

# THE CENTURY MAGAZINE.

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## THE NEW NATIONAL GUARD.



THE centennial celebration in New York of Washington's first inauguration revealed to more than a million astonished spectators a force of over 30,000 soldiers, well armed, equipped, and drilled, of whom not more than 2000 were in the service of the United States. It was the largest body of armed men assembled on this continent since the close of the civil war, now nearly a generation ago. It was the largest force of militia ever paraded in this country. It was a force whose methods of organization and support are unlike those of any other military system; and its present condition of excellence is the result of barely more than a dozen years of well-directed effort. The purpose of this article is to explain as briefly as possible the origin and present condition of this force, the objects of its existence, and the extent to which these objects have been realized.

During the closing year of Washington's life, after the machinery of the new government under the Constitution was in full operation, there were four measures which he advocated on all proper occasions with his usual dignified but forcible language. These were the opening of commercial highways to the West, the founding of a national university, the establishment of a military academy, and the organiza-

tion of an efficient militia. None of them were realized during his lifetime, and the national university is still only a matter of discussion. The Military Academy was founded in 1802 and thoroughly organized in 1814, after the defeats of the war of 1812 had still further emphasized the necessity for its existence. It has since so clearly demonstrated its utility that no one now seriously questions the advisability of maintaining it. The problem of Western communications was first partially solved by Clinton in opening the Erie canal in 1825, and the solution has been completed by railways in a manner and to an extent of which Washington never dreamed. The militia "upon a regular and respectable footing," for which Washington so often pleaded, and which is the only one of these four projects to which reference is made in the Constitution, is just becoming a reality, ninety years after his death.

Concerning the militia, as concerning other military matters, Washington's opinions were radically different from those of most of his contemporaries in politics. What he had in mind was a force uniformly organized, armed, equipped, and clothed throughout the several States, and as thoroughly trained and disciplined as the circumstance of their military service being other than the principal object of their lives would permit. His long military experience had impressed upon him the immense advantage of training and organization. On the other hand the members of the Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention were thoroughly imbued with jealousy of a standing army, which is one of the most strongly rooted

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prejudices of the Anglo-Saxon race. They looked askance at too much discipline and too thorough organization, and in military matters they relied above all upon patriotic enthusiasm.

Their ideal of a soldier was the minuteman of '76, who provided his own arms, was practically without uniform or training, belonged to the great body of the population and not to a class apart, and came forth in an emergency to fight with all his will, but returned to his ordinary avocation the moment the emergency was passed—and not infrequently reserved to himself the right to judge when that moment had arrived. With such a soldier in view—and there are some instances of his success in the Revolution along with many failures—the framers of the Constitution gave no small prominence to the militia in their scheme of government. In the Bill of Rights, side by side with such fundamental doctrines as the rights of petition, peaceable assembly, and freedom of speech, it is recited that a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free State. Congress is authorized in the eighth section of the first article to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, to call it forth to execute the laws, suppress insurrection and repel invasion, and to govern such part of it as may be so called forth into the service of the United States. To the States was reserved the right to appoint the officers and to train the militia according to the method prescribed by Congress.

In spite of the ample authority thus given to Congress, and the evident intention that the militia should play an important part in the constitutional government, Congress has done little or nothing to provide an efficient militia. It called out the militia in 1812, and in some of the Indian wars, but only to see it, on account of its lack of organization and training, ignominiously defeated, except when under command of a natural leader of great force like Jackson. In the space of a hundred years Congress has passed but sixteen laws relating to the militia, and of these only five were of more than temporary importance. The first, in 1792, provided for its organization, substantially on the basis proposed by Knox in his report of 1790; the second, in 1795, conferred on the President the right to call forth the militia in cases of invasion or rebellion, and the Supreme Court decided in 1827 that it belonged exclusively to the President to judge when such an exigency existed, and that his decision was conclusive upon all other persons; the third, in 1808, passed at the urgent solicitation of Jefferson, made a permanent annual appropriation of \$200,000 for its armament and

equipment; the fourth, in 1820, required the militia to observe the system of discipline and field exercises which is prescribed for the regular army; and the fifth, in 1887, increased the annual appropriation to \$400,000.

The various presidents from Washington to Tyler, each in succession and almost year by year, urged upon Congress the desirability of a more efficient militia law; numerous projects were discussed, but none was enacted. For the last ten years legislation has been pending in behalf of the modern militia which has grown up in spite of the neglect of Congress, and many reports of committees have been made, but still the quaint and obsolete law of 1792 remains unrepealed in the book of Revised Statutes, and is to-day the law of the land.

This law requires every able-bodied male citizen between eighteen and forty-five years of age to "be enrolled in the militia." The enrolment is to be made by the captain of every company sending notice "by a proper non-commissioned officer" to "every such citizen residing within the bounds of his company." After his enrolment the citizen is to "be constantly provided with a good musket or fire-lock, of a bore sufficient for balls of the eighteenth part of a pound, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints," and many other articles which can now be obtained only by loan from a museum of antiquities. The officers are to "be armed with a sword or hanger and spontoon." The citizen "shall appear so armed, accoutred, and provided when called out to exercise or into service." The act then goes on to specify at length the organization of regiments and batteries, the number of officers, and their respective duties.


It is thus seen that under the law of the United States as it exists to-day—which, however, is in direct conflict with the law of the State—the captain of any militia regiment in New York can enroll all the able-bodied citizens of that city in his company, and call upon them to attend muster and drill, duly provided with flint-locks and powder-horns.

The theory upon which this law was framed was the theory of individual armament and equipment, and of universal service (not merely liability to service). It has been a complete failure from the day of its enactment, and has never been observed in any of its prescriptions. The militia, as it existed during the first half of the last one hundred years, consisted of independent companies, each having its own name and organization, and its own methods of drill and equipment, whose principal function was to "train" in its own village as part of the Fourth of July or other celebration. The companies were seldom, if ever, brought together for camp or instruction, and were deficient in the first

principles of practical military knowledge. The very name of militia fell into a not undeserved contempt after the war of 1812, and the whole system passed out of existence some years before the war with Mexico.

The fundamental error of this system was in requiring service from all able-bodied citizens. The enforcement of this requirement was neither possible nor desirable. This defect was recognized immediately after the passage of the act, and as early as 1794 a bill was introduced, providing for "a select corps which should be armed and equipped by the general Government, and paid for service in annual

legislatures. Organizations were formed in the various States, in limited numbers, of volunteers, and these sought and obtained recognition from their legislatures. These organizations partook in some measure of the nature of athletic clubs, but were not unmindful of the military purposes



for which they existed. The States gave them arms and equipments received from the general Government, and in some instances supplemented these by appropriations of their own. Many of these organizations particularly excelled in the manual of arms and company drill, but in the more important military duties of camping, marches, guard duty, manœuvres, and rifle-practice they had no experience. Yet the members of them rendered most valu-

camps of instruction."<sup>1</sup> This bill was not passed, but the same idea in various forms has been recommended to Congress and discussed from time to time ever since, and is the guiding principle of the act which was introduced but failed to pass in the last Congress. Failing, however, to gain any encouragement from Congress, this idea was adopted in the State

<sup>1</sup> "History of the Militia Law," in the report of the Committee on the Militia, United States House of Representatives, March 13, 1890.

SOME TYPES OF THE NATIONAL GUARD.

able service as officers of volunteers both in the Mexican and civil wars—the 7th Regiment of New York, for example, having furnished no less than 667 men, and the 1st company of cadets of Massachusetts 150 men, of all grades from private to major-general, to the Union armies of 1861–65. With the rapid increase of urban population, the growing taste for outdoor and athletic sports, and the manifest advantages of club association, these volunteer organizations increased in numbers and in popularity. At the same time, however, there grew up a tendency to make the organi-

arms, and equipment of the United States army were adopted as far as possible; rifle-practice was rigidly required; additional armories were built for drill in winter, and camps of instruction were provided for field exercises in summer; the military codes in all the States were thoroughly revised and made as nearly uniform as possible; the courts martial were recognized by the laws of the State and as firmly established in their limited jurisdiction as any other courts, and the civil power of the sheriff and the marshal was invoked to carry their sentences into effect.



FIELD MANCEUVERS.

zation top-heavy, the number of generals and staff-officers being out of all proportion to the strength of the rank and file. This had reached its maximum just before 1877, when the militia was called upon to meet, in the railroad strikes and riots of that year, the most serious of those emergencies for which it chiefly exists. It failed to accomplish what was expected of it, and was mortified to see a handful of regulars under General Hancock easily overcome a resistance which had been too powerful for the national guard of an entire State. A reorganization on a practical military basis was soon undertaken in all the seaboard States. Great numbers of generals were retired; the organization, uniform,

In this work the Atlantic States, and particularly Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, have taken the lead; from them the movement has spread among the lake cities, and, more recently, in the South and extreme West. Every State in the Union has revised its military code since 1881, and in all but seven States there is now an organized, uniformed, and armed national guard,<sup>1</sup> of greater or less strength, in proportion to population and wealth. The general result is to produce the beginning and in some measure the fulfilment of Washington's plans for "placing the militia of the Union upon a *regular and respectable* footing." The day of the patriotic

<sup>1</sup> The name "National Guard" was first assumed by the 7th Regiment (then the second battalion of the 11th Regiment New York State Artillery) on the occasion of Lafayette's visit to New York, August 16, 1824. It was held exclusively by that regiment until 1862, when the legislature gave the name to the entire force of organized militia in New York. (See "Clark's


History of the 7th Regiment," Vol. I, p. 105.) The name has since been adopted by a majority of the States.

In Massachusetts and some other New England States the troops are called "Volunteer Militia"; in Virginia, "Volunteers"; in other Southern States, "State Guard" and "State Troops."

but untaught minute-man belongs to the past. The modern militia is organized more in accordance with the ideas expressed so clearly by Washington in his letter to the governors of all the States, written from Newburg on the disbanding of the army in 1783, in which he says :

The militia of this country must be considered as the palladium of our security, and the first effectual resort in case of hostility. It is essential, therefore,

present there is a well-organized battalion of this character in Massachusetts and another in New York, each about three hundred strong and divided into four divisions. Both are commanded and officered by ex-officers of the navy and graduates of the Naval Academy. They are instructed during the winter at armories in the drill of the battalion as a landing-party, with muskets and boat-howitzers, and also on board training-ships in the use of large guns.




IN CAMP—COMMANDING OFFICER'S QUARTERS.

that the same system should pervade the whole, that the formation and discipline of the continent should be absolutely uniform; and that the same species of arms, accoutrements, and military apparatus should be introduced in every part of the United States. No one who has not learned it from experience can conceive the difficulty, expense, and confusion which result from a contrary system, or the vague arrangements which have hitherto prevailed.

Within the last few years a new branch of the militia has been founded in the seaboard States, under the title of "Naval Reserve." At

During the last summer each battalion hired a steamer, on which the regular routine of a man-o'-war was rigidly enforced. The Government placed its finest squadron of new cruisers, with modern guns, at their disposal for instruction.

The naval-reserve steamer for the Massachusetts battalion was attached to the squadron in Boston harbor, and in Long Island Sound for the New York battalion. A week's hard work was performed with a surprising amount of enthusiasm. The men were instructed in the use of great guns, and acquitted themselves at ocean target-practice with credit not



FIELD ARTILLERY — IN BATTERY.

inferior to that of the regular crews of the squadron. They were also constantly exercised in boat-drill and in a successful landing-party.

In view of the difficulty of obtaining officers and instructed men for the volunteer navy in time of war, this most recent application of the principle of the volunteer militia affords the promise of very great usefulness in the future.

The annual return of the militia for 1890 gives the strength of the "unorganized" force as 7,691,987. This is a mere census statistic, and is the number of able-bodied men liable to military duty. In some States it is determined by actual enrolment, and in others it is estimated.

The organized militia numbers 109,674, or 9000 officers and 100,000 men. The average attendance at camps, as reported by the adjutants-general of States, varies from 75 to 95 per cent., but in some of the States in the South and West there is no provision for armories or encampments, and the troops have not yet attained such organization or instruc-


tion in military duties as to make them valuable in an emergency. The armed force of the States which can be relied upon is therefore probably between 70,000 and 80,000 men. The total force is distributed as follows:

In the States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, available for prompt concentration at any point between Boston and Harrisburg, . . . .	34,800
In the other Atlantic States from Maine to Virginia, . . . . .	11,400
In the States along the lakes and Upper Mississippi, available for prompt concentration in Chicago, St. Louis, or other central cities. . . .	23,100
In the South . . . . .	25,500
In the West . . . . .	7,100
On the Pacific Coast . . . . .	7,700
	109,600

This distribution, and other statistics of the militia, are shown more in detail in the table given below.

The annual cost of maintaining the United States army is about \$1000 per man. The armies of Europe cost from about \$450 per man (in England) to \$125 per man (in Russia). The

States and Territories.	Population.	Annual Expenditure by U. S.	Annual Expenditure by States.	Organized Militia.	Organized Force per 100,000 of Population.	Cost per Unit of Population.	Cost per man of Organized Force.
Mass., Conn., N. Y., N. J., Pa. . . . .	15,686,001	\$89,300	\$1,136,000	34,800	.222	\$.078	\$35.21
Me., N. H., Vt., R. I., Del., Md., D. C., Va. . . . .	4,812,799	39,600	191,000	11,400	.337	.048	20.18
Ohio, Ind., Ill., Mich., Wis., Minn., Iowa, Mo. . . . .	19,364,746	112,600	516,500	23,100	.119	.032	27.23
N. C., S. C., Ga., Fla., Ala., Miss., Tenn., } W. Va., Ky., Ark., La., Tex. . . . . }	16,671,724	107,200	96,300	25,500	.153	.012	7.98
Neb., Kan., Col., N. Mex., Dak., Mont., } Idaho, Wyoming. . . . . }	3,902,407	35,400	75,000	7,100	.182	.028	15.55
Wash., Ore., Cal., Nev., Ariz., Utah. . . . .	2,184,573	15,900	200,000	7,700	.385	.099	20.65
	62,622,250	\$400,000	\$2,214,800	109,600	.175	\$.042	\$23.85



organized militia cost a little less than \$24 per man, of which the general Government contributes one sixth and the States five sixths. Officers and men give their services free (except a nominal pay while in camp), and contribute for uniforms, traveling expenses, and other purposes an amount which probably exceeds the amount paid by the States.

It will be noticed that the Southern States spend less for their militia than they receive from the general Government; while in the West the Government contribution is only about one third of the total cost, in the Central States about one fifth, in certain Eastern States one sixth, and on the Pacific Coast and in the vicinity of New York the States pay fourteen times as much as the general Government. This proportion is even greater in New York, for the cost of constructing expensive armories<sup>1</sup> is not included in the expenditures given in that State, whereas in other States the cost of renting armories is included as part of the expenses of

OVERCOME BY HEAT: A CASE FOR THE MEDICAL CORPS.


maintaining the force. The largest expenditure in proportion to population in any State is in Connecticut, where it is nearly fifteen cents per inhabitant. In some of the Southern States no appropriation is made.

<sup>1</sup> In 1889, in addition to \$400,000 for the expenses of the National Guard, the State of New York spent \$553,332 for armories (exclusive of those built in the city of New York which are paid for by the city) and \$125,000 for pay, transportation, and subsistence of

her 12,000 men who took part in the centennial parade. The total appropriations for the year in New York were thus \$1,078,332. In Massachusetts and some other States the cost of erecting armories is a charge upon the city or town, and no statistics of such cost are available.

The Government contribution can be drawn only in arms, equipments, and equipage, and not in money. It is distributed to the Territories in such proportions as the President may direct, and to the States in proportion to their representation in Congress, but nothing is avail-

four guns each. A few of the batteries have the new 3.2" steel breech-loading gun, and many of them have Gatlings; but most of the guns in the hands of the militia are the 12-pounder brass Napoleons, or the 3-inch iron rifles of 1863. In addition to the guns with



A STREET PARADE.

able for any State where there are less than one hundred organized and uniformed men for each senator and representative. The relative efficiency of the troops in different States is closely proportionate, up to a certain limit, to the money expended on them by the States themselves.

Of the total force about 94,000 are infantry, 5500 artillery, and 7000 cavalry. About one half of the force in New Mexico and in South Carolina is cavalry, and the proportion of this arm in all the Southern States is much greater than in the Northern. In many States there is no cavalry organization, and in New York, with a force of 14,000 men, there is only one troop of cavalry. Of artillery there are in the various States about sixty batteries, usually of

the batteries, there is at nearly every State arsenal a miscellaneous collection of old guns of various ages, most of which it would be dangerous to use with projectiles.

The usual proportions of the three arms in an army in the field are cavalry one sixth of the infantry, and artillery three pieces to 1000 infantry. But the enormous expense of maintaining or even hiring horses makes it out of the question for the militia to keep these proportions. Nor is it at all necessary, for their principal service is not in the field, but in supporting the civil authorities in maintaining order in large cities, where cavalry is practically useless, and artillery can be used only in small numbers.

In the National Guard, even more than in an army, the infantry constitutes the bulk of the



efficient force. In all the States the company is the unit of organization, but they are usually organized into regiments of ten companies each, and in most of the States into brigades of three to five regiments. In Pennsylvania the entire force constitutes a single division with three brigades and fourteen regiments. In New York there are four brigades without a common commander, except the governor and adjutant-general; the brigades contain fourteen regiments and forty-four separate companies. In Massachusetts, Illinois, and New Jersey there are two brigades each, and in many other States the entire force constitutes a single brigade. In Ohio, with eleven regiments, eight batteries, and one troop, there is no brigade organization. In New Jersey there is a division with two brigades, seven regiments, and three separate battalions.

In the matter of armament there is a diversity which would prove disastrous if the troops of different States should serve together in the field. In New York the Guard is armed (at the expense of the State) with the Remington, caliber .50, in Connecticut with the Peabody, caliber .43; in some of the States are still to be found some of the Springfield, caliber .50. With these exceptions, the troops are armed with the Springfield, caliber .45. As the army is on the point of changing its rifle for one of smaller caliber and probably of the magazine pattern, it is not desirable to change the armament of the National Guard until the new rifle is adopted. But at that time it would seem that the Government should promptly replace all the old guns and ammunition in the hands of the militia with new material.

In uniforms the entire National Guard, with hardly an exception, has now a service uniform closely resembling (and in many cases exactly like) the undress uniform of the army. For full-dress uniforms some regiments, like the 7th in New York, have a distinctive uniform to whose history they are attached; others have the full-dress uniform of the army, and some have no full-dress uniform at all. But in all cases the former tendency to gaudy and unserviceable uniforms has been entirely eradicated. The fault, if any, in the uniforms is too much simplicity. In all armies the picked regiments and corps have special full-dress uniforms, often quite unlike, even in the same army; their history is associated with these uniforms, and they have a positive military value in pro-



THE SIGNAL CORPS.

moting regimental pride and *esprit de corps*. The gray uniform of the cadets at West Point, which has not been changed, except in head-gear, for over seventy years, is of this character, as is also that of the 7th Regiment in New York. It would be well if each regiment, or at least each State, had such a distinctive uniform for full dress, but all having the same undress or service uniform.

It has previously been stated that the legislatures of all the States have revised their military codes since 1881. These new laws are perhaps as nearly uniform as the laws of the different States on any other single subject. Certain fundamental principles are to be found in all of them, and the most important is the division of the militia into two classes, one of which is the active or organized force, and the other is the mass of able-bodied citizens liable for military service. The active militia is composed wholly of volunteers, compulsory service being authorized only in time of war or invasion. The maximum strength is fixed by law, and in most of the States the applications for formation of new companies are much in excess of the legal limit. The enrolment of able-bodied citizens liable to military service (the unorganized militia) is in most States made every year by the tax-asses-

sors, and the return is made by them under oath to the adjutant-general. In Connecticut there is an excellent law under which all those enrolled and not serving in the active militia pay an exemption tax of two dollars. This pays all the military expenses, and enables Connecticut to make the comparatively large expenditure above mentioned. Such a tax in all the States would produce a fund of about \$14,000,000 in the aggregate.

The next point in common is the exemption of the active militia from jury duty and poll-tax except for schools. The principle of electing officers is common to all the States, except that in Pennsylvania and Connecticut general officers are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Senate, and in Illinois, Michigan, and Vermont they are appointed by the governor alone. In New Hampshire all officers are appointed by the governor and council. With these exceptions, the officers are always elected by ballot: generals by the field-officers, field-officers by the company officers, and company officers by the enlisted men of companies. Governors appoint their own staffs, and the staffs of brigades and regiments are appointed on the recommendation of the generals and colonels with whom they serve. In some States officers hold their commissions during good behavior, in others for periods of five or three years. In many States officers are appointed only after examination by a board of officers as to their fitness; and in New Jersey whenever the division commander reports that any officer is unfit for his position, the commander-in-chief may place him on the retired list and declare a vacancy. Had such a law existed in New York, it would have saved many recent scandals which have tended to demoralize the service. In nearly all the States the commander-in-chief has the power summarily to disband any company which fails to reach a certain standard of numbers or efficiency at inspection.

Enlistments are usually for three years, but in some States for five. The system of drill is invariably the United States Tactics, and in several of the States there are complete sets of regulations issued in pursuance of law, and conforming as closely as possible to the United States Regulations. The arms and equipments are issued by the States, and are public property, kept in public armories. The uniforms are sometimes furnished by the States, but more frequently by the individuals, the State contributing a specified sum of money in partial reimbursement. In nearly all the States the assembling or parade of armed bodies other than those belonging to the regularly organized militia, or National Guard, is prohibited under heavy penalties.

In all the States there are elaborate provisions for courts martial for the punishment of military offenses, but in many of them the manner of enforcing the sentences of these courts is not clearly defined. The laws of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, however, leave nothing to be desired on this score. Most of the sentences are fines, and there are also statutory punishments for absence and neglect of duty, which are imposed without the necessity of trial by a court. In Pennsylvania the president of the court issues his warrant direct to the sheriff of the county where the court is held, and the sheriff is required to collect the fine in the same manner as debts are collected on civil process; the sheriff is to make his return within twenty days, and if no goods are found, the president of the court issues his writ of commitment of the delinquent to the county jail. In New York the president is authorized to appoint a marshal of the court, who shall perform the duties of a sheriff, or he may issue his warrant direct to the sheriff, and in default of payment may commit to jail, but the imprisonment shall not exceed twenty days. In New Jersey the collection of fines is intrusted to paymasters, to whom they are duly certified; and if the fines are not paid, the paymaster puts the return into the hands of the county judge or justice of the peace, and he issues an execution directed to the sheriff by whom the fine is to be collected, but it is especially provided that no person shall be imprisoned for a militia fine in time of peace. In Michigan, for the punishment of minor offenses, complaint is entered by the company commander before a justice of the peace, who causes the offender to be arrested and brought before him for a hearing. If satisfied that the forfeiture has been incurred without good cause, he imposes the fine and issues his execution, but in default of payment imprisonment is limited to two weeks, and cannot be inflicted on any delinquent less than twenty-one years of age. This form of procedure takes the place of the Delinquency Court of New York. Graver offenses are tried before a general or regimental court martial, and the sentences "may be confirmed and carried into execution by the officer ordering the court," but the precise manner of doing so is not specified.


In thirty-three States the laws provide for an annual encampment of various length, from four to fourteen days. In all but three of these States provision is made for paying part or all of the expense of the encampment by the State. In some cases this is limited to the actual expenses of transportation, but in others subsistence is also furnished, and the officers and men receive pay for the time they are engaged in this service at a fixed rate per day.

From this brief examination of the principal features of the military laws of the different States it is seen that while these laws differ in details, yet the same general principles run through them all. Year by year the laws tend to become more and more uniform, each State adopting those features which have proved beneficial in other States, and rejecting those which under the test of experience have proved unsatisfactory. By this method of natural selection will be attained in due time that uniformity of system, of formation, and of discipline which Washington advocated.

The practical result of these laws, in the States where they have reached their highest

are of nearly equal strength, by a brigadier-general, brigade headquarters being at Philadelphia, Franklin, and Lebanon. All orders and correspondence are invariably transmitted through the proper military channels.

The troops are armed with the United States Springfield rifle, caliber .45, and wear the undress uniform of the United States army. They have no full-dress uniform. During the winter they drill in their armories in the evenings, not fewer than four times a month, in the school of the soldier, the company, and the battalion. In the spring each regiment is carefully inspected by the brigade inspector, and a minute report made of its condition in all military re-



RIFLE-PRACTICE AT THE 7TH REGIMENT ARMORY.

development, may be best stated by comparing the National Guards of New York and Pennsylvania. In these two States the organization and training have proceeded on somewhat different lines, each of which has its advocates, and for each of which there is much to be said.

In Pennsylvania the whole force is a unit, a compact division which can be relied upon to put eight thousand men at any point within the commonwealth on notice of forty-eight hours or less. The governor is commander-in-chief and has his own administrative staff, most of whom are paid officers. The division is commanded by a major-general, with headquarters at Philadelphia, and each of the three brigades, which


spects, and its figure of merit is determined according to certain clearly defined rules. In July they all go into camp for six days, one year by regiments in the vicinity of their homes, the next year by brigades in different parts of the State, and the third year by division. In 1884 the division encamped at Gettysburg, in 1887 and 1890 at Mount Gretna near Lebanon. The men pitch their own tents, draw rations from the Commissary Department, and cook their own food. The time in camp is occupied in rifle-practice, guard duty, regimental and brigade drill, inspection by the adjutant-general, and review by the governor. It is no holiday picnic, but six days and nights of the hardest

possible work, regardless of weather, yet the percentage of "present" is about ninety-two per cent. of the total strength, and the work is performed not only without complaint, but with enthusiasm. The Guard is popular throughout the State, and corporations and other employers encourage the attendance of their employees at the camp. The work done in rifle-practice is shown by the qualification of about 600 "sharp-shooters" and 4000 "marksmen," all qualified in strict accordance with the rules prescribed and followed in the army. At each camp one or more officers of the army are detailed as inspectors to report to the War Department. At the brigade and division camps detachments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery from the regular army are sent to form part of the camp and provide an object-lesson for the instruction of the Guard. The triennial encampments of the division are invariably inspected and reviewed by the commanding general of the army, and frequently by the President of the United States.

In New York the governor is commander-in-chief, with his staff of administrative officers, some of whom are paid as in Pennsylvania, but there is no commanding general. The adjutant-general has the rank of major-general, and is senior to all other officers in the Guard. In the lack of a division commander, he exercises many of the functions of a commanding general. The troops are formed into four brigades, with headquarters at New York, Brooklyn, Albany, and Buffalo respectively; but the strength of the brigades is unequal, the first brigade having forty per cent. of the entire force and the fourth brigade only fifteen per cent. The troops are armed with the Remington rifle, caliber .50, which cannot use the Government ammunition. They all have an undress uniform, and in addition each regiment has a full-dress uniform of its own, many but not all of which are identical. During the winter they drill in the evenings in their armories, which are larger and superior in every respect to those possessed by any other State; in fact such magnificent covered drill-houses are not to be found anywhere else in America or in Europe. These armories afford facilities for gallery rifle-practice which are fully utilized. In the spring every regiment or company is inspected and mustered by the inspector-general at the armories, and ordinarily there is a street parade on Decoration Day. The city of New York has in Van Cortlandt Park a training-ground of over 1000 acres, sufficiently large for manœvering a brigade in practical field-exercises, and containing in one part a level parade-ground of nearly 100 acres, recently completed at an expense of \$90,000, and probably the finest drill-ground of its kind in the world. This park

affords such favorable opportunities for field-exercises that probably such exercises and a brigade review will form part of the routine of duty every spring hereafter. During the summer and autumn there is constant rifle-practice for the first two brigades at the State range at Creedmoor, and for the other two brigades at other ranges scattered throughout the State. The number of sharp-shooters is about 250 and of marksmen 4600. In July a portion of the troops go into camp for seven days. The State owns a permanent campground near Peekskill, on the Hudson, where the tents are pitched by employees, comfortably floored, and remain standing throughout the camp season of six weeks. There is also a permanent mess-hall, erected at a cost of \$26,000, where the men are fed by a caterer and hired cooks. The camp will accommodate about 1200 men, and in six weeks about half of the regiments can have their turn, each one week at a time. Thus each regiment or company has a turn of camp duty once in two years. The number "present" averages only seventy-five per cent. of the total, the feeling of the employers in New York toward their employees in regard to absence for this service being quite different from that existing in Pennsylvania. The adjutant-general is in permanent command of the camp as a post, and has a permanent post-adjutant and special instructors in guard duty and other exercises. An officer of the army is always detailed, for the whole period of the camp, to report to the War Department. No time is wasted in reviews, formal inspections, or rifle-practice. All these are performed at other times and places. The whole period of the camp is devoted to guard and outpost duty, battalion and skirmish drill.

The two systems of organization and instruction thus outlined are quite dissimilar. In Pennsylvania there is a unit—the division—with its subordinate organizations and well-defined military channels. In New York there is a collection of regiments and "separate companies" which are seldom brought together, and many of which do not see each other for years. The practical instruction in mobilizing, transporting, and supplying the Pennsylvania division is invaluable to the staff. The education in the hardships and discomforts of a soldier's life, and in taking care of one's self when removed from the sphere of the landlord, the tailor, the butcher, the grocer, and the baker, is equally invaluable to the company officers and men. The experience of seeing large bodies of troops assembled and commanded in proper manner gives an idea of the ultimate end and aim of all military instruction, which can be gained in no other way. All this the Pennsylvania system provides in some measure, and the New




INDOOR CAVALRY PRACTICE—SHOOTING AND CUTTING AT THE HEADS.

York system not at all. On the other hand, this is gained at the expense of proficiency in details. The New York troops are better "set up," present a smarter appearance, are much more thoroughly drilled in the school of the company and battalion, have a better knowledge of guard and outpost duty, are more observant of military courtesy,—in short, are in every way better drilled as regiments. In Pennsylvania some of the governors, all of the general officers, and many of the colonels have been veterans of the civil war; they keep in close touch with the army and its principal officers, and they pride themselves on being practical soldiers and not merely men of parade. Their model is the veteran volunteers of 1865, than which none could be better; but in following this ideal too many of the men mistake a slouchy appearance, a lack of discipline, and a disregard of cleanliness in camp for evidences of their practical knowledge. Unconsciously they imitate the bummer instead of the veteran. In New York, on the other hand, the propor-

tion of officers who served in the civil war is much smaller, the men as a rule are possessed of more means, the State spends much more money in providing them with armories and other facilities, and their minds are more closely occupied with the minor details of drill. Their ideal is not so much the veteran volunteer as the 7th Regiment, which has for fifty years maintained its reputation as the best-drilled body of soldiers in the whole country, with the single exception of the West Point cadets.

There are merits and defects in both systems, and the true ideal is to be found in accepting what is good and rejecting what is bad in both. The Pennsylvania troops can adopt, with great advantage to themselves, the neatness and the proficiency in drill and details of the New York men; and if these latter could add to their knowledge of the drill-book the better organization of the Pennsylvania troops and their practical experience in massing and handling large bodies in the field and in the routine of camp, as it is carried on in actual service, they would



LAST HONORS.

form a corps which would compare favorably with regular armies. Whether with the limited time at disposal the two systems can be combined is a question which admits of doubt, but there can be no doubt that the effort of all the National Guards should be in this direction.

The objects for which the militia is maintained, so far as the Federal Government is concerned, are clearly defined in the Constitution, "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." But the militia is very much older than the Constitution, and its primary object always was, and still is, to aid the civil authorities in maintaining the law within the States, in those cases where the ordinary means — the sheriff, the constable, and the police — are insufficient. The States are prohibited from keeping troops in time of peace without the consent of Congress, but this consent was given by the Act of 1792, authorizing the organization of the militia into "divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies, as the legislature of the State may direct," and the consent has never been withdrawn except by the Act of March 2, 1867, which for a time prohibited nine States lately in rebellion from maintaining an organized militia.

The militia has thus a twofold allegiance — first, to the State, to assist in maintaining order,

and, second, to the general government, to suppress insurrection and repel invasion. But outside of its legal duties to the State and nation, the militia has a well-defined status in the military policy which has grown up in a century of experience, and which, while not prescribed in any statute, is quite permanently established. This system comprises, first, a small *regular army*, to aid in the settlement of the country by affording protection against Indians, to serve as a training-school for officers, and to provide a nucleus for the large armies necessary in time of war; second, the *militia*, to aid the civil authorities in maintaining order, to serve as a secondary training-school for officers, and to act at decisive points on the outbreak of hostilities; third, large armies of *volunteers*, enlisted for the period of the war, officered principally from the regular army and the militia, and upon whom fall the hard fighting of the war, and the conquering of a peace, almost to the exclusion of the regular army and the militia.

Our history shows that this military system, which has replaced the method of relying upon an unorganized militia which produced such disaster in the war of 1812, is well adapted to our situation and requirements, and it is approved practically without dissent. In the two subsequent wars each of the three branches, the regulars, the militia, and the volunteers,

performed its allotted part. In Mexico the regular army sustained the bulk of the fighting, but it was assisted by a considerable body of volunteers, who at Buena Vista and elsewhere rendered most gallant and admirable service, and the officers of these volunteers had largely gained their military training in the militia. In the civil war, at its outbreak, the capital was saved from occupation, and communication between it and the North was maintained, by the militia of New York and New England. It is difficult to overestimate the value of the service thus rendered in gaining time for the organization of the volunteer armies by whom the war was to be fought.

In any future war the militia will doubtless play the same part. At the outbreak its best brigades and regiments will be sent to decisive points, to hold these until volunteers can be organized to take their places. After that is accomplished they can render greater service by furnishing instructed officers to volunteer regiments, and thus disseminating their military knowledge, than by acting as military regiments. At no previous period of our history have we had so large a body of militia capable of rendering efficient service at the beginning of hostilities, or so many men available, by reason of their military instruction and enthusiasm, for officers of volunteers.

Yet, while this is true, much remains to be done and can be done still further to improve the efficiency of the militia. On a previous page it has been shown that the annual cost of the militia is about four cents per unit of population, and that in the States where the militia is most thoroughly organized the general Government contributes but one fourteenth part of this. It is evident that the general Government should give a larger portion, and should couple its donation with a more rigid inspection by its own officers as to the efficiency of the force to whose support it contributes. At present it divides its money among the States according to their representation in Congress, regardless of the condition of the force in any State, provided only that this force is reported "organized and uniformed" to the extent of one hundred men for every senator and representative. The Government might well make its assistance dependent on the number of men present in camp, fully armed and equipped and instructed in drill and rifle-practice, as determined by its own inspectors according to certain definite standards. The total amount of the Government contribution is also much too small. In 1808 it provided \$200,000 for this purpose, which was  $1\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. of its total revenue, and  $2\frac{3}{4}$  cents per unit of the population of that date. At present  $1\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. of the total revenue would be \$5,000,000, and  $2\frac{3}{4}$  cents per unit

of population would be \$1,722,000. Such sums are not necessary; but something more is necessary than the \$400,000, or one tenth of one per cent. of its revenue, which the Federal Government now contributes to the militia. The bill which failed in the last Congress provided for an annual appropriation of \$1,000,000, a sum which would doubtless be sufficient, and which at the same time is not only easily within its means, but less in proportion to revenue or population than it paid for more than thirty years after 1808, without receiving any adequate return.

Not only should the general Government aid the militia more liberally, but the individual States should increase their share of the expenses. An inefficient militia is worse than useless, and the money spent upon it is wholly wasted. If it is to be maintained at all, it should be kept to the highest state of efficiency consistent with its fundamental principle of being a voluntary, unpaid organization of men engaged in other occupations for their livelihood. It has been previously stated that some of the States contribute less than the pittance allowed by the general Government, and the nominal force in them is nearly one fourth of the whole. In these States there are no suitable armories, but few encampments, and little if any rifle-practice. The troops are not properly instructed, and would be of doubtful value in any of the emergencies for which the militia exists.

What should be and can be accomplished in the militia is to provide a force with a proper organization, uniformly armed, clothed, and equipped, well instructed in the book-drill and in the rudiments of guard and outpost duty, and, above all, perfectly familiar, by constant use, with its firearm. It is doubtful if more than this can be accomplished, and, at least in its present condition, it is probable that extended field-maneuvers and other ambitious projects which have been suggested would result in failure. It was a maxim with Colonel Emmons Clark, during the twenty-five years in which he commanded the New York 7th Regiment and brought it to its unrivaled excellence, never to attempt anything that could not be done well, and to do perfectly whatever was attempted. The result is seen in a regiment which has the maximum strength of 40 officers and 1011 men authorized by law, with over 200 instructed recruits on the "waiting list," which qualifies every year from ninety-five per cent. to ninety-seven per cent. of its strength as marksmen, whose reputation for proficiency in drill is known from one end of the land to the other, and which furnished 667 officers and men to the volunteer armies of the civil war.

The fundamental fact should always be re-

membered that the militia is a voluntary and unpaid organization of men, to whom soldiering is an incident and not the main object of their lives. Such a force must be judged by different rules and standards from those which apply to a regular army. Discipline is not impossible in such a force, but it must be maintained through the intelligence, with force only distant in the background, rather than by brute force alone. The election of regimental and company officers, which would be an absurdity in a paid regular service, is a cherished and ancient privilege of the militia, without which the force could not be maintained for a year; and it is almost equally important that the men should have the right to elect their comrades. If the guardsman is to be obtained without pay, and to give his evenings and his holidays to military work, the service must be made attractive to him by the State and Federal governments. The fact of his enlistment presupposes military enthusiasm, for there is no other sufficient motive. To keep this enthusiasm alive the State and the nation must do their part.

With these fundamental principles in view, it is not difficult to define in a general way the respective duties of the three parties to the system.

*First.* The Federal Government should provide arms, equipments, and equipage, all of the latest pattern furnished to the regular troops, a service undress uniform, and the system of drill; and it should have the right to an annual inspection, and to require a certain standard of efficiency as a condition of its contributions.

*Second.* The State should provide armories, camping-grounds, rifle-ranges, and ammunition, and the cost of transportation necessary for assembling the entire force of the State for outdoor instruction once in each year.

*Third.* The officers and men should give their own time without pay, purchase the distinctive full-dress uniform of their regiment or State, and pay such annual dues as are necessary for fitting up their armory rooms according to their own taste, providing such athletic sports as are useful in developing their physical condition, and paying such incidental expenses as the State cannot properly be charged with, but which are essential to maintaining a proper *esprit de corps*.

All this can be accomplished and an efficient force of about 100,000 men be maintained at a total annual expense of about fifty dollars per man, supplemented by extra appropriations for an entire rearmament whenever the progress of military science makes a change of weapons necessary. Of this expense the Federal Government may fairly be asked to contribute one fifth, the State three fifths, and the individuals one fifth. In this way will be secured the cheapest military force in the world; a force quite different from a regular army, but having a distinct and well-defined place in our military system, capable of rendering efficient and valuable service in emergencies which are more frequent than war, as well as in war itself; a force which is a constant safeguard on the side of law and order, and is competent to realize the constitutional ideal of giving "security to a free State."

Francis V. Greene.



"CEASE FIRING!"