

OUR NATIONAL MILITARY SYSTEM.

I.—WHAT THE UNITED STATES ARMY SHOULD BE.



BEFORE submitting the following suggestions in regard to the possibilities of the future army of the United States, I will state some facts that pertain to the army as it exists to-day.

The law fixing the peace establishment of the army, passed in 1869, limited the strength to thirty thousand. The annual appropriation bill has of late years contained a proviso that no money thus appropriated shall be used for recruiting more than twenty-five thousand men. The cost of keeping up this force has always exceeded \$30,000,000 and has often amounted to \$40,000,000. The men enlisted for this force are mostly recruited in the large cities, and consist of a class who in the main have selected to enlist from other than patriotic motives or love of the military profession. A large proportion are foreigners who are not sufficiently acquainted with the country to find other employment. Many have found out their incapacity to make headway in civil life, the causes being as different as the characters and circumstances of the individuals. Too many belong to that large and unfortunate class known under the generic name of "tramps," who are wanderers by nature and who become the deserters from the army. Many are illiterate, few are educated and capable, and the great majority lack the necessary talents and capacity to take care of themselves and to advance in life. The smart and apparently capable man, when found in the ranks, is generally suspected of some moral taint or intemperate habit not tolerated among his friends, and the number who attain distinction in the army, or after leaving it, are few indeed. There is no opportunity afforded the enlisted man to become qualified to command in case of war, and the number who rise to a commission is remarkably small.

The law permits original enlistments from sixteen to thirty-five years of age. Reenlistments are not restricted by age, and can take place so long as the examining surgeon finds no objection. The duration of each enlistment is five years. The number of posts garrisoned by the regular army is about 125. They are scattered throughout the territory of the United States, and the duties of the troops occupying them are mainly confined to the simplest rou-

tine of garrison life, such as guard duty, target practice, and company and battalion drills. Their time is taken up in rehearsing these elementary lessons over and over, doing them as well, if not better, after the first few weeks of instruction as they ever do afterwards. This is the experience and attainment of the larger portion of the enlisted men. On the frontier there are occasional outbreaks of the Indians in the vicinity, but they are yearly becoming less frequent. When an outbreak does occur the troops have an opportunity to learn a little field service. This humdrum condition is less true of the cavalry than of the other two arms of the service, because the care and instruction of the horse adds a material task to the duties of the trooper. But his duties are also confined to a narrow sphere, and the training of the enlisted men of the army is limited to taking care of themselves and performing the elementary duties stated above. There is no provision for elevating the rank and file, no means held out to the soldier to enable him to rise in the profession of arms, and the longer he remains in service the more incapable he becomes of taking care of himself out of it. The great majority go through their first enlistment of five years making little or no progress after the first year, and when they are discharged, if they do not reenlist, they settle down on a homestead or in some frontier village, and are lost to the country, so far as any further military service to be derived from them is concerned. The most valuable service they have rendered is the opportunity they have afforded the commissioned officers to practice the administration of army affairs and to acquire the care and command of troops. Those who reenlist simply repeat this experience, and make no material progress. They may be good enough soldiers in case there is any actual service in the field to do, but all that they have acquired is limited to the individual.

While military knowledge is fairly maintained and practiced in the army, there is no provision for disseminating it, in order that we may have as many men as possible throughout the country who are themselves instructed and who are capable of giving instruction to others in the event of a war. If proper men were selected at the proper time of life, and the proper training furnished them, with such an end in view, they would at the end of five years' service be able to take a company

into the field and instruct others to do the same.

The annual cost per man of maintaining our military establishment is about \$1200. Surely at such a cost a much better result could and should be obtained. It is evident that, by the methods which are in use in the army at present, we get only a minimum return for this sum. According to the foregoing calculation, it costs more to maintain a private in the United States army than it does to make an officer at West Point. Can there be any doubt about the relative value of the two to the country? No enlisted man, be his abilities what they may, can hope to compete with a graduate of the Military Academy, through such opportunities as are furnished at the present time in a five-years' enlistment. This is due to the fact that the material in the ranks is incapable of acquiring the necessary knowledge, even if it were furnished, which it is not. Besides, a large percentage of the rank and file are morally disqualified for higher and responsible positions, as may be shown by the number of desertions from the service. A large percentage are professional deserters, as was shown by the number of men in the ranks who claimed the benefit of the President's proclamation in 1873. At that time nearly one-third of the enlisted men confessed themselves deserters. There is no means at present by which this class of criminals, or any other, can be kept out of the ranks. With the history of the Academy before us, can it be doubted that we can, and should, get much more for the money expended than we do? Since 1870, when the army was reduced to its present strength, the cost of maintaining it has been, on an average, about forty millions a year. For this sum 100 West Point Academies could be maintained, educating 30,000 students, and graduating annually from 5000 to 7000. Would not the substitution of the method of making officers for the one of maintaining enlisted men, since it can be done cheaper, give the country a much greater military strength, in the event of a war, than any result that we get out of the army as it is now constituted?

Some of the defects of our military system, or rather want of system, have here been pointed out, not with the view to finding fault, but to aid in suggesting where improvement is needed. The defects cited will not be questioned by any officer of sufficient experience, for they are easily deduced from the official reports made from time to time. The Lieutenant-General of the army, in his last annual report, states, in reference to desertion, that there is a slight increase over the previous year, and that it is likely to continue. The

army, notwithstanding its defects, due to mismanagement and unwise legislation, has done good service whenever it has been called upon, and has amply repaid its cost, in proof of which the history of the growth and settlement of the great West in the past half-century will fully testify.

But the nature of its duties are destined soon to change, and we must change our methods to meet the new conditions. The Indian question is fast being settled so far as requiring a military force, and will be soon so insignificant as to be disregarded in military legislation. Soon the sole duty of the army will be the preparation, conservation, and dissemination of military knowledge, and keeping pace with the progress of military science, in order that the country may not invite war by being unprepared for it. Our geographical position relieves us of the great expense of maintaining a very large standing army, for we have no large standing armies on our borders. But we cannot afford to neglect to provide ourselves with the means and material for war, for the reason that being prepared is the surest means of preventing war; not to be prepared is simply to invite it. So long as the great nations of the earth maintain immense armies and foster the art of war, we must do the same. China, the most populous nation on earth, is at the mercy of any third-rate power, simply because in her civilization she has paid little attention to the art of war. If China had given the same attention to the subject that the Western nations have, she could with her population control the world.

The ideal army that we have in view is an educational institution, the fundamental principle being to recruit its material from the youth of the land, who will be able to learn the duties of the service and to impart them to others. To furnish the necessary field for the extension of their knowledge, and to give the entire country the benefit of it, the recruits should be selected *pro rata* from the congressional districts, to which they would be returned when they had completed their education.

Every military post should be a military school. A liberal construction of section 1231 of the Revised Statutes would enable this to be done without further legislation. The authorities, however, have been unfavorable to this idea in so far that they have ruled that a soldier cannot be compelled to go to school. It is difficult to understand the position of General Sherman on this question, in view of the support he has given to the schools established at Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth. The Adjutant-General and the Inspector-General have also advocated this view, and maintained that further legislation is necessary in order

that soldiers can be compelled to go to school. Unquestionably further legislation is necessary, if the general of the army and his staff so maintain. The law of obedience seems sufficient to exact nearly everything else from the soldier, and it is not easily understood why he cannot be required to learn everything that will make him more useful to the service. There would be no difficulty in the way if the Commander-in-Chief or the War Department should make a rule requiring soldiers to attend school. General Sherman has declared in his annual reports, while in command of the army, that the above-mentioned schools have added nothing to the current expenses of the army. If this is so, then every post could be converted into a military school, without increasing the annual appropriation. The schools referred to are for officers, and not for enlisted men, but whether the attendance of officers is voluntary or compulsory has not yet been made apparent. Neither is it self-evident that they are more necessary for the officer than for the enlisted man. An officer's commission is given him on the theory that he has received his commission because he is already familiar with the subjects that are taught at these schools, and illustrates another serious defect of the service; viz., the tendency to repeat and revive over and over again what has once been thoroughly learned. It would not be deemed advisable for a graduate of the Military Academy to be permitted to return to West Point to go over the same course again even once, to say nothing of continuing the repetition. Yet a large percentage of the duties of the service is nothing more than repetition. Take the matter of target practice and drill, which is carried to such an extent that it often becomes detrimental instead of beneficial. Why compel men to do a thing that has once been learned until the monotony of the repetition destroys interest and makes it truly distasteful. Every graduate of the Academy will concede that the repetition of the whole course of infantry tactics three times annually is one of the greatest trials of the course. Target practice has been conducted to such an excess that officers and men have been outspoken in their condemnation of it, and have brought about a reduction to a reasonable limit. After a man has once learned to shoot, it is expensive, besides being detrimental, to require him to shoot for weeks and weeks. The principle of taking up some other subject useful in the profession would be more conducive to the interests of the service, and less irksome. It is not maintained that practice should be dispensed with entirely after a subject is once acquired, but that it should not form the sole occupation of troops, to the ex-

clusion of every other duty, as drill is sometimes made to do. Too much importance is attached to drill tactics. When the sword and pike and the bow and arrow were the essential weapons of war, the formation of ranks had its origin, and developed into masses and an elaborate and complicated manual. With the introduction of fire-arms the thinning of the ranks began, and has continued with the improvement in arms until it is simply disastrous for any force to be surprised in solid formation, where formerly the reverse was the case. The complicated drill, which is having a tendency to simplicity of late, was devised by the sovereigns of large armies to furnish occupation for the troops in time of peace, who if not kept busy would soon engender trouble.

We are disposed to adopt the customs of European nations without taking into consideration why they exist there, and the possibility that they are not necessary in our country. So long as the French nation was considered the first military power in the world, we used French tactics and wore French uniforms. When the Germans conquered the French, we donned the helmet. We adhere to rigid lines in ranks and drills, and to unnecessarily complicated systems, when every officer of experience knows that they have no value and are not used in actual warfare. A member of the National Guard is liable to think that he knows the whole art of war if he can take the prize at a competitive drill or a target practice, on an armory floor and with an unobstructed range. In actual war he would not be able to accomplish the facings in a plowed field any better than the volunteer of a few weeks, and the accuracy of his fire would be materially affected by the unfamiliar ground and the knowledge that there was an enemy who might fire first. Modern warfare is influenced in a greatly diminished degree by what remains to us of the tactics of Frederick the Great and his time. All that is ever used of the endless drilling, when in actual campaign, is the passing from column into line and from line into column by the simplest methods, and no other movements, no matter how favorable the ground or how perfect the drill. The precision required in drill takes away from the soldier what is of the first importance in modern warfare—*independence of movement, freedom of action, and that individuality which belongs to every man whether in or out of the ranks.* We must progress with the changes that attend military science, and the improvement in weapons to which the old formations are no longer applicable.

During times of peace the instruction of the army in most of its duties should be confined

to learning *how* to do them, and to *do* many of them only for the purpose of learning *how*. In the conduct of war there is ample time for practice of all its requirements if the knowledge exists as to how it should be conducted. Constant and unremitting exercises for the purpose of being ready for war that comes so seldom is really a waste of time and strength. The great precision in firing that is attained by so much hard work is lost as soon as the practice ceases.

With each post organized as a school and graded for each arm of the service, and the recruits classed at depots according to capacity and progress already made, they can be assigned to their proper place to begin the contest for the prizes that should be held out for all. There should be something for each and every man to work for. The young man who has nothing to work for is without a very essential qualification for a soldier; and the service that holds out no adequate reward to the industrious and efficient worker in time of peace, nor to the gallant and successful man in time of war, cannot hope to have an efficient and trustworthy army. The system of service should be so arranged that the sifting and promotion will, in the course of the enlistment, place each man in his proper place according to his merits, both as to services and to acquirements. For the inferior and refractory material that would undoubtedly find its way into the service under the most rigid scrutiny one or two companies could be assigned in each regiment, to which these men could be transferred and made to do the rougher and more disagreeable work, to the relief of the better men.

While holding that the army should be an educational institution, it is not intended to limit it to book knowledge. The instruction should also be technical to a certain extent. There will be many who will not take to books who can be of great service as carpenters, wheelwrights, blacksmiths, masons, painters, etc.;—these are all trades which can be taught, for they are all carried on at every post. All these pursuits are essential in war; in fact, there is no pursuit in civil life that may not be of service in war. The ax and the spade were as valuable as the musket in the last days of the rebellion.

Many officers of the army will be averse to the introduction of mechanical and industrial work into the military service, as improper and unnecessary. There has been much written and said against the working of the soldiers, it being claimed that it is one of the objectionable features of the service that so much manual labor is required of the men, and that it is incompatible with military duty. This will readily

be met by changing the status of manual labor in the army and making it a military duty as well. The management of working parties can be utilized as a means of discipline as well as drill, and with much greater utility to the service and the soldier. There will be no difficulty in doing this, for the importance of skilled labor under military control, applied to military affairs, can readily be shown; and whether war comes or not, its utility remains, especially as we are supposing the army to be composed of a younger and superior material.

The Military Academy would furnish the instructors for these post schools, and the various branches taught there could be carried on to a greater or less extent at all military posts, without additional increase of the current expenses of the army. In the course of a five-years' enlistment the progress which each man would make would be in proportion to his application and capacity and the opportunities afforded him. That education of the rank and file would be beneficial to the army will hardly be questioned. Yet many officers will be found who will oppose the plan of making the army an educational institution, on the ground that it would never be ready for immediate service. It is possible that if education should be made the important feature that its importance demands, the necessity of being ready to move at a moment's notice might be lost sight of in a measure, but there is nothing in the system here suggested that would prevent the most complete preparation for any emergency. It would, however, be quite sufficient to teach the army how to be ready. As has already been stated, it is a great waste of energy for the army to be maintained in constant readiness for what comes so seldom, and rarely comes so suddenly that preparation cannot be made if the means and knowledge exist to get ready. It is the supplying of the means and the knowledge that is here advocated.

In order that the proper material for the army may be provided, it will be necessary to change the methods of the recruiting service. It should be the duty of that branch of the War Department to procure the recruits from the youth of the land, from all parts *pro rata*, in order that all sections of the country shall be represented; when the enlistments expire, the young men, with the knowledge they have acquired while in the service, should be distributed as widely as possible. They should be young men, preferably eighteen and certainly not over twenty-five years of age. Selecting them from congressional districts, the present strength of the army could be maintained by obtaining fifteen recruits annually from each district.

The prevailing rule should be one enlistment, in order that the greatest number possible may get a military training. Five years is ample time in which to produce good results. The young man who could not in five years qualify himself for an officer under a system with that end in view, would not be likely to do it by longer service.

If an education, in addition to the pay, clothing, and subsistence, could be held out, there would be no difficulty in getting the necessary young men. There is little doubt that, when such a plan should become known and established, it would be necessary to make the selections by competitive examinations. The prospect would be very inviting to a large percentage of the young men of the United States, for the number of those whose ambition is greatly in excess of their opportunities is very large. The opportunity of getting an education while one is being clothed and fed, and receiving from fifty cents to one dollar per day, would be availed of gladly by any young man who had not been favored by fortune. It would be his chance to see something of the great world. After five years he could return to his home and relatives with a diploma and a discharge that would give him a claim to a commission as an officer in the event of a war, and he could have from one to two thousand dollars in his pocket; for he could save all his pay, as he would have little time to spend it if he applied himself closely to his duties. Many armies of young men, larger than the United States army to-day, are longing for such a start in life.

The expense of the army graduate would not be lost to the country even if a war did not occur during the available life of such graduate. He would be utilized in the local military organizations, and his savings would enable him to make a beginning in such civil pursuit as he might desire to follow, if he had not acquired a trade during his service. He would take a place and position among his friends and kindred corresponding to the standing his abilities and application won for him in the army. A very large percentage of the pay of the enlisted men of the army, which is now spent in saloons and gambling establishments, would be brought home by the discharged men, to be usefully spent among the people — an economic feature that would be of great value in time, for it would be a constant and continuous addition to the wealth of the congressional districts from year to year; not in money alone, but also in educated and well-trained defenders of the country. At the end of five years there would be in each district about seventy-five graduates from the army, from among whom a sufficient number of officers

could be obtained to instruct any number of volunteers that would probably be called for from the district in the event of a war. With such a body of competent instructors, the volunteer service could be placed in better condition for the field in thirty days than was attained during the first year of the war of the Rebellion.

This plan would provide from twenty to twenty-five thousand instructors every five years, and place them where they would be most needed. An army of half a million of men will require at least fifteen thousand officers. When war comes in this country, the first necessity is a sufficient quota of competent officers. By the foregoing plan there would be a permanent source of supply to select from, possessed of the most recent information on the subject of the care and management of troops.

Our form of government being different from that of all other great nations, our military system must be modified to suit it. We raise our armies by calling for volunteers, and without the approval of the people no war could be got on foot by the Government in this country. For this reason our military methods should be popularized as much as possible, in order to have the sympathies of the people. We have no military system whatever. The militia laws looking to that end, which were devised in the early history of the United States, have failed of their object, and are a dead letter on the statute books. When war comes we shall be as unprepared for it as we were when the Rebellion came upon us. We shall be obliged to resort to the same expensive methods, and suffer the same humiliations in the beginning that the country has heretofore experienced. Great as were our resources, we could make no headway in the first year of the rebellion, because the great body of the people were ignorant of the means and methods of carrying on war, and there were not a sufficient number of instructors provided for such a contingency. In another decade there will not be left a military remnant of our last experience that could be utilized, for the improvement and changes that have been made in the means of warfare will require new and original adaptations of our resources. The object of this paper is to suggest the best possible preparation that the amount of money we annually appropriate could accomplish.

The limited force scattered throughout the United States that we ostentatiously designate as our standing army is smaller than that of any other country in proportion to its population, except China. While France has a soldier to every 60 inhabitants, we have one in 2400. By some extremists, who hold that a standing army is not consistent with a republican form of government, this insignifi-

cant force is sometimes accused of threatening the liberties of our people. It is a misnomer to call an establishment that bears such a proportion to the population a standing army. It is nothing more than the custodian of what military knowledge exists in the country. This is a heavy responsibility, which should be aided by making it also a producer and disseminator of military knowledge, in order that it may have the opportunity of rendering an adequate return for the immense cost it is to the country.

It is necessary that the people at large should see and appreciate the importance — if not the necessity, at least the economy — of utilizing the army as has been outlined in this paper. The army of the present day is conservative and not disposed to radical innovations. The War Department could do much to put the army in the way indicated; but, in view of the opposition of the high authorities

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cited, it will be necessary for Congress to direct what should be done. That august body is also slow to act without being stimulated to action by the people.

Every friend of the army who has the interest of his country at heart, and sees the necessity for maintaining the greatest possible military strength at the smallest cost, must appreciate any plan that will provide for the production of military knowledge and its dissemination among the people, for it is the primary element of national defense. It is believed that the foregoing plan is in accord with our institutions, and that when fully understood by the people it will be accepted as the most practical and economical means of fostering and developing the greatest national strength, of engendering patriotism and the love of country, and will tend to the preservation and perpetuation of the Union.

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II.— MILITARY EDUCATION AND THE VOLUNTEER MILITIA.

A VERY important element in the national defense, when the nation's peace is threatened, must be the character of the troops which will compose her armies, and the means which must be relied upon to call them from their homes to the battle-fields and to change them as quickly as possible from an unorganized body of citizens into an efficient and victorious army. First in importance is the character of the material upon which we have to work. Grant said of a prominent Union general, "He perhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who enlisted for the war and the soldier who serves in time of peace." There are a great many officers who make the same mistake. The volunteer soldier, who in time of the nation's peril enlists for the war, is often a man in comfortable circumstances, of competence or even wealth, and his enlistment is a pecuniary sacrifice to him. He is often a man of social position, surrounded by friends who regard and esteem him, all of which he fully appreciates. Patriotism and the hope that by honorable and perhaps distinguished services he may still improve his social position and popularity are the motives of his enlistment. They infuse him with energy and prompt him to heroic deeds.

As a rule a member of the National Guard or State Militia is a man of good social standing. He has usually some military taste, inclination, and ability. All the time he gives to his military studies and training is at a sac-

rice of his private interests; and consequently he desires to accomplish as much as possible in the shortest space of time. There is nothing mercenary in his motives, for the pay and allowances he receives are never equal to his outlay of money, taking no account of the time he gives.

The chief pleasure he derives from his service is in the gratification of his taste for military knowledge, the satisfaction he takes in his military exercises and the excellence of his attainments, the knowledge that he is in a position to defend his country and society promptly and well, and the increased regard and esteem he merits from his countrymen. He has independence of character and is self-reliant, strong, and intelligent, and frequently is a man of broad and liberal culture and the strongest sense of personal honor, dignity, and self-respect.

This is the kind of men who must constitute our volunteers in time of war, and we must rely especially upon such to rouse the people to patriotic action and to lead them forth in the defense of the country in time of peril.

The nation having secured the volunteer, the next step is to convert him into a soldier in the shortest possible space of time. To this end the most difficult and at the same time absolutely indispensable thing is to induce him at all times to submit his judgment, in matters requiring action, to that of his commanders, and certainly and surely to obey the

orders of his superior officers in the most prompt and exact manner. This result is obtained in two very different ways, owing to the character of the material of which the soldier is to be made; and it is exceedingly important that the difference in the two systems should be understood, that the method may be adapted to the character of the material. One system is based upon a cringing submission to and personal dependence upon superiors. Under such discipline men soon cease to be men and become mere machines. The kind of men who constitute the majority of our volunteer armies, and especially of the National Guard, do not yield to these measures. Three or five years is not enough in which to teach them to cease to reflect: so short a time is not enough in which to destroy the enthusiasm with which they enlisted, or to cause them to lose their independence of character and to cease to think for themselves; and we are all glad that it is not.

It seems to me that in our United States army and Military Academy the tendency has been, and still is, too much to seek the wrong foundation for discipline, and the more intelligent, patriotic, and self-respecting class of men have been deterred from enlisting in the regular army; and many of the best men, of the noblest impulses, who do enlist are no doubt by this cause moved to desert without being willing to give their reasons, fearing the ridicule of their companions and officers who do not sympathize with them in their ideas of personal dignity and self-respect.

Aristocratic theories are impracticable in a volunteer army of free citizens, and still more so in the National Guard. Some of the very best National Guard companies, which would have obeyed the military orders of their officers, even at the risk of their lives, with an eagerness, exactness, and self-devotion that could not have been excelled, have sometimes been discouraged, their self-respect wounded, and their ardor destroyed by an unwise and foolish attempt of their military superiors to carry their superiority beyond strictly military matters, into the social life of the command, and to make their men feel that the subordination extended not only to things military but to all things, and was personal rather than official. Such companies only await the expiration of their enlistment to leave the service, with the advice to their friends— which, contrary to the ordinary rule, is sure to be taken— never to enter it. The loss of such men is absolutely irreparable. The decline in discipline and efficiency in many commands of the National Guard may be attributed largely to the loss of such men, their places being supplied by others of inferior character. If this process should be general and should continue, the

decline and ultimate extinction of the National Guard would be inevitable.

A subordination that is attempted to be made instinctive by basing it upon an exaggeration of the personal, social, and assumed inherent inferiority of the enlisted man, besides preventing the best enlistments, can only, where a free citizen is concerned, be made efficient by long years of effort— longer than any war is likely to last; and therefore this kind of discipline, while it may answer in the armies of aristocratic countries, is not the best in a free country. Fortunately the foundations of a better are ready at hand, and it is not necessary to change the character of the man in order to make of him a good soldier.

For the aristocratic idea we should substitute that of properly constituted authority, a love of law, order, and system, fidelity to duty, pride of good citizenship and of military and chivalric qualities, and an intelligent and full explanation of the absolute necessity of silence and strict obedience at all times, in order to conquer— supplemented, as in other cases, by real merit and proper example in the superior. By proper instruction on these subjects, addressed to the soldier's intelligence, a better discipline can be developed in the volunteer army, and especially in the National Guard, and in a very much shorter time than can possibly be done by the aristocratic method. And when at the close of a war such a soldier again becomes a free citizen, he is a better one than before, and in mind, principles, and habits is in full accord with free institutions.

This is the reason why the soldiers of the volunteer armies so quickly, so naturally, and so completely returned to their civil duties, after four or five years of active military life, to the great surprise of those whose ideas had been formed by contemplating the result of the disbanding of armies governed by the aristocratic principle.

It would seem best in a free country in time of peace to use, so far as possible, that basis of discipline best adapted to the volunteer armies in time of war. Any system may answer when but little strength is required, and that one should be selected which, with the least change, would give the greatest strength in the time of the greatest trial.

Some system should be adopted by which men should be instructed in the nature of military subordination* as distinct from social. When this is done, the work will be much facilitated. This system should be developed as much as possible before a war occurs, and is an important part of the preparation for the national defense.

Persons who have formed their opinions upon matters of discipline by observing armies

governed on the aristocratic principle are apt very much to underrate the value of the subordination and discipline of the National Guard and volunteers, on account of the freer intercourse between inferior and superior and the apparent disregard for ceremony and forms to be noted in the ranks of the latter. It is difficult for them to believe that a man who does not stand at "attention" in the presence of an officer is nevertheless fully prepared to obey his orders to the utmost; but such is often the case.

The National Guard of the States is a sort of cadet corps from whose rank and file general and field officers are likely to be evolved in case of war, as has often been done before; and it is generally admitted that the more intelligent an officer is the more efficient he will be. It is likewise true, though not so universally admitted, that the same rule applies to the private. In thousands of ways, such as in making the most of his few comforts and in taking care of himself in camp and field as well as in battle, the private soldier's efficiency is largely in proportion to his intelligence.

So much for the education of the republican soldier in military discipline. The soldier of the Republic should also differ from the soldier of a monarchy in this: he should be of the people, for the people, in close relation to and in sympathy with the people, and should continue to be so well acquainted with them, and they with him, that they and he may have the fullest confidence and esteem for each other. In monarchies the soldier is the fighting instrument of his sovereign, who often desires that he should *not* sympathize with the people.

In selecting material for soldiers from among the people, it is best that the culling process should go on from youth up. The youths at colleges and high-schools should have an optional class in military tactics and drill. It would not be without profit to all if it were made compulsory, as it is in Switzerland, for the time would not be wasted if the individual should never become a member of a military organization. The physical development and the muscular and mental training resulting from an elementary course in military tactics, drill, and exercises would be ample compensation for the time and money spent, and probably would be as useful to the learner in after civil life as his Latin, French, or algebra, and possibly more so. Boys and men having a military bent or inclination would naturally seek schools where such advantages were offered in connection with their other studies, and so of higher schools and colleges. He who had a special talent would be most likely to go farthest in this direction, and he who found that he had

no taste or ability of this kind would more easily take some other profession without any sense of disgrace to himself or friends in doing so. In this way the selection of the fittest would be continually going on in the most natural way possible, just as in the other spheres of life. Appointments to the regular army and to the Military Academy could then be made from among those who had distinguished themselves by special natural fitness and by special attainments. The West Point Academy should have its doors thrown open wider, so that any one who might be willing to subject himself to the severe discipline there practiced for four years, under penalty for desertion, could enter, and students on graduation should not be promised commissions in the army or required to take them. This change, it is believed, would not injure the discipline at West Point. Experience teaches that it is not the students who are of their own will striving for an education who are insubordinate at college, but those who have their education thrust upon them by doting friends.

Likewise every inducement of honorable mention, or otherwise, should be offered to men of proper natural attainments and qualifications to enter the standing army and to remain as long as they can feel enthusiasm for their work; and when they practically cease to learn they should be allowed and encouraged to resign and to seek employment among the people in the kindred professions or occupations of peace, as did Grant, Sherman, McClellan, Schofield, Rosecrans, and others, thus giving place to other young men who would be glad to spend a few years in preparing themselves to defend their country if occasion might require. It is not probable that Grant, Sherman, and McClellan lost anything of efficiency by their years of civil employment, but rather gained. It placed them in positions where special effort and ability would produce for their possessors special results, and so increased their energy, their tact, and their mental resources and enterprise. It brought them into closer contact with the people, and so increased their knowledge of the peculiar character and quality of the material of which were composed the volunteer armies of the Republic, which they afterwards so gloriously led.

Men should not always be in school, and that is what military life might well be called in time of peace: it is a preparation for work to be hereafter done when the nation's strength is tried.

It is not recommended, at least for the present, that there should be a compulsory rotation in the army. It is only proposed that resignations of officers after a few years' ex-

perience should be freely accepted and encouraged, and that they should be allowed to return to the body of the people, in order that other officers may receive commissions in the army for short periods, or may receive commissions which they would be permitted to resign as soon as they too had received some experience. Some officers might remain permanently in the army to preserve its traditions, as professors remain in colleges while students come and go. Under such a system of military preparation men of military experience and education living in civil life among their neighbors and countrymen could in a short time gather together their friends and acquaintances, whom they would know, and who would know them, thus giving mutual confidence, and could lead them to the defense of society and of the state and nation more promptly than it could be done in any other way; and this would make a strong nation without the expense and disadvantages of a large standing army.

In a free republic the military force always has been, and always will be, in the body of the people. It cannot be permanently otherwise: where the ultimate force is, there is the sovereignty. All institutions and orders and all laws exist by sufferance or direct command of this ultimate force. This has been recognized by all our great statesmen, and they have shown their belief by urging the necessity for training the people to arms, in the form of a well-organized militia. They have embodied their principles in our constitutions, state and national. The practice in the earlier years of the Republic of seeking to train all men physically capable, if ever justifiable, has long ceased to be so, because the number of such men, being about seven millions, is so large that the training of all is entirely unnecessary. It would involve an enormous expenditure of money. It would compel men to drill who have no aptitude for military affairs. They would not succeed, and they would be a hindrance to the others. It would be irksome to them, and they would use their efforts to break up the system. It would also prevent the natural process of selecting the fittest, which results where only one in fifty or a hundred is trained, and only those who from an instinct of fitness volunteer for the purpose.

The officers in the volunteer militia are selected, and should be, from men whose attainments, abilities, and experience make their time most valuable to themselves as well as others.

It would be a good thing for the National Guard if some part of the five thousand enlisted men and officers, which the Adjutant-General recommends should be added to the regular

army, should be taken from the National Guard by enlistments and commissions for a short period of service — of three or six months, or even a year. The candidate for such a service should be required first to pass such an examination by an army board as would show him to be reasonably well qualified by nature and attainments to at once assume the duties that his new position would impose upon him. At the military posts where the National Guard men serve there should be a school for officers and enlisted men, where the duties of the various positions should be intelligently explained and illustrated by officers detailed for the purpose, in which these citizen soldiers might make the most of their time while in the army. These short-term men and officers might perhaps be required to discharge all duties, so far as might be deemed practicable, that are required of others of their rank in the army. They should be enlisted or commissioned in the army, and for the time being have nothing to do with the National Guard. That kind of discipline in the army which is based upon personal dependence might be slightly impaired by this practice, but the best discipline would not be to any considerable extent; for if the right persons were selected, it would be those who were most desirous of learning true discipline.

In order to secure a more general instruction the National Guard should go into camp from six to ten days each year, and it should all go into state camps, under one commander. There is a very great, very beneficial, and almost indispensable influence in converting men into soldiers — in the promotion of discipline of every sort, in army-making as distinguished from mere teaching — to be found in having soldiers do duty in the presence of others, and having other soldiers do duty in their presence. Each one learns that he has a duty that he himself must perform, and that others have duties with which he must not interfere; and the latter is almost as important as the former. By seeing other soldiers faithfully performing their duties without swerving to the right hand or to the left, by seeing perfect order prevailing and everything being done by the right person and in the right way and at the right time amidst so large a number as to make this utterly impossible without military discipline, the *esprit de corps* is engendered, and the feeling strengthened that the whole army is a unit, and each part, while attending to its own duty, can rely, without the least nervousness or distrust, upon all other parts attending to theirs. A soldier may and will have his private personal friends with whom he talks and in whom he confides. As a soldier he should know other soldiers simply as such, ac-

ording to their rank, position, and duties, without reference to the personality of the man. This is more easily learned where the soldier is brought into contact with soldiers of whom he knows nothing but their rank, position, and duties, except that they are honorable members of his own army, and as such are always worthy of the utmost confidence as soldiers, from a soldier. These things can only be learned by having large bodies of troops together under trusted and competent officers, and they must be learned or there is no real army. It is these feelings, felt to be so strong and so deep by the veteran comrades of many well-fought campaigns, that make old soldiers so confiding, so trusting, so partial to one another through all their after life. These things constitute the indispensable essence of the army; and without them there can be no army, no matter how many otherwise good soldiers there may be. It is only when these things are too much overlooked, undervalued, or misunderstood, and when too much relative importance is attached to the mechanical execution of the drills and ceremonies, that small camps are preferred to the largest possible.

In States where there is a well-organized National Guard, a commission might be appointed consisting of four or five officers selected from the National Guard, and as many more detailed from the regular army, including such professors of military science as might be serving in the colleges of the State. This commission might examine such officers and non-commissioned officers as desired to be examined and such as might be ordered before it, and grant diplomas showing attainments in

the various branches of military art and science. Such an institution to be of any value must have its expenses, including pay of officers who compose it and transportation and subsistence of officers attending it, paid by the State. In this event a healthy demand would be created for the service of such regular officers as could be secured from the army and the military colleges during the annual encampment, to conduct officers' schools and non-commissioned officers' schools, and to assist and coach the various officers in the discharge of their duties generally. It would not be well for any one to supersede commanders as the proper instructors of their own troops; but commanders would be glad to avail themselves of the assistance of better-informed men, and would be profited thereby. In this way the services of several officers of the regular army would be extremely profitable, if they could be obtained during the annual encampment of each brigade.

If something of the plan here suggested were gradually adopted, it would have a tendency to put many graduates of West Point and some ex-army officers with their technical knowledge into the National Guard; and some of the most military of the National Guard officers might find their way into the army, carrying with them their practical knowledge of the character of our volunteers. It would bind together in one bond of sympathetic union the Military Academy, the Army, and the National Guard, greatly strengthen the military power of the nation, and foster that sentiment so necessary in a republic of liberty governed by law.

James Montgomery Rice,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Illinois National Guard.

III.—COMMENT ON COLONEL RICE'S PAPER.

COLONEL RICE'S paper covers many points on which opinions naturally differ. It is a wholesome sign that so much attention is being paid by thoughtful men to the necessity of providing for our national defense by a more thorough organization of the militia of the several States, and it is from a comparison of their opinions that the best method is to be selected.

Wars nowadays are speedily decided, and a nation not prepared to protect itself will be conquered before it can organize and train its natural forces so as to render them effective. With our absurdly small regular army, it is to the National Guard of the various States alone that the country must look to supply the regimental and company officers who are to command the volunteers who are to protect it in time of war. No pains, therefore, should be spared to make their military education as thorough as is possible under the peculiar circumstances of their services.

The foundation of a military organization is disci-

pline. I do not think it possible to have in a militia regiment the rigid discipline of regulars. But while not carrying "class distinction" too far, it is perfectly possible to require the men, *when in uniform*, to conform to rigid rules in regard to the respect to be paid to their officers and to the forms of ceremony, etc., so as to impress upon them the maxim "that obedience to authority lies at the foundation of military efficiency." This is done regularly at the New York State Camp, and the better the regiment the more pride its members take in observing these matters.

The great point to insure obedience — and one upon which particular stress is laid by German authorities — is to impress upon the men that their officers will protect them from all unnecessary labor and danger; "for when the men know this they face hardship and danger uncomplainingly, knowing that it is inevitable." This involves, of necessity, that the officers should be taught how to care for their men; and here, therefore,

is where the National Guard officer is weak, because uninstructed.

I doubt whether it would be possible to throw open the doors of West Point as proposed, without injuring it. The cadets are now paid and supported by the country. If there were many more, it would cost too much. Besides, the present wholesome regulation which draws the officers of our army from every state and rank in life would be apt to be overthrown.

Any system, however, which would enable our youth and those National Guardsmen who are anxious to improve themselves in military matters to do so would be of great value. Military instructors in colleges, short-term service in army posts,—like the one-year volunteers of Germany,—would cost the country but little, and add greatly to its means of defense. It cannot be expected, however, that such men as compose our National Guard will enlist as privates in the army.

NEW YORK, July, 1888.

They would not like to associate with the men, nor would the influence upon them be good if they did.

Examinations and diplomas in the method suggested by Colonel Rice—anything, in fact, which will help the National Guardsman to fit himself for service without taking up more time than he can afford to devote—should be provided.

I cannot agree with Colonel Rice as to the value of large camps of instruction. They look imposing, but there is very apt to be too many "reviews" and ceremonies. A model camp should have as little show and as much hard work as possible. At the meetings of the United States National Guard Association the regimental officers all preferred regimental camps. The experience of New York shows, however, that there should be carefully selected instructors and inspectors to see that the prescribed work is done, and done properly.

George W. Wingate,

President National Guard Association of the United States.

IV.—OUR NATIONAL GUARD.

MALE citizens of the United States between eighteen and forty-five years of age are considered available for military duty, men holding State or Government positions, or certain religious beliefs, being exempt.

During the summer of 1887 twelve States and one Territory* had their guard inspected, while in camp, by United States army officers detailed for that purpose by the Secretary of War. The following extracts from the reports of some of these officers give an idea of the efficiency of the guard in general.

Colonel H. M. Black, United States Army Inspector Michigan N. G. :

The general appearance of the several regiments was excellent. All looked young, active, energetic, and healthy, and have in them the material to make as fine soldiers as could be found in any country.

Colonel E. S. Otis, United States Army Inspector Pennsylvania N. G. :

The men are young, of fine physique. . . . Its intelligence is of a high order; its organization is effective; its practical knowledge, considering its opportunities, very marked.

Colonel W. R. Shafter, United States Army Inspector Second Brigade California N. G. :

The conduct of the men while in camp was most excellent, their physical condition good, and it was apparent that the only thing necessary to make them first-class soldiers was the need for their services in actual warfare.

Edwin C. Mason, Acting Inspector-General, United States Army :

From my experience with the militia in years past, I was entirely unprepared to find the National Guard on such a high plane of discipline and general efficiency as I find that in the State of Iowa.

Colonel E. F. Townsend, United States Army Inspector Dakota N. G. :

It is an excellent body of men, full of zeal, and only requires to be directed rightly to make splendid soldiers.

* Alabama, California, Dakota, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont.

Adjutant-General Drum, United States Army (report to Secretary of War, 1887), calls attention to these reports as follows :

The reports, appended hereto, of the several inspecting officers are highly interesting and instructive. The steadily increasing interest manifested by the militia of the States is evidenced by the high percentage of attendance at the annual encampments and the general excellent military spirit of the troops. . . . Young officers of the army could be spared during the winter, to report to the adjutants-general of States, on application of the governors, to aid in the instruction of both officers and non-commissioned officers.

Whilst the reports referred to show that the *personnel* of the guard is all it should be, there are deficiencies to which these reports point—deficiencies which consist mainly in discipline, knowledge of guard duty, and equipments.

Whatever in the way of uniforms and equipments have been obtained were, until recently, issued by the State or purchased by the men themselves, but now the United States Government lends a helping hand by an annual appropriation of \$400,000 "in the way of equipments," each State being allowed its *pro rata* proportion. Each State has its own uniform and button (a few States, having adopted the United States army uniform and retaining the State button, are exceptions). The guns in use vary, but the tendency now in this is to adopt the regulation United States army gun, and many States have already done so. The armament of the artillery, as a rule, is old ordnance and unfit for service. The Gatling gun now forms part of the armament of the artillery in California, Connecticut, Indiana, Ohio, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and perhaps other States.

The National Guard of the different States, if brought together, would present a variegated appearance as to uniform, arms, and general equipment.

The guard in each State is enlisted for service within the State only, and is under control of the governor, who by virtue of his office is commander-in-chief, and who appoints an administrative officer called the adjutant-

general, who looks after the guard. Each State regulates the pay for her troops, which in many States amounts to very little, while some allow the guard, when on duty, United States army pay.

The accompanying table based upon the official return of the Adjutant-General, U. S. A., July 2d, 1888, gives the strength of the regularly enlisted militia. It will be seen that our National Guard numbers about one hundred thousand, and the first thing to be considered is the efficiency of this body of men.

STATES	General Officers.	General Staff.	Regimental, Field, Staff, and Company Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers, Musicians, and Privates.	Total Officers and Men.	Troops of Cavalry.	Batteries of Artillery.	Companies of Infantry.
Alabama	9	42	157	2036	2244	1	3	38
California	110	243	4056	4417	1	14	41	
Colorado	2	31	105	1015	1153	4	1	26
Connecticut	1	9	162	2401	2573	1	1	37
Delaware	14	40	655	709	2	2	8	
Florida	105	105	1066	1171	1	2	30	
Georgia	25	308	4233	4566	10	3	60	
Illinois	4	44	277	3825	4150	2	2	65
Indiana	1	22	164	1997	2184	1	4	36
Iowa	2	18	192	2481	2693			48
Kansas	5	30	130	1801	1966	2	30	
Kentucky	13	88	1235	1336	1	1	19	
Louisiana	7	31	158	1821	2017	5	8	10
Maine	1	6	70	801	958	1	1	22
Maryland	2	30	135	1849	2016			41
Massachusetts	5	37	351	4653	5046	3	3	72
Michigan	4	16	139	2853	3012	1	1	36
Minnesota	6	23	127	1649	1796	1	1	30
Mississippi	4	20	135	1230	1389	1	4	32
Missouri	1	12	112	2026	2151	1	1	20
Nebraska	1	19	84	1118	1222	1	1	20
Nevada	4	40	18	300	362	2	1	18
N. Hampshire	1	9	99	1127	1236	2	1	24
New Jersey	3	50	257	3637	3947	2	53	
New York	5	76	675	12474	13230	6	179	
No. Carolina	1	20	118	1175	1314	1	1	27
Ohio	16	368	5242	5626	1	8	89	
Oregon	1	12	111	1433	1557	1	1	25
Pennsylvania	4	41	535	7995	8545	2	2	132
Rhode Island	1	24	115	1016	1156	2	4	20
So. Carolina	8	88	443	4305	4844	36	4	42
Tennessee	20	226	1411	1557	5	25		
Texas	3	30	248	2275	2556	10	2	53
Vermont	1	14	56	721	792	1	1	12
Virginia	2	8	158	2707	2875	3	4	46
West Virginia	1	74	794	869	1	1	2	
Wisconsin	20	144	1928	2092	1	1	34	
TERRITORIES.								
Dakota	30	82	880	992	1	18		
Montana	5	7	40	571	623	2	1	8
New Mexico	9	144	1582	1735	32	5		
Washington	3	24	57	806	890	1	1	14
Wyoming	3	3	45	48				
Dist. Columbia	1	8	84	1096	1189			24
Total	106	1099	7237	98372	106814	125	97	1557

No return received from Arkansas. Arizona, Idaho, and Utah have no organized militia.

The officers of higher ranks and many of the company commanders now in the service served in the civil war, and those officers who did not, chiefly young men, are being molded and influenced by these veterans; and this influence will last long after the old soldiers are gone. The ranks are filled by self-sustaining young men who are unequalled in love of country, soldierly qualities, education, and habits.

Instead of keeping up a large standing army for the maintenance of its honor and integrity, this country relies on the volunteer. That the volunteer is expected

to respond to all calls in time of need is sufficient reason for having him properly equipped in time of peace. The guard as it now stands is virtually a volunteer army; although only sworn into State service, these men would at the first call volunteer to go wherever their country needed them.

Many theories have been advanced for the improvement of the guard, and the following ideas in regard to this improvement have been suggested by reports of inspecting officers, articles in military journals, conversations with military men, and service in the guard.

Let the guard be divided between the States and Territories in accordance with the population, and have a uniform oath of enlistment swearing men into the service of the General as well as the State Government. Make them, in fact, United States volunteers, and, if best, change the name from National Guardsmen to United States Volunteers.

After thoroughly equipping and arming, let the United States Government instruct them in the duties of the soldier; and with this in view, the Secretary of War could detail competent officers to visit as often as needed the armories in each State, to give instructions by means of lectures, schools, drills, etc., these officers, for the time being, to act in conjunction with the State's adjutant-general.

The adjutant-general of a State is a political appointee, and this is often detrimental to the guard. When a competent adjutant-general is found he should be retained, without reference to politics or change of governors. If this cannot be accomplished, let the Secretary of War detail a suitable officer, who, although acting under orders from the governor, would be free from political intrigue.

An important addition to any plan would be a pecuniary inducement for men to attend drill. Allow something per year for attending drills,—it need not be a large sum,—and for absence unexcused deduct a stipulated amount. Thus the hardest thing to contend against—non-attendance at drill—would be remedied. When drilling, in camps of instruction, or on duty for the General Government, let the same authority pay them; and when a State calls for them, let it pay for the service rendered. The idea of paying these men for drilling might be antagonized on the ground of expense; but it must be remembered that the money would be spent on our best young men, and that these men are holding themselves ready to spend their lives, if need be, for their country. The physical and mental training, the improvement in carriage and general appearance, of the men is a strong argument in favor of this plan. Furthermore, the fact that they were being paid for their efforts in perfecting themselves as citizen soldiers would increase their zeal and keep the ranks filled with the best material.

The State's adjutant-general's department should be supported by the State, and armories provided by the same authority.

Were the foregoing ideas carried out, the result would be a United States volunteer army divided between the States, the troops in each State forming a military department under command of the governor; but when called into the service of the General Government, the soldier would pass from under the State's control and be subject to the United States authority.

The importance of selecting efficient officers is not to

be lost sight of. The common plan now in vogue is for the men to elect their officers. When in addition to this the newly elected officer is required to go before an examining board, properly constituted, incompetent material will be kept out.

The following, from the last year's report of General Sheridan, is worthy of the consideration due to the high authority from which it comes :

I am strongly in favor of the General Government extending all possible aid to the National Guard of the different States, as they constitute a body of troops that in any great emergency would form an important part of our military force. They should be armed with the best weapons, amply provided with complete camp and garrison equipage, and instructed in the various drills and exercises according to the tactics and systems followed in the regular army. According to my observation and experience, most of the State troops now march well and handle the gun well, but they are deficient in discipline and all the duties that teach a soldier to take care of him-

self while in camp and upon the march. This defect can best be overcome by establishing some system of encampment under the control of the General Government. In the development of such a measure, the entire army, as well as myself personally, will be glad to render such assistance as lies in our power, and I recommend that the favorable consideration of the subject may be commended to Congress.


Experience would soon demonstrate the feasibility of any plan which might be adopted, and by proper changes, as needed, an effective system could be formed. In many States the maintaining of a military force is now a necessity in order to keep down the riotous element so freely admitted to our shores.

The number of men available for military duty is estimated at 8,000,000. Granting that a National Guard 100,000 strong is large enough, there would be one citizen soldier out of 80 available men, or one-eightieth of our strength, equipped.

Edmund Cone Brust,

Major 1st Regiment Light Artillery Ohio National Guard.

ZANESVILLE, OHIO, July, 1888.



SAPPHO.

UPON a height, upon a height of song,
A maiden sits whose bosom ne'er hath
heaved
With the dark billows that to Love belong,
Who hath not been deceived, who hath not
grieved.

From the bright bow of her delicious lips
Arrows of music, like to sunbeams, spring;
And, like the shafts upon the shoulder tips
Of Phœbus, loud in human hearts they ring.

Greece shuts her eyes to listen, as the lay
From Lesbos' isle o'ersings the echoing sea,
And in the purple fields of nether day
The shade of Homer brightens wondrously.

Tears fill those eyes, long blind to human strife—
Tears of keen pleasure such as Hector shed,
When on the fragrant bosom of his wife
The hero's baby hid a startled head.

And in that grove of cypresses severe
That sadly sentinel the Stygian stream,
When Sappho's music brims her empty
ear,
The ghost of Helen smiles through her dark
dream.

For never yet, since naked from the wave
That climbed her, clamorous for a last
embrace,
Arose that goddess crueller than the grave,
With gleams like laughs in her gliding
grace,—

Oh! never yet since Venus like a flower
Rose from the subject sea, hath woman's
word
The world's deep heart with such mysterious
power,
The world's deep heart, like the deep ocean,
stirred.