

or thirty-two inches high by eighteen or twenty inches wide. In my reproduction of it I have cut off a portion of the Gothic point, in order to get the figures larger upon the block; so by continuing the sloping lines of each side to a point you have the shape of the original.

I first saw a photograph of this picture at the studio of Mr. Murray in Florence, who referred to it as the finest and best preserved of all this master's works. It is soft and rich in coloring. The background and glories are gilded, the latter being elaborately and delicately worked. The robe of the Madonna, which falls down from her head, is of a rich dark blue with a border of soft brown. Her breast and her sleeve are of a fine soft tone of red. The rest of her garment, showing underneath the Child, is of some deep tone of green or blue. The white veil or linen around her head and falling over her breast is finely contrasted with the mellow tones of the flesh. The drapery of the Child is of a yellowish tone, and blends very harmoniously with the color of his skin. The whole is a warm and pleasing combination of color, and forms one of the finest examples in this respect of the Sieneese school. There is a dignified air of tenderness in the Madonna, and the

soul of the mother is seen in the way she holds her Child. It is the most motherly Madonna I have seen. And how true a child it is, with both its little hands clasped about the breast! Something has attracted its attention, and it instinctively strikes this attitude as it endeavors to glance around, which gives the crescent form to the white of the eye and which many a father has noticed, especially in his first-born, under like circumstances. It is this which arrests the attention of the beholder and fixes it upon the main object of interest. It is a perfectly natural expression in an infant, and, selected and portrayed in a picture such as the present, it assumes a singular air of importance, and suggests in a most artless manner the supernatural character of the Child.

AN excellent work by Lorenzetti is in the Gallery of the Belle Arti, Florence—"The Presentation in the Temple," one of his very finest works, and from which I should have selected a detail had not the picture in Siena presented the advantage of giving a full-page illustration, and so disposing of the necessity for cutting out a detail, always a painful thing to have to do.

T. Cole.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE SAMOAN QUESTION.

BY THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONER SENT BY THE UNITED STATES TO SAMOA IN 1886.



SAMOA is very far away and hitherto little known, but in spite of these conditions discussion has disclosed the fact that there still remains in the American people, regardless of party lines, the instinct of self-assertion and of adherence to honorable engagements, whether express or implied, always characteristic of our people. The settlement of the Pacific coast and of the great interior regions of our country has been so rapid that it requires a mental effort even now to realize that in place of a confederation of States lying mainly between the Mississippi River and the Atlantic Ocean, with the narrow strip upon the Pacific coast, we have now a great empire stretching from ocean to ocean, in which, between the Missouri River and California, great and populous States will soon replace vast unsettled Territories. In the near future the interests of the Pacific coast will be equal to those of the Atlantic, and it is possibly fortunate that the Samoan difficulty has arisen to awaken the minds of our Eastern people to the true extent of our interest in the Pacific.

Owing to the active operations of European powers in absorbing Polynesian groups, there

remain but three principal groups of islands respecting which this Government may concern itself actively without grave complications. These are Hawaii, Samoa, and Tonga; and with the Government of each of these groups the United States has now entered into treaty stipulations. A glance at the map will show that all these island groups are situated in longitude east of the extreme north-western possessions of the United States, and all of them are east of the 180th meridian, and therefore within the Western Hemisphere. Taking the two latter groups together the distance from the equator varies little from that of Hawaii, and between Hawaii and Samoa in the line of longitude there are no islands of importance.

The position of Samoa, with respect to lower Mexico and the Isthmian coast, is relatively the same as that of Hawaii with respect to the California coast. Hawaii and Samoa are equally distant from the Isthmus; Samoa being in the direct line of trade to Australia, and the course from the Isthmus to China lying equally distant between the two groups.

The necessity for our insisting upon and even guaranteeing the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama, with respect to any canals being constructed, is a conceded point in American diplomacy. It has been frequently asserted that the importance of the Sandwich Islands

as a strategic point with reference to the commerce of the Pacific is of equal importance to us with that of the Isthmus of Panama, and brings these islands equally within the range of an American commercial policy. If this be so, certainly the neutrality of Samoa, of no greater distance from the Isthmus and lying more immediately in the track of our future commerce, is of greater importance than even that of Hawaii.

The treaty relations of Samoa with the Great Powers may be briefly stated. In 1872 Commander Meade, U. S. N., entered into an agreement with Mauga, the great chief of Tutuila, under which there was granted to this Government the exclusive privilege of a naval station for the use and convenience of the vessels of the United States Government, and it was expressly stipulated that a like privilege should not be granted to any other foreign power or potentate. The consideration of this grant was the friendship and protection of the great Government of the United States of America. In January, 1878, a treaty was entered into between the Governments of the United States and Samoa, in which the right of the United States to the use of the port of Pago-Pago was solemnly affirmed. And in another article the Government of the United States undertook to employ its good offices for the purpose of adjusting any differences which might thereafter arise between the Samoan Government and any other Government.

The German treaty with Samoa was made in January, 1879, and it secured to the German Government the right to a coaling station in the harbor of Saluafata. The British treaty with Samoa was made in August, 1879, authorizing the establishment of a naval station and coaling depot on the shores of a Samoan harbor to be thereafter designated, excluding expressly the harbors of Apia and Saluafata and that part of the harbor of Pago-Pago to be selected by the United States as a station under the provisions of its treaty. On September 2, 1879, what was known as the Municipal Convention for the government of the town and district of Apia was entered into between the Governments of Great Britain and Samoa, and to this the representatives of the German Government became parties absolutely, and the representatives of the United States provisionally, subject to the approval of their Government. This convention, under which that part of Samoa inhabited by foreigners was actually governed, although not submitted to the Senate, and therefore not a treaty, was in fact acquiesced in by our Government, which joined in its execution as a convenient medium of local administration.

As the result of these treaty relations, the

representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Germany have in fact, from 1879 to the disruption of the municipal government by Germany, carried on a tolerably efficient municipal government in the district of Apia, and they have also from time to time interfered either to make or to preserve the peace in the various native wars. Whether right or wrong, it is too late to discuss the question of intervention in Samoan affairs; what must now be decided is, whether after an active and continued intervention of more than ten years we shall make ourselves felt or shall retire from the field.

There has been much discussion whether intervention in Samoan affairs is within the limits of the Monroe doctrine. It must be remembered that when the Monroe doctrine found its expression in the famous message of 1823 the only points at which the encroachments of the European nations could cause any apprehension were in Central and South America and in the West India islands. Any sensible attempt to limit this doctrine and apply it at the present time must necessarily seek to ascertain the underlying principle and not the mere terms in which it was couched. The keynote of that doctrine was not a philanthropic desire to preserve the Central and South American republics from European interference, but it was to prevent any such extension of the European system within this hemisphere as might be dangerous to our peace and safety. In plain language, self-preservation and not philanthropy was the end which Mr. Monroe had in mind. It would be absurd to apply this doctrine in any technical sense; but even if a fair interpretation of it would exclude from its operation such a group of islands as Samoa, it is only necessary to remember that Mr. Monroe in his day could not possibly have conceived that the time would come when Hawaii and Samoa would be more closely connected with our national interests than any one of the South American republics can ever become.

The Monroe doctrine was a rule of expression and not of exclusion. It was a statement by a far-seeing and patriotic man that certain things then apprehended would not be submitted to. Doubtless it could never have entered into his mind to conceive that his expression at that time would be tortured into a limitation of the powers of this Government to forbid in 1889 such interference by European nations in the affairs of other countries as would be far more detrimental to the peace and safety of the United States than that which was apprehended in 1823, and against which the declaration of Monroe was particularly aimed. But Mr. Monroe builded wiser than he knew. It was not against an extension of the European

system to the American continent that he protested, but to any portion of this hemisphere, and the uniform course of our diplomacy negatives the idea that the application of the Monroe doctrine is merely continental. Dr. Wharton, during the last four years the learned legal adviser of the State Department, in his excellent Digest of International Law classifies our action respecting Hawaii and Samoa among "special applications" of this doctrine. If, however, by any technicality, whether of reasoning or of expression, the Monroe doctrine is to be limited to exclude Samoa, we may trust the genius of our people to find some new doctrine which, legitimately succeeding that of 1823, will adjust itself to our changed condition and protect our national interests from the tendencies of Great Britain and Germany, which, not content with desiring as much as they can seize of "the earth," have actually entered into a solemn covenant to divide and make partition of the sea.¹

The question, What interest have we in Samoa? is not a difficult one to answer. In the first place, we are committed to the Samoans to see to it that no final disposition of their Government shall be made without our assent. The diplomatic correspondence on this subject between our Government and the Governments of Great Britain and Germany, and the conduct of our official representatives in Samoa, are susceptible of no other interpretation than that, whether rightly or wrongly, we have assumed the position that no adjustment of the internal affairs of Samoa should be made except by the consent of our Government as one of the three treaty powers. From this position it is impossible for us to retreat without dishonor.

Again, intervention is necessary for the protection of the persons and property of our own citizens residing in that country. It has been abundantly demonstrated that these are not safe with Germany dominating a so-called Samoan Government.

But above and beyond the mere property interests of individual Americans is the greater national interest for the preservation of the neutrality of this group. We require a naval and coaling station in that part of the Pacific. No better illustration could be had of this than the fact that, having in 1887 exhausted the supply of coal which we sent to the harbor of Pago-Pago during President Grant's administration, our single naval vessel at Apia was obliged to send 2500 miles to Sydney for coal; and when events recently required our Government to send three or four war vessels to Samoa it was also necessary to send a naval vessel as a store-ship, with coal as a deck-load.

¹ Treaty between Great Britain and Germany, April 6, 1886.

But the crowning interest of the United States in preserving the neutrality of Samoa grows out of its commanding position in the Pacific. This has been already stated, but can be better appreciated by observing it on a globe or a map than from any written statement. In a comparatively recent diplomatic paper Hawaii was said to be the key of maritime dominion in the Pacific. This was true under the former conditions of Pacific navigation, the direction of the trade winds making Honolulu a necessary point of call for all vessels bound to and from our Western coast; true, to a less extent, it still is, even under the ever-changing conditions of trans-Pacific commerce. But even now, of the two great steamship lines sailing from San Francisco, one finds its most direct course lying between the Samoan Islands of Upolu and Tutuila. And it is well understood in California that, were there facilities for landing freight on a pier at Apia, the trade of that port would already be sufficient to tempt the Oceanic Steamship Company to make it a point of call. Under all existing disadvantages, in 1886 there were landed at Apia over \$200,000 worth of American goods, shipped by sailing vessels from San Francisco. Even during the nine weeks of my stay in that vicinity I saw three sailing ships unload their cargoes, consigned to American and English merchants. The position of Apia makes it a distributing point for a large portion of Polynesia, whose islands are continually increasing in that demand for manufactured goods that keeps pace with the civilization which continually enlarges the circle of human wants.

It cannot be doubted that these islands, with Australia, will open up markets more than sufficient to absorb our surplus production, which a more enlightened economic policy will ere long teach our producers to distribute to the world rather than to store it up in warehouses or to contract it by trusts and other devices, while waiting for the alternate ebb and flow of the domestic demand.

The construction of an Isthmian canal is now a mere matter of time, and when the world's commerce floats through such a channel it needs no prophet to assure us that Hawaii will resign to Samoa the key of the maritime dominion of the Pacific. Surely no argument is needed to show what will then be the value of a healthy autonomous nationality, planted almost in the center of the Western ocean, where the commerce which we yet hope to see carried on under our flag as formerly may find ports of supply and repair in time of peace and of refuge in war. Can it be that American foresight is so lost and American prowess so dead that, having acquired the right to insist upon Samoan neutrality, we should hesitate to enforce it promptly

and at any reasonable hazard? Indeed, above and beyond all mere material considerations, there is involved our national self-respect. As before stated, no possible distinction can be drawn between our relations with Hawaii and Samoa except that the latter has become the more important, in view of the certainty of an Isthmian canal. We have unqualifiedly committed ourselves to the maintenance, by force if necessary, of the independence of Hawaii.¹ It has been repeatedly asserted that its position makes it a part of the American system. The uniform tone of our diplomatic utterances on this subject renders it needless to do more than to refer to a few of the late expressions of our Government.

Considerations already stated require that the same policy should equally apply to Samoa. Mr. Frelinghuysen on December 8, 1883, refused to interfere against the annexation of the New Hebrides, then agitated in Australia, because they were allied rather to Australia than Polynesia. But he added that the circumstances were different with Hawaii and Samoa, which had "so asserted and maintained a separate national life as to entitle them to entrance, by treaty stipulations and establishing forms of competent self-government, into the family of nations."

The examination of the diplomatic history of the Samoan question is beyond the limits of this paper, but it may be confidently affirmed that from the day of our treaty until now we have assumed the right to insist upon Samoan autonomy. Nay, more, we have by official utterances and action led Samoa to rely upon our assurances; we have tied the hands of the king whom we recognized, and have led him to refrain from the easy suppression of rebellion by the promise of endeavors "to secure permanent native government for Samoa"; we have stood by and watched the rebellion grow, under the inaction which we counseled and morally compelled, until this patient king was kidnapped and torn from his people, and his followers left to be slaughtered with the active coöperation of one of the powers with which we still keep up the pretense of negotiation about the autonomy of Samoa.

Under these circumstances is it too much to assert that our national self-respect is involved in making and enforcing a demand that this people who have relied upon us be put back to the condition in which they were when we began to mislead them?

Equally must we insist that, since Germany and Great Britain have constantly assented to Samoan independence as the base of all the

negotiations and upon that assent we have interfered with the native struggle, the same self-respect should compel us to hold them to their assurances even were our national interest less vital than it is.

The course pursued by Germany, the insults to our citizens and our flag, and more than all to our Government itself, in deceiving us with assurances which were belied by simultaneous inconsistent action, certainly should forbid further efforts in the direction of coöperative action until disclaimers are accompanied with "fruits meet for repentance."

The tearing down and treading underfoot of the emblem of our nationality, in a private house, by German sailors, may not be technically a *casus belli*, but it might be considered, when encouraged by local officials, as sufficient reason for intermitting the ordinary diplomatic assurances of our distinguished consideration.

The details of these matters cannot now be touched upon, but if the conclusions be challenged the facts can be readily established from the documentary history of the past three years.

But if we were to intervene—how? The only consistent policy for our Government was to require the restoration of the *status quo* existing when we were in conference with Great Britain and Germany. This necessarily involved the return of Malietoa and the opportunity for the Samoans to choose their king untrammelled by local foreigners, whether officials or others. Then it was imperative to require Germany to desist from assuming that preponderating control which we refused to give her when the conference was broken off. Above all it was requisite to make our demands known in a tone which even the German Chancellor could not misunderstand. There was scarcely to be apprehended any danger of war. With Boulangism—the synonym for revenge upon Germany—rampant in France; with Russia watching her opportunity; with the North German Lloyds, to say nothing of other commerce, a ready prey for our cruisers, Germany could hardly be thought likely to go to war with us over Samoa. But if it had been otherwise, even war, terrible as it is, is better than dishonor, which in a nation should crimson the cheek of every citizen as readily as the blow of a gauntlet did that of the knight of old.

There are ample precedents for armed interference by the navy to prevent such indignities to their persons and injury to their property as Americans in Samoa have been subjected to. The bombardment of Greytown by Captain Ingraham was for no other reason than that our citizens and others associated with them in business were subjected to gross indignities and injuries by local authorities who

¹ Mr. Legaré, June 13, 1843; President Fillmore's Annual Message, 1851; Mr. Fish, March 25, 1873; Mr. Blaine, November 19 and December 1, 1881.

were British, but claimed to act under authority of a native king, just as the Germans in Samoa tried to cover themselves with the scanty mantle of Tamasese. The commander of the *Cyane* bombarded the town to punish the local authorities, and he returned home to receive the approval of his Government and the plaudits of his countrymen. Similar action was directed by President Monroe, in 1817, in the case of Amelia Island. And General Jackson, in his seventh annual message, admirably stated the principle upon which such intervention rests, with the citation of which we may conclude:

Unfortunately many of the nations of this *hemisphere* are still so tortured by domestic dissensions.

Revolution succeeds revolution, injuries are committed upon foreigners engaged in lawful pursuits. Much time elapses before a Government sufficiently stable is erected to justify expectation of redress. Ministers are sent and received, and before the discussion of past injuries is fairly begun fresh troubles arise; but too frequently new injuries are added to the old to be discussed together with the existing Government after it has proved its ability to sustain the assaults made upon it, or with its successor if overthrown. If this unhappy condition of things continues much longer other nations will be under the painful necessity of deciding whether justice to their suffering citizens does not require a prompt redress of injuries by their own power without waiting for the establishment of a Government competent and enduring enough to discuss and make satisfaction for them.

George H. Bates.

TOPICS OF THE TIME.

The First Inauguration.

IT is not so much to the mere passing of an historical milestone that so many men's thoughts turn back, this month,¹ to the first inauguration of a President under the Constitution, as to the commemoration of the critical point in the development of the United States. History has changed its point of view of late years. It used to be thought that the accomplishment of national unity by the former English colonies of central North America was merely an evidence of the great political wisdom of our forefathers. Now it is conceived that national unity was the fit and natural line of development; that countless natural forces, seen and unseen, tended to drive the colonies, however unwilling, in that direction; that, successfully resisting these forces and missing their true road, they would have struggled hopelessly for all time in shallows and in miseries; but that, finding the true road, they have gone on triumphantly to achieve their destiny and become the great Republic. And, as the historical indication that the true road had been found at last, the first inauguration must have peculiar interest for every American.

Even from the purely human side, however, the event is very far from being confined to natural forces; it had its great personal element of such clear prominence as to give it a far higher interest. The emergency was so serious that the wisest of men saw and said that upon a rejection of the Constitution the course of events would turn to the establishment of national unity by armed force of some sort. And yet, in spite of the most singular errors on the part of the people, it never came to violence; we must go to the annals of other peoples to study the agonies of the birth of a nation in the throes of armed revolution. And, as the first inaugura-

tion showed that the American people had yielded wisely and peacefully to the demands of their natural position, every historical student must see how appropriate it was that Washington, whose existence, character, and influence had made that form of peaceful solution possible, should have been the central figure of the ceremony — the first President.

The belief is not uncommon that Washington had been the leader of the people before and through, as well as out of, the armed struggle against the British ministry. But the course of events which led to war was singularly lacking in leaders of national influence. Almost the only one who approached that position was Franklin. The people of the middle and New England colonies had faith in the common sense of Poor Richard; and, when his course was seen to be veering towards an apparent support of resistance, the silent influence of the fact was very considerable. But no contemporary would have dreamed of rating the Virginia colonel, during the twenty years after 1756, within many degrees of the hard-headed Pennsylvania printer as a leader. Until the recognition of Washington's usefulness on the military committee of the First Continental Congress, he was merely one who had done good service in the French and Indian War, and was now hardly to be distinguished from any other Virginia gentleman.

And so the character of Washington developed through twenty years of inglorious obscurity. There were examples in plenty in his time, as in ours, of the truth of Bacon's famous saying as to the varying effects of reading, writing, and conversation on man's development. Washington has left no special evidence that his development took any of these roads. It seems to have been a case in which a strong spirit, guided by strong sense, grew into greatness by constant thinking; by freedom from conventionalizing association with

¹ It is familiar history that the inauguration was to take place at New York City March 4, 1789, according to the vote of the Congress of the Confederation; but that the shiftless habits learned under the Confederation, difficulties of travel, etc., delayed the

ceremony until April 30. There is nothing sacred or even constitutional in March 4 as an inauguration day. The Congress of the Confederation named the first Wednesday in March, which in 1789 was the fourth day of the month.