

EVOLUTION AND THE FAITH.*

THE fears that were felt when the doctrine of evolution was first offered to the world were not unnatural nor derogatory to the dignity of earnest minds. When a new and revolutionary doctrine involving the nature, the action, and the destiny of humanity is proposed, there is an intuitive wisdom or instinct of self-preservation in man that prompts him to turn on it with resentment and denial. Truth is man's chief heritage; it is his life, and is to be guarded as his life. If lost, he knows that it cannot easily be regained. It is like the golden image of Vishnu that the Hindu was taking to his home from the sacred city: if once laid upon the ground, it could not be taken up again. The keeping of truth is not intrusted merely to our reason, but to our whole nature; every faculty and sentiment, down even to fear and pride, may properly be used in the defense of it.

Reason may at last decide what is truth, but not until it has won the consent of the whole man. The period between the exchange of theories is one in which human nature does not appear in its nobler guise, but a profound analysis shows that it is acting with subtle, unconscious wisdom. It is better also in the end that a doctrine which is to become truth should run the gauntlet of general denial and opposition. By far the greater part of what is proposed as true in every department turns out to be false. Theories more in number than the wasted blossoms of the May fall fruitless to the ground. If human nature as a whole did not turn on the conceits and dreams that are offered to it, truth itself would have no chance; it could not extricate itself from the rubbish of folly that overtolerance has suffered to accumulate. Truth becomes truth by its own achievement; it must conquer human nature before it can rule it,—win it before it can be loved of it. This wise spontaneous treatment of new theories delays their acceptance even when proved true, but always with advantage to the truth; for however fair the final form is to be, it comes unshaped and with entanglements, and often, like some animals, it is born blind. Its first need is criticism, and even criticism based on denial rather than on inquiry; only it must be criticism, and not blank contradiction.

The advent of the doctrine of evolution is an illustration of these wise and wholesome processes. When it was first proposed in scientific form—more than a hundred years ago—it was justly tossed aside in scorn, as too crude

and naked for presentation in the world of thought. Its revival within the latter half of the century provoked a similar storm of disdain and denial; but it kept its feet, bore its opposition bravely, and now may be said to have won a position,—but by no means in the same form in which it first appeared. The evolution that is now gaining general acceptance is very different from the evolution propounded twenty years ago. Then it claimed and defined its place in the universe, which it proposed to fill to the exclusion of philosophy and religion. But to-day its place and limits are defined by philosophy, and instead of having the universe as its exclusive domain, it has only a section of it which it holds as the gift, and as still under the supremacy, of philosophy. Having at last become presentable to the world of thought and grown shapely and yielded to limitations, it is winning the suffrage of the world and assuming its place in the hierarchy of truth that ministers to humanity. Definition and distinction will be made farther on, but some theory properly known as evolution may now be considered as established and as ready to enter into the practical thought of the world.

It may be said that evolution is not yet proved; that it will be soon enough to adjust our faith to it when it has ceased to be a hypothesis and become a full-established theory. The line between hypothesis and theory is seldom defined; it is not a line, but a region. There is much in the doctrine of evolution that is still hypothetical, as there is still in astronomy. But we have sailed far enough in this voyage of search after the creative method to warrant the belief that we draw nigh to the land of our quest. The sea-weed of the shore drifts by on the tide, the odors of spicy groves float on the wind, the birds come and go as from a near home, the dim outline in the horizon is changing from cloud to solid land. The quest is practically ended, and now that we are so near as to catch the ominous thunder of the surf, it is wiser to look out for harbor and anchorage than run the risk of breakers; for evolution, like the coast of all knowledge, is lined by destructive rocks, and also by inlets that run within where safe possession may be taken.

In accepting evolution, it is well to remember that we make no greater change than has several times been made in all the leading departments of human knowledge. In sociology the despotic idea yielded to the monar-

* See "Immortality and Modern Thought," by the same author, in *THE CENTURY* for May, 1885.

chical idea, which in turn is now yielding to the democratic idea. In philosophy the deductive method has yielded to the inductive. In religion the priestly idea is yielding to the ministerial. So in accepting evolution as the general method of creation in place of that which has prevailed, we only repeat the history of the exchange of the Ptolemaic system for the Copernican, and of those new theories of astronomy and geology that forced us to redate the age of the world and of man's life upon it. The wrench to faith and the apparent violation of experience are different, but no more violent than were those of the past. The present incompleteness of evolution has its analogy in the Copernican system, which waited long for the additions of Kepler and Newton; and geology is still an unfinished story. Nor are we justified in withholding our assent to evolution because we cannot each one for ourselves verify its proofs. The vast majority of men could not now verify the Copernican system; it has not even won recognition in human speech; — the sun "rises" and "sets," and will so be spoken of while men watch its apparent motion. Evolution is an induction from many sciences,—chemistry, astronomy, mathematics, geology, botany, biology,—and it is impossible that any but the special student should critically make the induction. But the Copernican system was an induction from mathematics, and even from those higher forms of it that ordinary men never have traced. Its acceptance was, and is still, an act of faith. Belief in evolution should be easier because it is confirmed by several sciences working on independent lines. It is not the biologist alone who proposes evolution, but the astronomer, the chemist, the geologist, the botanist, and the sociologist. I cannot examine and test their processes, but I can trust their conclusions. I do not, however, thus make myself the slave of their opinions, for these opinions run off into other fields where I may be as good a judge as they. I may represent a science as real as theirs, and possibly larger and more authoritative. Hence, in accepting evolution as a probably true history or theory of the method of creation, we do not necessarily yield to all the assumptions and inferences that are often associated with it. It is not above criticism. Like the germ-seeds of which science treats, each one of which threatens to possess the whole earth, and would do so if not checked by other growths, so evolution—shall we say through affinity with its chief theme? — threatens to take possession of the universe. But its myriad thistledown, blown far and wide by every breeze, meets at last the groves of oak and pine that limit and de-

fine its spread. All about these various sciences stands the greater science—philosophy—under which they are included, from which they draw their life, and to which they must bow. Evolution is to be feared not in its bare doctrine of development, but in the scope and relations assigned to it. If it be regarded as universal instead of general, as inclusive of all things instead of a part of all things, it is fatal to morals and religion. If it be regarded as supreme, it gives its own law of necessity to all else. But if it is subordinate to philosophy, if it is considered as under thought-relations, if it is held as finite and relative, it carries no danger to morals or religion or faith. It may possibly modify but it cannot overthrow them, simply because they stand in a larger order.

But evolution is not to be accepted in a simply negative way, because it can no longer be resisted. We are under no obligation to accept any truth until it is serviceable. It is possible to conceive of truths that would be of no value to men,—such as the constitution of other orders of beings; if made known, it might be passed by. But evolution, properly regarded, is becoming tributary to society, and seems destined to clarify its knowledge, to enlarge and deepen its convictions, to set it upon true lines of action, and to minister to the Christian Faith.

Amongst the important services it has begun to render is that it is removing a certain empirical thread that has been interwoven with previous theories of creation. The unity of creation has never been seriously denied except by extreme thinkers of the dualistic school. But the principle of unity has not been recognized until of late. The bond or ground of unity was justly found in God, but that conception merely asserted that because God is one there is unity in all created things. This may be faith, but it is not philosophy. May not faith become also philosophy? Unity exists not only because one God created all things, but because He works by one process, or according to one principle. As knowledge broadens and wider generalizations are made, we find a certain likeness of process in all realms that indicates one law or method; namely, that of development or evolution. One thing comes from another, assumes a higher and finer form, and presses steadily on towards still finer and higher forms. We find the same method in matter, in brute life, in humanity, in social institutions, in government, in religions, in the progress of Christianity. Let not this thought disturb us. Do we not see that otherwise the universe could have no unity? If God worked on one principle in the material realm, on another in the vital, on another in the social, governmental,

and moral realm, there would not be a proper universe. These realms might indeed be regulated and kept from conflict, but they would break up the universe into parts separated by chasms, render knowledge difficult, vain, and disjointed, and create a certain antagonism opposite to the nature of mind. Man would be correlated not to a universe, but to separate systems and orders, and these varied correlations would have no underlying unity. It would be difficult to prove the unity of God as against a harmonious polytheism or sovereign Jove. We might believe in one God, but we could not prove our faith. If matter has one principle in its process, and life another, and morals another, why not as many gods? It has not been easy to keep dualism out of philosophy. But, with one principle or method in all realms, we have a key that turns all the wards of the universe, opens all its doors in the past, and will open all in time to come. Knowledge becomes possible and harmonious; a path opens everywhere; the emphasis of the whole universe is thus laid on the unity of God. And when we find not only one method or principle, but the direction of its action, we obtain a prophecy and assurance of the final result of creation that falls in with the highest hopes of Christianity; for the process tends steadily towards the moral. The Church has hoped and striven for a righteousness that shall fill the earth. It may need only its faith to animate and guide it, but it is not amiss to lay its ear upon the earth, and hear, if it can, the same word. It is not amiss to see men in prehistoric ages, forsaking caves and living in huts, using first a club and then a bow, ores and then metals, nomadic and then in villages. It is not unhelpful to the hope of mankind to see despotism yielding to a class, and the class yielding to the people; personal revenge passing into social punishment of crime by law, and justice slowly creeping to higher forms; penalty first as vindictive, then retributive, and now at last reformatory; first a conception of God as power, then as justice, and finally as love. These evolutionary processes may be woven into the cord by which the Church binds itself to its mighty purpose. It thus secures a broader base for the generalization of its working truths; for the pyramid will not pierce heaven unless it rests upon the whole earth. No truth is perfect that is cut off from other truths.

Evolution not only perfects our conception of the unity of God, but it strengthens the argument from design by which his goodness is proved. This argument may be based on the course of civilization, or on the structure of the eye, or on the working of love. Paley's

argument, as Bishop Temple has well shown, stands, with slight modifications, on as strong a basis as ever. But if we can look at the universe both as a whole and in all its processes and in all ages, and find one principle working everywhere, binding together all things, linking one process to another with increasing purpose and steadily pressing towards a full revelation of God's goodness, we find the argument strengthened by as much as we have enlarged the field of its illustration. But if one part of the universe is abruptly shut off from another, if no stronger bond of unity be assigned to it than that of creative energy, and only the near-lying fields of design are used, then the argument is abridged and may even fall short of an absolute conclusion.

It is felt by some, especially on the first contact with evolution, that it puts God at a distance and hides him behind the laws and processes of nature. The apprehension is worthy, for we need and crave a near God, and may well dispute any theory that puts him at a distance or fences him off by impenetrable walls. The universal and unappeasable cravings of the heart may always be opposed to what seem to be the laws of nature; for there is a science of the spirit that is as imperative and final in its word as the observed processes of nature. But evolution, properly considered, not only does not put God at a distance, nor obscure his form behind the order of nature, but draws him nearer, and even goes far towards breaking down the walls of mystery that shut him out from human vision. In other words, in evolution we see a *revelation* of God, while in previous theories of creation we had only an *assertion* of God. In evolution we have the first cause working by connected processes in an orderly way; in former theories we had a first cause creating the universe by one omnipotent fiat, ordaining its laws, and then leaving it to its courses or merely upholding it by his power. In respect of nearness, we at once see that evolution brings God nearer than do the other theories. Their hold upon the mind is not at this point, but at another mistaken for it. The religious mind delights in mystery; it is an unconscious assertion by the highest faculties of our nature that we transcend the knowable — that we belong to, and live and have our destiny in, the infinite. Hence we shrink from theories that seem to undertake to explain God and his working, and repeat with complacency the ancient phrase, "It is impossible; therefore, I believe." It gratifies our reverence to abuse our reason. There is in all this a thread of truth, but the fine thread of reverence is not cut nor drawn out of the web of faith by transferring the mystery of creation from a point

of time and space beyond creation and putting it continuously into the processes of creation. Mystery enough there is and always will be, and God's ways will never become so familiar and plain that they shall "fade into the light of the common day." Instead, this drawing God down and into the processes of creation as a constant and all pervasive factor, deepens the sense of mystery and awe when we have turned our eyes in that direction. The poet plucks a flower out of the crannied wall, holds it in his hand, and says :

"Little flower — but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is."

In these simple lines we have an expression of the true ground of that form of reverence which is bred by mystery. It is not wonder at primal creation that moves the poet, but the creating power lodged and at work in every roadside flower. Goethe puts the same thought into statelier lines :

"No! Such a God my worship may not win
Who lets the world about His finger spin
A thing extern; my God must rule within,
And whom I own for Father, God, Creator,
Hold nature in Himself, Himself in nature;
And in His kindly arms embraced, the whole
Doth live and move by His pervading soul."

Milton built his great epic of creation upon an original creative fiat, but his conception is like his cosmology, traditional and unshaped by poetic insight. The greatest poet in these later centuries, he still lacked the highest of poetic qualities — sympathetic insight into nature. Tennyson in his one line,

"Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than
hands and feet,"

betrays a truer sense of God in creation than is to be found in "Paradise Lost."

It is true that a change in our conception of creation requires a readjustment of our feelings of reverence; and in the transition there may be danger of losing it altogether. It is always easier to change our beliefs than our feelings, and the mind more readily accommodates itself to necessary changes than do the sensibilities. But, whatever the danger and cost, such changes must be made, and in the end there is gain. The eyes are dazzled when a new window lets in more sunshine, and light does the work of darkness, but soon all things are seen more clearly. It cannot be said that, as yet, the conception of creation by evolution touches the mind so deeply and reverently as the former conception. We are still occupied by the details and by the wonder of the truth, and have not connected it

with its relations, nor learned to think and feel under it. When a meteor falls to earth, men at first take more heed of its shape and composition than of its origin. It will be found that as we live on under the great truth and discern increasingly its wisdom and harmony, the old sense of reverence will come back to us and become a finer, deeper, intenser feeling than it was under the old conception of creation. It will also be a more intelligent and better-proportioned reverence. It may be questioned if the reverence excited by the bare fact of creation has any great value. That God created the universe is a truth of supreme importance in philosophy and religion, but a valuable reverence is to be drawn from the later phases and outcome of creation rather than from its beginning and its earlier stages. The first active law in creation of which we know is that of gravitation, but no moral feeling is awakened by the fact that matter attracts inversely to the square of distance. The condition of the world as it first took spherical shape could only be regarded with horror, and animal life in the paleozoic ages repels us by its amorphous shapes; nor is it pleasant to picture our not very remote ancestors. Reverence is not to be stirred by that part of creation which is behind us, but by creation as a whole, and by its end. It is only under a theory of evolutionary creation that we can truly wonder and adore God. Otherwise, how shall we think, how feel, before the Power that created those long orders of beings that simply ravened and devoured one another? If those orders were created independently, if they are not necessary links of a whole united in an evolutionary process, their creation cannot be rationally reconciled with any worthy conception of God. But seen as transient forms in an ever-growing process, thrust aside and buried under Devonian strata, and yielding to more shapely and complex orders, and so climbing by an ever-finer transition to some final and perfect end, we not only can tolerate them in thought, but adore the directing Power and delight in his method. But the feeling of reverence only possesses us as we discern the creative process issuing in man as a moral being. Were creation cut short at man as a physical being, there would be nothing in it to command our reverence, as there would be nothing to satisfy our reason.

Nor should it disturb us to find that our moral qualities have their first intimations in the brute world; that we find in the higher animals hints, forecastings of moral faculty and actions; that as our bodies bear some organic relation to the brutes, so also may our minds. Body is not mind, but they are organi-

cally related; sensation is not consciousness, but the latter is conditional on the former. So man is not a brute, but he is organically related to the brute, and the relation may touch his whole nature. Our feeling on this point should be determined not by the first look, but by its final bearing. If it invalidated our moral faculties, or robbed them of their dignity, or made them less imperative, or separated them in any degree from God, we should be justified in rejecting the theory on the simple ground that these faculties constitute a science in themselves, as commanding and real as physical science. To disown mind before matter is stultification. But there is no such alternative. A relation of the moral faculties to brute qualities may exist without impairing the divineness of conscience and reverence and love. But whatever our feeling, we cannot ignore the fact that in the brute world there are intimations or semblances of moral faculties; nor need we hesitate to say that they are united by the secret cord of the creative energy. The man of science, observing the development, says that it is brought about by natural forces; the philosopher may grant it, but adds that it is brought about by an intelligent force working freely and progressively, and therefore possibly by increments. Moral qualities are not found in the brutes, but there are the grounds of them—the stuff, so to speak, out of which they are constituted, though not the essence that gives them their particular nature. Their presence there is only an indication that the moral is in the mind and purpose of God, even so far back as in the brute world—a foregleam of the approaching issue. They show the divine purpose to crowd in the moral as soon and as fast as possible, prophesying it long before it can appear, impatient, as it were, with the dull processes behind, and pressing on with yearning speed towards his moral image. We have spoken altogether too long of the brutes with contempt—as though they had nothing of God in them, and were wholly alien to ourselves. It is no degradation of human love that it is organically linked with the brooding care of a brute for her young, nor of self-sacrifice that it is so related to a lioness dying for her whelps, nor of fidelity that it is akin to that of a dog dying for his master. They are not identical, but they are related: they spring from one root, but they reach forth to different issues; they have one motive in common, but in man they have also other motives and other relations. The rudimentary forms of moral qualities in the brute world simply show that the moral element and purpose is present in the entire creative process. For it was not power

that brooded over the elements at the beginning, but love; and the laws of nature are not the cold formulæ of mathematics, but are laws of righteousness and truth. In the most absolute sense these laws are holy, and when they begin to work in the higher brutes, they must by their very nature assume a moral aspect or semblance; it cannot be kept out. Life, in its more complex forms, is so dependent upon the moral, or what is practically moral, that it cannot be maintained without it. There could be no gregariousness in the animal world without the action of principles that are essential to morality. It is no impeachment of the dignity or value or imperativeness of a moral faculty, that it has come about by growth and differentiation. Indeed, it may stand all the firmer if its root reaches through all grades of life, and strikes down to the center of the earth. If I can trace my moral qualities throughout the universe, I certainly will not respect them less than if I found them only in some corner of it. We are on false lines of thought when we try to divide creation; more and more does it appear to be an indivisible thing bound together by some mysterious, internal bond of unity.

It does not follow that because a moral faculty is brought to full appearance by a combination of qualities or feelings, it has its origin or its essential potentiality in those qualities and feelings, or that it contains no more than is formed in them. A combination of two things that produces an effect that neither could produce alone, implies more than is to be found in the two things: there is the *idea* or the *proportion* of the combination upon which the effect depends; and this must come from some mind that ordained the proportion, and not from the things themselves. An acid and a base when mingled precipitate a salt, but they are not the authors of the salt; the law of the relation between the acid and the base is the author. The whole process may be set down in mathematical terms, but all the more is it evident that the product originates in the mathematical thought underlying it.

The same may be true of the moral faculties; they may appear as the results of brute qualities through long growth and differentiation, but they are not on that account to be regarded as the product of brute qualities, but of the law under which they have come about. And so far from moral faculties originating in brute qualities, though their history may lie in them, they do not become moral except as they cease to be brute qualities. A flower is a flower only by refusing to be a leaf, though it comes about by differentiation from a leaf. So conscience or reverence may have come

about by evolution through brute qualities, but they become themselves only by ceasing to be what they were. They get their real and essential nature from the mind that is behind — *in, cum et sub* — the whole process.

If the conclusion disturbs us, if we shrink from linking our nobler faculties with preceding orders, it is because we have as yet no proper conception of the close and interior relation of God to all his works; nor do we stop to see that our attempts to separate ourselves from the previous creation are reflections upon God's handiwork. Much of the talk upon the theme has a Pharisaic taint. Let us be thankful for existence, however it came about, and let us not deem ourselves too good to be included in the one creation of the one God.

The fact that man may be organically related to the material and brute world does not in itself determine either his nature or his destiny. So long as he is what he is, it does not matter what his history has been, though it may be a matter of consequence how — by what agency — he is differentiated from the brute. But the bare fact of his development from lower nature is not itself a fact that determines anything. It is a hasty and imperfect logic that conjures dark visions out of the relation, and reasons that if man is developed from the brutes he will share their fate. Origin has nothing to do with destiny; we can measure one as little as the other, and we know too little of either to use them as terms of close argument. I may be bound to physical and brute nature by the cord of origin, but that cord does not bind my destiny. A bird might be tied to the earth by a thread of infinite length and the knot never be unloosed, yet it might fly forever into the heavens and away from its source. It is an unreasonable contempt of lower nature that makes us fear it. As we find God in destiny, so we may find him in origin — present at both ends of his own process and in equal power. Indeed, our chances destiny-wise may be all the better because we are thoroughly interwoven with the whole creation. It is possible that we must be organically connected with the previous creation in order to share in the eternal order before us; that only thus can we be included in the circle of endless existence. If man is a sporadic and unrelated creation, his destiny hangs upon the arbitrary will that so created him, and gets no promise or assurance from the great order of the universe and its Creator.

Nor need we be disturbed by the claim of an organic relation between the various orders of existence, lest no place be found for the truths and doctrines of religion. This has been

the chief ground of alarm in the past. This firm linking of creation into one, this eduction of one phase from another by a natural process, seems to many to shut off the possibility of a revelation, of miracle, of an incarnation, of moral action, of immortality. It seems easier to defend these truths when a creative chasm, so to speak, has been placed between man and the rest of creation; man is more easily handled as a moral and spiritual being when he is treated as an independent creation. It has been feared that if such a chasm were not insisted on, man as a moral being would fall under the laws of the previous creation, and be swamped in necessity, and swallowed up in the general destruction of the previous orders; that so unique a fact as the incarnation could have no justification; that miracle could not be defended in the presence of hitherto universal law; that moral action could not be discriminated from the instinctive action of the brutes, whose action in turn could not be discriminated from the chemic and dynamic action of matter, thus throwing the chain of materialism about mind and spirit. I grant that these fears would be well grounded if certain theories of evolution were to be accepted as settled — such as the theory that matter has within itself the potentiality of all terrestrial life, and goes on in its development alone and by its own energy; a theory that may stand for the various mechanical and atomic doctrines that deify force and dispense with cause. But this theory is now an outcast in the world of thought, and is branded with rejection by every science that uses thought, for the simple reason that it is a theory that renders thought impossible.

These fears would also be well grounded if the theory were established that what is called *force* or the *forces* were invariable — never more nor less; that they worked only by transmutation and within the original limits; that force itself is an entity. This theory also has no tenable place in philosophy. What is called *force* is the method of the action of a cause, and is not a self-acting entity. Force can proceed only from a will. It is absurd to say of any inanimate thing that it is a force; it may transmit force, but only as it has first received it. Force cannot be conceived except as proceeding from a will; nor can it be observed except as acting under a thought-relation — that is, intelligently towards an end by design. Nor is it the invariable and eternal thing it is claimed to be. Matter existed — logically if not otherwise — before force, and must therefore have received its force from some source or reservoir; and as it works in thought-relations it must have come from an intelligent source that cherishes a design. The

claim that force is invariable because it is so observed is fallacious, simply because observation is limited. In the morning we see the sun go up, and till noon we might say that it will go up forever, but night reverses our observation. It would have been necessary to be present when the foundations of the earth were laid, to be able to say that as the chemic and dynamic passed into the organic there was not an addition of a force. Indeed, when the origin of force is considered, we need not think of it as forever exactly so much and no more, but only as the steady pressure of the Eternal hand upon matter, working uniformly indeed because there is an affinity between force and steadiness, and a Divine wisdom in uniformity; but we are under no compulsion either of reason or of observation to assert that this force is without variation. Force begins — where we know not till we postulate God; and it ends — how and where it goes we know not. That it is without play, that it may not be rhythmic and so analogous to the divinest of arts, that it is worked by necessity and not by freedom, is an assumption that is contradicted by every conscious act of the human will. A system that works by law or apparent necessity towards will or freedom as an end, must be grounded in freedom. In the early orders of creation, the Divine hand held steadily and evenly the lever of the great engine as it ran along the grooves of changing matter; but when a brute, seeing an enemy in one path, chooses another, there is a hint at least of self-generated force. And it is idle to say that the changes wrought by man on the face of the earth are not the products of his creative will. These phantoms of necessity, of materialized virtues, of instinctive morality, need no longer disturb us; they are vanishing before the growing light of reason. It is not the better way to assail them with indignant denial; our fierce weapons cleave them through, but they stand, like Miltonic devils, as before. Nor can we exorcise them by the magic of faith; they thus cease to frighten us, but they are not dispelled. The light only will drive them to their caves, and the light is growing.

When evolution is regarded, not as a self-working engine,—an inexorable and unsupervised system, a mysterious section of creation assumed to be the whole,—but rather as a process whose laws are the methods of God's action, and whose force is the steady play of Eternal will throughout matter, there need be no fear lest man and religion be swallowed up in matter and brute life. In other words, man is not correlated to the *process* of creation, but to the *Creator*. Man may bear a certain relation to the process, but his real and absolute relation

is to the power over and in the process. We may have come to be what we are through a process of development; much of it may linger on in us; some of its laws still play within us; we eat and procreate as do the brutes; chemical action builds up and takes down our bodies; analogies of its processes reappear in us: evil to be put away, good to be perfected. But we are cut off from our previous history quite as much as we are bound to it, because, the whole process being one of design and man being its fulfillment, he drops away from it as the apple drops from the tree. The fruit when it is ripe is no longer related to the branch but to its use; it no longer belongs to the tree but to him who planted the tree, and he will use it as seems to him fit. It may be set down as an axiom that *the end of a process cannot be identified with the process*. Man is the final and perfect fruit of creation and belongs to whatever has the best claim upon him — to morals, if he is found chiefly to belong there. However he came about, out of whatever depths of seeming necessity he has been drawn, he has freedom, consciousness, moral sense, personality. He can obey and disobey, love and hate, do right and wrong. These powers may engender a history that requires all that religion demands — even to a doctrine of the fall, if any care to insist upon it. There is no scientific reason to be ascribed against the theory that when a free agent finds himself crowned with moral sovereignty,—it matters not how,—he trifles with it, puts his crown under his brutish feet and not on his godlike brow. His past may follow him as a temptation, a deceiving serpent; his future may stand before him as duty upborne by a hope; he may at first drop back towards his past and not hold himself steady to duty. And as in creation the chemic needed more of God in order to become organic, and as the organic needed more of God than could be found in the chemic in order to become vital and conscious, so man may need God in all his fullness and in the perfection of his manifestation in order to become perfectly man. Hence a revelation; hence the incarnation. If the whole progressive creation is a progressive revelation of God, when its process culminates and ends in man, it is the very thing we might expect; namely, that there should be a full and perfect manifestation of God in the form and with the powers needed to lift humanity up to the level of its destiny. The very thing to be expected, after man has been drawn out of the processes of matter and brought to the verge of the moral and spiritual world, is that he should be provided with a moral and spiritual environment for feeding and protecting his moral nature. However

else Christianity may be defined, it is the moral environment of humanity — the bread of its life. Without it the fulfillment and completion of man's destiny as a spiritual being could not be secured. He may have all spiritual faculty within him, but he lacks environment: the spiritual world must be opened to him, it must infold him; and this is done in a real way and by an actual process in the Christian facts.

If it should appear that these facts and the theory of evolution were incompatible, and the question were raised which must be given up, the answer would be—hold on to the moral and spiritual claim, and let the scientific theory go; for the simple reason that the moral facts involved in Christianity are more stable and trustworthy than those of physical science. The unknowable thing is matter. It is often said that theories of religion cannot stand up against ascertained knowledge. Doubtless, for nothing can stand up against the truth. But the real question is, what is ascertained knowledge? There is a solidity, a certainty in moral truth that cannot be claimed for the verdicts of physical science, because moral truth is the direct assertion of personal identity, which is the only thing that we absolutely know; but matter—who can tell us what it is, or trace our relation to it beyond uniformity of impression? Morals are absolute; man knows them because he knows himself, and he can know nothing opposed to them; but physical science is the merest kaleidoscope—turn the tube and you see a new picture. The surest and most universal law in the material world is that of gravitation, but it is unique; it contradicts other laws, and is so mysterious that it can hardly be included in science. As for all else, we wait while the physicists strip from matter one husk after another, and change our definitions accordingly.

The world of mind and morals is not only the authoritative world, but it gives the law to science; the thought of a law of nature goes before the process of the law and determines it. To set physical science and its ascertained knowledge against mental and moral truth is like a shadow turning against the light, or like a flower contradicting the root. It is only by mind that we know matter, and to use a product for discrediting its source is absurd.

Science is all the while solving physical mysteries, not by bringing them within its present terms, but by enlarging its boundaries. There are still many mysteries that sit in the clouds and laugh at our science with its doctrines of force and environment, and there they are likely to remain till science can in-

fold them within a larger circle. The key to the whole subject is a broader generalization; think far and wide and high, enlarge your science, and perplexity will vanish.

At the cost of repetition I will state the generalization that contains a solution of the questions that put religion in apparent conflict with evolution and its laws. The main fact in evolution is force working uniformly; but evolution does not explain force; it receives it from some will, which is its only possible origin. But will is an attribute of personality, and is the basis and a large part of religion. We have, therefore, in religion an original factor which is found in the process of evolution—not as an essential element, but simply as a method of operation. Religion, therefore, is not compassed by the evolutionary process and laws, but is directly related to the eternal will that imparts its force to the process of evolution. In other words, religion is not correlated to a method of force, but to force itself, *i. e.*, to the eternal will. Religion therefore stands in freedom, for will is free. Nature seems to be under apparent necessity, but only apparent because of the uniformity of its action, behind which lies the absolute free will of God. If we were under a different sense of time, a woodsman felling a tree would seem to be acting under necessity, so uniform and sustained are his strokes; he can stop at any moment, but his purpose keeps his action constant for an hour, which might seem an æon to a differently constituted being.

But if man is involved in the evolutionary process, where and when and how does the free will come in, with all the facts and duties of religion? We may not be able to say when and where, but possibly we can tell how, *viz.*, in the progressive working of God. To produce a will or a person seems to be the end in view of the whole process, and at last it is gained. It is often said that freedom cannot come out of necessity, nor altruism out of egoism; doubtless, if necessity and egoism are absolute, and not phases of a process. The very uniformity of force may be a condition of the result—freedom, and egoism may be the path to altruism. The difficulty of getting from one to the other is no greater than in passing from the chemical to the vital. But when the result is reached, the conditions under which it was produced may be relaxed. And so we have man—a free will, himself a force acting in creative ways. If it be asked where he gets his free will, the answer is, from the same source from which matter gets its force—God. He may get it *through* nature, but he gets it *from* God working by nature. Hence, when we come to dis-

discuss the problems of religion,— duty, conscience, faith, prayer, reverence, love,— we are at full liberty, if we see fit, to turn our back upon that uniformity of nature which is called a law. Man stands before the Eternal One, and not before a method of nature. Nature is all about him, but his real relation is to God. His moral qualities may have been evolved through natural process, but they do not originate there. The flower is evolved through the differentiation of leaves, but it does not originate in them, nor can it be compassed in their differentiation. Not only is science unable to explain the *why* of the differentiation, but it is still less able to give any account of the idea of the flower. It may possibly learn to penetrate the process by which leaves become flowers, but it must go to other schools than its own to get the *idea* of the flower as a germ of life and fruit and seed.

I have endeavored to show that the influence of evolution upon the faith turns upon the form or definition of the theory. If evolution be held as simply a mechanical process; if force be regarded as an independent thing, or be blankly named as proceeding from an unknowable cause; if an observed section of the universe in time and space be considered as the whole; if an acknowledged essential factor be left out of account because it seems to be unknowable; if the observed uniformity of nature be interpreted as proof of necessity; if the laws seen in the earlier periods of creation be regarded as universal and incapable of yielding to other possible laws and forces; if, in brief, there is not a Power before, under, and in all these natural laws and processes, inclusive of them,— a Power working intelligently towards an end, and therefore progressively, and therefore in ways that seem new and even antagonistic to previous methods,— then evolution is dangerous to the faith. It is, of course, illogical to assert that because such theories are dangerous they are untrue—the standing argument of bigotry and ignorance. The path of truth always winds through dangers—abysses below and crumbling cliffs above. We base our protest against these theories on the ground that the logic and the science of the subject are against them. In that court of reason to which men in all ages have repaired for final verdicts—a court not of mere sensations, but of the combined faculties and whole nature of man, where reason, imagination, reverence, love, and all the passions of human nature, stern logic, mathematics, and universal knowledge are the judges—no verdict for these theories can be found. It can be secured only in a specific school of philosophy known as positivism—a philosophy

that postulates reason and then uses it to discredit it—a philosophy of the senses that plays in a pool within the sand-bar, with no eye for the ocean beyond. I would not speak disrespectfully of this school nor of their methods, but I deny their claim to a philosophy. They are useful in their way, and their method is a wise check upon other and better schools of thought. They are good sentries about the castle of truth, quick to descry and drive off the prowling theosophies and demiurgisms that swarm in from the limbo of unreason and wild imagination; wise, instinctive geese that cackle loudly when Rome is endangered; good beacons that warn against the reefs and shallow waters of half-way thought and imperfect knowledge; but they are not philosophers, nor is their method one that suits the human mind. If logically held, it runs into pessimism, where it meets its end, for mankind cannot long be induced to think ill of itself. It is enough to say of it here that it is narrow; it does not cover the facts of its own field; it ignores factors that are beyond the limits it has imposed upon itself, and denies the reality of phenomena that may be referred to those factors; it attempts to measure the universe by a rod no longer than the eye can see, and by mathematical laws with total disregard of the thought in these laws. The conflict of the faith is not with the science of evolution, but with the school of thought that claims to be its exponent—a claim, however, that we can with ill grace resist so long as we spend our time in casting theological stones at evolution. It is time to remember that evolution is the exclusive property of no one school of thought; least of all can it be compassed by a few unquestioned methods of nature, such as a struggle for existence, natural selection, and variation by environment—a process which, if taken by itself, has more of chance in it than order, and hence is exclusive of a definite end. Evolution may embrace these methods, but it is not only not defined by them, but they do not contain its secret.

The few principles that have guided and determined the thought of all ages in respect to creation, and, we venture to say, will guide and determine it in all ages to come, are these: A cause must be assumed as soon as an effect is observed; force cannot originate itself, and must proceed from a self-acting agent; a law in action, as in gravitation or crystallization, must be preceded by a thought of the law, and hence the priority of mind; forces working towards an end in a complex and orderly way presuppose a mind and force ordaining the order and the end. These are the granitic foundations underlying evolutionary creation, and they can no more be overlooked or set

aside than the process itself. To refer them to an unknowable cause may possibly be correct if we know only what our five senses tell us; if

“All we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool.”

But to think in this way is to deliberately build a wall around ourselves and then assert that we know nothing of the outside; it is to deny cause and effect, by resolutely ignoring cause, and dwelling only on effects under the plea that the senses give us only effects and say nothing of cause. The human mind refuses to think in this way, and it disdains to be regarded as a Cerberus that can be appeased by morsels of empty phrase flung to it under the stress of logical demand. The human mind is patient with truth-seekers, but it will not tolerate a philosophy which asserts that because a straight staff seems bent in a pool, it is actually crooked.

Turning from this philosophy in search of one more consonant with reason, we do not expect to reach the mystery of creation, but we may be able to find lines along which we can travel even though it be forever — an “endless quest,” but still one that we can follow without wronging our rational nature. Under what conception, then, can we best contemplate creation? What theory best covers the facts? What do the facts require? The one impregnable position, the *fons et origo* of thought upon the subject is this: Forces that work in complex order and with design are sequents of the thought in the order and design. Before the morning stars sang together some master prepared the measure. Before matter began to gravitate inversely as the square of distance, some mathematician fixed the problem. Before homogeneous matter at rest became unstable, some will disturbed its equilibrium. Starting thus with One who is Force and Thought and Order, how can we best connect him with creation and its methods? Shall we conceive of him as simply thought, and so have a mere idealism — an unreal world? or as force, and so bring up in necessity and the confusion of pessimism that turns on us with furious denial of the validity of reason? or as a mechanic, and so make him external to the world? or as an arbitrary ordainer, forcing on us the question why he did not ordain better and omit the needless early stages of cruelty? Or shall we accept the conception of Immanence, and so have a Thought and Will and Order who is continuously in the processes of creation, and is revealing himself in a real way in them — a true manifestation? Such a conception covers the facts; under it creation is thinkable. It meets that most imperative of questions —

What is the bond or relation between creation and its source? For we cannot escape the conviction that the relation is organic. We may not be able thus to compass the mystery of creation and lift the whole veil from Isis, but we can at least withdraw a corner and discover the golden feet that uphold it. Our highest possible achievement will be to think rationally of the universe — not to explain it. Science may carry us far; it may be able to link all phases and orders of creation into one whole, and explain the links; it may be able to bring matter and mind, force and feeling, sensation and consciousness, desire and duty, attraction and love, repulsion and hatred, pain and pleasure and conscience, fear and reverence, law and freedom, into some natural relation evolutionary in its character. As all these things are bound up in one human organism, so they may be united in creation as a whole. As man is a microcosm, so the universe may be the analogue of the human cosmos. In this direction we can think at least without violation of reason, — if forever without reaching a final solution, so be it. But so thinking we escape at least the absurdity of picking up creation at a point given by the senses and propounding the fragment as a theory of the universe. By so thinking we find that we are constantly transcending limits. The simple fact that we reach a limit implies a knowledge beyond it; and so we find at last that we are correlated to the limitless and have knowledge of it. Thus we learn to pronounce easily and with confidence the Infinite Name; and so naming it, we find it a revelation to us; under it creation gets meaning. We no longer stand on a headland and view creation as a ship rising out of the horizon and sailing past till it sinks again beneath the sky, port whence and port whither unknown, whether swept by currents or guided from within also unknown. Rather do we tread the deck, mark the hand that holds the helm, hear the word that shapes the voyage, and so journey with it to the harbor.

In closing this essay, in which I have attempted merely to show that the Christian Faith is not endangered by evolution, and to separate it from a narrow school of thought with which it is usually associated, it may not be amiss to indicate in a categorical way the lines upon which further study should be pursued:

I. The respects in which evolution as a necessary process in the natural and brute worlds does not wholly apply to man.

1. Instinct yields to conscious intelligence.
2. The struggle for existence yields to a moral law of preservation, and so is reversed.

3. Intelligence takes the place of natural selection.

4. The will comes into supremacy, and so there is a complete person; man, instead of being wholly under force, becomes himself a force.

5. Man attains full, reflective consciousness.

6. Conscience takes the place of desire.

7. The rudimentary and instinctive virtues of the brutes become moral under will and conscience.

8. Man comes into a consciousness of God.

9. Man's history is in freedom.

10. Man recognizes and realizes the spirit.

II. Contrasting phenomena of evolution under necessity, and evolution under freedom.

1. Man changes and tends to create his environment; achieves it largely, and so may

improve and prolong it. The brute adapted itself to environment, but had no power over it.

2. Man progresses under freedom. The brute progressed under laws and environment; man, under will and moral principles of action.

3. Man thinks reflectively, systematizes knowledge and reasons upon it; the brute does not, except in a rudimentary and forecasting way.

4. Man has dominion; the brute is a subject.

5. Man worships, having become conscious of the Infinite One; the brute does not.

6. Man is the end of creation, and the final object of it; the brute is a step in the progress.

The end of a process cannot be identified with the process.

T. T. Munger.

ZWEIBAK; OR, NOTES OF A PROFESSIONAL EXILE. III.

HEIRESSSES are thick here. An heiress is a humorous object. She is such a mixture of conventional with natural and necessary attributes. She is made up of stocks, smiles, tears, mining property, blushes, real estate, a complexion and hair dark or blonde, as the case may be. When she falls in love she is extremely interesting. It is affecting to see the hopes and fears of that passion rising in her heart in complete independence of those weighty matters which control men in great cities. The man honored with her affection feels that it is very good of her. But some heiresses are very rude. Diana D., a Boston girl with a million or two, clever and learned, they say, and handsome as well, is staying here. She plainly regards herself as something very desirable, and considers men proper objects of suspicion. She takes a solitary morning walk in the gardens, keeping her veil down. If you meet her and regard her with a natural and proper curiosity, she returns your glance with an expression of countenance like that of the ladies of Constantinople, who exclaim on meeting an infidel,—particularly if some of the male faithful happen to be in sight,—“Dog of a Christian, how dare you look at me!”

. . . The characters of women change very much with years. Imagination and feeling are so large a part of them that they are liable in age, through mental peculiarities, to present a great contrast to their youth. It might be interesting to make guesses as to the old age of certain heroines of history and romance, of whose later days we have insufficient accounts. Héloïse became the mother

superior of a convent, noted for her sour temper and hard rule. Laura turned out a vegetarian and a practical dress-reformer.

The later career of Helen of Troy affords a good subject for speculation. One account is as follows: On her return to Sparta she was generally received, her little adventure having been overlooked. During the remainder of her career her life was perfectly correct. But shortly after her return she became impoverished by the collapse of certain properties, and went to live in a neighboring city. For some time she was in great vogue here, but after the first season or two she began to descend. Second-rate people got hold of her for their afternoon teas. In this world, of course, she remained for some time a considerable person. Many parties were given “to meet Helen of Troy.” Men who could not have got near her in her greater days were glad of the chance to give her a cup of tea. They thought as they looked at and talked with her: Is this Helen of Troy? Is this indeed the very woman? But even these men, when they had once “done” her, ceased to take any interest in her. It was at this period of her career that she made the acquaintance of a certain Myrrhina, a woman of somewhat dubious social position, with whom by degrees she contracted a friendship which was of life-long duration. This Myrrhina was at first greatly delighted with her extraordinary good fortune in having attracted the notice of so celebrated a person. The good-natured Helen was on her part pleased to condescend. This state of feeling, however, soon wore away, and before many months they were

political party who are honest enough and intellectual enough to be Congressmen of that class; and if there is a district which is lacking in such material, it may lawfully select such a man from any other part of the State of which it constitutes a portion. But such men are seldom nominated by party conventions, where those conventions are controlled by delegates who are sent there to promote selfish ends. To secure the nomination and election of such men to Congress, it is generally necessary for patriotic citizens to attend and control the caucuses or primaries which select the delegates to the nominating conventions. Such citizens are always numerous enough to be entitled to control such conventions; and nothing but their systematic and united action is necessary to such control.

Albert H. Walker.

The Rev. Dr. Munger on "Evolution and the Faith."

WITH the interest which fine writing always excites, enhanced by my personal friendship for the author, I have read Dr. Munger's "Evolution and the Faith" in the May number of *THE CENTURY*.

It has intensified my conviction that we shall not be able to make very satisfactory progress in the discussion of this subject until thinkers and writers shall somehow contrive to agree upon definitions. So long as we continue either to make one word carry two meanings, or to employ two words to signify the same thing, we shall be in confusion. I can see how an intelligent man would both agree and disagree with Dr. Munger's article, taken in its totality. Its one defect is that he uses two words indiscriminately. In one place he does this so distinctly as to be marked; it is where he closes a sentence with these words: "One law or method, namely, that of development or evolution"; and that way of thinking and writing diminishes the value of his brilliant article. He is not solitary in this, but instances might be drawn from many writers showing this same confusion of thought.

Why is it not possible to separate "development" and "evolution" so as to have no confusion in the use of the words? Professor Huxley ("Critiques and Addresses") says that the fundamental proposition of evolution is "that the whole world, living and not living, is the result of the mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of the forces possessed by the molecules of which the primitive nebulosity of the universe was based." To him the leading evolutionists, such as Tyndall and Haeckel, give agreement. Why should we not all agree? Then we should confine "evolution" to the hypothesis which means that matter has the promise and potency of all things; that matter is first, and that all things proceed out of matter without any intervention *ab extra*; that the forces are in the molecules; that they act and interact on themselves, and that they have always done so, and will always do so, as long as they continue to be the basis of matter. If we could all agree to this, the advantage would be that it would leave us free to give "development" another meaning, a meaning which might include a process by which matter passed from a homogeneous into a heterogeneous condition, under the supervision of the intellect which devised the law in the beginning and continues to operate that law

until now. Would not this be a real gain to our philosophical and scientific literature?

I call attention to the following passage in Dr. Munger's article, as showing the embarrassments under which writers labor so long as "development" and "evolution" are considered interchangeable terms: "I grant that these fears would be well grounded if certain theories of evolution were to be accepted as settled—such as the theory that matter has within itself the potentiality of all terrestrial life, and goes on in its development alone, and by its own energy; a theory that may stand for the various mechanical and atomic doctrines that deify force and dispense with cause." But that is "evolution"; that is the definition of evolution given by the most conspicuous scientific men on that side of the question; and we are surprised to hear the doctor say: "This theory is now an outcast in the world of thought." Does the *Encyclopædia Britannica* agree with this? Do the writings of the scientific gentlemen named above agree with this?

Take another passage: "When evolution is regarded, not as a self-working engine,—an inexorable and unsupervised system, a mysterious section of creation assumed to be the whole,—but rather as a process whose laws are the methods of God's action, and whose force is the steady play of God's will throughout matter, there need be no fear lest man and religion be swallowed up in matter and brute life." Yes; but that is *not* "evolution." Evolution is "an inexorable and unsupervised system, a mysterious section of creation assumed to be the whole"; but "development" may be a "process whose laws are the methods of God's action," etc.

Why should we not settle upon that distinction, and not bracket the words, or tie them together? Does it not lead to great confusion of thought? Is it not confounding genus and species? If not that, is it not confounding two species? For instance, if process were genus, might not evolution and development be species included in that genus? Evolution could stand for the process that has no creator nor supervisor, and development for the process which is carried forward by one who is both creator and supervisor. Also, "evolution" could continue to stand for that hypothesis for which it now stands, namely, the product of mind by matter; and "development" could stand for what Dr. Munger sometimes calls evolution, namely, the product of matter from mind in a process which had a person who is both the creator and the supervisor.

Dr. Munger would have found great advantage if he had given his paper the title of "Development and the Faith"; for evolution, according to its own accredited apostles,—and we have no right to steal their thunder,—is a process in which there are no pauses, no laps, and no breaks. According to "evolution," in the beginning was matter; according to "development," in the beginning was mind. According to evolution, there must be abiogenesis: the organic must spring from the inorganic; the living must spring from the non-living. I am not now saying whether this hypothesis be true or false; if it be true, we shall certainly discover spontaneous generation, and until spontaneous generation be discovered, whether true or false, it is not scientific to take this hypothesis as settled scientific doctrine. I do not now say that the other theory

that of development, is true or false; that remains to be shown; but its reception among thinkers certainly seems to be growing, and Dr. Munger has amply and ably shown that some forms of it may be held without at all endangering the faith. But it must be borne in mind that what he has shown as not endangering the faith is *not* "evolution," if evolutionists are to be allowed to define the name which they give to their own hypothesis, and it would seem that they are certainly entitled to this privilege.

With all the pleasantness of personal regard, I must say that my friend in his article reminded me of Milton's description of the lion coming from the earth, which Mr. Huxley ridiculed in his New York lecture:

"Now half appear'd
The tawny lion, pawing to get free
His hinder parts."

Towards the end Dr. Munger says: "I have attempted merely to show that the Christian faith is not endangered by evolution, and to separate it from a narrow school of thought with which it is usually associated," etc. Plainly he cannot pull out: evolution belongs to the school of thought with which it is usually associated. If we baptize our child into the name of our neighbor's child, it will not make the babies one, nay, it will not even make them twins; they are separate things. Dr. Munger may call a certain school of thought "narrow," but evolution belongs to the school of thought with which it is usually associated. And then immediately after, in laying down categorically the lines upon which future study should be pursued, the first line is: "The respects in which evolution as a necessary process in the natural and brute worlds does not wholly apply to man." Now just so far as any process in the natural world does not apply to man, so far forth it is *not* "evolution," and we ought not to call it "evolution," because it produces confusion of thought by making confusion of terms.

Throughout his whole article, wherever Dr. Munger has held to "the faith," he has been compelled to reject "evolution." If he had simply stated what evolutionists hold to be evolution in the first paragraph of his article, and then stated the development theory as held by other scientific men, he would have increased the value of his brilliant article. My simple contention is that when there are two theories before us, the *terminus a quo* of one being matter, and the *terminus ad quem* of the other being matter, we shall not talk of two trains, both running, but running in opposite directions, as if they were one and the same train.

Charles F. Deems.

REPLY BY THE REV. DR. MUNGER.

I AM grateful to my friend Dr. Deems for the very courteous terms in which he comments upon what he regards as an unwise confusion of the terms "evolution" and "development." The points he raises did not escape me while writing the article, and I considered the reasons he so well states, but reached a different conclusion. I trust Dr. Deems will not consider the brevity of my reply as indicating that I think the point unimportant or not ably defended.

My main reason for using the word "evolution"

where Dr. Deems would say "development" is that I do not consider it wise to yield the word to the school that first brought it into general use and put its own definition upon it. It is not a trademark; it is not private property; and I must so far disagree with my friend as to think that it has not been so exclusively used by one school, and in so exclusive a sense, that it cannot properly be used by other schools. It is too valuable a word to be so surrendered. It has already passed into literature and common speech as a general phrase, and it is now too late to limit it to a certain hypothesis, even if it were desirable. It seems to me wiser to use it in its general sense, and not as an exact term, and to contend under it for the definitions we hold to be true. I grant the inconvenience of using terms that are not precise, but the contention between the two schools is not one that will be much helped or hindered by mere words. It is not the first time that opposing schools have fought under the same banner. The Church of Rome has as good a claim to the word "Catholic" as the Huxley school has to the word "evolution"; but the Protestant refuses to yield it to the Romanist, because the word itself has inestimable value and power. On exactly the same ground I deemed it wiser to use the word "evolution" and put into it what seemed to me its proper meaning, just as the Protestant insists on using the word "catholic" despite opposition and occasional misapprehension. In other words, I believe we can win a place in common speech for *theistic evolution*, and that the phrase is worth contending for.

T. T. Munger.

A Plan for Harmony between Labor and the Employing Interests.

A COMMON suggestion in what has been written on the labor question is, that arbitration can accomplish a settlement of the existing difficulties and those of a kindred kind that may occur in the future. But the theorists seem to lose sight of the fact that only one side of the arbitration would be a responsible side, viz., the side representing the industrial establishment against which the demands of the laborers are advanced. In a recent railroad strike a large amount of property was destroyed by violence, and when a proposition was made by the workmen to submit their grievances to arbitration, the other party put the question as to who would pay for these losses. On the refusal of the labor organization to assume this burden, the peace negotiations were stopped.

The only safeguard for both the workman and his employer is a written contract with sufficient surety. Let every man who employs workmen in large numbers divide his men into twelve classes, which are to be employed respectively from one to twelve months each. He will then make with the individuals of each class a written contract, binding himself to employ them for the period of time represented by the class to which they are assigned. Any causes which will void the contract, such as negligence or the indulgence of bad habits on the part of the workman, and the failure to pay the wages agreed upon, or other default, on the part of the employer, are to be specifically enumerated in the instrument. Unless ten days' notice is given by either party, the contract is to be renewed for the