten of the total registered voters were set down as purchasable. Prices range from \$2 to \$5 a head, according to the demand.

It is worse than useless for the American people to shut their eyes to the existence of this evil, or to ima-

gine that it will cure itself in time. It must be met in this country, as it has been met in England and other countries, with restrictive and prohibitive measures of the most comprehensive and stringent character. Bad as our condition is, Professor Jenks is quite correct in saying it is not so bad as that of England was before the enactment of its Corrupt Practices Act in 1883. Our bribery methods are in some respects different from what the English were, and are less open and less general, but they are all as easily reached by law as theirs were found to be.

In all American efforts to meet the evil by legislation the mistake has been made of trying to accomplish the end in a brief and more or less general statute. The authors of the various bills, while drawing their ideas mainly from the English act, have been afraid to imitate its great length and minuteness lest their measures be condemned as "too complex" and "too cumbersome" for the simple needs of free American election methods. When ballot reform was first discussed, the opponents of it raised the same cry against the bills which its advocates prepared, and sought to have substituted for them measures of their own invention which were said to be simple and direct. Experience has shown, however, that in practice the simple and direct laws have all been failures, while those condemned as complicated have succeeded so perfectly as to furnish the accepted model of all subsequent ones. This lesson ought to be of use to us in preparing our corrupt practices laws. It is true that the English act is long, but it is also true that it was so completely successful from the moment of its application to an election that it abolished corruption and bribery at a single blow. The minuteness of the law covered every form of corruption so surely that its practice without detection was found to be impossible. Any law which fails to do this is too short, no matter what its length. The English act, as one of its ablest commentators, Mr. Henry Hobhouse, says, "is pervaded by two principles: the first is to strike hard and home at corrupt practices; the second is to prohibit, by positive legislation, any expenditure in the conduct of an election which is not absolutely necessary." Both these principles were embodied in the act with such thoroughness that bribery disappeared instantly from English elections, never to return.

We can accomplish the same purification in this country, whenever public opinion reaches the point at which it is demanded. We must, as Professor Jenks points out, limit the expenditures in every instance, grading the maximum sum according to the office, and must require the sworn return of every penny received or expended, either by the candidate, or his agent, or his campaign committee. On every point the law must be drawn with such minuteness and clearness that evasion or violation will be impossible without detection and punishment. Then, too "assessments" upon candidates must be forbidden, and voluntary contributions from them must be limited, and the uses made of money strictly accounted for; every loophole of escape from the publication of every penny expended must be closed and barred. That is the strength which makes the length of the English statute, and we must have the sense as well as the courage to imitate it.

One new evil has sprung up here recently which Professor Jenks does not mention, and that is the hiring of registered voters to remain away from the polls. By

this method the briber is able to get positive proof that the bribed voter has kept his bargain. This practice would be broken up by the requirement of strict accountability for every penny expended. Like all the other evils, it exists only because of a kind of dullness of the public conscience, which, while it may not exactly condone bribery in elections, is not equal to the exertion of declaring that it will no longer be tolerated. Professor Jenks's words on this question of public responsibility are strong and to the point, and we commend them to the serious consideration of our readers. Public opinion is king in the United States, and it must bear the responsibility of all the sins which its own supineness or indifference permits corrupt politicians to commit.

What the Columbian Exhibition will do for America.

THE fact which most strongly impressed all visitors to the international exhibition at Paris in 1889 was its artistic character. Far beyond any of its predecessors in any land as a triumph of industry and a triumph of science, it was still more remarkable as a triumph of beauty. To perceive this fact, one did not need to enter the vast and stately palace filled with pictures and statues which showed the current work of all civilized countries, and, as in a splendid historical panorama, France's own work for a century past. Nor did one need to examine the buildings, or to study the sculptured decorations with which buildings and grounds were lavishly adorned. The most impressive, the most beautiful thing at the Paris Exposition was the conception of the exhibition as a whole: the choice and arrangement and planting of the site, the placing of the buildings, their design considered as factors in a great coherent yet diversified scheme, and the way in which all individual factors worked together toward a magnificently harmonious general effect. It was the general effect of this exhibition — the fine combining of its architectural, sculptural, and natural features — which gave it unique importance as an artistic spectacle.

All Americans who saw it must have said: "Only in Paris could such a result be achieved. Only the most artistic nation in the world could have achieved it; and even this nation could not if its artistic powers had been unorganized, uncontrolled. France possesses a far larger number of great artists than any other land. These artists have been trained in the same schools, are inspired by the same practical and esthetic ideals, and are used to working together, and to working under official control; and this exhibition is an official, Government enterprise. Under such conditions such success was possible; under other conditions it would be impossible. Under American conditions how could we hope to see it even remotely approached? How can we hope soon to see in America anything very different from what we saw at Philadelphia in 1876: a big industrial show, a triumph of commercialism and applied science, an exaltation of material wealth, where beauty existed only in certain collections almost altogether drawn from foreign sources, and where the desire for beauty, when it could be elsewhere divined, had been stunted by crude ignorance, limited by economy or deformed by the love of mere display, and stultified by the lack of any common ideal and the absence of any general scheme of arrangement and design? We